Why debate the war?

[Skybird]

Very clever and pointy (?) comment, thinking beyond the usual limits of arguments discussed regarding Afghanistan.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/...703408,00.html

Why Debate the War?

The Real Reason We Are in Afghanistan

A Guest Commentary by Rory Stewart

NATO has sent tens of thousands of troops to Afghanistan and spent tens of billions of euros. But why? British Member of Parliament Rory Stewart says we have adopted a set of unquestioned beliefs about the region. Acknowledging that those beliefs may be fallacious is almost impossible.

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Two years ago, I went to Tartu, for an Estonian government conference on Afghanistan. There were German generals, Italian diplomats and representatives from European think-tanks. The three Afghans, who had been brought up in California and Virginia, were practically the only native English speakers in the room. We were reminded that there was "no military solution," lectured on the need for a "comprehensive approach" -- including economic development and good government -- and we were also taught about the intricacies of Pashtun tribal structures. I argued for my belief that we should have neither troop increases nor a total withdrawal but a light long-term footprint.

But why were we having this debate? The Estonians did not, it seemed, see Afghanistan as vital to their future. They were there primarily to deepen their relationship with NATO and particularly the United States. So why were the Estonians, or I, or any of the representatives of America's allies -- even those with lots of troops on the ground, such as Germany, France and Italy -- producing power-point presentations on Helmandi government structures, papers on police training and principles for tackling Pakistan?

If we drew different conclusions to the United States, would we really be willing to present them or able to implement them? The European debate on Afghanistan seemed almost a ceremonial activity preserved to entertain the public and please visiting dignitaries, particularly from the US -- a ritual which is preserved for the same reasons that the Horse Guards still wave their swords outside Buckingham palace.

More Troops, More Tactics, More Time

When I moved to the United States, I expected the debate to be more lively because America bore more of the operation's responsibility and costs. It certainly seemed more open. Very senior figures encouraged me to speak out against troop increases. Even the most committed US soldier acknowledged that the project could not succeed without creating an effective, popular Afghan government alternative to the Taliban -- and that that was, to put it politely, "challenging."

Richard Holbrooke, would have remembered from Vietnam that generals never admit a mission is impossible and always assume that they need only to have more troops, new tactics, and more time. US President Barack Obama must have been acutely aware of the parallels between his position in Afghanistan and that of his predecessor, President George W. Bush, in Iraq. But did any of these people, even Obama, feel they had a real choice?
I would guess that Obama felt trapped by his political position, by his generals and by abstract theories of contemporary foreign policy. He would not want to be perceived as weak on national security. His would not want to be distracted from his focus on health care reform. And he himself had long justified the withdrawal from Iraq on the grounds that Afghanistan was the "good war," vital to US national security -- one which could have been won had resources not been diverted to Iraq.

Impossible to Refute

General Stanley McChrystal, the recently-released commanding general on the ground, with the implicit consent of Centcom commander General David Petraeus, had publicly declared in the autumn of 2009 that he needed 40,000 more troops. It was understandable that Obama would be reluctant to tell his newly appointed commanding general, with decades in the Special Forces and a row of medals on his chest: "I have not spent any time in Afghanistan and have never served in the army, but I can tell you that you are wrong. You will not defeat the Taliban, additional troops will be a waste of time and I reject your counter-insurgency theory. Instead, we will reduce our troop presence. And as the situation deteriorates in southern Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Taliban increase their control and the Republicans mock me for my weakness, I will take the full blame for having over-ruled my general's advice. (And I will also take the sole blame if there is another terrorist attack on the United States)."

Ultimately, the president succumbed to the dominant assumptions of the last two decades. Just as 8th century Mahayana Buddhists invented world after world, filling them with their distinctive demons and bodhisattvas, our think tanks and governments have also developed their own metaphysical structures, labeling them "failed states," or "counter-insurgency."

These theories can be made to seem absurd and indeed future generations may wonder, as we do about 8th century mysticism, why the beliefs of so many powerful and intelligent people were shaped by such eccentric systems. But seen from within our own historical context, or from behind a desk in the Oval Office, these theories are emotionally appealing, intellectually intimidating and often profitable. On their own terms feel almost impossible to refute.

Take, for example, the master-concept behind Obama's surge, namely that in order to prevent Afghanistan posing a terrorist threat it was necessary to launch full-spectrum counter-insurgency operations. It is possible, of course, to expose the curious premises, analogies and chains of inductive logic which imply our activities in 2010 are an efficient way of preventing another terrorist attack. And 20 years from now, we may struggle to explain why we once felt Afghanistan required the deployment of 100,000 troops or the spending $100 billion each year -- why it required far more resources and attention than its more powerful and populous neighbors Iran or Pakistan.


Leader Always Have a Choice


But counter-insurgency is an emotionally appealing theory for us today. Instead of only killing terrorists, it focuses on subjects close to the heart of a humanitarian or a journalist: tackling human rights' abusers, eliminating corruption, establishing the rule of law, building schools and clinics and, ultimately, creating a legitimate, stable state at peace with itself and its neighbors. Who could be against that?

It is also not an easy matter, to argue against such an intimidating, developed and detailed theory, enshrined in US army field manuals, justified by historical analysis of 70 previous insurgencies and endorsed by the charisma and experience of victorious generals. Even the basic premise that "the surge worked in Iraq and will work in Afghanistan" could only be refuted through a very detailed analysis of the violence in Baghdad in 2008 and a sophisticated comparison with social and political trends in southern Afghanistan -- an historical analysis which few feel equipped to attempt.
Meanwhile counter-insurgency is highly profitable not only to consultants (more than a quarter of the international aid spent in Afghanistan in 2008 was spent on foreign consultants) but also to NGOs. They can easily access money from the US government for repairing a school or rebuilding a clinic on the grounds that development is an important aspect of counter-insurgency. It is neither in the interests of Afghans nor those internationals who care about Afghanistan to quibble with the theory that development projects are making the world safer from terrorism. Finally, creating stable, effective and legitimate government through counter-insurgency fits neatly with our other global theories, such as the importance of fixing failed states.

Acknowledging Our Limits

The only way in which we could move beyond the counter-insurgency theory, or the hundred other theories which buttress and justify the Afghan war, is by rejecting their most basic underlying premises and objectives. Instead of trying to produce an alternative theory (on how to defeat the Taliban, create an effective, legitimate and stable Afghan state, stabilize Pakistan and ensure that al-Qaida could never again threaten the United States) we need to understand that however desirable such things might be, they are not things that we -- as foreigners -- can do.

We can do other things for Afghanistan but the West -- in particular its armies, development agencies and diplomats -- are not as powerful, knowledgeable or popular as we pretend. Our officials cannot hope to predict and control the intricate allegiances and loyalties of Afghan communities or the Afghan approach to government. But to acknowledge these limits and their implications would require not so much an anthropology of Afghanistan, but an anthropology of ourselves.

The cures for our predicament do not lie in increasingly detailed adjustments to our current strategy. The solution is to remind ourselves that politics cannot be reduced to a general scientific theory, that we must recognize the will of other peoples and acknowledge our own limits. Most importantly, we must remind our leaders that they always have a choice.

Incomprehensible

That is not how it feels. European countries feel trapped by their relationship with NATO and the United States. Holbrooke and Obama feel trapped by the position of American generals. And everyone -- politicians, generals, diplomats and journalist -- feels trapped by our grand theories and beset by the guilt of having already lost over a thousand NATO lives, spent a hundred billion dollars and made a number of promises to Afghans and the West which we are unlikely to be able to keep.

So powerful are these cultural assumptions, these historical and economic forces and these psychological tendencies, that even if every world leader privately concluded the operation was unlikely to succeed, it is almost impossible to imagine the US or its allies halting the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan in the years to come. Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa may have been in a similar position during the Third Crusade. Former US President Lyndon B. Johnson certainly was in 1963. Europe is simply in Afghanistan because America is there. America is there just because it is. And all our policy debates are scholastic dialectics to justify this singular but not entirely comprehensible fact.

[SteamWake]

Recently 'released' McChrystil ... I guess thats one way to put it.

I really would like to hear his take on it instead of some british politician.

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by SteamWake

Recently 'released' McChrystil ... I guess thats one way to put it.

I really would like to hear his take on it instead of some british politician.

Expecting and maybe preferring to hear the usual set of more familiar "we will win if we put our effort into it"-arguments that this one British politicians puts into question by highlighting some basic cultural preconditions in our thinking that seem to be poorly equipped to handle the realities we are confronted with in that place...?

Also, this guys knows Afghanistan quite well, mind oyu, he was there and learned it not from behind a dsktop only but from travelling the dusty village roads. I know from my own experiences in other places that this is the most valuable and improtant way to learn about a forereign place and it's people and culture. No think tank not having staff sharing such learning experinces from location, can compensate for that. Indeed I tend to be extremly critical of think tanks: their ways of thinking often seem to be extremely tunnel-viewed, reflecting the nature of their financiers. and that includes Pentagon think tanks, of course.

[SteamWake]

Oh there is no question that if we set out to 'win' the war we could/would.

But they would have to restort to methods that would not be looked upon favoribly but the 'world'.

In the meantime we will continue to police the region pouring man and machine into a bottomless pit.

[TarJak]

Whilst I agree with much of what the author says in this text I feel he chickened out badly in simply saying that America is there simply because they are. I still stand by my statement that America (and therefore all it's allies including Australia who is as trapped as the NATO allies), is there simply as a salve to the American people after 9/11.

The original goal in the aftermath of that terrible event was to capture, kill or punish the perceived perpetrators of the attrocity. After a reasonably good start and of course with some lumps and bumps along the way, we are now in a situation where exiting is not as easy as saying OK you guys we're out of here good luck.

The goal now is to keep American (and it's allies), opinion positive about the potential outcomes of the war and to ensure that it continues to look like something is being done about the threat of terrorism.

As soon as this opinion is shattered and the President's popularity polls take a nosedive in relation to the war, you can almos guarantee that an exit strategy will be hastily arranged and the Afghans will be left pretty much to their own devices.

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by TarJak

Whilst I agree with much of what the author says in this text I feel he chickened out badly in simply saying that America is there simply because they are. I still stand by my statement that America (and therefore all it's allies including Australia who is as trapped as the NATO allies), is there simply as a salve to the American people after 9/11.

I do not think he wants to argue with that, however, he is seeing things from the presnt perspective, and the forseeable future. 9/11 triggering the launch in Afghanistan is quite some time ago now, in the beginning it was a purely American mission, and America even denied NATO assistance by allies. then there started a separate NATO/euzropean mission, separate to the american one.Then both missions more or less were amalgated together, and turned into a mainly american mssion with some NATO assistance.

the original goals of the missions are almost obsolete, and the situation on location, while not having generally improved, has chnaged, and some things became better, some things chnaged between better and worse repeatelsdy, and much became different but stayed bad.

Now, 8 years after the war was launched, any link between current mission planning and 9/11 as the cause of war, at best compares to lip confessions. We are since long at a stage were we wish we could bail out and just do not see how to do it without loosing too much face. So, from a present perpsetcive, we are indeed there "just by habit":america is there becasue it is there, and European allies allowed to get trapped there becasue they thoight they must folow the ameircan example and their overly ambitious, world-improving, political under-acchievers.

It's 2010 now , not 2002. The nature of opposition has changed, too. You may stillö use the same names, and still the way the war is fought by them and the sociologicaol and cultural comnstealltion forming the allience of different enemies and threats, has chnaged.

Or to put it simple: Afghanistan once was about 9/11, in the early phase - today, it has almost nothing to do with it anymore.

[TarJak]

Originally Posted by SteamWake

Oh there is no question that if we set out to 'win' the war we could/would.

But they would have to restort to methods that would not be looked upon favoribly but the 'world'.

I guess that depends on what counts as winning doesn't it? It all comes back to the lack of clearly articulated achievable goals. We should be asking :

1. What are the war aims?
2. When will they be achieved?
3. What are the criteria for ''success'' in Afghanistan?
4. What is the exit strategy?

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by SteamWake

Oh there is no question that if we set out to 'win' the war we could/would.

But they would have to restort to methods that would not be looked upon favoribly but the 'world'.

In the meantime we will continue to police the region pouring man and machine into a bottomless pit.

If you define "win" as the coimplete annihilation of enemy fighters, that you can only acchieve by killing most of the population in fghanistan and wip9ing Pakistan off the map. Neutron bombs and nuclear bombs, maybe biological weapons. but if you kill all people there are, so noithing is left that could be liberated, gained, freed, whatever, this is as juch a win as was it a saving of a city when that general in Vietnam said: in order to save that city we had to destroy it. to "defeat" or to annihilate the enemy in that kind of country with infrantry and air strikes is an idea you can forget about. Even with 500,000 troops you would fail in the long run. Always.

Not to mention that all this was not the declared goal of the war in the beginning, after 9/11.

This idea is what the author is criticising: the wrong belief that if only we put more time and more troops into it, victory is just a question of time then. Military peope get trained to believe that there is nothing they cannot acchieve by the means of the military. Generals hate to admit that a mssion annot be accomplished. It is so very very typically "military" a thinking scheme. recruits get trained to think like that to boost their self-.cinfidence in the face of maximum threat and hazards to their life. But when this kind of self-confidence is not put into relation by more general education and situational understanding in the commanding and planning ranks, then this leads to wars going amiss, and endless military odysseys. Patreus in parts has understood this trap, but in parts nevertheless ended up in falling into the same trap again with his doctrine. His succees in Iraq already falls apart again, since it could not last without strong milizary action, that America now restrains itself from to a wide degree.

[UnderseaLcpl]

Well, I can certainly see the author's point and am inclined to agree to some extent. I have comrades who are still serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to hear them tell it, not much has changed. In the recent words of my friend Sgt. "Shrapnel" Macintosh, "It's the same ********** ****** ****** as before. We're just going through the motions now."

However, I do not agree with the idea that the war is unwinnable - it's just being fought incorrectly. In my own experience, that of my fellow servicemembers, and in first-hand written accounts o the subject of counterinsurgency, I keep coming across the same themes.

The first is that the training is simply not up to par. It looks good on paper, but when you actually go through it you see that it's mostly just a show. For example, I underwent counter-insurgency training at March AFB, where they had the innovative idea of building an entire simulated town and firebase, with the town populated by "citizens". We would go on patrols through the town on a daily basis and attempt to uncover who the actors portraying "insurgents" were through all the usual techniques. There was a whole backstory for the town and the clans and everything. I'd like to meet the guy who came up with the idea, it really was superb.

Unfortunately, the theory was better than the practice. Most of our actors didn't even speak Arabic, and nobody bothered to teach us, not that anyone wanted to learn. I actually wanted to learn but all I managed was memorization of about 40 phrases. The actors didn't understand or try to emulate arabic culture, other than dress, and the lacksadaisical approach spread to the training companies in about 24 hours. By the end of day 3 nobody was taking the training all that seriously. How can you when the citizen you are attempting to question in Arabic pulls you aside and says "look, man, go down that street and there's a guy in that house on the right with prayer beads and a beard -he's the insurgent, just hurry up. We've got other **** to do."? I find it hard to believe that the military couldn't drum up thirty or so Arabic Americans to provide a convincing training environment and some good advice on the culture and language.

Once in the field, things didn't get any better. Most of the good officers in the line companies in Iraq and Afghanistan understand that you really have to get out and be part of the community you are working in to develop effective relationships with the people and get to know the situation. It's hard to do that when there are dozens of TTPs specifically prohibiting just about every kind of interaction with the locals and you have to go back to your firebase every night, or afternoon, or whenever they feel like calling you back. The poorly-trained troops don't help the situation either. We were always blowing up crap we weren't supposed to be blowing up, or wasting everyone's time at checkpoints with no intelligence on what to look for, or just pissing people off in general when we weren't accidentally killing them. Even if we hadn't messed everything up that badly it wouldn't have mattered because nobody spoke Arabic and we never had enough translators.

I think the whole process needs to be restructured from the ground up, with a core element of regular troops who act only as quick-response forces supporting contingents of specially-trained line infantry who operate for extended periods within the communities, each of which needs an expatriate translator native to the area. Those troops in turn need to support an extensive network of low-key expatriate spies/informers and an even larger network of local support developed by the line infantry. More than anything, the training needs to be improved. Like March AFB, it just looks good on paper.