Torpedo failures - weather related.

[BigWalleye]

Originally Posted by GJO

Although many of us think of the breaking waves that we may see at the sea shore or in shallow water, the long rollers of the North Atlantic are quite different. Here the length of the trough between wave crests may be more than sufficient to enable a torpedo to keep to a constant depth below the surface whilst following the shape of the wave - this would be especially true if the advice provided at Torpedo School was followed regarding positioning to enable the weapon to be fired at approximately 90 degrees to the wave direction.

ETA: In heavy seas, merchant ships (especially in the days of sail or steam) would choose to head into or away from waves rather than take them broadside on. Therefore, a torpedo fired at 90 AOB would be fired along the waves rather than against them.

"...along the waves..." doesn't mean that they would be tucked safely in the belly of the wave. A torpedo is not a bullet. It takes 30-120 seconds to reach its target. During that time, the torpedo is going to be passed over by several swells and troughs. Amd, at 15 m/s wind speed, those are not going to be long, gentle rollers. There are going to be perturbing forces on the torpedo which are going to push it in different directions over time. Think of trying to hold a boat on course in beam winds and seas. Granted that the torpedo is below the surface, but the water within a wave height of the surface is moving in a churning circular flow pattern. And the torpedo is steered by a mechanical feedback loop that is prone to upset by impulsive inputs.

Again, it is your game and you are free to play it in any way that you enjoy. So turn off h.sie's Torpedo Failure Fix and go out and sink 'em in a howling gale. We all adjust the game to make it play the way we want. Personally, I object to the lack of crew assistance and am willing to accept some totally unrealistic compromises to avoid having to do things no R/L sub skipper ever had to do. YMMV

BTW, how do you line up a shot? Do you turn off No Stabilized View? Either on the surface or at periscope depth in 15 m/s met conditions, the sub is liable to be moving around pretty well, maybe even broaching, and the peri or UZO under water much of the time. I can't even line up a shot under those conditions. What's your technique?

[GJO]

My technique is to get in real close (between 250 and 450 metres) on a parallel course matching the targets speed then drop back very slightly and fire with a 90 degree giro angle. The torpedo usually explodes amidships on the target which is often enough to break it's back or at least put it's engine room out of action. My only problem is that I sometime get port and starboard mixed up and have been known to send one off in entirely the wrong direction!

[BigWalleye]

Originally Posted by GJO

My technique is to get in real close (between 250 and 450 metres) on a parallel course matching the targets speed then drop back very slightly and fire with a 90 degree giro angle. The torpedo usually explodes amidships on the target which is often enough to break it's back or at least put it's engine room out of action. My only problem is that I sometime get port and starboard mixed up and have been known to send one off in entirely the wrong direction!

!

[Warren Peace]

Originally Posted by GJO

My technique is to get in real close (between 250 and 450 metres) on a parallel course matching the targets speed then drop back very slightly and fire with a 90 degree giro angle.

Originally Posted by BigWalleye

!

Quoted Walleye for emphasis/truth, I tried to actually respond in some fashion, but he summed it up perfectly.

[banryu79]

Originally Posted by Warren Peace

Quoted Walleye for emphasis/truth, I tried to actually respond in some fashion, but he summed it up perfectly.

Me too! I wanted to say something but was too much flabbergasted
Btw, Warren Peace, thak you very much for the extremely intresting link you posted, I'm having great fun (and enlightenment) in reading it!

[Friscobay]

I sometimes wondered what SH3 AI did for the 1940 post-Norway improvement of the G7e. I notice that in rough waters after Bergen goes ''blue'', I experience fewer problems with the eels. Perhaps coincidental, but the challenges with contact detonation and depth appear to slacken. However, in granting that Doenitz struggled with problems of the G7 being set too deep [ due to shore pre-settings at normal 14.7 PSI atmospheric instead of the greater pressures within a submerged U-boat whereupon depth sensors were impacted usually at a ''false deeper depth'' ], I considered, and used, settings at shallower depth in rough seas against larger C2-3 targets within 900 meters at the T and sent them to Davy Jones without other incident.

Or maybe I was just lucky.. The war drags on outside the BF grid on a calm summer day in waters still enough to fish in.

[GJO]

Originally Posted by BigWalleye

!

I am sorry if have caused offence - but you asked what my technique was and I explained it in as few words as made sense.
Perhaps I am stating the obvious but it is very simple and it works.

The only drawback is that it is better not to be too close when a ship explodes (I recently had my boat lose significant hull integrity through this) and, in the later war years when the target is armed, surface attacks are impossible so the technique only works if the target speed can be matched while submerged - and, unless visibility is very poor, it is necessary to keep the periscope down and use the hydrophones for positioning until the last few seconds before firing.

BTW I have read through the theses by David Haversham Wright and it appears to agree with my stance that weather and wave height was not the problem. This had been the initial reaction by Dönitz but it was subsequently proved not to be the case.

[banryu79]

Originally Posted by GJO

BTW I have read through the theses by David Haversham Wright and it appears to agree with my stance that weather and wave height was not the problem. This had been the initial reaction by Dönitz but it was subsequently proved not to be the case.

I have not read it all, I'm at page 78 out of 200.
But even at this point, I feel myself so lucky and blessed and experiencing a (too) easy life in the face of the incredible torpedo failures documented there expecially for the first months of war (I'm currently finishing my first patrol, October 1939).

[BigWalleye]

Originally Posted by GJO

I am sorry if have caused offence - but you asked what my technique was and I explained it in as few words as made sense.
Perhaps I am stating the obvious but it is very simple and it works.

The only drawback is that it is better not to be too close when a ship explodes (I recently had my boat lose significant hull integrity through this) and, in the later war years when the target is armed, surface attacks are impossible so the technique only works if the target speed can be matched while submerged - and, unless visibility is very poor, it is necessary to keep the periscope down and use the hydrophones for positioning until the last few seconds before firing.

BTW I have read through the theses by David Haversham Wright and it appears to agree with my stance that weather and wave height was not the problem. This had been the initial reaction by Dönitz but it was subsequently proved not to be the case.

I was hardly offended. I was just in awe of your chutzpah. And a bit bemused that your thread began as a critique of the historical accuracy of h.sie's Torpedo Failure Fix.

[GJO]

Originally Posted by BigWalleye

I was hardly offended. I was just in awe of your chutzpah. And a bit bemused that your thread began as a critique of the historical accuracy of h.sie's Torpedo Failure Fix.

The 'getting up close' technique is realistic and was clearly employed in real life by the most daring commanders of the early war years. Eye witness reports from merchant seamen who had survived a torpedo attack include reports of periscope spotted and even U Boats surfacing on a parallel course at a range of 200 yards. I am currently working with two volunteers who have tales to tell - one, as a child, was a survivor of the Dutch steamship Bodegraven that was sunk by U-547 in July 1944 - the other joined the Merchant Navy at the age of 16 in 1947 and served his apprenticeship with a Chief Engineer who had been torpedoed twice and gave very graphical descriptions that have stuck firmly in his memory for the last 67 years - both men have thoroughly researched aspects of the U-Boat War by talking to former Royal Navy and merchant seaman who were involved. The term "audacious" crops up frequently when they describe the attitude of U-Boat Commanders. As an example, both quote many incidences of a U-Boat surfacing alongside a sinking ship or among survivors in lifeboats so that the U-Boat Commander could ascertain the name and home port of the ship that had been sunk - something that is not mentioned in the books by Werner and Kretschmer!

[BigWalleye]

Clearly, you have found sources which lead you to have a different view of U-boat tactics than many others, including historians and men who were there and did the things we are discussing. It is interesting to read your comments. Enjoy your game!

[Friscobay]

Originally Posted by GJO

The 'getting up close' technique is realistic and was clearly employed in real life by the most daring commanders of the early war years. Eye witness reports from merchant seamen who had survived a torpedo attack include reports of periscope spotted and even U Boats surfacing on a parallel course at a range of 200 yards. I am currently working with two volunteers who have tales to tell - one, as a child, was a survivor of the Dutch steamship Bodegraven that was sunk by U-547 in July 1944 - the other joined the Merchant Navy at the age of 16 in 1947 and served his apprenticeship with a Chief Engineer who had been torpedoed twice and gave very graphical descriptions that have stuck firmly in his memory for the last 67 years - both men have thoroughly researched aspects of the U-Boat War by talking to former Royal Navy and merchant seaman who were involved. The term "audacious" crops up frequently when they describe the attitude of U-Boat Commanders. As an example, both quote many incidences of a U-Boat surfacing alongside a sinking ship or among survivors in lifeboats so that the U-Boat Commander could ascertain the name and home port of the ship that had been sunk - something that is not mentioned in the books by Werner and Kretschmer!

This is a factual reading. At times, I believe that there is collision between ''gaming'' and ''historical'' aspects of SUBSIM. I am positively NO expert on the epic SH series and have experienced some of my greatest pleasure in simulations by my often-stumbling and evolving mastery of the TDC and the environment of the world in which I move . The full credit for devotion to the realism aspects of this series goes nearly solely, if not exclusively, to the hard work of those who are right here at SUBSIM.
I can however, claim to have gotten drunk with Erich Topp a long time ago when gamers were pushing little pieces of hard cardboard across a vinyl map surface where dice were rolled or counters spun in order to determine the ''music of chance'' which in turn, made the rules on whether you made it back to Lorient, or plowed mud at the bottom of the Atlantic back when Steve Jobs and Bill Gates were totally unknown to anyone other than themselves and a few college pals.
Thus in reading the historical record, we find [ never mind even Topp, who readily acknowledged getting his Red Devil in as close as fate or skill would allow ], that the drivers of U-boats and their victims, would play their deadly games at as little as a few hundreds of yards, between hunter and prey.


Heres some of the action between ships of the famous SC 42 and U-652 skippered by Oberleutnant zur-See Georg Werner Franz on the night of Sept. 09,1941 at approximately 2210 Hours.

'' Franz was stealthily overtaking the convoy on the surface from the starboard quarter. Carefully matching the ships alteration of course to-port, Franz entered between columns 7 and 8 when the submarine was seen by lookouts aboard KNOLL and PLM 13.

The range was only 300 yards''.......................

OK , so we understand that to win close, you must get close. Hell, even I haven't closed to this range yet before any convoy, Taffy, or lone wolf in either SH 3 or 4.

Damn the Torpedoes, as they say..................