Soviet SSBN strategy

[Skwabie]

Completed my second campaign to date. Apparently the only chance one gets to hunt SSBNs is the final campaign mission.

I'd like to have a chance to do so other than that. I'd like to edit in some SSBN missions. Currently I simply replicated the 2 SSBN_patrol final missions and added them as normal missions.



But my question is, what would be the Soviet SSBN doctrine during the 1984 time frame, realistically? Would they stay at the backyard bastion or venture towards American east coast via a breakout? If it's the latter, I ought to make some more missions where an SSBN wolfpack would transit the Norwegian/Greenland sea towards the North Atlantic.

Googling finds very vague answers. Wiki suggests "3rd gen" boomers staying back while older ones go to the eastern seaboard or some such. But I never believe wiki all that much..

[C-Wolf]

Soviet front-line boomers during this timeframe had no reason to move any closer to their target areas than the range of their missiles allowed, which was considerable. Their goal was to remain undetected, disbursed, and as close to their own ASW screens as possible.

The only SSBNs allowed into the open ocean, --closer to the US, were the Yankees and Deltas. They were so loud, they were considered sacrificial in a conflict - and likely would have been. The NATO code-named, "Typhoon" class were their "ace-in-the-hole" for deterrence, and patrolled closer to home.

In the 80's the Soviets knew they would lose a large percentage of their SSBNs if a conflict erupted, due to the information they received from the Walker spy ring. They chose a conservative strategy in order to preserve enough deterrence to make the Americans think twice about a pre-emptive attack. They did not have the financial resources to re-build and deploy a stealthy SSBN fleet. As it was, their patrol posture declined considerably as the country fell apart.

Today's Soviet boats, are another story. They are very capable and quiet; what they lack in numbers, they make up for in quality.

[XenonSurf]

You must edit these entries from the campaign_data.txt file (campaign folder) to change the frequency of missions you get:

[PLAYER MISSIONS]
//Last mission is the FINAL MISSION for the campaign
//Second to last mission is simple RETURN TO BASE
PlayerMissionTypes=SSN_WOLFPACK,SS_WOLFPACK,SS_SPE COPS,INSERTION,LAND_STRIKE,ASUW_STRIKE,LANDING_FOR CE,RESUPPLY_CONVOY,SHIP_RESUPPLY,SUB_RESUPPLY,RETU RN_TO_BASE,SSBN_PATROL
//Last two missions are not included on frequency list
//Sum of frequencies must equal 1
PlayerMissionFrequency=0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1 ,0.1,0.1,0.1
PlayerMissionThreshold=0,0,0,0.5,0.6,0,0,0,0,0

Edit the fore-last line to your liking, the sum must be 1. The order corrisponds to the PlayerMissionTypes above.
Then put all the last line to 0 values.

Cheers,

[The Bandit]

You could always make the argument for the much feared 'depressed-trajectory' launch but honestly I think that was mostly theoretical. Not that it couldn't be done (launching SLBMs at ranges well below their maximum to cut-down on flight / reaction time in hopes of taking out enemy command and control or doing a counter-force strike on their bomber and ICBM bases), but that the Soviets were actually considering a 'first-strike' role for their SSBNs.

From what I recall reading, most of the SSBNs which would have patrolled close to the East Coast (like C-Wolf mentioned) were the old Yankees, and they were there because it was dictated by the relatively short range of their missiles. Further more, these 60s-era SLBMs probably wouldn't have had the accuracy to really accomplish a first-strike mission (i.e. knock-out or completely destroy the counter-force targets she'd likely be aiming at, in hopes of blunting / disrupting the American second-strike response.) so I think the whole thing is basically a non-starter which was more of something that the US was scared / paranoid about what could happen vs. a valid tactic that the Soviets actually planned on using.

As far as 'SSBN Wolfpacks' go, while I do remember hearing that the Soviets frequently escorted their boomers, I doubt very much they'd do it in a large numbers (multiple boomers and multiple escorts), especially for something getting sent out into the Atlantic because I think it would just be too easy to detect and put them into an 'all our eggs in one basket' situation. You could say that's exactly what they were doing by staying in bastions, but in that case it was their basket.

[Skwabie]

C-Wolf & The Bandit - Thanks! I've currently added a 3rd mission where a Yankee class SSBN would transit into the Atlantic, based on the mission from the 1968 campaign. It is questionable as to its realism but hopefully adds a bit more flavor to gameplay.

XenonSurf - yes, I halved both SHIP and SUB_resupply mission chances which leaves the extra 0.1 for my SSBN missions.

[Skwabie]

OK, it works. Though probably gotta re-write briefing to state it is a Yankee.


https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/kotAh6R2vip_KvfsF2tEXYCco7BLLCCd5zxWmkjIAm_beTNJ6y 84OfhBYo3-cP12arUp3hsskkQF57EcRVZJE5MLQfn0DKvmGOJD2Jw63xCtVk jH1skDQD99xTHVWMihR6JzjRtZl0ZpztF_mC3vMHmGn4GjTTLB Idj39R3q8oH-VKMRGP2HBDiuZIQY9q95XeGERo_ZVfEeJVIZAtdlyWz_fJ4Pan 4NMYwnpOdSp1tXuOzcM_s3iLHsJOKQb8vWBQfb0vMhcD-G0UMry09tGCyAJqKtDNWwfVl5Sg8eAtWLRniEYsQ_rw4CyIb9l NRd--XphDQ9VZqUr8BFrpnormNP17dNhqe-wl4YHkViLA6xZSi9bbzOua_s9gByenz4TLRitmozWiIZ3lGNW7 LhiukwQ2NmD7An8Mm4_zfBzYAIVcYRdWwVFi9zmo_QD6AfEnEl YibOLN7C0qhHWRVp9iF7uMo2Hsv3uqfchbb2-stDSw5JQzxdNK_aAhnoeh6WWqa3FZ6FcagBJ90MdT7m5-hX-euplVcNyUEyj5qn6Mo-AxWEfDz1E_v6VsxRLO6TczX5ek8yxNU_7vtv6c8L1POpBVQ2xb 9efg1W7EdMGKC_65Wsu6s3dwOAwQZ6Yd_VQFbOcyD-eyIEvMFUOneNpAx-c5KtXYYe=w1100-h880-no

This is after re-doing an amphib landing mission 3 times that is. First time blasted by 4 torpedoes, second time the transports escaped. Third one barely succeeds on 17% hull and bottoming the boat. Just how hard can these missions be??..
(Off topic:timeout:)

[Capt.Hunt]

I've heard that the Typhoons and later model Deltas could theoretically hit US targets from Pier side at Severodvinsk

[ikalugin]

Long story cut short - SSBNs were viewed as a deep second strike option.

As such the deployment of those submarines would depend on the ranges of their weapons. Due to this consideration the SSBN force would be split between bastion deployment (Deltas, Typhoons) and forward deployement (Yankees and older).

Another point to make is the nature of this deployment, because Soviets (and present day Russia) prefers surge deployment over constant at sea patrol. The reason behind this was simple - the principles of mass and concentration of effort (in time and space), but was based around the capability of Soviet leadership to detect the approaching crisis and shift the forces to the "threatened/special period" stance (which is why Able Archer was such a big no-no).

As Atrina shows, in 1980s NATO had a very limited capability to track then modern Soviet submarines, should those submarines employ wartime tactics.

p.s.
surge deployment is not done only for the SSBNs, but for the mobile launchers too, both during threatened period and training, for example the recent exercise of the SNRFs:
https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12157781@egNews

[Bubblehead Nuke]

As Atrina shows, in 1980s NATO had a very limited capability to track then modern Soviet submarines, should those submarines employ wartime tactics.



As someone who has been and done that in the 80's...

pure B.S.

No issues, no problems.... and no, I can not comment how or why.

[ikalugin]

As someone who has been and done that in the 80's...

pure B.S.

No issues, no problems.... and no, I can not comment how or why.
Are you fammiliar with Aport-Atrina?

p.s. Perharps a more expanded statement would help, as I am not familiar with your person, nor can I be expected to verify your statements and as such view them as factual.

[Bubblehead Nuke]

Are you fammiliar with Aport-Atrina?

p.s. Perharps a more expanded statement would help, as I am not familiar with your person, nor can I be expected to verify your statements and as such view them as factual.

Who am I?

Real Submariner.

Real Deployments.

Real Ops.

As for tracking Soviet SSBN's? Been there.. done that. Tracked Soviet SSN's? Yep, done that many times as well. Done many things that I can never talk about. That is why we are called the Silent Service.

I will tell you this:

You can read anything you want from any source. you can make any conjectures you want.

I just told you the truth.

Unvarnished.

Unfiltered.

We could track anything that could be put in the water that the soviets had.

[ikalugin]

I conclude that you are not familiar with those two events then.

The later may be of interest, especially in the light of this:
" We could track anything that could be put in the water that the soviets had." statement.

"I just told you the truth"
This is your opinion. While I respect your right to have one, I could not be expected to verify and as such trust your authority on the topic, nor could I be expected to accept unsubstantiated statements as fact, especially if to disprove them I would have to prove non existance (Russell's teapot).

[clayton]

Who am I?

Real Submariner.

Real Deployments.

Real Ops.

As for tracking Soviet SSBN's? Been there.. done that. Tracked Soviet SSN's? Yep, done that many times as well. Done many things that I can never talk about. That is why we are called the Silent Service.

I will tell you this:

You can read anything you want from any source. you can make any conjectures you want.

I just told you the truth.

Unvarnished.

Unfiltered.

We could track anything that could be put in the water that the soviets had.

22 years and 8 tours...and you discover this strange ability to not only bond with those who served, but you get this gut feeling when you come across someone who knows what he's talking about.

[C-Wolf]

Just as any potential 1980's-era adversary's priority naval intelligence target was the location of USN Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups, the USN's primary intel focus was focused toward Soviet's SSBN locations, --especially when they were underway.

A tremendous amount of training, resources, funding, and technological effort was made to ensure: "No more Pearl Harbors." This engrained philosophy has dominated US naval planning and doctrine since 1941.

SLBMs can strike the US mainland much sooner than fixed ICBMs due to their shorter range/decreased flight times, making determining their location paramount. As sonar supervisors, we were updated with the latest "hot cock" regarding potential adversary submarine movements every watch.

With a variety of sophisticated techniques that have never been revealed, I can say with certainty the life expectancy of a Soviet boomer sailor would have been very brief if the US submarine force had been tasked with removing Soviet SSBNs from the playing field at any time during the 70's-80's.

I never heard of a substantiated account of a Soviet SSN holding sustained trail on a US SSBN during the 60's, 70's, or 80's. Ever.

SSBN surge capability? That defeats the nature of forward deterrence using SSBNs. SSBNs are safest when submerged, not tied to a pier, vulnerable to an offshore TLAM strike.

As the 80's progressed, the Soviets went broke trying to keep pace with US/NATO ASW tactics and retreated to the bastions closer to their home waters, (this is called self-preservation) with other forces to help protect them. As money got increasing tighter, deterrent patrols stopped, and their boats rotted. Eventually, there were zero Soviet SSBNs at sea! To this day, there are half-submerged Russian SSNs rusting away in Russia because the will/funding isn't available to dispose of them properly. The Russian economy is still a mess.

Are today's Russia's latest submarines better? Absolutely! While low in quantity, their quality poses a huge challenge for the USN.

But. . .

The US submarine force has never been complacent where potential adversaries are concerned. (Wish I could say that with any conviction regarding the readiness status of the surface forces.) Today's submarine force is ready tonight to perform whatever mission they're assigned, and I would not want to be on the receiving end of their skill sets.

To find us, you must be good.
To catch us, you must be fast.
To beat us, you must be kidding!

(It isn't bragging if one can do it. . . )

[ikalugin]

I never heard of a substantiated account of a Soviet SSN holding sustained trail on a US SSBN during the 60's, 70's, or 80's. Ever.This is probably because you are not familiar with the Soviet experience like your comrade here.

SSBN surge capability? That defeats the nature of forward deterrence using SSBNs. SSBNs are safest when submerged, not tied to a pier, vulnerable to an offshore TLAM strike.Yet this is exactly what the doctrine was and still is, but it does imply, as I have mentioned before, that leadership would conduct the surge before the initiation of the hostilities. This doctine also applies to other assets, for example land mobile ICBM TELs.
The surge stance allows the capability to push more assets into the patrol areas during threatened period that the constant at sea patrol stance would allow, but it does have the disadvantage that you have mentioned.
As to the specific threat that you have mentioned, the SSBN bases (and other nuclear deterent related fascilities) were covered by an air defense zone, with multiple layers, including SAM layer. Here you could see the change in capability vs bombers and CMs between two time periods in multiples (starting period is used as the base):
http://www.vko.ru/sites/default/files/images/pictures/archive/0906/17-01.jpg
source:
http://www.vko.ru/koncepcii/prikrytie-strategicheskih-yadernyh-sil-vazhneyshaya-zadacha-voenno-vozdushnyh-sil2

As the 80's progressed, the Soviets went broke trying to keep pace with US/NATO ASW tactics and retreated to the bastions closer to their home waters, (this is called self-preservation) with other forces to help protect them.As I said, as the Soviet SSBNs were deep second strike assets, with the advances in weapons range there was no need for them to deploy forward.

In part, in the later years of the cold war, they were supplimented in the nuclar deterence role with Granat capable SSNs.

[Julhelm]

It's well established that the Simon Bolivar (SSBN-641) was trailed by the Victor-class K-147 in 1985. The November that trialled the SOKS installation also trailed a US boomer departing from Guam during September - October 1969.

The Soviets also likely had advanced knowledge of US boomer deployments from intercepting SOSUS tracking reports issued when US submarines were detected by SOSUS.

[C-Wolf]

Please cite your source for your Bolivar claim.

Fun Fact: John Walker served aboard the Bolivar.

[Julhelm]

The claim is from Norman Polmar's "Hunters and Killers, vol 2: Anti-Submarine Warfare since 1943", page 148, who cites the following Soviet literature in the chapter dealing with wake detection:

Rear Adm. Ye. Buzov, Soviet Navy, "From the History of the Creation of Non-acoustic Means of Detecting Submarines", Morskoy sbornik, no. 7 (2003), 59.

[C-Wolf]

Thanks.

I'm aware of the Soviet efforts in non-acoustic wake detection. First you have to find a wake, then follow it to it's source, (while remaining undetected) which is no easy feat in a vast ocean unless you're laying in wait off a harbor entrance where you can be reasonably sure a boat will exit at some point.

In some cases, Norman Polmar's research has to be taken with a grain of salt, but he's one of the most visible, (and prolific) writers of some very niche subjects, so he ends up with more attention (and money!) He's a good historian, but a better writer, and to the best of my knowledge, never served in the Navy or even held a security clearance. With thirty books to his credit, he's a minor celebrity as well. And if there's one thing most celebrities believe, it's their opinions and ideas are more informed than the rest of the population. I'll read the Soviet side, just for fun.

Not everything that's written is true; especially where submarining is concerned. Anyone can make a claim, but the only ones who really know the full story are those who were present and those who read the mission reports.

My experiences with armchair admirals who make money writing books and have never been to sea has left me a skeptic over the years.

A few other authors come to mind - especially Drew and Sontag (Blind Man's Bluff.) They took a couple of often-told sea stories, wrote a book, and cashed in. Their research had numerous holes in it, but sometimes it's better to let someone run with a story that's not factual rather than confirming or denying the facts, which only helps the people you're trying to protect the information from getting to in the first place.

I experienced this firsthand.

In the early 90's, Drew called me at home while gathering source material, starting the conversation with, "Hi, We're writing a book about submarines during the Cold War and heard you'd be a good guy to talk to." It took me less than a minute to determine what they were really after, and we made plans to meet the next night at their hotel.

As soon as I hung up, I made a phone call to NCIS and the next day, every source in the area mysteriously dried up, and they left town empty-handed.

With their quest to try to land a Pulitzer by writing a meaty story, neither author could have cared less regarding the simple fact that the passage of time does not release anyone from their pledge to protect information that has not been declassified. They used several dubious methods to convince a few people otherwise, but most of their sources were second-rate. --So much for journalistic integrity or patriotism. I'm sure they made a few bucks trying to publish information the rest of us protect for free.

The end result is there is a tremendous amount of BS written (and repeated) online and in books masquerading as fact when it's anything but.

The old adage, "Those who don't know, talk. And those who do know, don't." is one of the reasons we call it the Silent Service.

[Julhelm]

I enjoyed Blind Man's Bluff :)

We'll likely never know for sure, but I do believe the Soviets had enough success with non-acoustic ASW or they wouldn't still be spending lots of money on it and equipping their frontline boats with the technology. So to me that makes their trailing claim somewhat credible.

[Capt.Hunt]

From the sound of it, they might have used other means (intelligence assets) to find the boat, and then once they knew where to look were able to track it.

[Delgard]

Wasn't that a part of the Walker spy issue?

[ikalugin]

I'll read the Soviet side, just for fun.Sadly the bulk of the accounts are in Russian and were not translated so far. But now Polmar and others are getting to it.

For example accounts of operations Atrina and Aport from the looks of it are not well known by the local comunity.

Aport was the 1985 (1986) operation by 3 Victor-IIIs (299, 324, 502), Victor-II (488), Victor-I (147), supporting assets.
Atrina was the 1987 follow up operation by 5 Victor-IIIs (244, 255, 298, 299, 524), supporting assets.
Victor-IIIs, participating in Atrina, were fitted with improved sonar processing equipment.

The objective of the later was to deploy to Sargasso sea and from that area of operation conduct offensive ASW search for USN boomers.
Submarines operated in the wartime stance, ie limited their exposure to hostile action, did not use standard peacetime deployement routes,
were authorised to use wartime equipment and tactics (such as self propelled imitators).

The objective of the former was to deploy to the area off the coast of Newfoundland and to both study NATO ASW and to conduct an offensive search of the USN SSBNs. During operations prolonged (over 24h) contacts were established on USN SSBNs, by K-147 and K-324. The most substantial development was the use of non-acoustic sensors (wake detection equipment on K-147) to constantly track USN SSBN for 5 days.

[Bubblehead Nuke]

Submarines operated in the wartime stance, ie limited their exposure to hostile action, did not use standard peacetime deployement routes,
were authorised to use wartime equipment and tactics (such as self propelled imitators).


Oh, I see..

The Soviet submarine navy does not practice its job at all when they go to sea. On anything other than combat ops they allow themselves to be trailed, make noise, and generally be easy to track on purpose.

Thank you. It all makes sense now. Wow.. that is DEVIOUS.

[ikalugin]

Oh, I see..

The Soviet submarine navy does not practice its job at all when they go to sea. On anything other than combat ops they allow themselves to be trailed, make noise, and generally be easy to track on purpose.

Thank you. It all makes sense now. Wow.. that is DEVIOUS.
Sadly, as I am a rather socially inept person it is hard for me to understand if this is sarcasm.

As to the statement itself - this is not (exactly) what I talked about. In peacetime there are restrictions both for conveniency (ie use of standard inter-theatre deployment routes, G-loading and speed limits on aircraft, etc) and for operational security (ie use of advanced decoys, radiating for radars, etc).

Atrina and to lesser extend Aport are of interest because of how those restrictions were lifted and the results they have achieved (ie during Aport K-147 shadowing USN SSBNs for extended period of time, the interactions with NATO ASW forces). The other operation of interest in that respect would be operation Bohemoth, where a Delta launched a full SLBM salvo and thus proved that it was operationally possible.

But I guess one can just stick to one's sense of superiority, atleast as far as the secrecy and language barriers stay.

[Breakerchase]

It's very tempting to doubt a writer's credibility no naval matter for having "never served in the Navy or even held a security clearance", but to quote Fred T. Jane in Eric Grove's The Future of Sea Power: "it would be a bad day...if the principle ever gets established that unless a man is an actor he is incapable of criticising the actions of a drama...the contention world work out that 'you cannot tell whether an egg is good or bad unless you are a hen."'. :haha:

[Bubblehead Nuke]

Sadly, as I am a rather socially inept person it is hard for me to understand if this is sarcasm.

As to the statement itself - this is not (exactly) what I talked about. In peacetime there are restrictions both for conveniency (ie use of standard inter-theatre deployment routes, G-loading and speed limits on aircraft, etc) and for operational security (ie use of advanced decoys, radiating for radars, etc).

You are correct in your statement. There are operations restrictions that may not apply in actual combat.

However, due to the operating environment of ships and subs those operation constraints pretty much define how they are going to perform in real life. A ship is not going to go twice as fast, a sub is not going to suddenly be able to dive twice as deep or half its noise signature just because combat started. These are things that are designed in when constructed. So if you see a ship operated one way somewhere, then you can pretty much bet it is going to operate the same way elsewhere.

Now things like radar and active sonar ARE things that you can control. But you to train with them in order for them to be useful and effective in combat. You spy on us, we spy on you, and we all learn what the other guys sensors and weapons are good at and NOT good at. I am not saying that is right to spy, but that is the facts of life.

With this being said your statement being that things are different when they went on those ops because they were allowed to 'use a wartime stance' is just garbage. The ONLY way they could be construed to have made a difference is if the Soviet navy was intentionally operating stupidly at other times. Hence my use of sarcasm.

I was in before the cold war settled down. We had a saying what was repeated OFTEN on deployment: "The Red Bear is MANY things, but dumb ain't one of them." It was a manta that kept you on your toes and thinking.

But I guess one can just stick to one's sense of superiority, atleast as far as the secrecy and language barriers stay. The sense of superiority statement could be made right back at you. You are reading a report and stating that it was fact. I read lots of things. Some of it makes for a pretty good laugh when you know the rest of the story.

Our own SSN's could not track a boomer that wanted to be hidden and that was with us knowing that they were going to be in a pre-defined box for a specific amount of time. Stating that a soviet SSN tracked one for hours on end seems a little far fetched to those of us who tried and failed to track our own boats. I am not doubting that you make have gotten some kind of track on one. But one that could be used for a shooting solution? No, I highly doubt that.

Now don't get me wrong. I admire what the soviet sub force was able to do all things considered. They had some really good designs and some wild out of the box thinking. Some of it WAS copied by our navy. The same is true in the rest of the WORLDS arms forced. The Soviet military has some good thinkers and designers.

In truth the Soviet navy is not a blue water force but more of a self defense force. For that role they were very well designed and they had sound tactics. It does not mean that we did not pick those tactics apart and exploited deficiencies in the equipment and tactics.

As far as the statements that I have made that you disagree with. It is fine for you to disagree with them. That is the purpose of communication.

I do not know your background nor have I asked you to elaborate. But taking a holier that thou position and just repeat a report as the writ of god? Come on now, lets be real.

[C-Wolf]

Recently declassified and released related reading:

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005512850.pdf

Parent article: http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a28724/submarine-sonar-soks/

[Delgard]

Should we be seeing more Yankees in 1984?

And, I gather that near-ice activity wasn't so much a capability at the time. Moving in the ice flows would take longer than simply zipping down and through the GUIK gaps to the Atlantic, but safer. Was it that sonar was just not up to the task operating in the ice flows of north end of the Denmark Strait?

I guess these are analytical questions towards the '68 to '84 timeframe scenarios.

If I was a Yankee skipper, I would have attached a fishing motor to an iceberg and let it tow me silently to the US East Coast. :)

[ikalugin]

Should we be seeing more Yankees in 1984?

And, I gather that near-ice activity wasn't so much a capability at the time. Moving in the ice flows would take longer than simply zipping down and through the GUIK gaps to the Atlantic, but safer. Was it that sonar was just not up to the task operating in the ice flows of north end of the Denmark Strait?

I guess these are analytical questions towards the '68 to '84 timeframe scenarios.

If I was a Yankee skipper, I would have attached a fishing motor to an iceberg and let it tow me silently to the US East Coast. :)
There are obvious peacetime navigational issues (ie if you operate under the icepack and suffer a reactor failure you are in big trouble) which is why where possible other routes were used, for example for inter theatre transfer between Northern and Pacific Fleets.

[ikalugin]

With this being said your statement being that things are different when they went on those ops because they were allowed to 'use a wartime stance' is just garbage. The ONLY way they could be construed to have made a difference is if the Soviet navy was intentionally operating stupidly at other times. Hence my use of sarcasm. Yet in case of the Soviet force this was the reality as:
- transfer routes (bases->Atlantic)
- tactics (evasion tactics)
- equipment (self propelled imitators)
were wartime restricted (with exceptions - ie Atrina).

This follows the "surge" logic Soviets in general and Soviet Navy in particular used.

While one could disagree with that logic (ie citing the possibility of a surprise attack) it nonetheless existed. If one does not understand this logic one makes the common mistakes in understanding the Soviet forces and the scenarios, under which those would be deployed and thus the the likelly outcomes of such scenarios.
The prime example (other than the nuclear forces we have discussed here already) would be the large, conventional land war in Europe post Ogarkov reforms, where many analysts assumed that, for example, NATO would be capable of conducting the lengthy (30-90 days) re-deployment of forces under REFORGER and that Soviet Navy would be attempting to deny such re-deployment and as such was built for this mission, and through that perception lense the Soviet Navy (including the Naval Aviation assets it had) was analysed.

(I applogise for not citing fully, as I am pressed for time and capability to respond adequately)

[ikalugin]

Recently declassified and released related reading:

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005512850.pdf

Parent article: http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a28724/submarine-sonar-soks/
1972 dated report :yeah:

From which I get the impression that the report does not account for Victor-II class, which was the first class to have specific noise reduction measures (ie rafting), which were subsequently improved on later classes (such as Victor-III). As such this report may be misguiding when considering 1980s subsurface picture.

[C-Wolf]

Subsequent noise quieting for the Victor class were inadequate. The first boat that was an acoustic challenge to the US was the NATO code-named Akula.

For the purposes of the game as the time periods are set now, the Russian submarine force was quite detectable. --As in freight train loud, and easily picked up by the Q-5.

CCC

[ikalugin]

Aport and Atrina show otherwise.

Which Akula? Which Victors (IIs and IIIs)? There are significant internal (within the same class) differences there.

p.s. there is a convenient graph here (it counts combat submarines in general):
http://russianforces.org/SovietRussianSubmarines1958-2015.png
Depending on the year (ie after Soviets went with noise reduction on the late 2nd and then 3rd generations of submarines) there would be different ammount of "silent" submarines in service (ie 21 Victor-IIIs by 1984, 6 more Victor-IVs by 1992, then the whole Sierra/Akula can of worms). So while there would be submarines which would be fairly loud (the whole first generation, part of the 2nd generation) for the game time line, there would also be fairly quiet ones as well.

The 1972 vintage CIA report presented here reinforces my impression that the US parties at the time (and it appears still) did not (do not) understand the nature of the Soviet ASW development (I can show the significant developments that report misses), nor are aware of Soviet experience. For example the whole Afalina shebang is missed.

p.p.s I can provide a short overview of Soviet noise reduction evolution for the relevant time period.

[C-Wolf]

Other than reading books, how much time have you spent at sea?

[ikalugin]

Other than reading books, how much time have you spent at sea?
Should I view this as appeal to authority?

Though I guess Brakerchase already covered that point here:
It's very tempting to doubt a writer's credibility no naval matter for having "never served in the Navy or even held a security clearance", but to quote Fred T. Jane in Eric Grove's The Future of Sea Power: "it would be a bad day...if the principle ever gets established that unless a man is an actor he is incapable of criticising the actions of a drama...the contention world work out that 'you cannot tell whether an egg is good or bad unless you are a hen."'. :haha:

[C-Wolf]

I'll take that as a no.

I you have never participated in submarine operations or held a security clearance for such matters, you are very much in the dark, and as such your statements don't reflect reality or in-depth knowledge of the subject matter with no degree of "authority" whatsoever.

Case closed.

[ikalugin]

I'll take that as a no.

I you have never participated in submarine operations or held a security clearance for such matters, you are very much in the dark, and as such your statements don't reflect reality or in-depth knowledge of the subject with any degree of "authority."

Case closed.
Ahh, so it was an appeal to authority.

p.s. it is amusing to see how one who uses "silent" in the "silent service" as cover for his apparent appeals to authority decides that the oponent has no in-depth knowledge of subject when confronted (on the matter of said fallacious argument) or when the oponent does not comment on him having or not having clearance.

case closed indeed.

[Bubblehead Nuke]

Ahh, so it was an appeal to authority.

p.s. it is amusing to see how one who uses "silent" in the "silent service" as cover for his apparent appeals to authority decides that the oponent has no in-depth knowledge of subject when confronted (on the matter of said fallacious argument) or when the oponent does not comment on him having or not having clearance.

case closed indeed.

You keep quoting two 'studies' that are not translated. This seems to be the whole of your experience. You are taking these as the 'writ of god' that that are factual and bullet proof evidence to back up your statements.

While we are the silent service we have and will continue to provide insights that you may be unaware of. We will not give you 'time, place, and methods' knowledge.

No matter how much you try to goad us into telling you something that you frankly do not need to know, I have to tell you that it is not going to happen.

Back to the sound level of Soviet boats in the 80's:

When we talk about loud submarines we are talking about so loud that one boat could mask another acoustic point of interest. It was like trying to listen to classical music softly with a punk band playing next door with the amps turned up to 11.

So in the context of one Victor boat to the other it is like comparing two gravel trucks with bad tires driving by. Yeah, one may be 'quieter' but they both still give you a headache. As was stated before, until the NATO coded Akula got in the water they did not have anything resembling a 'quiet' SSN.

[Delgard]

So, does all that mean that in 1984 we should see more Yankees trying to break into the Atlantic?

:D

[ikalugin]

So, does all that mean that in 1984 we should see more Yankees trying to break into the Atlantic?

:D
Sadly I don't remember the numbers, but there should be 20-25 Yankees in service with the Northern Fleet in 1984, so I guess during the war you should see their mass deployment to Atlantic via wartime routes, as well as the older submarines.

[ikalugin]

You keep quoting two 'studies' that are not translated. This seems to be the whole of your experience. You are taking these as the 'writ of god' that that are factual and bullet proof evidence to back up your statements.

I have not been citing studies (or articles or books), I was talking about specific events - operations Atrina and Aport, which gave very different results to, say, Kama. Components of those events, such as K-147's prolonged contact with a USN SSBN was discussed in literature, referenced by other participants of the discussion.

Knowledge of those events (all 3) is commonly viewed as pre-requisite for an educated discussion on Soviet Navy in the Russian community due to their importance.

As to the noise reduction topic - there is a reason why I asked about which boats in the broader class you are talking about, as there was more than 10db difference between early and late boats within the same broad class.

[The Bandit]

Sadly I don't remember the numbers, but there should be 20-25 Yankees in service with the Northern Fleet in 1984, so I guess during the war you should see their mass deployment to Atlantic via wartime routes, as well as the older submarines.

I like how Cold Waters handles SSBNs as a final mission of the campaign. Despite established doctrine, you can see how risk-aversion at the political level could effect things either way (while a very real threat, both sides could have reservations about neutralizing strategic assets and provoking an escalation /possible nuclear exchange).

[ikalugin]

I like how Cold Waters handles SSBNs as a final mission of the campaign. Despite established doctrine, you can see how risk-aversion at the political level could effect things either way (while a very real threat, both sides could have reservations about neutralizing strategic assets and provoking an escalation /possible nuclear exchange).
Yes, I could see the risk-aversion as a valid concern.

[Marcantilan]

I love the exchange of opinions.

My two cents. Some years ago I was reading a CIA paper called "Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters", for the year 1982.

It was really top secret at the time, now is open to the public (not in full).

Since I was researching for the 1982 South Atlantic War, my key interest was about Soviet boats in the South Atlantic. The report was categoric: just a couple of Foxtrot boats in Angola and thats all. No other boats deployed down south in 1982.

The trouble is, I also have a nice picture of K-513 (a NATO Victor II) crew crossing the equator line on 3 Nov 1982. The boat was near Ascension Island, unaware to the US Navy or CIA.

US boats were good. Soviet boats were good too. It is nice the humanity never paid the price to be sure which one was better.

Regards,

[ikalugin]

Remember how in 1983 K-324 got tangled in TASS cable in Sargasso sea?

[Overkill]

Remember how in 1983 K-324 got tangled in TASS cable in Sargasso sea?

I remember that it was screwed (or de-screwed if ya think about it. :har:) when it got tangled up.

[C-Wolf]

Ahh, so it was an appeal to authority.

p.s. it is amusing to see how one who uses "silent" in the "silent service" as cover for his apparent appeals to authority decides that the oponent has no in-depth knowledge of subject when confronted (on the matter of said fallacious argument) or when the oponent does not comment on him having or not having clearance.

case closed indeed.

You are trolling with disinformation, conjecture, and innuendo masquerading as profound insight.

As previously stated, those of us with knowledge of the subject, (ASW operations and capabilities) won't be discussing classified information. Without a clearance and ASW experience, one might know 2% on the subject. Effective ASW is as much an art as it is a science, and there's a lot of formal training required to mastering them.

Of one thing you may be assured, (from those of us with in-depth experience and knowledge of the subject) is that within the timeframe of this game, the US Navy submarine force sailed with impunity and while respectful of Soviet submarines, was not intimidated one iota by them.

TRAINING GENERATES CONFIDENCE / EXPERIENCE DELIVERS EXPERTISE

In the submarine community, those of us in the sonar rating were superbly trained, attending various schools for up to two years, (The Q-5 maintenance course was nine months long alone) prior to ever setting foot onboard a boat, which is where the real training begins.

In contrast, most US college students spend four years attending classes for a few hours a week. We spent forty hours a week in a formal setting, not including night study with a teaching assistant to help us out. During inport periods, additional training courses were scheduled, including sonar and attack team trainers followed by countless drills and exercises at sea preparing for the next deployment. If you aren't doing the real thing, then you're training, anytime you're at sea.

All prospective sonar supervisors with at least a year of sea time were required to complete a seven-week Submarine Sonar Subjective Analysis, (SSSA, or as we called it, "Triple-S A") acoustic intelligence course. We filled out a two-hundred page workbook of mostly Russian-oriented intelligence information from lectures and then committed it to memory for the final. During the practical portion of the final, each student was presented with a recording of a vessel recorded by an SSN from a SPECOP and we used all of the same equipment onboard the ship to analyze the acoustic data, interpret the results, and render a classification with other acoustic cues to back up our decision. The written portion of the test was four hours long. Anyone who completed this would agree it was a very tough course.

It was never our goal to just prevail in the water column, but to dominate, and there's a big difference between those two words. Whether you take my word for it or not is irrelevant; history will bear this out. Maybe you are confusing authority with truth, I cannot tell, but truth eventually wins.

The only thing you have conclusively proven with your posts thus far is your incomplete knowledge of the subject matter since you have ZERO experience other than what you read in open source publications, which is often wildly inaccurate, and woefully incomplete due to the classified nature of the subject. Amateurs who pretend to know what they're talking about regarding naval operations are called "armchair admirals" for a reason. Your continuing posts defending your untenable position only serve to confirm this assessment.

"Opponent"? This isn't even a fight (or an argument.) You're just wasting server bandwidth, trying to pretend you're knowledgeable about something you're not. You aren't qualified, (in more ways than one) to debate anything regarding the subject of 1980's-era ASW with any degree of authority.

The game as coded is a very good representation of the capabilities involved at the time using the information available now. As such, those of us who have "been there, done that" enjoy playing it, which is the highest tribute a developer can receive. But just like owning a gun and playing SOCOM doesn't make one an authority of SEAL tactics, neither does playing Cold Waters, (or any other publicly-released submarine simulation) and reading open source literature make one an authority on submarine operations. You would do well to remember that.

But in the interests of free speech, you may pretend to know what you're talking about as much as you want. . . Knock yourself out; it still doesn't change a thing. By continuing to make wild claims with insufficient proof, you only continue to embarrass yourself, "admiral" :salute:

As for real tactical employment methodology, those details have not been released. And truth IS stranger than fiction.

“Si Ego Certiorem Faciam … Mihi Tu Delendus Eris”

[ikalugin]

You are trolling with disinformation, conjecture, and innuendo masquerading as profound insight. Ahh, so a shift to Ad-hominem.

p.s. I think one of the issues here is in fact your experience (which we did not verify, but lets assume that it indeed exists), because cold war era intel (as for example the 1972 vintage CIA reported posted here shows) was rather, ehem, imperfect, especially compared to post cold war era Russian accounts, which became availiable because people in question were no longer bound by their oaths (USSR is no more) or scared of prosecution by successor states - such as Russia (ie if they lived in Ukraine or Baltics).
This problem is illustrated by your apparent lack of knowledge on the critically important events - such as Aport and Atrina and the lack of rocognition of the name of the event that you probably do know - operation Kama, events that are covered by open sources today, yet not covered (or appear so) by your proprietary knowledge.

That bias and your appeal to your perceived authority make your arguments toxic and counter productive.

As to myself - I am more of the industrial side person, so armchair industrialist would be a better description I guess?

[Jimbuna]

Can we all keep this debate at an acceptable level please, without resorting to name calling and insults.

[Kapitan]

Ok Ladies and Gentlemen keep it down Just my 2 cents coming in here.

Operation Atrina information which was gathered by the United States was declassified by the USN in 2005 and is available for public viewing.
Operation Atrina information in Russia today was declassified around the same time 2004/5.

Now we all know that the United states and the UK well generally the west has better technology when it comes to computers we don't really need to make a comparison of this it is well known.

I think a lot of the west does have a superiority complex when it comes to east v west topic, and i am talking as someone who is from the west and spent a lot of time in the east also.

Atrina had two main goals, "the first goal of atrina was to find new routes into the Atlantic ocean, as we knew that the British and Americans could predict where we were headed using the traditional routes"

"The second goal was to study the anti submarine techniques and deployments of western forces trying to find us" (Quoted from Captain of K524 Sergey Kourov)

Out of the five captains that took part i know of two; Captain Victor Alikov who is nicknamed the prince of darkness, and Captain Surgey Kourov both took part in Atrina.

During this mission it is noted and confirmed offically both by the United States and the Soviet Union that ASW forces were increased considerably during this time.

It is a confirmed fact that the United States deployed 6 Los Angeles types in order to bolster their forces in the Atlantic this is confirmed by the USN, it is also known that 3 hydro-graphic ships of the Stalwart type were also deployed in ASW activity against the 5 submarines, it is also a fact that more ASW aircraft from land based establishments on the east coast and the islands were also deployed in greater than usual numbers.

The United Kingdom also pitched in with its forces the Light carrier HMS Invincible was diverted from her duties along with her escorting ships to track the soviet submarines. this is a fact which was disclosed by Rear Admiral Christopher Parry in 2006 and he is a former commander of Polaris and Trident submarines for the Royal Navy.

During the operation Admiral Chernavin had authorized the use of "sound simulators" something that was to be used only in war time normally but assisted in the submarines remaining undetected for 8 days.

It is confirmed that the United States and the UK had tracked by Satellites the deployment of five victor III type submarines from their base in Zapadnya Litsa, a trailing unknown United States and British submarines that was patrolling nearby also recorded and reported increased submarine activity in the area.

The UK and European NATO allies (Excluding France as it ceased to be a member in 1966) were responsible for the GIUK (Greenland Iceland United Kingdom gap) this is where known SOSUS nets were deployed, however the Victors had already changed course and were heading away from the area.

We do know my the declassification they took an un-charted route into the Atlantic and made there way to Bermuda, before another rapid course change.

It was then the intelligence stated 6 Los Angeles class submarines had been put to sea, the captains had also observed a heavily increased anti submarine patrols by aircraft in the region, it is also known that the USN based in Rota Spain also put to sea "blocking" the Straight of Gibraltar with ASW forces but also limitedly deploying into the med (as other units from the Black sea were at the time operational in that area), they were also assisting the 6th fleet based in Naples Italy.

Rear Admiral Christopher Parry does state "it took us 8 days to find them"

According to Admiral Chernavin by the time the Western ASW forces had located the submarines the mission was already over they were returning to base.

It is known and confirmed by both the RN and USN that only 4 of the 5 boats were identified the 5th boat was that of Captain Victor Alikov.

So while the USN and RN had the upper hand in technology it didn't always play to their advantages something clearly atrina exploited that, so while the USA and UK believed SOSUS was their see all and be all in fact we know now that it really wasn't and that given the leaks with in the USN al'la walker it is known and confirmed SOSUS was starting to show its age and not be able to detect the newer classes of submarines, that's a fact confirmed by DR John P Craven in 1999 he goes on to say "those who believe the USA didn't have a great intelligence network is just pure Bull"

So with all the facts laid out i have to ask this question: why would the USA and UK deploy such vast forces to find 5 submarines? if as the claim by one poster states they knew all the time where soviet submarines were.


As a side note it is known that a November class Submarine K14 trailed the USS Daniel Boone it was only detached when an attack submarine managed to Shepard it away, the submarine did use the SOKS system and K14 was the trials boat for this system, the CIA declassified in 2017 its knowledge of the SOKS system.

It is also known and confirmed the the Victor III class submarine Tracked and trailer USN submarines leaving Bangor Washington in 1985 while on deployment off the east coast the submarine is confirmed to be K314.



I have spent the best part of 15 years working with / for the British MOD from working on ships that are STUFT (Ships Taken Up From Trade)(yeah that's the best acronym the UK government has ever come up with IMHO) to Logistics which is my specialization, i have worked in many capacities.

I have been on board many types of submarines across the world including Russian American Japanese and French boats a lot of my work ends me on naval bases hence why i also make a point of at least trying to get some pictures here and there when possible.

My last goal this year is to end my job (which i love) and move full time to Canada and no i don't want another Job in the Canadian MOD either! i was thinking more Walmart :D

[Kapitan]

As for the original post question

Delta III and IV along with the Typhoons do not need to forwardly deploy into the Atlantic they are fully capable of launching missiles from home port the the United States.

These types stay in home waters protected by ASW forces its called the Bastion concept.

By 1984 with the SALT talks most of the elderly SSBN's such as the Hotels and Yankees were converted into Special projects submarines Radar Pickets or just had their silo's filled with concrete and used as attack submarines or became SSGN's or even test platforms. as we know 1 was lost K219 after a incident with a missile.

Given that the Yankee's main missile had short range it did mean they had to deploy forward into the Atlantic this also meant they would be sacrificed in war as the Russians did know they would take heavy losses should war break out.