WWII after Pearl Harbor

[SUBMAN1]

Can someone please explain to me why the Japanese never hunted down the American carriers after Pearl Harbor in WWII? They had the strength, they had the capability, They had the time, so why did they turn tail? This I really do not understand. They left the Battleships smoldering, but they failed to take out the most dangerous weapons - the carriers.

-S

[Ostfriese]

Because even the carrier task forces were tiny spots in a huge ocean. You can only attack a target if you know where it is, and obviously the japanese did not know. They simply didn't have the resources to search for the carriers, at least not that far away from mainland Japan.

[CCIP]

Eh, it's even more of a mystery why they left after one day of attacks, when they had every opportunity to conduct several attacks over several days and completely devastate everything that was at Pearl, knocking out all the capital ships there for good. But they left.

[GlobalExplorer]

I think subman is right. They had the full strength of the Kido Butai available, the element of surprise, so they should have made a push. And they must have known that situation would never return.

I think Admiral Nagumo was too cautious, and missed a great chance, and I think I remember he was acting against Yamamotos will in this question.

Well, the Japanese would have lost the war anyways.

[U-533]

They wanted to lose...

They were already stretched to the limits of resources and the only honorable way out was to attack a country that would come in and rebuild their country and modernize as they went.

seems like the best way to go... send all males who can fight to die ...thus thinning an already overburdened population... but you have to make it look like your doing it for prosperity in the eyes of your people other wise you will lose your face...

[CCIP]

...now, U-533, I don't think the Japanese were THAT insane And knowing them, they certainly would NOT culturally favour either losing or 'bringing in someone else' to do work in their country. No sir, I think you've really no idea how Japanese nationalism worked/works

Yamamoto, of course, was among those who knew they had no chance, but that was far from the general attitude of their leadership. In retrospect, a more effective execution of the Pearl attack and other early actions, and a lack of blunders committed somewhat later down the road, could really put the US in a much more precarious position.

Whether the Japanese had a chance is an open question, but I would say that in december 1941, they could have turned the pacific campaign decidedly in their favour and achieved their initial goals. The real question is whether the US would have accepted peace terms after that; I don't think they would, myself. But that would have made the war much more difficult and prolonged, and could have had some fairly consequential effects on WWII in general.

[GlobalExplorer]

The Japanese always tried to adhere to overcomplicated plans, plans that required everything to happen exactly as the planned, and they were not very well in reacting to new situations. So in a way, their leadership was lacking, and that accelerated their defeat.

[CCIP]

Originally Posted by GlobalExplorer

The Japanese always tried to adhere to overcomplicated plans, plans that required everything to happen exactly as the planned, and they were not very well in reacting to new situations. So in a way, their leadership was lacking, and that accelerated their defeat.

Agreed. They lacked a pragmatic doctrine all over, and that really messed up many of their opportunities at the end. That wasn't the only case where, for no reason other than sticking to plan or being overly cautious, they didn't push their attack beyond an initial success and let their initiative just slip.

[GlobalExplorer]

Originally Posted by CCIP

...now, U-533, I don't think the Japanese were THAT insane And knowing them, they certainly would NOT culturally favour either losing or 'bringing in someone else' to do work in their country. No sir, I think you've really no idea how Japanese nationalism worked/works

Yamamoto, of course, was among those who knew they had no chance, but that was far from the general attitude of their leadership. In retrospect, a more effective execution of the Pearl attack and other early actions, and a lack of blunders committed somewhat later down the road, could really put the US in a much more precarious position.

Whether the Japanese had a chance is an open question, but I would say that in december 1941, they could have turned the pacific campaign decidedly in their favour and achieved their initial goals. The real question is whether the US would have accepted peace terms after that; I don't think they would, myself. But that would have made the war much more difficult and prolonged, and could have had some fairly consequential effects on WWII in general.

The Japanese knew that they could not defeat the US, but they felt the situation would be even worse if they lost any more time. The whole plan was resting on the hope that Germany would defeat Great Britain and Russia, and leave the possiblity of the US forced into some sort of peace treaty.

The timing of the attack was a disaster for Japan. By concidence, in December 1941, German military succeses had also reached their peak, as the russians counterattacked before Moscow. A couple of months later, Japan would not have entered the war any more because it would have been a sure defeat.

[Takeda Shingen]

Also, remember that it was the battleship, not the carrier, that was the centerpiece of the naval group. The carrier-sponsored turkey shoot that was Midway changed the thinking of most of the worlds navies, and changed the concept of the battle group, evolving into what it is today.

In short, carriers were just not that important to the world's naval leaders in December of 1941.

[CCIP]

Yea, good point.

One often wonders, though, why Japan refused to attack the USSR. They could have really messed up the situation in Europe had they gone for Siberia then...

[GlobalExplorer]

The Japanese mentality contributed a lot to ther defeat. A good example is how the lack of armour on their fighters (because they believed anything but a 100% offensive weapon was disgraceful) and their reluctance to rescue "dishonored" pilots from the sea cost them the air war, because there were plenty of modern aircraft at the end, but no more experienced pilots who could fly them.

[GlobalExplorer]

Originally Posted by CCIP

Yea, good point.

One often wonders, though, why Japan refused to attack the USSR. They could have really messed up the situation in Europe had they gone for Siberia then...

I think that they had decided on that question several years earlier, that it was in their best interest to stick to a doctrine to pacify Russia and concentrate on Asia.

For sure an attack on Russia would have played into Hitlers hands, but I am not sure that the Japanese Army would have been able to make any impact on Russia as the Navy could against the US. Just look at Russian and Japanese tanks of the era to see what I mean.

[Ostfriese]

Originally Posted by CCIP

Yea, good point.

One often wonders, though, why Japan refused to attack the USSR. They could have really messed up the situation in Europe had they gone for Siberia then...

Battle of Lake Khasan (1938), Battle of Khalkin Gol (1939), Russian-Japanese Neutrality Pact...

[CCIP]

Originally Posted by GlobalExplorer

I think that they had decided on that question several years earlier, that it was in their best interest to stick to a doctrine to pacify Russia and concentrate on Asia.

For sure an attack on Russia would have played into Hitlers hands, but I am not sure that the Japanese Army would have been able to make any impact on Russia as the Navy could against the US. Just look at Russian and Japanese tanks of the era to see what I mean.

Yea, the 'doctrine' thing again. Khalkin Gol must have made up their mind.

Certainly a direct confrontation with the main Russian forces would not play into their favour, you're right about the tanks and in general, the Soviets were far superior at modern, mobile warfare compared to the Japanese. In late 1941, on the other hand (and again in mid-1942), the Soviets were hanging on by their teeth against the German advance, and having to divert any amount of frontline forces to Siberia could have seriously damaged their defense; otherwise, the Japanese would have an open road into Siberia and the indistrial centres there...

Originally Posted by Ostfriese

Battle of Lake Khasan (1938), Battle of Khalkin Gol (1939), Russian-Japanese Neutrality Pact...

Pacts never stopped anyone :p
You're right about the battles though.