1943 on convoys.....

[John Pancoast]

....can be tough to attack. But when your G7e/es sink two convoy escorts it is a bit easier.

[John Pancoast]

.......because when you then get hit by a FIDO, the advantage turns back to the convoy.

[John Pancoast]

Well, this boat's luck went from bad to worse. Limping back to port along the Piening route with a heavily damage hull due to the FIDO hit, it was sunk by a MAD equipped Catalina.

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by NickSaggy

This is very interesting.
So cool to have a lot on this arranged.

The FIDO and MAD are due to mod work done by Stiebler and LGN1. The MAD was done for NYGM, but I use it in all my installs. Neither come with the stock game.

[TooJaded]

Do you find yourself concentrating on military targets more than merchantmen?
Seems to me that when the battle of the Atlantic is over, there is no possibility of claiming enough tonnage?

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by TooJaded

Do you find yourself concentrating on military targets more than merchantmen?
Seems to me that when the battle of the Atlantic is over, there is no possibility of claiming enough tonnage?

Not on purpose; the goal is still to sink merchant tonnage. But when you're almost always getting chased by an escort(s) at some point during a patrol due to radar, it switches to a military target very quick.

[blackswan40]

to have played a full carrer with same Uboat Kapitan from 1939-1945 thats something tobe proud of for sure

Liberty ships list with Americas industrial might and the invention of liberty ships gave the Americans a big problem they built that many they ran out of names for the ships but for the Germans due to heavy losses they were sending boys 17-18 year olds to die in the Atlantic.


In SH3 by late 1942 when you find a convoy attack it once and once you have fired your first four bow eels and if you can fire your stern tube/tubes then get down deep n fast then rig for silent running and slip away @ 1knt reload eels at night and dont dock at home port unless you need vital repairs that can only be done at home port traversing the bay of dismay can be a real problem from spring 1942 onwards


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_o...s_(A%E2%80%93F)

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by blackswan40

to have played a full carrer with same Uboat Kapitan from 1939-1945 thats something tobe proud of for sure

Liberty ships list with Americas industrial might and the invention of liberty ships gave the Americans a big problem they built that many they ran out of names for the ships but for the Germans due to heavy losses they were sending boys 17-18 year olds to die in the Atlantic.


In SH3 by late 1942 when you find a convoy attack it once and once you have fired your first four bow eels and if you can fire your stern tube/tubes then get down deep n fast then rig for silent running and slip away @ 1knt reload eels at night and dont dock at home port unless you need vital repairs that can only be done at home port traversing the bay of dismay can be a real problem from spring 1942 onwards


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_o...s_(A%E2%80%93F)

Yes, Doenitz sacrificing thousands of lives, sending out crews he knew had little chance and would make no difference to the war's outcome just so he could suck up to the corporal.
With the laughable excuse of "tieing up enemy resources". Even with the Allies technology, etc. he was out Admiraled the entire war.

[Randomizer]

Yes, Doenitz sacrificing thousands of lives, sending out crews he knew had little chance and would make no difference to the war's outcome just so he could suck up to the corporal.

While I won't disagree with the "sucking up to the corporal" thing, I actually don't think that first part of your rant really holds water, at least as it applies to 1943.

Recall from Peter Cremer's book that Doenetz sent Cremer out in U-333 starting 31 August 1943 to try to find out what the hell was happening in the North Atlantic. He took Cremer from the BdU staff for the patrol so clearly he needed someone close to him whom he could trust. However, this also indicates that he did not understand that Black May was decisive and that the Type-VII with Wolfpack tactics were no longer viable.

BdU was in an information-scarce environment as too many boats were being sunk while surviving captains provided contradictory accounts of what was actually happening. Plus, he was now Chief of the Naval Staff, possibly over tasked and no longer running the day to day activities of BdU. Recall that Doenitz was a mere captain zur see with little staff experience in 1939 and just four-years later was running the entire show. It's not too far fetched to speculate that he may have been in over his head but unwilling/unable to see it.

Add National Socialist hubris, a lack of solid tactical analysis, poor scientific assessment and an over inflated sense of the current capabilities his pet arm of service and you can also conclude that the war BdU was actually fighting in the summer of 1943 bore little relation to the salad days of the convoy battles just one-year earlier and they could not determine why.

I'm not a fan of Doenitz the man but in this case, Doenitz the Admiral probably should get a pass for 1943. Von Friedeburg should probably wear more of the failings of BdU at this time but his historical status as a" grey man" has pretty much insulated him from accountability. That said, your sentiments are a perfect match for 1944 and the Inshore Campaign but I suspect a bit harsh for the previous year.

-C

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by Randomizer

While I won't disagree with the "sucking up to the corporal" thing, I actually don't think that first part of your rant really holds water, at least as it applies to 1943.

Recall from Peter Cremer's book that Doenetz sent Cremer out in U-333 starting 31 August 1943 to try to find out what the hell was happening in the North Atlantic. He took Cremer from the BdU staff for the patrol so clearly he needed someone close to him whom he could trust. However, this also indicates that he did not understand that Black May was decisive and that the Type-VII with Wolfpack tactics were no longer viable.

BdU was in an information-scarce environment as too many boats were being sunk while surviving captains provided contradictory accounts of what was actually happening. Plus, he was now Chief of the Naval Staff, possibly over tasked and no longer running the day to day activities of BdU. Recall that Doenitz was a mere captain zur see with little staff experience in 1939 and just four-years later was running the entire show. It's not too far fetched to speculate that he may have been in over his head but unwilling/unable to see it.

Add National Socialist hubris, a lack of solid tactical analysis, poor scientific assessment and an over inflated sense of the current capabilities his pet arm of service and you can also conclude that the war BdU was actually fighting in the summer of 1943 bore little relation to the salad days of the convoy battles just one-year earlier and they could not determine why.

I'm not a fan of Doenitz the man but in this case, Doenitz the Admiral probably should get a pass for 1943. Von Friedeburg should probably wear more of the failings of BdU at this time but his historical status as a" grey man" has pretty much insulated him from accountability. That said, your sentiments are a perfect match for 1944 and the Inshore Campaign but I suspect a bit harsh for the previous year.

-C

Understood, thanks Randomizer. Yes, my "sacrificing lives" was meant for late '43 on. But while the Allies (UK) were always thinking, from early on, of how to improve the situation/what was needed to do so, he was stuck in a WW1 mindset and stubbornly clung to it as events passed him by and once realized was then too late.
Instead of being proactive, he was reactive, i.e.