Tell us what you're up to in current campaign (lets get this one going lol)

[Kapitän]

Originally Posted by Kapitän

Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...

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U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)

Monday, 12 July 1943 - Indian Ocean -

Annex 1

S u p p l y :

1.) Meeting was good (including Recognition Signal exchange).
2.) Fuel oil transfer according to plan and smoothly (13.5 cbm taken on in 30').
3.) Provisions transfer considerably complicated because in addition to inflatable boat as cargo boat only 1 small boat from the supplier as towing boat (Launch of the motorboat and torpedo loading not tried because of the poor sea state). Doctors visit not required. Exchange of navigational fix.
4.) Signal personnel at tanker at a strength of 1:1 was sufficient but is not enough for group supply.
5.) Beyond fuel and provisions the supplier was not fitted out for supply (hardly any spare parts etc., i.e., Repair of compressor not possible).
6.) The kindness of the supply ship Captain to the last crew member was exemplary.
7.) Supply was great for morale of own boat and for the raider crew.
8.) Weather and Sea conditions throughout were consistently poor with high winds, overcast and swell.

RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115

Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...

+++++++

U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)

Monday, 12 July 1943 - Indian Ocean -

Annex 2

Radio Messages transferred by Schliemann:

U-boat Situation.

A. North Atlantic:

1) When on May 24th convoy operation "Donau" failed and all the boats still well off for fuel (U 569, 641, 228, 603, 636, 666, 211, 608, 221, 951, 232, 435, 642, 217 and 92) were ordered to proceed to the central Atlantic, it was intended that the remaining boats in the N. Atlantic should occupy varying attack areas and deceive the enemy as to the number of boats actually in the area by heavy dummy radio traffic. Altogether 13 boats remained in the Northern operations area and during the first few weeks is was actually possible to keep the enemy in the dark as to the number of boats there, as English U-boat situation reports have shown. He continued to believe that there were 2 or 3 large groups of U-boats.

2) It was intended to keep the number of U-boats remaining in the operations AK and AJ, at approximately the same level by relieving them by boats sailing from home ports. Within a short time however, several boats had to return owing to fuel consumption and damage and 2, U 202 and 304, were lost. The number of boats coming from home ports was not sufficient, especially as 4 Atlantic boats in Bergen were made available to F.O. U/B Norway, for operations in Northern Waters.
Of the 16 boats which left home ports or Norway up to 12.5. (i.e. U 467, 667, 450, 535, 341, 170, 669, 271, 308, 449, 536, 417, 388, 194, 200 and 420);
a) 5 were lost in the Iceland Passage: (U 467, 308, 417, 200, 194).
b) 2 were lost after 2 days in the operations area: (U 334, 338).
c) 2 were damaged in the Iceland Passage and returned to W. France: (U 450, 449).
d) 3 boats, type IXc were ordered to CE 70 to deliver their fuel, owing to the strained tanker situation (U 535, 536, 170).

3) After it became known that U 194 and U 200 had been lost, the sailing of all boats without quadruple Flak from home ports was cancelled. This meant a postponement of approximately 4 weeks for all sailing dates. 4 boats on their way to the Atlantic: (U 387, 277, 713 and 307) were diverted and made available to F.O. U/B Norway for his mining operation.

4) These facts have led to the N. Atlantic being at present practically devoid of U-boats. There is one boat U 667 still in the Northern operations area. It is presumed that the enemy is no longer deceived to the actual state of affairs (there is no information on this, as no English U-boat situation reports have been received because of change in Radio procedure ("Frankfurt"). As far as can be gathered from the press, the enemy believes that, by using more auxiliary carriers, he has succeeded in chasing the U-boats off the North Atlantic convoy routes. At present, chances of attacking are so slight owing to the strength of the escort forces and chances of finding the convoys so remote with so few U-boats, that there is little purpose in sending boats from Western France to fill this gap in the Northern operations area. In practice boats would have to operate in the North Atlantic with very small prospects of success.

5) The plan to resume convoy operations in the North Atlantic, at the end of July with stronger forces, has been abandoned, as by that time neither the Zaunkönig nor the improved Radar interception gear necessary to prevent surprise attacks by aircraft will be available. If it is possible to equip boats leaving W. France by the middle of August with Zaunkönig and the Radar interception gear, action against convoys on the England - America route will be resumed during the new moon period at the end of August.

RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115