Why the Submarine is the unsung hero at Midway -- true story.

[Dread Knot]

Originally Posted by WernherVonTrapp

@Dread Knot:
As to my ealier reference involving John Toland's book, as I alluded, I don't believe in the conspiracy theory either. BTW, Toland was a graduate of Williams College (undergraduate degree ) and did win a Pulitzer Prize for "The Rising Sun". Yes, "Infamy" was controversial when it first came out 30 years ago (also when I first read it). Books like this inevitably will be controversial. But Toland is, by no means, the picture you have painted of him. I suppose Billy Mitchell was deemed just as controversial when he said that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor.
As my English Lit professor used to say, "Bad reviews are not necessarily a bad thing for a writer. It is when your work receives no reviews, that you should start to worry".

Sorry, didn't mean to imply you were a PH conspiracy believer. I've read Toland's Rising Sun tome as well. I recall it was in two hardcover volumes when it was first published. His literary style makes for great and fast paced reading although he did tend to concentrate on some parts of the war and skim on others.

As regards Infamy, I know that other students of the Pearl harbor attack have criticized his thesis severely. David Kahn, a well-known authority on the history of intelligence questions the reliability of Toland's evidence. Kahn points out that the Japanese Pearl Harbor striking force maintained complete radio silence from the time it left harbor in the Kuriles. It never transmitted any messages, even on low-power ship to ship channels. Toland's informants had, in all likelyhood, picked up naval transmissions originating from Japan and nearby waters. Shipboard direction finding was notoriously unreliable then, with a likely error of 11 to 20 degrees in a bearing. Enough to throw of the calculations of the SS Lurline radio men.

I guess it just points out while that there will always be tantalizing clues and coincidences, in the absence of real smoking gun evidence we'll never be sure.

[joea]

Originally Posted by gmuno

For the question why Hitler declared war on the US:
- convoys were escorted by US-DEs and DDs
- large deliveries of weapons and other goods to the Sowjets (i read a statement of one German general after war. He believed that only the US deliveries held the Germans troops from getting Moscow in '42) and the Brits (ships)
- new happy hunting grounds (Oil of the West Indies) without the risk of a diplomatic war with the US
- being a total nuthead

The point is though why would FDR think Hitler would declare war, he surely knew the Tripartite accord as another mentioned didn't require it. Why would the other factos you mentioned suddely become good reason after a Japanese attack and not before? Hitler was not exactly predictable you know.

As to the factors you lsited I only take issue with the huge amount of supplies sent to the Soviets-I pretty sure LL shipments didn't hit huge quantities til 1943 and nearly nothing had arrived during the battle for Moscow in 1941.

As to the forcing Japan into war theory-well perhaps but they need not have invaded China, ally with the Third Reich, or threaten DEI and SEA. If I were advising Hirohito I would have told him to keep Manchuria as a base to subvert and spread influence in China that way - keep friendly with the US perhaps even to the point of seeking economic partnerships in China and Manchuria while shutting out the Europeans and use lots of propaganda against them. good relations with the Soviets as well. No open military adventures except limited attacks against one adversary at the most.

Yes off topic but this is interesting.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Originally Posted by Dread Knot

Kahn points out that the Japanese Pearl Harbor striking force maintained complete radio silence from the time it left harbor in the Kuriles. It never transmitted any messages, even on low-power ship to ship channels. Toland's informants had, in all likelyhood, picked up naval transmissions originating from Japan and nearby waters. Shipboard direction finding was notoriously unreliable then, with a likely error of 11 to 20 degrees in a bearing. Enough to throw of the calculations of the SS Lurline radio men.

I guess it just points out while that there will always be tantalizing clues and coincidences, in the absence of real smoking gun evidence we'll never be sure.

Yes, I do vaguely recall that point of controversy, now that you mention it. I do believe, though still am not certain, that "Seaman-Z" has since come forward, as well as some other anonymous sources, and corroborated Toland's story. Still controversial, nonetheless.

Originally Posted by Admiral Von Gerlach

This thread has been an interesting read and several cross winds are blowing thru many of the posts.

Fact is that the Imperial Japanese Navy was far superior to the USN thorughout the war in every way except materiel, in that area alone the USN won the war,

I have to respectfully disagree here, admiral. The advent of technology involving the application of radar and inflexibility of protocol/tactics is what doomed the Japanese Navy. However, I do agree that the IJN was far superior than the USN, up until the Solomons campaign. I believe it was during the battle of Vella Gulf (for one example), where 6 American Destroyers took on 4 IJN Destroyers (an American disadvantage in numbers up until this point) in a torpedo attack which left 3 IJN destroyers sunk at no loss to the Americans. Even Capt. Tameichi Hara, in his book "Japanese Destroyer Captain", was astonished at the accuracy of the U.S. torpedo attack. In fact, the U.S. destroyers caught the IJN completely by surprise. This was all due (for once) to the proper application and understanding of the use of radar in an attack. The Americans were still learning and adapting to IJN tactics which, by this point, had become completely predictable. The Solomons Campaign, during which the U.S. Pacific Fleet was able to replace but had still not reached parity in numbers with the IJN, came of age in superior tactics and marksmanship, all compliments of new young officers with a more complete respect and understanding of the use of radar. It wasn't until about mid 43 that U.S. numbers in the Pacific really swung into high gear, and seemingly overnight. By the end of 43, beginning of 44, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was larger than the navies of all the warring powers, combined!

It hit quantities high enough to be considered as a reason. At least as a reason considered by some high ranking Germans (also nutheads - but strung-up nutheads). Look at the Nuremberg-Trials protocols. A lot of reasons were named, including "I can't remember.""Followed only orders".
I still don't get it, why Dönitz didn't buy his ticket too.

I believe, that the Kriegsmarine high-ups promised Hitler, that the U-Boats could starve England if they got the official permission to go after US-freighters too.
The Nazis didn't want a war against the US in the beginning (see the SS Athenia follow-ups), they tried a lot to prevent it. When it became obvious, that Operation Seelöwe wasn't an option anymore, GB had to be starved. But how to accomplish, when a large part of essential goods are ferried by neutrals? A good reason for FDR to believe, that Hitler would declare war at the US.
When the US-forces would be tied up in the pacific, things would have to develop rather good for the Nazis. At least in their eyes.
When FDR brought up his Europe-first-speech, some people suddenly got very pale and cold sweat broke out, i expect.
When Midway happened the way it happened, it must have been getting obvious to the Kriegsmarine (and the Nazis) that their gamble had gone bad.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Originally Posted by gmuno

It hit quantities high enough to be considered as a reason.

Well, the USN was always outgunned or outnumbered through the early years of the war. It was in the Solomons campaign where the ability to replace it's losses, became a factor for the USN. Most of the new USN warships were deployed piecemeal into battles there, just narrowly averting disaster. It's one of the major reasons why the battle for Guadalcanal took 6 months. The USN just didn't have the warships to support the resupply missions. It was also during the Solomons campaign that the IJN really showed it's prowess in night engagement tactics, usually overwhelming their American counterparts.
Now, if you want to factor-in the replacement abilities of the U.S. war machine, including the warships at the bottom of Iron-bottom Sound, into the overall numbers counted, I suppose that point might be arguable.

[Dread Knot]

Originally Posted by WernherVonTrapp

I have to respectfully disagree here, admiral. The advent of technology involving the application of radar and inflexibility of protocol/tactics is what doomed the Japanese Navy. However, I do agree that the IJN was far superior than the USN, up until the Solomons campaign. I believe it was during the battle of Vella Gulf (for one example), where 6 American Destroyers took on 4 IJN Destroyers (an American disadvantage in numbers up until this point) in a torpedo attack which left 3 IJN destroyers sunk at no loss to the Americans....

Another area in which the Japanese Navy was subpar was in anti-aircraft defense. Japanese AA fire control was lousy throughout the war. The Japanese started the war with the Type 94 director for heavy antiaircraft, which proved much too slow for tracking dive bombers. After the disaster at Midway the Japanese Navy rushed development of the Type 3 director, but the prototype was never completed. The Type 95 director for light antiaircraft was available only for triple 25mm mounts, all others having to rely on simple open ring sights. The low quality of Japanese antiaircraft fire control was pretty apparent at the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, when only 18 Allied aircraft were shot down out of hundreds attacking a Japanese task force (which included the monster BBs Yamato and Musashi) carrying literally hundreds of antiaircraft barrels

[WernherVonTrapp]

I cannot help but think of all the early war battles between the USN & IJN, where the USN was predominantly outnumbered and/or outgunned, yet the Americans still, fearlessly pressed home the attack, sometimes achieving a strategic victory, even if not a tactical one. On the other hand, the IJN, which usually outnumbered and outgunned their counterparts, didn't seem to have the heart to press-home the attack. This in fact, IMO, seemed to be the order of the day for the IJN throughout the entire war. I suppose some could argue that there is some bias in my opinion on this point, but I've searched my heart and believe I'm being truly objective with this analysis. Look at the battle of the Coral Sea, Midway or Leyte Gulf (for a few examples). From all the Pacific naval battles I've read about, and I'm not saying in every single instance, but it just seems like the IJN was far too timid and missed a lot of possibilities by tossing in an early towel.

[Diopos]

They were saving up on steel ...

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[MKalafatas]

I think "timid" is too strong. The "Tokyo Express" runs through the Solomons were a bold concept. Pearl Harbor was a bold concept. It may be fair to say that at key moments, certain commanders lacked the courage of their convictions. But such criticism could be leveled at commanders in nearly every theater of war from the dawn of time.

The death of Yamato makes an interesting counterpoint to the "timidity" argument.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Originally Posted by MKalafatas

I think "timid" is too strong. The "Tokyo Express" runs through the Solomons were a bold concept. Pearl Harbor was a bold concept. It may be fair to say that at key moments, certain commanders lacked the courage of their convictions. But such criticism could be leveled at commanders in nearly every theater of war from the dawn of time.

The death of Yamato makes an interesting counterpoint to the "timidity" argument.

The Tokyo Express wasn't a bold concept, IMO. It was an absolute necessity (for a people that could not accept defeat) if they were to have any chance of holding onto a valuable asset. As time when on, it became an act of desperation, despite the fact that defeat was staring them in the face. Guadalcanal was called "Starvation Island" by the Japanese while the Tokyo Express was still running, and the IJN eventually had to rely on Destroyers as fast, armed, transports since all of their merchants and barges were being sunk.
No doubt, Pearl Harbor, IMO, was the most carefully contrived Japanese operation of the entire war, but quite possibly the only one. Every successive offensive stroke (again, IMO) was under the pretense of "Bold". All their other conquests of the time, were against positions defended by poorly trained and supplied armies, and/or poorly defended positions. The fact that the Philippines held out against the Japanese for so long, despite the poorly trained and equipped defenders using outdated weapons and tactics, was more a tribute to "Bold" American spirit than bold Japanese initiative. If a mugger chooses to attack an old lady as opposed to the 6 foot tall young man, is he being bold, or choosing an easy opportunity?
I don't think timid is too strong, but again, as I said earlier, I wasn't speaking of every instance.