Tactics in May '43+

[rudewarrior]

I've seen many people quoting statistics that the majority of u-boat attacks occurred on the surface at night. I've read a few excellent books on the Atlantic war (including the Commander's Handbook), but nothing that gives a specific account of the tactics of attacking a convoy with full-blown radar or just later in the war for that matter. Is there anyone that could give me a brief description of attack doctrine/tactics in these situations? If you could quote a source, that would be even more helpful. Thanx in advance.

[Schwuppes]

Hi!

I have learned that in the later part of the war the BdU would set up a line of boats perpendicular to the known convoy lanes.... each U-Boat say 20 km apart or so.
If there was accurate intelligence they would set up the U-Boats right infront of an incoming convoy. The Germans also used surveillance aircraft to help find the convoys.

The boats would stay submerged most of the time and if they were "lucky" the convoy would come their way and they would be able to manouver into a more or less good attack position.
If you weren't in the right place at the right time you missed your chance.
It was virtually impossible to resurface and overtake a convoy because of allied air superiority.

However Most of the time the allies were able to divert the convoys around the U-Boats because of ultra (intelligence) intercepts.

[rudewarrior]

Excellent post, and thank you for the info. Any chance I could get a source, please? Thank you.

[Schwuppes]

yes here is an example, but its in German.




http://www.u-boot-archiv.de/dieboote/u0264.html


maybe you can use Babelfish or worldlingo.com to translate it.

[GoldenRivet]

GWX 1943-45 tactic:

beach your u-boat on a neutral shore and have all of your crewmen go their separate ways.

:rotfl:

[Pablo]

Originally Posted by rudewarrior

I've seen many people quoting statistics that the majority of u-boat attacks occurred on the surface at night. I've read a few excellent books on the Atlantic war (including the Commander's Handbook), but nothing that gives a specific account of the tactics of attacking a convoy with full-blown radar or just later in the war for that matter. Is there anyone that could give me a brief description of attack doctrine/tactics in these situations? If you could quote a source, that would be even more helpful. Thanx in advance.

Hi!

In general, the Germans generally stopped using their wolf-pack tactics after May 1943, with individual U-boats trying lie submerged just off the convoy's path so as to use their FAT, and later LuT "convoy torpedoes" from a distance. A brief return to the wolf-pack tactics in late 1943 led to heavy causalties, and the tactic was generally dropped after that date. See Michael Gannon's Black May and Clay Blair's Hitler's U-boat War: The Hunted 1942-1945.

Pablo

[rudewarrior]

Excellent!!!

Thank you again!

[TarJak]

Originally Posted by GoldenRivet

GWX 1943-45 tactic:

beach your u-boat on a neutral shore and have all of your crewmen go their separate ways.

:rotfl:

I think the leather trenchcoated fellows will want a word with you over on PrinzAlbrechtstrasse on your next visit to Berlin GR.

One of the best sources you can get your hands on is Clay Blair's two volumes, Hitler's U-Boat War The Hunters and The Hunted.

As Pablo has pointed out doctine was adjusted throughout the war by Doenitz, but usually too late to make a significant difference to the losses the u-waffe suffered after 1943.

From late 1942 onwards most attacks had to be made submerged due to the ability of allied escorts to pick up approaching u-boats on radar.

The approach to a convoy was also hampered by HF/DF picking up radio bearings as initial sightings were made and wolfpacks were being gathered. Usually if the initial spotter was picked up using HF/DF, then an escort was dispatched to track down the boat and either destroy it or drive it under so the transmissions stopped and approach became difficult.

Add in the increased effectiveness of allied air cover and their ability to decode German signals made life hell for the u-waffe whose boats were by this time far obsolete for the task they were undertaking.

I'm currently reading U-Boat Killer by Capt. Donald Macintyre who was a destoyer commander during the most of WWII. This book gives an interesting perspective on the Battle of the Atlantic from the Allied perspective. In it he described both Allied and German tactics during different phases of the war and gives some great examples of how these were employed in real life.

One notable example was a dummy acknowledgement signal used by another escort commander to trick a u-boat commander into thinking help was on its way when infact an escort was racing to take up the hunt.

[Von Manteuffel]

Not much to add to the wealth of knowledge and research already posted here, except to hope that the GWX 2 team haven't managed to duplicate the post May 1943 situation too realistically - I'm too young to die. So far I'm still in 1940.

Airborne Radar gave the allies a huge advantage over the U Boats and in very short order forced them only to operate surfaced in the "air-gap" South of Greenland. The gap was soon closed. Add to this the fact that escorts and other sub-hunters obtained not only sea-borne Radar, but also very efficient Radio Direction Finding equipment, which meant that they could steam down the exact bearing to the source of the radio transmission. Apparently there was a large, almost continuous amount of radio "chatter" between U Boats - especially the large wolf-packs, whch made the job of the escorts much easier.

There were also new tactics for escorts and hunter-killer groups such as "Johnny" Walker's "creeping" attack and the Ultra intercepts of the "Shark" Enigma traffic from Bletchley Park. It's no wonder that the hunters very quickly became the hunted.

The turning point came in May 1943 and culminated in the wolf-pack attack on Convoy ONS 5. Six escorts sank 7 U-boats and damaged 3 others - 25% of the wolf-pack. In all 41 U-Boats were lost in May 1943 and Donitz was forced to the conclusion that "Wolf-pack operations against convoys in the North Atlantic were no longer possible." The success of the escorts was almost entirely attributable to Radar and new RDF technology.

One thing I'm not sure if GWX2, or any other version of SH3 reflects in the game is the shattering effect on morale the allied successes had. Boats crewed by young replacements would leave harbour, never to be seen again. Those left became increasingly reluctant to go out on war-patrols (sabotage to delay sailing became increasingly common) and, when at sea, crews became increasingly reluctant to engage allied shipping except at extreme range and submerged. This "defeatism" was also fuelled by Germany's reverse of fortune in the land-war.

One U-Boat commander summed it up when he said that "We no longer believed we could succeed."

[Penelope_Grey]

One other thing you will need.... luck... I kid you not.

[papa_smurf]

Head for the nearest neutral port, preferably somewhere in south america, and sun it up for the remainder of the war.......

Or here is a link to U-boat tactics in '43, might help you a bit:

http://hnsa.org/doc/uboat/index.htm

[Jimbuna]

Originally Posted by Penelope_Grey

One other thing you will need.... luck... I kid you not.

I agree with Pen, but remember........skill and judgement make you lucky

[rudewarrior]

Hey guyz,

Thankx for all the excellent info. You answered all of my secondary questions as well.