A hole without a bottom...

[Skybird]

.. or an Afghan maze without an exit.

A 15-pages Pentagon memorandum from Decembre 16th shows some numbers about defence contractors and mercenaries being deployed in Afghanistan, that imo illustrate a worrying shift from regular forces to private entrepreneurs. Also, it seems a lot of money gets sunk there headlessly.

http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/200...6StaffMemo.pdf

The document, 15 pages, is worth to be read in full length.

Wasteful Spending on Defense Department Contracts Nears $1 Billion. According to federal auditors, approximately $950 million in questioned and unsupported costs has been submitted by Defense Department contractors for work in Afghanistan. This represents 16% of the total contract dollars examined.

 Afghanistan Contract Spending Exceeds $23 Billion. According to the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), the United States has spent more than $23 billion on contracts performed in Afghanistan since 2002.

 Number of Defense Department Contractors in Afghanistan May Reach 160,000. There are currently 104,000 Defense Department contractors currently working in Afghanistan. The increase in troops may require an additional 56,000 Defense Department contractors, bringing the total number of Defense contractors in Afghanistan to 160,000.

 New Concerns about Troop Support Contracts. The Army continues to rely heavily on LOGCAP III, the monopoly troop support contract held by KBR, to support operations in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. In 2010, the Army anticipates spending more than $657 million under LOGCAP III and approximately $87 million under LOGCAP IV – despite the fact that the Army intends to complete the transition from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV in Afghanistan by June 2010.

In this context, it should be remebered what Mathew Hoh, former Senior Civilian Representative in Zabul province, has warned of and criticised in his resignation letter from mid-Septembre 2009:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv...T2009102603447

If the history of Afghanistan is one great stage play, the United States is no more than a supporting actor, among several previously, in a tragedy that not only pits tribes, valleys, clans, villages and families against one another, but, from at least the end of King Zahir Shah’s reign, has violently and savagely pitted the urban, secular, educated and modern of Afghanistan against the rural, religious, illiterate and traditional. It is this latter group that composes and supports the Pashtun insurgency. The Pashtun insurgency, which is composed of multiple, seemingly infinite, local groups, is fed by what is perceived by the Pashtun people as a continued and sustained assault, going back centuries, on Pashtun land, culture, traditions and religion by internal and external enemies. The US and NATO presence and operations in Pashtun valleys and villages, as well as Afghan army and police units that are led and composed of non- Pashtun soldiers and police, provide an occupation force against which the insurgency is justified. In both RC East and South, I have observed that the bulk of the insurgency fights not for the white banner of the Taliban, but rather against the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative government in Kabul.



The United States military presence in Afghanistan greatly contributes to the legitimacy and strategic message of the Pashtun insurgency. In a like manner our backing of the Afghan government in its current form continues to distance the government from the people. The Afghan government’s failings, particularly when weighed against the sacrifice of American lives and dollars, appear legion and metastatic:

• Glaring corruption and unabashed graft;
• A President whose confidants and chief advisors comprise drug lords and war crimes villains, who mock our own rule of law and counternarcotics efforts;
• A system of provincial and district leaders constituted of local power brokers, opportunists and strongmen allied to the United States solely for, and limited by, the value of our USAID and CERP contracts and for whose own political and economic interests stand nothing to gain from any positive or genuine attempts at reconciliation; and
• The recent election process dominated by fraud and discredited by low voter turnout, which has created an enormous victory for our enemy who now claims a popular boycott and will call into question worldwide our government’s military, economic and diplomatic support for an invalid and illegitimate Afghan government.

Our support for this kind of government, coupled with a misunderstanding of the insurgency’s true nature, reminds me horribly of our involvement with South Vietnam; an unpopular and corrupt government we backed at the expense of our Nation’s own internal peace, against an insurgency whose nationalism we arrogantly and ignorantly mistook as a rival to our own Cold War ideology.

I find specious the reasons we ask for bloodshed and sacrifice from our young men and women in Afghanistan. If honest, our stated strategy of securing Afghanistan to prevent al-Qaeda resurgence or regrouping would require us to additionally invade and occupy western Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, etc. Our presence in Afghanistan has only increased destabilization and insurgency in Pakistan where we rightly fear a toppled or weakened Pakistani government may lose control of its nuclear weapons. However, again, to follow the logic of our stated goals we should garrison Pakistan, not Afghanistan. More so, the September 11th attacks, as well as the Madrid and London bombings, were primarily planned and organized in Western Europe; a point that highlights the threat is not one tied to traditional geographic or political boundaries. Finally, if our concern is for a failed state crippled by corruption and poverty and under assault from criminal and drug lords, then if we bear our military and financial contributions to Afghanistan, we must reevaluate and increase our commitment to and involvement in Mexico.

Eight years into war, no nation has ever known a more dedicated, well trained, experienced and disciplined military as the US Armed Forces. I do not believe any military force has ever been tasked with such a complex, opaque and Sisyphean mission as the US military has received in Afghanistan. The tactical proficiency and performance of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines is unmatched and unquestioned. However, this is not the European or Pacific theaters of World War II, but rather is a war for which our leaders, uniformed, civilian and elected, have inadequately prepared and resourced our men and women. Our forces, devoted and faithful, have been committed to conflict in an indefinite and unplanned manner that has become a cavalier, politically expedient and Pollyannaish misadventure. Similarly, the United States has a dedicated and talented cadre of civilians, both US government employees and contractors, who believe in and sacrifice for their mission, but they have been ineffectually trained and led with guidance and intent shaped more by the political climate in Washington, DC than in Afghan cities, villages, mountains and valleys.

"We are spending ourselves into oblivion" a very talented and intelligent commander, one of America’s best, briefs every visitor, staff delegation and senior officer. We are mortgaging our Nation’s economy on a war, which, even with increased commitment, will remain a draw for years to come. Success and victory, whatever they may be, will be realized not in years, after billions more spent, but in decades and generations. The United States does not enjoy a national treasury for such success and victory.

The situation compares to many details in Iraq as well. Regarding Iraq I again remind of the criticism mentioned in what became known as "Col. Reese's memorandum":

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/wo...gewanted=print

The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.
2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki
3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.
4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.
5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.
6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.
7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.
8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.
9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.

(...)

The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are:

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.
2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.
a) Corruption among officers is widespread
b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm
c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues
d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system
e) Laziness is endemic
f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm
g) Lack of initiative is legion
h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress
i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining
j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.
3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:
a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions
b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties
c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result
d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards
e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism
f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process
g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders
It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:
1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA
2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA
3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July
4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,
5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.
6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.
7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

(...)

Therefore, we should declare our intentions to withdraw all US military forces from Iraq by August 2010. This would not be a strategic paradigm shift, but an acceleration of existing US plans by some 15 months. We should end our combat operations now, save those for our own force protection, narrowly defined, as we withdraw. We should revise the force flow into Iraq accordingly. The emphasis should shift towards advising only and advising the ISF to prepare for our withdrawal. Advisors should probably be limited to Iraqi division level a higher. Our train and equip functions should begin the transition to Foreign Military Sales and related training programs. During the withdrawal period the USG and GOI should develop a new strategic framework agreement that would include some lasting military presence at 1-3 large training bases, airbases, or key headquarters locations. But it should not include the presence of any combat forces save those for force protection needs or the occasional exercise. These changes would not only align our actions with the reality of Iraq in 2009, it will remove the causes of increasing friction and reduce the cost of OIF in blood and treasure. Finally, it will set the conditions for a new relationship between the US and Iraq without the complications of the residual effects of the US invasion and occupation.

Considering these two feedbacks, that NATO'S Rassmussen recently said NATO would stay in the theatre as long as it takes "to get the job done", sounds like a hollow phrase - or wishful thinking.

Most of us probably expected Obama to approach both wars a little bit different than Bush did some exopected him to do worse, others to do better. However, I did not share most Europeans' expectations that there would be a revolutionary new way to adress both issues and bring them to an end. That said, I must say that even with my more limited expectations for "change" in these fields I am quite surprised to actually see no signfiicant change in procedures and habits at all. If one would ask me whether or not I see a substantial difference between Bush and Obama regarding both conflict zones, I would answer with "No".

that leaves the question to what degree voted politicians even have the power and opportunity anymore to influence proceedings and change the self-dynamic of the daily routine in the administrational apparatus. And if that is answered with something like "not too much", purpose and legitimation of elections seriously get put into doubt.

As I see it, Obama falls victim to three factors:

1.) the immensely pushed high expectations he has intentionaly raised himself in order to win the elections,
2.) political realities and the momentum of the political apparatus being too strong,
3.) himself being too weak, and overestimating both his own abilities and powers, and that of america on the global stage as well.

Ooops - I start to hijack my own thread, don't I!?

[CaptainHaplo]

Meet the new boss.... same as the old boss...

The reality is there are limited options available to Obama. Politically, he promised the unreachable, and yet has to find a way to get out of it without losing face with any voter that isn't extremely left.

There are other options - but none of them are within the realm of political feasibility for Obama or the liberal power structure. The reality is that they have little choice but to continue and "hope for change", because the things that would really fix the issues are things they cannot do, if they did it would be political suicide.

Its hard to get things done when you have promised people the moon, and then learn that the issues were alot more complex than you were willing to admit. But then, they only wanted to get elected, they had no plan after that.

[Torvald Von Mansee]

I always thought special warfare was the way to go in Afghanistan, w/the guys on the ground getting all the support they could possibly want.

Supposedly, we had Bin Laden w/in our clutches at Tora Bora in December of 2001, and didn't grab him. What's the deal w/that?

[CaptainHaplo]

Torvald, same thing as when Clinton had an opportunity to get Bin Laden. The opportunity was not taken. Both Bush and Clinton screwed up. However, it should be noted that there is no firm proof that Osama was in Tora Bora, though it is highly likely. It doesn't matter, because taking him out changes nothing. Had we taken him out then, we would still be fighting the Taliban. If we were to take him out today, we will still be fighting Al Qaida for years.

He is not a "leader" in the classical sense, and killing him changes nothing in reality.

[Skybird]

As the memorandum just confirms my old point: one has to stop thinking of the enemy in Afghanistan being all Taliban only. the Taliban are just one mongst several factions fighting there. And they probably even are not a majority group.

All Wetsern strategy for Afghanistan ignores this. And that's why it not only fails in acchieveing it'S goals, but makes things even worse.

Different to widespread perception, the Afghans by majority are no great fans of the Taliban. The Taliban are more a Pakistani than Afghan problem. In Afghan you are battling mroe with local facitons that oppose the central givernment in Kabul. And that the West lines up with that centralised, corrupt government, makes things worse.

All Taliban are enemies to the West. But not enemies in Afghnaistan are taliban. Speaking with Taliban does not make sense, since by definition the Taliban are extremely relgious and faithful in folliwing the djihad. Only trying to talk some of the other factions out of the amred confolict, sometimes has some chances for constructive results- which necessarily must be at the cost of the centralised goivernment.

We must kick Karzai, and seek solutions on small scale, local levels, ignoring the interests of the clique in Kabul. As I see it, the Afghan govenrment is as hostile to the Western attempts as is any other faction in the war. However, the Taliban themselves of course must be forget and killed, no matter where. But again: most of the enemy factions in Afghanistan are probably not at all Taliban.

Interesing points..very interesting points.
Yet the interesting points fall apart.
FFS skybid your own arguement by definition shoots your own arguement down??????????
If your arguement is shot down by your own arguement then honestly I don't care how many books you have read.....you are still talking rubbish.
Would an ignore list help?
Kent Hovind has a big one so they must work eh?

[Torvald Von Mansee]

Originally Posted by CaptainHaplo

Torvald, same thing as when Clinton had an opportunity to get Bin Laden. The opportunity was not taken. Both Bush and Clinton screwed up. However, it should be noted that there is no firm proof that Osama was in Tora Bora, though it is highly likely. It doesn't matter, because taking him out changes nothing. Had we taken him out then, we would still be fighting the Taliban. If we were to take him out today, we will still be fighting Al Qaida for years.

He is not a "leader" in the classical sense, and killing him changes nothing in reality.

What got me about Clinton is that he wouldn't do a strike to kill Bin Laden because he saw a SWINGSET near the target area!!! Oh noes, we MIGHT hurt/kill some children!!!! What a pussy!!!

[AVGWarhawk]

I just wonder if Obama is as fast as Bush when a shoe comes flying!