100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George's Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Three with General Bliss (United States), General Wilson and Captain Fuller (Great Britain), and Mr Venezelos of Greece


Mr Lloyd George suggests it would be best to begin by obtaining full information as to the present situation.

Captain Fuller says that the following warships are at present at Smyrna:

British: One light cruiser, two destroyers, two sloops. One light cruiser, one leader, four destroyers have been ordered to the Aegean.

French: One battleship, one cruiser. One battleship is due to arrive on May 18th.

Greek: One battleship, one cruiser, one destroyer.

Italian: One battleship, six small vessels.

Admiral Kakoulides in Kilkis is proceeding to Constantinople from the Black Sea to confer with Commander-in-Chief. Transports for from 12,000 to 14,000 men were assembling at Kavalla. They have left Athens, but their arrival at Kavalla has not yet been reported. More transports are being sent from Athens to convoy the material, but the date of their departure has not yet been reported.

Mr Venezelos says that 14,000 Greek troops are available at Kavalla. He hopes that the whole of the transports will arrive at Kavalla this evening. They will then commence to embark.

Captain Fuller says that their embarkation should occupy from 24 to 36 hours. He agrees with Mr. Lloyd George that the whole force should be embarked by Monday evening.

Mr Lloyd George asks how long the material will take to embark? There iss no time to lose.

General Bliss thinks that 48 hours will be enough for the embarkation of the material, if, as he understands, there are no horses.

Mr Venezelos suggests that if the matter is urgent the troops can be embarked and the transports can sail without waiting for the impedimenta. This is only a case of the occupation of a town and not of big military movements.

General Wilson thinks that sufficient transport can be requisitioned in Smyrna for the purpose of distributing the food.

Captain Fuller says that the forts are on the hills outside the town.

Mr Venezelos, in reply to President Wilson, says that not more than 24 hours will be required for the voyage from Kavalla to Smyrna.

Mr Lloyd George asks if, when the Turks are told that Smyrna will be occupied, they will be told that the forts were to be handed over? He believes that the French have a considerable landing party of blue-jackets or marines on board their ships. The Turks will probably raise less objection to the surrender of the forts to the French or the British than to the Greeks.

M Clemenceau says he does not mind whether it is the French or the British.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not either.

President Wilson asks if there is not a danger from the lack of unity of command?

Captain Fuller says that the whole of the transport and escort and landing operations will be under the supreme command of Admiral Calthorpe, who is the Allied Commander-in-Chief in that part of the Mediterranean.

M Clemenceau said that the Greek troops are under their own command.

Mr Lloyd George says that orders should be given for the forts to be handed over to the Greek troops when they had arrived.

President Wilson says he understands it has been agreed that both the Turks and Italians are to be informed just before the landing. The Allied representatives should be instructed to inform both by Monday night.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Italians ought to be told in Paris.

General Wilson suggests that Admiral Calthorpe should be instructed to inform the Turks that the forts are to be handed over under the terms of the armistice. They should be told that the forts are to be handed over to Allied troops, for, if they were not told they would have a legitimate right to resist.

General Bliss asks what objection there is to warning both the Turks and the Italians in time to ascertain their attitude? The chance of a conflict is much greater if they have no warning. Not to warn them is to invite disaster.

Mr Lloyd George says that there is no fear of resistance by the Italians. The danger is that the Italians will egg the Turks on to fight. He asks Mr Venezelos’ view.

Mr Venezelos says he disagrees with General Bliss. If the Italians are told beforehand they will tell the Turks. He advises that the Turks should be told only 12 hours before the landing. Admiral Calthorpe will direct the movements of the transports, and he will know at what moment to make the communication.

General Wilson suggests that the Italians will probably insist on joining in the landing as Allies.

General Bliss points out that the Italians cannot put many men ashore.

General Wilson points out they can bring up plenty of troops from Rhodes.

President Wilson says he foreshadows a difficulty if the British Admiral goes to Smyrna, having reached an understanding only with the Greek Commander. If the Italian Commander has no instructions to cooperate, an awkward situation will arise. The Italian Commander will have received no instructions to take orders from Admiral Calthorpe.

Captain Fuller points out that Admiral Calthorpe is Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Before giving any order to the Italians he will, of course, have to consult the Italian commander.

President Wilson says that we do not want the Italians to land their troops.

General Wilson says it will be very awkward if the Italians have a battalion on the spot and want to land. Is our Admiral to be instructed to forbid it?

Captain Fuller points out that Admiral Calthorpe will very likely remain at Constantinople and delegate the command to the French Admiral.

Mr Lloyd George says in that case the French Admiral will have command over the Italians as well as the other allied forces.

President Wilson points out that, in that event, the Italians will ask why they are not to cooperate. They will also ask why the forts are to be handed to the Greeks.

General Bliss anticipates that, in the absence of any definite instructions, the Italian Admiral will say to himself that he does not want to lose the trick, and he will anticipate trouble with his own government if he does not take part in the landing. If, however, he knows beforehand, there will be no friction. Without instructions he feels sure the Italian Admiral will insist on participating in the landing.

President Wilson says that in his place he would certainly do so.

Mr Lloyd George remarks that if the Italians are informed on Monday their Admiral will know before Tuesday, and with the greatest expedition a landing could not take place before that day.

Mr Venezelos urges the importance of Admiral Calthorpe going specially to Smyrna as Commander-in-Chief of the Allies in the Aegean. The Commander of the Italian ships would then never think of opposing him unless he had instructions from his own government. He believes that if the Italians are notified only some hours beforehand all would go well, on condition that the French occupy the forts.

President Wilson agrees that Admiral Calthorpe’s personal authority will not be questionable, but if he deputes his authority to someone else, it is more doubtful.

Mr Lloyd George says that Admiral Calthorpe, in that case, ought to be told to go to Smyrna.

Captain Fuller undertakes to do this.

Mr Lloyd George recalls, however, that it is also important that Admiral Calthorpe should inform the Turks of what is taking place. Should he, he asked, do this by deputy?

Mr Venezelos says he has received a dispatch from the Greek representative at Constantinople, who have discussed the whole matter with Admiral Calthorpe, who has told him that he wants to go to Smyrna, but that this is difficult owing to the absence of Admiral Seymour in the Black Sea, which prevents him from leaving.

Captain Fuller says that it has not been possible to release the British ships from the Black Sea to go to Smyrna, consequently Admiral Seymour is detained. In reply to Mr Lloyd George he says that perhaps Admiral Seymour can be brought down to Constantinople, but it will take three days for him to come from the Crimea.

Mr Lloyd George considers there is a great deal to be said for Admiral Calthorpe being at Smyrna. He agrees with Mr Venezelos that in that case the Italians were much less likely to make difficulties.

Mr Venezelos and M Clemenceau agree.

General Wilson expresses doubts as to whether 12 hours is a long enough warning to the Turkish Government. They do not function very rapidly and the Commanders of the forts might not receive warning to hand over. In this case they will be justified in resisting. The difficulty might be got over by an order issued locally.

General Bliss is inclined to favor this.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether they will obey an order given locally under the armistice?

Mr Venezelos suggests that the Turks should be asked to surrender the forts to the Allied forces under the terms of the armistice 36 hours before the operation takes place. 24 hours later they should be informed that Allied troops were about to arrive.

Captain Fuller says that the landing party will be a French one. In reply to President Wilson he says he believes there are two forts.

General Wilson expresses doubts as to whether the size of the landing party is sufficient to deal with two forts.

Captain Fuller says there is little information about the forts.

(At this point there is considerable discussion about the forts.)

Captain Fuller reads a draft of the instructions which he understands he is to send to the Admiralty for transmission to Admiral Calthorpe.

(These instructions are slightly modified during the discussion.)

(President Wilson withdraws, and shortly after Admiral de Bon, who has been summoned by telephone, arrived.)

Professor Mantoux (the official Interpreter), at M Clemenceau’s request, explains the situation to Admiral de Bon.

M Clemenceau asks if the Turks can be warned without warning the Italians also?

Mr Lloyd George says that if the Italians were informed on Monday they will communicate it to the Turks.

Mr Venezelos suggested that the Turks ought to be informed in regard to the forts on Monday afternoon.

Admiral de Bon pointed out that Admiral Amet is at Constantinople.

Mr Lloyd George says that in this case it will be unnecessary to recall Admiral Seymour from the Crimea. He asked what is the strength of the French landing party available.

Admiral de Bon says it is from 300 to 400 men.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that this is enough unless the Turks intended to fight. If they should fight then a much larger number will not be sufficient.

General Wilson asks whether the Italians in Paris will be informed that no Italian troops are to be landed?

Mr Lloyd George says that this difficulty should be surmounted by telling Admiral Calthorpe that the landing party is to consist entirely of French forces so as to avoid mixing up nationalities.

The following is a summary of the decisions reached:

1) At the Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers on Monday afternoon the Italian representatives should be informed of the action to be taken, and should be asked to issue instructions to place their Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna under Admiral Calthorpe’s orders:

2) Captain Fuller should make a communication on the following points to the British Admiralty, in order that instructions might be given to Admiral Calthorpe:

a) That, in view of the presence of Italian ships at Smyrna, it is very desirable that Admiral Calthorpe should be at Smyrna just prior to and during the operations.

b) That it is presumed that the Greek troops will arrive at Smyrna not before Wednesday morning, May 14th.

c) That the Italian representatives will be informed on Monday afternoon, as stated above.

d) That Admiral Calthorpe should arrange with Admiral Amet at Constantinople to make the following communications to the Turks:

i) Thirty-six hours before the Greek troops are due to land at Smyrna, the Turks at Constantinople are to be informed that the forts at Smyrna are to be handed over to Allied detachments.

ii) Twelve hours before the Greek troops are due to land at Smyrna, the Turks at Constantinople should be informed that Allied troops will be landed at Smyrna in accordance with the armistice terms, and that these movements have been decided on in view of reported disorders in the neighborhood of Smyrna.

3) Admiral Calthorpe should also be informed that the forts will eventually be turned over to the Greek troops.

e) Admiral Calthorpe should be instructed to arrange that no men are to be landed from Italian ships, nor should any British parties be landed. The landing parties for taking over the forts should be entirely French, thus avoiding the mixing up of nationalities.

f) Admiral Calthorpe should, as soon as possible, report the date and time at which transports would leave Kavalla, and the date and time of their expected arrival at Smyrna, so that, if they are due at Smyrna later than Wednesday morning, the Supreme Council can adjust the time for informing the Italians in Paris to correspond.

(Note: A communication in the above sense has been sent to the Admiralty, London, and Admiral de Bon is instructing Admiral Amet to follow Admiral Calthorpe’s directions in this operation.)

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. M Clemenceau hands round two notes on the Peace Terms which have been forwarded by the German Delegation.

President Wilson produces the draft replies which he has prepared.

It was agreed:

i) To approve the replies prepared by President Wilson;

ii) That both the Notes and the Replies should be published at once.)


2. M Clemenceau produces a report that has been sent to him by the Ministry of Marine, signed by Admiral Benson, Admiral de Bon, and Admiral Hope in regard to the measures to be taken to maintain order in Slesvig during the operation of the plebiscite. The Admirals have come to the conclusion that it is not their function to decide which nation should have the command of the Allied force. The report had been called for by a Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on April 30th.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that as the matter is not urgent, it should be postponed.

(This is agreed to.)


3. M Clemenceau produces a report containing the results of consideration given by the Council of Foreign Ministers to the boundaries of Austria and Hungary.

Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson ask that before the report is discussed, it might be circulated.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to reproduce and circulate the report.)


4. Mr Lloyd George asks what impression Mr Tchaykowsky had made.

President Wilson says that he had not been as definite as he himself would wish. He had received the impression that Kolchak’s advisers had inclined to the Right as soon as they had got power. This very often happenes.

Mr Lloyd George says he got the impression that Mr Tchaykowsky does not quite trust Denekin. He does evidently like Kolchak, though he himself had not got a very clear impression of Kolchak’s “entourage”. He does not think public opinion will allow us to abandon Kolchak even if he should establish a reactionary Government, because the world would say that the establishment of order was so important. It would be awkward to be placed in the position of supporting a Government that we do not believe in.

President Wilson says he thinks a fresh view ought to be obtained of Kolchak. He does not like being entirely dependent upon the views of British and French military men.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Colonel John Ward, who commands the Middlesex Battalion, is a Labour Member of Parliament.

(After some discussion President Wilson undertakes to ask an American gentleman named Mr Morris, who was at present at Tokyo, to proceed as rapidly as possible to Omsk in order to gather as much information as he could about Admiral Kolchak’s political intentions.

He undertakes to instruct him to consult Colonel Ward, and Colonel Johnson, Commanding the 5th Hants. Battalion, as to their view of the political situation.)

President Wilson says that Kolchak’s program is all right viewed in the background of M. Tchaykowsky's mind. What, however, does it look like, he asks, viewed in the background of Admiral Kolchak’s mind?

Mr Lloyd George says he feels sure that a soldier is bound to get to the top in Russia. Even if the Bolsheviks ultimately prevail, it would probably be by military action.


5. Sir Maurice Hankey again brings forward Lord Cunliffe’s letter asking for a decision as to whether new States such as Poland are to bear any portion of the costs of the war. He is informed that a decision on this point is essential before the experts on Reparation by Austria and Hungary could proceed with their inquiry, and he is also informed that this is the most backward part of the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.

President Wilson says that his first and sentimental idea is that Poland ought to be let off altogether. Poland has been caught, as it were, in three nets - the Austrian, the German, and the Russian, and had in consequence suffered dreadfully. It seemed only common justice to leave her out from any share of costs of the war or reparation. The same does not apply to other parts of Austria-Hungary, but he does not know on what basis their share of reparation is to be reckoned. He asks whether they are to take a share of the national debt or only of reparation?

Mr Lloyd George says that their share of the national debt should be regarded as cancelled, as the Allied and Associated Powers are not concerned in this.

President Wilson suggests that reparation should be worked out on the same principles as for Germany, by categories of damage.

Mr Lloyd George says that if put in the same categories as for Germany, the Austrian reparation will become merely collateral to Germany, and to that extent they will relieve Germany of her debt.

President Wilson says that one of the elements in his mind is that in fairness to Italy, to make Austria collateral would increase the possibility of adequate reparation to Italy.

Mr Lloyd George said that Italy is in exactly the same position as Great Britain.

S Orlando agrees.

President Wilson says the difficulty is that there will not be enough to go round, and this is the argument for making Austria collateral.

Mr Lloyd George says that if Germany’s capacity to pay is adequate, all would agree that to make Austria collateral would be a relief. Even if Germany’s resources are inadequate, this would provide some relief. He suggests that the claim for Austria and Hungary ought to be on a different basis. It ought to be assumed that Austria could not pay the whole of the damages, and it would be better to lay down definitely how much Austria and Hungary were to pay.

President Wilson hopes that a moderate sum will be named.

M Clemenceau asks who is to estimate the amount.

President Wilson says theoretically this could be done, but he does not know whether the sources of information are sufficient to enable the sum to be estimated and allotted.

Mr Lloyd George says it will be very dangerous to impose an unknown liability on these new countries.

President Wilson asks whether the Reparation scheme for Germany could not be applied in some way; so as to make Austria’s share collateral but independent.

Mr Lloyd George proposes, without prejudicing the decision, that the experts should be asked to report as to how much the whole group of countries in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire could pay.

President Wilson suggests that the experts should be asked to report whether it would be feasible to form a conclusion as to how much the whole group; omitting Poland, could pay, and, in the event of this not being feasible, to add to the suggestion an outline of the proportion to be paid by each component part.

Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau agree.

M Orlando says that it is a very complex question, which will have to be referred to experts. For example, considering the case of war debts only, it will be very difficult to ascertain the precise situation of the several States formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. It will be found that some had a war debt, and others had not, and the situation would be very confusing. The best plan is to put the matter in the hands of experts, who should be asked to take as the basis of their work that all the States except Poland should pay: on this basis the experts should estimate the capacity of the whole group to pay. Then they should examine the distribution of liabilities, as well as of means of payment. The Germans might have the right to complain if they did not know how much their former allies were to pay. This is an additional reason for dealing with the problem reasonably.

Mr Lloyd George says there is another reason. All the Allied Powers have incurred heavy debts for the emancipation of these races. They have been freed not by their own efforts, but by those of the Allies. Their only share in the war had been to fight against us. Without taking a final decision as to the case of Poland, he thinks the inquiry should be extended to Poland.

President Wilson says that Poland has been prostrated by the war almost as much as Belgium. He does not think that she ought to bear any part of the Austro-Hungarian war debt. He does not think that any of the new countries should bear a part of the Austro-Hungarian war debt, but only a part of reparation.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a decision on this matter for consideration.)


6. Sir Maurice Hankey says he has been asked by the British representatives on the Committee which is preparing the Financial Clauses for the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties to obtain authority to consult the Czechoslovaks and other States concerned.

(It is agreed that the Committee considering the Financial Clauses should have authority to consult the Czechoslovaks or delegates of any other State represented at the Peace Conference.)


------------------------------------------------------

German Objections to Draft Conditions of Peace
Deutsche Friedensdelegation.
[May 9, 1919.]
German Note

The German Peace Delegation has finished the first perusal of the Peace Conditions which have been handed over to them. They have had to realize that on essential points the basis of the Peace of Right, agreed upon between the belligerents, has been abandoned. They were not prepared to find that the promise, explicitly given to the German People and the whole of mankind, is in this way to be rendered illusory.

The draft of the treaty contains demands which no nation could endure, moreover, our experts hold that many of them could not possibly be carried out.

The German Peace Delegation will substantiate these statements in detail and transmit to the Allied and Associated Governments their observations and their material continuously.

Brockdorff-Rantzau


Reply

The Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have received the statement of objections of the German plenipotentiaries to the Draft Conditions of Peace.

In reply they wish to remind the German Delegation that they have formed the Terms of the Treaty with constant thought of the principles upon which the Armistice and the negotiations for peace were proposed. They can admit no discussion of their right to insist upon the Terms of the Peace substantially as drafted. They can consider only such practical suggestions as the German plenipotentiaries may have to submit.

10 May, 1919.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


The Council has before it a Report from the Italian Delegation giving reasons why the frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria should follow a south south-easterly direction reaching the frontier granted to Italy by the Treaty of London in such a manner as to leave to Austria the upper part of the valley of the Save as far as Radmannsdorf.


1. M Pichon asks M Tardieu whether he has any additional explanations to make to the report.

M Tardieu said that the Report has been circulated and that it explains itself.

Baron Sonnino says that in his opinion the solution finally proposed by the Committee in Part II of the Report appears to him somewhat complicated. Italy, in the interest of the port of Trieste, wished that there should be uninterrupted communication between that port and German-Austria and Bohemia. For this purpose the Railway line should not pass through the territory of any third State which had no direct interest in the development of the line and possibly an adverse interest. Similar considerations had been given weight in dealing with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc. No doubt this might involve the delivery of a certain number of Slovenes to Austrian rule, but similar instances are not lacking elsewhere. For instance, the town of Marburg had been given to Yugoslavia though it contained from 18,000 to 20,000 Germans. He does not wish to delay peace with Austria, and for that purpose, he would, if necessary, agree to the solution proposed, but he pointed out that it is no real solution; it is only a postponement.

M Pichon says that it has the advantage of rendering an early signature of peace with Austria possible. The ultimate attribution of the territory could then be settled among the Allies.

Baron Sonnino says that the alternatives are to give the territory in question, namely: the triangle surrounding Klagenfurt, to Austria or to Yugoslavia. If it were to go to Austria, why not decide at once? Were it to go to Yugoslavia, either at once or later, the economic trouble to which he had alluded would inevitably ensue. There is a third possibility, to attribute it to Italy; but this is not desired by Italy, who wished to avoid the inclusion of non-Italian populations, except in cases of territories required for Italian safety.

Mr Balfour says that he does not wish to express any strong dogmatic views, but he wishes to suggest a few points. He feels some difficulty in meeting the views of the Italian Delegation, and in disregarding those of the French, British and American delegations. The Italian solution involves not only the separation of some Yugoslavs from the bulk of their nation, but their surrender to an enemy State. It is difficult to justify the handing over to an enemy the natural subjects of a State it was intended to create. Secondly, he understands that the frontier proposed by all but the Italian Delegation follows the crest of a high range of hills. This crest forms the natural frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria. The Italian proposal would bring the Austrians south of the range. This, on the face of it, is an extraordinary thing to do in dealing with a hostile State. The proposal appears to violate both ethnographical and geographical considerations. It is not a parallel case to that of the Brenner, the acquisition of which by Italy could be justified on geographical grounds, though open to criticism on ethnological grounds. In this case both ethnology and geography agreed, and both were to be violated. The only answer to these objections is that one of the two railway lines connecting Trieste and the north passes through this tongue of territory. It was assumed that if this tongue of territory belonged to Yugoslavia, it might be utilized to obstruct the trade of Trieste with the North. This is a serious argument, as undoubtedly all the Allies wished to promote the trade of Trieste. There was, however, one qualification to this, namely: that there is another railway line connecting Trieste with German-Austria. This line, it is true, was inferior to the more easterly line. Still it exists and is an element in the situation. A further qualification is that the Allied Powers in dealing with Poland had been faced by a similar, but yet more vital, railway problem. The arrangement with Germany makes it possible that the only main line of communication between the capital of Poland and the sea will be intercepted by German territory. This possibility had been contemplated, and in the event of its being realized, arrangements had been thought out to safeguard the traffic. The Polish case is obviously a stronger case than the one in question, as the most vital interests of the whole country are in jeopardy. It cannot be held that the railway line from Trieste to the North affects Italian interests to this extent. If, therefore, the provisions made for Poland are sufficient, similar provisions ought to be adequate for Trieste. Lastly, he wishes to draw attention to a very serious aspect of the delivery of this territory to Austria. It will give the Northern powers access to a region from which they could advantageously invade Yugoslavia. He does not think that Italy will readily grant such an advantage to any of her own enemies. The Council cannot, he thinks, decide this case against the Yugoslavs until this military problem has been studied. The remarks just made represent the reflections suggested by the report just put forward by M Tardieu. Before concluding he wishes to say that he sympathizes most cordially with the Italian wish to develop Trieste. All wish to see Trieste prosperous, and possessed of free access to all the countries north of it.

Mr Lansing inquires whether he is wrong in understanding that both of the railway roads are single tracks.

M Laroche says that both lines have a single track, but that tunnels have been made on the Eastern line (Trieste-Assling) for a double track.

Mr Lansing says that he has little to add to the very full consideration given to the subject by Baron Sonnino and Mr Balfour. As to the principles on which the solution ought to be based, he agreed with Mr Balfour. In the case of the Brenner Pass the Council had decided to give precedence to topographical over ethnographical considerations, and had given to Italy territory including a large number of Austrian-Germans. They are now asked to change their principles, and to decide against a natural boundary. It seems to him that a similar argument might be used in the case of Fiume. If this territory must not be Yugoslav, because the Yugoslavs might use it to interrupt communications with an Italian port, the Hinterland of Fiume, it might equally be argued, must not be Yugoslav because the railways feeding the port might similarly be interfered with.

Baron Sonnino says that he does not admit the cases are parallel. In this instance the railway is to pass through a band of territory about 20 kilometres broad. The Yugoslavs will not be interested in the railway at all, and if they possess this strip they might seize the opportunity of neglecting the line in order to favour traffic to another part. In the case of Fiume, however, the whole trade must come through territory which no one suggested should be withheld from Yugoslavia. The contest is really between two ports, and the natural flow of commerce to each should be kept as far as possible separate, and no entanglement between them should be allowed. This is the only way to secure the development of both.

As to the ethnological point, in Poland, some 300,000 Germans are to be made subjects of the new Polish State, and about 280,000 Hungarians are to be Romanian subjects, as the inevitable accompaniment of some hundreds of kilometres of railway.

Mr Lansing observes that the process of giving to friends rather than to enemies is being reversed. This territory was being taken from the Yugoslavs to be given to the Austrians.

Baron Sonnino observes that the Slovenes are not his friends in a greater degree than the Austrians.

Mr Lansing retorts that America regards them as friends.

Baron Sonnino says that the new States should be considered neither as friends nor foes. Should German Austria, for instance, join the Danubian Confederacy, the Austrians might come to be regarded as friends. Should they join the German Confederation, the Austrians would be counted among foes. The question is really one of permanent commercial relations. Further, if the question of friendship is raised, he claims a share for Italy.

Mr Balfour says that he heartily endorses the last sentence.

Mr Lansing agrees but points out that the question is an Austrian rather than an Italian problem.

Baron Sonnino says that it was an Italian question in as much as it concerned Trieste, Istria and the Adriatic.

Mr Lansing says that he is struck by the fact that if Austria were brought so far south, she might feel she had a claim to reach salt water.

Baron Sonnino observes that she would only be brought some 20 kilometres nearer the sea.

M. Pichon inquired whether any practical solution can be found.

Baron Sonnino says he is ready to accept the proposal made by the Committee at the end of the second section of the Report. He is ready to do this in a conciliatory spirit to avoid obstructing the signature of a Treaty with Austria. He would have, however, a small amendment to make. He would stipulate that the triangle, the ultimate fate of which is to be reserved, should not be made so wide as to include the western line from Trieste, and thereby to leave in suspense the whole of the railway communications between Trieste and the north. In other words, the triangle should not include the line from Trieste to Villach via Udine and Tarvis.

Mr. Lansing proposes that the formula suggested by the Committee be accepted with a proviso that the limit of the territory be to the east of Tarvis.

M Tardieu observes that the Committee has constantly kept in view the desirability of preserving uninterrupted communication between Trieste and Austria.

Mr Balfour says that he is ready to accept the view that it is the business of the Conference to see that direct and free railway communication be assured between Trieste, German-Austria, Bohemia and the north generally.

Baron Sonnino says that on this understanding he would agree to the draft of the Committee.

Mr Balfour says that his remark should not be interpreted as a pre-judgment on the question of territorial sovereignty. By direct and free communication, he does not mean necessarily to imply that railway lines are not to pass through ground belonging to a third State.

Baron Sonnino says that he accepts the proposal of the Committee on the understanding that due consideration is given to the necessity of preserving the railway communications of Trieste towards the north. He will make no concession in advance regarding the question of territory just mentioned by Mr Balfour.

Mr Lansing points out that the Report of the Committee proposes that the frontier line should pass north of the tunnel of Rosenbach. He thinks that it would be better to have the frontier line along the ridge over the tunnel.

(After some discussion it is agreed to omit the last clause of the first paragraph of the Committee’s recommendation in part II of the Report.)

M Pichon suggests that the Committee should formulate a proposal, after taking into consideration the above discussion, for reference to the Council of Heads of States, and that no further reference need be made to the Council of Foreign Ministers, should the Committee reach a unanimous decision.

(This is agreed to.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

11th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Successes by General Denikin in S. Russia.

German delegates protest against Terms officially.

Illustration by Louis Sabattier depicting Parisians demolishing the fortifications of Paris after the end of the war to make parks.


Ship Losses:

Lyubimets (Soviet Navy Red Movement) The gunboat was shelled and sunk on the Kama River by artillery. She was raised post-war and scrapped.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, May 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

12th May 1919

Aftermath of War

National Assembly meets in Berlin.

Australian troops marching in front of Buckingham Palace for a victory parade.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, May 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. M Clemenceau reads a letter he has from Brockdorff-Rantzau (Lead German Negotiator) on the subject of Labour Legislation, together with a draft reply.

Mr Lloyd George says that the reply is a matter of some importance and should be carefully studied. It would be a serious matter for France and for Great Britain if the Germans were to work 10 hours while we were limited by law to 8 hours.

President Wilson says that as an 8 hours man he doe not share this view. The United States’ experience had been that men could produce more in 8 hours than in 10.

Mr Lloyd George agrees generally, but says that in some forms of labor, for example, cotton, he does not think the principle applies. In regard to coal, for example, the British experience had been that the adoption of shorter hours had lessened output.

President Wilson agrees in regard to unskilled labor, but not in regard to cotton. He thinks the real argument is that it would be disadvantageous to the Allied and Associated Powers to have the sympathy of their working classes excited in favour of the German working classes, thus setting up a sympathetic connection between the two.

Mr Lloyd George suggests the question should be referred for a reply to the Labor Advisers of principal Allied and Associated Powers.

(It is agreed that the letter from the German Delegation should be referred to a Committee of Labour Experts which should include M Colliard, of the French Delegation, Mr Barnes of the British Delegation and Mr Robinson of the United States Delegation.)

S Orlando undertakes to nominate an Italian representative.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General.


2. M Clemenceau reads a letter he has received from the German Delegation on the subject of Prisoners of War, but the question of the reply is postponed until the afternoon.


3. Sir Maurice Hankey hands round the draft of a letter to Lord Cunliffe on these subjects.

(The letter is approved, signed by M Clemenceau and dispatched to Lord Cunliffe.)


4. S Orlando says he has a question of special interest to Italy to raise in connection with reparation by Austria and by Hungary, namely, the question of the tonnage in the Adriatic. In his view, the same distribution of the enemy tonnage cannot be applied in the Adriatic as in the case of the German tonnage. The reason of this is that in the Adriatic whether the ships serve Italian interests or Yugoslav interests, there is this common bond between them that if they are taken away from the Adriatic, it would deal a death blow to Italian ports and to Yugoslav ports. Hence, the portion of the Austrian-Hungarian tonnage in the Adriatic must not be dealt with on the same principles as the German tonnage. In reply to M Clemenceau, he states that these ships have been sequestrated by the Allies and used in the Mediterranean for the benefit of the Allies. The question now arises as to whom they should belong in the future. It will mean ruin to all the ports in the Adriatic if they are taken away from that sea.

M Clemenceau says he does not quite understand what is proposed.

Mr Lloyd George says that surely S Orlando does not suggest that Italy, while obtaining a share of the German ships, should also appropriate all the Austrian ships remaining in the Adriatic. If this is done, the Northern Powers being excluded from any share in the Austrian ships, while the Italians receive not only the whole of the Austrian ships but their share of German ships also, will not be fairly treated.

S Orlando says that the question of the Austrian ships will not make an addition to the Italian tonnage, since they have a special economic use which is quite distinct from the Italian mercantile developments. To say to Italy that the acquisition of these ships will compensate her losses is not fair because, in fact, Italy would be acquiring certain ports that had essential shipping needs of their own. These ships would have to be appropriated as they had been in the past for the services of these ports.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not mind if Italy would stand out of the German claim altogether and take her chance of recouping herself from the Austrian-Hungarian Mercantile Marine. Most of the fighting with Germany had been done by Great Britain and France but, nevertheless, it had been decided to give Italy a share of the shipping. If Italy is to have a share of the ships of the nation she had not fought and in addition to have all the merchant ships of the nation she had fought, he really cannot understand what logical basis is being acted on.

President Wilson says that what S Orlando is claiming iss that the Adriatic fleet should not be removed from that sea.

Mr Lloyd George says it would be equally fair and right to say that North sea ships were not to be removed from the North sea. The German ships plying in the North sea were just as essential there as the Austrian shipping was in the Adriatic. Nevertheless, the British Government had never thought of making such a demand.

S Orlando wishes to put the question in another aspect. He greatly regrets the effect of his proposal on Mr Lloyd George as he is firmly convinced of its justice. Italy is now to have Trieste which was a great commercial sea port. If, however, Trieste was to be handed to Italy but its mercantile fleet is to be taken away, Italy would receive a ruined city. It had been rightly decided that Alsace-Lorraine was not to contribute towards reparation. Alsace-Lorraine was not a maritime country but was a riverside country and in that case it had been decided that the river craft should not be included in the German craft ceded for reparation, but should be left to Alsace. All he asks is the application of the same principles to Trieste since without these ships Trieste would be a ruined city.

M Clemenceau points out that Great Britain had lost a very formidable tonnage.

S Orlando says Italy had also.

M Clemenceau says that the Italian losses were not comparable to the British.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that the British losses were larger in proportion even than the Italian.

M Clemenceau says he entirely agrees with the views expressed by Mr Lloyd George.

President Wilson asks what exactly S Orlando intended by the Trieste mercantile fleet.

S Orlando says the merchant ships registered at the port of Trieste.

Mr Lloyd George says he is not familiar with what had been decided about river craft on the Rhine, but he would point out that these cannot be used anywhere else, whereas the ships registered at Trieste could for the most part be used in any part of the world. If Italy gives notice of this proposal, he will object to Italy having any share of the German ships. During S Orlando’s absence it had been agreed to share the German ships equally. Now Italy says that she is quite prepared to share equally in the German ships, but must have also all the Austrian and Hungarian ships. He must enter a strong protest against this proposal.

S Orlando says he regrets that his ideas of justice do not correspond with those of Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau. He then reads the following extract from Annex III of the Reparation Clauses in the Treaty with Germany:

“The ships and boats mentioned in paragraph 1, including all ships and boats which

(a) fly, or may be entitled to fly, the German Flag; or

(b) are owned by any German national, Company or Corporation, or by any Company or Corporation belonging to a country other than an Allied or Associated country, and under the control or direction of German nationals; or

(c) which are now under construction
(i) in Germany;
(ii) in other than Allied or Associated countries for the account of any German national, Company or Corporation.”

All he asks is that the same basis should be applied to the Austro-Hungarian nationals, but it should not apply to any citizen of Trieste, since these were becoming Italians.

Mr Lloyd George says that what S Orlando meant was that, as in the German treaty only ships belonging to German nationals were being taken, the ships registered at Trieste must not be taken, since the inhabitants of Trieste became Italian citizens.

President Wilson points out that they will not be Italian citizens until the Treaty is signed.

Mr Lloyd George says he is quite unable to understand how this proposal can be made. Hundreds of thousands of tons of Allied shipping had been sunk in carrying wheat and coal and munitions to Italy, and yet the Allies are not to participate in the tonnage received from Austria. Under this scheme Trieste and Pola are to be ruled out, because they were to become Italian, and the only ships to be taken were those in Sebenico and Spalato and other Yugoslav ports. In fact, as the Yugoslavs had now become Serbs and were Allies, the principal Allied and Associated Powers would be ruled out altogether.

M Clemenceau agrees that if this principle is adopted they would never touch a penny.

Mr Lloyd George says he hopes it will never be necessary to tell this story in Parliament, in order to explain why Great Britain could get no part of the Adriatic Fleet.

S Orlando says that it would be impossible for Italy to deprive Trieste of her Fleet so that the result would be that the rest of Italy would get no reparation for the ships lost.

Mr Lloyd George says that the most dangerous voyage during the war had been that to Italy, and the British mercantile marine had lost very heavily in these narrow seas. He entirely disputes that Trieste would be ruined any more than any other port. If there is a chance of trade and business being done, ships of all flags will go there.

President Wilson points out that Austria by this treaty is likely to be deprived of all access to the sea, as are the Czechs and other parts of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. Consequently, by the application of S Orlando’s principle all the ships belonging to Czechs and Hungarians will be divested of their nationality.

S Orlando asks if he would be free, as Mr Lloyd George suggested, to abandon the Italian share of the German commercial fleet and accept instead the whole of the fleet registered at Trieste and Pola.

Mr Lloyd George says there are two principles of reparation.

(1) that Italy should put in a claim against the Germans for damage inflicted on her by Germany and another claim against the Austrians and Hungarians for damage inflicted by Austria and Hungary; or,

(2) to share in the total amount for reparation. Possibly there might be a third principle, namely, that Italy should look to Austria for the whole of her reparation, while Great Britain and France looked to Germany. He knew of no other principle except those three.

S Orlando says that the least he can ask is that Italy’s share of the ships should include the ships at Trieste.

President Wilson asks if he makes this demand whether the amounts were in the proper proportion or not.

S Orlando replies yes.

Mr Lloyd George says that S Orlando’s intention is, supposing Italy receives 100 ships, that these ships should be picked out from the Trieste ships. This is a question which might be discussed.


5. M Clemenceau says that there only remains the Greek affair, on which some explanation should be given. During the absence of the Italian delegates from Paris, the Greeks had asked us to agree to a disembarkation at Smyrna, which we conceded. As a consequence, a concentration of ships had taken place, he believed at Kavalla. There was no question of making a reparstition affecting Smyrna, but we desired that the Greeks should be able to land to protect their co-nationals from massacres; many such had lately taken place. We considered it convenient that British, French and Italian detachments should take part in the landing. So far as we know there were at Smyrna many Italian warships, 6 or 7.

S Orlando says there are only 2.

M Clemenceau says that we should not wish that the British, French and Italian disembarkation should be made in a different manner. France had there only a small force, and we should not like the Italians to land a much larger detachment. We could not do that without warning S Orlando in order to ask him to make appropriate dispositions.

S Orlando asks if it was a question of a Greek, French, British, and Italian landing.

M Clemenceau says that the Greeks would occupy Smyrna, but, he repeats, we did not pretend to give an indication of any repartition of territory.

Mr. Lloyd George says we proposed that the occupation should be a Greek occupation, to suppress massacres lately perpetrated against Greek subjects.

M Clemenceau repeats that the Greeks had asked permission to make this landing.

President Wilson, interrupting, says that the original suggestion had not come from the Greeks. The Council had suggested to the Greeks that they should land their troops to prevent massacres.

M Clemenceau says: Yes, that is right. In these circumstances, and in order to prevent a conflict, and to keep the best possible order, Admiral Calthorpe had been asked that he should go from Constantinople to Smyrna. According to his information, the Italians had already disembarked some time back some sailors at Smyrna, and then they had been withdrawn.

S Orlando says he had no information to this effect.

M Clemenceau said that what was intended was that simultaneously with the Greek occupation there should be a disembarkation of Italians, French and English, leaving the custody of the city to the Greeks.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Allied disembarkation was solely for the occupation of the forts, and that they would be replaced by Greeks, when they would embark again. It was natural that there should not be more commands in a single place. The command at Smyrna would be Greek.

(Turning to Colonel Hankey, he asks if Turkey had been warned.)

Sir Maurice Hankey says it had not.

Mr Lloyd George says that Sir George Riddell had received a letter from a British inhabitant of Smyrna, a thoroughly reliable man whom he himself knows quite well, giving a very bad account of Turkish atrocities on the Greeks, which included massacres and tortures.

S Orlando says he was not well up in this question, and would like to postpone his answer in the afternoon when he had talked it over with Baron Sonnino.

Mr Lloyd George says that according to his information, three Italian landings had taken place without any notice to their Allies, namely, at Makri, Marmaris, Budrum and at Scala Nuova. He asked if that was true and what was the reason for them.

M Clemenceau says that there was also a landing at Adalia.

Mr Lloyd George says we knew all about that.

S Orlando says it was on this question that he wished to consult Baron Sonnino, who knew all about the matter.

President Wilson asks that he would take particular note of the landings mentioned by Mr Lloyd George.


6. President Wilson asks Sir Maurice Hankey how matters stand as regards the preparation of the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.

Sir Maurice Hankey replies that he had, in accordance with instructions, circulated the report of the Foreign Ministers on the subject of boundaries, and that this was ready consideration.

(It is agreed to meet on the same afternoon with the Foreign Ministers at the Quai d’Orsay and consider the boundaries of Austria and Hungary.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, May 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 15:30

Meeting of the Council of Four



(M Loucheur is introduced.)


1. M Loucheur draws attention to the revised edition of Article 430 of the German Treaty as approved by the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on May 10th, which reads as follows:

“In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under Part VIII (Reparation) of the present Treaty, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Forces.”

He points out that some portions of the Reparation Clauses ware scattered through the Treaty, and not included in Part VIII. He therefore asks for the omission of the words “under Part VIII”.

(It is agreed that the words “under Part VIII (Reparation) of the present Treaty” should be omitted, and that the following should be substituted:

“For reparation as provided in the present Treaty”. Article 430 of the Treaty should therefore read as follows:

'In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations for reparation as provided in the present Treaty, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Forces.”')


2. Mr Lloyd George says that there was a demand from the British Parliament for the Treaty of Peace to be laid on the Table of the House. He had replied that he must consult his colleagues before he could possibly consent. Mr Bonar Law had given his view that as a summary had been published, the inference would be drawn if the Treaty was not published that the summary was inaccurate.

M Clemenceau says he had already refused to lay the Treaty, both to the Senate and the House of Representatives.

S Orlando said he did not like publication, as it made it so much more difficult to make changes.

Baron Sonnino agrees with this view.

President Wilson say that he could not lay the Treaty before the Senate until he returned to the United States.

(It is agreed that the text of the Treaty of Peace as handed to the Germans should not be laid before the legislatures of the Allied & Associated Powers.)

(M Loucheur withdraaws.)


3. President Wilson asks what was the decision of his Italian colleagues in regard to the questions put to them that morning.

S Orlando said he accepts in principle. He thinks it might be preferable to leave the troops of the Principal Powers on shore, and not to withdraw the British, French and Italian detachments, pending the final decision as to the disposal of Smyrna. That is the only alteration he asks for.

President Wilson says that the landing parties from the British and French ships will not exceed 200.

Mr Lloyd George says that the British detachment will not exceed 50.

Baron Sonnino says that their retention on shore would give the expedition an international character.

M Clemenceau asks who would have the command?

Mr Lloyd George says the Greeks.

President Wilson agrees that the command must be Greek, since Greece disposes of by far the largest force.

M Clemenceau thinks it unsuitable to place the troops of the Principal Allied Powers under Greek command. Nothing could be more to the point than the decision taken today that the landing was without prejudice to the ultimate disposal of Smyrna in the Treaty of Peace.

President Wilson thinks it undesirable to leave handfuls of men on shore.

Mr Lloyd George says that Sir George Riddell’s correspondent, to whom he had spoken in the morning, had himself seen Turkish troops firing at Greeks, and had seen two quite harmless people shot. There had been no rebellion or provocation.

President Wilson considers a continued joint occupation unwise.

S Orlando says he will not insist.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether the Turks will now be told?

President Wilson says they will be told 12 hours before the movement takes place.

Mr Lloyd George asks if the Greeks can leave at once?

President Wilson says he understands that they can. Cavalla is only 24 hours distant.

Baron Sonnino asks if the ships are already assembled.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is the case. The decision had been taken more than a week ago.

(It is agreed that the Greek force should start from Cavalla as soon as ready, and that an Italian detachment should take part in the landing of Allied forces. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the British naval authorities for the information of Admiral Calthorpe, and to Mr Venizelos.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. M Clemenceau asks M Tardieu to explain the finding of the Committee on Yugoslav affairs.

M Tardieu gave an explanation of the finding of the Committee substantially identical to that given in I. C. 1821 and in I. C. 184.2

Mr Balfour asks whether any method of obtaining a plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin has been thought out.

M Tardieu replies that no methods have been suggested, as the Committee has not thought it necessary to propose any until the plebiscite had been accepted in principle.

M Clemenceau inquires whether the principle of the plebiscite was accepted.

President Wilson replies in the affirmative.

Mr Lloyd George also agrees.

Baron Sonnino expresses the view that if a plebiscite is resorted to in this area, there should be one in Marburg and in other doubtful corners along the proposed frontier.

Mr Balfour says that it is true there are other regions with mixed populations, but if the Conference is satisfied that it possesses sufficient knowledge to solve these problems without a referendum, he can see no reason why a plebiscite should not be resorted to in the isolated case of the Klagenfurt Basin if the Conference does not think itself sufficiently well-informed to decide its fate without one.

M Tardieu points out that the Commission has been unanimous not only regarding the rest of the frontier, but in recommending a plebiscite in this area.

President Wilson points out that the most urgent business before the meeting is to frame a clause for the Treaty. Some definite stipulation should be put down. He reads the draft prepared by the Committee on Romania and Yugoslavia:

“In the whole of the basin of Klagenfurt, as defined below, an Inter-Allied Commission will be charged by the five Allied and Associated Powers with the duty of ascertaining on the spot the wishes expressed by the inhabitants as to the attachment of their territory to that of the Yugoslav State.

If the conclusions of this Commission establish the formal desire of the population to be attached to the Yugoslav State, the five Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to give satisfaction to such desire”.

Mr Balfour agrees that all Austria need know is that the people in the area in question will be consulted.

S Orlando says that if he understands the clause aright, it meant that the fate of this territory is reserved until the conclusion of the labors of the Commission set up by it. On these terms he will accept the draft Article.

(The draft Article regarding the consultation of the population in the Klagenfurt Basin by an Inter-Allied Commission is accepted.)

M Tardieu then proceeds to explain the difficulty regarding the triangle south-east of Tarvis.

Baron Sonnino asks at what date the final attribution will be made. He expresses the opinion that the occasion of making a Treaty with Austria is the best moment for settling this.

Mr Balfour explains that the result obtained at the last meeting of the Foreign Ministers a compromise had been reached solely in order to obtain means of settling speedily with Austria. He agrees with Baron Sonnino that the final attribution of this territory must be made at some date. He suggests that if it is not settled immediately, it might be considered when the Conference came to decide on the boundaries of Yugoslavia.

M Clemenceau suggests that this course should be adopted.

Baron Sonnino adheres to the view that the matter should be settled immediately; not only is it an Italian interest, but it is also a first rate Austrian interest. It concerns the Austrians to know by what means they will communicate with the sea. The territory in question is a small mountainous wedge with a very small population. It is quite separate from the question of Fiume, and it could readily be decided in connection with the forthcoming Treaty with Austria.

President Wilson points out that two questions are involved. One is that of the ultimate sovereignty to be acknowledged by the population of the district. As this population was predominantly Yugoslav, the natural answer would be that the sovereignty should be Yugoslav. The second question is that of direct railway communication between Austria and Italy. In a similar instance the Conference had found no great difficulty in settling an almost identical problem. Arrangements had been made to ensure unimpeded transit between Eastern and Western Prussia.

Baron Sonnino points out that in order to give Czechoslovakia some 60 kilometres of railway, about 60,000 Magyars are to be subjected to Czechoslovak sovereignty. This had been done in order to ensure unimpeded railway communication between Czechoslovakia and Romania. Similarly, no less than 280,000 Magyars had been handed over to Romania, and in Poland, together with 100 kilometres of railway, some 100,000 Germans had been made Polish subjects.

(Considerable dissent is expressed from this statement. Such solutions might have been proposed by Committees, but have not yet been accepted by the Council.)

M Clemenceau says that the proposal which he asks the Council to accept or reject is that the limits of Austria should be fixed provisionally, and that the final attribution of the triangle in question be reserved until the frontiers of Yugoslavia are determined. This will be in accordance with the decision of the Foreign Secretaries of the previous Saturday.

(This is finally agreed to and the frontier of Austria as proposed by the Committee on Yugoslavia in the report is accepted.)

(The southern frontier of Hungary is also accepted.)


2. M Cambon makes a statement explaining the findings of the Committee on Czechoslovak affairs. He points out that the administrative boundary between Austria and Bohemia has been followed almost throughout. There are two small deviations. Firstly, at Gmund, the railway junction of which is to be left within Czechoslovakia. This junction is situated at some 4 kilometres from the town and is the junction of the two main lines serving Bohemia. The second deviation is near Feldsberg, at the join of the rivers Thaya and Morava. These two streams are the main arteries of Moravia and give access to the Danube. The line has therefore been drawn in such a way as to give the stream to Czechoslovakia, while the railway parallel with the stream which was necessary to Vienna is left within Austria.

M Clemenceau asks whether any objections are raised to the solution proposed by the Committee.

(No objections are raised, and the frontier proposed by the Committee is adopted.)


3. President Wilson points out that it will be necessary to specify the frontier between Austria and Hungary in the Treaty with the former. He reminds the Meeting that it had been decided to set up a Commission to investigate this matter in order to prepare the Conference for the raising of the question by either of the parties interested. He is informed that the Austrians will raise the question, and that the Allied and Associated Powers will be called upon to decide it. He reads the decision recorded in I. C. 182 Para. 1, D,4 and asked whether any nominations have been made.

(No nominations have been made.)

Baron Sonnino asks whether it would not be enough to require Austria to recognize the independence of Hungary, and Hungary that of Austria, without raising the frontier question at all.

President Wilson says that he is informed the Austrians will raise the question.

(After some discussion it is decided that Austria will be required to recognize the frontier of 1867 between Austria and Hungary, and that if any difficulty arises regarding this frontier, the Allied and Associated Powers might if necessary arbitrate.)


4. After a short statement by M Tardieu the frontiers of Hungary, as defined previously, are accepted.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

13th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Greek troops landed at Smyrna.

Estonian army moves on Petrograd.

Canadian troops in a camouflaged artillery position in Northern Russia, participating in the Allied intervention against the Communists.


German prisoners tasked with doing reconstruction work in the damaged town of Château-Thierry, France.


The ruins of Rheims Cathedral in France.


Ship Losses:

Premier (United States) During a voyage from Grays Harbor, Washington, to Ugashik, Territory of Alaska, with ten crewmen and a cargo of 426 tons of lumber and salt on board, the 307.69-gross register ton, 141.7-foot (43.2 m) schooner was wrecked without loss of life at Cape Lutke on Unimak Island in the Aleutian Islands, about 18 nautical miles (33 km; 21 mi) east of Scotch Cap Light, during a snowstorm. The steamer Kvichak ( United States) rescued all on board, but Premier was pounded to pieces as the surf broke over her and became a total loss.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, May 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. M Clemenceau says that three of the German Plenipotentiaries have left for Berlin, saying that they will not sign, but Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, according to his information, said there was no way of avoiding it.

Mr Lloyd George draws attention to the speech by Scheidemann, reported in the French newspapers, from which, however, he says it is difficult to draw a conclusion as to whether he intended to sign or not.


2. President Wilson says that he has invited his experts to make a further study of the Italian claims. A proposal has been put before him, which he thinks will, at any rate, be acceptable to the Yugoslavs, and which is based on the idea of a plebiscite all down the Dalmatian Coast. He then produces some suggestions for the solution of Adriatic problems, which he understands emanated from the British Delegation. It so happens that their line, drawn quite independently, corresponds very closely to the line drawn by the United States experts. He then explains on a map the line proposed by the United States experts, the principal features of which (so far as can be gathered) are a departure from the Treaty of London in favour of the Italians in the region of the Sexten Valley; the proposal being to straighten the line and avoid a curve, thus closing up the only open valley through the Alps; the allocation of the railway junction of Villach to Austria, of Tarvis to the Italians, and of Assling to the Yugoslavs. The line continues thence along the crest of the mountains across the Istrian Peninsula, differing from the Italian claim; which takes in the southern slope of the mountains. The Treaty of London, President Wilson continues, had laid down that the line should be drawn along the point where the rivers flow eastward. As a matter of fact, they flow underground in this region, and the Italians drew the line at where the rivers emerged from underground. For this area between the line of the crest and the line of the outflow of the rivers, the United States experts proposed a plebiscite. In order to surmount the objection that the island of Cherso in Italian hands would strangle the Port of Fiume, the United States experts proposed that this island should be Yugoslav, but that a group of islands south of it, which they stated were ethnologically Italian, should go to the Italians. In the portion of Dalmatia claimed by Italy, they proposed that a plebiscite should be held on the understanding that any part should be Italian that declared in favour of Italy They proposed further, that a plebiscite should be held at Fiume, the population of Fiume being told that they would only assume Italian nationality after Italy had constructed an efficient port in Buccari, which is a good port a few miles to the southward of Fiume, rather enclosed by mountains.

Mr Lloyd George says that would settle the question of Fiume, as they would never create a rival port so close.

President Wilson, continuing, says there is some reason to believe that the capitalists who control shipping want to kill Fiume as a port. He does not see how the Italians could decline so favorable a plebiscite as one in which parts could elect to become Italian. His object is to find a formula by which a decision could be postponed and put into another process than the present Peace Conference.

M Clemenceau says he would like to find a formula also, but he is not sure of this plan. He thinks the Italians would agree to accept Zara and Sebenico without the islands, but the Yugoslavs want the islands above all.

President Wilson says that the decision from which he cannot depart is that the Conference has no right to hand over people to a sovereignty they do not wish. If, by hook or by crook the Italians obtain Fiume, how are the British and French then bound to give them Dalmatia?

Mr Lloyd George says that if the Italians obtain Fiume, the British and French are entitled definitely to say that they must give up Dalmatia.

President Wilson says the difficulty is that public opinion in Italy is far more inflamed about Fiume than about Dalmatia. He reads an interesting document, giving both the Yugoslav and the Italian version of the declaration made at Fiume in favor of annexation to Italy. From both accounts, it is clear that it is not general popular demand, but merely a declaration formed by a group of private persons, who, according to the Italian account, did get some kind of a meeting to endorse it. His view is that if Fiume is allowed to become Italian after the creation by Italy of an efficient Croatian port at Buccari, the Treaty of London would no longer be binding.

Mr Lloyd George describes a conversation he had with the Aga Khan, the head of an Indian Mohammedan sect, a man of immense wealth and vast knowledge. In the course of the conversation, the Aga Khan had said that the mistake made in the Treaty of Peace with Germany was in the handing over of so many Germans to the Poles, whom they regarded as an inferior race. He had also said that he knew Fiume well, and that it was in all respects an Italian town.

President Wilson says he has been informed by an American officer, who is thoroughly sympathetic to the Italians, that if he were in the place of the Italian Government and secured Fiume, the first thing he would do would be to clear out the so-called Italians and replace them with real Italians. They were like citizens of other countries, who had long resided abroad and had lost the real qualities of their nationality.

Mr Lloyd George says he wishes to explain the conception he has formed of the Italian case, which he thinks has never been quite understood. Italy has a good deal of national pride. The feelings they have spring not merely from their treatment in regard to Fiume, but over the whole field of the Treaty of Peace. They are not being treated quite as a great first class power. In fact, not quite as equals of the other great Powers. They realize that there are a certain number of backward people to be taken in hand by more efficient nations. They know the question has arisen, for example, as to whether the United States could take in hand certain parts of Turkey, an onerous and difficult task. No one however, was asking Italy to undertake this burden. Consequently, their pride of race was hurt. They know that the Japanese are being allowed to accept a mandate in the Pacific, but no one was saying to Italy “will you not take this backward people in hand.” It would be much better to settle the question of Fiume in this sort of atmosphere. The principal Allied and Associated Powers are the real trustees of the League of Nations looking after the backward races, and for a long time they will remain the trustees of the League of Nations.

(President Wilson agrees.)

We were saying to Turkey “we cannot leave you to run alone any longer; you have got into a rut; and you will remain in it until some big country comes along and pulls you out.” Gaul and Britain would have remained in such a rut if Rome had not come along and pulled them out. Asia Minor is now in exactly the same situation. The question now arises as to whether Italy should not be asked to take charge. The Italians, he points out, are an extremely gifted race. It is curious in this war how they have developed some of the qualities for which the Romans had been famous. For example, they are amazingly good engineers and had created the most wonderful roads.

President Wilson agrees that it was marvelous how they have maintained the war in the mountains.

Mr Lloyd George, continuing, says that this shows what gifts the Italian people have. Italy is a very poor country. It contains no coal and no iron. Yet it had produced a vigorous and manly race.

M Clemenceau refers to the remarkable emigration from Italy to the two Americas.

Mr Lloyd George says he has been trying to give his colleagues a picture of what is in his mind. Why should we not say frankly to the Italians “we have not quite worked you into the picture yet.” He thinks that the Italians have been underrated. Consider, for example, the question of police. The Greeks had asked the British Government to organize the police forces for them in the towns, and he believed that they were right, because the British are very good police. In the mountains, however, the Greeks have not gone to the British Government, but to the Italians for police. In Asia Minor, the Italian police would be working under conditions similar to those that had once prevailed in Italy, which had been infested with bandits. He is not proposing that Italy should be offered a mandate for the whole of Anatolia, but why, he asks, should they not be invited to police, and develop a part of Anatolia, where they will find a country not dissimilar from their own. He understands that inland there are great patches of desert, but they contain lakes, and, as in Mesopotamia, there are possibilities of irrigation. He is told that before the war, Italian emigration had been as great as 800,000 to 900,000 a year. Why should these not be diverted to Turkey, which had not the population to develop Anatolia. He feels that the whole frame of mind of the Italian representatives would change if the questions could be discussed as a whole. There is Somaliland. He knows there are difficulties in regard to this. Directly the question was raised, the French said they could not live without Djibouti, and the British said much the same. Turning to M Clemenceau, he says that if France could not give up something here, neither could we. He thought, however, something might be done here. The British experts claim that there are coal and oil, but Great Britain had plenty of coal and oil elsewhere. Moreover, there is a difficulty about Aden, which is dependent on Somaliland for its supplies of fresh vegetables and food. To this he had replied, that the Italians would probably produce far more food than anyone else.

President Wilson agrees that Mr Lloyd George has stated the case on right principles. He would like, however, to set out the plan in parts. Considering first the part of Anatolia, which needs supervision, he would like Smyrna and the adjacent district, as proposed in the report of the Greek Commission, to be united to Greece, in complete sovereignty. The same would apply to the Dodecanese. In addition, he would like to give Greece a mandate for the remainder of the territory claimed by Mr Venizelos.

(Mr Lloyd George at this point leaves the room to fetch a map.)

President Wilson explains his proposals on the map.

Mr Lloyd George then makes a suggestion on the following lines. The United States should take a mandate for Armenia; France should take a mandate for Northern Anatolia; Italy for Southern Anatolia; and Greece should be dealt with as proposed by President Wilson. The United States, he earnestly hopes, would also take a mandate for Constantinople.

President Wilson says he cannot settle this question until he has returned to the United States and definitely ascertained whether the United States would accept a mandate. He reminds his colleagues that it has been represented to him that certain influential and important elements in Turkey are very anxious that Turkey should not be divided, but that it must be subjected to guidance. There should be a single mandate for the whole. The principle is the same as that which he has contended in the case of the Arabs, namely, that the mandate should not be divided. He feels there was much to be said for this proposal.

Mr Lloyd George says that he does not think this can be done in practice.

President Wilson says that his idea is that the southern parts of Anatolia should be economically developed, involving a question of administration. In northern Anatolia, however, the mandate should be limited to advice and guidance.

M Clemenceau says that to be frank it is not so easy to distinguish between a mandate for development and administration, and a mandate for mere guidance.

President Wilson thinks there is a great difference between guidance and administration.

Mr Lloyd George then turns to the map of Anatolia. He points out that there is no very convenient port in the Italian sphere, and he urges it would be necessary to give them part of Makri.

President Wilson says it will be easy to draw the line so as to leave Makri to the Italians. He again repeats that he thinks the Greeks ought to have a mandate outside the purely Greek zone. He feels that the whole district included in the western slope of the mountains should be treated as one geographical unit, and ought not to be divided.

Mr Lloyd George says he understands the Italians attach importance to including Scala Nuova.

Sir Maurice Hankey, in reply to a question by Mr Lloyd George, says he has visited Ephesus, which was a short distance inland from Scala Nuova, and has also anchored in the Bay of Scala Nuova in a battleship. His recollection of it is a flat, alluvial plain, where the sea has receded, low-lying, with slight undulations, surrounded by hills. There is a railway, as well as a road, running from Ephesus to Smyrna, but he can recall no road across the plain, which is only traversed by mules. The population is scanty, and so far as he can remember, the villages are miserable collections of hovels, inhabited by Turks, although the hotels and better class people are Greek.

President Wilson says that the Greeks have hitherto never been taken, as it were, into the family of nations. He thinks that if they are given what Mr Venizelos had claimed - which he states very frankly, and with great ability - he fee;s that a new spirit would be put into the Greek nation. He feels that under leaders such as Venizelos they might make a success. It is, he thinks, true of nations as of men, that when given a big job, they will rise to the occasion.

Mr Lloyd George points out that they are very good traders in all parts of the world.

President Wilson says it would add a good deal if some cession could be made to the Italians in Somaliland.

Mr Lloyd George says that he personally would like to add Cyprus to Greece, although there are considerable difficulties. He thinks that such an act would deprive the whole transaction of any atmosphere of “grab”.

President Wilson says it would be great thing if Mr Lloyd George could accomplish that.

Mr Lloyd George says that of course the Turks have a right to be in Turkey, but they have no right to make it a wilderness.

President Wilson says that people who know the Turks well say that the body of the population are really docile people. They are all right so long as they are not put in authority. Under the guidance of a friendly power they might prove a docile people.

M Clemenceau agrees, but says he is very anxious not to cheat anyone out of what belongs to him.

President Wilson says that his conception of a mandatory for Turkey is a guide, but a guide which must be obeyed. If advice is rejected, it might be necessary to exercise pressure. Normally, the position should be one of guiding.

M Clemenceau said that the United States will not have an easy task in Armenia.

President Wilson says he has at the present moment before him reports on affairs in Armenia of such an appalling nature that he finds it difficult to read them.

M Clemenceau says that the first thing to be done is to decide what is to be allotted to Italy.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether the Turks will stand the Italians as mandatories. The Italians, he thinks, are a more efficient executive race than the Greeks, and always have been in history. The Greeks have had more ideas, but the Romans had been the superior executive nation.

President Wilson says that he is rather anxious about putting a superior executive race as mandatory round the Greeks at Smyrna. The effect might be ruinous.

M Clemenceau says a decision ought to be taken about Scala Nuova.

Mr Lloyd George undertakes to make inquiries about the possibilities of creating a port at Makri. He asks M Clemenceau to make inquiries also. If no port can be constructed at Makri, it might be necessary to give the Italians Mersina. What the Italians want is Heraclea, where there are some coal mines. Italy has no coal and no fuel. He understands that the Italians will be satisfied if, as part of their reparation from Germany, they can receive the German shares in the mines of Heraclea and Zunguldak. He asked M Clemenceau to consider this.

M Clemenceau undertakes to do so.

President Wilson asks if Mr Lloyd George can draw up a complete picture of the settlement.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that this would be the best plan. If President Wilson will draw up a scheme for Dalmatia, he will draw up a scheme for Asia Minor.

President Wilson says his idea is that if the Italians should get Fiume under the plebiscite he had proposed that they should surrender all claims to Dalmatia and the islands, except one group of islands inhabited by Italians South of Cherso, and the island of Lissa. The getting of Fiume will depend upon the Italians consenting to restrict the boundary to the crest of the mountains on the Istrian Peninsula. He asks if his proposal for a Greek mandate over the territory in the hinterland of the Smyrna region to be assigned to the Greeks, is acceptable.

Mr Lloyd George says his only fear was that the Mohammedan population is a very fierce one, and he doubted if the Greeks can handle it.

M Clemenceau says that in Crete a very strange thing has happened. Although there can be seen in Crete any number of Greek villages which had been destroyed by the Turks, and of Turkish villages destroyed by the Greeks in the past, when he had visited Candia he had been received by a Turkish mayor who was on the best of terms with the Greeks, and the two populations seemed to live in accord.

(Mr H. Nicolson [Harold Nicolson, assistant to the British representative, Sir Byre Crowe, on the Commission on Greek and Albanian Affairs] is introduced.)

Mr Lloyd George tells Mr Nicolson he has been invited in to hear the general lines of the proposals that have been made, in order that he might draft a proposition in regard to them.

President Wilson explains that his proposal is to unite to Greece in full sovereignty Smyrna and the surrounding district, as proposed in the report of the Greek Commission (as subsequently modified by agreement between the British and American experts so as to exclude the valley of the Meander and the country South of it), and in addition to give Greece a mandate over the larger area claimed by Mr Venizelos. Mr Lloyd George, however, has suggested that in order to give the Italians a harbor, the line should be drawn so as to leave Makri to them. The Dodecanese should be united to Greece in full sovereignty. Italy should have a mandate for the remainder of the Southern part of Anatolia, for which the Council would be glad if Mr Nicolson could draw a line on an economic basis.

Mr Nicolson, referring to a line drawn on the map which Mr Lloyd George has produced, says that this had only been very hastily drawn, and he could no doubt find a more logical basis if given a little more time. This line had been drawn so as to exclude the Baghdad railway from the Italian zone.

Mr Lloyd George says there is no reason to exclude the railway, because in any event the railway will have to pass through the territory included in several mandates, and arrangements would have to be made for it to become an international line.

(Mr Nicolson withdraws.)

President Wilson says that the Italians have always asked for a comprehensive proposal. He hopes, therefore, that the result of the present meeting will be to produce one. It will be a great advantage if something could also be said about Somaliland. He proposes that M Clemenceau should see M Simon, and that the French should take the initiative in some proposal.

M Clemenceau undertakes to see M Simon on the subject.

Mr Lloyd George repeats the objections which the British Colonial experts have to the cession of Somaliland.


3. (It is agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to consider and make recommendations in regard to the territorial boundaries of Bulgaria. They should be authorized to consult the representatives in Paris of the various nations concerned in this settlement.)


4. M Clemenceau hands round a letter from Count Brockdorff-Rantzau on the subject of Prisoners of War, together with a draft reply.


5. (It is agreed that the Indian Delegation should be heard in regard to Constantinople at the end of the present week.)

Hearing of the Indian Delegation Mr Lloyd George undertakes to endeavor to find someone who can state the Mohammedan case in regard to Constantinople in addition to the statement by the Maharajah of Bikaner and Lord Sinha. He thinks possibly some Mohammedan expert might be attached to the Indian Delegation.


6. Sir Maurice Hankey hands to M Clemenceau a communication from the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference enclosing a copy of a letter addressed by M. Pachitch to M Clemenceau, requesting that two milliards of francs out of the 20 milliards required from Germany as an installment in respect of reparation for damage should be allotted to Serbia.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Serbia is acquiring very large new territories.

(It is agreed that the question should be referred in the first instance to the Committee considering the question of Reparation in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.)


7. (It was agreed that on the following day the Council should meet the principal Members of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, in order to discuss and Railways the clauses prepared by them for the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.)


8. Mr Lloyd George asks whether the Turks are to be invited to Paris, or whether they should be met somewhere else.

President Wilson says that as only some of the Allied and Associated Powers had been at war with Turkey, it might be better to agree on terms and then send a Commission to meet the Turks. His own position in the matter is that as a member of the League of Nations, the United States will have to guarantee the arrangement.

Mr Lloyd George says that their position is a good deal more than that, since he hopes the United States will accept the Mandate.

(It is agreed that in view of the pressure of work on the Drafting Committee, the Treaty with Turkey should not be put in hand just yet.)

[Jimbuna]

14th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Austrian delegates arrive in Paris.

German protest-Note against economic terms received.

Nurse Cavell's body brought to England; and buried after services in London, etc., 15th.

Afghans falsely sue for peace.

German demonstrators passing Hotel Adlon where Allied Missions were staying during a demonstration against peace terms. Berlin, 14 May 1919. Note a banner carried by members of the German National Youth League (Deutschnationaler Jugendbund).


Dining Hall at Fulham Palace. Fulham Palace was formerly the principal residence of the Bishop of London. During WWl the palace formed part of Fulham military hospital. It is now a museum. Photo by Sister Mary Latchmore, one of the nurses at the hospital.


Henry J. Heinz, founder of the American food processing company Heinz, has passed away.

[Jimbuna]

15th May 1919

Aftermath of War

British enter Afghanistan.

General Kolchak's army falls back.

Germans protest in Berlin in front of the Reichstag against the harsh clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.


Greek troops land in Smyrna (İzmir, Turkey) to begin occupation of parts of the Ottoman Empire:.


Reinterred: British nurse Edith Cavell, whose body was brought back to Britain from Belgium where she was executed during the war.


Ship Losses:

Derband (Soviet Union) Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The schooner was sunk by gunfire by the auxiliary cruisers HMS Kruger and HMS Emile Nobel (both Royal Navy) in the Caspian Sea.
Useyn Abdad (Soviet Union) Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The schooner was sunk by gunfire by the auxiliary cruisers HMS Kruger and HMS Emile Nobel (both Royal Navy) in the Caspian Sea.

[Jimbuna]

16th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Mr. Asquith answers Lord French (re: supersession by Lord Kitchener).

British drive back Afghans.

Greek troops escorting Turkish prisoners in Smyrna. Looting by Greek troops and minor clashes occur as Greek forces land in Anatolia.


British officers conferring decoration for bravery upon soldiers of the Polish Murmansk Battalion, 16 May 1919. Note a boy-soldier amongst decorated troops.


30,000 workers in Winnipeg, Canada go on strike to protest working conditions in one of the largest general strikes in the country’s history.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. The Council has before it a letter from the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways, notifying the amendments necessary in their text to render it suitable for inclusion in the Treaty with Austria.

S Crespi, as President of the Commission, reports that, as the Commission has drawn up one text envisaging the enemy countries as a whole, their present letter is solely confined to notifying the alterations necessary to apply that text to Austria. No questions of principle have arisen and no new proposals are put forward.


2. On behalf of the Italian Delegation, however, he desires to delete in Article 61a (now Article 42) the reference to Article 45 (now Article 26) relating to the regime of railway Railway Regime tariffs as regards traffic to Adriatic and Black Sea Ports. By including this paragraph in Article 61a it is subjected to the possibility of revision, or reciprocity, after five years; but as Italy already gave reciprocity, the Italian Delegation thinks that the matter can be settled immediately and finally.

S de Martino explains that the Clause (last paragraph of Article 45) has no political bearing and is irrespective of the fate of the Adriatic ports in question. Before the war there existed a regime of tariffs which favored Austrian and Hungarian ports on the Adriatic as compared with German, etc., ports. Now in place of Austria as the hinterland to those ports there will be a variety of States, and unless the pre-war arrangements as a whole are maintained there will be a state of anarchy as regards railway rates, etc., which Germany will doubtless be able to utilize for her benefit. It is to prevent this that the Italians have suggested the clause in question which would maintain a pre-war tariff system. It does not fix the rates of freight, but merely the existing railway arrangements as a whole. If this is to be revised after five years the results would be deplorable to the States owning the Adriatic ports. The clause is of benefit to the whole of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy; and as Italy formally declares that she is ready to give reciprocity in the matter she desires that the possibility of revision after five years should be avoided.

Mr Lloyd George understands that the intention of the Italian Delegate is to make the clause (last paragraph of Article 45) permanent.

President Wilson draws attention to Article 61 (now Article 41) under which the Council of the League of Nations can recommend the revision of any clauses relating to a permanent administrative regime. It does not, however, appear to him that this will affect the matter since a railway tariff regime can in all probability not be considered as a permanent administrative regime. He sees no danger to Italy for the possible reconsideration after five years.

Mr Lloyd George agrees. He thinks it will be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain pre-war rates for more than five years, even if they could be maintained as long. Railway wages had doubled and increases in other costs would of necessity involve increases of railway rates unless the railways were to become bankrupt.

S de Martino says that they do not want to fix the rates of railway tariffs but only to keep the system as a whole in being. It is a matter of proportion.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that in practice the establishment of proportion would be very difficult.

He says that the British Delegation on the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways has gone into the matter very carefully and that they would never have agreed to this if they had thought that it was going to be permanent.

Mr Hudson says the American Delegation on the Commission had similarly only accepted the Italian proposal on the understanding that there was a time-limit.

S Claveille is entirely in favor of the inclusion of Article 45 (now Article 26) in the Treaty. He points out that railway rates are of three kinds:

1) General tariffs.

2) Special tariffs.

3) Export tariffs.

The object of the Italian proposal is that the proportion which the second and third categories bore to the first should be maintained for the traffic in question, and he thinks this should be a fairly simple matter. He pointed out, however, that Article 61a (Article 42) does not mean that the clause will be revised after five years. It simply means that the clause would in any case remain in force for five years and that after that time it would be revised only if the Council of the League of Nations thinks fit. As Italy is ready to accept reciprocity he does not think they would risk losing anything by allowing the reference to remain.

S Orlando suggests that in the interests of the stability of trade the period should be extended from five to ten years.

President Wilson emphasizes that the clauses as they stand only provide for the possible revision by the League after five years. Inasmuch as Italy would be in the League of Nations he thinks their position is abundantly safeguarded.

In view of these explanations
S Orlando withdraws the Italian proposal.


3. Mr Lloyd George wishes to raise a question of principle. Austria and Hungary now become land-locked States without access to the sea. They had just been discussing provisions suggested by the Commission to protect Trieste, etc., against attempts on the part of Austria or Hungary artificially to divert traffic from them. He wants to know whether there is any protection at all for Austria and Hungary as regards their access to the sea being cut off by artificial means. They have a right to get to the sea and he would like to know whether that was safeguarded in the Commission’s suggested clauses.

S Claveille said that in the Commission’s clauses there is no such guarantee, but this will be given by the General Convention which the Commission had been instructed by the Supreme Council to prepare. Enemy States agreed beforehand in the Treaties to accept this Convention, so that the general rights thereby conferred would apply to Austria and Hungary. He agrees that such countries should not be cut off from the sea and thinks that access is not only in the interests of those countries but of the ports through which their commerce would be carried on.

S Orlando agrees that guarantees must be given to the countries concerned.

President Wilson understands that there is a possibility of the General Conventions not being pressed on with.

Mr Lloyd George agrees. The Conventions might take many months to draw up and even longer to come into force. The Peace Treaty is, however, to be signed very shortly, and the matter now under consideration is one which affects the very life of the countries. They must have access to the sea; and as matters stand at present they have no guarantee that if they have some trivial dispute with the surrounding countries those countries might not cut them off. To refer them to a General Convention in the present indefinite conditions was not a satisfactory solution. He proposes that a clause should be inserted in the Treaty and that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways should be left to produce a suitable wording.

President Wilson agrees.

(This proposal is accepted, and the Supreme Council nominates the following as a Committee to prepare a suitable article:

United States of America: Dr Hudson.

British Empire: Sir H. Llewellyn Smith.

Italy: S Crespi.

France: M Claveille.


4. The Supreme Council accepted the articles for inclusion in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties as submitted by the Commission, it being understood that the alterations made by the Supreme Council in the Articles submitted for the Treaty with Germany should also be made in the Articles for the Treaties with Austria and Hungary so far as they are applicable.


5. The following resolution, embodying the results of the meeting were initialed or signed, as shown below, for communication to the Drafting Committee.

The Supreme Council of the Allies, at a meeting at 11.00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 14th, accepted the clauses regarding Ports, Waterways and Railways, recommended by the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways, for inclusion in the Austrian Treaty, subject to the retention in Article 61a (now Article 42) of the reference to Article 45 (now Article 26) and to the inclusion of a new article safeguarding the right of Austria (and eventually Hungary) of access to the Sea. The drafting of this new article was entrusted to a small Committee nominated at the Meeting.

It is also decided that the alterations made by the Supreme Council in the Articles submitted for the Treaty with Germany should also be made in the Articles for the Treaty with Austria, so far as they are applicable.

W. W.
D. Ll. G.
G. C.
Orlando