Should I get SH4?

[Rockin Robbins]

Oh, yes, there were plenty of fatal mistakes to go around, any one of which spelled a well-deserved doom for the Third Reich and a tragic loss for the German people, who did not deserve any of this. I am only saying that the use of U-Boats was one of them.

Canada was not really able to contribute to the war until they jumped into the British/US convoys after the US entry. The US entering the war made Canada able to be a consequential participant instead of just giving moral support to the Commonwealth.

You are 100% correct. The entire war was an act of insanity, sure to result in no good for Germany or anybody else. It was all about the Austrian private seeking a place in history. Well, he got it, just not what he envisioned.

If a script writer had tried to sell the story in the 1920's he would have been laughed out of town. Unfortunately the real thing was in no way funny. There was plenty of tragedy that everyone participating had more then their fair share...

[WernherVonTrapp]

Originally Posted by Torplexed

Some German sources, in noting the lack of offensive spirit shown by Soviet naval commanders in the Second World War, have speculated as to whether it was Stalin's intention to husband his warships in order to be in a better position to challenge the naval supremacy of the Anglo-Americans after the war. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is more probable that the sea war was of no interest to Stalin, except that he wanted war supplies delivered to Murmansk, Archangel and Vladivostok. It is more likely that, even if the Soviet Navy had the ability and means to undertake the task, which it obviously had not, he saw no reason why the USSR should exert itself to sweep the Arctic Sea of German bombers and U-boats for the benefit of allies whom he deemed to be well provided with a plethora of top notch warships and aircraft.

It is doubtful whether Stalin's interest in the Soviet Navy ever went much beyond cynically seeing it as a ready reserve of manpower to provide bayonets for the land fighting. Between June and September 1941 six marine infantry brigades, each about 5,000 men strong, were formed from the Baltic Fleet crews to fight in the Siege of Leningrad. This was later increased to nine, and in the end the Baltic Red Banner Fleet gave up 13,000 officers and ratings to fight on dry land. Eventually, thinned by causalities, many of these marines infantry brigades were marine only in name, since they were by then commanded by Red Army officers and received their reinforcements from Central Siberia, from men who had never seen the sea. It points out the difference between the two dictators, Stalin and Hitler. Unlike the czars, Stalin was never much swayed by the prestige of seapower, or deceived into thinking his war would be won on the sea.

Well, I tend to agree to a great extent. Most of his reserves that fueled his offensive drive came from Siberian and Asian divisions. Not sure what bearing this has on my previous comment but, yeah, I tend to agree. I think a lot of it had to do with the vast land areas that made up the country. Much more conducive to ground, rather than, naval forces. My point was industrial/technical might, and yeah, there are reasons for that too but, nevertheless, they could not have matched our industrial/technical abilities. Besides, the Soviet Union/Russia wasn't really known (historically) as a successful naval power, aside from some very brief periods of world history. The Japanese Navy defeated them as recent as (I think) 1905. Then, we defeated the Japanese Navy (and army).

[Daniel Prates]

Originally Posted by Torplexed

It is doubtful whether Stalin's interest in the Soviet Navy ever went much beyond cynically seeing it as a ready reserve of manpower to provide bayonets for the land fighting. Between June and September 1941 six marine infantry brigades, each about 5,000 men strong, were formed from the Baltic Fleet crews to fight in the Siege of Leningrad. This was later increased to nine, and in the end the Baltic Red Banner Fleet gave up 13,000 officers and ratings to fight on dry land. Eventually, thinned by causalities, many of these marines infantry brigades were marine only in name, since they were by then commanded by Red Army officers and received their reinforcements from Central Siberia, from men who had never seen the sea. It points out the difference between the two dictators, Stalin and Hitler. Unlike the czars, Stalin was never much swayed by the prestige of seapower, or deceived into thinking his war would be won on the sea.

I think there is more to it. Russia was a great power by then (it still is, but that's another subject), and it simply could not allow itself to fall back on the current advances on any field. Even if you do not want to fully develop a fighting navy, as a great power you must mantaing at least a few ships on each class for technology and doctrinary reasons. If Russia had completely forfeited its fleet, there would be no training grounds for recently developed technologies and docrines, and a whole generation of tech/doctrinary thinking would be forfeited. Picking it up again, should it happen a revolution in doctrinary thinking over a decade or two, would be impossible if the soviet navy had been completely abandoned in the previous period.

First-rate countries are always investing heavily on every single field - even it it is just a skelleton army, if concerning a field you are not particularly interested in, just for the sake of not falling out to date on what your counterparts are doing. This is a concept that will be familiar to Hearts of Iron 3 players (). Another example of this kind of thinking was the (useless?) investments made by the germans on developing heavy bombers during WW2. They never planed to put them into wide producion, but they were being developed anyway.

The same thing happened to russia during the cold war. Their strategic plans demanded a lot of subs on every single class you could think of, but no CVs, and still they would always have at least one modern CV, just to avoid falling behind american tech advances on that field. I think they were aiming at the same kind of investment during the 30s - the soviet navy was kept small as it could be, with a couple of BBs, escorts and subs, but without being mothballed completely.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by Daniel Prates

I think there is more to it. Russia was a great power by then (it still is, but that's another subject), and it simply could not allow itself to fall back on the current advances on any field. Even if you do not want to fully develop a fighting navy, as a great power you must mantaing at least a few ships on each class for technology and doctrinary reasons. If Russia had completely forfeited its fleet, there would be no training grounds for recently developed technologies and docrines, and a whole generation of tech/doctrinary thinking would be forfeited. Picking it up again, should it happen a revolution in doctrinary thinking over a decade or two, would be impossible if the soviet navy had been completely abandoned in the previous period.

First-rate countries are always investing heavily on every single field - even it it is just a skelleton army, if concerning a field you are not particularly interested in, just for the sake of not falling out to date on what your counterparts are doing. This is a concept that will be familiar to Hearts of Iron 3 players (). Another example of this kind of thinking was the (useless?) investments made by the germans on developing heavy bombers during WW2. They never planed to put them into wide producion, but they were being developed anyway.

The same thing happened to russia during the cold war. Their strategic plans demanded a lot of subs on every single class you could think of, but no CVs, and still they would always have at least one modern CV, just to avoid falling behind american tech advances on that field. I think they were aiming at the same kind of investment during the 30s - the soviet navy was kept small as it could be, with a couple of BBs, escorts and subs, but without being mothballed completely.

I have no doubt that the prewar USSR of the 1920s and 30s would have loved to have a large oceangoing fleet. However, practical reality dictated a primarily coastal defensive one. The sad state of the Soviet fleet at this time was a function of many factors. The complete collapse of the country's fledgling industrial infrastructure in the wake of the Russian Civil War was one. Concern about the Navy's political reliability as a result of the 1921 uprising of dissident Baltic Fleet sailors at Kronstadt was another. Concern about the Red Navy's reliability probably also stemmed from it's exposure to foreign 'contagion' as it went about visiting foreign ports. That was always a sore spot with the super-paranoid Stalin.

However, the biggest factor was the need to switch from the czarist agrarian economy to an industrial one and build up the country's steel, metallurgical and electrical industries first. In the end that proved to be the correct decision as it laid the groundwork for Soviet industry to overwhelm the invading Germans with a nearly inexhaustible supply of tanks, artillery and Strumoviks. In fact it was only after extensive shipyard development in the early 1930s that the Soviets were able to begin construction of the first large submarines and destroyers since the czarist era. When the Germans invasion came in 1941 this process had only recently started to turn out a few large modern cruisers. It's important to remember that a lot of the former Russian Imperial Fleet warships were purchased (or designed) abroad from foreign builders like the French, British, or even the Germans. So Revolutionary Russia had to start from square one in many respects.

Probably the biggest boost to Soviet naval technology came after the war. The defeat of the Axis powers allowed the Soviets to increase the size of their postwar fleet with former Japanese and German ships. Scores of advanced German submarines fell into Soviet hands as well as the naval shipyards that helped build them. The not quite finished German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin also became Soviet war booty. Additionally, warships transferred from the Western allies during the conflict introduced new technologies such as radar and sonar. That's really when the construction of a 'bluewater' Soviet Navy began.

[WernherVonTrapp]

I think a lot of nations would jump at the prospect, if feasible, of having a powerful blue ocean navy. I think the problem has more to do with expense, than anything else. A large surface navy is extemely expensive to maintain and operate, especially aircraft carriers. By now, the technologies are certainly in place for the building of carriers for any country, but the United States is the only country that can afford to absorb the immense costs of their continuous maintenance, operation and inherent upgrades. Even as far back as WWII, a blue ocean navy would cost a huge sum of money to build, operate and maintain. Throughout history, the few countries with thriving economies were the ones capable of maintaining large powerful fleets during specific eras.
The Soviets did have a large CV for a time, but what they didn't have was practical experience in wartime applications of it's use. You can only learn so much from observing or reading the successes or failures of it's use by other countries. One aircraft carrier is more a novelty item than a deployable tactical or strategic advantage.
Cost seems to have been the defining factor for large powerful navies. The English experienced this when the Dutch Fleet entered the port of (I forget) and sank the moored British fleet in (again, I think) the 16th century. (Gee, growing old is great, isn't it?) After which, due to lack of funds to rebuild it's fleet, the English lost the upper hand (for a time) in it's control of commerce in the English Channel. The means are always there, the monies aren't.

[Daniel Prates]

Originally Posted by Torplexed

I have no doubt that the prewar USSR of the 1920s and 30s would have loved to have a large oceangoing fleet. However, practical reality dictated a primarily coastal defensive one.

That is not what I am saying. My point is, even if a major power does not intend to develop some branch of it's armed forces - a large ocean going, blue water fleet in this case - it will still invest on a few exemplars of it, just to keep up with the most up-to-date advances on its field. If you have no battleships whatsoever, you have no way of knowing what are the current advances on its fabrication, use, deployment etc.

So a major power as the SU was then, necessarily would have to invest in things they did not plan on using even in a remote future. If you see what Russia had in the 30s and 40s, you see not a fleet but a backbone for a future fleet, should it become necessary some day.

[Arlo]

Originally Posted by Daniel Prates

That is not what I am saying. My point is, even if a major power does not intend to develop some branch of it's armed forces - a large ocean going, blue water fleet in this case - it will still invest on a few exemplars of it, just to keep up with the most up-to-date advances on its field. If you have no battleships whatsoever, you have no way of knowing what are the current advances on its fabrication, use, deployment etc.

So a major power as the SU was then, necessarily would have to invest in things they did not plan on using even in a remote future. If you see what Russia had in the 30s and 40s, you see not a fleet but a backbone for a future fleet, should it become necessary some day.

http://www.beyondweird.com/conspiracies/sem7.html

[Daniel Prates]

Originally Posted by Arlo

http://www.beyondweird.com/conspiracies/sem7.html

Reminds me of "the tournesol affair".

[Jasiuz]

I strongly recommend it, one of my all time favorites and I never get tiered of it