Thoughts on torpedo failure

[Barkhorn1x]

Originally Posted by Sailor Steve

I'd say yes, the German torpedo problems were every bit as bad as the Americans'.

But their response to them was way better.

[Subnuts]

Originally Posted by Barkhorn1x

But their response to them was way better.

Well, it's not like they could threaten to have the entire Bureau of Ordanance rounded up by the military police and shot. Or sent to a concentration camp, or shipped out to New Guinea for that matter.

[Sailor Steve]

Originally Posted by Barkhorn1x

But their response to them was way better.

Not really, and that was my point. They didn't solve the depth-keeping problems until mid-1941, so it took more than a year; and they didn't have magnetic pistols from 1940 until early 1943. The went through many of the same arguments, including the design people saying it wasn't their fault and the torpedoes simply couldn't have those problems.

I'll have the book with me tomorrow and will give some direct quotes.

[Barkhorn1x]

Originally Posted by Sailor Steve

Not really, and that was my point. They didn't solve the depth-keeping problems until mid-1941, so it took more than a year; and they didn't have magnetic pistols from 1940 until early 1943. The went through many of the same arguments, including the design people saying it wasn't their fault and the torpedoes simply couldn't have those problems.

I'll have the book with me tomorrow and will give some direct quotes.

The devil is in the details. :p You are right - for the most part*** - and I stand corrected.

From this page:
http://uboat.net/history/torpedo_crisis.htm

A commission was set up in mid-April to investigate the case thoroughly. The commission came out with a comprehensive report in late July, which placed a considerable blame on the Torpedo Department. The TD, it was found, had supplied the boats with the new magnetic firing pistol with four-blade propellers before it had undergone the necessary trials. Consequently, the personnel of the Torpedo Experimental Institute responsible for that SNAFU were court-martialed and sentenced to prison terms. Although the negligence of the Institute had been established, it was not until February 1942 that the U-Bootwaffe got to the heart of the matter.

...and:

In December 1942, well into the war, a new, improved magnetic pistol was introduced which also functioned on contact. It proved very efficient. Until then, writes Dönitz, "the effectiveness of our torpedoes was no greater than it had been during the First World War" (94).

So - the problem was identified and fixed over a period of approx. 28 months - figuring from the start of the war.

And the US torp. problem existed till about August of '43 - or 21 months from the start of the war for the US.

***I do offer one caveat however - and that is fact that the US Navy higherarchy knew that both the Germans and the English had withdrawn their magnetic pistols due to operational issues. This should have been a signal for thorough field testing - especially in light of the dismal results achieved on so many patrols with the Mark XIV. Alas, hubris whispered in senior US Admiral ears that these issues just could not be happening to "our" superior pistols.

[Sailor Steve]

Originally Posted by Barkhorn1x

***I do offer one caveat however - and that is fact that the US Navy higherarchy knew that both the Germans and the English had withdrawn their magnetic pistols due to operational issues. This should have been a signal for thorough field testing - especially in light of the dismal results achieved on so many patrols with the Mark XIV. Alas, hubris whispered in senior US Admiral ears that these issues just could not be happening to "our" superior pistols.

I can't argue with that one! Even worse, when "Drumbeat" started, our wonderful C-in-C Admiral Ernest King refused to take advice or help from the British, and so for several months east coast cities were lit up, as were merchant ships, no convoys were instituted in the US and it was let out that "several" German U-boats were "made to pay". The actual number sunk during the period was zero.

Also when Admiral Lockwood ordered the magnetic pistols deactivated he met with fierce resistance from ComSubsAsiatic (I'll have his name tomorrow). The two commands were entirely separate, and that particular admiral had also been the man behind the development of the magnetic head!

Originally Posted by Sailor Steve

Also when Admiral Lockwood ordered the magnetic pistols deactivated he met with fierce resistance from ComSubsAsiatic (I'll have his name tomorrow). The two commands were entirely separate, and that particular admiral had also been the man behind the development of the magnetic head!

Which lead to the curious practice of boats leaving Pearl with the magnetic pistol deactivated and once they arrived under the command of Adm. Christie in Australia the magnetic exploder had to be activated. The opposite procedure was used for boats going the other way!

[Sailor Steve]

It was Christie, thanks. I was thinking earlier of Captain John Wilkes, who commanded the Asiatic fleet subs before being replaced. When Lockwood advised removing the magnetic exploders, Christie refused. He had been in charge of the development of the magnetic pistol, and defended it staunchly.

Here's a note from Doenitz's war diary:

That the BdU has to burden himself with wearying discussions and investigations into the causes of duds - and struggle to correct them - is an absurdity. (So long, however, as these bodies [the Torpedo Directorate and Experimental Department] limp along behind with their measures I am thrown back on my own resources.)