Here we go again-Ukraine once again

[Jimbuna]

Total combat losses of Russian Federation since beginning of war - about 99,230 people (+430 per day), 266 helicopters, 2,995 tanks, 1,960 artillery systems, 5,974 armored vehicles. INFOGRAPHICS

Losses of the Russian occupiers as of the morning of December 20 are approximately 99,230 people.

This is reported by Censor.NET with reference to the press center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

As noted, the total combat losses of the enemy from 24/02 to 19/12 are approximately:

personnel - about 99,230 (+430) people were liquidated,
tanks - 2995 (+7) units,
armored combat vehicles - 5974 (+5) units,
artillery systems - 1,960 (+7) units,
MLRS - 410 (+0) units,
air defense equipment - 212 (+0) units,
aircraft - 281 (+0) units,
helicopters - 266 (+2) units,
UAVs of the operational-tactical level - 1680 (+23),
cruise missiles -653 (+0),
warships/boats - 16 (+0) units,
automotive equipment and tank trucks - 4599 (+7) units,
special equipment - 177 (+2). Source: https://censor.net/en/n3388074

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by Jimbuna

Ukraine: Putin warned it would take NATO just 'three days' to take out Russia

Vladimir Putin has been warned that NATO could take out Russia in just three days if the conflict between the two sides exploded to dangerous levels. If the Russian President was to attack a NATO member state, that particular country could invoke Article 5 of the alliance's charter, which states "an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all allies". Adam Kinzinger, the US representative for Illinois's 16th congressional district, responded to a Tweet questioning why NATO hasn't defeated Russia yet. He wrote: "I'm hoping this is a joke. NATO vs Russia would be like a real three day operation."
https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world...c3241c990833df

I wonder why underestimating fighting a war is a mistake being repeated again and again and again and again throughout all history. Could be a genetic defect of our species.

[Skybird]

Focus:
------------------
An explosion reportedly occurred on the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod gas pipeline west of the Russian city of Kazan. The pipeline carries gas from Russia via Ukraine to Europe.

Three people have died in the explosion of a gas pipeline in central Russia, local officials and the TASS news agency reported Tuesday. The destroyed pipeline transports gas from the Russian Arctic through Ukraine to Europe.

Local officials said via the messaging app Telegram that the flow of gas through the section of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod pipeline was interrupted at 1:50 p.m. local time.

TASS quoted local emergency services as saying that three people had died and one had been injured.

The Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Chuvash region said the pipeline exploded during planned maintenance work. The accident happened near the village of Kalinino, about 150 km west of the Volga city of Kazan. The resulting gas flare was extinguished, it said.

The pipeline, built in the 1980s, runs to Ukraine via the Sudzha metering point and is currently the main route for Russian gas to Europe.
----------------

[Jimbuna]

[Skybird]

I have the feeling, too, that the Ukrainian losses are heavier than what is vaguely described to be, if even being mentioned at all. We know that the Russians are firinbg sevcerlka times a smnany artikleklry shewlls form beginning on. This cnanot happen without causing effects as long as they do not shoot 180° at the opposite direction. Its also pretty clear that the weapons given to Ukraine, the Western systems I mean, are superior to Russian counterparts - but that they are just drops of water on a hot stone, due to their small numbers.



Just days ago i said that Ukraine may have - or may have had - the tactical initiative in the grond battle, but that Russia, as that Kremlin-critical politologist I quoted said, seems to have the (strategic) initiative back, and that its reserves in quantity, though not quality, are immense. And that Russia can have destroyed boig parts of Ukraine even if if being driven out of the country.



We do not understand or do not want to see that this already is a war were thew Werst has taklen sides and is deeply involve din it, whether we like it or not. Still we refuse to wake up to this reality and fight this war as would be needed, instead we are coincerned all day long to not provoke Russia more.



I do not see Ukraine loosing soon, but currently I see it loosing nevertheless in the long run. Either by gettign defated by Russia, or by paying a so big price for driving Russia out that it is effectively destroyed as a livable state and survivable entity.



Our acts in this war lack the needed determination. Poland and the Baltic states see it, understand it, but them alone cannot doo too much, even if, standardized by their economy and population size, do many factors as much than Europe or the US. They simply lack the total net weight.



And then there also is a lets call it formal dilemma. Ukraine is no NATO member, formally. Still I demand that we defend it and it is demanded by some that we fight over it as if it were a NATO member. This of course is a contradiction, it renders NATO membersup kind of pointless. If you must not be NAOT membe rin order to benefit form prteciton by NATO, then what poiunt is ther ean ylonge rin doiferebntiating between formal membership and non-membership? Its a dilemma and I have no reply to it, just pragmatic acting - acting to get engaged in this war, accepting the contradiction in this policy, and excusing it with further leading own survival interests and strategic interests that effect ourselves more than the Ukraine. We should niot be in this position, but unfortunately we are. We have no reasonable answer, and still must decide and do and live with it. Things are not perfect. Sometimes life just sucks.

[Dargo]

Originally Posted by Skybird

I have the feeling, too, that the Ukrainian losses are heavier than what is vaguely described to be, if even being mentioned at all. We know that the Russians are firinbg sevcerlka times a smnany artikleklry shewlls form beginning on. This cnanot happen without causing effects as long as they do not shoot 180° at the opposite direction. Its also pretty clear that the weapons given to Ukraine, the Western systems I mean, are superior to Russian counterparts - but that they are just drops of water on a hot stone, due to their small numbers.



Just days ago i said that Ukraine may have - or may have had - the tactical initiative in the grond battle, but that Russia, as that Kremlin-critical politologist I quoted said, seems to have the (strategic) initiative back, and that its reserves in quantity, though not quality, are immense. And that Russia can have destroyed boig parts of Ukraine even if if being driven out of the country.



We do not understand or do not want to see that this already is a war were thew Werst has taklen sides and is deeply involve din it, whether we like it or not. Still we refuse to wake up to this reality and fight this war as would be needed, instead we are coincerned all day long to not provoke Russia more.



I do not see Ukraine loosing soon, but currently I see it loosing nevertheless in the long run. Either by gettign defated by Russia, or by paying a so big price for driving Russia out that it is effectively destroyed as a livable state and survivable entity.



Our acts in this war lack the needed determination. Poland and the Baltic states see it, understand it, but them alone cannot doo too much, even if, standardized by their economy and population size, do many factors as much than Europe or the US. They simply lack the total net weight.



And then there also is a lets call it formal dilemma. Ukraine is no NATO member, formally. Still I demand that we defend it and it is demanded by some that we fight over it as if it were a NATO member. This of course is a contradiction, it renders NATO membersup kind of pointless. If you must not be NAOT membe rin order to benefit form prteciton by NATO, then what poiunt is ther ean ylonge rin doiferebntiating between formal membership and non-membership? Its a dilemma and I have no reply to it, just pragmatic acting - acting to get engaged in this war, accepting the contradiction in this policy, and excusing it with further leading own survival interests and strategic interests that effect ourselves more than the Ukraine. We should niot be in this position, but unfortunately we are. We have no reasonable answer, and still must decide and do and live with it. Things are not perfect. Sometimes life just sucks.

We only see (for months) Russian advances in meters when the Ukraine forces if in offensive retake kilometers of terrain Ukraine is dealing with this defense several times and could after the Russians fail to break through still lead two offensives with huge terrain win the rest is fog of war. Russia can deliver the meat to the fronts but still can not solve its supply and material problems, can not see in the future but still place my bet on Ukraine.

[mapuc]

^^ You comment made me remember a Danish article.

Russia has such large military resources that it is possible to attack civilian targets in Ukraine from the air with the current intensity for several more years

Putin has cancelled his annual press conference and also his annual message to the people of the Russian Federation.

In August he held a huge party in the Kremlin to celebrate the formal incorporation of a number of occupied Ukrainian regions into Russia. However, large parts of these regions have been retaken by Ukraine. So what is he going to say?

Yet the intensive air strikes, designed to systematically destroy Ukraine's infrastructure and make life unbearable for its people, continue day after day and night after night.

At the same time, even more destruction is threatened if Ukraine hits military targets on Russian territory. For the time being, one Russian shopping centre after another is burning down on a scale that suggests sabotage.

A Russian organisation, Russia's Freedom, recently claimed it was behind the sabotage of a railway line carrying military supplies for the war in Ukraine. And recently, Ukrainian drones hit Russian bombers at a base deep inside Russia. There have also been numerous Ukrainian attacks on military targets in Crimea in the past.

Now a well-known Ukrainian journalist, Dimitrij Gordon, predicts that "all of Russia will soon burn". This is necessary to make the Russian people understand the seriousness of the Kremlin's crimes in Ukraine. "Of course we must bomb Russian territory to destroy military targets - not the civilian population," he says.

He also imagines that the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square by the Kremlin walls with the stuffed Lenin will be hit.

Since the Russians themselves have not been able to confront Lenin and his misdeeds, we must do it for them - he argues. Many Russians believe that as long as the remains of Lenin are kept and venerated in the centre of the Russian state, Russia will be corrupted by the evil spirit of the mass murderer.

Ukrainian Lieutenant General Mykhailo Zabrodskyi estimates that Russia has such large military stockpiles and resources that it is possible to attack civilian targets in Ukraine from the air with the current intensity for several years. From all parts of the Federation, from the Baltic to the Pacific, cruise missiles are being transported to the frontline against Ukraine. Ukraine still does not have weapons systems that can effectively protect it from these attacks.

Ukraine's top commander, General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, would not rule out a new Russian offensive starting in Belarus to capture the capital Kyiv - perhaps in January. 300,000 new troops have been drafted in this autumn, but the question is how war-ready they are.



The experience so far is very disappointing for the Russians. The new recruits are poorly trained, poorly equipped and not at all motivated to go to war. They therefore drop like flies. The professional Wagner Corps of mercenaries, which now includes released criminals, fights better.


Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

I have my doubt about this..they are buying Drones and ballistic missiles from Iran and it wouldn't surprise me if they even buy war material from China and/or North Korea.

Markus

[Dargo]

Originally Posted by mapuc

^^ You comment made me remember a Danish article.



I have my doubt about this..they are buying Drones and ballistic missiles from Iran and it wouldn't surprise me if they even buy war material from China and/or North Korea.

Markus

The Russian Ministry of Defense talks every day for half a year about how successfully the offensive against Bakhmut is going on... and guess it is still not taken. We have not seen any proof of Chinese and/or North Korean material used on the fronts.

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by Dargo

We only see (for months) Russian advances in meters when the Ukraine forces if in offensive retake kilometers of terrain Ukraine is dealing with this defense several times and could after the Russians fail to break through still lead two offensives with huge terrain win the rest is fog of war. Russia can deliver the meat to the fronts but still can not solve its supply and material problems, can not see in the future but still place my bet on Ukraine.

The Russians may advance at meters - but they also wear out Ukrainian units, and have destroyed 50% of the power infrastructure in Ukraine, done tremendous destruction to the economic infrastructure as well. Many bridges and factories are destroyed. Agricultural areas and fields are mined. Whole cities disappeared. We get told the Russians are stupid at Bachmuth and that they stick to a claimed worthless objective. Has anyone ever considered that maybe they know what they are doing when sticking to it - having the Ukrainians bleeding there like they bleed themnselves? Its a meat grinder apparently, and thats what the Russians keep it runnign for, I think. This new supreme commander of theirs unfortunately is not only as ruthless as was claimed, but also as competent as feared.



We better do not assess Russian gains only by meters won on the ground, this is no American football. They get their copmensations, I would say.



I stick to it: maybe Ukraine will finally drive the Russians out one day. But the costs for that could be that what then remains of Ukraine is not a functional state anymore. And no functional economy anymore. Also the fact that the aggressor never will be held responsibeo for compensatiuons tio tha damage he has done, can be seen as a form of victorious escape. No matter how all thsi ends: the ukrainians and the European donators are the ones who are left behind with the losses and burdens. Burdens in form of moeny for the Ukraine, burdens also in trades with Russia that are no moe there, siocne the Russians shift their trading to others who are willing to rade with them: at the costs of Europe that additonally dmages itself with its climate policies and its attempt to lecture and appease China at the same time. Yesterday Quatar has threatened to stop all gas deals with Europe - they can afford to do so, they can easily find other buyers. I must admit: a victory for Ukraine and for Europe - I think that would have a very different taste. I do not see us as winners even if the Russians must go home.



One thing is clear, however, there is a propaganda war raging, too, and the ukraine runs this part of the campaign much more refined and successful and skillful than Russia. Which only means that what Ukraine says must be taken with two, three and four grains of salt. I have no doubt that their situation and their losses, like the video above says, are much bleaker and more grim than we are made to believe by our media. I dont know how hiogh they are, but they cnanot be a slow as they imply or let the world beleive. I think that simply is not possible. Not after fighting of the intensity seen in many battles in Ukraine.


We must understand it: practically Europe already is at war with Russia, and is party in this war, so is America. It's just that everyone tiptoes around this admission because it describes the path to opening Pandorra's box. Nevertheless, we are still fooling ourselves.

[mapuc]

You scratch my back I scratch yours

Ben Wallace has warned that their military partnership “must be exposed”. The defence minister said Russia intends to supply Iran with “advanced military components”, a move which could “undermine security” both internationally and in the Middle East, as a token of gratitude for their supplying more than 300 deadly “kamikaze drones” to Putin.

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world...ne-Ben-Wallace

Markus

[Skybird]

Markus Kaim, born in 1968, is a senior fellow in the "Security Policy" research group at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, as well as a lecturer at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Zurich and a visiting lecturer at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. he writes in Der Spiegel:
---------------------------------

The Secret Fear of a Quick Peace

In hardly any other European country is an end to the Russian-Ukrainian war as longed for as in Germany. It is a very heterogeneous group that is urging the parties to the conflict to reach a quick negotiated settlement: Some argue the terrible consequences of the war for the Ukrainian population, which is suffering from the destruction of civilian infrastructure by Russian airstrikes.

Others point to the war's lasting destabilizing effect on Europe, migratory movements, high energy prices, and the conflict's risk of escalation. Finally, a third group hopes that a swift Ukrainian-Russian peace will allow them to return as quickly as possible to the state of economic and energy relations between Berlin and Moscow before February 24.

Only a cynic would turn a deaf ear to the cause of peace. But just as a war is bound to certain preconditions and has specific consequences, a peace is also subject to or produces comparable effects. Both states of aggregation have far-reaching consequences for the parties to the conflict, the parties indirectly involved and the global balance of power. From this perspective, it seems questionable whether Germany would be prepared at all for the desired quick peace between Moscow and Kiev.

The German strategic gap

A quick peace would strategically catch German policy on the wrong foot. It is indisputable that all the basic assumptions of Germany's Russia policy of the past 25 years have turned out to be wrong and that this field of German foreign policy became one of the first victims of the war: "Change through trade" or "European security can only be organized together with Russia" are just two of these diplomatic gems which, representative of many others, mark the complete defeat of German Russia policy.

At present, then, German policy can indicate what is no longer the basis of bilateral relations. A new Russia policy for the future, however, does not exist. That it will be guided by security policy priorities rather than energy policy priorities is so far only conjecture. Whether the National Security Strategy, which the German government will present in a few weeks, will be able to close this gap remains to be seen.

A quick peace in Ukraine, possibly only in the form of a fragile ceasefire, would be tempting in times of this strategic vacuum. The outcome of the war would then define the goals of Berlin's future Russia policy from a pragmatic point of view. Strategic foreign policy, however, works the other way around: its security policy goals should guide the German government in defining and implementing its future policy toward Ukraine and Russia even before the end of the war. Elsewhere, this is happening: the huge aid and reconstruction pledges to Kiev or Ukraine's EU candidate status are far-reaching geopolitical decisions for the future of Europe.

Germany as guarantor of European security

In early December, Chancellor Olaf Scholz outlined in a technical article that Germany aspires to become "a guarantor of European security, just as our allies expect us to be." He set the bar high by firing up the hopes of German allies and claiming political leadership of the West. After all, a "guarantor" is clearly more than a contributor; it provides guarantees for the performance of the European security architecture, it provides the necessary military and financial resources, and it bears the corresponding costs disproportionately.

A litmus test for this claim will be what contribution Germany is willing to make to securing Ukraine's territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The obvious option, namely NATO membership for Ukraine, was again put on the back burner by the German government at the last meeting of NATO foreign ministers. Nor does Berlin really like to commit itself to granting security guarantees to Kiev, even after ten months of war. Both Chancellor Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock have repeatedly expressed Germany's willingness to do so in principle. However, there is still a droning silence on the details.

A quick peace would deprive the German government of the possibility of this "strategic ambivalence" and force a concretization of the hitherto vague commitments. For the alternative is even more dangerous: a Ukraine threatened from the east, inadequately connected to the West, would remain a haven of instability. In this respect, too, a quick peace in Ukraine would be rather inconvenient for German foreign policy.

Germany and U.S. Security Policy

In the wake of Russia's attack on Ukraine, the United States has unhesitatingly fulfilled its security obligations in and for Europe and forcefully underscored its role as a protective power. Since February 2022, the Biden administration has supported Ukraine with massive arms deliveries, sworn the West to severe economic sanctions against Russia, and increased the number of U.S. troops in Europe by some 20,000 to more than 100,000. The U.S. Congress had provided aid to Ukraine totaling $68 billion through mid-November 2022 alone.

However, the Biden administration's security policy commitment in favor of Ukraine and Europe is ultimately only a snapshot, which one may be pleased about in Europe's capitals, but which one should not interpret as a permanent regular state or even use as a basis for one's own strategic planning. Even if the Biden administration's support for Ukraine does not diminish in the short term, Washington is unlikely to be able or willing to maintain the current level of diplomatic engagement, troop deployments and financial resources for European security in the long term.

This is because the U.S. political turn toward the Indo-Pacific region continues unabated. The main focus is on China's rise in power politics. As early as May 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken clearly communicated U.S. prioritization to the Europeans: "Even as President Putin's war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order - and that comes from the People's Republic of China." The outbreak of a military conflict in Asia, in which China could attack Taiwan, would change U.S. priorities even more rapidly. The same thing happened with a quick peace in Ukraine, which would allow a reduction in U.S. involvement.

The German government would therefore urgently need to start thinking now about how to permanently recalibrate the transatlantic security relationship. More political responsibility, a stronger military commitment, and greater financial burdens over decades will be necessary to "successfully weather the geopolitical storms of our time" (Scholz).

A quick peace between Kiev and Moscow would also increase the pressure to act in this regard. Ten months after the proclamation of the turning point, it seems doubtful whether all those responsible in Berlin are aware of this.
-----------------
I think the idea of Germany as a guarantor of Ukrainian or European security is simply ridiculous, it is far too impotent militarily for that. And Babble-Olaf doesn't want to show leadership, he's too cowardly and turncoatish for that. He just wants to pretend and get the applause.

[Jimbuna]

Zelensky in Washington: Ukraine's leader heads to US for first foreign trip

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky says he is on his way to Washington, where he will meet US President Joe Biden on Wednesday.

It is his first foreign trip since Russia invaded in February.

Details of how and when he travelled are unlikely to be made public, given the security risks involved.

The White House confirmed it would supply Ukraine with a Patriot missile system, significantly increasing the country's air defence capability.

"On my way to the US to strengthen resilience and defense capabilities of Ukraine," Mr Zelensky wrote on Twitter.

He also said he would give a speech to Congress and hold a number of meetings.

The visit was, unsurprisingly, kept as a secret, with official confirmation coming only hours before it was due to start.

The US has been Ukraine's most important ally in the war, committing $50bn of humanitarian, financial and security assistance - far more than any other country.

Mr Zelensky has held regular phone calls with Western leaders since the start of the war. But by hosting him at the White House, President Biden will signal that Washington is committed to supporting the country for "as long as it takes", as has been repeatedly said.

Russia said the visit would lead to an "aggravation of the conflict".

"This does not bode well for Ukraine," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said.

In its briefing ahead of Mr Zelensky's visit, the White House confirmed a new package of nearly $2bn (£1.6bn) of security assistance for Ukraine.

That includes a new Patriot missile system - a sophisticated air defence system that will help Ukraine to protect its cities from missiles and drones that Russia has fired at critical facilities.

The visit to Washington comes a day after President Zelensky, dressed in combat khaki, was in Bakhmut, a front-line city in eastern Ukraine that has seen some of the fiercest battles in this war.

He met troops and handed out awards to soldiers, the presidency said.

The visit was a significant show of defiance - and a demonstration of support for Ukrainian forces on the front line.

Soldiers gave Mr Zelensky a Ukrainian flag with their names signed on it and asked him to give it to President Biden and the US Congress, in a moment that was captured on camera.

President Zelensky has vowed to take back all territory that's under occupation, including areas invaded before February. Before the visit, in his traditional evening address, he said Ukraine would do "everything possible and impossible, expected and unexpected" to get "the results that all Ukrainians expect".

Also on Wednesday, the Kremlin says Russian President Vladimir Putin will set Russia's military goals for 2023 in an "important, voluminous speech".

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, the US military estimates that at least 100,000 Russian and 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed or injured, along with some 40,000 civilian deaths.

The UN has recorded 7.8 million people as refugees from Ukraine across Europe, including Russia. However, the figure does not include those who have been forced to flee their homes but remain in Ukraine.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64047058

[Jimbuna]

US Congress is going to recognize Russian Federation as aggressor state. This is alternative to being recognized as sponsor of terrorism, - The Hill

The leadership of the US Congress is working on the rapid introduction of a bill that would condemn Russia as an aggressor state. There is no mention of recognizing the Russian Federation as a sponsor of terrorism.

This was reported by the American publication The Hill with reference to the text of the draft law, Censor.NET informs.

The leadership of the US Congress and the White House are working on the fastest possible introduction of a bill that condemns Russia as an aggressor state during the visit of President Volodymyr Zelensky to Washington on December 21.

Passage of the bill would give Biden new powers to impose sanctions on Russian officials, but a House Republican aide called it a "half-baked" response to Zelensky's calls for the U.S. to designate Russia a state sponsor of terrorism.

"Zelensky requested the status of a state sponsor of terrorism, and instead the Biden administration told them that it would not support it, but invented an alternative status that does not even exist in US national or international law - there is no legal basis for this.
This is an incomplete PR event that will not punish Russia and will not help the Ukrainian people," said an aide to the congressman familiar with the discussions.

The draft text states that the president has the right to designate any country as an aggressor state if it is involved in acts of aggression against Ukraine and to punish anyone involved in aggression.

Critics of the text say the sanctions are redundant because the Biden administration has imposed sanctions on Putin and many of his top officials and family members since Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine in February.

Organizations based in the USA and supporting Ukraine issued a joint statement opposing the draft law. The statement was signed by the Ukrainian Committee of the American Congress, the United Baltic-American National Committee, and Razom for Ukraine.

"This is a destructive concept that undermines the ongoing efforts of Congress to support Ukraine. Currently, Russia is waging a merciless war and genocide against Ukraine and its people.
This appointment will not change the actions of the Russian Federation, seize its assets, or lead to meaningful prosecution of the Russian government, and simply relies on the discretion of the executive branch to determine when Russian aggression against Ukraine will end," the joint statement said.

The groups expressed fears that declaring the Russian Federation an aggressor state would ease sanctions and return frozen assets to war criminals as part of possible early negotiations with Russia.

"Although the US government, Congress, and President Biden have done a lot to support Ukraine, the proposal of the aggressor state is counterproductive and should not be adopted," they wrote.

Ukrainian officials acknowledged to The Hill that aggressor state status does not meet their requests to designate Russia as a terrorist state, but support the measure as a way to describe Russia as committing acts of terrorism and may generally support the introduction of a separate term if it provides additional tools to punish the aggressor states. Source: https://censor.net/en/n3388313

[Jimbuna]

Putin faces either trial or ignominious death in bunker, - Maliuk

The fate of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin will be one of two options. He faces trial or an inglorious death in a bunker.

As Censor.NET informs, the head of the SSU, Vasyl Maliuk, made such a statement in an interview with Natalia Moseichuk for the "1+1" TV channel.

"(Putin) played around, sneaked in, exposed himself. He is a bunker grandfather. He really lives in his painful world and two options will befall him: either the dock in The Hague or an inglorious death somewhere in a bunker in Altai," said Maliuk.

When asked by a journalist whether the scenario is real that Putin and his entourage will end up on the dock, he replied that "the SSU has a unique treasure trove of evidence."

"Today, the Security Service formed a unique treasure trove of evidence for future international criminal courts, our investigation is working on this...And in the materials that we have already collected, Karin Khan (Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court - ed.), when he saw them, said - "aerobatics"," noted Maliuk.

In turn, the head of the SSU clarified that it is about evidence that was collected not only publicly.

"A very large-scale set of clandestine investigative technical measures was carried out. We have a lot of interesting audio files and more. Therefore, everything has its time," added Maliuk. Source: https://censor.net/en/n3388340

Ukraine has full information about Iran’s supply of drones to Russian Federation, - Danilov

Ukraine has complete information on Iran’s supply of drones to the Russian Federation. If Iran dares to supply missiles to Russia, it will become another challenge for Ukraine.

As Censor.NET informs, the Secretary of the National Security Council Oleksiy Danilov said this in an interview with "Voice of America".

"We have a clear understanding, based on our intelligence and the intelligence of our partners, what is happening with Iran. We are more than sure that these are Iranian drones. They supplied them to the Russian Federation, unfortunately, this is still happening today. And for us, this is a big challenge. Moreover, we know for sure that the Russian Federation is negotiating with Iran about the supply of other weapons to the territory of Russia. On the one hand, we should be happy that the Russian Federation does not have the internal ability to win this war without the involvement of other countries, but with on the other hand, it will be an additional challenge for us if Iran dares to supply Russia with not only drones, but also missiles," Danilov emphasized.

He added that the Ukrainian military has already learned to repel drone attacks, but, unfortunately, there are also cases when they achieve their goal, and this is a challenge for our country.

As for the 50% destruction of the Ukrainian energy system, from which the civilian population suffers, then, according to Danilov, the Russian Federation as a terrorist country has chosen exactly this path of war.

"Unfortunately, they are not taking off the agenda the very simple issue they are asking is the destruction of us as a nation. I am more than sure that they are no different than Hitler who was in the last century. This is the same regime today, so is Hitler. If he exterminated the Jews, then this one says: "I want to exterminate the Ukrainians," Danilov noted. Source: https://censor.net/en/n3388356

[Dargo]

Originally Posted by Skybird

Markus Kaim, born in 1968, is a senior fellow in the "Security Policy" research group at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, as well as a lecturer at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Zurich and a visiting lecturer at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. he writes in Der Spiegel:
---------------------------------

The Secret Fear of a Quick Peace

In hardly any other European country is an end to the Russian-Ukrainian war as longed for as in Germany. It is a very heterogeneous group that is urging the parties to the conflict to reach a quick negotiated settlement: Some argue the terrible consequences of the war for the Ukrainian population, which is suffering from the destruction of civilian infrastructure by Russian airstrikes.

Others point to the war's lasting destabilizing effect on Europe, migratory movements, high energy prices, and the conflict's risk of escalation. Finally, a third group hopes that a swift Ukrainian-Russian peace will allow them to return as quickly as possible to the state of economic and energy relations between Berlin and Moscow before February 24.

Only a cynic would turn a deaf ear to the cause of peace. But just as a war is bound to certain preconditions and has specific consequences, a peace is also subject to or produces comparable effects. Both states of aggregation have far-reaching consequences for the parties to the conflict, the parties indirectly involved and the global balance of power. From this perspective, it seems questionable whether Germany would be prepared at all for the desired quick peace between Moscow and Kiev.

The German strategic gap

A quick peace would strategically catch German policy on the wrong foot. It is indisputable that all the basic assumptions of Germany's Russia policy of the past 25 years have turned out to be wrong and that this field of German foreign policy became one of the first victims of the war: "Change through trade" or "European security can only be organized together with Russia" are just two of these diplomatic gems which, representative of many others, mark the complete defeat of German Russia policy.

At present, then, German policy can indicate what is no longer the basis of bilateral relations. A new Russia policy for the future, however, does not exist. That it will be guided by security policy priorities rather than energy policy priorities is so far only conjecture. Whether the National Security Strategy, which the German government will present in a few weeks, will be able to close this gap remains to be seen.

A quick peace in Ukraine, possibly only in the form of a fragile ceasefire, would be tempting in times of this strategic vacuum. The outcome of the war would then define the goals of Berlin's future Russia policy from a pragmatic point of view. Strategic foreign policy, however, works the other way around: its security policy goals should guide the German government in defining and implementing its future policy toward Ukraine and Russia even before the end of the war. Elsewhere, this is happening: the huge aid and reconstruction pledges to Kiev or Ukraine's EU candidate status are far-reaching geopolitical decisions for the future of Europe.

Germany as guarantor of European security

In early December, Chancellor Olaf Scholz outlined in a technical article that Germany aspires to become "a guarantor of European security, just as our allies expect us to be." He set the bar high by firing up the hopes of German allies and claiming political leadership of the West. After all, a "guarantor" is clearly more than a contributor; it provides guarantees for the performance of the European security architecture, it provides the necessary military and financial resources, and it bears the corresponding costs disproportionately.

A litmus test for this claim will be what contribution Germany is willing to make to securing Ukraine's territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The obvious option, namely NATO membership for Ukraine, was again put on the back burner by the German government at the last meeting of NATO foreign ministers. Nor does Berlin really like to commit itself to granting security guarantees to Kiev, even after ten months of war. Both Chancellor Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock have repeatedly expressed Germany's willingness to do so in principle. However, there is still a droning silence on the details.

A quick peace would deprive the German government of the possibility of this "strategic ambivalence" and force a concretization of the hitherto vague commitments. For the alternative is even more dangerous: a Ukraine threatened from the east, inadequately connected to the West, would remain a haven of instability. In this respect, too, a quick peace in Ukraine would be rather inconvenient for German foreign policy.

Germany and U.S. Security Policy

In the wake of Russia's attack on Ukraine, the United States has unhesitatingly fulfilled its security obligations in and for Europe and forcefully underscored its role as a protective power. Since February 2022, the Biden administration has supported Ukraine with massive arms deliveries, sworn the West to severe economic sanctions against Russia, and increased the number of U.S. troops in Europe by some 20,000 to more than 100,000. The U.S. Congress had provided aid to Ukraine totaling $68 billion through mid-November 2022 alone.

However, the Biden administration's security policy commitment in favor of Ukraine and Europe is ultimately only a snapshot, which one may be pleased about in Europe's capitals, but which one should not interpret as a permanent regular state or even use as a basis for one's own strategic planning. Even if the Biden administration's support for Ukraine does not diminish in the short term, Washington is unlikely to be able or willing to maintain the current level of diplomatic engagement, troop deployments and financial resources for European security in the long term.

This is because the U.S. political turn toward the Indo-Pacific region continues unabated. The main focus is on China's rise in power politics. As early as May 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken clearly communicated U.S. prioritization to the Europeans: "Even as President Putin's war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order - and that comes from the People's Republic of China." The outbreak of a military conflict in Asia, in which China could attack Taiwan, would change U.S. priorities even more rapidly. The same thing happened with a quick peace in Ukraine, which would allow a reduction in U.S. involvement.

The German government would therefore urgently need to start thinking now about how to permanently recalibrate the transatlantic security relationship. More political responsibility, a stronger military commitment, and greater financial burdens over decades will be necessary to "successfully weather the geopolitical storms of our time" (Scholz).

A quick peace between Kiev and Moscow would also increase the pressure to act in this regard. Ten months after the proclamation of the turning point, it seems doubtful whether all those responsible in Berlin are aware of this.
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I think the idea of Germany as a guarantor of Ukrainian or European security is simply ridiculous, it is far too impotent militarily for that. And Babble-Olaf doesn't want to show leadership, he's too cowardly and turncoatish for that. He just wants to pretend and get the applause.

Germany can think what they want, but I do not see them leading more other smaller countries are leading in this reaction to the invasion of Ukraine. Decisions in the EU are also not taken alone by Germany and France, in this crisis power shifted to other countries who can make collations against the German France axis.