Why the Submarine is the unsung hero at Midway -- true story.

[Sailor Steve]

Originally Posted by Horus3K

I also love a good debate and im not paranoid hehehe...i just wasnt sure how people would react on my post

You don't have to worry about that around here...up to a point. 9/11 discussions are better left to the General Topics forums, but anything war-related is welcome. Just be ready to back up any claims for the wilder stuff. You won't be pilloried, but you will get demanding arguments.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by Horus3K

You think Yamamoto was overrated? I think you wrong there, his MAIN goal with attacking PH was to eliminate the US carriers, which where "luckily" not there...on receiving the message that no carriers where found/hit he said that from now on it will be impossible to beat the USA, esp after its industrial moloch starts to gear up....and maybe you dont know but he studied in the UK and im sure he was often in the USA, so i guess he could judge the overall situation well enough to do what he did!

Sorry, but that's just my opinion. I have no doubt about his impressive credentials in America and at Harvard, but they didn't seem to serve him well in command of the Combined Fleet. He engineered the the attack on Pearl Harbor, the most politically disastrous naval operation in modern history. He used his prestige to push through the Midway operation, a stunning and avoidable setback. He also presided over the catastrophic air war of attrition against American forces in the South Pacific, which gutted Japan's air power. He did have the forbearance to see troubled times ahead for Japan, but seemed to do things that made that trouble worse.

For some strange reason he never used his considerable political clout to relieve the witless and indecisive Admiral Nagumo, although he enjoyed upbraiding him for his shortcomings. If Yamamoto was indicative of Japan's best, perhaps it explains the sad state the IJN eventually found itself in.

[Sailor Steve]

A friend of mine used to say that these Japanese officers had visited places like Alabama, Georgia and West Virginia, where folks keep their relatives chained up in the basement, they might have thought twice about messin' with the U S of A.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by Sailor Steve

A friend of mine used to say that these Japanese officers had visited places like Alabama, Georgia and West Virginia, where folks keep their relatives chained up in the basement, they might have thought twice about messin' with the U S of A.

When I look at the weirdness of modern Japan, I'm not so sure I wanna mess with them anymore either.

[Sailor Steve]

Well, during the heyday of Japanese imports (Honda, Sony, Datsun, Yamaha) it was looking like we might actually lose, but pictures like that show that, in the end, yes - the west won the war.

[Admiral Von Gerlach]

This thread has been an interesting read and several cross winds are blowing thru many of the posts.

Fact is that the Imperial Japanese Navy was far superior to the USN thorughout the war in every way except materiel, in that area alone the USN won the war, they out built and out manned the fleet and IJN had never a chance to replace war losses...and the IJN submarine campaign was a total mis use of a fine fleet arm. To belittle the abilities of the IJN High Command has been the traddional approach to Japan from the Commodore Perry expedition in the 1800s which most western nations found to their loss over the decades since.

They have in fact a superior culture in many ways, our country lacks much of the moral fibre that allowed us to prevail in that war...but our services did their best. Facts in action are hard to establish at times for many reasons. One must assume people do their best in their own way.

Yamamoto counted on the Japanese Diplomatic service to serve the Declaration of War BEFORE the attack on Pearl, when they failed in this the attack was rendered a disaster, no matter what the results were. He knew that and knew what the result would be.

Though I lost family members in the war and had many others who served, most of them in the Navy and Marines, we never had illusions about the enemy, or their abilities or their honour and worthiness.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by Admiral Von Gerlach

Yamamoto counted on the Japanese Diplomatic service to serve the Declaration of War BEFORE the attack on Pearl, when they failed in this the attack was rendered a disaster, no matter what the results were. He knew that and knew what the result would be.

The 14-part message which the Japanese diplomats tardily delivered to ambassador Hull on December 7th has been characterized as a declaration of war, but it was much more ambiguous than that. The message simply repeated Japan's position, rejected the American position, and expressed the view that further negotiation seemed pointless. While this was certainly ominous, and its significance was not lost on the American cryptanalysts or administration, the note did not formally declare war or even present an ultimatum.

Recently, Japanese historian Iguchi Takeo has cast further light on the 14-part message with the discovery of Japanese archival material showing that the Japanese Army and Navy insisted that the language of the 14-part message be toned down to deliberately avoid giving any warning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He further speculates that the transmissions to the Washington embassy from the Tokyo Foreign Office were deliberately garbled to ensure that the embassy staff would be unable to deliver a clean copy to the Americans before the attack took place. Iguchi also found a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations and they clearly prevailed."

A formal declaration of war was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8, but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.

Frankly, even a formal declaration of war had been delivered a half hour before the attack I think it would have made little difference. Which scenario is more despicable? Someone attacking you and saying "I'm declaring war on you" or someone declaring war on you and then punching you in the mouth immediately after? It's a sneak attack versus a sucker punch.

By the way if anyone wishes to read the 14-part message that was meant to be on Cordell Hull's desk before the attack it's here...

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/Fourteen.html

[WernherVonTrapp]

Originally Posted by Torplexed

Sorry, but that's just my opinion. I have no doubt about his impressive credentials in America and at Harvard, but they didn't seem to serve him well in command of the Combined Fleet.

I'm inclined to concur with your opinion here, and admittedly, it has been my opinion ever since I read Shattered Sword.

@Dread Knot:
As to my ealier reference involving John Toland's book, as I alluded, I don't believe in the conspiracy theory either. BTW, Toland was a graduate of Williams College (undergraduate degree ) and did win a Pulitzer Prize for "The Rising Sun". Yes, "Infamy" was controversial when it first came out 30 years ago (also when I first read it). Books like this inevitably will be controversial. But Toland is, by no means, the picture you have painted of him. I suppose Billy Mitchell was deemed just as controversial when he said that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor.
As my English Lit professor used to say, "Bad reviews are not necessarily a bad thing for a writer. It is when your work receives no reviews, that you should start to worry".

For the question why Hitler declared war on the US:
- convoys were escorted by US-DEs and DDs
- large deliveries of weapons and other goods to the Sowjets (i read a statement of one German general after war. He believed that only the US deliveries held the Germans troops from getting Moscow in '42) and the Brits (ships)
- new happy hunting grounds (Oil of the West Indies) without the risk of a diplomatic war with the US
- being a total nuthead

The largest mistake by the Japanese (after the one with the PR) in the attacks on PH and Midway was their limited trust in their submarine force.
By placing a sub cordon at the endrances to PH they would have suffered loses, but also would have gotten some straglers.
By scouting Midway, they might have gotten some useful intel on the shore defences and by using their submarine force to the fullest, they could have had some inclination about the approach of the US carriers.

[Sailor Steve]

Originally Posted by Torplexed

By the way if anyone wishes to read the 14-part message that was meant to be on Cordell Hull's desk before the attack it's here...

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/Fourteen.html

Thanks for the link. I've never read the actual document, and you're right - there is nothing there that even looks like a declaration of war, or even an ultimatim. There is a lot of nonsense ("Stabilizing the region..."). The link within to other documents is great as well.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Originally Posted by gmuno

The largest mistake by the Japanese (after the one with the PR) in the attacks on PH and Midway was their limited trust in their submarine force.
By placing a sub cordon at the endrances to PH they would have suffered loses, but also would have gotten some straglers.
By scouting Midway, they might have gotten some useful intel on the shore defences and by using their submarine force to the fullest, they could have had some inclination about the approach of the US carriers.

The Japanese did, in fact, dispatch a rather large submarine force to Midway for the purposes of reconnaissance and/or engagement. I do not recall all the specific particulars involving the operation's failure, but many of the Japanese subs arrived late, they lacked coordination and (if I remember correctly) they were out of position. But, this all goes back to the overall planning strategy employed for the battle of Midway.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by gmuno

By placing a sub cordon at the endrances to PH they would have suffered loses, but also would have gotten some straglers.

The Japanese did place a sub cordon around Pearl Harbor preliminary to the attack there as well. On December 7th, 1941 there was a virtual Japanese submarine armada in position around Oahu. Although the subs sank several merchant ships and made two unsuccessful attempts to torpedo the carrier Enterprise, no US warships fell victim to this submarine pack. On December 10th, 1941 aircraft from the Enterprise caught the Japanese sub I-70 on the surface 200 miles from Oahu and sank it with all hands, making it one of the first Japanese warships lost.

[TorpX]

Originally Posted by Torplexed

The 14-part message which the Japanese diplomats tardily delivered to ambassador Hull on December 7th has been characterized as a declaration of war, but it was much more ambiguous than that. The message simply repeated Japan's position, rejected the American position, and expressed the view that further negotiation seemed pointless. While this was certainly ominous, and its significance was not lost on the American cryptanalysts or administration, the note did not formally declare war or even present an ultimatum.

Recently, Japanese historian Iguchi Takeo has cast further light on the 14-part message with the discovery of Japanese archival material showing that the Japanese Army and Navy insisted that the language of the 14-part message be toned down to deliberately avoid giving any warning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He further speculates that the transmissions to the Washington embassy from the Tokyo Foreign Office were deliberately garbled to ensure that the embassy staff would be unable to deliver a clean copy to the Americans before the attack took place. Iguchi also found a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations and they clearly prevailed."

A formal declaration of war was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8, but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.

...

I never heard of this before, but it does not surprise me. If you plan a knockout blow that rests heavily on having complete surprise, it stands to reason, you are not going to risk tipping your hand.

All this makes me wonder: What might have changed if the US had somehow gotten a 2 hour warning of the attack? Would that have been enough to significantly change the outcome?

[MKalafatas]

Originally Posted by WernherVonTrapp

The Japanese did, in fact, dispatch a rather large submarine force to Midway for the purposes of reconnaissance and/or engagement. I do not recall all the specific particulars involving the operation's failure, but many of the Japanese subs arrived late, they lacked coordination and (if I remember correctly) they were out of position. But, this all goes back to the overall planning strategy employed for the battle of Midway.

If I remember correctly, they also sent subs to Pearl Harbor --- expecting reconnaissance on the US fleet when the Japanese attack at Midway became known. Alas, the US already knew about the attack. I think the Yorktown sailed mere hours before the Japanese subs arrived....

Didn't know.

So, it boils down to bad planning and coordination? To much trust in your cojonnes ain't good and the Japanese had to learn it apperently.