Doctrine question: when to submerge on patrol?

[vindex]

Is anyone familiar with real-life doctrine on when US subs ran submerged and when surfaced?

I have come across a few websites that said that at the start of the war, subs had strict orders to stay submerged below 100 feet within 500 miles of an enemy airbase, in order to avoid being spotted by aircraft (http://www.valoratsea.com/subwar.htm). I'm presuming this means during daylight, and then they would patrol on the surface while recharging batteries at night. I also came across an entry(http://www.navyhistory.com/Submarine/troutI.html) that says that during a prewar practice patrol, the sub remained submerged from 0500 to 1800 each day (although this would have to be adjusted as you change longitude).

The question is, what do they mean by "patrol" -- do they mean once you are ON STATION and seeking contacts? Or do they mean any time after you leave base? I see two problems:

(1) what about when you're traveling to reach station? Do you travel during the night and go slow submerged during the day, effectively cutting your travel speed in half? Do you start doing this once you get within the enemy air zone?

(2) what about when you find a contact and need to get into position? Speed is necessary, are you (doctrinally) allowed to surface to flank and then resubmerge? Even shadowing submerged until sunset, it might be pretty hard to keep up with a good contact without running out of batteries, which you will REALLY need once you do your attack run. And if you can't flank on the surface, what's the point of calling it "flank"?

I also read that US subs were doctrinally supposed to fire from deep submersion using only sonar contacts, but this worked very poorly and successful commanders basically started ignoring this and shooting from periscope depth with visual contact. To what extent did aggressive commanders follow the surface/submerge patrol rules as well?

From reading "Das Boot," it sounds as though U-Boats ran on the surface frequently while in range of enemy aircraft, and crash dived when they sighted one. They probably had little choice, since the moment they were out of harbor they could encounter aircraft, at least once the war got going. If they did the travel-by-day, submerge-at-night thing, they'd never get to their patrol zone. Or do I have it wrong?

I'm always tempted to run on the surface until I get to my patrol zone, and crash to avoid planes when I see them. In SH3, I really only submerged to attack or do sonar checks, or when I was transiting Scapa or the Channel where I'd get buzzed every 10 seconds. But I realize this is because I'm playing a game and my life isn't really at stake. I have a feeling I'd be a lot more cautious and a lot less impatient if the bombs and bullets were real, and my first mistake would be my last.

[Chock]

Ultimately it's up to the skipper of the boat to interpret his orders in any way he sees fit, as he is the one most aware of the tactical situation at the time.

This is one of the themes explored in the movie, Run Silent, Run Deep, when Clark Gable takes his boat to the Bungo Strait despite having been given specific orders to avoid it, claiming that he is in possesion of new facts which give him a tactical advantage that HQ is unaware of, thus setting up the conflict with Burt Lancaster, his XO. It was also a theme which was rehashed in Crimson Tide Between Gene Hackman and Denzil Washington (nowhere near as good though).

One of the critical things with military doctrine is that a battle plan survives intact about as long as cheap screwdriver does. This was one of the problems with the former Soviet Union, where the officers were vastly more skilled than the men, meaning that if the officer took a hit, there was rarely anyone below him who could take over with any degree of competence. More enlightened forces place the emphasis on everyone being capable of taking the initiative and training the man below you to do your job, which is why conscript armies usually get their asses kicked by volunteer forces.

[perisher]

Without effective radar subs would remain submerged during daylight if the skipper thought that there was a probable threat from enemy aircraft. This would depend on the tactical situation and the proximity of enemy bases. Once reliable radar was installed subs would run on the surface in daylight and dive on a radar contact being made.

The sonar only attack was employed because the Americans, at first, over estimated the Japanese ASW capability. They thought that a periscope would almost always be spotted and that once the scope was sighted a D/C attack would be inevitable and probably fatal.

[TheSatyr]

Once subs got SD radar it wasn't unusual for a sub to stay on the surface all the way to it's patrol area...only diving for drills and the occasional air contact...and even then they wouldn't dive unless they thought the contact was getting too close to visual range.

[TheSatyr]

As for sonar attacks,those were quickly discarded after the first war patrols as being useless. And some of the skippers that tried to use it were removed from command...which was not in the least bit fair...since that was how they were taught to attack. Daylight-Sonar,Night-Periscope. The object was to not put your sub at risk.

[VonBlade]

Originally Posted by TheSatyr

As for sonar attacks,those were quickly discarded after the first war patrols as being useless. And some of the skippers that tried to use it were removed from command

It's lucky this isn't Wikipedia because that sounds like the ultimate unsourced statement.

Submarine Captains aren't exactly ten-a-penny. And if Sonar was that frowned upon they wouldn't have installed it in the boat.
VB

[SteamWake]

Originally Posted by VonBlade

It's lucky this isn't Wikipedia because that sounds like the ultimate unsourced statement.

Submarine Captains aren't exactly ten-a-penny. And if Sonar was that frowned upon they wouldn't have installed it in the boat.
VB

While it may be "un sourced" I think youll find that the participants of this forum are quite knowledgable.

Sonar has uses other than "attacks".

[VonBlade]

Absolutely. Sorry I seemed to have missed off all my "gentle ribbing" smileys from my earlier post.

Still sounds like a dubious statement, but I wasn't implying it doesn't have the potential of being accurate.

[Driftwood]

Early in the war most sub skippers ( a lot of whom got relieved) followed standard peacetime doctrine for US Subs, meaning you submerged all day and only surfaced at night to recharge batteries. All attacks were conducted submerged and even sound attacks (IIRC) were in the peacetime "tool kit" of sub commanders althought they were HIGHLY ineffective. Prior to hostilities breaking out Naval doctrine for submarine employment was primarily scouting for the surface fleet. It wasn't until the Silent Service became the only offensive naval capability available (post Pearl Harbor) that their role as a major offensive weapon began to be explored. And even then the different views of the major Sub Commands (Adm's Lockwood at Pearl and Christie in Australia) varied greatly on how best to employ our submarine force. So, in answer to your question, as the war progressed your more famous sub skippers (Morton, Dealey, O'Kane, Fluckey, Street, etc.) stayed on the surface (both day and night) to find their targets and then dove (during daylight) once in postion to attack. They stayed on the surface at night for attacks. As always tactics are driven by the situation at hand.

[TheSatyr]

Ultimate unsourced statement??? Try Pig Boats by Theodore Roscoe or Silent Victory by Clay Blair.

They were relieved for lack of aggressiveness...which is what making sonar attacks was regarded as by the high command...never mind that it was a major part of prewar doctrine.