Well as far as i read the trimming automatics came on after being put to off position, this video does not mention one word of this.
Not speaking about how you want to build a plane using less fuel while changing aerodynamics and trying to patch this with software.
https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/bo...to-the-pilots/
"
It’s probably this counterintuitive characteristic, which goes against what has been trained many times in the simulator for unwanted autopilot trim or manual trim runaway, which has confused the pilots of JT610. They learned that holding against the trim stopped the nose down, and then they could take action, like counter-trimming or outright CUTOUT the trim servo. But it didn’t. After a 10 second trim to a 2.5° nose down stabilizer position, the trimming started again despite the Pilots pulling against it. The faulty high AOA signal was still present."
"How should they know that pulling on the Yoke didn’t stop the trim? It was described nowhere; neither in the aircraft’s manual, the AFM, nor in the Pilot’s manual, the FCOM. This has created strong reactions from airlines with the 737 MAX on the flight line and their Pilots. They have learned the NG and the MAX flies the same. They fly them interchangeably during the week.
They do fly the same as long as no fault appears. Then there are differences, and the Pilots should have been informed about the differences."
Not mentioning that if one of two sensors fail let the electronics decide which one to trust and not alarming the pilot.
Despite some omissions he also clearly states that this runaway trim was not able to overcome manually with the trim wheels due to the load on the elevators. But you do not take away thrust in a starting condition at a high angle of attack, when your plane's nose goes up and down without being able to control it, and they had two minutes to check it all. Not enough altitude. They were two pilots, not one of them seems to have realized the speed. I can only imagine howit is with a runaway stabilizer, warnings blaring and then adding another one with overspeed.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...runawa-453443/
" ... in the case of the Lion Air Boeing 737 MAX crash, “now the airplane is pitching down and actually moving the control wheel will not stop that system. If the pilot uses the trim system on the yoke, the [MCAS] system will stop" but "if the airplane isn’t in the proper attitude it will reactivate, ...”
Two minutes sounds like much time and mybe for a fighter pilot it is, but..
Maybe it was a 'pilot error', or an unlucky combination of changed 737's properties and the pilot(s) (both of them!) knowledge, but in any case it is not a good idea to use several automatic systems fighting each other, and overloading the pilot with figuring it all out and requiring inputs to correct faulty sensors.
I do not like Airbus for exactly this reason. Taking control away from pilots is seldomly a good idea when there is a real problem.