Speculate for $h!t$ and giggles...

tater · 08-22-10, 09:20 AM

US pilots had the luxury to learn from mistakes. As a result, US pilots could improve over time. Japanese pilots didn't have a lot of wiggle room for mistakes as their planes sacrificed all pilot protection for "offensive" capability. Also, the huge range of IJN planes—a big "plus" for their design, did have a bad side. It meant they operated FAR from any sort of help if they did go down.

Note that at Midway US CV operations doctrine was still very much a work in progress, informed by their one real combat experience, the Coral Sea. They had very little time to integrate their new information, but they did so, and damn fast.

If you have any interest in early USN vs IJN air combat, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books are obligatory reading.

Japanese pilot training brings us back on topic. They were in a mode in the Pacific War that required a SHORT conflict. Their pilot training could not rplace losses, they didn't have the resources to fight a long war, or replace losses. As such, an alternate strategic plan that could have used what they had better, without putting them in a war of attrition that they could not possibly win is interesting.

sergei · 08-22-10, 09:55 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by tater

If you have any interest in early USN vs IJN air combat, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books are obligatory reading.

Thanks for that, I'm always on the lookout for good books.

And yep, that's what I've read. The Japanese gambled everything on a short war, with the US rolling over and suing for peace shortly after the Pearl attack. Oh boy, did they ever misread that.

I guess it comes back to the point made earlier, they seemed to view the 'decadent Americans' of being incapable and unwilling to fight them.

As soon as it became apparent that the US completely stymied their plans by not just rolling over and giving up they were screwed.

EDIT:

Quote:

Originally Posted by tater

US pilots had the luxury to learn from mistakes. As a result, US pilots could improve over time. Japanese pilots didn't have a lot of wiggle room for mistakes as their planes sacrificed all pilot protection for "offensive" capability. Also, the huge range of IJN planes—a big "plus" for their design, did have a bad side. It meant they operated FAR from any sort of help if they did go down.

Another very good point I hadn't considered.
But I do remember reading that the US went to great lengths to rescue downed pilots.
On the Japanese side the attitude seemed to be - if you go down, too bad. It's in the hands of the gods.
Another reason for the quick decimation of their top line aircrew.

tater · 08-22-10, 10:03 AM

Really, the choice of planes in many ways was bizarre. They went to great lengths to try and create incredibly good pilots. The USN pilots also had excellent training, but they culled fewer, so call it many "very good to great" pilots vs a handful of "only the great" for the IJNAF.

The IJN had such an investment in aircrews, they really should have done whatever possible to keep them alive. Planes can be replaced... for Japan, pilots were virtually irreplaceable.

As the war progressed, Allied pilots got better over time, and Japanese pilots got worse. Add in better Allied aircraft, and the slaughter becomes inevitable.

08-22-10, 09:20 AM	#1
tater Navy Seal Join Date: Mar 2007 Location: New Mexico, USA Posts: 9,023 Downloads: 8 Uploads: 2	US pilots had the luxury to learn from mistakes. As a result, US pilots could improve over time. Japanese pilots didn't have a lot of wiggle room for mistakes as their planes sacrificed all pilot protection for "offensive" capability. Also, the huge range of IJN planes—a big "plus" for their design, did have a bad side. It meant they operated FAR from any sort of help if they did go down. Note that at Midway US CV operations doctrine was still very much a work in progress, informed by their one real combat experience, the Coral Sea. They had very little time to integrate their new information, but they did so, and damn fast. If you have any interest in early USN vs IJN air combat, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books are obligatory reading. Japanese pilot training brings us back on topic. They were in a mode in the Pacific War that required a SHORT conflict. Their pilot training could not rplace losses, they didn't have the resources to fight a long war, or replace losses. As such, an alternate strategic plan that could have used what they had better, without putting them in a war of attrition that they could not possibly win is interesting. Last edited by tater; 08-22-10 at 09:53 AM.

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08-22-10, 10:03 AM	#3
tater Navy Seal Join Date: Mar 2007 Location: New Mexico, USA Posts: 9,023 Downloads: 8 Uploads: 2	Really, the choice of planes in many ways was bizarre. They went to great lengths to try and create incredibly good pilots. The USN pilots also had excellent training, but they culled fewer, so call it many "very good to great" pilots vs a handful of "only the great" for the IJNAF. The IJN had such an investment in aircrews, they really should have done whatever possible to keep them alive. Planes can be replaced... for Japan, pilots were virtually irreplaceable. As the war progressed, Allied pilots got better over time, and Japanese pilots got worse. Add in better Allied aircraft, and the slaughter becomes inevitable.