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This scenario is an interpretation of the account from Michael A. Palmer's, "The War that Never Was".
"In response, Seventh Fleet had concentrated formidable amphibious assets in WESTPAC. A sizable task force had concentrated at Okinawa -- fourteen ships capable of lifting twelve thousand marines of III MEF. Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron 3 lay anchored at Guam, loaded with equipment for 1 MEB, based in Hawaii (the 3rd Marines). A six-ship convoy carrying additional equipment and supplies for the marines was at sea about 750 miles south of Okinawa. If the Independence group moved north, only about a dozen frigates, an SSN, and three squadrons of patrol aircraft would remain to protect these assets.
Cooper also worried that the Soviets might move their remaining surface assets from Vladivostok through the Tsushima Strait between Japan and Korea, link up with their KUG already in the East China Sea, and 'devastate our poorly screened amphibious forces as they clear Okinawa.' On the morning of 13 July, CINCPAC received a report from Japanese intelligence sources that a task force including the carrier Baku, two cruisers, a destroyer, four frigates, and several replenishment vessels would shortly depart Vladivostok. Unless the Japanese and South Koreans intervened, only limited American forces -- the four marine squadrons at Iwakuni, Japan, the SSN Tunny, and the old diesel boat Barbel -- were positioned to prevent a Soviet move through the Tsushima Strait.
Despite his concerns, CINCPAC deferred to his subordinate's judgement. To Cooper's mind, Jernigan was responsible for operations in WESTPAC, and the decision was his call. Either choice involved risks, grave risks. No one knew what the Russians were going to do, or for that matter the Japanese or Koreans, north or south. But Cooper was a proponent of what he considered a cherished naval principle -- the initiative of the subordinate, trust and confidence. Cooper had no wish to overrule a subordinate's decision, especially one of his first decisions of a campaign. Cooper had known Jernigan for twenty years and had complete faith in him. So the Indy went north, not south."
"Shortly after 1100 Tokyo time (1500 at Pearl), reports of air battles over the Sea of Japan began to reach LTG James Bridges, Commander Fifth Air Force at his headquarters in Yokota, Japan. To the north, American F-16 Falcons of the 432nd Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), based at Misawa in northern Honshu, and to the south, F/A-18 Hornets of Marine Aircraft Group 15, based at Iwakuni, engaged Soviet MiGs and Sukhois in aerial duels to control the air space to the west of the Japanese home islands. The marine and air force pilots found themselves outnumbered and hard pressed. At 1355, Bridges called GEN Henry Eustace, Commander, Pacific Air Forces, at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, over a secure telephone line and requested the release of the two squadrons of F-15 Eagles based at Kadena, Okinawa, which had heretofore been restricted to CAP missions between Japan and Taiwan. Bridges also recommended that Seventh Air Force assets in South Korea be fed into the battle. Eustace promptly gave Bridges complete authority over the 18th TFW at Kadena, but, fearing a North Korean attack across the DMZ, PACAIRFOR, with CINCPAC's approval, continued to hold the South Korea-based Seventh Air Force's 314th Air Division in reserve."
"Turkey trots to water GG From CinCPac action Com Third Fleet info ComInCh CTF Seventy-Seven X Where is RPT Where is Task Force Thirty-Four RR The world wonders"
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