The XXI was not the fastest sub during WWII! - Page 2

CCIP · 01-17-12, 02:58 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by mookiemookie

How would this have worked when German submarine production couldn't even replace their own losses in the Atlantic? How would the subs have been delivered? The only way to get them there would have been sailing them to Japan around Africa. Logistically, the idea would never have worked.

And let's not forget that sailing around Africa was no cakewalk either - one of the key successes of Allied ASW was that it was everywhere after a certain point in the war, and Germany's industry was already suffering from Allied bombing raids. Ordering a boat that could easily be destroyed before it was built or on the way to its initial base of operations seems like a colossal waste of resources, ignoring all the other factors.

Otherwise, it is of course in some sense true that the Germans really lost the U-boat war in the construction phase, much in the same way that Americans had succeeded at so many campaigns. Submarines were inherently (and fatally) flawed weapons, but one side in this conflict was vastly better at both rebuilding them and sinking the enemy's. In a war of attrition, not even Germany was a match for the Allied production capacity - and Japan was nowhere close. Many key WWII campaigns were, in their own ways, wars of attrition, complicated by geography and technology, but still ultimately driven by production. The Battle of the Atlantic was certainly a classic example of that.

mookiemookie · 01-17-12, 04:54 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by CCIP

Otherwise, it is of course in some sense true that the Germans really lost the U-boat war in the construction phase, much in the same way that Americans had succeeded at so many campaigns. Submarines were inherently (and fatally) flawed weapons, but one side in this conflict was vastly better at both rebuilding them and sinking the enemy's. In a war of attrition, not even Germany was a match for the Allied production capacity - and Japan was nowhere close. Many key WWII campaigns were, in their own ways, wars of attrition, complicated by geography and technology, but still ultimately driven by production. The Battle of the Atlantic was certainly a classic example of that.

Exactly right. Any discussion that implies that the Axis could have won the war if X had happened almost always ignores the fact that the U.S could outproduce the entire Axis as a whole. And that's a HUGE (if not the) reason why the Allies won the war.

CCIP · 01-17-12, 05:21 PM

Ironically, that's possibly the biggest contribution of the submarine (and the airplane) to modern naval war - turning it back into a war of attrition, rather than the grand Mahanian vision that the Japanese were so hung up on. It made sure that no matter how brilliantly you won that big naval battle, no matter how good your tactics and individual ships were, you would never have full control of the sea lanes and safety for your fleet as long as the enemy had enough submarines/airplanes to ruin your day. And conversely, you could never win against a submarine campaign unless you had enough ASW ships and airplanes to chase down those subs. No matter what Churchill said, although what the U-boats did was incredibly impressive and breathtaking in scale, it wasn't ever close to bringing Britain to her knees, and when 1943 came - with the U-boat force in better shape than it had been before - it was simply crushed by attrition, not sudden tactical failings or massive technological breakthroughs. It was not a sudden defeat, but one that (in all clarity of retrospect) had been in the making since the start of the war, and certainly over previous couple of years. Things just needed to reach a tipping point in numbers, and then they did.

Neither the XXI nor the Japanese efforts were something that could stop the allied ASW steamroller - they would set the Allies back, but at what cost? The cost would be too high for the Japanese who would have to divert resources, personnel, technology and training to this problematic new sub, or sub production in general. They wouldn't be magically able to build a sub fleet out of nothing - something else would have to be sacrificed. What would it be? Airplanes? ASW escorts? What would that cost them? At the same time, the damage that they would be able to do to the Allies as a result would not be enough. Of course that was Japan's whole premise in the war - the idea that if somehow they could humiliate the US enough with a series of impressive victories, they would lose the will to fight and sue for peace. And we know what became of that...

01-17-12, 06:58 PM

Mahan's "Decisive Battle" theories were essentially obsolete after Tsushima. The submarine was a factor to be sure but aircraft, the locomotive torpedo, mines and wireless all played a part.

I would venture to state that by the time Dreadnought slid down the ways in 1905, the battleship was already obsolescent but naval Mahanian dogma prevent most (but not all) admirals from facing the unpleasant facts. The swan song for the gun-armed capital ship was 8 December 1914 when Sturdee annihilated von Spee and, for the last time, established uncontested sea control using big guns alone.

As for the rest, I think your analysis is spot on. The Type XXI, XXIII and I-201 could never have been decisive for the reasons stated. Will go even further and say that likewise, Bismarck, Yamato, the I-400's and all their ilk were dodo birds trying to contest mastery with rats and dogs (metaphorically subs and aircraft); they represented resources, material and manpower wasted on theories that were irrelevant decades before they were built.

01-17-12, 05:21 PM	#18
CCIP Navy Seal Join Date: Apr 2005 Location: Waterloo, Canada Posts: 8,700 Downloads: 29 Uploads: 2	Ironically, that's possibly the biggest contribution of the submarine (and the airplane) to modern naval war - turning it back into a war of attrition, rather than the grand Mahanian vision that the Japanese were so hung up on. It made sure that no matter how brilliantly you won that big naval battle, no matter how good your tactics and individual ships were, you would never have full control of the sea lanes and safety for your fleet as long as the enemy had enough submarines/airplanes to ruin your day. And conversely, you could never win against a submarine campaign unless you had enough ASW ships and airplanes to chase down those subs. No matter what Churchill said, although what the U-boats did was incredibly impressive and breathtaking in scale, it wasn't ever close to bringing Britain to her knees, and when 1943 came - with the U-boat force in better shape than it had been before - it was simply crushed by attrition, not sudden tactical failings or massive technological breakthroughs. It was not a sudden defeat, but one that (in all clarity of retrospect) had been in the making since the start of the war, and certainly over previous couple of years. Things just needed to reach a tipping point in numbers, and then they did. Neither the XXI nor the Japanese efforts were something that could stop the allied ASW steamroller - they would set the Allies back, but at what cost? The cost would be too high for the Japanese who would have to divert resources, personnel, technology and training to this problematic new sub, or sub production in general. They wouldn't be magically able to build a sub fleet out of nothing - something else would have to be sacrificed. What would it be? Airplanes? ASW escorts? What would that cost them? At the same time, the damage that they would be able to do to the Allies as a result would not be enough. Of course that was Japan's whole premise in the war - the idea that if somehow they could humiliate the US enough with a series of impressive victories, they would lose the will to fight and sue for peace. And we know what became of that... __________________ There are only forty people in the world and five of them are hamburgers. -Don Van Vliet (aka Captain Beefheart)

01-17-12, 06:58 PM	#19
Randomizer Stowaway Posts: n/a Downloads: Uploads:	Mahan's "Decisive Battle" theories were essentially obsolete after Tsushima. The submarine was a factor to be sure but aircraft, the locomotive torpedo, mines and wireless all played a part. I would venture to state that by the time Dreadnought slid down the ways in 1905, the battleship was already obsolescent but naval Mahanian dogma prevent most (but not all) admirals from facing the unpleasant facts. The swan song for the gun-armed capital ship was 8 December 1914 when Sturdee annihilated von Spee and, for the last time, established uncontested sea control using big guns alone. As for the rest, I think your analysis is spot on. The Type XXI, XXIII and I-201 could never have been decisive for the reasons stated. Will go even further and say that likewise, Bismarck, Yamato, the I-400's and all their ilk were dodo birds trying to contest mastery with rats and dogs (metaphorically subs and aircraft); they represented resources, material and manpower wasted on theories that were irrelevant decades before they were built.