USs Billfish...worst depth charging ? - Page 2

virtualpender · 09-20-13, 08:37 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Bubblehead1980

Just wondering what the most harrowing depth charge attack you have read about is.

USS SALMON was pummeled.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/...8/WDR58-7.html

Talltom · 05-05-14, 10:29 AM

Puffer and Billfish had long and harrowing depth chargings, but the Kingfish may have gotten closest to being destroyed. See report and photos at: Report and photographs of damage at: www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/WDR/WDR58/WDR58-5.html
Major indentiations in pressure hull, valve and door frames, and instruments. Very luckly to have survived. Section of the submarine had to be replaced. I recall there were other US WWII submarines that may have been so badly damaged that it made no sense to attempt to repair them. That was likely near the end of the war when the US had so many submarines around Japan and what was left of "Empire Watters" that the effort to get the boat back to sea did not appear to be worth it.

Aktungbby · 05-05-14, 11:19 AM

Talltom!

great first post; keep 'em coming!

Jimbuna · 05-05-14, 12:02 PM

Welcome to SubSim Talltom

SSI01 · 04-09-15, 06:11 AM

I don't know if it pertains specifically to a depth charging, but it is related to other comments in this thread re: suitability of some COs for submarine command. If you've already covered this I apologize. Wasn't there a captain in one boat whose subordinate officers essentially staged a mutiny against him because he repeatedly refused to attack targets that might involve some risk to the boat? I remember reading about this in Clay Blair's two-volume work on US subs in WWII. If memory serves the boat was recalled from patrol and a quick COI was held. The capt admitted to basically being far too cautious for the work and was removed from command. Officers involved were not reprimanded or disciplined -at least, not officially. I can't remember if the XO was made CO or they just got a new CO. But if the actions of the XO and subordinate officers didn't constitute a mutiny in this case they came bloody close. Probably the only things that saved them were 1) the capt admitting he wasn't cut out for the job; 2) the XO and others wanted to take more aggressive actions, not avoid combat.

EDIT: Suspect boat involved was Batfish.

Longknife · 04-09-15, 03:05 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by SSI01

If memory serves the boat was recalled from patrol and a quick COI was held. The capt admitted to basically being far too cautious for the work and was removed from command. .

Early in the war this was rather common with the "old school" officers. Doctrine for subs was more to be used as a patrol boat than an offensive weapon.

One of the 1st boats to have this happen was the USS Argonaut.

Thanks for refreshing this old thread. It was an interesting read!

Pigboatcook · 04-09-15, 03:31 PM

The U.S.S. Salmon was indeed pounded to scrap metal. How she made it home for her final patrol is a miracle. Because of her history she is one of my favorite SH4 boats. I ran an entire career with her.

I located on eBay a matchbook of her. Yes, the sub crews commissioned match books for the several subs (some for post war reunions). I have that matchbook framed and here in my office next to a large B&W framed photo of the U.S.S. Houston and H.M.A.S. Perth. Yeah, I'm an old sentimental fart but those two things always give me a feeling of pride in ours and the Australian Navy.

Cheers, mates.

SSI01 · 04-09-15, 05:35 PM

Longknife - interesting you mention the differences between accepted norms for fleet boat activities before and then during WWII. As you said this new, much more aggressive attitude on the part of the newer, younger captains grew in favor following early lack of results by the older, pre-war captains operating IAW accepted pre-war doctrine (i.e., night sonar approaches/attacks (?)). It's got to be remembered in the pre-war Navy this was a service where a captain's continued command of a boat could depend on whether he came alongside a dock wall too heavily. Lockwood and the other force commanders eventually allowed much, much more aggressive tactics but it was with the realization, arrived at with eyes wide open, this would inevitably lead to increased losses. The wartime captains were younger men, the most successful with exceptional aggressiveness - Morton, Dealey, O'Kane. Of these three outstanding examples, two ended up dead and the third a POW. This is remarkable because Navy doctrine normally specifies preservation of the ship above all other considerations. I would think SSs and DDs were the two most quickly thought of exceptions to this outlook in WWII.

The most ironic thing about Morton's loss was that Wahoo's PCO was aboard with him for a fam patrol at the time of the ship's demise. One wonders what Lockwood, Nimitz or King would have done with him once relieved.

TorpX · 04-09-15, 08:36 PM

I don't think the Navy's problems in this department were limited to subs. In peacetime, officers were judged by the performance of their engineering plants, efficiency reports, exercises, and such. Risk-taking behavior was most likely to be a negative factor. Nor were there many vessels to command. Officers lucky enough to get one, would want to keep it.

Pre-war, USN sub doctrine involved complicated tactics making torpedo attacks by sonar. Exercises with aircraft and task forces indicated periscope attacks were too dangerous, and skippers who did it that way were given bad grades, when they were spotted. What is the Navy's slogan? You fight how you train.

***

I haven't read about the Batfish 'mutiny', but certainly there was tension on the Wahoo under Kennedy. O'Kane and Morton didn't mutiny, but they sure tried to prod Kennedy to take more risks.

SSI01 · 04-10-15, 12:58 PM

I remember that's why they were called "fleet submarines" - their targets, in pre-war thinking, were meant to be enemy surface units and they were supposed to attack these targets IAW overall fleet strategy. In light of how the Kaiser's navy nearly starved Great Britain in WWI using U-boats against merchant shipping, it's hard to see how pre-WWII US naval strategists arrived at the conclusion the big, long-range boats we were developing - ideal commerce raiders - should be used to function as an extension of the battle line rather than operate independently and eliminate an enemy's merchant marine. It could be seen that using this method, there would still be the opportunity for the periodic shot at enemy capital units around naval bases and in rear areas, which would obviously still help America's overall naval strategy.

There are a lot of things hindsight makes 20/20 - one of them was that an earlier emphasis and high priority should have been placed on sinking Japanese tankers. I won't even go into the fiasco about the depth control and exploders on US torpedoes.

TorpX · 04-10-15, 10:45 PM

They did give some thought to commerce raiding, but, the U.S. was obligated to abide by signed agreements about unrestricted submarine warfare, and had a lot to loose, if such a war came to pass. The U.S. declared war on Germany in WWI partly about this.

In a way, we were somewhat fortunate to have a fairly capable submarine fleet ready in '41.

05-05-14, 10:29 AM	#17
Talltom Bilge Rat Join Date: May 2014 Posts: 1 Downloads: 0 Uploads: 0	Worst Depth Charging USS KINGFISH Puffer and Billfish had long and harrowing depth chargings, but the Kingfish may have gotten closest to being destroyed. See report and photos at: Report and photographs of damage at: www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/WDR/WDR58/WDR58-5.html Major indentiations in pressure hull, valve and door frames, and instruments. Very luckly to have survived. Section of the submarine had to be replaced. I recall there were other US WWII submarines that may have been so badly damaged that it made no sense to attempt to repair them. That was likely near the end of the war when the US had so many submarines around Japan and what was left of "Empire Watters" that the effort to get the boat back to sea did not appear to be worth it.

05-05-14, 11:19 AM	#18
Aktungbby Gefallen Engel U-666 Join Date: Jul 2013 Location: On a tilted, overheated, overpopulated spinning mudball on Collision course with Andromeda Galaxy Posts: 29,997 Downloads: 24 Uploads: 0	welcome aboard! Talltom! great first post; keep 'em coming! __________________ "Only two things are infinite; The Universe and human squirrelyness?!!

05-05-14, 12:02 PM	#19
Jimbuna Chief of the Boat Join Date: Feb 2006 Location: 250 metres below the surface Posts: 190,500 Downloads: 63 Uploads: 13	Welcome to SubSim Talltom __________________ Wise men speak because they have something to say; Fools because they have to say something. Oh my God, not again!!

04-09-15, 06:11 AM	#20
SSI01 Loader Join Date: Jul 2011 Posts: 88 Downloads: 56 Uploads: 0	I don't know if it pertains specifically to a depth charging, but it is related to other comments in this thread re: suitability of some COs for submarine command. If you've already covered this I apologize. Wasn't there a captain in one boat whose subordinate officers essentially staged a mutiny against him because he repeatedly refused to attack targets that might involve some risk to the boat? I remember reading about this in Clay Blair's two-volume work on US subs in WWII. If memory serves the boat was recalled from patrol and a quick COI was held. The capt admitted to basically being far too cautious for the work and was removed from command. Officers involved were not reprimanded or disciplined -at least, not officially. I can't remember if the XO was made CO or they just got a new CO. But if the actions of the XO and subordinate officers didn't constitute a mutiny in this case they came bloody close. Probably the only things that saved them were 1) the capt admitting he wasn't cut out for the job; 2) the XO and others wanted to take more aggressive actions, not avoid combat. EDIT: Suspect boat involved was Batfish. Last edited by SSI01; 04-09-15 at 07:05 AM.

04-09-15, 08:36 PM	#24
TorpX Silent Hunter Join Date: Sep 2010 Posts: 3,975 Downloads: 153 Uploads: 11	I don't think the Navy's problems in this department were limited to subs. In peacetime, officers were judged by the performance of their engineering plants, efficiency reports, exercises, and such. Risk-taking behavior was most likely to be a negative factor. Nor were there many vessels to command. Officers lucky enough to get one, would want to keep it. Pre-war, USN sub doctrine involved complicated tactics making torpedo attacks by sonar. Exercises with aircraft and task forces indicated periscope attacks were too dangerous, and skippers who did it that way were given bad grades, when they were spotted. What is the Navy's slogan? You fight how you train. *** I haven't read about the Batfish 'mutiny', but certainly there was tension on the Wahoo under Kennedy. O'Kane and Morton didn't mutiny, but they sure tried to prod Kennedy to take more risks.

04-09-15, 03:31 PM	#22
Pigboatcook A-ganger Join Date: Jan 2015 Posts: 74 Downloads: 21 Uploads: 0	The U.S.S. Salmon was indeed pounded to scrap metal. How she made it home for her final patrol is a miracle. Because of her history she is one of my favorite SH4 boats. I ran an entire career with her. I located on eBay a matchbook of her. Yes, the sub crews commissioned match books for the several subs (some for post war reunions). I have that matchbook framed and here in my office next to a large B&W framed photo of the U.S.S. Houston and H.M.A.S. Perth. Yeah, I'm an old sentimental fart but those two things always give me a feeling of pride in ours and the Australian Navy. Cheers, mates.

04-09-15, 05:35 PM	#23
SSI01 Loader Join Date: Jul 2011 Posts: 88 Downloads: 56 Uploads: 0	Longknife - interesting you mention the differences between accepted norms for fleet boat activities before and then during WWII. As you said this new, much more aggressive attitude on the part of the newer, younger captains grew in favor following early lack of results by the older, pre-war captains operating IAW accepted pre-war doctrine (i.e., night sonar approaches/attacks (?)). It's got to be remembered in the pre-war Navy this was a service where a captain's continued command of a boat could depend on whether he came alongside a dock wall too heavily. Lockwood and the other force commanders eventually allowed much, much more aggressive tactics but it was with the realization, arrived at with eyes wide open, this would inevitably lead to increased losses. The wartime captains were younger men, the most successful with exceptional aggressiveness - Morton, Dealey, O'Kane. Of these three outstanding examples, two ended up dead and the third a POW. This is remarkable because Navy doctrine normally specifies preservation of the ship above all other considerations. I would think SSs and DDs were the two most quickly thought of exceptions to this outlook in WWII. The most ironic thing about Morton's loss was that Wahoo's PCO was aboard with him for a fam patrol at the time of the ship's demise. One wonders what Lockwood, Nimitz or King would have done with him once relieved.

04-10-15, 12:58 PM	#25
SSI01 Loader Join Date: Jul 2011 Posts: 88 Downloads: 56 Uploads: 0	I remember that's why they were called "fleet submarines" - their targets, in pre-war thinking, were meant to be enemy surface units and they were supposed to attack these targets IAW overall fleet strategy. In light of how the Kaiser's navy nearly starved Great Britain in WWI using U-boats against merchant shipping, it's hard to see how pre-WWII US naval strategists arrived at the conclusion the big, long-range boats we were developing - ideal commerce raiders - should be used to function as an extension of the battle line rather than operate independently and eliminate an enemy's merchant marine. It could be seen that using this method, there would still be the opportunity for the periodic shot at enemy capital units around naval bases and in rear areas, which would obviously still help America's overall naval strategy. There are a lot of things hindsight makes 20/20 - one of them was that an earlier emphasis and high priority should have been placed on sinking Japanese tankers. I won't even go into the fiasco about the depth control and exploders on US torpedoes.

04-10-15, 10:45 PM	#26
TorpX Silent Hunter Join Date: Sep 2010 Posts: 3,975 Downloads: 153 Uploads: 11	They did give some thought to commerce raiding, but, the U.S. was obligated to abide by signed agreements about unrestricted submarine warfare, and had a lot to loose, if such a war came to pass. The U.S. declared war on Germany in WWI partly about this. In a way, we were somewhat fortunate to have a fairly capable submarine fleet ready in '41.