Soviet SSBN strategy

[Bubblehead Nuke]

Originally Posted by ikalugin

Are you fammiliar with Aport-Atrina?

p.s. Perharps a more expanded statement would help, as I am not familiar with your person, nor can I be expected to verify your statements and as such view them as factual.

Who am I?

Real Submariner.

Real Deployments.

Real Ops.

As for tracking Soviet SSBN's? Been there.. done that. Tracked Soviet SSN's? Yep, done that many times as well. Done many things that I can never talk about. That is why we are called the Silent Service.

I will tell you this:

You can read anything you want from any source. you can make any conjectures you want.

I just told you the truth.

Unvarnished.

Unfiltered.

We could track anything that could be put in the water that the soviets had.

[ikalugin]

I conclude that you are not familiar with those two events then.

The later may be of interest, especially in the light of this:
" We could track anything that could be put in the water that the soviets had." statement.

"I just told you the truth"
This is your opinion. While I respect your right to have one, I could not be expected to verify and as such trust your authority on the topic, nor could I be expected to accept unsubstantiated statements as fact, especially if to disprove them I would have to prove non existance (Russell's teapot).

[clayton]

Originally Posted by Bubblehead Nuke

Who am I?

Real Submariner.

Real Deployments.

Real Ops.

As for tracking Soviet SSBN's? Been there.. done that. Tracked Soviet SSN's? Yep, done that many times as well. Done many things that I can never talk about. That is why we are called the Silent Service.

I will tell you this:

You can read anything you want from any source. you can make any conjectures you want.

I just told you the truth.

Unvarnished.

Unfiltered.

We could track anything that could be put in the water that the soviets had.

22 years and 8 tours...and you discover this strange ability to not only bond with those who served, but you get this gut feeling when you come across someone who knows what he's talking about.

[C-Wolf]

Just as any potential 1980's-era adversary's priority naval intelligence target was the location of USN Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups, the USN's primary intel focus was focused toward Soviet's SSBN locations, --especially when they were underway.

A tremendous amount of training, resources, funding, and technological effort was made to ensure: "No more Pearl Harbors." This engrained philosophy has dominated US naval planning and doctrine since 1941.

SLBMs can strike the US mainland much sooner than fixed ICBMs due to their shorter range/decreased flight times, making determining their location paramount. As sonar supervisors, we were updated with the latest "hot cock" regarding potential adversary submarine movements every watch.

With a variety of sophisticated techniques that have never been revealed, I can say with certainty the life expectancy of a Soviet boomer sailor would have been very brief if the US submarine force had been tasked with removing Soviet SSBNs from the playing field at any time during the 70's-80's.

I never heard of a substantiated account of a Soviet SSN holding sustained trail on a US SSBN during the 60's, 70's, or 80's. Ever.

SSBN surge capability? That defeats the nature of forward deterrence using SSBNs. SSBNs are safest when submerged, not tied to a pier, vulnerable to an offshore TLAM strike.

As the 80's progressed, the Soviets went broke trying to keep pace with US/NATO ASW tactics and retreated to the bastions closer to their home waters, (this is called self-preservation) with other forces to help protect them. As money got increasing tighter, deterrent patrols stopped, and their boats rotted. Eventually, there were zero Soviet SSBNs at sea! To this day, there are half-submerged Russian SSNs rusting away in Russia because the will/funding isn't available to dispose of them properly. The Russian economy is still a mess.

Are today's Russia's latest submarines better? Absolutely! While low in quantity, their quality poses a huge challenge for the USN.

But. . .

The US submarine force has never been complacent where potential adversaries are concerned. (Wish I could say that with any conviction regarding the readiness status of the surface forces.) Today's submarine force is ready tonight to perform whatever mission they're assigned, and I would not want to be on the receiving end of their skill sets.

To find us, you must be good.
To catch us, you must be fast.
To beat us, you must be kidding!

(It isn't bragging if one can do it. . . )

[ikalugin]

I never heard of a substantiated account of a Soviet SSN holding sustained trail on a US SSBN during the 60's, 70's, or 80's. Ever.

This is probably because you are not familiar with the Soviet experience like your comrade here.

SSBN surge capability? That defeats the nature of forward deterrence using SSBNs. SSBNs are safest when submerged, not tied to a pier, vulnerable to an offshore TLAM strike.

Yet this is exactly what the doctrine was and still is, but it does imply, as I have mentioned before, that leadership would conduct the surge before the initiation of the hostilities. This doctine also applies to other assets, for example land mobile ICBM TELs.
The surge stance allows the capability to push more assets into the patrol areas during threatened period that the constant at sea patrol stance would allow, but it does have the disadvantage that you have mentioned.
As to the specific threat that you have mentioned, the SSBN bases (and other nuclear deterent related fascilities) were covered by an air defense zone, with multiple layers, including SAM layer. Here you could see the change in capability vs bombers and CMs between two time periods in multiples (starting period is used as the base):

 

source:
http://www.vko.ru/koncepcii/prikryti...ozdushnyh-sil2

As the 80's progressed, the Soviets went broke trying to keep pace with US/NATO ASW tactics and retreated to the bastions closer to their home waters, (this is called self-preservation) with other forces to help protect them.

As I said, as the Soviet SSBNs were deep second strike assets, with the advances in weapons range there was no need for them to deploy forward.

In part, in the later years of the cold war, they were supplimented in the nuclar deterence role with Granat capable SSNs.

[Julhelm]

It's well established that the Simon Bolivar (SSBN-641) was trailed by the Victor-class K-147 in 1985. The November that trialled the SOKS installation also trailed a US boomer departing from Guam during September - October 1969.

The Soviets also likely had advanced knowledge of US boomer deployments from intercepting SOSUS tracking reports issued when US submarines were detected by SOSUS.

[C-Wolf]

Please cite your source for your Bolivar claim.

Fun Fact: John Walker served aboard the Bolivar.

[Julhelm]

The claim is from Norman Polmar's "Hunters and Killers, vol 2: Anti-Submarine Warfare since 1943", page 148, who cites the following Soviet literature in the chapter dealing with wake detection:

Rear Adm. Ye. Buzov, Soviet Navy, "From the History of the Creation of Non-acoustic Means of Detecting Submarines", Morskoy sbornik, no. 7 (2003), 59.