China tells U.S. to shut up....

[August]

Originally Posted by Kazuaki Shimazaki II

Better for everyone, probably.

I positively wince whenever I hear about the US whining about another nation's militarization. It is utterly hypocritical.

"Oh no, they are arming themselves so one day they might actually be able to defend against us or defy our will!"

You don't really believe that do you? Washington isn't the only ones worried about it.

[Kapitan]

Il say this one sentance and no more unless people want me to defend it.

its about bleeding time someone should tell the U.S.A to shut thier face

(note this is to the bush regieme not being prejudice against american citizens on the whole im not against the american people just bush for his pointless i know best we do it my way then it goes tits up, yes im one of these people fed up of following bush because he is "hard")

[August]

Originally Posted by Kapitan

Il say this one sentance and no more unless people want me to defend it.

its about bleeding time someone should tell the U.S.A to shut thier face

Hey why don't you go vandalize someones car.

[Kapitan]

Because im not a vandle thief or what ever i do that if some one pisses me off threatens me or does something against me otherwise im as sane as the next man isnt that right fred yup he sure is !

[Kapitan]

Originally Posted by August

Hey why don't you go vandalize someones car.

I have already done this meaningless task this morning (not directly), i was doing my route on the dustcarts (trash lorrys) when we tried to get round a tight corner, some woman had parked a 4x4 in the acctual drive way, we tried knocking her up by honking the horn several dozen times and even knocking on her door.

The viachle had no tax on it which means we can hit it and get away with it, so what do we do reverse the hopper into the rear and push it down the road a tad.

I dont think the woman in question will be very happy when she acctualy sees the back door and bumper, but it cant come back on us she had no tax therefore not insured and was on the road so not our fault.

[SUBMAN1]

Enough said:

-S

PS. It didn't transfer perfectly, so use the link for the weapon statistics.


http://www.globalfirepower.com/chinese_report.asp

CHINA'S SHOW OF FORCE FOR TAIWAN

Excerpts from the Annual Report to Congress. Notable points in RED.
Trends in China's Strategy in the Asia-Pacific and Other Regions of the World
In 2004, China became more active in the global arena, deploying its growing political and economic weight to increase its influence not only regionally but globally. China's decision to deploy peacekeepers to Haiti and its growing engagement in Latin America are emblematic of this effort. In the Asia-Pacific region, some of its diplomacy was geared to regional institutions that would exclude the United States. Globally, competition with Taiwan and constraining Taiwan's international profile are important elements of China's foreign and diplomatic strategy, particularly among developing countries.

• <LI class=smalltext>China introduced "peaceful rise," a new term to describe China's emergence.
  Although China's leaders themselves spoke of "peaceful rise" when it first appeared,
  they quickly withdrew the term - apparently reflecting unresolved internal debate
  over whether or not the term itself was too unsettling to the region or, for some, too
  soft. Elements of that debate continue to appear in the Chinese press and professional
  journals. Nevertheless, China's leaders continue to highlight peaceful themes to
  describe its rise. <LI class=smalltext>China became the world's second largest consumer and third largest importer of oil in
  2003. As China's energy and resource needs grow, Beijing has concluded that access
  to these resources requires special economic or foreign policy relationships in the
  Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, bringing China closer to problem countries
  such as Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela. Resource concerns, among others, played a role
  in increased Sino-Japanese tensions over the disputed East China Sea. <LI class=smalltext>Beijing continued to play its role as the chief organizer of the Six-Party Talks aimed
  at resolving the North Korea nuclear issue. China continues to call publicly for a
  "nuclear-free Korean Peninsula." China has unique potential, due to its historic ties
  and geography, to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions. <LI class=smalltext>China expanded upon the successful conclusion in 2003 of the China-ASEAN Joint
  Declaration of a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity - the first such
  agreement China has ever concluded with a regional organization - and China's 2003
  accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation - the first non-ASEAN
  country to do so - by signing in 2004 a memorandum of understanding with ASEAN
  on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues and endorsing the
  ASEAN Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China maintains
  active diplomacy, including military relations, with most ASEAN member states to
  promote positive views of China's rise, gain access to resources, and isolate Taiwan. <LI class=smalltext>China continued to make progress on resolving its border dispute with India. In
  Beijing, improved ties with New Delhi serve as a way to stabilize its periphery and
  balance perceived improvements in U.S.-India relations. At the same time, Beijing is
  encouraging New Delhi and Islamabad to reduce tensions while preserving China's
  historical strategic partnership with Pakistan.
• The PLA conducted joint maritime search and rescue drills for the first time with
  British, Indian, and French naval forces in 2004. China and Russia announced plans
  to hold a combined exercise in China sometime in 2005.

The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

• <LI class=text>The 2004 Defense White Paper characterized the cross-Strait situation as "grim," and elevated Taiwan and sovereignty concerns to top priority for China's armed forces - an intensification of rhetoric from the previous Defense White Paper (2002). <LI class=text>China's National People's Congress passed an "anti-secession law" in March 2005 as
  a means to pressure the Taiwan leadership, build a legal foundation to justify a use of
  force, and form a rhetorical counter to the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act. <LI class=text>China held two large-scale amphibious exercises in 2004 (division to group-army
  level in size), one of which explicitly dealt with a Taiwan scenario, bringing the total
  number of amphibious exercises to ten over the past five years.
  Chinese Strategy Regarding Taiwan <LI class=text>China used diplomatic pressures and verbal warnings to try (unsuccessfully) to derail
  Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's re-election in March 2004. Beijing sought to
  preempt Chen's May 20 inaugural address by issuing a statement on May 17 warning
  of the consequences of Taiwan's "pursuit of a separatist agenda." <LI class=text>China continued to adhere to its policy of peaceful unification under the "one country,
  two systems" framework that offers Taiwan limited autonomy in exchange for
  Taiwan's integration with the mainland. <LI class=text>Kuomintang Chairman Lien Chan and the People's First Party Chairman James
  Soong visited the mainland in the Spring of 2005. China did not change its policy of
  no direct negotiations with the leadership of Taiwan's democratically-elected
  government.
• Beijing continues to see the threat and possible use of force as integral to its policy of
  dissuading Taiwan from pursuing independence and moving Taiwan ultimately to
  unite with the mainland.

The Size, Location, and Capabilities of Chinese Forces facing Taiwan
China continued to deploy its most advanced systems to the military regions directly opposite Taiwan. These new weapon systems represent significant improvements from the older, less capable hardware that remains the bulk of China's inventory. To realize the potential in the technologically advanced equipment, China's armed forces are attempting to integrate the systems into the force structure, develop modern doctrine and tactics, and improve training and exercises.

• <LI class=text>Ballistic Missiles.China has deployed some 650-730 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7
  short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to garrisons opposite Taiwan. Deployment of
  these systems is increasing at a rate of about 100 missiles per year. Newer versions
  of these missiles feature improved range and accuracy. <LI class=text>China is exploring the use of ballistic missiles for anti-access/sea-denial missions. <LI class=text>China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic missile force by replacing older
  systems with newer, more survivable missiles. Over the next several years China will
  begin to bring into service a new road-mobile, solid-propellant, intercontinental-range
  ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-31, an extended range DF-31A, and a new
  submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-2. <LI class=text>Air Power. China has more than 700 aircraft within un-refueled operational range of
  Taiwan. Many of these are obsolescent or upgrades of older-generation aircraft.
  However, China's air forces continue to acquire advanced fighter aircraft from
  Russia, including the Su-30MKK multirole and Su-30MK2 maritime strike aircraft.
  New acquisitions augment previous deliveries of Su-27 fighter aircraft. China is also
  producing its own version of the Su-27SK, the F-11, under a licensed co-production
  agreement with Moscow. Last year, Beijing sought to renegotiate its agreement and
  produce the multirole Su-27SMK for the remainder of the production run. These later
  generations of aircraft make up a growing percentage of the PLA Air Force inventory. <LI class=text>China's indigenous 4th generation fighter, the F-10, completed development in 2004
  and will begin fielding this year. Improvements to the FB-7 fighter program will
  enable this older aircraft to perform nighttime maritime strike operations. China has
  several programs underway to deploy new standoff escort jammers on bombers,
  transports, tactical aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicle platforms. <LI class=text>China is acquiring from abroad or developing advanced precision strike munitions,
  including cruise missiles and air-to-air, air-to-surface, and anti-radiation munitions. <LI class=text>The PLA appears interested in converting retired fighter aircraft into unmanned
  combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). China has hundreds of older fighters in its
  inventory that could be converted for this purpose. <LI class=text>Naval Power. China's naval forces include 64 major surface combatants, some 55
  attack submarines, more than 40 medium and heavy amphibious lift vessels, and
  approximately 50 coastal missile patrol craft. Two-thirds of these assets are located
  in the East and South Sea fleets. <LI class=text>China deployed its first two Russian-made SOVREMENNYY-class guided missile
  destroyers (DDG) to the East Sea Fleet. An additional two SOVREMENNYY DDGs
  are under contract for delivery. The SOVREMENNYY DDGs are fitted with
  advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and ship-borne air defense systems. <LI class=text>China's SONG-class diesel electric submarine has entered serial production. The
  SONG is designed to carry the YJ-82, an encapsulated ASCM capable of submerged
  launch. Last year, China launched a new diesel submarine, the YUAN-class,
  improving the capabilities of its submarine force. China's next generation nuclear
  attack submarine, the Type 093, is expected to enter service in 2005. <LI class=text>China is acquiring eight additional KILO-class diesel electric submarines from Russia
  to augment the four previously purchased units. The new KILOs will include the
  advanced SS-N-27 ASCM, and wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes. <LI class=text>Air Defense. In August 2004, China received the final shipment from Russia of four
  S-300PMU-1/SA-20 surface-to-air missile (SAM) battalions. China has also agreed
  to purchase follow-on S-300PMU-2, the first battalion of which is expected to arrive
  in 2006. With an advertised intercept range of 200 km, the S-300PMU-2 provides
  increased lethality against tactical ballistic missiles and more effective electronic
  counter-counter measures. <LI class=text>The PLA fielded a new self-propelled tactical SAM to its air defense brigades, the
  FM-90 (CSA-7). The CSA-7 is an improved copy of the French Crotale system.
  With a 15km range, the CSA-7 more than doubles the range of the man-portable air
  defense SAMs the PLA previously relied upon. <LI class=text>Ground Forces. China has 375,000 ground forces personnel deployed to the three
  military regions opposite Taiwan. China has been upgrading these units with
  amphibious armor and other vehicles, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers. <LI class=text>The PLA is expected to complete another round of downsizing, by some 200,000, by
  the end of 2005, bringing the size of the PLA to about 2.3 million, according to
  official statistics. The inclusion of paramilitary People's Armed Police and reserves
  increases that figure to over 3.2 million. The 2004 Defense White Paper claims that
  China can also draw upon more than 10 million organized militia members.
• China acquired more Mi-17/171 medium-lift helicopters from Russia in 2004 and is
  developing its own attack helicopter, the Z-10, which may enter service in 2014.

Assessment of Challenges to Taiwan's Deterrent Forces

• <LI class=smalltext>The cross-Strait military balance appears to be shifting toward Beijing as a result of
  China's sustained economic growth, growing diplomatic leverage, and improvements in the PLA's military capabilities. <LI class=smalltext>Taiwan defense spending has steadily declined in real terms over the past decade,
  even as Chinese air, naval, and missile force modernization has increased the need for countermeasures that would enable Taiwan to avoid being quickly overwhelmed.
• A $15.3 billion Special Budget for the purchase of Patriot PAC-III air defense
  systems, P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, and diesel attack submarines, approved by the United States for sale to Taiwan in 2001, is now before the Taiwan Legislative Yuan.

Space and Counterspace
Beijing has focused on building the infrastructure to develop advanced space-based C4ISR and targeting capabilities. Building a modern ISR architecture is likely one of the primary drivers behind Beijing's space endeavors and a critical component of its overall C4ISR modernization efforts. Beijing's ongoing space-based programs with potential military applications include:

• China launched its first manned spacecraft into Earth orbit on October 15, 2003.
  Chinese press reports indicate that it will send up a two-person crew on a five-day
  mission in September 2005.
• China has two remote-sensing satellite programs known as Ziyuan-1 (ZY-1), also
  known as the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite, and ZY-2. China launched the
  ZY-1B in October 2003. A third ZY-2 satellite was launched in October 2004. ZY-2
  payloads probably are digital imagery reconnaissance satellites and have worldwide
  coverage. Beijing also tested new film-based imagery satellites and small digital
  imagery satellites in 2003 and 2004.
• China is interested in electronic intelligence (ELINT) or signals intelligence
  (SIGINT) reconnaissance satellites. Although these digital data systems probably
  will be able to transmit directly to ground sites, China may be developing a system of
  data relay satellites to support global coverage. Furthermore, Beijing has acquired
  mobile data reception equipment that could support more rapid data transmission to
  deployed military forces and units.
• China is studying and seeking foreign assistance on small satellites. It has launched a
  number of them, including an oceanographic research satellite, Haiyang (HY)-1, in
  2002 with at least two more satellites in this series, HY-2 and -3, expected. Beijing
  launched four small satellites during 2004; two of these probably have imagery
  missions and the other two possibly are conducting space environmental research.
  Other missions for satellites of this class include Earth observation, communications,
  and navigation.
• China is developing microsatellites - weighing less than 100 kilograms - for remote
  sensing and networks of electro-optical and radar satellites. In April 2004 Beijing
  launched a microsatellite with a probable imagery mission.
• A joint venture between China's Tsinghua University and the UK's University of
  Surrey is building a constellation of seven minisatellites - a class of satellites
  weighing between 101 and 500 kilograms - with 50-meter-resolution remote-sensing
  payloads. Later satellites in the series probably will have improved resolution.

Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs)
China is working on, and plans to field, ASAT systems. Beijing has and will continue to enhance its satellite tracking and identification network - the first step in establishing a credible ASAT capability. China can currently destroy or disable satellites only by launching a ballistic missile or space-launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon. However, there are many risks associated with this method, and consequences from use of nuclear weapons. China is also conducting research to develop ground-based laser ASAT weapons. Based on the level of Chinese interest in this field, the Defense Intelligence Agency believes Beijing eventually could develop a laser weapon capable of damaging or destroying satellites. At lower power thresholds, Chinese researchers may believe that low-energy lasers can "blind" sensors on low-Earth-orbiting satellites; whether Beijing has tested such a capability is unclear.

Anti-Secession Law

On March 14, 2005, China's legislature, the National People's Congress, passed the "antisecession law." The law's passage followed months of speculation by outside observers over its contents and a simultaneous lobbying effort on the part of Chinese officials to cast the law in benign terms, while closely guarding the draft of the text. The law itself is broken into ten articles that codify, or render as legal instruments, policies and statements applied by the Chinese government to the Taiwan question. Key elements are described below.

Article One establishes that the law was formulated for the purpose of "opposing and checking Taiwan's secession from China."Article Two restates Beijing's "One China" definition - Taiwan is part of China - and that China "shall never allow" Taiwan to secede from China "under any name or by any means."Article Three asserts that the Taiwan matter is part of China's internal affairs and is subject to "no interference by outside forces."Article Four states that China's reunification is the "sacred duty" of "all Chinese people," including "Taiwan compatriots."Article Five reiterates China's position that acceptance of "One China" is a necessary precondition for peaceful resolution. It does not refer to the "one country, two systems" model, but claims Taiwan would "practice systems different from those on the mainland."Article Six enumerates the steps Beijing is willing to take to realize peaceful unification, such as expanding cross-Strait exchanges, including cultural, economic, educational, science and technology, health, and sports exchanges. It also refers to "other activities" conducive to peace and stability, but does not offer details.Article Seven specifies the range of issues that would be subject to negotiation during cross-Strait consultations. The article states such negotiations would be on an "equal footing."Article Eight states the State Council and CMC "shall decide on and execute" non-peaceful means to "protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" if "secessionist forces . . .cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China," if "major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession" occur, or if "possibilities for peaceful reunification" are exhausted.Article Nine provides that during conflict, China will "exert its utmost" to protect lives, property, and rights of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals on Taiwan, and the rights of Taiwan citizens in other parts of China.Article Ten specifies that the law comes into force on the day of its proclamation.

China continues to declare a policy of peaceful resolution under the "one country, two systems" framework that offers Taiwan limited autonomy in exchange for Taiwan's integration with the mainland. China sees the potential use of force as an integral part of its policy of dissuading Taiwan from pursuing independence and encouraging it to unite ultimately with the mainland. Beijing has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan.

The threat of force against Taiwan is now codified in the "anti-secession law," enacted by the National People's Congress in March 2005.

The circumstances in which Beijing has historically claimed it would use force against the island include: a formal declaration of independence by Taipei, foreign intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs, indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue, Taiwan's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and internal unrest on Taiwan.
These circumstances are not fixed and have evolved over the last decade in response to Taiwan actions and changes in China's own military capabilities. They are, moreover, deliberately general, allowing Beijing to determine the timing and form of its response.
Beijing's Courses of Action against Taiwan Although the costs of the use of force against Taiwan would be high, Beijing leaders might use force if they believed they had no other way to prevent Taiwan independence or, as implied in its "anti-secession law," to guarantee reunification over the long term.
The Chinese Communist Party came to power on its credentials as a defender of Chinese sovereignty; its leaders appear to see progress - or perhaps, the absence of failure - on the Taiwan issue as affecting the legitimacy of their rule.
Beijing is developing military capabilities that will enable it to pursue several courses of action against Taiwan, allowing Chinese leaders more flexibility to apply pressure against the island and minimize the risks of a military confrontation with the United States. The PLA is simultaneously developing the capability to deter and/or slow a potential U.S., or U.S.-led, response to defend Taiwan.
Persuasion and Coercion.
China's current approach to preventing Taiwan independence combines diplomatic, economic, legal, psychological, and military instruments to convince Taipei that the price of declaring independence is too high. This strategy combines the credible threat to use military force with the economic and cultural tools that China has at its disposal. China uses its growing economic links with Taiwan to influence political behavior on the island. Beijing seeks to attract more Taiwan investment in China, while emphasizing that peace in the Strait will bring prosperity.
Beijing is increasing its pressure on Taiwan businessmen operating in China to refrain from supporting "pro-independence" parties or individuals on Taiwan. Beijing emphasizes historic, ethnic, and cultural links between Taiwan and the mainland, and unofficial diplomacy with "Taiwan compatriots" to generate domestic propaganda in Taiwan in favor of reunification.
Beijing has also intensified its competition with Taiwan in the developing world for
diplomatic recognition. This effort has focused on eroding Taiwan's diplomatic support among the 26 remaining countries that recognize Taipei. Simultaneously, using diplomatic and commercial levers, China has increased pressure on other states to limit their relationships with and to restrain Taiwan.
Portraying a military threat to Taiwan backstops the overall campaign to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and pressure Taiwan leaders. Exercises, deployments, and press operations all contribute to Beijing's policy of pressure.
Limited Force Options. Beijing could use limited strikes, employing information
operations, special operations forces on Taiwan, and SRBM or air strikes at key military or political sites, to try to break the will of Taiwan's leadership and population. Although Beijing might view these as a complement to non-military coercion and as less than a full use of force, others may view such actions differently. Such a Chinese miscalculation could lead to a full-fledged conflict.
Nuclear Weapon/High-Altitude EMP Option.
Some PLA theorists are aware of the electromagnetic effects of using a high-altitude nuclear burst to generate high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP), and might consider using HEMP as an unconventional attack, believing the United States and other nations would not interpret it as a use of force and as crossing the nuclear threshold. This capability would most likely be used as part of a larger campaign to intimidate, if not decapitate, the Taiwan leadership. HEMP causes a substantial change in the ionization of the upper atmosphere, including the ionosphere and magnetosphere. These effects likely would result in the degradation of important war fighting capabilities, such as key communication links, radar transmissions, and the full spectrum of electro-optic sensors. Additional effects could include severe disruptions to civil electric/power and transportation. These effects cannot easily be localized to Taiwan and would likely affect the mainland, Japan, the Philippines, and commercial shipping and air routes in the region.
Such a campaign could include computer network attacks against Taiwan's political,
military, and economic infrastructure to undermine the Taiwan population's confidence in its leadership. Simultaneously, PLA special operations forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct acts of economic, political, and military sabotage.
The PLA could also use limited, coordinated SRBM, special operations forces, and air strikes against air fields, radars, and communications facilities on Taiwan. Beijing could use the shock of rapid, accurate, and coordinated strikes and their effects on Taiwan's key C4ISR nodes to try to push the Taiwan leadership towards accommodation. At the same time, an information operations campaign on multiple levels could be launched to gain legitimacy for Beijing's claims on Taiwan and to reinforce the theme that military operations were limited to key military infrastructure, not the Taiwan people.
Air and Missile Campaign. Surprise SRBM attacks and precision air strikes could
support a campaign designed to degrade Taiwan defenses, decapitate its military and political leadership, and break its will to fight rapidly before the United States and other nations could intervene. To attempt these effects, China could employ SRBMs to saturate Taiwan's air defense system, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, and communications facilities.
Third-Party Intervention
Beijing sees Washington and, increasingly, Tokyo as the principal hurdles to any attempt to use military force to coerce or capture Taiwan. Beijing might coerce or target other critical countries to deny or delay their willingness to provide support, basing, overflight rights, or transit authority to U.S. forces operating in the theater. Deterring, defeating, or delaying foreign intervention ahead of Taiwan's capitulation is integral to Beijing's strategy. To that end, Beijing will pursue political and diplomatic efforts to keep the United States and Japan from taking action to support Taiwan. The U.S. Intelligence Community also believes China will consider a sea-denial strategy to attempt to hold at risk U.S. naval forces, including aircraft carriers and logistic forces, approaching the Taiwan Strait.
Blockade
Beijing could threaten or deploy a naval blockade either as a "non-war"
pressure tactic in the pre-hostility phase or as a transition to active conflict. On one end of the spectrum, Beijing could declare that ships en route to Taiwan ports must stop in mainland ports for inspections prior to transiting on to Taiwan. Alternatively, China could attempt the equivalent of a blockade of Taiwan ports by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches and roadsteads to ports to divert merchant traffic.
Chinese doctrine also includes activities such as an air blockade, missile attacks, and mining or otherwise obstructing harbors and approaches.
More traditional methods of blockade would increase the impact on Taiwan, but also would tax PLA Navy capabilities and raise the potential for direct military confrontation, particularly with U.S. naval assets. Although sea lanes closer to China (i.e., the South and East China Seas) could be interdicted, any attempt at a close-in blockade or operations on the east side of Taiwan would strain the PLA Navy, which lacks significant replenishment and open ocean surveillance capabilities. More restrictive blockades increase the likelihood of international intervention. Although any blockade would have an immediate economic impact, it would take time to realize decisive political results. It would also increase the opportunity for countervailing U.S. and international pressure and could lead to the protracted campaign Beijing seeks to avoid.
Amphibious Invasion
An invasion of Taiwan would be a complex and difficult operation relying upon timing and pre-conditions set by many subordinate campaigns.
Publicly available Chinese writings on amphibious campaigns offer different strategies for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these is the Joint Island Landing Campaign. The objective of this campaign is to break through or circumvent the shore defense, establish and build a beachhead, and then launch an attack to split, seize and occupy the entire island or important targets on the island. To achieve the final objective of the Joint Island Landing Campaign, a series of sub-campaigns, such as electronic warfare, naval, and air campaigns, must be executed, including the underlying logistics support.
Amphibious operations are logistics-intensive and rely for success upon the rapid buildup of supplies and sustainment ashore and an uninterrupted flow of support thereafter.
This particular amphibious operation would tax the lift capacities of China's armed forces needed to provide sustainment for this campaign. Add to these strains the combat attrition of China's forces, and an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be a significant political and military risk for China's civilian and military leaders.
The PLA's prospects in an invasion of Taiwan would hinge on: availability of

amphibious and air lift, attrition rates, interoperability of PLA forces, the ability of

China's logistic system to support the necessarily high tempo of operations, Taiwan's will to resist, and the speed and scale of third-party intervention.

Factors of Deterrence

China is deterred from taking military action against Taiwan on two levels. It does not yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island, particularly when confronted with outside intervention. Beijing is also deterred by the potential repercussions of any use of force against Taiwan. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China's leaders recognize that a war could severely retard economic development. Taiwan is China's single largest source of foreign direct investment. An extended campaign would wreck Taiwan's economic infrastructure, leading to high reconstruction costs. International sanctions against Beijing, either by individual states or by groups of states, could severely damage Beijing's economic development.
Conflict with Taiwan could also lead to instability on the mainland.
Maintaining internal security in wartime appears to be an important consideration in PLA planning - reflecting leadership concerns about political stability. Failure would almost certainly result in severe repercussions for those in the leadership who had advocated such a course of action. A conflict also would severely hurt the image China has sought to project regionally and globally in recent years. If Beijing chose to use force against Taiwan prior to the 2008 Olympics, China would almost certainly face a boycott or loss of the games. Finally, Beijing must calculate the probability of U.S. intervention in any conflict in the Taiwan Strait. It views the United States as having advantages over China in many scenarios involving the use of military force. China's leaders also calculate a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would give rise to a long-term hostile relationship between the two nations - a result that would not be in China's interests.
Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces
ChinaTaiwanAircraft Total Within range of TaiwanFighters1,500425420Bombers7802800Transport5005040
Note: The PLAAF and PLANAF have a total of around 2,600 combat aircraft: air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, and bombers. An additional 470 older fighters and bombers are assigned to PLA flight academies or R&D.
The two air arms have over 90 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with photographic, surface search, and airborne early warning sensors. The PLAAF and PLANAF have 500 transports. The majority of PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft are based in the eastern part of the country. Currently, more than 700 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan without refueling. Taiwan has some 400 fighters of various types.
Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces
ChinaTaiwanTaiwan Strait Area TotalPersonnel (Active)1.6 million 375,000200,000Group Armies189 Infantry Divisions/Brigades
(including airborne)20/209/110/25Armor Divisions/Brigades10/104/40/5Mech Infantry
Divisions/Brigades5/53/10/3Artillery
Divisions/Brigades5/153/50/0Marine Divisions/Brigades 0/20/20/3Tanks6,5002,5001,900Artillery Pieces11,0005,5004,400
Note: The PLA active ground forces are organized into Group Armies. Infantry, armor, and artillery units are organized into a combination of divisions and brigades deployed throughout the PLA's seven Military Regions (MRs). A significant portion of these assets are deployed in the Taiwan Strait area, specifically the Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan military regions. In a major Taiwan conflict, personnel, units, and equipment from other military regions would augment existing combat power in the Taiwan Strait area. In 2004, Taiwan began transforming motorized rifle and armored infantry brigades to mechanized infantry.

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces
ChinaTaiwanEast & South Sea Fleets Personnel 290,000140,00060,000Destroyers21136Frigates433421T ank Landing Ships202012Medium Landing Ships23154Diesel Submarines51294Nuclear Submarines600Coastal Patrol (Missile)513450
Note: The PLA Navy has a large fleet that includes 64 major surface combatants,
approximately 55 attack submarines, more than 40 medium and heavy amphibious lift ships, and some 50 coastal missile patrol craft. Two-thirds of those assets are located in the East and South Sea Fleets. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, both fleets would be expected to participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The North Sea Fleet would be responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coasts, but could provide mission critical assets to support the other fleets.

China's Missile Forces

China's Missile Inventory

TotalLaunchers/MissilesEstimated RangeCSS-4 ICBM20/208,460+ kmCSS-3 ICBM10-14/20-245,470+ kmCSS-2 IRBM6-10/14-182,790+ kmCSS-5 MRBMMod 1/2 34-38/19-231,770+ kmJL-1 SLBM10-14/10-141,770+ kmCSS-6 SRBM70-80/230-270600 kmCSS-7 SRBM100-120/420-460300 kmDF-31 ICBMDEVELOPMENTAL7,250+ kmDF-31A ICBMDEVELOPMENTAL11,270+ km
Note: China's SRBM force has grown significantly in the past few years. China's
Second Artillery now has at least five operational SRBM brigades; another brigade is deployed with the PLA ground forces. All of these units are deployed to locations near Taiwan.

[SkvyWvr]

Originally Posted by Kazuaki Shimazaki II

Better for everyone, probably.

I positively wince whenever I hear about the US whining about another nation's militarization. It is utterly hypocritical.

"Oh no, they are arming themselves so one day they might actually be able to defend against us or defy our will!"

The first step to an expansionist policy is a military build up