Differences between German and American submarine life and combat

[Hitman]

It may only serve as a measure of my own ignorance, but would the Type VII U boat had the "legs" to patrol in the Empire areas from bases as distant as Midway and Pearl Harbor. Certainly the Type IX would have.

Respectfully Submitted;
CDR Resser

It could eventually go there and back, however it would patrol about 5 minutes in the assigned area before needing to go back in echonomical speed And in case he found enough targets -say a convoy, which is difficult since they were smaller than allied ones- he would only have 16 eels to spend in salvoes of 4, against 24 in salvoes of 6 in the US feelt subs

As I said many times, different tools for different purposes Type VII subs were good for what they were deisgned, so were fleet subs for their purposes.

You can only compare directly a Type IXD/2 with a fleet boat, and nothing else. In that case, the german design gets better diving depth as only advantage, versus similar diving times, higher surface speed in US subs, and more punch in the latter. And then again you have the radar, something that makes the difference

[the_belgian]

Originally Posted by Julhelm

On the subject of shaving, it is my stated opinion that shaving for submarine crews should be strictly verboten. Submariners should have large beards, and that's it.

Just imagine a returning boomer crew after a 6 month cruise during which their beards have been steadily growing, growing and growing.

For me at least, the Pacific Theatre was a "Carrier War" with both adversaries having a substantial naval force. The goal being to control air superiority whilst battling for pacific islands (which in turn can be considered carriers, albeit stationary ones).

The Atlantic Theatre was an attrition war, with both adversaries having completely different naval forces. The Axis goal was to restrict the supply lines to Britain (itself a stationary carrier of sorts) and hence starve it into submission or at least ineffectivness. In this regard, the U-Boat was the dominant Axis sea weapon. Likewise, the Allies used the Destroyer, and later Air power, with equal zeal.

The two theatres are really not comparable in my oppinion, neither are the general goals and aims of the participating submarine forces.

This is my oppinion, any likeness with anyone else's oppinion is purely coincidental.

[Rockin Robbins]

Originally Posted by Uber Gruber

For me at least, the Pacific Theatre was a "Carrier War" with both adversaries having a substantial naval force.

Well, that's how the Japanese saw it. So they ignored the necessity of escorting their merchant fleet. The British understood the most dangerous threat and acted accordingly with the convoy system and the escorts from hell. The Japanese remained seduced by sexy battleships and carriers, not realizing that there are losses in war and those losses must be replaced with materials brought in with your mrechant fleet if you are an island nation like the UK or Japan. The Japanese never did understand that battles and wars are won by logistics, not just fancy weapons.

But had they understood that they never would have begun their war. They would have worked hard to prevent it, realizing that their supply lines were not tenable.

[TheSatyr]

(Deleted by TS due to the belief that some of my facts may have been wrong...re-researching to get more definitive facts).

[Rockin Robbins]

Originally Posted by TheSatyr

(Deleted by TS due to the belief that some of my facts may have been wrong...re-researching to get more definitive facts).

The mark of an honest man. Go get 'em and bring 'em back right!

[Ducimus]

So the question being, What did they do differently?

At the start of the war the US sub service were viewed as scouts for the big fleet. Submarine warfare against merchants wasnt even on the agenda. The subs were meant to be kept "with the fleet", hence the term, "fleet boat". With the distruction of the pacifc fleet at pearl harbor, the role of these boats changed.

The only one that comes to mind is that I've noticed that American subs tend to keep their distance while German U-Boats would try and get in close.

Early war, this was true by way of prewar doctrine, which proved to be patently absured. Once the submarine war in the pacific picked up, the doctrine took a complete reversal. Aggressiveness was encouraged, arguably to an extreme in some cases. skippers not aggressive enough were quickly releived of command.

Also Americans seemed stricter on their dress code while on U-Boats the crew wore mostly their home clothes.

True. Even today you still stay in uniform. Uniform restrictions may be relaxed, but you still wear the uniform.

I've never seen photos of returning American crews with beards.

Look around and you WILL find some. Infact the only way they look any differernt the german submariners is that they are still wearing their uniforms, but the beards are fully grown.

I find U-Boats more facinating in both the technology and the lifestyle however I'd be interested in knowing how it was for Americans as well.

Once you familirize yourself with more of the pacifc and what went on there, you'll find that alot of the exploits that people like to do in sh3, are acutally borne from stories of pacific submarines. US subs engaged in more surface actions, and raided harbors/anorages with more regularity then the germans.

[Ducimus]

the Germans were on the cutting edge of technology.

Not really. Like the US, they excelled in some areas, but lacked behind in others.

[U-96]

Originally Posted by Ducimus

Not really. Like the US, they excelled in some areas, but lacked behind in others.

Admittingly the Americans encouraged the developpment of new technology while the Nazi party who took operational control of the Kriegsmarine, interferred very often impeding developpment. So many new technology came alot later then it should have (Radar, Radar detectors, The type XXI, etc) But in terms of pure technological marvel the Germans were in front, Nazi beaureaucracy just delayed their arrivals endlessly.

It is estimated the type XXI Electroboot would have been out as early as 1942 and it was far more advanced the the U.S. Balao class sub (Which is considered the US Navy's best submarine of the war.) But it was still pretty similiar to the technology of the time. Though to the Americans Radar and active sonar, was common tech and implimented early in their subs. The type XXI Electroboot impressed so many, that the Americans, Brits and Russians researched heavily into them as a base of subsequent Submarine design. The huge submerged speed and range was unheard of to the allies even at the end of the war, Not only the submerged performance but also the hydraulic torpedo loading system which took less time to reload all 6 of their tubes then loading just one on a conventional sub / U-Boat

But in terms of their conventional submarines, you're right. Both sides had their strengths and weaknesses. The American subs had wonderful means of detection, a large array of tubes and many torpedoes and amenities for their crew. German U-Boats had the advantage in surface speed in alot of cases, smaller profiles, agility and diving depth. Crush depth for a U.S. sub was a yellow zone for German U-Boats. However U-Boats suffered from fewer tubes and torpedoes, very squalid living conditions for the crew and a lack of Radar and active sonar technology which proved fatal. Though Ironically enough, the food seemed to be better on German U-Boats.

[Rockin Robbins]

The strategy comparison is the most interesting aspect for me.

The German strategy was cooperation between U-boats to gang up on convoys to overwhelm the escorts and kill most of the merchies. They set up screens across a suspected convoy route. When a submarine detected the convoy they radioed base, which coordinated available U-boats to form a wolfpack attack on the convoy. This strategy was fatally flawed as it assumed that there could not be enough direction finding equipment close enough to compromise the positions of the U-boats. They also were so convinced of the superiority of the German mind that it was inconceivable that enemies could decode their messages. Throughout the war, they never tested the integrity of either system, even after inexplicable losses should have sounded the alarm. So the German method was "Design an attack system and work it to death." Unfortunately, the death was their own.

American strategy was......... um..........er...........no stragegy at all! OK, no strategy left, as the fleet boat was supposed to be the eyes and ears of the fleet, seeking the showdown at the OK Corral with the Japanese Navy. How would that have worked out? Not too good! Fortunately, the Japanese sank our contribution to the showdown, forcing some new thinking as the old strategy was busy attracting fishies to their new homes. At that point all we had left was submarines and some bright person noticed that was all the Germans had to begin with! Why not copy their battle plan? We did exactly that with some important refinements. We assumed that all radio transmissions endangered the submarine and all messages could be understood by the enemy. Therefore German wolfpack tactics were willfully sacrificed in favor of secrecy. The submarine program was top secret to avoid the wonderfully helpful publicity the Nazis gave their submarine successes. While it bolstered home spirits and succeeded in some demoralization of the enemy, we gleefully learned much information that resulted in death for many U-boat crews. In the final analysis, though, American strategy was based on imitating the strengths of German efforts and attempting to avoid the negatives the Germans were never aware of.

The German story will always be more compelling for several reasons. First, the German sub captains were the rock stars of the war, even surpassing pilots in glamor and excitement. Therefore their exploits are much better known, even to this day. Any information we know about the American efforts was published after the end of the war. Also, the German experience was truly a Shakespearian tragedy. What made them strong was what brought them down, their dependence upon compromised communication to concentrate their attacks on well-defended convoys. Their hubris, so believing in their mental superiority that they considered their Enigma code impregnable, was the final piece in their puzzle of complete anihilation. In spite of the failure of their commander, crews remained faithful, captains courageous to the end. What a story! It's better than Thermopylae! Who can resist identifying with it?

[Ducimus]

In terms of technology, on the whole, the germans did develop alot of firsts. The first jet fighter (me-262), the first assault rifle (SG44), the MG42 is still in use today if you look at the linage of various machine guns, or their actions. The first missles, in the V rockets.

But in terms of technology in submaines, in reference to the type 21, its not even a factor. The type 21 isn't so much a WW2 submarine, as it is a product of lessons learned from WW2. The type 21 never fired a shot in anger, and i beleive only 1 acutally made it on patrol before Nazi germany surrendered. By mid to late war, it woudlnt have made a difference anyway.
http://www.uboat.net/men/interviews/...p_xxi_role.wav

[Rockin Robbins]

Originally Posted by Ducimus

The type 21 never fired a shot in anger, and i beleive only 1 acutally made it on patrol before Nazi germany surrendered. By mid to late war, it woudlnt have made a difference anyway.
http://www.uboat.net/men/interviews/...p_xxi_role.wav

Great find! Who better than Topp to answer that question? It could be answered that wolfpack tactics were not necessary for submarine victory, but Topp sounds like he couldn't think beyond that. Obviously with a weapon as different as the Type XXI, new tactics would have to be developed. Topp seems oblivious to that fact. But developing those tactics would have taken even more time that the Germans did not have. Maybe that is why he felt bound to a return of the happy hunting times.

If you read Admiral Daniel Gallery's "U-505" you'll discover the jeep carrier hunter killer groups' compasses were entirely capable of drawing larger circles and they had enough planes to cover those larger circles so that no submarine, once detected, could escape. The Type XXI was defeated before the first one was launched, no matter if that date had been one year sooner.

Even worse for the U-Boat effort, there were only a very few months where Allied losses exceeded their production capacity, even when the U-Boats were most productive. No matter how successful they were, there were not enough boats to sink enough ships fast enough. It was just like the tank situation on the continent. American tanks were crap and the German tanks supreme. It didn't matter because we put tanks and crews in the field quicker than the Germans could destroy them. The Allies could afford the losses, the Germans couldn't. End of story.

It's like the cops and robbers situation. The cops don't have to catch Mr. Bad Guy every time he commits a crime, only once and he's out of business. The cops can afford mistakes, the thief cannot. Who wins there?

I am curious that no one has jumped on my heresy of blaming Donitz for the failure of U-Boats. What gives? I can think of a lot of points to quibble with that one. (That's OK, I blame Robert E Lee for Confederate failure in the American Civil War, too!) I have come to the conclusion that the only possible way Germany could have won WWII was to keep the United States out of the war. There was no way to use unrestricted submarine warfare against Britain without fighting the United States. Therefore, once again, the central strengths of the German plan contained the seeds of its own unavoidable destruction. (Play the ominous music here, preferrably some Wagner)

[mrbeast]

Ok I'm going to jump!!

Donitz wasn't to blame for the failure of the U boat war, though he was to blame for other things. Donitz understood the correct strategy to use but was crippled by Germany's pre war obsession with big gun, prestiege surface vessels therefore he never had enough U boats to isolate Britain swiftly and decisively.

The key to the strategy was speed. Germany needed to bring Britain to her knees before the US could justify entering the war. Donitz could not be blamed for the logistical failure of German ship yards to produce enough U boats for the strategy to achieve critical mass.

Donitz, however, was to blame for the deaths of hundreds of young U boat crews. His persistance in continuing the strategy long after it had failed contributed greatly to the needless suffering of people on both sides.

[mookiemookie]

Doenitz isn't completely blameless. Yes, he recognized that he needed more U-boats than the Reich was willing to give him but one of the single largest blunders of the U-boat war and the one that arguably lost it for them was his chattiness and micromanagement of the boats on station.

Between HF/DF and giving the Allies enough messages to use as fodder in cracking the Engima code, the boats never stood a chance when their chief weapons, stealth and surprise, were taken away from them.

[Ducimus]

If you read Admiral Daniel Gallery's "U-505" you'll discover the jeep carrier hunter killer groups' compasses were entirely capable of drawing larger circles and they had enough planes to cover those larger circles so that no submarine, once detected, could escape

If you read Hans Goebellers, "Steel boat, iron heart" he cites that U-505 initially did escape "the noose" as he called it by doing something unexpected. Surfacing in daylight (something uboats didnt do anymore in 1944), and made a mad dash out of the area. According to Hans, it worked, and it was blind fate that brought the two together again a bit later.

As for uboats losing the battles. Ive always thoguht it fell on 3 things.
1.) code breaking
2.) advances in electronic warefare by the allies, and lack thereof by the axis.
3.) shear raw, industrial capabilities of the US to outproduce the axis. (Sadly in modern times i dont think were capable of this anymore.


Numbers 1 and 2 are also some of biggest reasons for US submarine successes in the pacific.