100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

30th May 1919

General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, with French officers at Romagne, France for Memorial Day.


HMS Impregnable, a 19th-century warship, used as a training ship for the Royal Navy.


American engineers repairing broken wire during a training gas attack.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. S Orlando hands round a document regarding the situation in Carinthia. He suggests that Allied Commissioners should be sent to the scene of the fighting between Austria and the Yugoslavs with instructions to secure at once a cessation.

President Wilson suggests that the best plan would be for M Clemenceau, on behalf of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, to present a note to the Serbo-Slovene-Croat Delegation.

(It is agreed that Mr Philip Kerr should draft for consideration a note to the Serbo-Slovene-Croat Delegation warning them that the fighting must cease if they wish the boundaries to be settled, and that the result of the fighting will not prejudice the final decision as to the boundaries.)

The following instructions to the Drafting Committee, prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey in accordance with directions, was approved and initialed by the four Heads of State:

“With reference to the attached note C. F. 41, Minute 9, the Drafting Committee are instructed that any articles of the Treaty of Peace with Germany which are inconsistent with the text of articles 102 and 104 as notified to the Drafting Committee on May 24th., are to be brought into conformity with these articles.”


2. M Clemenceau says he has received an application from the Turkish Grand Vizier to come to Paris and enlighten the Peace Conference.

Mr Lloyd George supports the proposal. He thinks that it is unnecessary to treat the Turks in in the same manner as the Germans. He can see no harm in hearing the Turkish side of the case. The same will apply to the Bulgarians if they wish to come.

President Wilson says their first object will be to protest against what had been done in Smyrna.

M Clemenceau asks why they should not protest.

Mr Lloyd George says he would let them protest.

(It is agreed that the Turkish application should be granted and that Mr Philip Kerr should draft a reply for M. Clemenceau to send.)


3. Sir Maurice Hankey reads a note received from M Fromageot on behalf of the Drafting Committee, proposing in Article 228 of the German Treaty to omit the word “military” before the word “law”, so as to make the sentence read “such person shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law”.

S Orlando points out that if Belgium chooses to send her military culprits before a Civil Tribunal, it is a domestic matter which did not affect the other States.

(After a short discussion, the proposals of the Drafting Committee are approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


4. With reference to C. F. 37B, Minute 10,2 the question is raised as to whether the political articles affecting territory to be transferred to Italy will be ready for inclusion in the Treaty to be handed to the Austrian Delegates on Monday, June 2nd.

Count Aldrovandi reports that the Commissions to which some of the draft clauses had been referred are meeting that afternoon at 15:00.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to ascertain whether the Reports of the Commissions will be ready for consideration on the following day.)

(Note: Sir Maurice Hankey has made inquiries, and ascertained that the Report of the Financial Commission is ready. The Report of the Reparation Commission, with which was bound up the Economic questions, is not ready.)


5. There is a short conversation in regard to the German counter-proposals.

President Wilson say that he has sent the German document to his Experts, and asked them merely to summarize what counter-proposals had been made by the Germans. He proposes to consider these, and not their counter-arguments.

Mr Lloyd George says he has had a preliminary conversation with his colleagues on the British Empire Delegation, and has invited several members of the British Government to meet him in Paris on Sunday. There are certain statements of fact in regard to the eastern frontier, for example, the distribution of population in Poland, on which he would like to elicit the truth.

President Wilson refers to the statement that 750 years had passed since Silesia was Polish.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed to adjourn until Monday at the earliest any further consideration of the question by the Council, in order to give members an opportunity to study the question with their respective Delegations.)


6. The Council has under consideration the second German Note dated May 22nd, on the subject of International Labour Legislation and the reply suggested by Mr. Barnes’ Committee.

(After the reply has been read aloud, it is approved.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General in order that it might be presented for M Clemenceau’s signature and forwarded to the German Delegation.

It is further agreed that the Note should be published after dispatch.)


7. The Council has before them the remarks of the Drafting Committee on the proposals of M. Kramarz on the Political Clauses for the Czechoslovak State.

The discussion is adjourned owing to the fact that the Articles of the Treaty to which M. Kramarz’ observations referred are not available.


8. With reference to C. F. 41, minute 8.3 Mr. Lloyd George asks leave to refer to the dispatches from Poland handed round by M Clemenceau on May 29th.

The point to which he wishes to call attention is the statement that General Haller had said he has no recollection of any promise made by him to anyone not to use his Army against the Ukrainians. This raises the question as to whether Marshal Foch had ever carried out his instructions to notify General Haller that he was not to do so. He recalled that Marshal Foch had, at one time, been exceedingly desirous of sending General Haller’s Army to Lemberg.

M Clemenceau undertakes to make full inquiry into the matter.

President Wilson reads a report from a United States Officer, a Lieutenant Foster, who had visited Sambor and Stanisslau, and reported that in the districts he had visited, the peasants, who were Ukrainians by nationality, had returned to the land and showed no antipathy to the Poles; the Poles had behaved with great tact and judgment, and had released all their prisoners; the Ukrainian Government, according to this report, had proved most unsatisfactory - had been unable to keep order and had made many requisitions mainly at the expense of the Polish population. The Ukrainian transport had been disorganized and the currency system hopeless. The Ukrainian troops had perpetrated many outrages on the Poles, and this Officer marveled at the restraint shown by the Polish troops. In his view, the Ukrainians were not capable of self-government, but he qualified his report by stating that he had only visited a limited part of the country, and this only applied to what he himself had seen.


9. With reference to C.F. 13, Minute I.4 S Orlando again raises the question of the action to be taken in cases where subjects of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire had committed breaches of the laws of war and had subsequently assumed some fresh nationality such as Czechoslovak or one of the other nationalities formed out of the old Austrian Empire. He said that according to his recollection, the previous decision had been to refer this to the Drafting Committee but that the Drafting Committee had received no instructions.

President Wilson says that the difficulty is that the Austrian Treaty cannot bind the Czechoslovak State.

S Orlando made the suggestion that the Czechoslovaks should undertake in the Treaty to bring to trial in their own Courts, persons accused of Breaches of the Laws of War.

This proposal is accepted.

(The Resolution was approved and initialed, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it immediately to the Secretary General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

[Jimbuna]

31st May 1919

Aftermath of War

British warships again defeat Bolsheviks near Kronstadt.

Allies present Note to Germany re: troops in Baltic Provinces.

Bolsheviks withdraw from Gulf of Riga.

A Scottish officer enjoys fly fishing on the Rhine in occupied Germany.

[Sailor Steve]

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 8, Plenary Session of May 31, 1919


The Session is opened at 15 o’clock (3 p.m.) under the presidency of M Clemenceau, President.


Present

For the United States of America:
The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing.
Honorable Henry White.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

For the British Empire:
Great Britain:
The Rt Hon David Lloyd George.
The Rt Hon A J Balfour.
The Rt Hon G N Barnes.
The Rt Hon Sir Joseph Ward.

Dominions and India:

Canada:
The Rt Hon Sir George Foster.
The Hon C J Doherty.

Australia:
The Rt Hon W M Hughes.
The Rt Hon Sir Joseph Cook.

New Zealand:
The Rt Hon. W F Massey.

For France:
M Clemenceau.
M Pichon.
M L L Klotz.
M André Tardieu.
M Jules Cambon.
Marshal Foch.

For Italy:
S. V E Orlando.
The Baron S Sonnino.
S S Crespi.
The Marquis G Imperiali.
S S Barzilai.

For Japan:
The Marquis Saionji.
The Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
Mr K Matsui.
Mr H Ijuin.

For Belgium:
M Hymans.
M van den Heuvel.

For China:
Mr Lou Tseng-tsiang.
Mr Cheng-ting Thomas Wang.

For Cuba:
Sr Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.

For Greece:
Mr Eleftherios Veniselos.
Mr Nicolas Politis.

For Nicaragua:
Sr Salvador Chamorro.

For Panama:
Sr Antonio Burgos.

For Poland:
Mr Roman Dmowski.
Mr Ignace Paderewski.

For Romania:
Mr Jean J C Bratiano.
Dr Vaida-Voevod.

For the Serb-Croat-Slovene State:
Mr N P Pachitch.
Mr Trumbitch.
Mr Vesnitch.

For Siam:
The Prince Charoon.
Phya Bibadh Kosha.

For the Czechoslovak Republic:
Mr Charles Kramar.
Mr Edouard Benes.


The Agenda Paper calls for the communication to the Allied and Associated Powers of the Conditions of Peace with Austria.

The President, after making a statement to the above effect, points out that the document which he is laying on the table of the Conference only lacks the political clauses relating to Italy, the Military and the Reparation Clauses, which are, moreover, in an advanced stage. He adds that the Secretariat-General has received a certain number of amendments, and calls on Mr Bratiano to speak.

Mr Bratiano (Romania) reads the following declarations:

A. The Romanian Delegation considers that the conclusion of Peace with Austria leaves no doubt whatever in regard to the union of Bukovina with Romania. In point of fact, Romania, having become by her Treaty of Alliance of the 17th August, 1916, a belligerent Power against Austria, saw Bukovina revert to her as a result of the dissolution of the Austrian Empire and in accordance with the wishes of its population. In this manner the mutilation of 1775 is remedied in respect of the whole of the territory torn from Moldavia.

Romania, by adhering to the Act of Union proclaimed by Bukovina, is taking in hand the reconstitution of that province, ensuring its safety and arresting on the frontier of the Dniester the spread of anarchy which threatens a large area of Europe. At the cost of military sacrifices which have not yet approached their end, Romania is watching over Bukovina and is also asserting her solidarity with the general interests of civilization.


B. In regard to Article 5, of Part 3, Section IV, of the Draft Treaty with Austria, concerning the treatment of minorities by Romania, the Romanian Delegation has the honor to make the following declaration:

The first Romanian Delegate, on the 27th May last, addressed the following letter to M Berthelot, Chairman of the Commission entrusted with the task of fixing the nature of the guarantees which should be provided for the protection of minorities included in the new States which are in process of formation in Europe, as well as those in other States which are about to receive accretions of territory:

“Sir,

In reply to the letter which you were so good as to address to me on the 23rd May last, I have the honor to inform you that Romania has assured to all her citizens, without distinction of race or religion, complete equality both of rights and of political and religious liberties. She regards as a Romanian citizen any individual born in Romania, but not enjoying any foreign nationality, as well as the inhabitants of the territories newly united to Romania, who were subjects of the States to which those territories hitherto belonged, with the exception of those who have expressed their desire to opt for a different allegiance.

Indeed, the Royal Government, in accordance with its principles and in agreement with the representatives of Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina, have likewise decided to ensure the rights and liberties of minorities throughout the whole extent of the new kingdom by a wide administrative decentralization such as will guarantee to populations of different racial origin their free development in the matter of language, education, and the exercise of their religion.

Generally speaking, Romania is ready to accept any arrangements which all the States belonging to the League of Nations would admit on their own territories in this connection.

In all other circumstances Romania would in no case be able to admit any interference by any foreign Governments in the application of her domestic laws.

In this letter Romania expresses her intention to give the widest recognition to the liberties of ethnical or confessional minorities. Her Delegates, taking their stand on these principles, voted, on the occasion of the constitution of the League of Nations, in favor of the guarantees suggested for the whole group of States which compose the League; outside these general principles, however, Romania would be unable to consent to stipulations of a nature to limit her rights as a sovereign State, and in this connection she considers the rights of States to be the same for all.

In the very interest which the founders of the League of Nations necessarily possess in avoiding any inconsistency as regards the great principles by which the League is animated, it is essential that the leading members of that institution should abstain from any attitude which would not be identic towards all States.

Foreign intervention, as a matter of fact, even if it granted no liberties beyond those which the Romanian State is determined to guarantee to all its citizens, might compromise the work of fraternization which the Romanian Government has taken as its aim.

On the one hand, certain minorities might consider themselves absolved from all gratitude towards the State, whereas it is precisely on the development of that sentiment that the State relies for cementing the brotherhood of the various races; on the other hand a tendency would arise towards the creation of two classes of citizens in the same kingdom: the one trusting in the care of the State for their interests, the other disposed to be hostile to the State and to seek protection outside its frontiers.

History is there to prove that the protection of minorities, regarded from this point of view, has done more to disintegrate States than to consolidate them. At the present moment the Conference of the Allies is bound to endeavor to establish, on the basis of fraternity between peoples, the countries whose development is destined to ensure peace in Central and Southern Europe. Moreover, these same Allies, when the draft of the League of Nations was under discussion, withdrew Article 21, of which the following is the tenor:

'The High Contracting Parties agree to state that no obstacle shall be placed in the way of the free exercise of every belief, religion, or opinion, the practice of which is not incompatible with public order and morality, and that, within their respective jurisdictions, no one shall be disturbed in his life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness by reason of his adhesion to such belief, religion, or opinion.'

Because it was thought that this Article infringed State sovereignty, Romania determined, in the interests of liberty and justice for all, as well as in that of her own internal development, to safeguard the rights of minorities; as an independent State she does not claim any exceptional treatment for herself, but she cannot, on the other hand, accept a special régime to which other sovereign States are not subjected.

For this reason she declares her readiness to insert in the draft Treaty, Article 5, Part 3, Section IV, the following text:

'Romania grants to all minorities of language, race, and religion residing within her new frontiers rights equal to those which belong to other Romanian citizens.'"


C. As regards the second paragraph of Article 5, Part 2, Section IV of the draft Treaty with Austria, Romania states that she is prepared to take every measure for the purpose of facilitating transit and developing trade with other nations.

She will accept all the measures of a general character adopted in this connection by the League of Nations and rendered applicable to all of the States composing the League, as well as those adopted by the various special Commissions of the Peace Conference to which the Romanian Delegates have given their adhesion.


D In agreeing to adhere to the stipulations set forth in the draft Treaty with Austria - subject to the reservations stated in the attached declarations - Romania has been animated by the desire of maintaining her solidarity with the Allies. However, while giving her adhesion, she finds herself compelled to state that it must not be inferred therefrom that she will acquiesce in all similar principles which may be embodied in the Treaties with other enemy States.


E. Proposals concerning the Financial Clauses:

1) In Article 2, last paragraph, substitute for the words “in the currency of the creditor State” the words “in crowns, gold.”

2) In Article 10, leave to each interested State the right of fixing the periods within which it will stamp or repay the currency notes, this being a matter of domestic concern. Each State, being acquainted with its own capacities, is in a better position to fix the periods of time for effecting these operations.

3) In regard to the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, the Romanian Delegation is of opinion that, in view of the small amount of the available assets of this Bank, if the securities deposited by the Austrian and Hungarian Governments as cover for the currency notes issued up till the 27th October, 1918, inclusive, are, as stipulated in Article 10, likewise cancelled, the cover remaining for those notes would be so reduced that the latter would scarcely have any value. Such a situation would bring about too heavy a charge from the Romanian point of view.

The Romanian Delegation therefore thinks it just to request that no such cancellation should take place.

4) The Romanian Delegation states afresh that it considers neither as just nor as in conformity with the principles of international law that the cedee States of territories of the former Austrian Empire, or those formed as a result of that Empire’s dismemberment, should be obliged to pay the value of the goods and properties which belonged to the Government of the former Austrian Empire and are situated on their respective territories.
The President explains that the Financial Clauses will be referred to the Drafting Committee for an immediate report. He then adds:

“As far as territory properly speaking is concerned, it must of course be understood that, whether regarded as the League of Nations or as separate Governments, we are unable to guarantee any portions of territory other than those which we have ourselves assigned, and that it is impossible for us to guarantee others.

I am very glad to know that, as regards the rights of minorities, Mr Bratiano’s opinion coincides precisely with our own. What we have to ascertain is whether in view of the past history of several peoples it may not be necessary to give, I will not say additional guarantees, but such guarantees of a more complete nature as may be admitted to be necessary. That is a question in regard to which we have got to take a decision, and I beg Mr Bratiano and anyone else who may have observations of a like character to offer, to rest assured that there is no intention of humiliating anyone or of encroaching on the sovereign rights of any nations whatsoever, but rather to remember that, in the matter of minorities, everyone’s history has not been quite the same. Some distinctions are necessary in this connection, so much so that we desire to humiliate no one when we suggest conferring a right of control, not on foreign governments, as Mr Bratiano states in his text, but on the League of Nations, whose control we all accept in our own territory in the circumstances to which Mr Bratiano has alluded.

In this matter, therefore, there is no question of humiliating anyone or of encroaching on anyone’s sovereignty.”

M Klotz (France) points out that the Financial Clauses and those concerned with Reparation, are altogether inter-dependent. As the Reparation Clauses have not been included in the text to be communicated to the Austrians on the following Monday, he proposes that a like decision shall be taken in respect of the Financial Clauses.

Mr Bratiano (Romania) points out that, according to the text distributed, the small States are to be controlled, not by the League of Nations, but by the Great Powers; the text reads: “Romania likewise adheres to the insertion in a Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers of the measures which those Powers may consider necessary for the protection in Romania of the interests of the inhabitants, &c. …”

It is, therefore, the Great Powers which are to intervene in order to safeguard the rights of minorities within the Kingdom of Romania. That is the principle against which the modification proposed by Mr Bratiano is made, because Romania was an independent country before the war, and he cannot believe that her attitude during the war can have warranted in the slightest degree any derogation from that political independence.

The President admits that Mr Bratiano’s observation in regard to control being exercised by the Governments, in the place of the League of Nations, is in accordance with the text. He does not, however, think that it can be humiliating for Romania to receive friendly counsel given her by States which are named, the United States of America, Great Britain, Italy, and France. No one of these States desires to exercise any improper power in Romania. He adds that rectifications of historical traditions which have been perpetuated in certain countries have been requested for a long time past, even in other Treaties, but it has been impossible to secure them. In these circumstances the text under criticism is rather in the nature of an encouragement and support.

Mr Bratiano (Romania), in order to justify the statement which he has read out, expresses himself in the following terms:

“As I do not wish to waste the time of the Conference, I will refrain from any complete explanation of Romania’s policy in the past. I must, however, say that she does not deserve the situation which it is sought to impose on her to-day. In any case, we stand here - at least, we have always understood it in that way - before the Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers which have striven to establish the right to equality of great and small States, and to set up rules which may henceforth serve both as principles and precedents. Among those rules there are some in virtue of which it is sought to-day to establish classes of States which differ in the matter of sovereignty. On behalf of Romania I am unable to admit this principle. There is no question here of friendly counsel, but of formal engagements. The Romanian Government will always be willing to accept such advice, but counsels which are recorded in Treaties and in the form of precise engagements between one Government and another cease to have the character of advice.

History supplies us with precedents in this connection: the Russians, for instance, interfered in the policy of Turkey for the protection of Christians, but the result so far as Turkey is concerned has been her dissolution. Such an attitude naturally commanded our sympathy, but it could only be logical if its final aim was to secure the independence of these peoples.

Except with this object in view, it is not possible, in the interests either of States or of minorities, to accept a rule of this nature. As I had the honor to state in the short summary which I read to you just now, we desire, together with you, to set up a new world to take the place of the old one. This new world must be established in such manner as to enable States to find in the persons of their citizens devoted sons and a life of brotherly concord. If minorities are conscious of the fact that the liberties which they enjoy are guaranteed to them, not by the solicitude for their welfare of the State to which they belong, but by the protection of a foreign State, whatever it may be, the basis of that State will be undermined. At the very basis of the new state of things which it is sought to establish, the seed is being sown of unrest, which is in contradiction with the aims which this conference pursues.

Gentlemen, it is on behalf not only of the independence of the Romanian State, but also of the two great principles which this Conference represents, that I have given expression to these remarks; one of those principles is that of peace, order and fraternity among the peoples of the same State, while the other is that of the equality of all States, both great and small, in respect of their rights of domestic legislation. Those are the reasons for which I request you, on behalf of Romania, not to impose conditions on her which she could not accept.”

As Mr Bratiano has declared his acceptance of M Klotz’s proposal, the President states that his observations will be subjected to fresh examination by the heads of Governments, and thereupon calls on Mr Paderewski to speak.

Mr Paderewski (Poland) explains the point of view of the Polish Delegation as follows:

“Poland has submitted her remarks in writing as regards the financial questions; but as these questions are to be considered in connection with the Reparation Clauses, I will refrain from speaking on that subject.

On the other hand, I state, on behalf of the Polish Government, that Poland will grant to all minorities of race, language and religion, the same rights as she does to her other nationals. She will assure to those minorities all the liberties which have already been or may be granted to them by the great Nations and States of the West, and she will be ready to amplify those rights in the same degree as the League of Nations may consider desirable for the States which compose it.

I am convinced that these guarantees when once incorporated in the fundamental laws of Poland by her Constituent Diet, will be in absolute harmony with the noble and lofty spirit which animates the great labors of the Peace Conference.

That is all I have to say.”

In reply to a question by the President, Mr Paderewski states that his proposals as regards the property of nationals have already been made in writing, and that he has no further request to make.

Mr Kramar (Czechoslovakia) states that he is quite satisfied that the Financial Clauses should be dealt with in the same way as the Reparation Clauses; the question of the claim to State property belongs to the Financial Clauses, and he will therefore now confine himself to presenting his remarks in writing. Mr Kramar thereupon expresses a wish to say a few words in regard to a question concerned with the frontiers in the Czecho-Slovak State, and proceeds to do so in the following terms:

“In the Frontier Commissions we were not in a position to discuss the question, namely, that of the Station of Gmund, which was rebuilt a few years ago and moved further to the south. In view of this there might well be misunderstandings, unless the frontier be clearly defined.

I propose to substitute for the proposed text the words ‘by the extreme easterly point of the railway bridge.’ Such a modification would not be in any way out of accord with the ideas of the Frontier Commission, while it would avoid considerable inconvenience.”

As this question has not yet been submitted to a competent Commission, it is decided, after an exchange of remarks between the President, Mr Kramar and Mr Jules Cambon, that the two last named gentlemen shall come to an agreement for the Commission to draw up a report as soon as the Conference adjourns.

Mr. Kramar (Czechoslovakia) resumes his statement in the following terms:

“As regards minorities, I accept the proposed text, subject to some slight modifications. I request the deletion of two words which, in my opinion, are quite useless and might, on the other hand, cause us considerable inconvenience because people would consider our situation to be quite different from that which the President has indicated. We are ready to do everything possible for minorities in order to have peace at home, and we are perfectly ready to deal with this question together with the Great Powers. However, there are three words which I consider quite useless. It is stated:

'Czechoslovakia agrees to incorporate in the Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers all measures which may be regarded as necessary for the protection in Czecho-Slovakia of the interests of the inhabitants who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion. …’

I ask for the deletion of the words ‘which may be regarded as necessary' because they are superfluous and even rather wounding to our feeling of independence. The result will be the same if they are omitted. It goes without saying that the Great Powers possess sufficient authority to ensure our acceptance of what we may be able to concede without fear for the sovereignty of our State; but there is no advantage in saying so in the Treaty.”

The President: If you will kindly underline the three words which you ask should be deleted and give me the text, I will bring it to the notice of the Assembly.

Mr Kramar (Czechoslovakia): I shall have a few amendments to bring forward to the clauses submitted to us, which are very difficult for foreigners to understand. I shall not, however, press these points, because the Drafting Committee will no doubt examine the question and our amendments with the courteous attention to which we are accustomed.

We wish, for instance, to give the Germans of Bohemia the right to opt for Austrian nationality, whereas, according to the text under consideration, that would not be altogether possible.

The other modifications which we propose are of a similar character to this one, and are designed to make the text clearer.

The President having inquired whether the Drafting Committee would be ready to make a very early report, M Fromageot states that the Committee has already sent a note on the subject to the Supreme Council.

The President points out that agreement has been reached in regard to the Financial Clauses, and calls on Mr Trumbitch to speak.

Mr. Trumbitch (Serb-Croat-Slovene State), expresses himself as follows:

“The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation has had the honor to deposit with the Bureau of the Conference proposals for the modification of certain clauses, especially in regard to the questions of minorities, of freedom of transit and commerce, of our northern frontier, and of the Financial and Economic Clauses.

I will not concern myself with the Financial and Economic Clauses, as that is not necessary, in view of the declarations which have already been made by M Klotz.

As regards the question of minorities I must make substantially much the same observations as Mr. Kramar. We should like to delete certain words from the official draft and say that ‘the Serb-Croat-Slovene State undertakes to determine in agreement with the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the necessary measures for protecting within the territories formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and ceded by the present Treaty to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the interests of minorities.’ The difference between the two texts is clear.”

The President: Is that the Serbian and Czechoslovakian claim?

Mr Trumbitch (Serb-Croat-Slovene State): The Serbian claim is identical with that of the Czechoslovak State. I will hand you, M President, the text of our new proposal. Our request is that the principal Powers should come to an understanding with us for the insertion by common agreement of these provisions in a general Treaty.

The second question to which I should wish to call your attention is the limitation of the text as regards minorities to the territories formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary. We ask you not to extend that limitation to Serbia. The reason is clear: Serbia was an independent State; she had certain acquired rights; to-day it is not desirable to impose on former Serbian territories certain clauses which might interfere with the sovereign rights which she possessed as a State existing before the war.

I beg leave to offer you, Sir, the precise drafting which we should wish you to accept.

The second question relates to the northern frontier of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. We are under the impression that the text in regard to this frontier is not sufficiently clear or accurate. The first draft assigned the town of Radkersburg to the Yugo-Slav State; whereas in the final draft that is no longer the case. The text, therefore, lacks in clearness, as it is impossible to know whether Radkersburg will belong to the Yugo-Slav State or remain in Austria.

Carinthia was the subject of a question raised in the territorial Commission on the 21st May. In regard to Prekmurje, we have put forward a fresh draft, the substance of which is as follows.

In the Treaty of Peace with Austria we read in Part II, Frontier of Austria, Article 1, 2 and 3, that the frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia, so far as it is to be drawn between the eastern extremity of the Austro-Italian frontier (to be determined later on) and Hill 1054 at Stroina, will be fixed ultimately by the principal Allied and Associated Powers. From Stroina onward, the frontier will be either a line to be fixed on the ground, or the Drave below its confluence with the Lavandt and passing by Hill 1522, or (as is stated in the Summary on page 2) a line passing just to the east of Bleiburg and crossing the Drave just above its confluence with the Lavandt. In Part III, paragraph 5, Section 2, Article 4, we find the remark: “Klagenfurt is reserved.”

The Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State declares that these provisions do not take account either of its claims or of the minimum demands with which it acquainted the Territorial Commission. The point as regards Stroina and Bleiburg actually opens up a prospect which is in direct contradiction with the claims of the Delegation. Our Delegation is under the discouraging impression that it is sought to exclude the Serb-Croat-Slovene State from Carinthia; in fact, none of our numerous proposals have been taken into consideration. Now, even according to the Austrian statistics, about 100,000 Slovenes reside on the territories in question; there is nothing, therefore, to prevent an equitable solution.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation notices with regret that the Allied and Associated Powers have not taken this request into account, even to the extent which the Germans themselves had, as is proved by the book “Staatsgrenze des Karntengebiets (1919)” (“State Frontiers of the Carinthia Territory”). The Delegation therefore considers itself compelled to call the urgent attention of the Great Powers to the untenable situation in which the Slovene people would be placed if the loss of Slovene Carinthia were added to its sacrifices in the Adriatic. The soul of the Slovene people would never recover from this blow, while a constant ferment of irredentism would hinder the peaceful development of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and would become a perpetual source of hostile feelings towards German Austria.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation must therefore make a final appeal to the Conference in order to secure the definite assignment of the territory situated above the line fixed in Annex I and traced on the map Styria-Prekmurje.

In Part II, already mentioned, the Mur may be considered as a natural frontier up to its meeting with the frontier between Austria and Hungary, whereas, according to our Delegation, that formula would involve the exclusion from the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom of the region of Radkersburg.

Finally, we call the attention of the Great Powers to the fact that, in Section 4 of Part II of the Treaty with Hungary, the determination of the point from which the frontier between Austria-Hungary starts is inaccurate, because it leaves out of account the fact that Prekmurje is to form part of the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom. The same is the case in the Summary on page 3.

I have the honor to state that our Delegation urges this proposal, and I beg this high Assembly to give the matter its favorable consideration.

M Tardieu (France) offers the following explanation: As regards Radkersburg, it is an actual mistake in the text of the old proof which warrants Mr. Trumbitch’s remark. The line of the frontier has been rectified as he wishes.

As regards the rest of Prekmurje, there is no need to mention it in the Treaty with Austria, because, except the little corner of Radkersburg, Prekmurje is Hungarian territory. Provisions in regard to Prekmurje will be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary.

The President of the United States, speaking in English, makes the following speech:

“M President, I should be very sorry to see this meeting adjourn with permanent impressions such as it is possible may have been created by some of the remarks that our friends have made. I should be very sorry to have the impression lodged in your minds that the Great Powers desire to assume or play any arbitrary role in these great matters, or presume, because of any pride of authority, to exercise an undue influence in these matters, and therefore I want to call your attention to one aspect of these questions which has not been dwelt upon.

We are trying to make a peaceful settlement, that is to say, to eliminate those elements of disturbance, so far as possible, which may interfere with the peace of the world, and we are trying to make an equitable distribution of territories according to the race, the ethnographical character of the people inhabiting them.

And back of that lies this fundamentally important fact that, when the decisions are made, the Allied and Associated Powers guarantee to maintain them. It is perfectly evident, upon a moment’s reflection, that the chief burden of their maintenance will fall upon the Great Powers. The chief burden of the war fell upon the Greater Powers, and, if it had not been for their action, their military action, we would not be here to settle these questions. Therefore, we must not close our eyes to the fact that in the last analysis the military and naval strength of the Great Powers will be the final guarantee of the peace of the world.

In those circumstances is it unreasonable and unjust that, not as dictators but as friends, the Great Powers should say to their associates: ‘We cannot afford to guarantee territorial settlements which we do not believe to be right, and we cannot agree to leave elements of disturbance unremoved, which we believe will disturb the peace of the world?'

Take the rights of minorities. Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities. And therefore, if the Great Powers are to guarantee the peace of the world in any sense, is it unjust that they should be satisfied that the proper and necessary guarantees have been given?

I beg our friends from Romania and from Serbia to remember that while Romania and Serbia are ancient sovereignties the settlements of this Conference are greatly adding to their territories. You cannot in one part of our transactions treat Serbia alone and in all of the other parts treat the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as a different entity, for they are seeking the recognition of this Conference as a single entity, and if this Conference is going to recognize these various Powers as new sovereignties within definite territories, the chief guarantors are entitled to be satisfied that the territorial settlements are of a character to be permanent, and that the guarantees given are of a character to ensure the peace of the world.

It is not, therefore, the intervention of those who would interfere, but the action of those who would help. I beg that our friends will take that view of it, because I see no escape from that view of it.

How can a Power like the United States, for example - for I can speak for no other - after signing this Treaty, if it contains elements which they do not believe will be permanent, go three thousand miles away across the sea and report to its people that it has made a settlement of the peace of the world? It cannot do so. And yet there underlies all of these transactions the expectation on the part, for example, of Romania and of Czechoslovakia and of Serbia, that if any covenants of this settlement are not observed, the United States will send her armies and her navies to see that they are observed.

In those circumstances is it unreasonable that the United States should insist upon being satisfied that the settlements are correct? Mr Bratiano - and I speak of his suggestions with the utmost respect—suggested that we could not, so to say, invade the sovereignty of Romania, an ancient sovereignty, and make certain prescriptions with regard to the rights of minorities. But I beg him to observe that he is overlooking the fact that he is asking the sanction of the Allied and Associated Powers for great additions of territory which come to Romania by the common victory of arms, and that, therefore, we are entitled to say: ‘If we agree to these additions of territory we have the right to insist upon certain guarantees of peace.’

I beg my friend Mr Kramar, and my friend Mr Trumbitch, and my friend Mr Bratiano, to believe that if we should feel that it is best to leave the words which they have wished to omit in the Treaty, it is not because we want to insist upon unreasonable conditions, but that we want the Treaty to accord to us the right of judgment as to whether these are things which we can afford to guarantee.

Therefore the impressions with which we should disperse ought to be these, that we are all friends—of course, that goes without saying - but that we must all be associates in a common effort, and there can be no frank and earnest association in the common effort unless there is a common agreement as to what the rights and settlements are.

Now, if the agreement is a separate agreement among groups of us, that does not meet the object. If you should adopt the language suggested by the Czechoslovakian Delegation and the Serbian Delegation - the Yugoslav Delegation - that it should be left to negotiation between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and their several Delegates, that would mean that after this whole Conference is adjourned groups of them would determine what is to be the basis of the peace of the world. It seems to me that that would be a most dangerous idea to entertain, and therefore I beg that we may part with a sense, not of interference with each other, but of hearty and friendly co-operation upon the only possible basis of guarantee. Where the great force lies, there must be the sanction of peace. I sometimes wish, in hearing an argument like this, that I were the representative of a small Power, so that what I said might be robbed of any mistaken significance, but I think you will agree with me that the United States has never shown any temper of aggression anywhere, and it lies in the heart of the people of the United States, as I am sure it lies in the hearts of the peoples of the other Great Powers, to form a common partnership of right, and to do service to our associates and no kind of disservice.”

Mr. Bratiano (Romania) then makes the following speech:

“The eminent personality of President Wilson invests both his words and his advice with a specially authoritative character. I beg leave, in the name of the great principles which the President himself has proclaimed, to call his friendly attention to the apprehension lest the application in certain instances of principles, even with the best intentions, may bring about results precisely in contradiction with the end in view.

As I said, there must emerge from the labors of this Conference results which do not admit of discussion. The Conference has accomplished a great work of justice; it has set up, not only guarantees against the enemy, but also equality of rights for all States, great and small. If principles such as those which it is sought to embody to-day in the Treaty with Austria had been inserted in the Statutes of the League of Nations, we should not have raised any objection. President Wilson will certainly admit that the Romanian Delegation voted in favor of these principles being established once for all and as applicable to all. To act as it is proposed to act in the present Treaty means the establishment of varying degrees of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the feelings of friendship and profound admiration which I entertain for the Italian people, I am unable to conceive why, in identical circumstances, countries like Romania or Serbia should be treated differently from Italy.

On the other hand, as I have likewise had the honor to explain, we are seeking to establish a life of brotherhood between the peoples which are compelled by their geographical situation to form themselves into a single State. It would be a cardinal error to make these friendly relations dependent on a third party, whatever it be.

Further, we must not lose sight of the fact, even though men imbued with these principles are at the head of the Governments of the present Great Powers, it is quite possible that political evolutions will bring about the representation of those same States by other men, or that new interests may arise such as to make certain Governments deviate from their former attitude and involve them in actions of which the mainspring will not reside in these great principles, but rather in certain special interests.

It is undeniable that the Great Powers, by their sacrifices, have made certain the victory of the great cause common to us all. I may be permitted to add to the words pronounced by the President - words for which I thank him on behalf of all the small States - when he asserted that we can rely henceforward on the solicitude for our welfare of the great political factors, and that he wishes to guarantee the security of all of us; but I will add that the responsibility of each State in matters of independence and security nevertheless remains just as entire, whatever be its extent.

Thus, at the present moment, Romania is compelled to provide with her own troops for the defense, not only of her own frontiers, but also of a cause which is a matter of concern for the whole of Central Europe. Therefore, even though the Great Powers have a more important part to play, in proportion to their size, the responsibility and duties of independent States, whatever their size, remain undiminished.

I beg the Representatives of the Great Powers, and especially President Wilson, not to limit those responsibilities by a dangerous application of the principles which are dear to us all.

“It needs no effort to secure the recognition of the rights of minorities. There is no single State represented here which is not convinced of the necessity for respecting and developing those liberties; therefore, allow these States to develop themselves in the only atmosphere likely to render possible the consolidation of the general political state which we are here to establish to-day.

Such are the feelings, alike of respect and gratitude for the services which they have rendered, which animate me in earnestly praying the Great Powers to examine, with all the attention demanded by such important principles, the proposals and declarations made by the Romanian Government; it is necessary that these proposals should be accepted, for otherwise Romania would no longer preserve in its entirety the independence which she enjoyed in the past for the settlement of her domestic concerns.”

Mr Veniselos (Greece) offers a few remarks in the following terms:

“I beg leave to remark most respectfully that the clauses under ‘discussion do not necessarily form an essential part of the Treaty of Peace with Austria. I should wish, therefore, to suggest to you the desirability, after detaching those clauses, of communicating on Monday the remainder of the Conditions of Peace with Austria and referring those clauses to examination by the Heads of the Five Great Powers at a special meeting in conjunction with the Heads of the Powers with limited interests which are specially concerned. There would thus be nine or ten persons in all seated at one table, who would certainly find some means of allaying the legitimate uneasiness of the Powers with limited interests, while giving satisfaction to the Great Powers.

If you think it necessary to embody those clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, we shall have sufficient time, up till the day before the signature of the Treaty - since these clauses do not concern Austria - to formulate them and insert them in the Treaty in order to obviate the drafting of a special Treaty for matters which concern the Powers with limited interests.”

The President: Mr Veniselos’ proposal will, of course, be examined together with those which have already been submitted.

The Agenda being disposed of, the Session is adjourned at 17 o’clock (5 p.m.).

The President,
G. Clemenceau.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 31, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon's Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 17:30

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. Attention is drawn to the Acts relating to

The proposed Romanian march on Budapest.

League of Nations. Drafting Correction to Article 24.

Omission of an Article on the Assling triangle from the draft Treaty of Peace with Austria.

Invitation to the Grand Vizier of Turkey to come to Paris.

Carinthia. Cessation of fighting between Austrians and Yugoslavs.


2. S Orlando draws attention to the following sentence in the Preamble of the draft Treaty of Peace with Austria:

“Whereas, by the free action of the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, this Monarchy has now ceased to exist and has been replaced in Austria by a Republican Government, and”

He said that the words underlined would be displeasing to Italian public opinion, as it would be taken as underrating the Italian Military effort.

(It is agreed to omit the words underlined, as well as the words “this Monarchy”, and that the clause should read as follows:

“Whereas, the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to exist and has been replaced in Austria by a Republican Government, and”)


3. S Orlando also suggests that the clause in the Preamble following the above, in which it was stated that the Czechoslovak State and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State have been recognised should be omitted. He says that Italy has not recognised these States. He adds that he has no knowledge of the instruction to the Drafting Committee, on which this Preamble is stated to have been based.

President Wilson suggests that the clause should begin as follows:

“Whereas the majority of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have already recognised etc”.

He points out that Poland is not included.

(The Drafting Committee are then sent for, and are introduced.)

During the discussion which follows, the Council are reminded that the presentation of the full powers of the Croats and Slovenes to the Germans had been regarded as tantamount to recognition.

S Orlando then withdraws his objection, and the paragraph is left unchanged.


4. (After some discussion, it is agreed that no alteration should be made in the provisions of the Draft Treaty of Peace with Austria in the clauses relating to Rights of Minorities, as proposed on the same afternoon at the Plenary Conference.)

(M Jules Cambon enters.)


5. (The attached Article of the Draft Treaty of Peace with Austria, relating to the frontiers between Austria and Czechoslovakia, which had been drawn up by the experts under M Jules Cambon, in consequence of remarks made by the Czechoslovak Delegation at the Plenary Conference the same afternoon, is approved and initialed by the four Heads of States).

Sir Maurice Hankey communicates the Article direct to the Drafting Committee.

(M Jules Cambon withdraws.)

(M Dutasta is introduced.)


6. M Clemenceau says he has received a letter from Herr Renner, the Head of the Austrian Delegation, who has asked to talk with him. Subject to the consent of his colleagues, he proposes to reply that it had been agreed that there should be no conversations, but that if Herr Renner liked to send a confidential note, he would undertake to show it only to the four Heads of States. Communications With the Austrian Delegation

(This is agreed to.)

(M Dutasta withdraws.)


7. With reference to C. F. 42, Minute 7,2 Sir Maurice Hankey states that he now has the Articles of the Treaty to which M. Kramarcz’s observations referred, and which had not been available on the previous day.

(In view of the discussion at the Plenary Conference that afternoon, it is decided not to discuss the question.)

(M Tardieu enters.)


8. Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram he had received from General Allenby, indicating that the situation in Syria would be extremely grave unless the Commission of the Peace Conference should come to Syria. He says that General Wilson has also received a private letter from General Allenby, dated May 17th, 1919, which fully confirms the message in the telegram. Hence, he feels that the moment has come to decide whether the Commission is to be sent out. Personally, he would prefer that the Commission should proceed at once. The United States Commissioners have already left for Syria. He himself, does not wish to send out British Commissioners unless the French also send Commissioners, but in this case, he must inform General Allenby. The situation is so serious that he cannot postpone action.

M Clemenceau says his position is as he had stated a few days before, namely, that he is willing to send French Commissioners as soon as the relief of British troops by French troops was begun. As long as Syria remains entirely in British military occupation, and Mr Lloyd George’s latest proposals hold the field it is useless to send French Commissioners. Nevertheless, he will undertake not to send any more French troops against the wishes of the British Government. He is sending some troops to Cilicia, although there is not much object in this from the French point of view, if Cilicia is to go to the United States. As soon as General Allenby lets him know that the replacement of British troops by French could commence, so that the people of Syria know that they were not exclusively under British force, he would send Commissioners.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks it right before taking action, to let his colleagues know exactly what he proposed to do. He will not send Commissioners if the French do not. General Allenby shows clearly that if French troops go to Syria now, there will be very serious trouble. He himself is not in a position to judge of the matter, but General Allenby is a very reliable man, and is the British representative on the spot, and he cannot afford to neglect his advice. Mr Lloyd George then reads a copy of the telegram he proposes to send to General Allenby. At M Clemenceau’s request he agrees to alter one passage in order to make it clear that the French are not willing to send Commissioners until the relief of British troops by French troops has been arranged.

M Clemenceau says he will make no comment beyond asking for the above alteration.

Mr Lloyd George promises to send M Clemenceau a copy of General Allenby’s dispatch.

S Orlando says he will not send Commissioners until the British and French Governments send them.


9. S Orlando presents several proposed alterations in the Financial Clauses in the Draft Treaty of Peace with Austria which had been signed by the representatives of the four States on the Drafting Committee of the Financial Commission.

President Wilson is reluctant to initial these alterations without having some explanation as to their meaning.

(The question is reserved.)

[Jimbuna]

1st June 1919

German women at a British checkpoint in Düsseldorf-Reisholz, Germany enter a house where they’ll be searched for contraband.


Sailors on the HMAS Australia, the flagship of the Royal Australian Navy, mutiny due to low morale.


The Allied triumvirate arrives at Versailles, 1 June 1919- (from left to right) Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France; Woodrow Wilson, President of the USA; and Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister.


Berlin: The body of murdered socialist Rosa Luxemburg is discovered in a canal.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, June 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

2nd June 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: New Loan of £250 million proposed in House of Commons.

British Government recognises Yugo-Slavia as kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Terms of Peace presented to Austrian delegates.

A family visits the American Military Cemetery No. 32 near Paris, France.


After having abandoned his first wife Mileva Maric and two children, Albert Einstein remarries with Elsa Löwenthal, his double cousin, on June 2, 1919. Indeed, their two mothers, Pauline and Fanny, were sisters, while their two fathers were first cousins.


Ship Losses:

Rucumilla (Chilean Navy) The H-class submarine sank near the naval base at Talcahuano, Chile, when a valve was left open inadvertently during a training dive. All 25 men on board survived. She later was refloated, repaired, and returned to service.
Skoryi (Russian Navy White Movement) The gunboat was shelled and damaged by artillery and run aground on the Kama River, pulled off and towed away.
Statnyi (Russian Navy White Movement) The gunboat was shelled and sunk on the Kama River by artillery.

[Sailor Steve]

Peace Congress (Saint-Germain), Protocol No. 1, Plenary Session of June 2, 1919, 12:30.

The Presentation of the Conditions of Peace to the Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria

The Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria, their Credentials having been verified and found to be in good and due form, are invited to come to the Château of Saint-Germain-en-Laye on the 2nd June, 1919, at noon, there to have the Conditions of Peace communicated to them.

On the appointed day, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers, hereinafter enumerated, meet in the Congress Hall, and thereupon the Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria are ushered in.

The Session is then opened at 12.30 p.m. under the presidency of M Georges Clemenceau, President.

Present
For the United States of America:
The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State.
Honorable Henry White, formerly Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States at Rome and Paris.
General Tasker H Bliss, Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme War Council.

For the British Empire:
Great Britain:
The Rt Hon David Lloyd George, MP, First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister.
The Rt Hon A J Balfour, OM, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Rt Hon G N Barnes, MP, Minister without Portfolio.
The Rt Hon Sir Joseph Ward, KC, MG, Minister of Finance and Posts of New Zealand.

Dominions and India:

Canada:
The Rt Hon Sir George Foster, GC, MG, Minister of Trade and Commerce.
The Hon C J Doherty, Minister of Justice.

Australia:
The Rt Hon W M Hughes, Prime Minister.
The Rt Hon Sir Joseph Cook, GC MG, Minister for the Navy.

New Zealand
The Rt Hon W F Massey, Prime Minister.

India:
The Rt Hon E S Montagu, MP, Secretary of State for India.

For France:
M Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War.
M Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
M L L Klotz, Minister of Finance.
M André Tardieu, Commissioner-General for Franco-American Military Affairs.
Mr Jules Cambon, former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of France.
Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

For Italy:
S V E Orlando, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of the Interior.
The Baron S Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
S Crespi, Minister of Food.
The Marquis G Imperiali, Senator of the Kingdom, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy at London.
S S Barzilai, Deputy, formerly Minister.
General A Diaz, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army.

For Japan:
The Marquis Saionji, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.
The Baron Makino, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Diplomatic Council.
Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at London.
Mr K Matsui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Paris.
Mr H Ijuin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Rome.

For Belgium:
Mr Hymans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of State.
Mr Van den Heuvel, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, Minister of State.
Mr Vandervelde, Minister of Justice, Minister of State.

For China:
Mr Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr Cheng-ting Thomas Wang, formerly Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.

For Cuba:
Sr Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, Dean of the Faculty of Law in the University of Havana, President of the Cuban Society of International Law.

For Ecuador:
Sr Dorn y de Alsua, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Ecuador at Paris.

For Greece:
Mr Eleftherios Veniselos, President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr Nicolas Politis, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For Guatemala:
Sr Joaquín Mendéz, formerly Minister of State for Public Works and Public Instruction; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Guatemala at Washington, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mission at Paris.

For the Hedjaz:
Mr Rustem Haidar.
Mr Abdul Hadi Aouni.

For Liberia:
Mr H F Worley.

For Nicaragua:
Sr Salvador Chamorro, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

For Panama:
Sr Antonio Burgos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Panama at Madrid.

For Poland:
Mr Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee.
Mr Ignace Paderewski, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For Portugal:
Dr Affonso Costa, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr Augusta Soares, formerly Minister Foreign Affairs.

For Romania:
Mr Jean J C Bratiano, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
General Constantin Coanda, Corps Commander, ADC to the King, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

For the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom:
Mr N P Pachitch, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr Ante Trumbitch, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr Ivan Zolger, Professor of the Faculty of Law at the University of Zagreb.

For Siam:
The Prince Charoon, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Siam at Paris.
Phya Bibadh Kosha, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

For the Czechoslovak State:
Mr Charles Kramar, President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr Edouard Benes, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Republic of Austria:
Mr Karl Renner, Chancellor of the Austrian Republic.
Mr Franz Klien, Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Mr Franz Peter, Director of the Legal Section of the Department for Foreign Affairs.
Mr Johann Andre Eichoff, Political Director of the Department for Foreign Affairs.
Mr Richard Schuller, Economic Director of the Department for Foreign Affairs.


M Clemenceau (President) makes the following speech:

“Gentlemen,

“The Allied and Associated Powers have entrusted me with the duty of handing to you, the Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria, the draft of the Treaty which has been the subject of our deliberations; not, indeed, the whole Treaty for I shall have to make some reservations in that connection, but at least its principal parts, which you will forthwith be able to consider.

It has been decided that the discussion shall take place in writing. You will be good enough to transmit to us, in writing, such remarks as you may have to make in regard to the text laid before you. The replies thereto will similarly be sent in writing.

You have a period of fifteen days within which to hand in your observations. It is, of course, understood that if, before that time, you are in a position to furnish documents, we shall receive them with pleasure and will immediately give our attention to any papers which you may be good enough to send us. You will understand, however, that your examination of the whole matter must take place within fifteen days time.

Those are the conditions of procedure, and these are the documents communicated to you. They comprise the following subjects:

Preamble.

League of Nations.

Frontiers of Austria.

Political Clauses.

Czecho-Slovak State,

Political Clauses relating to certain European States,

Protection of Minorities,

General Provisions.

Austrian Interests outside Europe.

Naval and Aerial Clauses.

Prisoners of War and Graves.

Penalties.

Economic Clauses.

Aerial Navigation.

Ports, Waterways and Railways.

Labor.

Miscellaneous Provisions.

The text of the clauses mentioned hereafter will be handed to you later on, and as soon as possible:

1) Political Clauses (Italy).

2) Financial Clauses.

3) Separation Clauses.

4) Military Clauses.

5) Clauses in regard to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.

The Supreme Council, after examining the observations handed in within the period which I have mentioned, will send a written reply to the Austrian Delegation, fixing the period within which it should send in a final reply in regard to the Treaty as a whole.”

(The Text of the Conditions of Peace is then handed to Mr. Renner by the Secretary-General.)

(The President’s speech is translated into English, Italian and German.)


Mr. Renner (Republic of Austria) reads the following statement in French:

“The people of German Austria have awaited during a long and distressing period the advent of the day which should deliver it from uncertainty in regard to its future fate. We have been consumed with anxiety in expectation of the decisive hour; first of all because it would at last bring peace to our sorely-tried country, but also because it affords us an opportunity of explaining to this distinguished Assembly, whose authority runs throughout the whole world, who we are and what are the conditions in which we can hope to acquire the vitality necessary for an independent State.

The Danubian Monarchy, with which the Allied and Associated Powers were at war and with which they concluded the Armistice, has ceased to exist. The 12th November, 1918 may be regarded as the date of its disappearance. From that day onward there was no longer a monarch, nor any Great Power for him to rule; the disastrous dualism exists no longer; there is no Government, either Austrian or Hungarian, no army, no institution whatever recognized as issuing from a public power. There only remained eight nations, bereft of all public organization, which, at a day’s notice, have created their own Parliaments, Governments and armies, and thus formed States which reflect the peculiar genius of each one. Our young Republic has been constituted in the same way as all the other States; it is therefore, in no greater degree than they are, the successor of the former Monarchy. That fact is the direct origin of the fundamental contradiction which must be cleared up in the presence of this high Assembly.

On the one hand it is impossible to dispute, from the point of view of international law, the judicious statements recently made by the President of the Congress, according to which it would be contrary to every principle of international law to seek to assert that a mere alteration of political régime or change of governors would suffice to extinguish an obligation once assumed by a nation. It follows therefore that all the territories, as well as the populations of the former Monarchy, might be held responsible for the consequences of the war into which they were forced, one and all, by their former governors. Thus both we and the other States which have arisen on the territories of the former Monarchy are heavily burdened by our respective share of the inheritance of the fallen Empire—an inheritance of war, of exhaustion and of crushing financial obligations. Now, our young Republic has rid itself of all the ambition to dominate other nations which inevitably brought about the downfall of the former Monarchy. Our Republic has likewise rid itself of all the reactionary traditions which had made that ancient Empire a prison for these peoples. It is but the unfortunate victim of the terrible crime committed in 1914, a crime of the former governors, but not of the peoples.

On the other hand, the successor States have only been set up, from the point of view of international law, since the suspension of hostilities. The German-Austrian Republic itself has never declared war, nor made war on any one, nor found itself in the international position of a belligerent as against the Western Powers.

Now, it cannot be maintained, from any point of view, that our young Republic has ever been in a state of war with one or other of the new National States.

On the contrary, in our own city of Vienna, all the successor States have set up Commissions for the purpose of dividing among themselves, by common agreement, the heritage of the former Empire, and especially the rights and assets of that heritage. Their purpose there is by no means that of making peace among themselves, but rather of liquidating the former community, under the intervention and guarantee of the Great Powers, whose support we are here to request, and of regulating in a practical manner their future relations.

However, notwithstanding their situation, the successor States meet again here in Paris, with quite a different part to play. We hope to be able to enlighten the Peace Congress in regard to this confused situation. We can today foresee all the consequences which flow from this contradiction, and I reserve to myself the right of laying them before this High Assembly in writing. It is therefore as one of the portions of the Empire which has been vanquished and destroyed that we appear before you.

We are even perfectly willing to assume our respective share of the responsibility towards the Great Powers arising out of the situation which I have just described, and are well aware that our fate lies in your hands.

Nevertheless, we hope that the conscience of humanity will neither refuse us, nor restrict in our respect, the inalienable right of free self-determination proclaimed by the Allied and Associated Powers as an aim of their war against the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern Monarchies, a right which was, with our cordial and spontaneous consent, put into practice without delay in favor of our neighbors, while our own people trusting fully in the principles recognized by the Great Powers, has adopted it as the basis of its new Constitution.

We like to believe that reason and the practical spirit of the world can neither desire nor countenance our economic collapse and the destruction of the whole economic fabric of the Monarchy, the more so since the impediments placed on the outlets for the natural resources by which our country is supplied have condemned us during the last six months to a state of distress far more terrible than the actual sufferings of the war.

It is entirely due to the generous relief measures taken by the Allied and Associated Powers and conducted by their distinguished representative, Mr Hoover, that our people owes its salvation from a famine which would have literally decimated it. Now, throughout these disasters our people has, in spite of all, preserved its discipline, its spirit of endurance and its good sense in an admirable manner, and its revolution has not been stained by blood.

Encouraged by its confidence in the decisions of this Congress, it has abandoned all military action for the defense of its territories, two-fifths of which are still occupied by its neighbors. It has remained as the support of a peaceful and sensible social evolution in the middle of Europe. It will not deviate from this attitude provided that a just and democratic peace restores to us the indispensable means of economic existence.

We are aware, Gentlemen, that it is you, the victors, who will impose on us the Conditions of Peace, and we are determined loyally to examine any proposal which you make to us and any counsel which you may offer.

It will be our especial duty to explain to you thoroughly the true situation of our country, as well as to enlighten you in regard to the conditions of our existence. With very few exceptions you have hitherto only had the opportunity of hearing our neighbor’s accounts on this subject. We beg you to give us the same degree of attention. As the arbiters of the whole world you will likewise decide the fate of our small country. It is, too, fair that an arbiter should hear both sides. We ask you for a decision which will safeguard our future and our national, political and economic existence.

You may for your part be convinced that it is above all our desire, within uncontested frontiers and in the enjoyment of our liberty and our national civilization, to serve the cause of peace by collaborating, to the modest extent of our strength in the noble task of the League of Nations.”

(Mr Renner’s statement is translated into English and Italian.)

As no one else asks leave to speak, the President declares the Session adjourned at 13.10.

The President,
G Clemenceau.

The Secretary-General,
P Dutasta.

The Secretaries,
J C Grew,
M P A Hankey,
Paul Gauthier,
Aldrovandi,
Sadao Saburi.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Flat, 23 Rue Nitôt, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. President Wilson says that after the meeting with the Austrians in the morning, he had consulted his experts about the question of Klagenfurt. It appears that the whole difficulty had been raised by the Yugoslavs who want to hold the plebiscite by communes instead of for the whole district. This was what had been refused by the Council of Four in other cases. It was particularly unsuitable to the Klagenfurt Valley which constituted an economic unit. It was indeed a pocket surrounded by mountains and Klagenfurt was the only railway center in the Valley. Klagenfurt

Mr Lloyd George points out that there is a river running through the middle of the valley and a river is not a bad boundary between two countries. North of the river there is an overwhelming majority of Austrians; South of it an overwhelming majority of Slavs. If a plebiscite were taken for the whole, it might give a slight majority to the Yugoslavs who would then carry the whole Valley. He understands that the United States’ experts say that they are not Slavs but Wends and that these would very likely vote with the Austrians.

President Wilson says that the interests of the Wends are with the Austrians. He does not mind if the Valley went to Austria if it is given by votes of the Slavs. The United States’ experts who had traveled through the region had found that the people were, on the whole, desirous of remaining as a unit and part of Austria.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the views of the Yugoslavs should be heard.

M Clemenceau agrees and suggested Mr Vesnitch should be heard. It would only take a quarter of an hour.


2. Mr Lloyd George says he feels it is his duty to explain the present position of the British Delegation toward the German Treaty of Peace. It is an anxious one. So far as British public was concerned, it has made up its mind that it wants to get Peace and is not so much concerned about the precise terms. British public opinion will not support a Government that goes on with the war without very substantial reasons. Consequently, he thinks it advisable to invite as many members of the British Government as can be spared to come to Paris and confer with him. Altogether he has held four meetings. He had first consulted the British Empire Delegation alone. Then he had conferred informally with the members of the British Cabinet alone on Saturday evening and finally on Sunday he had held two joint meetings of the members of the British Government with members of the British Empire Delegation. He feels it useful to gather the views of men who were not immersed in the details of the Peace Treaty and whose perspective was consequently clear. He has asked each member separately for his opinion. They had proved to be unanimous on certain points. In particular, they had shown that they were not prepared to continue the war and march on Germany or join in the reimposition of the blockade unless certain defects in the Peace Treaty were put right. He regrets to say that Mr Barnes, who is the only labor representative in his Cabinet, had written to say that he could not sign the present Treaty of Peace. The South African Delegation were also refusing to sign the present Treaty and General Botha, who is a man of great moderation, insists on certain changes. Apart from these, however, the whole of those he had consulted had unanimously agreed that unless certain defects in the Treaty were put right they could not advise that the British Army should be allowed to march or that the Fleet should take part in the blockade. He would point out that those present had constituted a very fair representation of all Sections of the British Cabinet. There had been Conservatives and Unionists, Mr Barnes representing labor, representatives of the Dominions and a moderate liberal in Mr Fisher, whose views carry great weight. Before coming to the Meeting, they had read all the documents carefully. They were in touch with public opinion in England which, they said, wanted Peace and did not care so very much about the details of the terms. Several of his colleagues had expressed surprise that the German counter-proposal had gone so far in concessions to the Allies. Mr Chamberlain had been present and both he and Lord Egbert Cecil were strongly of opinion that changes were necessary in the Treaty. Both the Archbishops had written to him and expressed the same view. They might be taken as fairly representative of moderate opinion.

The points his colleagues had been most anxious to see changed were the following:

The Eastern Frontiers:

After reading the case put forward by the Germans, they felt they could not support an advance by the British Army unless this matter was put right. In this they had the support of the British experts.

Pointing to an ethnographic map of Western Poland and Upper Silesia, he explained that the following were the changes which the Experts advised.

In Upper Silesia they considered that there should be a plebiscite. The advantage of this was that if Upper Silesia elected to go to Poland no question of a war of revenge could arise. If Germany instead of annexing Alsace Lorraine had held a plebiscite in 1870, the present war would never have taken place. Neither could Prussia nurse a war of revenge in the future if Upper Silesia had declared itself for Poland by a plebiscite. His personal view was that Upper Silesia would vote in favour of Poland.

The next point arose in connection with Guhrau and Militsch. He was informed that this area had no historical connection with Poland and was inhabited by Germans in an immense majority. The frontier had been moved to the South in order to secure a strategical defensive line upon the river Bartsch. The strategic arguments however had not been deemed of a very convincing character.

Another district in which a rectification ought to be made was the Schneidemühl-Konitz region. In this district the frontier had been moved slightly to the west of the ethnographical frontier because of railway considerations and further a desire to avoid a serious strategic danger to Poland. The population in this area, however, was predominantly German.

Yet another point where change was desirable was a small district in the extreme north of Pomerania which was inhabited by Germans in a large majority and had been assigned to Poland partly because of railway considerations and partly in order to widen the corridor to the sea. This region, he was informed, was historically German and had no connection with Poland. Finally there was the question of Memel but this was a minor matter. His colleagues had also been a good deal concerned about the Saar. On this matter, however, he had taken up a strong line and had pointed out that at the end of 15 years, if the Saar wished to become Prussian it could do so and he thought his Colleagues would not press their objection here.

The next point, and every one of his Colleagues had made it, referred to compensation. All thought that more had been asked for than Germany could pay. They had pointed out that the scheme was indefinite and no figure had been fixed. He himself had two alternative suggestions on this subject which he would elaborate later, if desired, but he would rather have them examined by Experts before they were discussed in detail by the Council.

The next question raised had been that of the army of occupation. To this his Colleagues would not agree. They urged that when the German army was reduced to a strength of 100,000 men it was ridiculous to maintain an army of occupation of 200,000 men on the Rhine. They represented that it was only a method of quartering the French army on Germany and making Germany pay the cost. It had been pointed out that Germany would not constitute a danger to France for 30 years or even 50 years; certainly not in 15 years. There was something to be said for Marshal Foch’s view that the Rhine should become the frontier of France, although personally he could not agree to it, but there was nothing to be said for the 15 years’ occupation. British military opinion coincided with that of all his Colleagues in that respect. It would cost 100 millions a year if the burden were placed on the German Exchequer and the result of this would be that there would be nothing left for compensation. He then referred to the report by Lord Robert Cecil, M. Loucheur, Mr. Norman Davis and other experts, on a scheme of credit for Europe from which he drew the inference that for the first year or two, Germany would have as much as she could do to pay for her own maintenance. Hence it was reasonable to infer that for a time the army of occupation would cost every penny that Germany could spare. Further, it would be a constant cause of friction. Experience had shown that an army could not be quartered in a foreign country after a war without this result. His Colleagues therefore said they could not see their way to authorize the British Delegates to sign unless there was some modification of this part of the Treaty, nor would they allow the British army to be used for any advance to enforce the Treaty unless the modifications were made. They felt that they could not put this burden on Germany and at the same time deprive the Allies of every penny of compensation. The advice of the British military authorities was that two years was the utmost limit of time for the occupation.

Another point arose in connection with the League of Nations. His Colleagues thought that some indication ought to be given that if Germany showed a disposition to carry out the Peace terms, they should be allowed to enter the League of Nations as soon as possible. They did not urge that this should be done immediately, but that hope should be held out of their being allowed to come in within a year or two. His Colleagues had been unanimous on this point. They had advised that public opinion in Great Britain was a little shaken by the German comments on the Peace terms and found from Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter that the Germans were prepared to go a good way to meet the Allies.

A final point was that there were multitudes of small matters in the Treaty that gave the impression that Germany was being tied up in many different directions. These pin-pricks had been held by his Colleagues to produce a very serious cumulative effect.

To sum up, the main points on which his Colleagues pressed for a change referred to the Eastern front, Reparation, the army of occupation, the League of Nations and the pin-pricks. He had felt that he ought at once to communicate this information to his Colleagues on the Council.

President Wilson says that the objections raised to the Peace Treaty are of such importance that he would ask that instead of holding a Meeting on the following morning, he should be free so as to be able to consult the American group of Plenipotentiaries and Experts.

M Clemenceau says that he would like to do the same thing.

President Wilson says he would begin by asking the opinion of his Colleagues, without expressing any view in order not to bias them.

Mr Lloyd George says that his Colleagues had disliked the Saar Valley scheme, but he had defended it. He and Mr Balfour had taken a defensive attitude and his Colleagues had been the critics.

President Wilson says he thinks the Saar Valley scheme is sound, he asks Mr Lloyd George for the loan of his ethnographic map of Poland, a request which is granted.

M Clemenceau says he wishes to thank Mr Lloyd George for his frank statement of the position. It is an extremely grave situation. Indeed it could not be more grave. Just as Mr Lloyd George had considered current opinion in his own country, so he has to consider the current opinion here in France. In England the view seemed to prevail that the easiest way to finish the war is by making concessions. In France the contrary view is held that it is best to act firmly. The French people, unfortunately, know the Germans very intimately and they believe that the more concessions we make, the more the Germans will demand. What he fears is that by making concessions, a road will be taken which will lead to Peace through negotiations over an incalculable number not of weeks but of months. With these preliminary remarks, he would make a few observations on each of the questions raised.

In regard to Poland he does not say that there might not be desirable rectifications of the frontier. It is possible that some alterations might be made. He will observe, however, that sometimes it is not possible to follow purely ethnographical lines, as President Wilson had himself pointed out in the case of Klagenfürt. When we speak of establishing Poland, it must be remembered this was not done merely to redress one of the greatest wrongs in history. It was desired to create a barrier between Germany and Russia. He would emphasize this by referring to the statement attributed to Erzberger and reproduced in the Paris edition of the Chicago Tribune. He was alleged to have said that the principal aim of Germany would be to weaken Poland. If Poland were weak, she would be at the mercy of Germany. If she were strong she would provide a barrier between Germany and Russia. If Poland fell to Germany, the Allies would have lost the war. Germany would be stronger than ever and would be able to renew the advance of 1914, and as Erzberger had put it would “resume her march on Paris”. Without taking this statement too seriously, it should not be forgotten that if Germany were to colonize Russia, the war would be lost and not won.

In regard to the Saar he will make no comment as he understands that Mr Lloyd George’s Colleagues did not press that point.

In regard to compensation, France is convinced that Germany is not being asked to pay as much as she ought. (Mr Lloyd George says that this view had been expressed in England also.) As France had suffered most in the war, having been overrun by the enemy, so she demanded more from Germany. The general view in France was that he himself had not done enough. Moreover this was by no means what was said by those holding extreme opinions but by quite moderate men. M Ribot had made some such observation in his recent speech. He himself believed that the proposals made in the Treaty were reasonable but he had the whole opinion of France against him. Consequently, it would be impossible for him to recede still further. (Mr Lloyd George interjects that he does not wish to recede though he had alternative proposals to make.) If Mr Lloyd George could show him a better method he would be glad to examine it together. Public opinion in each country takes a different note. Mr Lloyd George had spoken of British public opinion. This of course said nothing about the Colonies or about the Naval proposals. Naturally it was satisfied in these respects. (Mr Lloyd George interjects that he had not spoken about the Colonies. If France is willing to give up Colonies so is Great Britain.)

The question of occupation was the most difficult and painful. He had been struggling from day to day with military men who had all sorts of proposals to make. One day when the controversy was finished he could show his Colleagues a remarkable collection of documents on the subject. Here in France he is accused of making too great concessions. The agreement in regard to reparations is one matter in which he is said to have yielded too readily. The burden of the cost of the Army of Occupation must be ascertained. He would be upset if the result should prove unfavorable to the just claims of Great Britain or any other ally. Another question was as to whether the Army of Occupation was necessary. He thought that this question had not been properly put by Mr. Lloyd George’s colleagues. He recognizes that Germany ias not an immediate menace to France. But Germany would sign the Treaty with every intention of not carrying it out. Evasions would be made first on one point and then on another. The whole Treaty would go by the board if there were not some guarantees such as were provided by the occupation. Consequently he could not agree to there being no troops on the Rhine.

His policy, as he had declared in the Chamber was to keep a perfect entente with Great Britain and the United States of America. He saw the inconveniences of this policy. He recognized the immense distance of water which separated the United States from France and he recognized the growth of the British Empire. Nevertheless it is his policy to stand to the Entente. For this he had been strongly attacked. If he were obliged to retire from office, his colleagues would find themselves met by a much stronger opposition. The best course to be taken was to discuss these matters and try and reduce their differences to a minimum. They should consider the facts and only facts. But if in the end there should remain some points on which there was an irreducible chasm between their views he did not see how they were to act, with the Germans waiting at Versailles.

Mr Lloyd George says he would like to offer a few remarks on what M Clemenceau had said. Preoccupations in England had been much the same as in France. The only trouble which he had had in England had been in regard to compensation. He had had no trouble about the Colonies. There had been a little difference about ships and there must be no surprise about this, when it was remembered how many ships had been lost by Great Britain. With regard to Colonies, however, he had read scarcely a speech or a newspaper article in the United Kingdom, though of course some of the Dominions had an interest in particular colonies. If Germany were to say, “We will sign if you will give us a mandate to our colonies”, he would be prepared to give up German East Africa on condition that France would give up the Cameroons. The main British concern, however, at present, was in regard to the occupation of the Rhine. His colleagues had felt that from the moment when a guarantee had been given to France that if they were attacked by the Germans, Great Britain would go to their support, there should have been no question of occupation.

M Clemenceau says he hopes Mr Lloyd George will not begin the whole matter again. The situation is very grave.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not in the least wish to minimize the gravity of the circumstances, but he has perfectly clear instructions as to the line he is to take. Those instructions are in his hand, and in writing. He feels he ought to speak quite frankly. His colleagues believe that it would be a real danger to the peace of Europe to have a great French Army on the Rhine. Occupation by a foreign Power is always dangerous, but is doubly so in the case of peoples who had hated one another for centuries. The result might be an incident which would necessitate Great Britain coming to the assistance of France. If M Clemenceau and his Cabinet come to the conclusion that they cannot meet the British Government on that point, he would have no alternative but to go home and put the whole matter before his Parliament. He had to admit that he ought to have contested this point before. He had never much liked it, and neither had Mr Balfour. But he had not quite realized the strength of the feeling of his colleagues about it. Although they had not put the matter quite so bluntly, the line they had taken up had been that France ought to have been given the alternative between the occupation of the Rhine and the guarantee of her territory. He himself quite agreed in this. We ought to have said to France “You are entitled to tell us whether you would prefer to occupy the Rhine or to have our guarantee.” He believed British opinion on this was unanimous. To show how he had misunderstood the strength of his colleagues’ views on this he mentions that before they came to Paris he had reckoned how he expected that they would be divided. Some of his colleagues, he had anticipated, would take a very strong view in one direction, and others, possibly, in another. As a matter of fact, they had all been agreed on this point. Mr Hughes, whom no-one could suspect of sympathies towards the Germans, had asked how he had ever agreed to this Treaty.

M Clemenceau says that he owes it to Mr Lloyd George to be as frank as he can on this point. It Is impossible for him to meet his views. Mr Lloyd George says that if they cannot reach an agreement he must go back to his parliament. He himself is in exactly the same case. He is quite willing to resign his position if he is an obstacle to peace, but it is not good either for him or for Mr Lloyd George to go to their Parliaments on such a matter. He will not conceal his difficulties. He has to struggle continuously against mighty forces in the Parliament and Press, etc. Nevertheless, he did not feel any recrimination against Mr Lloyd George.

Mr Lloyd George says that it was the same on his part. He has no reproaches of any sort or kind to make.

President Wilson asks if Mr Lloyd George could give the details of his proposals for reparation.

Mr Lloyd George says he stands by the main lines of the demands made in the Treaty. He will not cut out a single one of the categories of reparation, and so he has informed his colleagues. He thinks, however, that there is something in the contention that Germany should not be presented with an unknown liability. The difficulty is that they do not know what they have to pay. If the scheme is indefinite, it is equally so for France. If they suffer from this, why should France also suffer?

His first alternative suggestion is to take a contract from Germany to make restoration within a certain time or else to pay. Guarantees for proper execution of the contract would have to be provided. Outside restoration every item could, he believed, be fixed, for example, pensions, ships, etc. He would fix a definite sum for all these, and beyond it allow Germany to take a contract for restoration.

The second alternative is not to say to Germany “Sign the Treaty” but to give her three months within which she can make a definite offer of a figure. We would tell her that the offer in the Treaty was inadequate. The figure of five thousand million Pounds sterling was really only equivalent to two thousand million sterling when the dates of payment and the fact that no interest was to be provided were taken into account. If at the end of three months Germany cannot give a figure, then the Treaty would stand.

In conclusion, he wants to tell M Clemenceau that what he had said was not in any way intended as a kind of menace.

M Clemenceau says he recognizes this, and that he would much rather know the full truth.

(It is agreed that no meeting should be held on the following morning, so that the Heads of States might be free to consult their own Delegations, but that a meeting of the Council should be held at 16:00, when the following subjects would be considered in connection with the German remarks on the Peace Treaty:

Poland

Reparations

League of Nations.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify this to S Orlando.)

[Jimbuna]

3rd June 1919

Aftermath of War

Austrian Peace Terms published.

Mr. Asquith answers Lord French on the shells question.

British reinforcements reach Archangel.

Chinese students at Peking University protest against the Versailles Treaty while police keep a close eye.


Anarchist Luigi Galleani and his followers send eight mail bombs to several politicians across the United States. None of the targets are killed, but one watchman and one of the bombers are killed.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, June 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon's Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of Foreign Ministers


M Pichon says that the meeting has been called to resume the examination of the revision of the Treaties of 1839. At the end of the previous meeting the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs had declared that he would be in a position to throw further light on the intentions of his Government regarding this question. The best thing therefore, is to ask Mr Van Karnebeek to speak.

Mr Van Karnebeek says that the meeting will remember that he had asked his Belgian colleague at the end of the last meeting to communicate to him the requests of the Belgian Government. He had since become cognizant of the statements made by M Hymans in the two previous meetings, and he had been able to form an opinion of the ideas inspiring the proposals of the Belgian Government. He does not intend to enter into the details of the question or repeat what he had said on a previous occasion. From one point of view, however, he feels that he ought to reiterate the declaration already made regarding the question of the territorial status quo of Holland. As would be remembered he had declared that the Government of the Netherlands could not allow any modification of this status, and could engage in no negotiations regarding territorial modification. It follows that he is obliged to exclude from discussion some of the Belgian proposals tending, either upon grounds of defense or, for economic reasons, to withdraw certain territories from Dutch sovereignty in order to transfer them to Belgian sovereignty. He will not press this matter any further, but he thinks it necessary, in a few words, to recall the views of the Dutch Government on the question.

His Belgian colleague will allow him to call attention to point “C” relating to the management by Belgium of the Locks regulating the flow of water in Flanders. This matter is regulated according to the Treaty of 1843, but as the system is not fully satisfactory, a Commission had been instituted to deal with the question. The labors of this Commission had been interrupted in 1914 by the war. If Belgium has any further requests to make on this subject, he is glad to state that the Netherlands Government will willingly take cognizance of them, and examine them with the utmost goodwill.

The second question is that of the grievances of the Belgian fishermen at Bouchante. This problem, if it might be called a problem, results from the damming of the waters of Dragmund. The Dutch Government had begun the construction of a new Port and of a new canal, both of which would shortly be completed, and as a result, the fishermen would receive satisfaction and would be better off than before. If other difficulties arise, the Belgian Government need only communicate them to the Dutch Government, and the latter will immediately examine them with the wish to find a satisfactory solution.

Thirdly, his Belgian colleague had mentioned the canal from Antwerp to Moerdijk. The Meeting would know that there is a line of communication between Moerdijk and Antwerp, which is reputed to be better than in former days. The Belgian Delegation had now put forward the idea that another line of communication ought to be made. The Dutch Government has not as yet received the reasons which might militate in favour of this change, but he is prepared to renew the same declaration, and to assure the Belgian Government that any communications made by them to the Dutch Government would be studied by the latter very willingly with the object of finding a common settlement of the question.

There is also the question of the Dam of Baerle-duc. This is a very simple question, and is in process of settlement.

Finally, there is the question of communication between the Rhine, the Meuse and the Scheldt. He will again make the declaration made on a previous occasion, namely, that the Netherlands Government is disposed to enter into conversations with the Belgian Government regarding the latter’s desiderata. He would like to pause for a moment over the question of the Scheldt. It has been discussed on the previous occasion. His Belgian colleague had had certain grievances against the existing system. He, himself, had endeavored to show from his point of view that the application of the existing regulation should not give rise to any complaint on the part of the Belgian Government. He thinks it is fair to say that the system established by the Powers has not hampered the prosperity of Belgium. Nevertheless, in a spirit of conciliation he would ask M Hymans the following question:

“Could not Belgium and Holland come to an agreement on the question of extending the already existing system of cooperation from the matters to which it applied to other matters?”

This might be a means of satisfying Belgium. The system of cooperation he refers to applies to the management of buoys, piloting and preservation of channels, all of which were regulated by a mixed Commission. He thinks perhaps this system of cooperation might be extended to yet other interests even administratively in such a way as to afford Belgium the satisfaction she desired regarding guarantees of the navigability of the stream. He wishes to submit this idea to his Belgian colleague.

Such, in a few words, is the declaration he wishes to make regarding the desires formulated by the Belgian Government. M Hymans will not fail to observe that he is animated by the same spirit as at the first and second Meetings of the Council. He had previously said that he had not come to make matters more difficult, but to make them easier, and to see whether and to what extent Belgian desires could be met. He is glad to believe he has been able to open to his Belgian colleague an avenue of progress, and he thinks that there is now a basis for conversations between Belgium and Holland. If he recollects aright, during the last discussion he and his Belgian colleague had not been in agreement regarding the method to be followed in dealing with this question. He would like to add a few words on this subject. He had said on the previous day that the choice of the method should be governed by the consideration of bringing about the utmost mutual confidence between the two countries. It is clear that if Belgium and Holland wish to achieve new arrangements, these arrangements should be based on reciprocal good will. He need hardly remind M Hymans that the Netherlands are under no obligation in this respect, and that no change can be imposed on Holland. Nevertheless, the country wishes to reach agreement with Belgium in a spirit of cordiality which would itself contain guarantees for the future of both countries.

His impression is that Belgium, in this manner, would find a welcoming attitude, if she wishes to consult with the Dutch Government. He wishes to speak frankly. His impression is that the questions to be raised, will present themselves in a different form, if, first of all, the two Powers concerned are called upon to examine them in concert. Belgium desires certain changes. These changes, in a large measure, depended on the good will of Holland. He will ask his Belgian colleague to consider what conditions will incline Holland to be most yielding. Does he not think that it would be by adopting the method he recommends, namely, that Holland and Belgium should meet, face to face, and realize together the necessity for both to go forward harmoniously in the future?

He has a few more observations to make regarding the question of method. He would like to remind M Hymans of all the questions, which, since 1839, had been directly transacted between Holland and Belgium. There are a considerable number of Treaties to which he might allude. Some of these agreements relate to questions dealt with in the Treaty of 1839, others have a more extended scope. This shows that many of the Belgian desiderata could be transacted directly between the Government at Brussels and the Government of the Netherlands. He would indicate in a few words the principal Treaties in question.

Treaty of November 5th, 1842, supplementary to and explanatory of Treaty of April 19th, 1839.

Treaty of May 20th, 1843, laying down several regulations regarding navigation and fisheries.

Delimitation Treaty of August 8th, 1843.

Treaty of July 12th, 1845 regarding the creation of a lateral canal to the Meuse between the towns of Liege and Maastricht.

Treaty of May 12th, 1863, regarding the redemption of the toll on the Scheldt.

Treaty of May 12th, 1863, regulating the right of taking water from the Meuse.

Treaty of September 19th, 1863, relating to pilotage on the Scheldt.

Treaty of March 31st, 1866, providing for the establishment of a series of new lights on the Scheldt, and at its mouth, as well as further Treaties relating to pilotage, lighting and buoying of the Scheldt.

Treaty of January 11th, 1873, modifying Treaty of 12th May, 1863, above mentioned.

Treaty of January 13th, 1873, providing for the passage of a line of railway across Limburg.

Treaty of May 24th, 1872, regarding the damming of the Zwin.

Treaty of October 31st, 1879, regarding improvements in the Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen.

Treaty of April 7th, 1886, regulating the conditions of construction and upkeep of bridge on the Meuse at Maeseyk.

Treaty of June 29th, 1895, regarding improvements in Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen.

Treaty of March 8th, 1902, modifying Treaty regarding improvements in the Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen.

He has recalled these Treaties to show that the subjects with which the meeting was concerned, relating to Canals, means of communication and lights, had been settled in the past by direct agreements between Belgium and Holland, and not by international regulations. He wishes to draw the attention of the meeting to this, because if Holland and Belgium had, in a cordial spirit, found the solution to all these problems, he could not see why such questions as, the outflow of water from Flanders, as that of the grievances of the Belgian fishermen, of communication between Limburg and the Rhine, of the Canal from Moerdijk to the Meuse, why all these questions should be regarded as of an international character.

His impression is that all these Treaties should serve to indicate the method that should be followed, and that if the same method is adopted, it would lead to the discovery of the means whereby the Netherlands could satisfy Belgium on all these questions.

His Belgian colleague, however, had suggested that these subjects should be submitted to a Commission composed of representatives of the Allied Powers and of Belgium and Holland. On his side, he would like to insist on the idea elaborated above, namely, that the Belgian and Dutch Governments be asked to begin the examination of these questions directly. These two Governments might nominate a mixed Commission of Dutch and Belgian representatives, who would study the problems and make a report. If, after their examination, any points remain outstanding, he thinks that the new international organ lately created could take cognizance of the matter and find a suitable solution. He refers to the League of Nations. He presses strongly for another method than that suggested by M Hymans, because he had the impression that the question was of great importance. Holland had come to meet Belgium as Belgium had asked for certain changes. Holland said to Belgium, “Tell us what you wish, we are ready to concert with you and see what can be done.” In order to obtain success and a happy result, he thinks the procedure indicated by him should be followed, and he begs to urge his Belgian colleague to adopt it. Present conditions must not be lost sight of. It is not a question only of finding means to arrange certain difficulties between Holland and Belgium, but of harmonizing the whole relations of the two countries.

His Belgian colleague, the other day, recalled the trials through which Belgium had passed. As representative of the Netherlands, he wishes to say that his country had proved to the Belgians that it had not been indifferent to their trouble. At the beginning of the War, the Dutch had opened their frontiers and their doors to the Belgians. They had been happy to do so, and the Belgians had been their guests.

Subsequently to this, to speak frankly, as he thinks he should before a meeting which was to settle questions between Belgium and Holland, a certain ill-will has been shown in Belgium against the Dutch people, which has been more or less affected thereby. It seems to him therefore, that the most important work to be accomplished is to dissipate this feeling, which might estrange and had estranged the Belgian from the Dutch people. He would, therefore, repeat with emphasis that the best means of obtaining this result, was to put the representatives of the two peoples face to face, in order that they should seek means of agreement on these various questions.

M Hymans says that the statement made by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs has been most friendly and courteous in tone; but he cannot conceal that it had disappointed him very deeply. No doubt Mr Van Karnebeek had declared himself ready to give benevolent attention to certain grievances, which though important were in the whole problem insignificant. There is for instance the affair of the fishermen, and that of the locks for the Flanders streams. Mr Van Karnebeek had also suggested certain proposals relating to an extension of the system of co-operation. The formula is vague, and it is difficult without further study to see how far it would reach. He is not, therefore, able to express an opinion regarding this proposal, which in any case would have to be submitted to the examination of technical experts. His Dutch colleague has produced on him the impression that he has excluded from the revision of the Treaty all territorial and military questions. In effect he maintains the regime of the 1839 treaties, of which the Belgian Delegation requires the revision. Now the great Powers, after an impartial examination of the problem, have come to the conclusion that revision is necessary, and that it affected all of the clauses of the 1839 Treaty, inasmuch as the system brought about by that Treaty has diminished Belgium’s capacity for defense, and that it is necessary to amend the system in order to shelter Belgium and general peace from the risks of the future. This conclusion has in view the interest of Europe. This is a point he wishes to make clear. It is the system as a whole that is attacked, because it places Belgium in a state of dependence in regard to Holland, and hampers her capacity for defense. As he had previously observed, Holland was mistress of Belgium’s communications towards the sea and towards the East, and the defense of Belgium depends on decisions taken by the Dutch. M. Van Karnebeek has not said a word on this question. It does not appear to have struck him, but he must realize that this is the question which in the mind of Belgium takes precedence over all others. The state of Europe will be more or less unstable for a long time. Measures no doubt are being taken to ensure a prolonged peace. President Wilson had said that France’s frontiers were the frontiers of freedom. The Belgian frontier was a prolongation of this frontier. Belgium had been the field of battle of Europe for centuries. It is through Belgium that the coast was reaches, and it is through Belgium that France could be attacked. He recently had received an address from a Belgian town which said that it had been destroyed six times in the course of last century. It now requests that it be sheltered from a recurrence of such calamities. Belgium has taken military precautions, established a strongly trenched Camp round Antwerp and fortified the Meuse, believing that the town would not be taken or could at least resist for several months. This had been a mistake. As to the future, according to Belgian Military authorities, the line of the Scheldt cannot be defended unless the defense rests on the whole course of the stream. Further, the salient of Limburg must be blocked. This is a question of life or death for Belgium. Had Liege held out much longer, the Germans would have passed through Limburg. He is, therefore, right in saying that these two questions pass before all others, and that their solution is the solution of the whole problem. It is for this reason that in previous meetings he had formulated the following questions.

1) Can the line of the Meuse, which is the first defensive line of Belgium, be adequately held and defended according to the territorial status established by the Treaties of 1839 which, in particular, deliver to Holland the town of Maastricht (“Mosae trajectum”) through which, throughout the centuries German invasions have passed into Western Europe?

2) Can the line of the Scheldt, which is the principal defensive line of Belgium and is of great natural strength, be effectually held unless Belgium can establish her position on the whole length of the stream?

He asks that these questions be submitted for examination to the military experts. These questions concern Europe. This has been the view of the Supreme Council, seeing that in the text of its declaration, this had been explicitly recognised. If in the interest of Europe, it is also in the interest of Holland.

Mr Van Karnebeek has shown that there were close ties between the two nations. Like everyone, he had realized in the last war that the security of Holland depended on the security of Belgium. If Belgium had perished, Holland would have perished too. When, therefore, he speaks for the security of Belgium and for the security of Europe, he also speaks for the security of Holland. When he speaks of the interest of Europe, it follows he speaks of the interest of Holland also.

He has just observed that the Powers who examined the question of the revision of the Treaty of 1839, had considered that this revision should be made in the interest of general peace. He has laid stress on this as he has heard Mr Van Karnebeek say that Holland was under no obligation to take part in the revision. He thinks there is a moral obligation for Holland to take a share in promoting general European peace. This is an obligation to which all countries are liable, especially in relation to a neighbor.

The question is whether the problem he has drawn attention to should be settled directly between the two Powers, or according to his proposal submitted to a Commission, on which will be represented all the Powers who took part in this discussion. It seemed to him impossible to adopt a system of negotiations between the two only for it concerns a Treaty signed and guaranteed by several Powers, especially by France and England.

These Treaties determine questions which are of interest to the whole of Europe and the Council has considered that it is a question of European interest.

These Treaties are the collective work of Europe in 1839. Their revision must also be the collective work of the Powers and not only the work of Holland and Belgium. The latter course would not be logical and he asks what advantage there could be in depriving themselves of the assistance of competent men who had studied the question. How, further, can such a course assist in the establishment of closer relations between Holland and Belgium which were just as much desired by him as by Mr Van Karnebeek?

He is therefore anxious that this question should be looked into by representatives of all countries interested in the revision of the Treaties of 1839. He does not see anything that could in the slightest degree upset his Dutch Colleague or could arouse the susceptibilities of the Dutch Government. They would not be a Court of Judges who would decide the question, but representatives of the Powers who would give their opinion. Mr Van Karnebeek’s opinion, in which he agrees, is that the chief question is to re-establish a feeling of confidence between the two countries. It appears to him that nothing could do more to obtain such a result than a meeting in an Inter-Allied Commission. What could it matter that in such Commissions there are Representatives of other nations? It is just by the exchange of views between members that the Commission would clear the matter up.

Two questions concerning the security and defense of Belgium had been raised and it was on the opinion that was come to about these questions that the solution would depend. He himself does not put forward a solution because he does not wish to impose one and because the solution of the questions should depend on the answer which would be made to the two questions of security and national defense which he had suggested.

This is the point on which he wishes to close. He thinks that the field of revision can never be limited and he shares that belief with the Allied and Associated Powers, for on this point he does no more than follow the conclusions that the Supreme Council has adopted. The Council has said that the 3 Treaties of 1839 in all their Clauses forms an indivisible whole and that the Belgian-Dutch Treaty could not be separated from the other two. It has further said that these Treaties ought to be revised; it had decided moreover that the territorial and riverine clauses had been a cause of real prejudice to Belgium and had as a conclusion said that these Treaties should be revised.

He asks therefore that the problem should be investigated as a whole, that nothing should be excluded, nothing prejudged and that in good faith a solution should be sought which might ensure the safety of Belgium, and he considered that this investigation should be made by the Representatives of all the Powers.

He does not think that there is anything that could upset Holland or that could hinder her from negotiations with Belgium. That in his opinion is the most certain and most rapid method to be followed, and he earnestly begs his colleague that Holland should agree to such a course.

Mr Van Karnebeek asks leave to make a few remarks. He says that M Hymans had remarked that Holland does not feel bound to assist in the revision of the Treaties of 1839 which Belgium had asked for. This however is not quite the case.

M Hymans said that he had only replied to an expression that Mr Van Karnebeek had used. Mr Van Karnebeek had said that Holland had no obligation, and he had remarked that there is a moral obligation.

M Van Karnebeek said that he offered no criticism on this point; he had come to the Meeting full of the desire to find out how far an agreement with Belgium could be arrived at, but he felt that there was one thing that separated him and M Hymans. That was, the interpretation to be given to the expression “Revision of the Treaties of 1839”. M Hymans had spoken as if it was a question of entirely refashioning the separation between Holland and Belgium.

It is hardly necessary for him to point out that the Low Countries could never accept such a point of view. The Dutch Government could never entertain the idea of the disposal of the rights of Holland in order to make a new arrangement. At their first two meetings and even to-day he abstained from entering into details of history or into details of a juridical kind; but he wishes to recall a few facts so that there might be no mistakes as to the conception of the revision of these Treaties.

In 1839 Europe did not in any way whatever dispose of the rights or the goods of the Low Countries. By the Treaties of 1839 the work of 1814 and 1815 was undone; that work had been the union of the Austrian Low Countries to Holland. It was not a durable work and it needed to be undone, but there was never any intention in 1839, nor even in 1814 and 1815, to touch the secular rights of Holland. Anybody who had studied the protocols of 1830 and 1831 and of 1839 must be convinced that there could be no doubt about this point; but what M Hymans asked for was an entire reconstruction of the Treaties of 1839. In such a way he would refashion the separation between Belgium and Holland in an entirely different way to that done by the Treaties of 1839. M Hymans, however, must be aware that in 1839 they had adhered to the status quo of 1790, and that the idea of territorial modifications or of any disposal of the goods and rights of Holland was expressly rejected by the Conference of London. Could it be that any such action should be held of no value and that Holland might find herself in 1919 in a worse situation than that in which she was in 1830 or in 1839?

He had come to the Meeting, as he had already said, to assist in all necessary modifications in the Treaty of 1839. If it is necessary to modify these Treaties, Holland is ready to look into the question and she is ready to see what could be done in order to satisfy Belgium, but to ask that such arrangements should be made at Holland’s expense was quite another question. That was the point of view and the situation which as a member of the Netherlands Government he could never accept.

M Hymans in his speech had drawn attention to the importance of distinguishing between military and economic questions. He himself had thought that the proposal he had made was such as to be worthy of the attention of his Belgian colleague. The latter, however, had said that this proposal had seemed to him somewhat vague, and that he could express no opinion about it, but he had nevertheless expatiated on military questions. He had said that it was the military question which dominated the whole discussion. He himself wishes to remark that, as far as questions of national defense are concerned, there might well be differences of opinion and that there would no doubt be found some military authorities who would not share the views which M Hymans had expressed on the question of Limburg. He does not, however, insist upon that point.

The question, however, which concerns them, is what method is to be adopted for the revision of the Treaties of 1839. If Belgium wishes to enter into explanations with Holland on military questions that is a matter which might be entertained, but he wished to ask M Hymans, seeing that such questions concerned the defense of Holland, whether he could imagine or even expect, that Holland would submit her system of defense to an international Commission.

M Hymans says that he has only spoken of the question of Belgian defense.

Mr Van Karnebeek maintains that it would be very difficult to separate entirely the Belgian plans of defense from those of Holland, if the question is put in the form in which M Hymans put it. There cannot be any doubt that in such a case the Low Countries will be forced to expose their system of defense before the international Commission. If Belgium wishes to arrive at an explanation with Holland, there will be no difficulty, but it is quite impossible to submit such questions to an international Commission; that alone is an argument against the method suggested by M Hymans. His Belgian colleague had also said that the Treaties of 1839 were one collective Treaty, and that they concerned not only Belgium and Holland, but several Powers as well, and for that reason their revision cannot be entrusted to Belgium and Holland alone. That is an interpretation which might be discussed from the juridical point of view, but he refrains from doing so. He is content to ask why all these questions which from 1839 up to the present day have been the subject of exchanges of views and negotiations between Belgium and Holland, should not still be settled directly between the two Governments.

M Hymans said that such negotiations had been carried out under the regime whose revision they were now demanding.

Mr Van Karnebeek says that many questions which were brought forward today by the Belgian Government have already been the subject of an exchange of views before the war with the Dutch Government. For instance, that had been the case with the question of communications between the Meuse and the Rhine, which had been reserved in the Treaty of Peace. There had even been a declaration made on this subject which had certainly not been unfavorable to Belgium. No one had ever thought that this question should be decided only by an international Commission. The same had also been the case with the question of a lateral canal from Maastricht to the Meuse; no one could imagine that that was a question of an international character, and it was so also with many other demands of the Belgian Government which had already been the subject of negotiations between the Cabinets of Brussels and the Hague.

Now it is claimed that because it is a question of the revision of the Treaties of 1839 all these questions must have an international character. There seems to him no foundation for such an argument. The result would be to create such a situation that in the future every demand put forward by Belgium might become an international question. He sees no reason for such a point of view.

He would speak frankly. He does not wish anyone to gather the impression that Holland wishes to keep away the other Powers; that is not the case. The fact that he is there is sufficient to prove that they are not animated by such a feeling. It is very necessary that such a result should be arrived at, but in order that such a result should be arrived at it is necessary he speaks frankly, to avoid in his country any appearance of international influence. He thinks that if the procedure suggested by M Hymans is adopted, Holland would be very much on her guard and would not be as much disposed as she had been to meet the wishes of Belgium.

If, however, it is agreed that Belgium and Holland should settle the matter between them, there would be much less hesitation, if indeed there were any; that is the psychological point on which he feels bound to insist. It is important that the path they follow should lead to an improvement of Belgian-Dutch relations, and to the end which he had suggested.

He wishes to ask his Belgian colleague whether he thinks his country could obtain more by his own methods or by the one which he, the speaker, had suggested. His own proposal was a logical one. Holland is holding out her hand towards Belgium - would Belgium refuse that hand?, would his Belgian colleague take the responsibility of so doing? He hopes that is not the case. He hoped, indeed, M Hymans would put his hand into the one which he, as a member of the Dutch Government, offers. That is the way in which business could be done, and in which the two Governments could walk in perfect harmony. It is not for technical reasons that he does not share the opinion of his Belgian colleague, but for the serious reasons which he had expounded.

He wishes he could agree with M Hymans. He is convinced that the path which the latter had pointed out would not lead them in the direction in which they wished to go. He asks M Hymans once more to reflect, for he is aware of his conciliatory attitude. In the name of Holland he offers him his hand, a hand which must not be refused. His own was a logical proceeding. Had anyone ever seen questions which concerned the two States dealt with outside both States by an international commission?

Had M Hymans taken into consideration the unfortunate impression which had been produced in February last by the answer given by the Belgian Government to the request of the Dutch Government? It is known that Belgium had put before the Peace Conference certain questions which might be of interest to Holland and that the Dutch had asked the Belgian Government to enlighten them on the subject of these demands. The answer of the Brussels Cabinet had been that they would learn later on. The impression produced by this answer in Holland had been deplorable.

He now points out to his Belgian colleague the path which they could follow, and he hopes that they might arrive at an agreement and walk in harmony.

M Pichon says they had before them two contradictory proposals. On the one hand, the proposal of the Foreign Minister of the Low Countries for the setting up of direct negotiations between Belgium and the Low Countries on the subject of the revision of the Treaties of 1839, and on the other hand, the proposal of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, asking that the Allied and Associated Powers should entrust to an International Commission the study of the conditions under which such a revision should take place. He asks whether the representatives of the Powers who had declared that they considered the revision of the Treaties of 1839 necessary thought that these two proposals should be discussed? If such is the opinion of the Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers he asks Mr Van Karnebeek to allow them to examine these two contradictory proposals, as they had been put before them; they would then inform him of the steps which they think it right to take after they have carefully studied the two proposals.

Mr Lansing takes the same view.

Mr Balfour says that he has no objection.

Baron Sonnino accepts the proposal.

M Pichon says that they will then look into the question and give an expression of their opinion on the two proposals put before them.

(The Meeting adjourns at 17:00)

Paris, June 3rd, 1919.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, June 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. President Wilson suggests that the Council should begin by discussing Upper Silesia. The aspect that takes him most by surprise is that in the general financial clauses of the Treaty of Peace, provision had been made which permitted the Allied and Associated Powers to expropriate the rights of German nationals in their own territory, and use the funds so obtained to indemnify their own nationals for losses in German territory. For example, in the United States all German businesses he understands have been sequestrated, and under the Treaty they will be used to make good to citizens of the United States for losses incurred in Germany. Germany is by the Treaty bound to make good their losses to German nationals. As he understands the matter there will be a certain balance in the value of German property which forms a contribution to reparation. Under these general terms, which are intended originally to apply to belligerents, Poland as an Allied and Associated Power will be in a position to expropriate mines privately owned by Germans and other property in Silesia, and to make the German Government pay the German proprietors.

M Clemenceau says he believes the mines in Silesia are the property of the Crown.

Mr Lloyd George says his impression is the same, but they are leased to private persons.

President Wilson says that in that case Germany will have to make good to the German proprietors the leasehold value. He had not been conscious that the new States were empowered to do this, particularly as it has been provided elsewhere in the Treaty for payment by Poland for public buildings. The question seems to him to present a very serious aspect with regard to many of the industries in Silesia.

Mr Lloyd George points out that it is specially serious in Silesia which, unlike Alsace-Lorraine, had not been Polish territory for 800 years.

President Wilson suggests that the mistakes in the Treaty about frontiers between Germany and Poland can easily be corrected. Furthermore he would be in favour of exacting from Poland an arrangement by which Germany would get her coal on the same terms from the mines transferred to Polish territory as Poland could. Provision should also be made for the property of German nationals to be paid for by the Polish Government under some fair process of assessment.

Mr Lloyd George asks why the Germans should lose their property at all. About one-third of the population of Upper Silesia is German, amounting in all to some 600,000; consequently it would not be right for the Poles to confiscate the property of these people. He asks if the clauses for the protection of minorities would not also protect the German minority. If the mines were the property of the German Government, their value ought to go to the Reparation Fund.

President Wilson then draws attention to the German statement as to the effect of the loss of Coal in Silesia. If the facts are considered they will be found to differ from the generalities in the German letter. The places in which the coal is actually consumed would no longer be in Germany, since they are in Posen. Consequently the German contention is untrue.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that the German case on the Silesian coal is no case at all.

President Wilson urges that provision ought to be made for allowing Germany to get the coal on the same terms as the Poles.

He then draws attention to the ethnographical map which Mr Lloyd George had lent him on the previous day. He said that he had conferred on this subject with Mr Lord, the American expert.

In the Schneidemühl-Konitz region he is advised that the country consists principally of heath and marsh, and that the population was very sparse. Mr Lord agrees, however, that the map should be redrawn so as to place the railway in German territory.

Mr Lloyd George says that the population concerned numbered some 80,000.

President Wilson suggests that if this matter is put right, and if there is a rectification of the frontier in Guhrau-Militsch region, based on ethnographical considerations, the main difficulty would be got rid of. The remainder of the boundaries are drawn almost entirely on ethnographical considerations.

M Clemenceau asks on which side the railway is now.

President Wilson says it is on the Polish side, and the proposal is to transfer it to the German side of the boundary, since it joins two German regions. It only runs just inside the proposed frontier line.

Mr Lloyd George then draws attention to an area in the extreme North of Poland, which is entirely German in population, and ought to form part of Pomerania. He points out that the line has been drawn so as to include it in Poland, mainly in order to widen the corridor.

President Wilson agrees that that might be rectified.

Mr Lloyd George says that the most important point is Upper Silesia. After long consideration he does not believe that a plebiscite could be carried out until the German officials, as well as the German troops, have been withdrawn. The officials, however, will not leave unless that were expressly provided for in the Treaty.

President Wilson says that Mr Lord has informed him that the people in Upper Silesia are entirely dominated by a small number of magnates and capitalists, probably not exceeding 20 all together. Among them was Prince Henry of Pless. Mr Lord actually knows the names of these magnates, who practically own the whole Region. The people of this district have been practically feudal servants of the magnates from time immemorial. The experts do not believe that a free plebiscite is possible in these conditions.

Mr Lloyd George says that the answer to this is that the people had actually shown their views by a vote.

President Wilson says they had voted German.

Mr Lloyd George said this was not the case. In 1907 they had returned a majority of Polish members. In 1912 the numbers of German and Polish members had been equal. That is to say in 1907 when the Germans were still complete masters, there had been only three German deputies to five Polish. Our experts believe that Upper Silesia would vote Polish. Nevertheless they strongly advise a plebiscite on the ground that it would get rid of a German grievance.

President Wilson points out that the property owners would be playing for high stakes, and would use every possible influence. Every possible objection would be made by the German Delegation.

Mr Lloyd George asks who are the capitalists on the German Delegation.

President Wilson says there are none, but they are arguing the case of the German capitalists.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Upper Silesia has not been Polish for 800 years. There is no resemblance between the case of Upper Silesia and Alsace-Lorraine. It is proposed to tear something from Germany that had been in the same combination as the other States of the German Empire for 800 years. In these circumstances he considers that the people must have some voice.

President Wilson says he does not dispute the right of the people to have a voice, but he doubts whether it could in practice be carried out freely.

Mr Lloyd George considers that it would be necessary to occupy Upper Silesia temporarily. If there were any attempt at intimidation, the Allies would have to interfere. Every man should have the right to vote as he pleases. He himself has some experience of attempts to intimidate in elections, particularly in agricultural districts, but it had been overcome in Great Britain. The population of Silesia, however, is not mainly agricultural and is not likely to be intimidated.

President Wilson points out that the greater part of the region is agricultural.

Mr Lloyd George replies that the bulk of the population, however, are in the towns and industrial areas. An industrial population very much resents interference by employers.

President Wilson says that Mr Lloyd George speaks of England. The same is not the case elsewhere. Even in the United States of America there is a great deal of domination at elections by employers in the great industrial districts. He himself has done much to overcome it and would be disappointed if he does not succeed in doing so in the end.

Mr Lloyd George then quotes the figures for the election which had taken place in 1912 in Upper Silesia, this being a less favorable election from the Polish point of view than 1907. In 1912, 97,000 Polish votes had been cast against 82,000 other votes, and these latter included Socialists, for whom a good many Poles would vote. The figures show that talk of intimidation had no basis in fact. Even when there had been every possibility of intimidation, the Poles had cast more votes, and the capitalists did not seem to exercise much influence.

President Wilson points out that in the case under consideration, the vote would be to join their fellow-countrymen. If they did vote for Poland, the whole status of their principal men would be changed, and not always for the good of the population.

Mr Lloyd George says that his understanding of self-determination is that of the people themselves, and not that of experts like Mr Lord. He is simply standing by President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and fighting them through. He cannot accept the view that any experts could judge better than the people themselves. Why should there be a plebiscite in Allenstein, Schleswig, Klagenfurt, but not in Upper Silesia?

President Wilson says that if there is a chance of a free vote, he is all in favor of it. But it would be necessary to exclude both the German officials and the army.

Mr Lloyd George says that that was exactly the argument S Orlando had used in the case of Klagenfurt.

President Wilson says he cannot allow Mr Lloyd George to suggest that he himself was not in favor of self-determination. All he wants to be sure of is that it is a genuine self-determination. He is assured by his representatives at Versailles that there would be armed resistance to the Polish occupation of Silesia.

Mr Lloyd George agrees, but says the same would not apply to a plebiscite.

President Wilson asks whether Mr Lloyd George has considered the time and the arrangements.

Mr Lloyd George says they would be the same as for Allenstein. In order to prevent intimidation in Allenstein, he reminds his colleagues that half a dozen conditions had been drawn up. Eventually it had been decided not to embody them in the Peace Treaty, but to leave it to the League of Nations Commission to lay down the conditions.

President Wilson says he assumed that the Germans would be bound by the Treaty to accept the conditions laid down by the Commission.

Mr Lloyd George says he is inclined to introduce a provision for occupation by United States troops.

President Wilson asks how Mr Lloyd George would escape the argument that the Germans would use that the Allied troops were simply being used to bring about the result their Governments desired.

Mr Lloyd George says the Germans would have to trust the Allies. His plan would be to remove both German and Polish troops and put in sufficient Allied troops to police the country.

President Wilson says that in the case of Allenstein, the idea had not been to send in the Allied troops, but to keep them in the vicinity. He feels there is a good deal of danger in Mr Lloyd George’s plan. The main object is to get a fair plebiscite.

Mr Lloyd George says that the impression he derived from many quarters - Berlin, Cologne, and what he heard from Versailles, is that Silesia is the point to which the Germans attached most importance. He himself wants to avoid the necessity of occupying Berlin. He is afraid of a repetition of the Moscow campaign, namely, an easy march and, on arrival, to find no-one with whom to treat.

President Wilson says that he is less concerned with the question of whether Germany will or will not sign than with ensuring that the arrangements in the Treaty of Peace are sound and just. He is not moved by the argument that the Germans will not sign unless it can be shown by them that the Allied and Associated Powers had not adhered to the principles on which they had agreed to make Peace.

Mr Lloyd George says that his view of the Peace Treaty is that it is the best we can do on an ex-parte hearing, for it must be admitted that the draft Treaty is entirely ex-parte. He thinks that now that the Germans have made their observations, the British Delegation is entitled to see how far they had made out a case, and how far it ought to be met. President Wilson himself admits that the Germans had made a case in regard to some districts. In regard to Silesia, the Germans said that for 800 years it had been associated with the political organisation of which the other States of Germany formed part. Under these circumstances, the British Delegation merely urged that the people should be allowed to decide it for themselves. They are ready that every possible precaution should be taken to avoid any interference by soldiers or officials. If, after this had been done, the Germans refuse to sign, then the British will be ready to march with their Allies as loyally as before, and to act as solidly with them as at any time in the war He is not in the least influenced by the arguments of pacifists, but by those of men who had supported him staunchly throughout the war and would still support him, provided they were satisfied that the Peace is a just one.

President Wilson suggests that perhaps he and Mr Lloyd George are not very far apart. His position is substantially the same as that of Mr Lloyd George. It would not be sound to yield merely because the Germans would not sign, and he is ready to make concessions where they could be shown to be in the interest of fairness. For example, in the matter of reparation, he is prepared to say not that it was not just that Germany should not make full reparation, but that if they could show that the present scheme could not be worked or would not operate fairly, it ought to be reconsidered.

Mr Lloyd George says that he is half way between the two positions postulated by President Wilson. He is ready to make any concession that is fair, particularly if it would give the Germans an inducement to sign. For example, even though a plebiscite would make no difference in the ultimate destination of Silesia, nevertheless, if it would enable the Germans to sign the Treaty, he would be in favour of it.

President Wilson says he has no objection to doing anything which would help the Germans to sign provided he was doing right.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks there ought to be a plebiscite taken where any doubt arises. There dos seem to be a certain element of doubt in Upper Silesia.

President Wilson suggests that the best plan would be to appoint Commissioners to draw up the safeguards, and supervise the operation of the plebiscite.

M Clemenceau says he Is afraid that in order to avoid one difficulty we should only get into a greater one. He recognizes that theoretically a plebiscite is the only method that fits into the doctrine of the rights of people. The experience of the past, however, does not support the view that the free will of the people could be expressed under Germany. This might be the case where a plebiscite was theoretically suitable, but he takes the liberty to affirm that if British, French or United States troops are employed, the Germans will simply allege that pressure had been exercised to avoid a free vote. They would say that the vote had been dictated by the Allies. Then, in Peace, you would have most of the difficulties you had in war, and in some respects they would be graver than today. Mr Lloyd George says he does not want to have to march to Berlin. Neither does he. Neither had he wanted hundreds of thousands - indeed, millions - to be killed in the present war. But he had had to put up with that, and might have to put up with the other. It is difficult to say what are the views of the Polish population of Silesia. He believes the Poles are in the majority, and Mr Lloyd George says that this is incontestable. He does not know how they would vote: but, if Allied soldiers were present, the Germans would protest just as much as they would against the transfer of Silesia to Poland without a plebiscite. Hence, he thinks it would be better to stick to the Treaty of Peace as President Wilson had at first proposed. He is always ready to yield when he is convinced that a proposal was a fair one, in which case he instanced the Saar. Today we wish to know the ideas of the Poles. If an International Commission were employed to carry out the plebiscite, order would have to be assured, and for this troops would be necessary. When it is said that the German troops will be turned out, he - knowing the Germans as he does - feels absolutely certain that there would be fighting; there would be quarrels if there were not actual battles. Hence, he would take the liberty to suggest that it would be better to leave matters as they were.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that if there would be resistance to a plebiscite, there would even the more be resistance to transfer to Poland as proposed in the Treaty.

President Wilson then reads No. 13 of his Fourteen Points:

“An independent Polish State should be erected, which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.”

All that has to be established under this is that the population of Poland is indisputably Polish.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is exactly the challenge that the Germans made. They said that the population was not Polish in sentiment. Surely the clause just read did not mean that if the Poles preferred to remain under Germany, they would have to become Polish because they were of Polish race.

President Wilson says that we know the ethnographical facts, and there is no need to add a plebiscite, which was not imposed by the Fourteen Points.

Mr Lloyd George appeals to the principle of self-determination. Under the doctrine proposed by President Wilson, Alsace ought not to go to France, since its population was of German origin.

President Wilson points out that Alsace-Lorraine was expressly provided for in the Fourteen Points. In the cases of both Alsace-Lorraine and of Poland, there are specific Articles in the Fourteen Points to meet the special conditions, and the settlement is based on those rather than on general principles.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that before the Polish Commission met, the case of the transfer of Silesia to Poland had not been in people’s minds.

President Wilson says that it has been generally in his own mind. In Washington, he had seen Mr Paderewski and Mr Dmowski, and had asked for their views about Poland. As a preliminary, he had asked for an understanding that he and they meant the same thing by Poland. They had sent him maps and papers demanding very much more than Poland was now being given, but, when he spoke of territory that was unmistakably Polish, he included generally Upper Silesia, although it might not have been very prominently in his thoughts.

Mr Lloyd George says that he had thought mainly of the historical claim, and had not thought much of Upper Silesia.

President Wilson makes the proposal that an agreement should be exacted from Germany to accept a plebiscite under safeguards to be laid down by an International Commission. If the Germans would not accept this, then the offer would be withdrawn, and the Allied and Associated Powers would be free to take any decision they pleased. This would avoid M Clemenceau’s difficulty.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not think that the Germans would object if United States troops were used to occupy territory during the plebiscite, and he would like to add this.

President Wilson suggests that his proposal should be accepted, together with the small rectifications of the frontiers which had been suggested, that is to say, the alteration of the frontier so as to include the Guhrau-Militsch region in Germany; to bring the railway in the Schneidemühl-Konitz region to the German side of the frontier; and to transfer to Pomerania the German-inhabited region which had been allocated under the Treaty to Poland. Further, the Germans should be bound to accept a plebiscite in Upper Silesia, and to accept the conditions to be laid down by an Inter-Allied Commission.

Mr Lloyd George suggests to add “including the withdrawal of German troops and policing by Americans”.

M Clemenceau asked how many troops Mr Lloyd George contemplates.

Mr Lloyd George suggests about a division.

President Wilson says he would also suggest to include such safeguards of the property of German nationals in their area as was rendered necessary by the provisions of the Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George asks for the inclusion of a guarantee that Germany should be able to purchase coal in any region that might be transferred on the same terms as Poland.

President Wilson says that with these provisions he does not think that the Germans would have any case for objecting.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is requested to draft a reference to an Expert Committee on the above lines.)


2. President Wilson says that his position is that he sees no injustice in imposing an obligation for complete reparation on Germany. But he thinks it is agreed that it is past hoping for that Germany could, in any time, make complete reparation. Ought we not therefore to instruct our advisers to re-study the method? The idea in the Treaty had been to leave the bill of the total amount undecided for two years, and to set up the Reparations Commission, first, to decide on the amount, and then, to supervise the process and means by which Germany would make good. Germany’s objection was that this constituted an undefined obligation, and that the whole industrial life of Germany would be at the disposal of the Commission, which could prescribe this or that method of payment. In short, it would put the whole economic life of Germany at the disposal of a Commission formed from outside nations.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that the Germans had overstated the case.

President Wilson agrees. One of his experts had said that, if only the matter could be explained to the Germans as to exactly what was intended, he thought they would not feel the same objections. He, himself, had replied that the present scheme would take 30 years to carry out. Consequently, what guarantee was there that the members of the Reparations Commission would understand the scheme in the same way as those who had drawn it up? Is it not possible, he asked, to make clearer what was intended?

Mr Lloyd George thinks that, in most points, it is perfectly clear.

President Wilson points out that, if the German proposal for a definite sum could be accepted, half the objections would disappear.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is not really the case. There would still be the installments to be considered, and the guarantees for payment and the controls. The only really important point in the German case is that until the whole liability was ascertained, Germany’s credit is gone, and she could not raise money for her current needs.

President Wilson agrees that this is the case for two years. His experts were, from the first, in favour of a definite sum being fixed.

Mr Lloyd George points out that every possible way of arriving at a sum had been attempted, but it had not been found possible.

President Wilson says he is struck by the fact that Germany had fixed on the same sum as had most frequently been mentioned in these discussions, namely, five thousand million pounds sterling. It is true that the Germans did not mean the same as the Allies by this. The Germans meant the five thousand millions as a total, whereas the Allies had contemplated the same sum with interest. If we were to say that we would accept five thousand millions sterling if treated as a capital sum with interest to be paid after the first year or two, during which by common consent, Germany could not pay much, would it not form a good basis? Capitalized, this would mean a very large sum.

M Clemenceau says that M Loucheur is opposed to this.

Mr Lloyd George asks if the following two alternative methods of dealing with Reparation, communicated by him to President Wilson and M Clemenceau, had yet been considered by their experts:

1) The Germans to undertake as a contract the whole task of Reparation, and that a sum should be fixed in the Treaty of Peace for all other items in the category of damage.

2) In the alternative, the Germans to sign the Reparation Clauses as they stand, but that three months should be given them to endeavor to effect an arrangement for the fixing of a definite sum in cash as a commutation for all the claims. In the event of the Germans making no satisfactory offer, the present Reparation clauses would stand.

M Clemenceau said that M Loucheur had promised him an answer this evening. He says that the period of three months in the second alternative was very short.

Mr Lloyd George says that it might be extended up to four months. He, himself, prefers the first alternative. It strikes him as odd that Article 234 of the Treaty of Peace seemed to have escaped the Germans. This article provides for the right of appeal. He thought it might be desirable to draw the attention of the Germans to it.

President Wilson points out that the Germans had deliberately avoided mention of everything favorable to them.

M Clemenceau says he cannot agree to settle this question today, as he had not yet seen his experts.

(It is agreed that one representative each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy, should be appointed to examine the proposals made by Mr Lloyd George, and referred to above. President Wilson nominates Mr Baruch for the United States of America. M Clemenceau nominated M Loucheur for France. S Orlando nominated S Crespi for Italy. Mr Lloyd George says that, for the moment, he would act for the British Empire himself.)


3. President Wilson says that the German acceptance of the military terms is conditional on their admission to the League of Nations.

Mr Lloyd George says that, on the question of the military terms, his military advisers say that Germany must be given an interval before being called on to reduce her army to 100,000 men. This was necessary, owing to the disturbances in Germany.

M Clemenceau says that, if this is granted, Germany will never bring her forces down to 100,000.

President Wilson says this is exactly his fear. Moreover, he does not know exactly where the disorder is in Germany, which necessitates the employment of troops. At present their army is used for occupying the Polish frontier and Lithuania.

Mr Lloyd George says that republics have been proclaimed here and there.

President Wilson says that Mr Hoover's food experts who, of course, had no political instructions, reported to Mr. Hoover that the question of the entry of Germany into the League of Nations was one of the points most prominently in the German minds. They put Upper Silesia first, and the League of Nations second. It is probably a matter of national pride, which is readily understandable. It was a question of whether they are to be pariahs, or to be admitted into the League of Nations. He thinks it is the common intention of the Allied and Associated Powers to admit them as soon as they are convinced that the change in the system of Government is sincere. At present, however, it is difficult to foretell what the future of Germany will be. He asks that a general assurance should be given to Germany.

M Clemenceau says Germany only wants admission to the League of Nations to give trouble there. He, himself, had agreed to the proposal to admit them to the Labour Organisation if the Washington Conference so decided. He has no objection in principle. But peace must first be established as a living thing in Europe and Germany must show herself to be free from the old system of Government.

President Wilson says that had been exactly the view of the Commission on the League of Nations. Would it, he asked, be sufficient to reply to the Germans that they would be admitted to the League of Nations as soon as a stable Government is established?

M Clemenceau suggests that it should be left to the League of Nations itself to decide.

President Wilson suggests that the answer should be that the Allied and Associated Powers have no intention to exclude Germany from the League of Nations, but think they have sufficient reasons for awaiting a proof of the sincerity of the change of the system of the Government in Germany. He agrees with Mr Lloyd George that Germany could be better controlled as a member of the League than outside it.

M Clemenceau agrees, but says she should not be admitted until she had shown her good faith.

President Wilson points out that the most troublesome elements in Europe - Germany and Russia - are, at present, being left outside the League of Nations.

(It is agreed that the reply to the German Delegation should be in the sense that the Allied and Associated Powers have no intention to exclude Germany permanently from the League of Nations, but that her inclusion must be postponed until the sincerity of the change in the system of Government in Germany had been proved by experience.)


4. Mr Lloyd George says that he has received information that Kolchak had received a bad reverse.

M Clemenceau says that Kolchak had made a speech that went far to meet the demands of the Council. He had given instructions for a despatch to be circulated to his colleagues to the effect that Kolchak’s reply would be received in a few days. He heard that Mr Sazonoff was strongly opposed to the memorandum that had been telegraphed to Kolchak.

Mr Lloyd George says he had heard of this, and as he understands it Mr Sazonoff is likely to advise Kolchak not to send a favorable reply he has asked Mr Churchill to telegraph to General Knox to urge Kolchak not to listen to Sazonoff.


5. President Wilson reads a telegram from the French Minister at Warsaw, dated May 31st, from General Pilsudski.

(It is agreed that this is thoroughly satisfactory.)


6. Mr Lloyd George says that the German documents have made a certain impression in the Allied countries, and it is necessary to consider the question of a general reply. He thinks it is very important to put the general case and to controvert certain points. It is desirable that a reasoned statement should be prepared. He has already instructed Mr Kerr to set to work on the subject.

President Wilson says it is very important to controvert the argument that the bases had been ignored. In fact, they had not been ignored, but if it could be shown that they had, he, for one, would be ready to make the necessary changes. The real case was that justice had shown itself overwhelmingly against Germany. This ought to be clearly shown in the reply. He was opposed to any further answers being sent to the various German letters. They should now be concentrated in the final reply to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau.

M Clemenceau says that in the last lines of the letter the Germans should be given a final period within which to say whether they would sign or not.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the period should not be longer than 7 days, at the end of which the Armistice would come to an end.

President Wilson says he is not at all convinced that if the concessions now proposed are made, the Germans would sign.

M Clemenceau was convinced that they would not.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that if Brockdorff-Rantzau would not sign, he would probably be replaced by someone else, whose signature might be of little account.


7. In view of the above discussion:

(It is agreed that the draft replies that have been prepared to the German Note of 22nd May, on the subject of Note of German property abroad, to the German Note of 17th May on the subject of Religious Missions, and to the German Note of 24th May, on the subject of Responsibilities and Reparations, should not be dispatched, but rather that so much of them as was necessary should be incorporated in the global rejoinder to the German Notes on the Treaty of Peace.)


8. (The proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers that the Note of the French Government to the Swiss Minister in Paris, dated 18th May, should be inserted in the Treaties of Peace with Germany and with Austria, is approved.)

A copy of the note in French was initialed by the Four Heads of States.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


9. The Council has before them letters from the Romanian and Serbian Delegations, dated 2nd and 1st June respectively, maintaining the reserves they had made in their declarations made at the Plenary Session on the 31st May, to the Treaty with Austria.

(On the proposal of M Clemenceau, it is agreed that Sir Maurice Hankey should draft a letter for consideration, asking the Romanian and Serbian Delegations what was the signification of these letters. Is the intention not to sign the Treaty, or is it proposed to sign and then not to carry it out?)


10. The Council has before them the following reports by the Drafting Committee:

Report on the proposition of Mr Kramarcz.

Opinion as to certain modifications demanded by the Polish Delegation (Polish Note of May 30th, 1919).

Financial Clauses; opinion on certain modifications demanded by the Czechoslovak Delegation. (Note of 30th May, 1919).

(After a short discussion, it is agreed that the above reports should be referred in the first instance to the Territorial Coordinating Committee of the Peace Conference, of which M Tardieu is President, the said committee to be empowered to invite the co-operation of such experts as it may from time to time require.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the necessary action.)


11. (It is agreed that the draft Reparation Clauses prepared by the Commission should be considered on the following day).

[Jimbuna]

4th June 1919

British MPs concerned about debt Britain owed the US #onthisday 1919. Government confirmed UK owed $4.26 billion ($62 billion in 2019) to the US Government as well as other debts due in America.

A Frenchwoman filling bags with coffee beans for the U.S. occupation troops in Germany.


The U.S. Senate, following the House of Representatives, approves the 19th Amendment to give women the right to vote. The amendment now goes to the states for ratification.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four with experts on Reparation


The Council has before them the draft Reparation Clauses for inclusion in the Treaty with Austria.

1. Mr. Lamont (USA) reminds the Council that they had approved the draft Reparation Clauses which had previously been before them subject to certain changes which had now been made according to the instructions then given. Further, the Commission had reconsidered the financial provisions of these Clauses and, having regard to the weakness of Austria’s economic position, it had been decided not to specify any definite amount of bonds to be issued by Austria in connection with Reparation payments and to insert special instructions to the Commission to take Austria’s economic situation into careful consideration.


2. Mr Dulles puts forward claims made by Czechoslovakia for the restitution of Objects of Art. It is agreed that the claims in their present form are too general: they can only be inserted in the treaty provided they refer to specific objects.

Lord Sumner is instructed to deal with the matter on behalf of the Commission.

President Wilson says that some of the claims seem to him to go rather far back in the matter of date: and added that his experience has led him to oppose the break-up of learned and artistic collections.

Lord Sumner points out that all these claims have to be proved before a juridical Commission, who will deal with the question whether lapse of time is a bar to a claim. He agrees with the objections to breaking up collections, but only a few specific objects had been mentioned in which national feeling was understood to be deeply engaged.


3. President Wilson suggests that the words “during the war” should be inserted after the word “sequestrated” in Art. VIII.

(This is agreed).


4. Mr Lloyd George says that he regrets that it should be found necessary to call upon Austria to surrender the cattle specified in Annex IV of the proposed Clauses: he understands that the position of the country with regard to food supplies is very serious. It must be noted that these proposed deliveries are in addition to the restitution of cattle removed from Allied countries and which would be identified. Such a measure seems harsh even in the case of Germany. He thinks, at any rate, that the percentage which these figures represented to the number of cattle now in the country ought to be ascertained.

M Tardieu says that the figures in the Annex had been approved by Dr Taylor, one of Mr Hoover’s colleagues.

Mr Lamont says that the condition of Vienna is certainly bad: but the cattle would be taken from the districts adjoining Italy, and, owing to transport difficulties would in no case have been sent to Vienna.

Mr McCormick says that the figures represent a very small proportion of the cattle in Austria. The demand for the surrender of cattle had been inserted at the desire mainly of Italy and Serbia who had suffered very seriously in this respect.

S Orlando says that the Austrians had carried off nearly 400,000 head of cattle from Italy.

(Mr Lloyd George then withdraws his objection to the provision in Annex IV for the surrender of cattle).


5. S Crespi draws attention to a provision proposed for insertion in the Financial Clauses allowing the requisition without payment by the new States of buildings of historical value in the ceded territories. He puts forward some general claims of a similar kind on behalf of Italy in Trentino and Trieste and more especially referred to the Palazzo Venezia in Rome. The text proposed is as follows (Article 12, paragraph 1, of Financial Clauses):

“States to which Austrian territory is ceded and States arising from the dismemberment of Austria shall acquire all property and possessions situated within their territories belonging to the old or new Austrian Governments, and the value of such property and possessions acquired by States other than new Austria shall be fixed by the Reparation Commission for the credit of the new Austria on account of the sums due for reparation. Nevertheless, any building or other property so situated whose principal value lies in its historic interest and associations and which formerly belonged to the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Kingdom of Poland, the Kingdom of Serbia, or the Venetian Republic and the episcopal princedoms of Trient and Bressanone, shall, subject to the approval of the Reparation Commission, be transferred to the Government entitled thereto without payment. These States shall have no claim to any property of the Governments of the old or new Austria situated outside their own respective territories.”

Lord Sumner supports the Italian claim to the Palazzo Venezia: it is not the Austrian Embassy but had been used for the representation of the Venetian Republic in Rome and had thus passed into the possession of Austria at the end of the eighteenth century. It has since been used for the representation of Austria at the Vatican, for which other arrangements had now been made by the Italian Government.

Mr Lloyd George agrees to the Italian claims as regards this building but considered that the claims as embodied in the proposed clause were too wide.

S Crespi points out that the clause in this form had been put forward by the Poles and Czechoslovaks.

President Wilson suggests some modification, and the substitution of “may … be transferred” for “shall … be transferred” is finally adopted.


6. M Sergent calls attention to the fact that in the Treaty with Germany a provision had been inserted in the Territorial Clauses sanctioning the acquisition by Poland, without payment, of the forests formerly belonging to the State in the territory ceded by Germany to Poland. The Polish delegation had asked for the insertion of a similar clause in the Treaty with Austria. He thought there was no objection and would propose to insert this provision among the Financial Clauses. It should be understood that the concession applied to Poland only.

President Wilson says he does not see how claims from other States can be avoided.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the clause was inserted in the Treaty with Germany as some compensation to the Poles for the devastation of their forests by the Germans.

M Clemenceau thinks that if these forests had really belonged to the Polish State they can hardly be made to pay for them.

Mr Lloyd George says that Poland is getting a great deal out of the war: the value of these forests, which is considerable, might represent a suitable means of contribution towards the cost of the war. Poland is also getting valuable coal mines. He suggests that the question of releasing Poland from payment for these forests should be put back until they know what contribution the Polish Government is prepared to make toward the cost of war.


7. Mr Lamont is then asked to state how the situation stands with regard to the payment of contributions by the new States towards the cost of the war. He pointed out that the provisions for the payment reparation by the States arising New states out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire has now been omitted from the proposed Reparation Clauses. They had drawn up instead a formula of undertaking to make contribution towards the cost of the war: this had been accepted by the Czechoslovaks and he hopes within 24 hours to get the consent of the other three states concerned, viz: Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia. The undertaking provides for the payment to the Allies of an amount equal to 25 per cent of the par value of the war bonds, found in each case in the territory in question; the amount payable being in no case less than 15 per cent of the value of the bonds which might reasonably be supposed to have been subscribed for in that territory. The total amount thus obtainable from all the four States would be from six to ten milliards of kroner.

Mr Lloyd George says that he thinks payment for the State forests ought to be additional to this sum. He desires to make two comments on these proposals. He does not see why a minimum of 15 per cent of war bonds should be allowed for: he thinks the figure should be 25 percent in both cases. It would be very difficult to ascertain how much had been subscribed in any given territory - probably they would have to resort to a rough allocation according to the estimated wealth of the territory. Further, he desires to recall to the minds of the Council a former proposal of S Orlando to the effect that, in the case of States like Serbia and Romania who have claims against Germany and are receiving accessions of territory, the amount of reparation which this new territory would have had to pay had it remained part of Austria should be set off against the claims made against the Enemy States by the State benefiting by the accession of territory. This scheme would relieve the Allies from the necessity of collecting contributions from the Yugoslav and Romanian Governments which would probably prove a difficult proceeding. He is disposed to suggest that claims and obligations should be regarded as cancelling out - more especially in the case of Romania. Serbia, indeed, might have a balance of claim and, upon the suggestion of Mr Davis, he agrees that some preliminary assistance might be given to Serbia on account of her claims in order to enable her to deal with her forged notes and that possibly a prior claim on the payments by Bulgaria should be accorded to her. Claims by Serbia and Romania against Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria for restitution and reparation in respect of livestock might also stand. Poland and Czechoslovakia having no claims against the enemy should be dealt with on the lines described by Mr Lamont.

Instructions are accordingly given to the Reparation Commission to negotiate with the respective States in question in accordance with these suggestions.

(It is agreed that, subject to a satisfactory agreement regarding contributions being concluded with the four States already referred to, and to the insertion of the modifications agreed upon at the present meeting, the Reparation Clauses should be incorporated in the Treaty with Austria).

(The meeting terminates at 12:50).