Pacific war What-ifs

[joegrundman]

So there is RR's interesting thread about the U-boat war and the what-if story. The fact that what-ifs abound in the european war highlights the fact that it was a close-run thing and that other scenario endings were possible.

But for the Pacific war, Japan's GDP was 1/6th that of the US. So they attack in some Satsuma rebellion style apocalyptic do-or-die spasm of violence.

I cannot think, for the life of me, of any what-ifs that may not have ended in total Japanese defeat. But then I know little about that war.

So here's my question:

What, apart from backing down from Manchuria after the oil embargo was in force, could Japan have done that may have yielded a different outcome from the one that did actually develop?

[Ducimus]

Adopt a different strategic doctrine with the IJN.

[AVGWarhawk]

Simply have resources to conduct a war. The Japanese knew that resources would be their undoing. They knew oil would not last but a few years to fuel the war machines. Perhaps a stock pile of resources before you conduct war. Most people do not go on a 400 mile trip with a 1/4 tank of gas and expect to get their.

One other thing, a second wave at Pearl Harbor should have happened.

[The Fishlord]

Originally Posted by Ducimus

Adopt a different strategic doctrine with the IJN.

Yep. Japanese subs were the largest and some of the most sophisticated of the war, but they used them to scout and sink warships, instead of trying to strangle the USA's merchants.

They were fast, had radar later in the war, and had Kaitens (like a Cutie, except with longer range, higher speed and a human pilot). If they had really focused on slaughtering US merchants they could have at least slowed down the island-hopping compaign.

[Torplexed]

One thing Japan could have done to change the equation a bit was to dispense with the initial Pearl Harbor attack. The surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet goaded and united Americans as never before. If Japan had declined to declare war on the US in December 1941 and had instead bypassed the Phillipines and other US possessions to attack the resource-rich British and Dutch colonies in the Far East that they desired, they probably would have still found themselves at war with the US as we were bound to come to Britain's aid. But without the surprise attack element it would have taken out a lot of the sting the American public felt on December 7th, 1941. We would have found ourselves going to war not to avenge Pearl Harbor or Bataan or Wake Island but to protect British and Dutch colonial interests in Asia. Not as much of a rallying point for a staunchily isolationist nation. America was fairly oil independent at the time so Japan taking oil-rich Sumatra and Borneo wouldn't have been a matter of life and death. Of course without the surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor the US would have gone ahead with Plan Orange. Sending a vast fleet of battleships and carrier across the Pacific to protect or relieve the Phillipines. Well...that was the battle the IJN had been preparing for for many years. They had more carriers at that point and excellent pilots. Not to mention a lot of land based air enroute. Battleships sunk in the mid-Pacific couldn't be raised from the bottom like the ones on Battleship Row.

Japan probably still would have lost. But it might have been a longer contest. Certainly a what if scenario. :hmm:

[Takao]

There really is not a what if where Japan, alone, wins the war. The Japanese policy of rearmament during the 1930's was bankrupting the nation. They had to import almost everything and their exports hardly covered this cost. So, if they did not go to war in 1941, the Japanese nation would have been bankrupt shortly there after.

A different strategic policy for the IJN is a non-starter. The USA is, for the most part, self-sufficient. A commerce raiding & I-Boat strategy would hinder the American war effort, but would not cripple or halt it. At most, the IJN can only delay the inevitable rise in American war production and the USN's march across the Pacific. The same for any strategic air campaign, the USA is to far away. Even if the Japanese had taken Hawaii, the Islands are to far from the West Coast to be of any good here. Not to mention, putting undue strain on the Japanese logistics to keep the islands supplied. Nor, can Japan hope of damaging any industries located on the East Coast.

A Japanese "victory" during World War II would rely heavily on Germany. Here, events would proceed normally through the fall of France. Here would be the deviation. Germany shifts its economy to "war production". The U-Boat campaign I'd keep, it holds the British Isles in check. Then, there is no Battle of Britain, that was a useless waste of German planes, pilots, and time. Instead, Germany moves to secure the Med and the Mid-East. Once this is done, both Germany and Japan move against Russia. The increased German war production and the addition of Japanese forces moving into Siberia will, hopefully, cause the downfall of Russia. With Russia out of the way. Germany is free to move against the British Isles and Japan can move into against India and the British territories in the Pacific. Even still, you would have to include what the USA would be doing during this time. If the combined efforts of Germany and Japan take out Russia by the end of 1941. The Japan, well the Axis, have a good chance of winning World War II.

Notice, I don't mention a Pearl Harbor. There is no way, I would attack it. Let the USA come to me to do battle. Nothing infuriated the Americans more than that attack. No Pearl Harbor, and much of the willingness of the American public to go to and then sustain a prolonged war is gone. If Germany and Japan could quickly dispose of Britain, than any overt action by the USA is unlikely. Germany gets Europe and Africa, Japan has Asia and the Pacific(out to but excluding Midway), and the United States has the Americas. What a different World that would be.

Not really a Japanese What-If, but an Axis one.

[FAdmiral]

Pure & Simple !! EXPANSION FEVER Without any loss to speak of, the
Japanese just kept going instead of grabbing what they needed and go into
a defense mode. Someone should have given them the book "Rise & Fall of the
Roman Empire"


JIM

[Torplexed]

Assuming a declared war on America but given hindsight I'd change a lot of things in the prewar production cycle if I were the Emperor. (Not that it'd make much of a difference) Cancel the Yamato BBs for starters. For roughly the same tonnage 3 Unryu class carriers could be built per Yamato.

Put more emphasis on pilot training and rotating veteran pilots home to train rookies. Japan had an insane policy of keeping veteran pilots at the front until they were dead or wounded. And they didn't train enough of them. The carrier pilots who fought in the Marianas battle in 1944 were almost all green. By Leyte Gulf they were switching to kamikazes.

Change ASW doctrine radically. Beg, borrow and steal any radar and sonar technology you can from allies and enemies alike. Beat and whip it into the destroyer and escort captains heads that defending merchant ship from subs is their most honorable profession. Cancel wasteful and counter-productive projects like the midget subs and the massive I-400 class in favor of building escorts. Frankly I'd cancel all Japanese sub production except for the advanced ST types. The RO-class in particular was virtually useless.

Scrap all the pre-war battleships for their steel with exception of the Kongo class. The old and slow Nagato, Ise and Fuso classes contributed very little to the war effort. Build even more escorts with the steel. Use the guns for coastal defence.

Well...there's a million things Japan could have done ahead of time. But assuming war with America they probably would have only delayed defeat given the disparity between the two opponents. Here's a link to a page on combined fleet site that compares Japan and the USA economically. Quite an eye-popper considering the historical decisions made.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

Originally Posted by Torplexed

One thing Japan could have done to change the equation a bit was to dispense with the initial Pearl Harbor attack. The surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet goaded and united Americans as never before. If Japan had declined to declare war on the US in December 1941 and had instead bypassed the Phillipines and other US possessions to attack the resource-rich British and Dutch colonies in the Far East that they desired, they probably would have still found themselves at war with the US as we were bound to come to Britain's aid. But without the surprise attack element it would have taken out a lot of the sting the American public felt on December 7th, 1941. We would have found ourselves going to war not to avenge Pearl Harbor or Bataan or Wake Island but to protect British and Dutch colonial interests in Asia. Not as much of a rallying point for a staunchily isolationist nation. America was fairly oil independent at the time so Japan taking oil-rich Sumatra and Borneo wouldn't have been a matter of life and death. Of course without the surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor the US would have gone ahead with Plan Orange. Sending a vast fleet of battleships and carrier across the Pacific to protect or relieve the Phillipines. Well...that was the battle the IJN had been preparing for for many years. They had more carriers at that point and excellent pilots. Not to mention a lot of land based air enroute. Battleships sunk in the mid-Pacific couldn't be raised from the bottom like the ones on Battleship Row.

Japan probably still would have lost. But it might have been a longer contest. Certainly a what if scenario. :hmm:

You know, it would have made for a much more interesting game if this "what-if" scenario had actually been made into a mod for SH4. Drag the thing out into a "you might win, you might lose" set-up instead of a "we know the USA wins, we just want to know if you'll survive to the end of it" situation.

Did I just come up with an idea for a mod? Possibly SH6? :p

[jetthelooter]

Originally Posted by joegrundman

What, apart from backing down from Manchuria after the oil embargo was in force, could Japan have done that may have yielded a different outcome from the one that did actually develop?

if japan had of adopted a doctrine of pulling their best pilots out of the war after so many missions to train new pilots in air combat it might have offset the disaster of their doctrine of "fly till you die".

If japan had of abandoned much earlier the strict code of entry to military leadership academies, flight school, and command school. they may have had the personal acailable to replace combat losses.

If japan had of consolidated their weapons procurement procedures and supplied the armies with consistent weapons across all units and consolidated the vastly duplicated naval and air force structure into a single service and done the same with ship building and aircraft construction they may have made a difference. prime example is the musashi and yamato class battle ships. compelete and total waste of treasure and manpower.

If japan had not relied so heavily on dispersed weapons productions basically based around the cottage industry model reserves of ammunition and weapons may have have been higher.

if japan had of adopted a early war convoy policy it would have renderd the effect of the US submarine service much smaller than it was

if japan had of taken a stronger control and emphasis over the merchant fleet

if japanese submarines had of been utilized to interdict american supply ships instead of primarly searching for warships.

if japan aircraft design doctrine had of shifted from unarmoured dueling style aircraft to a more keep the pilot alive model.

japanese commanders invariably when given a choice opted for a tactical victory sacrificing strategic objectives. pearl harbor was a prime example. tactically a massive success strategically a total and complete failure on numerous levels the highest being the total miss on the oil depot.

and last and most important if japan had of ditched that idiotic samurai mentality...

[Rockin Robbins]

Yes, the Japanese showdown mentality was their undoing. But the principle problem they had was ignorance. Their insular society had very few people who were familiar with America at all, aside from Yamamoto, who had the famous quote about awakening the sleeping giant.

But we had our own showdown strategy of getting all the capital ships of both nations together and duking it out to victory. Little did we know about the Japanese mastery of night battles (we didn't practice at night at all--might have a collision and give some ships boo-boos). We knew nothing about their advanced torpedoes or brilliance in execution thereof. See what the crew of the Houson has to say about all that!

If Japan had known us as well as they should, they would have known the phrase "Remember the Maine!" and another one similarly "Remember the Alamo!" Best not give those Yanks anything to remember. So Pearl Harbor is out. Let them attack Japan if they be so bold. Another bonus is that Pearl harbor put the means of significant American defeat safely on the bottom of the harbor with very little loss of life. Another aspect they did not understand was to power of the isolationist movement of the time, Americans completely willing to let the rest of the world go to hell, secure in the knowledge that if we left them alone, none of that mayhem would affect us. The Japanese could have used that, had they known it was available for their exploitation.

Just like the Japanese, we had a "big ship party" strategy. Had that happened, we would have taken casualties that made Pearl Harbor look like a USO dance. The Japanese would have chosen a night action, they would have unleashed several hundred Long Lance Type 93 torpedoes and we simply would have been anihilated with 10,000 dead at least. Now reflect on our attitude toward the comparitively few casualties in Iraq and imagine the reaction of the isolationist American public of the time to that! It was the symbolism of the Pearl Harbor attack, coupled with emulation of reactions to the Alamo and the Maine that galvanized American reaction. Without that rallying point and with a much more humiliation defeat for no particular purpose, there's a chance we would have pulled in our claws and called for our Mommy.

There is also a chance that the same thing would have happened. Once engaged, the Japanese had two good years of victory after victory and then it was the not so graceful swan dive for them.

I believe they were not capable of dealing with the Russians in a land battle. The Russians were methodical and covered all their bases while they just mopped the field with their enemies. The Japanese were impulsive and tactical, rather than strategic. Their strength played directly into Russian strategy. I suspect it would have been a repeat of Marshall Zhukov's earlier spanking.

Great thread here!

[CaptainHaplo]

What-if scenarios are not just based on what the Japanese could have done - but also the state of things and the reaction.

What if the major carrier elements of the USN had been moored in Pearl during the attack? Had they been catastrophically crippled like our battleship force was, the war in the pacific would have been entirely different. The ONLY reason that we responded with carrier forces is because thats all the heavy firepower we had left. The navy brass at the time still felt that heavy warships (BB's and CA's) were the "backbone" of the fleet and would be the major combatants in the coming future conflict. Make no mistake, naval planners in the 30s were planning on having to face the Japanese.

The idea of Carrier warfare for the US was not borne of great inspiration, it was developed out of dire need. This is not to say that even the loss of our carriers as well as the rest of our surface navy would have insured a Japanese victory, but it would have extended the war tremendously.

Where the German blunders were either broadly tactical on a large scale (such as base location for the Luftwaffe) or strategic (such as the Western Invasion) - the Japanese made the mistake that the CSA in the Civil War made. They didn't really have any strategic vision - no long term goal other than to expand in whatever direction presented itself. Other than the attack on the Phillipines and the attempt to take Midway (which was folly - whether we had Ultra or not!), they really never focused on attacking the US after Pearl Harbor. Instead they looked for whatever target of opportunity could be exploited. This is what led to the creation of ABDA, which the Japanese promptly ran all over. ABDA was a polyglot collection of various naval vessels that was to defend certain areas. The only reason ABDA was smashed was it was in the way.

The Coral Sea battle is a perfect example - it was designed to defend against, and possibly eliminate Australia from the war. While I have nothing against my Aussie friends, its not like Australia was the big dog on the block in the Pacific. The Japanese saw an opening tactically they thought they could exploit. But expansion without a goal is reckless - and Coral Sea set the Japanese up for defeat at Midway.

The other thing that cost Japan was its "death before dishonor" and fanatical devotion to Hirohito. While I normally dont draw "modern" parallels - the rank and file military were told that upon their deaths they would immediately be in heaven due to their service to the Emperor. This was told to not just kamikaze pilots, but the army and navy as well - be it banzia charges or the human torpedo's that were created. This not only is a horribly ineffective waste of manpower, but it creates a "no retreat" policy that did not allow the Japanese to withdraw and consolidate along a truly defensible perimeter in the pacific. This is also told to the extremist who are encouraged to blow themselves up with as many civvies as they can so they can go to "heaven" and get a bunch of "pure girls" to enjoy eternity with.... Just something people should think about on occasion.

Lastly, the foolishness of not insuring a land corridor up the coast to where they could just sail raw materials across a small body of water instead of leaving their supply lines vulnerable to the enemy is insanity. Especially when our subs started really hurting them. They had the ability to secure a northern corridor, they just never thought of it. With them, it was Attack Attack Attack until they had wasted their strength. Once that was done, the war was over for them.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by CaptainHaplo

Where the German blunders were either broadly tactical on a large scale (such as base location for the Luftwaffe) or strategic (such as the Western Invasion) - the Japanese made the mistake that the CSA in the Civil War made. They didn't really have any strategic vision - no long term goal other than to expand in whatever direction presented itself. Other than the attack on the Phillipines and the attempt to take Midway (which was folly - whether we had Ultra or not!), they really never focused on attacking the US after Pearl Harbor. Instead they looked for whatever target of opportunity could be exploited. This is what led to the creation of ABDA, which the Japanese promptly ran all over. ABDA was a polyglot collection of various naval vessels that was to defend certain areas. The only reason ABDA was smashed was it was in the way.

Actually the Japanese did have a strategic vision. They just didn't stick with it.

Japanese planners never envisaged a total defeat of the Western powers. Their intention was to strike a series of coordinated blows securing the resources of south Asia and establishing a defensive perimeter around them. This perimeter, extending well into the western Pacific Ocean, would be developed into a barrier of bases and fortified islands impregnable to amphibious assault. Behind that shield, the Imperial Navy would wait to launch javelin thrusts at counterattacks from any direction, making up for inferior numbers by use of interior lines and superior ships.

Japan, in short, proposed to fight the Pacific war as it had fought China and Russia. Limiting the conflict by escalating it's material and moral costs beyond what the Western powers, America in particular were willing to pay. The strategy was, oddly enough, based on American rationality. Americans were businessmen, not samurai. It was believed that they would calculate costs and benefits, and then come to terms with the harsh realities created by Japanese arms.

The problem came when the initial victories came much quicker and more cheaply then expected. The perimeter idea was expanded beyond the southern resource areas and the western Pacific to include the New Hebrides, the Aleutians, Midway, and then came the inevitable strategic overreach and disaster which ensued.

[CaptainHaplo]

Excellent point torplexed - I missed seeing that!