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This scenario is an interpretation of the account from Michael A. Palmer's, "The War that Never Was".
"OPLAN 220-90 called for U.S. forces throughout the Pacific Command (PACOM) to initiate conventional offensive and defensive operations against Soviet units and against the Soviet Union itself. The plan assumed that neither power, at least initially, would have the assistance of its allies, other than the use of foreign facilities, such as Soviet bases in Vietnam and American bases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines."
"Thus, on D-Day the Soviets began not a military, but diplomatic and public affairs offensives in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Taiwan. Soviet diplomats entreated and threatened each of these countries to remain neutral and to forbid the operations of American forces from their soil. Other Soviet officials, local communists, and their supporters initiated campaigns designed to divide public opinion and to persuade East Asians that they ought not to allow themselves to be dragged into a European war by the United States."
"The Soviets gained even greater success on D Day in the North Pacific. Several hours before hostilities began, Bear reconnaissance aircraft located four American frigates convoying six container ships about nine hundred miles southeast of Hokkaido along the Seattle-Yokohama sealift route. Throughout the morning and early afternoon, the Pacific Fleet KPF vectored air, surface, and subsurface assets -- the Novorossiysk-Kalinin group, a Foxtrot, an Akula, and SNA Backfires and Badgers -- into strike positions. The attacks began at 1330 and lasted for three hours. All ten American ships were sunk. The Soviets lost neither a ship, a plane, nor a submarine. ADM Ushakov saw the sharp engagement as a vindication of his strategic ideas for Pacific operations. 'This battle was,' he reported to the general staff, 'a classic example of our combined naval doctrine and the most successful engagement fought by our naval forces on D Day, anywhere.
For CINCPAC, the convoy debacle was one of those events in life that suddenly bring everything into sharp focus. The loss of the container ships, loaded with ordnance and spare parts for air force squadrons in Japan, placed an immediate burden on American air transport assets which had to be shifted from other missions to fly supplies to the western Pacific. The Soviet success also demonstrated the dangers of operating without air cover. ADM Cooper immediately saw the wisdom of ADM Jernigan's strategy. Allied land-based air assets in South Korea and Japan blocked the movement of Soviet strike aircraft to the south and to the east. Their only way out was to the north -- between Hokkaido and Kamchatka. The only way to plug the gap was with naval air. Fortunately, Jernigan has his carriers closing in perfectly -- the Kitty Hawk coming down from the Aleutians, and the Independence coming up from Yokosuka. But Cooper remained concerned: could two carriers fight their way into the gap and close it?"
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![[Blue Water Navy] 12.0 Operations Plan 220-90](./downloads/1_B43.gif "[Blue Water Navy] 12.0 Operations Plan 220-90")