Life on Earth older than thought?

[porphy]

A few observations on my part. I think the discussion is very interesting. I'm not here to help anyone out, but more to give my own view of the questions involved, which admittedly are complex and have entertained very much the best minds for a very long time.

If a natural law, formulated by science, is conditional in the way Aramike describes, that is saying. When ever the law doesn't apply to observations, changing conditions will explain this. (if not some other kind of error is found). Even history is called in to maintain this view, and the question is if there is, so far any example that contradicts this formulation.
This sounds, in itself, very much like a law like prediction based on observation and induction to me. Which means the discussion between Letum and Aramike haven't moved an inch, as Letum will maintain that you can't formulate laws based on empirical results and induction.
There is no way to logically exlude future cases where the law would not agree with the observations. That is a logical feature. What science have formulated as laws and how these have changed or not, is an historical and therefore empirical question, which will have to follow rules of language and logic as well. You can't really point to acctual history in order to strenghten or weaken a logical point.

Another way is the semantical part of it. It sounds as if conditional laws are made foolproof by a move in language. The law can't be wrong, as the conditions would have changed. I think Sir Karl Popper would have asked, is a scientific law and its theory backed up with this argument acctually possible to falsify? Any results that would show the law wrong, would be explained by changing conditions. But isn't this simply a way of trying to keep the concept of law as a kind of holy concept for science? The law was never wrong, beacuse now the conditions have changed. Or maybe the theory was wrong, but not the law, no not he law. Should conditions change back to the original, or we findt he correct theory, the law is still true. Of course, this is quite obvious, but is this a good stance in connection with the idea that science when formulating a natural law is based on empircal and fully testable (verification and falsification) work? It seems to me that the natural law risks to fall outside science this way.

However, it seems to me to be a good and proper way to do science as Aramike describes the situation. Of course one would look into the conditions, as they are what is supposed to explain and cause any law like observations. Anything else would be to give up scientific work as the idea of empirical research.
It might even be good reasons, pragmatically speaking for a concept of law in this "supra science" way. Scientist might work very well when using it.
It's like when Einstein maintained that some parts of what physics is, which he thought was given up in quantumm mechanis, was very important because those parts were the very thing that had made physics make progress. One of them was that it is possible to formulate fully objective and true laws of nature. Notice though, that Einstein, when discussing and arguing for the nature of scientific work, and natural law, didn't rely on how the concept of law works in science, but from a kind of outside position. This concept of natural law was the one that scientist had used during all the years, and it was crucial to keep it for future progress.
Taking one step back, this in turn makes it fulle possible that his argument can be proven wrong, even from a pragmatic point of view. Scientific progress might not at all have been that strongly connected to the idea of formulating objective laws of nature. Now, is the last sentence a point of logic or open to actual empirical research?

Ok, my thoughts of the day. I will now proceed to rock climbing again, where it holds very true, unfortunatly, that everthing that goes up, must come down....

cheers porphy

[Letum]

Originally Posted by porphy

If a natural law, formulated by science, is conditional in the way Aramike describes, that is saying. When ever the law doesn't apply to observations, changing conditions will explain this. (if not some other kind of error is found). Even history is called in to maintain this view, and the question is if there is, so far any example that contradicts this formulation.
This sounds, in itself, very much like a law like prediction based on observation and induction to me.

Whats more, it is a tautology, as you say Popper may have pointed out,
as there is no possible falsification if any data that does not follow the law
can be explained by Aramike as a change in conditions.

...Letum will maintain that you can't formulate laws based on empirical results and induction.

You are right about induction, but I do think you can base laws on empirical
results, provided that you have an infinite amount of results from every
possible time.
However, with a little Cartesian doubt, I don't think we can collect any results, let alone an
infinite set, but that's a whole new kettle of fish.

[Aramike]

We're going in circles. The bottom line is that science agrees with me. But here's a fun one:

There might be a 50/50 chance that what goes up sometimes keeps going
up. Just because you flip a coin 10 billion times and get heads, it doesn't
mean you won't get tails the next time. We can't tell.
No change is required, 50/50 chance that what goes up sometimes keeps
going up might have been true for all eternity, we just have been unlucky
not to observe it yet.
How ever unlikely this it, we can't be 100% sure it is not the case.

There is 100% no chance that something, under the same conditions, will keep going up. If so, then the conditions (gravity attracting mass) will have changed to allow that single object to keep going up, thusly invalidating the law in that circumstance.

There is no doubt that there is the phenomenom of a scientific law. It is a term used daily by scientists worldwide. The idea that something may just keep going up despite known conditions is preposterous. One doesn't need an infinite number of results to prove a scientific concept - all that is needed is a consistant, predictable result. In the case of invalidating the law of something going up and coming down, the burden of proof lies with the person making the unobservable claim (that something may keep going up).

[Letum]

Originally Posted by Aramike

[...]all that is needed is a consistant, predictable result.

Like the constant, predictable result the chicken had?

ed: also, it is ridiculous to say that 'science agrees' with you.
The induction problem has been one of the most hotly debated issues
in meta-science since the mid 1700s and continues to be so. No
consensus has been reached at all.

[porphy]

We're going in circles. The bottom line is that science agrees with me.

I don't think scientists as a whole agrees with you. Most scientists I have talked to on the very issue clearly favour a popperian approach. They do think his critique against inductive knowledge do point out the logical faults in this kind of reasoning. Maybe scientist, few or many, work on a daily basis with this approach of yours, that is another thing, that does not mean they are right about the justification of the concept, or that their results when formulating law like expressions automatically is a natural law in the sense you maintain.

But here's a fun one:There is 100% no chance that something, under the same conditions, will keep going up. If so, then the conditions (gravity attracting mass) will have changed to allow that single object to keep going up, thusly invalidating the law in that circumstance.

That really is a non convincing example Aramike. All that is concluded is arrived at from the very idea that we do know the natural law in question to be true, absolutely true under the conditions stated. The discussion is about if this very idea about natural law can be maintained, and still be part of science as based on inductive empirical findings and testable results contained in a theory possible to falsify.

This theme is a quite old question by now, but still very important, and it is a centre piece of classical philosophy of science. The idea of absolute truths as part of science, or that absolute true natural laws would be the crowning hallmark of scientific work has had it's fair share of critique since the early nineteenth centaury. (Just have a look at positivism, conventionalism, logical empiricism, critical rationalism etc. All these "isms" also have had prominent scientists in their ranks as well, not that this concludes what is correct in a straight forward way.)
I would say it is very uncommon to find the idea of science arriving at absolute true natural laws these days, especially when defended by conditional circumstances the way it is presented here. It is probably because it can't be maintained with any convincing argument.

There is no doubt that there is the phenomenom of a scientific law. It is a term used daily by scientists worldwide. The idea that something may just keep going up despite known conditions is preposterous. One doesn't need an infinite number of results to prove a scientific concept - all that is needed is a consistant, predictable result. In the case of invalidating the law of something going up and coming down, the burden of proof lies with the person making the unobservable claim (that something may keep going up).

Yes, the phenomenon of natural law exists, but you describe it as something which can be found and absolutely verified through simply observing how science works when formulating said laws. Yes scientist use the term of natural law everyday, together with thousands of other terms, but do they use the term the way you say?
Most people that have looked into this question would say that natural law in that sense is metaphysics, as it can't in itself be part of a science confined to empirical research, inductive logic and testing.

I don't think this means that scientist should throw out the concept of natural law, but maybe it is as Popper once said, there is good metaphysics in science and bad metaphysics, good metaphysical statements, or even full research programs, can be transformed to or contain real scientific problems, which can give us scientific knowledge and theories that can be tested further, if needed. But the metaphysical concept can't by some magic guarantee scientific truth. If one follows Poppers line of thought, any science that claim absolute truth, even when it comes to natural law, is simply no science, or one have misunderstood the nature of science.

To me it seems like your finishing lines of the last paragraph is much more in line with the popperian idea, but you prefer to pass the burden of proof to anyone disputing or doubting the absolute truth of the natural law in question. But this can't be right, as the question is not about if things do continue up or not, but what grounds we have to claim the concept of natural law as expressing something absolutely true. This is not the same thing as discussing if things do fall or not.
I don't doubt the natural law in question, but I can't see that science can have a concept about natural law that will not in itself contain the possibility of being proved wrong. And I can't see that I should need to put forward examples of phenomenon that invalidates the law in order to come to the conclusion that this idea of natural law rests on shaky grounds when it comes to its rational and logical justification. If the concept of natural law is supposed to be scientifically justified and mean anything clear, it needs to be possible to prove it wrong, but not necessarily proven wrong. You want the latter from those who oppose this idea of absolute natural law, but deny the first by your reasoning about natural law under specified conditions. So how is one supposed to show a counter example if your conclusion in advance is, that as things now continue upwards, conditions have changed, and we have a new formulation of true law under different conditions?

When you complain about preposterous claims, it seems more like a fall back on some kind of common sense and well tried experience, which in a way is fine, but it will not prove your stance about natural law in science, as science is mostly thought of as the institution that test the validity of knowledge derived from common sense and everyday experience.

By the way, I did fall down when rock climbing, as expected and predicted, both by science and by me, but I don't take that as a reason for science as legitimately incorporating a concept about absolute natural laws. If I would have continued up though, I would have been surprised indeed and I very much would like to know why this happened. But I would certainly not say: that was weird, but it's still good to know that science still always operates with and formulates fully true natural laws, regardless of what my findings about the conditions for this incident shows.

Time for coffee!

cheers Porphy

[Letum]

Originally Posted by porphy

Most scientists I have talked to on the very issue clearly favour a popperian approach.

They do!?
We need more Swedish scientists!

Most I have talked to are old school positivists when pushed on the matter.
I suspect it's more to do with lack of interest in the subject, rather than
anything so quaint as genuine positivism, not that it doen't still exist.

I have always been left with the impression that science has never really
taken Popper seriously on board, which I think is a shame.

[porphy]

Originally Posted by Letum

They do!?
We need more Swedish scientists!

Most I have talked to are old school positivists when pushed on the matter.
I suspect it's more to do with lack of interest in the subject, rather than
anything so quaint as genuine positivism, not that it doen't still exist.

I have always been left with the impression that science has never really
taken Popper seriously on board, which I think is a shame.

You might be right about the "pushed on the matter". I'm not sure though if they go popperian when pushed, or positivist when pushed...

In my line of work I mostly meet scientists with a philosophical and historical interest in science, so that might be part of the explanation for them finding Popper a good choice.

Of course the problems in philosophy of science doesn't end with Popper. Maybe Wittgenstein was right when saying something like: "When you do philosophy, you run into philosophical problems." That probably goes also for anyone trying to account for science, natural law, knowledge and truth.

cheers Porphy

[Letum]

I would have expected Wittgenstein to say "When you do philosophy, you run
into lingual problems.", which is why I don't get on with him very well.

It seams clear to be that meaning precedes language, but there are one or
two people on this forum that seam to agree with Wittgenstein, much to my
annoyance.

Ed: Especially when accused of 'semantics'.