How about top ten 20th century Commanders.

[Happy Times]

Originally Posted by Stealth Hunter

INCLUDE WOLFRAM VON RICHTHOFEN, DAMMIT!

I thought of him, if the creation of Luftwaffe can be atributed enough to him i will include him. Guderian is finished on my list.

[Mush Martin]

Originally Posted by Stealth Hunter

INCLUDE WOLFRAM VON RICHTHOFEN, DAMMIT!

Argue the Case in support We were just discussing Von Spee's squadron yesterday
on tarjaks thread Hunt for the Kaisers Cruisers.

[Mush Martin]

I think Omar Bradley was a better Officer and everybit as good a General
as Patton. To my mind when I study the second world war, I come away
impressed with a lot of dudes on all sides. But Omar had his men at heart
not just the victory.

Montgomery was excruciating about trying to keep the blue body
count as low as possible this is an important point, I think
we ought to alter the matrix to reflect preservation of forces
or Cost in lives friendly and enemy.

your thoughts.
M

[Happy Times]

Originally Posted by Mush Martin

I think Omar Bradley was a better Officer and everybit as good a General
as Patton. To my mind when I study the second world war, I come away
impressed with a lot of dudes on all sides. But Omar had his men at heart
not just the victory.

Montgomery was excruciating about trying to keep the blue body
count as low as possible this is an important point, I think
we ought to alter the matrix to reflect preservation of forces
or Cost in lives friendly and enemy.

your thoughts.
M

I dont know, thats the other extreme to Zhukovs meat grinder and i think Zhukov wins in comparison. Cruel maybe, but victory and the total destruction of the enemy has to be a priority.

[AntEater]

On an operational level, I'd rate Manstein fairly high.
The Kharkov operation was simply genial.
Tactically, Rommel. I mean he was not such a great army commander, but at division size engagements he was really great.
He understood the value of initiative and communication.
But at army level, the russians certainly were top notch. While individual engagements were often fought with much casualties, the mere logistics of moving such a huge army so fast in so few days are daunting.
Montogomery was also quite good at army level command and logistics.
Kesselring would rate quite high as well. His defense of Italy was maybe one of the first successful assymetric wars ever fought.
I wouldn't rate the japanese too highly, they were good at pre-planning, but in wartime they neglected intelligence and communications, often in favor of wishful thinking. Japanese favored extremely convoluted, complicated top-down planning over individual initiative.
The battle of the Marianas is an example.
The only real great leader was Yamashi ta. The Singapore operation was nothing but brilliant. Yamash ita was one of the few japanese leaders who dared to improvise.

Regarding the americans, the whole top echelon was quite good. The logistics of the US war effort were not glamorous, but simply an archievement which was not comparable to any war effort ever undertaken by any nation.
People like Gen. Marshall, Adm. King or Emory Land (father of the Liberty ship) created the largest war machine ever out of a civilian economy basically overnight.
And in doing so, they avoided crashing that civilian economy, instead, they managed to strenghten it.
German sources are usually quite disdainful of any US operational/tactical leader except Patton, but the US simply had a more cautious, firepower-centered approach that was only possible in a "rich man's war" and was never really understood here. Avoiding casualties might be a losing strategy if you are poor, but if you're the greatest industrial power on the planet, you can waste endless amounts of material instead of letting your people get killed.

Lol, Subsim doesn't let me spell the name of the conqueror of Singapore correctly.....

Problem with all operational leaders is Ultra. I only now realized how much codebreaking (on both sides) influenced WW2. Often codebreaking meant the difference between victory and defeat, not a leader's skill

[Mush Martin]

I agree with Von Manstiens inclusion as a worthy in this debate, He
was brilliant. so are most of the others thats why settling up the
matrix is important all these thoroughbreds will be hard to judge finely
and any result will be debatable.

M

[Mush Martin]

Originally Posted by Happy Times

Il put a WIP list with no particular order, this is hard.
Did Guderian, no points yet though.

Erich von Manstein

Heinz Guderian

Leadership
"In the Invasion of France, he personally led the attack that traversed the Ardennes Forest, crossed the Meuse River and broke through the French lines at Sedan. During the French campaign, he led his panzer forces in rapid blitzkrieg-style advances and earned the nickname "Schneller Heinz" (Hurrying Heinz) among his troops.[5] Guderian's panzer group led the "race to the sea" that split the Allied armies in two, depriving the French armies and the BEF in Northern France and Belgium of their fuel, food, spare parts and ammunition. Faced with orders from nervous superiors to halt on one occasion, he managed to continue his advance by stating he was performing a 'reconnaissance in force'. Guderian's column was famously denied the chance to destroy the Allied beachhead at Dunkirk by Hitler's personal order.

In 1941 he commanded Panzergruppe 2, better known as Panzergruppe Guderian, in Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, receiving the 24th award of the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross on July 17 of that year. From October 5, 1941 he led the redesignated Second Panzer Army. His armored spearhead captured Smolensk in a remarkably short time and was poised to launch the final assault on Moscow when he was ordered to turn south towards Kiev."


Planning

Manstein Plan
"Whilst Von Manstein was formulating the new plans in Koblenz, it so happened that Lieutenant-General Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIXth Army Corps, Germany's elite armoured formation, was lodged in a nearby hotel.[9] Von Manstein now considered that, should he involve Guderian in his planning, the tank general may come up with some role for his Army Corps to play in it, and this might then be used as a decisive argument to relocate XIXth Army Corps from Army Group B to Army Group A, much to the delight of Von Rundstedt. At this moment Von Manstein's plan consisted in a move from Sedan to the north, right in the rear of the main Allied forces, to engage them directly from the south in full battle. When Guderian was invited to contribute to the plan during informal discussions, he proposed a radical and novel idea: not only his army corps, but the entire Panzerwaffe should be concentrated at Sedan. And this concentration of armour should not move to the north but to the west, to execute a swift, deep, independent strategic penetration towards the English Channel without waiting for the main body of infantry divisions. This could lead to a strategic collapse of the enemy, avoiding the relatively high number of casualties normally caused by a classic Kesselschlacht or "annihilation battle". Such a risky independent strategic use of armour had been widely discussed in Germany before the war but had not at all been accepted as received doctrine; the large number of officers serving in the Infantry, which was the dominant Arm of Service, had successfully prevented this. Von Manstein had to admit that in this special case, however, it might be just the thing needed. His main objection was that it would create an open flank of over 300 kilometres, vulnerable to French counterattack. Guderian convinced him that this could be prevented by launching simultaneous spoiling attacks to the south by small armoured units. However, this would be a departure from the basic concept of the Führer-Directive N°6.

Von Manstein wrote his first memorandum outlining the alternative plan on 31 October. In it he carefully avoided mentioning Guderian's name and downplayed the strategic part of the armoured units, in order not to generate unnecessary resistance.[10] On 6 November, 21 November, 30 November, 6 December, 18 December 1939 and 12 January 1940, a further six memoranda followed, slowly growing more radical in outline."

Mastery of Logistics

"Guderian was convinced that tanks could not be successful without logistical support. Thus was born the idea of armored divisions to provide the support that allows tanks to fight to their maximum capacity. (36) However, during the creation of the German Armored Force, Guderian's request to motorize heavy artillery battalions was turned down. In his memoirs, he remarked, "The heavy guns remained horse-drawn, with unfortunate results during the war, particularly in Russia." (37)

The key to the blitzkrieg was the army's ability to be mobile, similar to the vision of De Guibert. Guderian stated, "Only movement brings victory." (38) The emphasis for the tanks was appropriately pushed, but not the logistics infrastructure to support them. As early as 1937, Guderian noted that resupply of Panzers was found to be insufficient during validity exercises. He noted that rapid movement of supplies and repair depots were needed. (39)"

Tactical execution

"Toward evening, Guderian sent infantry and engineers across the river in inflatable rafts to blast defenders out of their bunkers and construct pontoon bridges for the tanks and other vehicles. Many of the French units holding the unfinished extension of the Maginot Line in this sector were little more than construction crews and lacked combat training. Their opponents, by contrast, had drilled meticulously for this operation in Germany by crossing the Mosel River under live fire. By nightfall, the defenders were retreating in droves, clogging roads and spreading panic. “Tanks are following us!” they shouted, although no tanks would in fact cross the Meuse before daybreak. Their commander, Brig. Gen. Henri-Jean Lafontaine, wasted precious hours that night shifting his command post rearward and seeking detailed orders from superiors. By the time he counterattacked the next morning, Guderian—who habitually led from the front and made snap decisions—had enough armor and artillery across the river to repulse the belated French challenge and secure his bridgehead.

Guderian then overcame objections from superiors, who wanted to consolidate forces at Sedan before advancing, and pushed ahead with two panzer divisions, leaving a third behind to defend the bridgehead. He was taking a big risk, for Allied warplanes were swarming over the Meuse, and the French were massing heavy armor at Stonne, south of Sedan. Between May 15 and 17, Stonne changed hands more than a dozen times as panzers battled in the streets with hulking French Char B heavy tanks, so thickly armored that shells bounced off them like buckshot. Those gas guzzlers could not operate long without refueling, however, and few had functioning radios. Many eventually fell prey to lighter but more maneuverable panzers and to German artillery, including fearsome 88mm anti-aircraft guns that doubled as tank killers with their barrels lowered. The French were defeated at Stonne, and a spirited effort by Brig. Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s Fourth Armored Division to halt Guderian at Montcornet, west of Sedan, failed as well. “A few of his tanks succeeded in penetrating to within a mile of my advanced headquarters,” Guderian observed, but de Gaulle’s lonely bid faltered for lack of support."4.

Initiative

"Achtung - Panzer! was written in 1936-37 as an explanation of Guderian's theories on the role of tanks and aircraft in modern warfare. It was actually a compilation of not only of Guderian's own theories but also the ideas of other proponents of armored and combined-arms warfare within the general staff, though the bulk of the credit rightly is Guderian's. The panzer force he created would become the core of the German Army's power during the Second World War and would deliver the core of the fighting style known as blitzkrieg. To this day, his contributions to combined arms tactics are studied throughout military schools."
He summarized the tactics of blitzkrieg as the way to get the mobile and motorized armored divisions to work together and support each other in order to achieve decisive success. In his book Panzer Leader[2] he wrote:

In this year (1929) I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance. My historical studies; the exercises carried out in England and our own experience with mock-ups had persuaded me that the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance. In such formation of all arms, the tanks must play primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armor. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions: what was needed were armored divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to fight with full effect."

"Guderian believed that certain developments in technology needed to take place in conjunction with blitzkrieg in order to support the entire theory, especially in communication and special visual equipment with which the armored divisions in general, and tanks specifically, should be equipped. Guderian insisted in 1933, within the high command, that every tank in the German armored force must be equipped with radio and visual equipment in order to enable the tank commander to communicate and perform a decisive role in blitzkrieg."

"In the original Von Manstein Plan as Guderian had suggested it, secondary attacks would be carried out to the southeast, in the rear of the Maginot Line, to confuse the French command. This element had been removed by Halder. Guderian now sent 10th Panzer Division and Großdeutschland south to execute precisely such a feint attack,[52] using the only available route south over the Stonne plateau. However, the commander of the French Second Army, General Charles Huntzinger, intended to carry out at the same spot a counterattack by the armoured 3e Division Cuirassée de Réserve to eliminate the bridgehead. This resulted in an armoured collision, both parties in vain trying to gain ground in furious attacks from 15 May to 18 May, the village of Stonne changing hands many times. Huntzinger considered this at least a defensive success and limited his efforts to protecting his flank. However, in the evening of 16 May, Guderian removed 10 PD from the effort, having found a better destination for this division.

Guderian had turned his other two armoured divisions,1st and 2nd Panzerdivision sharply to the west on 14 May. In the afternoon of the 14 May there was still a chance for the French to attack the thus exposed southern flank of 1 PD, before 10 PD had entered the bridgehead, but it was thrown away when a planned attack by 3 DCR was delayed because it was not ready in time.[53] On 15 May, in heavy fighting, Guderian's motorised infantry dispersed the reinforcements of the newly formed French 6th Army in their assembly area west of Sedan, undercutting the southern flank of the French Ninth Army by 40 kilometres (25 mi) and forcing the 102nd Fortress Division to leave its positions that had blocked the tanks of XVI Army Corps at Monthermé. While the French Second Army had been seriously mauled and had rendered itself impotent, the Ninth Army began to disintegrate completely, for in Belgium also its divisions, not having had the time to fortify, had been pushed back from the river by the unrelenting pressure of German infantry, allowing the impetuous Erwin Rommel to break free with his 7th Panzer Division. A French armoured division (1st DCR) was sent to block him but, advancing unexpectedly fast, he surprised it while it was refueling on 15 May and dispersed it, despite some losses caused by the heavy French tanks."


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_Guderian
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_Gelb
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...g=artBody;col1
http://www.historynet.com/blueprint-for-blitzkrieg.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France


Kurt Student

George Patton

Douglas MacArthur

Heihachiro Togo

Isoroku Yamamoto

Mordechai Hod

Ariel Sharon

Israel Tal

Did this post change?

good post.

[Mush Martin]

I like the approach for listing the characteristics and naming the
commander you feel best met this criterion,

that might make it a smoother process if it was done that
way by all.


Hmmmmm:hmm:

[Mush Martin]

Originally Posted by Happy Times

I dont know, thats the other extreme to Zhukovs meat grinder and i think Zhukov wins in comparison. Cruel maybe, but victory and the total destruction of the enemy has to be a priority.

:hmm:The Acme of skill is not to subdue the enemy with battle
it is to subdue the enemy without battle.

[Happy Times]

Originally Posted by Mush Martin

:hmm:The Acme of skill is not to subdue the enemy with battle
it is to subdue the enemy without battle.

Ofcourse and most what ive listed so far have had great victories with minimal own losses.

[Bruno Lotse]

Originally Posted by Happy Times

His way of putting troops in to the "meat grinder" takes him from the list in this form for me.
The maskirovka before Bagration and organisation of logistics in -41 gives a lot of points though.

Happy Times, if you don't know what Marshal Zhukov's first name is (Sergei????!!!),
and his last name is (Zhukhov????!!!!)
allow me be VERY skeptical about your 'knowledge' on Marshal Zhukov's
tactics and strategy.

Marshal Zhukov commanded not only Armies ,
he commanded Fronts, i.e. groups of Armies (10-15 armies in one package).

HSU General Pavlov for a loss of the Western Front was shot, i.e. executed by the Soviets in 1941.
HSU Marshal Timoshenko (he broke Mannerheim Line in winter !!! 1940, remember?)
for heavy losses in his South-Western Front in spring-summer 1942 was sacked
and would never receive a command of any front or any army to that matter.

Marshal Zhukov would be given command of a Front,
because the Supreme Command (STAVKA) knew
that Marshal Zhukov would make out of a **** situation an acceptable one,
he would succeed in advance,
he would make defense strong,
and proportionately he would incur less losses then other commanders.

Less losses proportionately - that's why Marshal Zhukov would be appointed
to command 2-3 ml people in one sweep.

Cheers,
Bruno

[Happy Times]

Originally Posted by Bruno Lotse

Happy Times, if you don't know what Marshal Zhukov's first name is (Sergei????!!!),
and his last name is (Zhukhov????!!!!)
allow me be VERY skeptical about your 'knowledge' on Marshal Zhukov's
tactics and strategy.

Marshal Zhukov commanded not only Armies ,
he commanded Fronts, i.e. groups of Armies (10-15 armies in one package).

HSU General Pavlov for a loss of the Western Front was shot, i.e. executed by the Soviets in 1941.
HSU Marshal Timoshenko (he broke Mannerheim Line in winter !!! 1940, remember?)
for heavy losses in his South-Western Front in spring-summer 1942 was sacked
and would never receive a command of any front or any army to that matter.

Marshal Zhukov would be given command of a Front,
because the Supreme Command (STAVKA) knew
that Marshal Zhukov would make out of a **** situation an acceptable one,
he would succeed in advance,
he would make defense strong,
and proportionately he would incur less losses then other commanders.

Less losses proportionately - that's why Marshal Zhukov would be appointed
to command 2-3 ml people in one sweep.

Cheers,
Bruno

Thats a quote of Mush Martin there. I can see he is your biggest idol but try to hold in your pants.

[Bruno Lotse]

Nope, my idol is HSU Marshal Timoshenko for
breaking Mannerheim line
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mannerheim_Line
in WINTER 1940.

In reality, I am atheist, therefore don't have any idols.
Marshal Zhukov is called be common people 'Marshal of the Victory'.
Vox populi Vox dei

[Happy Times]

Originally Posted by Bruno Lotse

Nope, my idol is HSU Marshal Timoshenko for
breaking Mannerheim line
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mannerheim_Line
in WINTER 1940.

In reality, I am atheist, therefore don't have any idols.
Marshal Zhukov is called be common people 'Marshal of the Victory'.
Vox populi Vox dei

Let me guess, your another homesick Russian imigrant?
You know, in reality also, that the M-line is a myth?

[STEED]

I just like to add Heinz Guderian also did one heck of a job when he was appointed as Inspector of Panzer Troops and all those rows with Hitler, he did one heck of a job with what he could.