100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

16th April 1919

Canadian troops leave Southampton, England to return home on the S.S. Olympic (sister ship to the RMS Titanic and HMHS Britannic).


Save the Children Fund is established in London by Eglantyne Jebb (pictured) and her sister Dorothy Buxton to alleviate the starvation of children in Germany and former Austria-Hungary, which are still under Allied blockade.


Following a general strike in Limerick, Ireland in protest against British military rule, labour leaders of the city declare itself a soviet and free of British control. Members of the Limerick Soviet.


Ship Losses:

Lusitania (Portugal) The schooner caught fire off Cemaes Head, Cardiganshire. Her crew was rescued by Elizabeth Austin (Royal National Lifeboat Institution).

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:00

Combined Meeting


1. M Clemenceau announces that the Meeting has been called in order to bring together the Council of Four (Leaders) and the Council of Five (Foreign Ministers). It is proposed that the work done separately should be examined in common. His first request, therefore, is that the Council of Five should report what they have accomplished and what still remains to be done. He asks Baron Sonnino if he would make a statement on this subject.

Baron Sonnino says that on the previous day they had discussed some eleven items, the bulk of which had been remitted to the Drafting Committee, which is to meet today at 17:00 hours. The Council of Foreign Ministers is to meet again on Thursday the 17th to deliberate on the drafts submitted by the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee are charged with the task of coordinating proposals made by Great Britain and by the United States. In other words, to reconcile the two drafts suggested.

M. Clemenceau asks on what subjects the discussion had taken place.

Baron Sonnino says that the subjects dealt with were:
Opium.
Belgium.
The Suez Canal and Egypt.
An Article requiring from Germany a general renunciation of rights outside Europe, which ware to be surrendered to the trusteeship of the Five Powers.
Reference was made to the Drafting Committee with the object of insuring that the whole ground was being covered.

Baron Sonnino says that another question discussed had been the upkeep of the Army of Occupation in Germany. On this subject, General Weygand had made certain explanations revealing a difference of opinion in calculating the expenses involved in maintaining these forces. Two theses had been put forward and these had been referred to the Council of Four.

Mr Lansing says that he had been under the impression that this had been referred to the Economic Council. M Dutasta replies that the reference had been to the Council of Four. Mr Balfour says that if this is so then the matter should be dealt with.


2. Baron Sonnino says that two methods of calculating the cost had been mentioned:
1) The actual expenses of food, housing etc.
2) More general expenses.
Not having taken part in the discussion he is unable to be more specific.

President Wilson says that presumably the latter category includes expenses of army administration as separate from the cost of the actual maintenance in the occupied districts.

Mr Lansing comments that on the March 8th General Pershing had addressed a written inquiry to Marshal Foch. No answer has been returned. The United States of America are, therefore, somewhat embarrassed in giving an opinion on this subject.

M Clemenceau says that when the documents relating to the subject were before the Meeting, it would be possible to form an opinion or to remit them to some Committee.

Baron Sonnino says that General Weygand is in a position to state the case fully. President Wilson notes that if General Weygand were called, he could only re-state the question and not offer a solution. He would suggest that the Military Advisers at Versailles be asked to define what was understood by “cost of military occupation.” Baron Sonnino remarks that there are differences of opinion among military authorities. President Wilson says that it is desirable to have these differences of opinion laid before the Council.

Mr Balfour draws attention to the divergent views held by the various delegates at Spa. President Wilson asks that a digest of these various views should be prepared and laid before the Council. Mr Balfour agrees that what is required is a brief narrative fitted for civilian understanding. The Council of Four will then be able to reach a decision.

Baron Sonnino says that the whole discussion had been raised by a question put by the German General von Hammerstein asking for a definition of what was the cost of maintaining a man and a horse in occupied territory.

President Wilson suggests that the correspondence that had taken place at Spa should be referred to the Military Advisers at Versailles in order that a digest should be prepared of the various opinions. Baron Sonnino says that he does not disagree, but he thinks it right to warn the Council that military opinion is divided as to what should be reckoned in the account.

(It is then decided to remit to the Military Advisers of the Supreme War Council at Versailles the drafting of the various points of view regarding the estimation of the cost of upkeep of the Forces of Occupation in Germany).

Baron Sonnino observes that the cost of upkeep of the Armies of Occupation previous to the signature of Peace is distinct from that of a continuance of occupation after Peace. President Wilson says that should any occupation subsequent to the signature of Peace be provided for, the same definition and the same interpretation could be adhered to as in the case of occupation previous to Peace.


3. Mr. Balfour draws attention to Item 6 on the Agenda for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers on the previous day, referring to the Secret Processes for the Manufacture of Gas. There were two amendments before the Meeting. One had been adopted, and the other had been referred to the Council of Four. He suggested that the matter be explained by someone who had been present at the Meeting on the previous day.

Mr Lansing says that the difficulty was in regard to exacting from the Germans the disclosure of their secret processes for the manufacture of ingredients for the inhuman conduct of war. As the Allies in another provision had prohibited the manufacture of such things, he regards the suggested amendment as unnecessary. Further he believed that the disclosure of these secrets would add nothing to the military power of the Allies, who already possessed the secret of making even more dangerous gases than Germany. On the other hand, the revelation of these secrets would be of great economic advantage to Allied industries in that the dye making processes would be revealed at the same time. He believes that this motive very likely is connected with the proposal.

Mr Balfour says that the Military Authorities attached great importance to this question. Their opinions are based on military considerations, and they are in no manner concerned with any ambition to obtain industrial secrets. In their memorandum on the subject they took care to state that the dye process was quite divorced from the purpose they had in view. What they required was a purely military piece of knowledge. He does not claim to understand or to estimate the value of this knowledge but he was convinced that the Military Experts attached great importance to it.

Mr Lansing says that the American Military Experts does not attach any value to it.

Baron Sonnino pointed out that the British proposal demands the surrender of all chemical processes out of which gases had been or could be made, and for the production of all substances from which gases or other destructive agencies could be produced. This definition is so wide that it is bound to cover the revelation of the secrets of dye making.

President Wilson says that he believes this is not the object of the framers of the proposal.

Mr Balfour points out that an effective gas mask cannot be made without knowledge of the gas which it was to contend with.

President Wilson says that whatever weight might be given to the military opinion on this matter it is certain that many people other than military experts are interested in the revelation of these secrets. There was a further difficulty. However much the Allies might demand the revelation of secrets, they will never be certain that they possess them all.

Baron Sonnino agrees that the Germans might reveal their second best secrets, but will probably succeed in keeping their best ones.

President Wilson says that they will certainly not reveal their new ones.



4. M Clemenceau raises the question of the Kiel Canal. A document has been submitted to the Council of Four as being a unanimous report of a Commission on this subject. On examination, the report has proved to be an old report, previously dismissed. It had come up again unamended. He had telephoned to the Secretary of the Naval Committee, who had replied that he knew nothing of it.

President Wilson explains that there is unanimity on this subject in the Waterways Commission, which had referred the report back to the Council.

M Clemenceau observes that the question has a military side, on which naval authorities should be called upon to state their views.

President Wilson suggests that the naval authorities might sit in combined session with the Waterways Commission.

(It is decided to refer the question of the Kiel Canal to a Joint Session of Naval Experts, and of the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways & Railways.)


5. Baron Sonnino says that two drafts have been proposed on the subject of the validity of Prize Court Decisions. The British draft proposes a clause to be inserted in the treaty stipulating that the validity of Allied Prize Court decisions should not be challenged by the enemy. The American draft proposes, in addition, that the Allies should have the power to invalidate similar decisions taken by German Prize Courts. Both these drafts have been remitted to the Drafting Committee to be fused into one clause. The American draft also contains an additional paragraph, on which he understands the American Delegates did not insist.

Mr Lansing remarks that the United States did not insist on the form, but wished the substance to be preserved. The reason for this was that Prize Courts in America had ceased to function at the armistice. Nevertheless, the United States wished to maintain certain seizures made subsequently, and therefore without Prize Court decisions.


7. M Clemenceau says that a resolution has been adopted regarding responsibilities, and it has been considered right that Belgium should undertake the prosecution. This had been agreed, he thought, with the consent of M Hymans. He had heard since that the President of the Belgian Council had come to Paris, and was prepared to refuse his consent to this proposal. As representative of a monarchical State he holds the view that Belgium cannot take the lead in prosecuting a monarch.

President Wilson says that he does not think this obstacle insurmountable. The essential point is that the Kaiser is to be tried for a high misdemeanor, which might not legally amount to a crime, namely for violating the neutrality of Belgium. If Belgium refused to be prosecutrix she will not refuse to be witness. He further pointed out that in the draft adopted, Belgium had not been specifically set down as prosecutrix.

M Clemenceau said that if that was so, he did not wish to press the point any further.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

[Jimbuna]

17th April 1919

An American guardhouse in occupied Neuwied, Germany with German children looking at a Victory Liberty Loan poster.


Steamship Belfast misses a bascule bridge in Massachusetts and crashes.


Ship Losses:

USS Freehold (United States Navy) The minesweeping tug was sunk in New York Harbor while assisting with the docking of RMS Saxonia ( United Kingdom) with the loss of a crew member. She was later raised, repaired and returned to service.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, April 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


1. M Pichon hands out copies of the Article from the Drafting Committee demanding that Germany sign the Opium Convention of 1912. M Fromageot says that the Committee was unable to agree to the American proposal that all Allied and Associated Nations also be required to sign the Convention. He explains that the Committee feels that this has no place in a Peace Treaty between the Allies and Germany, and that it should be handled separately among the Allied Powers.

Mr Lansing points out that the Opium Convention was signed more than seven years ago, and has failed to obtain ratification. He feels that this is the perfect time to put the Convention into effect, and that this would be the best method.

Sir Robert Borden agrees with Mr Lansing in principle, but points out that the Drafting Committee feels that a separate agreement among the Allied Nations is the better course.

M Pichon suggests that the adoption of the Opium Convention should be made a condition of admission to the League of Nations. A clause to this effect could be added to the Treaty.

Mr Lansing objects that this would cause yet another postponement, saying He fails to see that any matter which is for the good of the world is unfitting for a Treaty of Peace.

M Fromageot explains the view taken by the Drafting Committee. An undertaking as between the Allies only appears unsuitable in a document regulating the relations of the Allies and Germany. The Convention, moreover, as between the Allied and Associated Powers was one which could not even remotely affect German interests.

Mr Lansing disagrees, saying he thinks that it is quite right to insert reciprocal agreements in a Treaty of Peace, as well as obligations imposed on the enemy.

Baron Sonnino agrees with Mr Lansing. If the Allied and Associated Powers mean to force Germany to undertake this engagement, there seems no good reason why they should not undertake it among themselves. History contains many examples of reciprocal arrangements included in Treaties.

Sir Robert Borden agrees. He thinks each Power could engage to introduce legislation with the object of ratifying the Convention.

M Pichon suggested that the Drafting Committee be asked to draw up another clause embodying the views of Mr Lansing, Baron Sonnino and Sir Robert Borden.

Mr Lansing said that the advantage of such a clause would be that all Nations signing the Treaty which had not signed the Convention would thereby be compelled to adhere to the latter.

Baron Makino said that he must make the same reservation as he had made previously regarding the time within which ratification was undertaken, as the Japanese legislature meets only in the Spring. It would, therefore, be impossible for Japan to undertake to ratify the Convention within three months. He wished the Drafting Committee to take this into consideration.

Mr Lansing agrees with Baron Makino that nothing should be done to embarrass legislation in the various Allied countries. There should be a reasonable time limit assigned for ratification. He suggests that in this case the term be one year.

(This is agreed to and it is decided that the Drafting Committee should add a paragraph containing the views expressed in this discussion.)


2. A draft Article is introduced which says that the Belgian Treaty of 1839 no longer applies, and that any of the Allied Nations are free to enter into their own Treaties with Belgium.

(This is adopted without discussion.)


3. A Draft Article is presented regarded German General Renunciation of all territorial claims.

Baron Makino asks whether particular questions were reserved.

M Pichon replies that there are reserved questions.

M Fromageot says that the Drafting Committee thought that the general formula proposed would fulfill the desires of the Council. It covered all the rights of Germany in or over Allied and Associated countries, as well as special rights in Colonies and any such countries as Siam, Liberia and Shan Tung. As regards Liberia, Germany would have to sign certain special clauses relating to finance and economic rights. There might be further rights of a special character which were introduced by the last paragraph in the draft article. The paragraph had been put in these terms as the Committee itself did not know exactly what provisions it would have to cover. It had appeared to the Committee, however, that there were many possible contingencies for which a general heading must be found.

Mr Lansing says he is prepared to agree to the proposed article, but suggests that the last paragraph be reserved until it appeared clear that special clauses would be required.

M Pichon points out that certain special clauses would be required in respect to Egypt and Morocco.

Baron Makino says that he must insist on the reservations made by the Japanese Delegation in respect to Shan Tung and Kiau Chau. He has on a previous occasion drawn attention to the fact that Japan claimed all the rights acquired by Germany from China.

Mr Lansing asks whether these rights are claimed by Japan from China or from Germany.

Baron Makino replies that they were claimed from Germany.

Mr Lansing says that in the event of special treatment being required for Shan Tung, he would ask the Japanese Delegation to propose a special clause. Once a precise text was before the meeting, it would be possible to debate on the reservation made.

Baron Makino says that towards the end of January he had presented the Japanese claims in a general statement. He had then declared that the claims would subsequently be introduced into the treaty. He proposes to bring forward a few articles embodying these claims. All he means by recalling his reservations is to give notice that he proposed to put forward these articles.

Mr Lansing suggests that these draft articles be submitted together with the agenda for the next meeting of the Council, in order that time for their consideration before the meeting might be gained. He suggests that a similar course might be followed with regard to Egypt and Morocco.

Baron Makino says that the Japanese statement had been made before the Council of Ten, and that it had been understood that the draft articles for the Treaty of Peace should also be submitted to that Council. In consequence, he thought that it would be right that the Council of Ten and not the present Council should take this matter into consideration.

Mr. Lansing asks whether there is to be another meeting of the Council of Ten.

M Pichon says that the meetings of this Council had become rare and that he had no notice of any future meeting. The procedure proposed, therefore, might delay a decision for a considerable time.

Baron Makino said that he was engaged in certain talks which he thought might lead to an early settlement of the question.

Mr Lansing suggests that the General Renunciation clause be accepted, with the proviso that any Power wishing to put forward special cases should do so as early as possible.

Baron Makino agrees, with the reservation previously stated.

(The General Renunciation Article is then adopted.)


4. Sir Robert Borden asks whether the case of Morocco comes under the general clause.

Baron Sonnino observes that at the previous Meeting it had been pointed out that the transference from the Sultan of Turkey to the British Government of the former’s powers respecting free navigation of the Suez Canal was irrelevant to a Treaty of Peace with Germany. No such objection had been raised to the insertion of a provision relating to the capitulations and to the recognition of a British Protectorate. He now sees in the draft an additional article providing for the transference of all German goods to the Egyptian and Moroccan Governments, respectively, and for the sale by auction in favor of these Governments of private property belonging to German subjects. This was an entirely new provision, and had not appeared in the draft concerning Egypt which had previously been submitted to the Council.

M Fromageot said that the Drafting Committee had not taken upon itself to introduce a new clause. This clause had been adopted in regard to Morocco, and the Committee had taken the view that the same provisions should be made to apply in the case of Egypt. Moreover, the clause was introduced by a proviso that it was subject to any adverse ruling by the Commission on Reparations or by the Economic and Financial Commissions. In so far as the clause affected Morocco he pointed out that the Italian Representative on the Committee had given his consent.

Baron Sonnino said that in his opinion the provision was contrary to all international law.

Mr. Lansing says that it amounts to confiscation of private property and that he objects to this clause.

Sir Robert Borden says that whatever is adopted in regard to Egypt must be subject to the general principle approved by the Economic Commission. He believed that they had taken the view that enemy private property in Allied countries could be liquidated and the proceeds applied to the claims of Allied subjects. The German Government will have to indemnify the victims. Any surplus that might remain after satisfying individual claims would be set off against the general claim against Germany or accounted in the bill for reparation. If this were the general principle there would be no objection to the special article framed regarding Egypt and Morocco.

M Pichon suggests that the article in question be reserved until the Council knows what general principles have been adopted by the Commissions on Reparation and Finance.

Mr Lansing suggests that the article be referred to the Economic and Financial Commissions in order that they should not overlook the point.

Sir Robert Borden says that the general principles adopted by these Commissions would be examined by the Council of Four and then remitted to the Drafting Committee which would then harmonize all the special clauses.

Mr Lansing asks whether Morocco had been at war with Germany.

M Pichon said that as Moroccan troops had fought against Germany it was clear that Morocco had been at war.

Baron Sonnino says that he is not quite sure what decision had been taken by the Economic Commission. He believes that the decision was that each Power might liquidate enemy property within its territory to recoup the losses of its subjects. In other words, liberty was given to each Power to do this if it thought fit in extreme cases. In the article under consideration more than this was stipulated. The Allied and Associated Powers said that in Morocco this was to be done. In consequence, they committed themselves a great deal further than the Commission had recommended. In his view the proceeding suggested was a barbarous one, and he was unwilling to take the responsibility of decreeing in Egypt or Morocco what he would not allow in his own country.

Sir Robert Borden said he quite agreed that nothing should be done in Egypt that was not done in other countries.

Mr Lansing asks whether the stipulation proposed concerns Tangier and the rights possessed by Germans there.

S de Peretti replies in the affirmative. He says that the Moroccan Commission had been unanimous on this point. The private property of Germans there would be dealt with in the same way as German private property in European countries. If the proceeds were assigned to the Governments ordering the sale, the proceeds of the sale of such property in Morocco would accrue to the Shereef Government. If, on the other hand, a general pool were constituted, among the Allies, the proceeds would be included in that pool. The utilization of the proceeds therefore depended on the decision of the Economic and Financial Commissions. He understood that the same procedure would be followed in the United States.

Mr Lansing says that the United States would only hold such property as security and would, if it were unnecessary to hold it, return it to the owners. This procedure had been followed in respect to the Boxers. He objects to the mention of any special category and is of the opinion that the whole subject should be covered by a general clause. Everything concerning the liquidation of private property in Egypt or Morocco should be deleted. The general principles should be determined by the Economic and Financial Commissions.

Sir Robert Borden suggests that the decision of the Council should be that the clauses relating to liquidation of German private property in Egypt and Morocco should be reserved, pending the formulation of a general clause. All the stipulations of the Article should therefore be eliminated.

M de Peretti says that the last paragraph of the article regarding mining rights should be accepted, as there is a Tribunal of Arbitration at work on the subject, the labors of which should not be interrupted.

(It is then decided that the draft articles in question should be sent back to the Drafting Committee for revision in view of the preceding discussion. Article 4 is provisionally eliminated in as far as it related to the liquidation of private property until the general principle on this subject had been formulated.)

M Fromageot points out that the recognition clause which is to be enforced on Germany regarding the Protectorate of Egypt did not ipso facto imply the recognition of that Protectorate by other signatories of the Treaty. A separate convention, therefore, would be necessary to bring about such recognition.


5. Draft Articles Relating to Prize Court Decisions:

M Pichon says that the Drafting Committee is not ready with the draft on this subject.

M Fromageot says that the Committee is faced by difficulties not of form but of substance. The various delegations are not in agreement. Some are of the opinion that past and future decrees of Allied and Associated Prize Courts should be accepted by Germany. Some think that only past decisions should be taken into consideration. It is hardly possible to make a draft until the delegations come to an agreement. Furthermore, some delegations wished to retain seizures made without reference to Prize Courts as security. Other delegations do not agree with this point of view. Some delegations are of the opinion that German Prize Court Decrees should be challenged and made subject to revision by the Five Powers, whatever the nationality of the persons party to the case. This view is not accepted by all. The Committee therefore feels that it would be useless to propose a draft until an agreement has been reached.

Mr Lansing says that the American Delegation wants a clause recognizing the validity of seizures of German ships and cargoes which had not been subjected to Prize Court orders. It would be impossible to obtain orders from Prize Courts relating to such seizures, as, after the cessation of war, American Prize Courts automatically ceased to function. On the other hand, the Government of the United States does not wish such seizures to be invalidated by decrees of German Courts.

Sir Robert Borden says he does not feel he has the authority to accept the American proposal without the consent of the Government of the United Kingdom, as it appears to involve the suppression of Prize Courts immediately after the cessation of war. Referring to the last paragraph of the American proposal Sir Robert Borden observes that the liquidation of those properties would apparently be covered by the general clauses to be framed by the Economic and Financial Commissions.

M Pichon said that he thinks no decision could be taken by the Council on this subject, and suggested that reference be made to a Commission composed of one Naval expert and one jurist from each of the Five Powers. Their report could be subsequently considered by the Council.

Mr Lansing says that he is himself prepared to decide the question immediately. He is willing, however, to postpone the decision until each representative had consulted his own experts.

Baron Sonnino says that Prize questions are so complex that he would prefer that they be referred to a Commission. Mr. Lansing is himself no doubt an expert, and might perhaps consent to be Chairman of the Commission.

M Pichon notes that if each representative consults his own experts, they would at their next meeting face one another with divergent views. It would be far better for the experts to arrive at an agreement before the discussion was resumed at the Council.

Sir Robert Borden says his main concern is that the American proposal, as he understands it, tends to abolish the action of Prize Courts, on the termination of war, in other countries as in the United States.

Sir Robert Borden also points out that it must be decided whether German Prize Court decisions are to be attacked under German law or under International law. There is no objection to subjecting German Prize Court decisions to revision, but the revision should be efficacious if undertaken at all.

M Fromageot observes that should the Conference decide to impugn German Prize Court decisions, it must of necessity appeal to international law. German Prize Courts consistently neglected what they termed the “so-called” international law. They only administered their own domestic regulations. In Allied Prize Courts, if any alternative to international law is followed, in any particular instance, that alternative must be one favorable to the owner of the captured property; failing this, a neutral might appeal to international law from any decree of the Court. It follows, therefore, that any revision of Prize Court orders must be made in accordance with International Law. Should the Conference so decide, the decision would be welcomed by many neutrals whose ships and cargoes had been seized by the Germans and whose subjects had in many cases lost their lives without compensation, as the German Courts had declared the action of the Germans to be justified.

Sir Robert Borden observes that international law was not a code, but is rather a series of agreements between civilized nations. The revision of certain isolated acts of German authority would not be sufficient to enforce on Germany the respect of civilized usages. It would be necessary to go further and declare that Germany must be bound by certain obligations, and a special clause to that effect would have to be inserted in the Treaty.

Mr Lansing says that his proposal covers every form of misconduct on the High Seas. In America, International Law was recognized as a code and applied as such. In principle all are agreed that Germany must be compelled to admit the validity of Prize Court decisions already given in Allied and Associated countries. The question of future decisions remains. Germany might be compelled, if the third paragraph of the American proposal were accepted, to recognize future judgments also. He has already explained the importance of this to America. As to the examination of the German Prize Court procedure it would give an opportunity for probing the crimes committed by Germany at sea.

Sir Robert Borden suggests that the Drafting Committee should make another attempt to draft an Article. He still thinks that the second paragraph of the American proposal was not quite adequate and he suggests that before dealing with the third paragraph the Drafting Committee should inquire how matters stand in the Economic and Financial Commissions.

Mr Lansing observed that if the British view are adopted the third paragraph of the American proposal must also be adopted, otherwise British Prize Courts will continue condemning prizes and obtaining the proceeds, while the United States could not. To such an unequal bargain he could not agree. There was one other possible solution, namely that the United States Congress should pass legislation to extend Prize Court jurisdiction after the cessation of War. This would have to be done before the insertion of the Article in the Treaty. He did not like to ask the Congress to do this as it is against American tradition.

Sir Robert Borden says that he was not authorized at present to accept this.

Mr Lansing then suggests that the Drafting Committee be instructed to make a draft preserving the substance of the third paragraph of the American proposal The result might then be examined.

Sir Robert Borden agrees subject to the reservation he had previously made.

(It is decided that the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft taking into consideration the above discussion.)


6. Article: "From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war into which Germany successively involved the five Allied and Associated Powers and the other belligerent signatory Powers will come to an end.

From that moment and subject to the provisions of this treaty, official relations between these Powers and Germany will recommence."

Baron Sonnino asks why a distinction was made between the “five Allied and Associated Powers” and the “other belligerent signatory Powers”.

M Fromageot says that as the situations of these Powers varies in several respects it is necessary to adopt this somewhat cumbersome formula in every instance in order to avoid misunderstanding.

Mr Lansing says that he has an alternative formula to propose, which says that upon the signing of a Peace Treaty between Germany and any Three of the Allied and Associated powers the State of War will cease between those Powers. Other Nations may then sign separate treaties with Germany.

The point of this is to avoid wasting time waiting for all the Powers involved to agree to the Peace Treaty before any action can be taken.

M Pichon says that he cannot agree to the proposal that three powers alone could pledge the remainder, France is bound by the Pact of London not to conclude a separate peace apart from the other signatories.

Mr Lansing says he wishes to see the operation of peace begin before all the belligerents had furnished ratifications, as this process might take a year or more.

M Pichon suggested that peace might come into operation when the Five great Powers had ratified the Treaty.

Mr Lansing says that this is a matter that should be referred to the Council of Four together with the arguments put forward in the discussion.

Mr Lansing says that the real problem was being avoided. It is said that Peace will begin on the coming into force of the Treaty. How and when the Treaty should come into force has not been determined. The Council of Four has asked the Council of Five to determine when the war would end, and the answer apparently was when the treaty came into force.

At this stage M Pichon is called away from the Meeting.

After a short interval the discussion is resumed.

Mr Lansing says that two proposals were before the meeting, one brief and the other somewhat lengthy. He suggests that the Drafting Committee should attempt to reconcile the two. It is important in any case to assert the responsibility of Germany for the outbreak of the war.

Baron Sonnino says that it was desirable to avoid giving the Germans a pretext for telling the Allies they did not know what they wished them to agree to. Care must be taken in framing the draft to avoid this.

(It is decided to refer the various proposals to the Drafting Committee, in order that an Article be framed in accordance with the tenor of the above discussion.)


7. A Draft Article is presented which binds Germany to accept Peace Treaties between the Allied Powers and Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

It is pointed out by Baron Sonnino that the wording of this Article is somewhat ambiguous.

(Subject to rectification by the Drafting Committee, and to M. Pichon’s acceptance, this Article is accepted.)


8. A Draft Article is presented requiring Germany to accept Treaties between the Allied Powers and Russia, as well as whatever new States my grow out of former Russian lands.

Baron Sonnino says that an expression of opinion is contained in this article regarding Russia, which it might be better not to express.

M Fromageot said that the Drafting Committee had not intended to pre-judge anything concerning Russia. He did not think the form of words employed prejudiced any ultimate decisions.

Baron Sonnino points out certain discrepancies between the French and the English versions of the Article. The French version appears to be the more adequate.

(It is agreed that the English version should be made to harmonize with the French, and, subject to agreement by M Pichon, the Article, as in the French version, is accepted.)

Mr. Lansing proposed that an additional paragraph be added to this article, decreeing the overturning of the treaties made in 1917 and 1918 at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest.

M. Sonnino points out that this has been already attained in the terms of the Armistice.

Mr Lansing remarked that the Armistice will be itself abolished by the Treaty.

Sir Robert Borden says that the Economic Council has framed a clause covering this very question, and refers them to the appropriate Clause.

He asks what effect the abolition of these Treaties would have on the relations of Germany and Russia. Could the abrogation of a Treaty between two parties at the instance of third parties bring about a state of war between the first two, even without their consent?

(It is agreed that the recommendation of the Economic Council should be harmonized with the Article proposed by the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee is asked to undertake this.)


9. Baron Sonnino says that it might be desirable in the Treaty to insert a clause requiring Germany’s assent to any regulations the Allied and Associated Powers might make with regard to Arms Trafficking. It has been agreed that Germany is to forfeit all her colonies. She might therefore be disposed to make mischief in the colonies belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers, and with this object to engage in illicit traffic in arms.

Mr Lansing observes that the Military Clauses already contain a prohibition of the manufacture and export of arms.

Baron Sonnino points out that this clause doe not affect the trade in arms manufactured in other countries than Germany and their transference by German agency from any such country to Allied colonial possessions. It was therefore desirable to frame a clause protecting the Allied and Associated Powers from this form of mischief.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should undertake to frame a clause to the above effect.)


10. It was decided that the report of the Drafting Committee on these various subjects should be considered on the following Saturday, at 3 p.m.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

18th April 1919

U.S. General William G. Haan tours the former battlefield of Romagne, France.


Design plans for a “small battleship” for the U.S. Navy (the design is never pursued).


Ship Losses:

Rosedale (Canada) The cargo ship collided with Luella ( United States) in the Bristol Channel and sank. Her crew were rescued by Luella.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, April 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no major meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

19th April 1919

King George V congratulates New Zealand players at an inter-services rugby championship final in London.


U.S. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels addresses men of the 2nd Division occupying Vallendar, Germany.


Leslie Irvin (1895-1966) of US makes first premeditated free-fall parachute jump. Using a newly developed “Parachute Type-A,” it stored the parachute in a pack worn on the back, a ripcord for manually deploying the parachute, and a pilot chute that draws the parachute from the pack.


French sailors digging around the bow of the cruiser Gueydon to free it from ice, Archangel, Russia.


Ship Losses:

Tyne (United Kingdom) The cargo ship collided with the brigantine Fleur de Mer ( France) in Langland Bay, Glamorgan and cut her in two. Her five crew survived. Tyne then ran aground at Rotherslade, Glamorgan and broke her back. Her 50 crew were rescued. Tyne was on a voyage from London, United Kingdom to Swansea, Glamorgan, United Kingdom
Wild Rose (United Kingdom) The cargo ship collided with Afon Lledi ( United Kingdom) off the coast of Cornwall, United Kingdom and sank with the loss of four of her crew.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, April 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. Signor Orlando presents the question of Italian claims from the point of view of Resolutions taken by the Supreme Council on other questions. He notes that the United States of America is the one Power present that had not taken any part in the Treaty concluded with Italy by France and Great Britain. Consequently he proposes for the moment to deal with the subject on the hypothesis that no engagements existed. Italy had formulated three definite and distinct claims. He believes these to be in conformity with the general principles which had been adopted by the Supreme Council in dealing with the Peace Treaty. Consequently, he proposes to make a comparison between the principles underlying Italian claims and the general principles on which the Treaty of Peace was being based.


2. Italy’s first claim relates to her desire for union with the territories on the Italian side of the natural frontiers of Italy. Italy shares with Spain and Scandinavia the distinction of having boundaries more clearly defined by nature than almost any other country on the continent. More than almost any other country Italy possesses a geographical unity being bounded by the sea and the mighty chain of mountains which encircle her northern limits.


3. The second point relates to Fiume. Italy considers that the question of Fiume depends on general frontiers fixed for her. The historic frontier line of Italy passes along the watershed of the mountains and comes down to the sea on the Gulf of Quarnero and would embrace Fiume. For Fiume Italy appealed to the principle of self determination of the people. He refers to a historical fact that is insufficiently remembered, that Fiume itself had, before the conclusion of the Armistice, expressed a desire for incorporation in Italy. On the 18th October, 1918, the deputies of Fiume had in the Hungarian Chamber stated that as the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in a state of dissolution, Fiume being a free city demanded union with Italy. Hence Italy was in the presence of a question that had not been raised in the first instance by Italians, and there was a general demand that the declaration by Fiume should be supported.


4. Italy’s third claim relates to Dalmatia and the Islands off the coast - and he would mention here that the case of the Islands applies also to Istria with which must be considered the large Islands of Cherso and Lussin which were largely Italian in character.


5. President Wilson recalls that it had been agreed that he should confer with S Orlando and through him with his colleagues and he would now state the substance of what he had said. His Italian friends would bear witness that through-out the conversations he had insisted on the same point of view. It had been his privilege as the spokesman of the Associated Powers to initiate the negotiations for peace. The bases of the Peace with Germany had then been clearly laid down. It was not reasonable to have one basis of Peace with Germany and another set of principles for the Peace with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. He must assume that the principles in each case would be the same. The whole question resolves itself into this: We are trying to make peace on an entirely new basis and to establish a new order of international relations. At every point the question has to be asked whether the lines of the settlement would square with the new order. No greater question has ever been asked in any negotiations. No body of statesmen has ever before undertaken to make such a settlement. There is a certain claim of argument which must be brushed aside, namely, the economic and strategic argument. Within certain limits he agrees that natural boundaries such as exist in the cases of Spain or Scandinavia (which M. Orlando had referred to) must be taken into consideration. The whole course of life in these regions was determined by such natural boundaries. The slope of the mountains not only throws the rivers in a certain direction but tended to throw the life of the people in the same direction. These, however, are not strategic nor economic arguments. On these grounds he feels no difficulty in assenting to that part of the Italian claims included in M. Orlando’s first point. Nature had swung a great boundary round the north of Italy. It included Trieste and most of the Istrian Peninsula on which Pola lies. He has no great difficulty there in meeting the Italian views.

Outside of these, however, further to the South all the arguments seem to him to lead the other way. A different watershed was reached. Different racial units were encountered. There are natural associations between the peoples and this brought him to the question of Fiume.

6. From the first it had seemed to him plain that on the side of the Alps on which Fiume lay there is not only a difficult but an entirely new problem. Hitherto Fiume had been linked up with the policy or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That Empire had been governed by men who were in spirit very similar to the former rulers of Germany and who had been more or less under their domination. In fact they had become their instruments. If the Austro-Hungarian Empire had not gone to pieces the question could not have been difficult to deal with. Now, however, it had disappeared. Hence part of the wisdom of the present situation seems to build up new States linked in their interest for the future with the new order. These States must indeed become partners in the new order and not be regarded as States under suspicion but as linked in the new international relationship. S Orlando would remember that at the time that we were trying to detach the Yugoslavs from Austria we spoke of them as friends. We cannot not now speak of them as enemies. By separating from Austria-Hungary they had become connected with the new and disconnected from the old policy and order. M. Orlando had argued the case of Fiume as though it were purely an Italian and Yugoslav interest. Fiume is undoubtedly important to Yugoslavia whatever the proportion of the Yugoslavian trade to the whole might be. But above all its importance is that of an international port serving Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. In the past Hungary has had the principal interest in Fiume. Hence, it had been the policy of Hungary to encourage the Italian element and to use it to check the Slav population round about Fiume. He conjectures that Hungary had encouraged the idea of the autonomy of Fiume as a check to the surrounding Slovak population. This does not lead to the natural conclusion that Fiume should be joined to Italy.


7. In regard to Dalmatia, the argument most dwelt upon, the argument which Baron Sonnino had most forcibly expressed to him when he first arrived was mainly strategic, that is to say the necessity, from the point of view of naval defense, of giving Italy control of part of the eastern shores. In this case also the new order must either be accepted or not. Under the new order of international relations we united influence with policy to protect territory and to give independence of life. He could not imagine that a Yugoslav navy, under the regime of the League of Nations, could ever be a menace to Italy. The only possible risk was an alliance between Yugoslavia and some other state and its only possible motive would be to attack Italy.

In his view one of the essentials of the new order is that the control of the Great Powers should be withdrawn from the Balkans. In the past this had furnished the seeds of war. Germany had sought to plant out sovereigns in the Balkans to be used, as occasion required, for her own purposes. Most of the intrigues against the peace of the world in the Balkans had arisen from this cause. There had been no real independence in the Balkans for these states had been under constant pressure from the Great Powers, and especially from Berlin. Consequently, he was opposed to the lodging of any great Power in the Balkans. Our rule must be not to interfere in the internal affairs of these states and one of his primary objects was to withdraw the hand of the Great Powers from the Balkans. He regards this as of capital importance. Hence the strategic argument must be rejected. Military men with their strategic, military, economic arguments had been responsible for the Treaty of 1815. Similarly, military men have been responsible for Alsace-Lorraine. It was military men who had led Europe to one blunder after another. It would be quite detrimental to the peace of the world if Italy insisted on a lodging on the east coast of the Adriatic. We were now engaged in setting up an international association and Italy would have a part of the leadership therein. If this did not suffice, then two orders would exist - the old and the new. In the right hand would be the new order and in the left hand the old order. We could not drive two horses at once. The people of the United States of America would repudiate it. They were disgusted with the old order. Not only the American people but the people of the whole world were tired of the old system and they would not put up with Governments that supported it. We sometimes speak in those conversations as though we were masters of Europe. We are not so in reality. If the new order of ideas was not correctly interpreted a most tragic disservice would be done to the world. Hence, he urges his Italian colleagues to remember that they were in the hands of true friends. He would not be serving their interests if he consents to their claims to Fiume and Dalmatia. He is prepared to leave it to history to judge whether he or they were serving Italian interests best. He had been brought up in America, 3,000 miles away, and had passed most of his life there. There had been a time when he had not cared a snap of the fingers what happened in Europe. Now, however, it was his privilege to assist Europe to create a new order. If he should succeed, he could bring all the resources of his people to assist in the task. The claim for Fiume was a recent one put forward only within the last few months. As far as self-determination was concerned, Fiume was only an island of Italian population. If such a principle were adopted generally, we should get spots all over the map. In the case of Bohemia and the Polish frontiers, there was a preservation of historical frontiers; but this was not so in the case of Fiume. There was no analogy here that attached Fiume to Italy.

He cannot conclude his remarks without stating the profound solemnity with which he approached the question. He fully recognizes its gravity for the Italians. He tried to approach the subject in the most friendly spirit. His conclusion was that of one who wished to serve Italian interests and not of one who wished to oppose them.

8. Baron Sonnino reverts to President Wilson’s remarks on the strategic reasons that he, himself, had given to the President for the incorporation of Dalmatia with Italy. The President had said that he could not admit the claim of strategic advantage in establishing the new order. He must point out that Italy has never asked for any strategic advantage from an offensive point of view. All that they had demanded was the necessary and indispensable conditions of defense. He had never even thought of obtaining any possible advantage for offence in the Balkans. All he wishes to avoid is the continuance of the tragic history of Italy as open to attack from across the Adriatic. Without this the east coast of Italy is helpless. The League of Nations could not intervene in time. Any fleet established behind the island could defy the fleets of the League of Nations when they arrived, just as in the late war the Austrians defied the fleets of the Entente, which were two or three times their size. The Allied fleets would have destroyed the Austrian fleet, if they could have reached them, but they were unable to. The present situation provided a temptation to war, or at least, to the menace of war. It was perhaps a temptation even to Italy to profit by any favorable situation that might arise to get rid of the danger. The League of Nations might be compared to any civilized community which possesses a police force, but in every town people have to shut their door at nights. Italy could not do without this.

Referring to President Wilson’s remarks on the Balkans, Baron Sonnino says that Italy has no desire to mix herself there. Dalmatia, and especially its Northern part, was entirely outside the Balkans. All its economic and commercial relations were on the Italian side of the Adriatic. This was why, in spite of every effort by the Austrians to prevent it, the Italian interest had survived and was still maintained in Zara, Sebenico and Spalato. Until 1859 or 1860 the Italian element in Austria had been numerous enough for Austria to have an interest not to smash it. After the loss of Lombardy, however, and later on in 1866, after the loss of Venetia, all the parliamentary interests in Austria had been Slavic.

He fully recognizes the importance of the League of Nations and the general sentiment that was maturing towards a better state of things, but the League of Nations is a new institution and has many difficulties to face. He would like to know how tomorrow the League of Nations is going to adjust the Russian situation for example? How could it be relied on until it was fully established? In the present state of affairs it would be a crime for Italy to give this up, and it could not be done. Italy was asked to assume great responsibilities in guaranteeing the position of others, and received nothing herself.

President Wilson points out that Italy herself received these guarantees.

Baron Sonnino says they are not sufficient. On the other side of the Adriatic they were close to the Balkan races who are excitable peoples, much given to intrigue and falsification of documents, etc.

Moreover, the League of Nations had no forces under its direct control.

President Wilson says Baron Sonnino is speaking of a time when the Balkan states were being used by the Great Powers for their own purposes.

Baron Sonnino says he mistrusts the Balkan peoples most. Who would say that economic relations would not again link up the Balkans with Central Europe? He was very sorry, and deeply pained with the attitude he had to take. If Italian claims were not satisfied he, who had always sought completely to do his duty, would feel that he had done something contrary to the interests of his people.


9. M Clemenceau says that, in listening to President Wilson’s speech, he felt we were embarking on a most hazardous enterprise, but with a very noble purpose. We were seeking to detach Europe and the whole world from the old order which had led in the past to conflicts and finally to the recent War which had been the greatest and most horrible of all. It is not possible to change the whole policy of the world at one stroke. This applies to France just as much as to Italy. He would be ready to make concessions to his Allies. They were a people which has merited well of humanity and of civilization and he felt it right to recall it in this tragic hour. To the powerful arguments given by President Wilson he would add one other. Great Britain and France were bound in advance. The Treaty with Italy had not been signed by him, but it bore the signature of France. In that Treaty Dalmatia had been given to Italy, and this was a fact he could not forget. In the same Treaty, however, Fiume was allotted to Croatia. Italy had at that time no pretensions to Fiume. They had granted it as a gift to the Croats. M Barzilai had told him that since that time Austria had disappeared, which altered the situation. This is true, but, nevertheless, Italy had signed a document allotting Fiume to Croatia. He was astonished that Italy, while claiming Dalmatia under the Treaty, also claimed Fiume, which had been given to the Croats. Signatures counted no longer. It was impossible for Italy to claim one clause of the Treaty and to cancel another clause. It would be deplorable if his Italian friends on such a pretext should break away from their Allies.

He believes they are making a great mistake. It would serve neither their own use nor the cause of civilization. We French, as he has often said, have had to deplore the treatment given to the Italians in the Adriatic. But these moments are past. Now it will be necessary to traverse another critical period. He hoped his Italian friends were not counting too much on the first enthusiasm which would greet this action. Later on the cold and inevitable results would appear when Italy was alienated from her friends. He could not speak of such a matter without the gravest emotion. He could not think of one of the nations who helped to win this War separating from their Allies. We should suffer much, but Italy would suffer even more from such action. (S Orlando interjects “without doubt”). If the Italian plenipotentiaries should leave, he hopes that after consulting their people the forces of reason would bring them back. He hopes they will make one last effort to come to an agreement. His heart is always with Italy with its great and noble history and its immense services to civilization. Nevertheless, he must listen to the voice of duty. We cannot abandon the principles we had worked for for the good of civilization. It is impossible for France to adhere to one clause of the Treaty and to denounce another.

S Orlando recalls that the at the beginning of his statement he had declared that, since he was discussing the demands of Italy in the presence of a Power which was not bound by the Treaty, he would examine them on the hypothesis that the Treaty did not exist. If he were only asking his Allies to carry out their engagements, he would not ask for Fiume. In regard to what M. Clemenceau had said, he must express profound anguish in his heart at the suggestion that he was animated by any consideration of popularity or enthusiasm among the people of Italy at the course he was taking. He fully understands the tragic solemnity of the moment. Italy has to choose between two methods of death according as they limited their demands solely to the Treaty or separated themselves from their friends and became isolated from the world. If he had to choose he would prefer death with honor. He recalled that when Henry III had been assassinated the Duke of Guise looked at the body of his friend and said he had not believed he was so tall. He anticipates that Italy would prove so great a corpse that he only hopes there would not arise a poison which would threaten the whole world.

10. Mr Lloyd George says that as the representative of a Power which had signed the Treaty of London, he must express his views. He had not much to add to what M Clemenceau had said, but in the present grave situation he must express the British point of view, since Great Britain had also been a signatory of the Treaty. His personal position is much the same as M Clemenceau’s, since he had not been a signatory to the Treaty. He realizes the strength of President Wilson’s arguments, but he thinks he is entitled to say that if we feel scruples about the Italian claims they should have been expressed before Italy had lost half a million gallant lives. He does not think we are entitled to express these doubts after Italy had taken part in the war. He wished to say that Great Britain stood by the Treaty, but that she stood by the whole of the Treaty. The map which he had in his hand attached to the Treaty showed Fiume in Croatia. This was known to Serbia. We cannot break one part of the Treaty while standing by the other. On merits he does not understand how the principle of self-determination could be applied. If it was applied at all, it must be applied to the whole area. There must be a plebiscite from Trieste to Spalato. This, however, is not the proposal, which was merely to take the views of the inhabitants of Fiume. It was only proposed to apply it to the ancient town of Fiume itself. If the suburb across the river - a narrow river as he was informed - were included, his information is that the majority would be Yugoslavian. (Baron Sonnino interjects that the majority would still be Italian). If S Orlando’s argument in regard to the strategic position of Trieste and its danger from the guns in the hills were applied to Fiume, the Yugoslav majority would be overwhelming. The population of the valley was some 100,000 people, of whom only 25,000 were Italians. He could not see that any principle could be established for giving Fiume to Italy. If Fiume were included in Istria, exactly the same would apply. The Italian claim is only valid if applied to a little ancient town where an Italian population had grown to a majority of some 8,000. To give Fiume to Italy would break faith with the Serbs, would break the Treaty on which Italy entered the war, and would break every principle on which the Treaty of Peace was being based. He admits that the Italian losses had been very heavy, and even appalling. But the French losses had also been very heavy. M Clemenceau could no doubt evoke a great demonstration by announcing that the French frontier was to rest on the Rhine. Moreover, this was a strategic frontier, and would fulfill long-standing ambitions of France. There are very powerful elements in France which favor this solution, and M Clemenceau had to face these. They would urge that France had lost 1,500,000 dead in support of the justice of the claim. As regards the strategic arguments, British towns had also been bombarded. Like the Italians, the British Fleet had not been able to catch the enemy. The Germans, however, had not been able to transport troops across the North Sea. Neither could the Austrians transport them across the Adriatic. In France, however, with the exception of the Rhine, which was merely a military obstacle, there was land all the way between their boundaries and Germany. If our principles were to be extended we should have to re-cast the whole of the principles on which the Treaty of Peace was based and to begin with France. (President Wilson interjects that France had foregone the principle). How can we apply a different principle to Italy to what we had applied to France and Poland?

M Clemenceau had spoken of Italy going out of the Conference. This was a very grave decision which he had not been made aware of. What was the reason for it? It was that a population of 25,000 people in a single town had an Italian majority; it was a case where the majority was doubtful if the suburbs were taken into consideration, and where, if the surrounding country were taken into consideration, the population was overwhelmingly against Italy. He asked his Italian friends to consider the position they would create by such action. What would their population do? What would our position be? We think Italy is in the wrong and is making an indefensible claim. If war and bloodshed should result, what would the position be? Surely, there must be some sanity among statesmen! To break an Alliance over a matter of this kind was inconceivable. If Italy should do so, however, the responsibility would not be ours. We stood by our Treaty and the responsibility would rest with those who broke the Treaty.

Baron Sonnino points out that President Wilson did not accept the Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George says he is speaking for Great Britain only. He recalled that some time ago he had told S Orlando that the British Cabinet had decided that they would stand by the Pact.

S Orlando again recalls that at the outset of the meeting he had stated that he would discuss the question as though the Treaty did not exist. If what Mr Lloyd George said meant that the Conference would take its decision on the basis of the Treaty of London, leaving Fiume to be settled as the Conference might think fit, then a new situation would be created, and he would be prepared to discuss it with his colleagues on the Italian Delegation and return to give his reply.

President Wilson says that this solution would place a burden on him that was quite unfair. He did not know and did not feel at liberty to ask whether France and Great Britain considered the Treaty as consistent with the principles on which the Peace Treaty was being based. He was at liberty to say, however, that he himself did not. To discuss the matter on the basis of the Pact of London would be to adopt as a basis a secret treaty. Yet he would be bound to say to the world that we were establishing a new order in which secret treaties were precluded. He could not see his way to make peace with Germany on one principle and with Austria-Hungary on another. The Pact of London is inconsistent with the general principles of the settlement. He knows perfectly well that the Pact of London had been entered into in quite different circumstances, and he did not wish to criticize what had been done. But to suggest that the decision should be taken on the basis of the Treaty of London would draw the United States of America into an impossible situation.

Baron Sonnino says he only asks the Supreme Council to accept the merits of the Pact of London.

President Wilson says he is willing to state, and might have to state, to the world the grounds of his objections. He could not draw the United States into principles contrary to those which now animated them and which had brought them into the War.

Baron Sonnino draws attention to President Wilson’s statement of the 23rd May 1918, in which he had admitted the principle of security for Italy.

President Wilson says he does not admit that Dalmatia is essential to the security of Italy. Great Britain is in exactly the same position as Italy. He cannot allow the argument, and he had said so frankly at his first interview with Baron Sonnino. It was inconceivable to him that Italy should draw apart from her friends, and he begs that the Italian plenipotentiaries will not decide the question in a hurry. He asks them to take every element into consideration and not tear the country apart from the sacred associations of the present Conference and of the past. He appeals to them with confidence to reconsider the question, and not to think of action which would be one of the most tragic results of the War.

Mr Lloyd George asks that the Italians would remember one factor. If they are not present on Friday when the German delegates arrive, the Allies would have no right to put forward a claim for compensation for Italy. This was a matter that they ought to take into consideration.

S Orlando says that this is a matter that can be corrected at the last moment if Italy doe not separate herself.

President Wilson makes a final appeal to Italy to take time to consider.

S Orlando undertakes to do so, but says that he is most anxious to have the question settled before he returned to Italy.

(The Meeting is adjourned until Sunday, April 20, 1919, at 10 a.m.)

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, April 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE (Continued)

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


M Pichon says that he has a letter from Baron Sonnino stating that due to a pressing engagement elsewhere he is unable to attend this meeting. Italy will be represented by Signor de Martino.


1. The first item on today's agenda is the question of German citizens joining foreign armies in order to serve as instructors. It is proposed that the following clause be added to the Military Peace terms.

“No German male subject shall be permitted to become enrolled in the Army of any Foreign Power or to be attached to such army for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof.”

Mr Balfour doubts whether it would be worthwhile to add a special clause to the Peace Treaty dealing with this subject.

Mr Lansing agrees in principle, but questions the possibility of enforcing this. He feels the responsibility should be on the employer rather than the employee. He notes that German officers so employed would cease to be under German jurisdiction, and that it makes more sense that the Allied and Associated Governments should enter into an agreement not to employ German officers.

M Pichon thinks the matter should be left to the League of Nations.

M Tardieu notes that this is already done with the exportation of other war materials, so why not have the same restrictions on human war materials?

Mr Balfour agrees with Mr Lansing, and points out that normal war materials can only be exported with the consent of the government, but human beings can always buy a ticket to take them to another country and offer their services as instructors.

M Tardieu thinks that though the Government could not prevent a subject from proceeding to a foreign country, it might nevertheless be possible to frame a law preventing or prohibiting a subject under definite penalties from taking service in a foreign army.

Mr Lansing says he sympathizes with the proposal to attempt to prevent German military training from being dispersed throughout the world. The question, however, was how best to accomplish this purpose. In the first place, Germany should be made to agree to send no military missions to foreign countries, and to take no official recognition of military instructors sent abroad. Second, as a supplement to the above, all the signatories; of the Peace Treaty must agree not to employ German military instructors. Third, this prohibition should extend to the employment of Germans naturalized after the signing of the peace treaty, otherwise there would be no security, as it would easily be possible for Germans to change their allegiance for the purpose of taking military service abroad.

Mr Balfour thinks that similar provisions should be inserted in their respective treaties prohibiting all other enemy countries, namely Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria, from employing German instructors.

Mr Lansing adds that they should also get the Governments to agree not to send military students to Germany for military training.

(It is agreed that Mr. Lansing should draft a clause for presentation to the Foreign Ministers at their next meeting, embodying the ideas set forth in the preceding discussion.)


2. M Pichon brings up the question of the establishment of a German Commission in or near Paris, to facilitate the conducting of the current economic negotiations and the present status of the Commissions set up under the Armistice With Germany and their relations to the Supreme Economic Council. He proposes that these two subjects be postponed to the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers, to give him time to consult the French technical advisers, and to receive replies from the French representatives on the Economic Council.

Mr Balfour says that he wishes in this connection to invite the attention of the Conference to the very real inconvenience which was now being caused by divided control in both the occupied and unoccupied parts of Germany. In these territories there are a number of purely civil questions to be settled, which require coordination between the various organizations, both in the occupied and unoccupied areas. He feels very strongly that nothing should be done to interfere with the military control those areas, or with the full freedom of action of Marshal Foch. But since the questions of food, finance, and commerce were far more important than the narrow military standpoint, something should be done to improve the organisation which at the present moment was acting very slowly and in a very unsatisfactory manner. Consequently, though he does not press for the question to be discussed and settled at once, especially in view of M Pichon’s request that the matter should be postponed to the next meeting, he wishes, nevertheless, to point out that the question, in his opinion, brook no delay and should be settled as quickly as possible.

S de Martino says that the Italian Delegation are also studying the question and they would not be in a position to discuss it that afternoon. He supports M Pichon’s proposal that the question should be adjourned to the next meeting.

(It is agreed to postpone the question of the establishment of a German Commission at or near Paris to facilitate the conduct of current economic negotiations, and the question of the present status of the Commission set up under the Armistice with Germany and their relations to the Supreme Economic Council to the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers.)


4. M Pichon reads a proposal from The Netherlands that a Conference be set up in Paris to discuss the revision of the Dutch-Belgian Treaties of 1839, and asks whether the Foreign Ministers accept this proposal.

Mr Balfour says that this proposal would not be a part of the Peace Treaty between the Allied Nations and Germany, and the Foreign Ministers are already overworked with the Peace Treaty. He therefore is not prepared to meet with representatives from Holland and Belgium.

M Pichon asks whether a mission of plenipotentiaries could not be appointed to deal with the question.

Mr Balfour says that the Dutch Government wishes to discuss the question with the Foreign Ministers themselves. They are anxious not to be put under a Commission.

M Tardieu notes that the Belgian Government is also anxious to discuss the question at an early date with the Foreign Ministers.

Baron Makino said this is the first time he has heard of this matter, and would like to reserve his judgement for the present. This does not mean that any difference of opinion exists, but he would like to have an opportunity of examining the question.

(It is agreed that a Conference should be held in Paris as early as possible, for the purpose of considering the question of the revision of the 1839 treaties, consisting of the five Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Allied and Associated Great Powers and of the representatives of Holland and Belgium.

It is proposed that this meeting be held during the week commencing April 28th 1919.

It is understood that the Japanese representative will participate in the Conference unless a notification to the contrary is communicated to the Secretariat General within the next 3 days.)


5. M Pichon presents a memorandum, dated April 11th:

“The Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council has received the most urgent appeals from the Governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and from the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments in these countries.

The Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council finds it impossible to reply to these appeals until answers to the following questions have been obtained:

1) Do the Allied and Associated Governments intend to support the maintenance of independent Governments in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia?

2) If so, would this decision be in any way affected should an agreement be entered into between any one or all of these States and the Bolshevists Government, whereby their integrity and their territorial independence would be guaranteed?

3) Are the Allied and Associated Governments agreed that one or more of the Associated Powers should, once this responsibility has been accepted, help these Governments by every means in their power (e. g. financial, moral, and material assistance) other than the despatch of Allied troops?

4) Are any of the Associated Powers prepared to make to any one or all of these Governments a loan or to open credits in their favour?

5) Is the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council correct in assuming that the effective occupation of Latvia and Lithuania by the German troops must continue until the next harvest?

6) Are the Allied and Associated Governments agreed that the Russian white troops in Estonia must be assisted, both morally and materially, by the supply of food and by giving them other assistance, both—

a) in order to maintain the independence of Esthonia, or

b) in order to carry out a possible attack against the actual Russian Government?

7) What is the line of demarcation that the Allied and Associated Governments intend to lay down between Poland and Lithuania in connection with the distribution of food supplies?”

Mr McCormick says that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has authorized the relaxation of the blockade in the case of Latvia, provided the military authorities approved. The military authorities have approved, and the Blockade Committee has taken steps to obtain the necessary guarantees. But during the last two or three days news has been received to the effect that the Germans have taken over the Government of Latvia, and at the meeting of the Blockade Committee held on that day, it was decided: first, to continue the individual licensing of imports, because it is thought that these could be supervised by the representatives of the Admiralty; second, to stop all shipments from Germany, except coal, which is needed for transportation purposes in connection with the maintenance of the German front against the Bolshevists.

M Seydoux points out that the London Blockade Council, who have been instructed with the duty of obtaining the necessary guarantees from the Letts, has so far been unable to do so. Consequently, the blockade still continues unaltered. Furthermore, according to latest information, the Germans have taken control of Libau, which is the only available port of access. Under these circumstances, he thinks the British and French ships in the Baltic would automatically stop all trade.

M Pichon explains to the Committee that the Germans now control Libau; they have overthrown the Lettish Government, but it is not clear whether this has been done by the Germans themselves or at their instigation. In his opinion, it would be very difficult to arrive at a decision in regard to the question presented to the meeting.

Mr McCormick understands that there would be no difficulty in insuring that shipments of food should reach the proper authorities. He can therefore see no reason why relief measures should not continue.

M Seydoux agrees. He thinks that since food goes to the Germans it can also go to the Letts. That, however, is only one side of the question. There is also the question of ordinary trade, which he considers should not be permitted.

Mr Lansing says that he cannot understand how this question has come to be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. In his opinion, it falls altogether outside their province.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Meeting does not think that the whole question can be summed up in the following two proposals:

1) Food should continue to be sent to the Baltic provinces in question, provided the local allied authorities are agreed that it would reach the right people, and

2) Coal should continue to go through on the understanding that it should only be used for the purpose of supplying the front now set up against the Bolshevists.

Mr Hoover explains that German troops and authorities in Latvia have seized the Government and disarmed the Army, and had set up a Government of their own, probably controlled by the German Landowners. This Government is in entire opposition to the wishes of the Lettish people. The question is whether the Allies will continue to feed the Letts or not. On the one hand, there was no desire to starve the people of Latvia; on the other hand, there is equally no wish to support the German Government.

Mr McCormick thinks that if the Allies are feeding the Germans in Germany, there was no good reason why they should not continue to feed the Letts.

Mr Balfour believes that the Germans are doing two things: First, fighting the Bolshevists, a measure the Allies thoroughly approve of, and, second, oppressing the Letts, a measure which the Allies disapprove of.

M Pichon thinks that the Germans have carried out a regular “coup d’état” against the Letts, and by sending food into the country the Allies would indirectly be supporting the German usurpation.

Mr. Lansing enquired as to the reliability of the information received. He had seen various reports, but had not been impressed by their apparent validity.

Mr. Hoover said that the Lettish Commander-in-Chief and some of the Government officials had come to the American Food Mission and had asked for protection. At the present moment, the American representatives in Latvia were defying the Germans.

M. Pichon points out that there are English warships on the spot, and asks whether correct information could not be obtained from that source.

Mr Balfour replies that the information received from that source agrees with all other reports received from those regions.

M Pichon expresses the view that if all sources of information concur, the Ministers would be entitled to accept the information as correct.

Mr Lansing says that if he remembers the circumstances correctly, they had been told that the withdrawal of the Germans from Latvia would result in the whole country being over-run by the Bolshevists. He thought the feeding of the Letts should be continued, and, by the Treaty of Peace the Germans should be required to evacuate Latvia.

Mr Balfour thinks there might be some objection to that procedure. Under the Armistice the Allied and Associated Governments are fully empowered to order the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by the German troops. The reason why this has not been done is that the Allied and Associated Governments have no troops with which to replace the Germans. The Allied and Associated Governments are therefore in the “humiliating” position of having to employ Germans to suppress the Bolshevists while the Germans have stopped the Letts from raising armies of their own. Obviously had Allied troops been available it would have been easy to order the withdrawal of Germans, leaving the former troops to assist the local levies in re-constituting the countries in question.

S de Martino believes that food supplies should continue to be sent to these provinces, all necessary precautions being taken to ensure that none of this food should reach the Bolshevists. He must warn the meeting, however, that the Italian Government will be unable to take any share in furnishing supplies for this purpose.

M Pichon pointed out that the Letts are wholly anti-Bolshevists, and at the same time the Germans were fighting the Bolshevists. He saw no reason, therefore, why food relief should be stopped.

Mr Balfour explains that the difficulty lies in the fact that though both the Germans and the Letts were anti-Bolshevist, the Baltic Barons were also anti-Letts.

Colonel Kisch explains that according to latest information the Germans have arrested all members of the Lettish Government; they have also disarmed the Lettish troops and seized all arms and munitions. A further report states that the food stores landed at Libau have been looted, but it is not clear by whom this was done. It is, however, thought that the German Army of Occupation was behind the whole trouble that had now arisen in that country.

Mr Lansing said that the situation is as follows: for a time the Germans and Letts had co-operated against the Bolshevists. Now, either at the instigation of the Germans or as an independent movement, a rising had occurred, and as a result the Letts might be driven to become Bolshevists, which would constitute a very dangerous situation. In his opinion, under these circumstances, all that the Allied and Associated Governments can do is to insist on the withdrawal of the German troops and on the restoration of the Lettish Government. But if that is done the Allied and Associated Governments would then have to rely upon the ability of the Letts to resist the Bolshevists.

Mr Hoover called attention to the fact that the Lettish Government has been dispossessing the Baltic Barons of their property as fast as possible, and not without violence.

Mr Balfour proposes that food should continue to be sent, instructions being issued to the Allied authorities on the spot not to land it unless reasonable security existed that it would not find its way into the hands of either the Bolshevists or of the Baltic Barons.

Mr Hoover says that Mr Balfour’s proposal raises another difficulty due to the difference of opinion existing between the local British and American authorities. The former think that no further food supplies should be landed; while the latter thinks that local machinery could be set up to insure its distribution to the proper people. In his opinion, both the British, who are furnishing a considerable portion of the food supplies, and the Americans, should continue to send relief as long as there is reasonable assurance that the food so sent will reach the people and not the Bolshevists.

Mr Balfour reminds the Conference that on Thursday last, April 17th, the Council of Four had decided to dispatch an Inter-Allied Commission to the Baltic States. The particular question under reference can obviously not be referred to that Commission since it would not reach those regions for some time to come.

(It is agreed:

1) to continue to send food supplies into Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, provided the local Allied authorities are satisfied that these supplies will reach the right people, and

2) to continue to allow coal from Germany to go through, provided it is only used for supplying the front now set up against the Bolshevists.

It is further agreed that instructions should be issued to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on the spot that the food should not be landed unless reasonable security exists that it will reach the people and not the Bolshevists.)


6. M Pichon read a draft article regarding the disposal of property of enemy religious missions in Allied territory:

“The Allied and Associated Governments agree that in all territories belonging to them, or of which the government is entrusted to them in accordance with this Treaty, the property which the German Missions or Missionary Societies possess, including that of Trading Societies whose profits were devoted to the support of the Missions, shall continue to be devoted to missionary purposes. In order to assure the due execution of this undertaking, the Allied and Associated Governments will retain full control and disposition of such property, and full control as to the persons by whom the Missions shall be conducted and as to the application of the property for missionary purposes.

Germany, taking note of the above undertaking, agrees to accept all arrangements made or to be made by the Allied or Associated Governments concerned for carrying on the work of the said Missions or Trading Societies, and waives all claims on their behalf.”

Mr. Balfour explains that a very large German missionary organisation exists in Western Africa which, while carrying out admirable educational work, has also undertaken important industrial work. The profits of the commercial part of the undertaking has annually been handed over for missionary purposes. It is felt that the commercial asset should not be merged in the general assets taken over from the Germans in conquered territories; but that the profits should be kept in order to carry on the missionary work in those territories.

Mr Lansing agrees with Mr Balfour, but he thinks it should be made clear in the text that the proposed article relates to religious missionary enterprises and not to diplomatic or other missions.

Baron Makino asks whether the draft article is intended to apply to all German foreign religious enterprises. He calls attention to the fact that it would be necessary for someone to decide whether the work of such missions was really benevolent or not.

Mr Balfour thinks that the draft article is intended to apply to all German foreign missions. In addition to those in West Africa to which his previous remarks had particularly referred, he understands there are others in India and China. He thinks the idea would be for the property so taken over to be kept in trust with a view to continuing the same religious work.

Mr Lansing calls attention to the fact the second paragraph of the English text reads “the Allied and Associated Governments will retain full control” whereas the French text said “the Five Allied and Associated Governments will retain full control.”

Mr Scott points out that in the French text the expression “the five Allied and Associated Governments” alone was used.

M Fromageot explains that the Drafting Committee has to employ definite formulas to cover definite cases. Thus by “the five Allied and Associated Governments” would be meant France, Great Britain, Italy, United States and Japan; while the words “Allied and Associated Governments” would be used to mean all the nations who had participated in the war on the side of the Allies.

Mr Lansing suggests that the proposal of the British Delegation be accepted in principle, but that the draft article be referred back to the Drafting Committee to be re-drafted in the light of the discussion just held. He thinks the text should be made perfectly clear, even though some difficulty might be experienced in doing so. As at present drafted it is not clear whether the control rested with all of the five Allied and Associated Governments as a whole, or whether it would rest in each case only with the one Government particularly concerned.

M Fromageot replied that it is his understanding that the control would rest with the Power specially concerned in each case.

S de Martino suggests that the following words should be added at the end of the first paragraph, namely: “in conformity with the principles of the local laws now in force in the respective territories”. He is anxious that no difficulty should arise through interference with local laws in the country where the mission was operating.

Mr Balfour agreed that the idea that S de Martino has in mind is right; but he thinks it should be left to the Drafting Committee to give effect to the proposal.

Baron Makino expresses the view that in re-drafting the clause the object of the missions should be made quite clear.

(It is agreed to refer the text of the draft article submitted by the British Delegation to the Drafting Committee for the preparation of a revised text embodying the ideas set forth in the course of the above discussion.)


7. M Pichon read the following new proposed draft article relating to the Opium Traffic, submitted by the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty of Peace:

“Those of the High Contracting Parties who have not yet signed, or have signed but not yet ratified the Opium Convention signed at The Hague on January 23rd, 1912, agree to bring the said Convention into force, and for this purpose to enact the necessary legislation without delay and in any case within a period of twelve months from the coming into force of the present treaty.

Furthermore they agree that ratification of this treaty should in the case of the Powers which have not yet ratified the Opium Convention be deemed in all respects equivalent to the ratification of that Convention and to the signature of the special protocol which was opened at The Hague in accordance with the resolutions adopted by The Third Opium Conference in 1914 for bringing the said Convention into force; and for this purpose the Government of the French Republic is requested to communicate to the Government of the Netherlands a certified copy of the protocol of the deposit of ratifications of this treaty and to invite the Government of the Netherlands in accordance with the provisions of the article to accept and deposit the said certified copy as if it were a deposit of ratifications of the Opium Convention and a signature of the additional protocol of 1914.”

(It is agreed to accept the above draft regarding the Opium Traffic for insertion in the Treaty of Peace.)

(The Meeting is adjourned to Monday afternoon, 21st April, 1919, at 15:00 hours.)

[Jimbuna]

20th April 1919

A tank demonstration in Rome, Italy.


General Pershing decorates the colors of the 88th Division at Gondrecourt, France.


British Officers’ Club at the General HQ in Montreuil, France during lunch.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, April 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. S Orlando reads the following declaration:

“I must maintain all the declarations which I have made so far as the question of Fiume is concerned. In reducing the matter to its minimum terms I must observe to President Wilson that, from the point of view of his noble intention of maintaining peace in the world, he is too eminent a politician not to realize that an essential condition for arriving at this object is that of avoiding between peoples the sentiment of reaction against injustice, which will form, without doubt, the most fatal germ of future wars. But I affirm here that if Fiume is not granted to Italy there will be among the Italian people a reaction of protest and of hatred so violent that it will give rise to the explosion of violent contrasts within a period that is more or less close. I think, then, that the fact that Fiume may not be given to Italy would be extremely fatal just as much to the interests of Italy as to the peace of the world. Nevertheless, since the British and French Allies have declared yesterday that they do not recognize the right of Italy to break the Alliance in the event of her being accorded only what the Treaty of Alliance guarantees her, I am so convinced of my responsibility towards the peace of the world in the event of a rupture of the Alliance to consider it necessary to safeguard myself against every possible accusation in this respect. I declare in consequence formally that, in the event of the Peace Conference guaranteeing to Italy all the rights which the Treaty of London has assured to her, I shall not be obliged to break the Alliance, and I would abstain from every act or deed which could have this signification.”

After a pause, President Wilson says it is incredible to him that the representatives of Italy should take up this position. At the center of the War there stood three Powers - France, Great Britain, and Italy - which undoubtedly had borne the brunt of the War, especially the two first engaged. Undoubtedly, however, the whole world perceived that the War had been largely undertaken to save these Powers from the intentions of the Central Powers. These Powers, however, had not brought the war to an end. Other Powers had come in which had nothing to do with the Alliance, and were not bound by the Pact of London. These Powers had rendered indispensable assistance; for example, the material and financial assistance of the United States of America had been essential to the successful conclusion of the War. (M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George interrupt to express agreement in this). As soon as the United States of America entered the War they declared their principles. These were acclaimed particularly by those peoples to whom they gave a new assurance of peace, namely, the smaller Powers. They were also greeted with acclamation by the peoples of the Great Powers. When I wrote these principles I knew that I was not writing merely my own conscience, but the point of view of the people of the United States of America. These principles were found to be identical with the sentiments of all the great peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers. Otherwise, these principles would have no effect. The world did not ask for the opinions of individuals. What it did ask was that individuals should formulate principles which called to consciousness what every man was feeling. The opinions expressed first by Mr Lloyd George, and a few days afterwards by myself, had accomplished this. On these principles the United States of America and some other Powers had entered the War. This world conference must, in formulating the peace, express the conclusions of the whole world and not those of a small group, even though he hastens to add the most influential group who had entered earlier into a Treaty. The object of our principles is not to exclude any legitimate natural aspiration. In this connection President Wilson reads the following extracts from his Fourteen Points:

“XI. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.”

“IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.”

This, he says, was what we had been attempting to do. If we did not do what S Orlando had so eloquently referred to and carry out our principles, but were to base ourselves on the Treaty which Italy invoked, we should be raising antagonisms which would never be stamped out until what we were now doing was rectified. Hence, the result of S Orlando’s proposal, namely, that other Powers than those bound by it should adhere to the Treaty of London, and if Italy insists on the carrying out of this Treaty she would stand in the way of peace. The United States of America are not bound, and besides they regard it as unsuited to the circumstances of the day. If the Austro-Hungarian Empire had survived, his attitude would have been entirely different. For then Italy would have been entitled to every outpost of security. Those dangerous circumstances, however, do not now exist, and though the signatories of the Pact of London did not consider themselves relieved of their undertaking, other Powers need not regard the Pact as binding. He asks his Italian brethren whether they are determined to take action which would result in reducing the chance of peace with Germany, of increasing the risk of the resumption of the War, and of alienating people who had been enthusiastically friendly to Italy. Would they refuse to enter the new circumstances of the world because they could not renew the old circumstances? Without the Pact of London Italy would receive her natural boundaries; the redemption of the Italian population; a restoration of her old glory, and the completion of her integrity. A dream would be realized which, at the beginning of the War, would have seemed too good to be true. The dream had come true by the gallantry of the Italian armies and the force of the world. It is incredible to him, even though he had actually heard it, that Italy should take up this attitude. It was the supreme completing tragedy of the War that Italy should turn her back on her best friends and take up a position of isolation. He deplores it as one whose heart is torn. But as representative of the people of the United States of America he cannot violate the principles they had instructed him to carry out in this settlement.

S Orlando says that he ought to declare to President Wilson that if he spoke of the Pact of London it had only been at the last moment and in spite of himself. He had only done so in order to reply to remarks made by Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau. They had said that he would take too great a responsibility in breaking an Alliance towards a people who say that they are ready to honor their signature and to fulfill their obligations. He had made all possible efforts to demonstrate that the rights of Italy rest within the bounds of reason and remain in the field of argument. No one more than he would regret to rely on the text of a Treaty instead of applying reason. Italy has not been, and is not, intransigent. No way to conciliation had yet been offered to her. In regard to the Fourteen Points, he asked the President to recognize that those relating to Austria-Hungary were obsolete because Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist. Yesterday President Wilson had recognized this himself. The President had interpreted the Fourteen Points as if Serbia had a right to Fiume. As a matter of fact, however, Serbia’s extreme ambitions in regard to a sea port had extended to St. Jean de Medua, Alessio, and they had never even dreamed of Ragusa. Now they are assured of far more. He asks President Wilson to bear two things in mind, first, that although those parts of the Fourteen Points applying to Austria-Hungary ceased to be valid after the fall of Austria-Hungary, those relating to Italy remain; and second, that he had made a definite reservation at the beginning of the Peace Conference with the United States of America, through Colonel House, in regard to their application to the Austro-Hungarian Treaty. Consequently, he is not bound by them in the Austro-Hungarian Treaty. President Wilson had said with emotion that the War had been waged for justice and right. Italy also considered that she had fought for justice. There, Italy was on the same ground as President Wilson. He deeply objects to President Wilson’s suggestion to the contrary, for Italy also had made war in good faith, and he himself could say that he could sign no peace contrary to justice and right. He had said this not to criticize President Wilson, but to explain his own point of view. President Wilson had concluded that his heart was torn by the separation of Italy. He expresses his deep thanks for this, and he declares that his heart is still more torn. He feels exactly the same sentiment of friendship, loyal and mutual affection and esteem, not only between the two peoples, but between the two men. But he also experiences sentiments of anguish when he thinks of his own country. As he had said on the previous day, if he must face death, it must be for a just cause.

President Wilson says that M. Orlando might rest assured that he himself has no misconception as to the Italian motives. It is merely a fundamental difference of policy between them. He fully realizes that Italy is not bound by the Fourteen Points in making peace with Austria. He is not inclined to insist on any particular principle in the Fourteen Points, but his position is that he cannot make peace with Germany on one set and with Austria on another set of principles. Throughout their consultations the drawing of frontiers has been based on ethnic lines as a principle.

Mr Lloyd George regrets that the Supreme Council finds itself confronted with the most difficult situation that had faced it since the beginning of the Conference. The question is a very troublesome one, and he could not see a way out. We were first confronted with the possibility that Italy was feeling she could not continue her association with her Allies in making peace, because of this troublesome Austrian question. Another alternative was that the United States of America could not assent to a Treaty based on principles involving a grave departure from those for which she had entered the War. Either way it was a very serious matter. Personally, he does not feel free to discuss the question of merits, because he must respect his bond. It has been honored by Italy in blood, treasure, and sacrifice. He would tarnish his country’s honor if he receded from it, though no one more than he recognizes the President’s powerful plea. He realizes that it was a very serious matter for Italy to antagonize two of the most powerful races in Europe, the Germans in the Tyrol, and the Slavs in Austria. He, however, is not entitled to discuss that. He wishes to put to President Wilson the reason why Italy found it difficult to recede from the Treaty. He had been profoundly impressed by S Orlando’s reasoning, but he had also been greatly moved by what Baron Sonnino had said. Baron Sonnino had been in the War from the very outset, and had taken upon himself a very heavy responsibility in rejecting Austria’s terms. What could he say to the people of Italy? If he returned to Italy without the Treaty, he would almost have to leave the country. After incurring heavy losses and large debts he had only got little more than what he could have had without risking a single life. His suggestion is that the representatives of the Powers signatories to the Treaty of London should meet separately to consider President Wilson’s grave decision. If, however, Italy cannot modify her attitude, he is bound to take his stand by his bond. Anything he could say would be by way of suggestion and appeal only. He asked if President Wilson agreed to this course?

President Wilson assents. He says he feels it to be his duty to mention any counsel of accommodation that had been made to him. He, therefore, asks the question as to whether, supposing Fiume were conceded to the Serbo-Croats, as provided in the Pact of London, and if the lines of the Pact and all within it were, for the time being, handed over to the five Great Powers as trustees to determine its disposition, would the Italian representatives then say they could not consent - always on the assumption of no guarantee of ultimate cession to Italy of what lay within the line. There is one point on which he had said that he would make an exception to Italy, that was in the case of the island of Lissa. He recognizes, however, that this was only a very small part of the Pact of London. He would not be frank if he held out to the Italian representatives any hope of the assent of the United States of America to the ultimate cession of the islands and other territory involved in the Pact of London to Italy. The proposal he had made, however, would relieve the present difficulty and give the Great Powers further time to consider the matter. As the suggestion had been made to him he would like to know if it had any weight at all with the Italian representatives.

Mr Lloyd George says he would like time to think the matter over, and he suggests that the signatories of the Treaty should meet on the following day.

Baron Sonnino agrees. He thanks Mr Lloyd George for his exposition of the Italian point of view. His own responsibility towards his conscience makes it necessary - the responsibility of those present towards their own consciences make it necessary that everything possible should be done to try to see a way out. Perhaps he himself was too agitated and pre-occupied to see the whole of the picture. He and S Orlando consent to meet and examine every point of view and to try to find a way out. It is his duty to do all he could to find a settlement. It has been said that it involves death, moral death to him. He does not care a pin about that. He only thinks of his country. It would be said that he had ruined his country, and nothing could trouble a man more than that.

Mr Lloyd George says that it was really an essential element in the case. Italy has rejected one (the Austrian) offer and accepted another and is now threatened with not having that made good.

President Wilson says that he fully realizes that Italy has no imperialistic motives and gives her entire credit for that. He also fully appreciates the tragic personal position in which Baron Sonnino was placed. He honors him for his steadfastness, which merely verifies the steadfastness he had shown throughout the War. If Italy can see a way out consistent with permanent peace, he would like to assist if it were only for personal reasons. He hopes that Baron Sonnino would never think he had ruined his country. He would really have given it a more glorious record and no one could say that he had ruined it.

Baron Sonnino thanks President Wilson for what he had said. The word “imperialistic” had been used. Italy, however, has never had any intention to damage others. She only sought security at home. She asks for no positions from which she could menace her neighbors. In other matters referred to in the London Convention in regard to Greece, Italy had made it clear that she would not take an overbearing position. She merely wishes to keep out of dangers. She wants to keep out of Balkanism, for example. She wants full freedom to her own commerce, culture, and influence, but not to be drawn into the confluence of Balkan States. She wanted a safe basis for keeping out of these questions. If Italy were to do what President Wilson wanted, she would inevitably be drawn in. Her reasoning might be wrong about this island or that island, but the whole political basis of the Pact of London was Italy’s desire to keep out of the danger of being attacked or of the temptation to attack herself in order to forestall a danger. For centuries of her history Italy had been overrun by barbarians - Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, &c. (Mr. Lloyd George interjects that Italy had herself overrun Britain). The reason was that Italy had fair lands. Now she desires to keep in her own corner of Europe outside it all and President Wilson wants to stop her.

President Wilson says that if he thought this would be the result he would help.

Baron Sonnino continues that even Fiume, which is outside the Pact of London was not asked for as a means of aggression. Other considerations prevailed here. There had been a movement by Fiume itself that had brought it up. The War undoubtedly had had the effect of over-exciting the feeling of nationality. This was not Italy’s fault. Perhaps America had fostered it by putting the principles so clearly. In the discussions about the Pact of London M Sazonoff1 had insisted on the names of places being put in, and Italy had conceded without discussion a number of big islands and the port of Segna, in order to give Yugoslavia means of defense. He cannot see that anything that Italy had done contravened the principles. It is very easy to make principles, but enormous differences arise in their application. It is their application that creates differences between people who were agreed on the principles themselves. Even in the settlement of the German Treaty concessions of principle had repeatedly to be made.


2. M. Clemenceau reads a telegram he had received from the German Foreign Office in reply to the invitation to the Germans to come to Versailles on April 25. The gist of this reply was that Germany would send, on the 25th April, Minister Von Haniel, Councillor Von Keller, and Councillor Ernst Smitt. These delegates would be provided with the necessary powers to receive the text of the proposed Preliminaries of Peace which they would bring back to the German Government. A list is then given of the functionaries and servants who would accompany them.

Mr Lloyd George says we cannot deal with messengers. He is altogether opposed to it. He then invites his colleagues to read a dispatch he has just received from Berlin which threw some light on this question.

After Professor Mantoux has read the document in French, Mr Lloyd George says that it has a most important bearing on the German reply. The suggestion to send more messengers to Versailles was a foolish one, because if not intended as insolent, it is purely futile. If circumstances were such as the British agent suggested in the Paper that had just been read, it might be desirable to force the Germans to choose a Government that could represent them.

President Wilson agrees in Mr Lloyd George’s suggestion that we cannot receive mere messengers and must insist on plenipotentiaries.

At M Clemenceau’s request he drafts a reply to be sent to the German Government somewhat on the following lines:

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot receive envoys merely authorized to receive the terms of peace. They must require that the German Government shall send plenipotentiaries fully authorized to deal with the whole question of peace as are the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers.

(The discussion is then adjourned).



Appendix to the Meeting

1. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Ebert-Scheidemann Government cannot long continue in its present form.

Reasons:

a) Great numbers of the rank and file of the Government supporters are going over to the left and joining either the “Independents” or (though to a less extent) the “communists”. Both Government and National Versammlung have lost the confidence of the country. The working classes believe that the failure to carry out a socialistic program is due, not to the inherent difficulties of the problem, but to the presence in the government of bourgeois elements whose sole object is obstruction.

b) The strikes and disturbances throughout the country are no longer merely food riots or “unemployed” riots but have taken on a definitely political, i. e. anti-Scheidemann, character (Scheidemann is of course merely regarded as the personification of bourgeois-socialist Government in league with capitalism).

c) The idea of the “Rate” or Soviet system has spread to such an extent and taken such a hold on the popular imagination that it has become impossible to leave it out of consideration. Scheidemann’s attitude on this question is one of the chief causes of his unpopularity.

d) The food that is being sent and such raw materials as there might be a possibility of sending, are not sufficient in quantity, so to change the outward circumstances of the working man’s life as to make him forget his dissatisfaction at the incompetence of the Government, whom he makes responsible for all his troubles.


2. Unless the government is modified or remodeled in some way either

a) it will be overthrown before peace is signed - by a general strike or Spartacist coup de main. In this case the Entente is faced with a Germany without any constituted government that can sign the Peace Treaty; or

b) on learning the terms on which the Allies consent to make peace, Scheidemann and Brockdorff-Rantzau2 will do their best to make a virtue of necessity and leave the stage with the “grand geste” of outraged dignity. It is becoming daily more evident that this government does not intend to sign the peace they will be offered. And the National Versammlung is already practicing the gestures of sympathy with which it will accompany the exit of its cabinet.
3. If then the Government is overthrown before peace or retires in a body on refusing to sign, there only exist two alternatives for the succession

(i) a military dictatorship backed by the Right wing—such a regime could not sign peace on behalf of the country even if it wanted to. It is questionable whether the troops would support it in any large numbers. The result will be civil war and complete anarchy, with sooner or later the necessity of military intervention by the Entente.

(ii) A soviet government probably leading to a Spartacist (or Bolshevik) dictatorship? The result in this case would equally be anarchy and the probable necessity of Entente intervention and occupation.


4. There is one possibility of avoiding either of these extreme results.

Negotiations are being carried on with great energy between the right wing of the “Independents”, the majority socialists and the military men who stand behind Noske and constitute his force. The objects are as follows:—

1) to remodel the cabinet (retaining Ebert as Reichspräsident) on a purely Socialistic basis including “majority” and “independents”.

2) to secure for such a government the support of the troops even supposing Noske himself were removed. It is stated that Captain von Papst, the moving spirit of the present military organisation, is in favour of the plan and would support the government if reconstituted on these lines.

3) to persuade the “Independents” to abandon that part of their program which involves the disbanding of the troops. The majority of their leaders have, it is said, now realized the necessity for this.


4. to form a second chamber of the Kate or councils which should have the right of initiative and of veto in legislation. It is argued that the Räte system has developed into a genuine political ideal among the proletariat and unless a far-reaching concession of this kind is made to them there will be no possibility of avoiding the worst evil of a Soviet dictatorship.


5. The two strong arguments in favour of such a reconstitution of the government are as follows:

1) It would start with the confidence of the country. The proletarians will feel that “their men” are at the helm and the bourgeois and capitalists have nothing to say. If “their men” cannot do all the workmen expect, they will realize it cannot be done.

2) They will be inclined to sign the peace treaty and the second (or Rate) chamber will be likely to bring pressure to bear on the National Versammlung to do so too. If a deadlock ensues, there must be a referendum to the country.

The present government (at any rate Scheidemann and Rantzau) quite evidently do not intend to sign the peace treaty. A purely socialist government on these lines would be much more likely to do so.


6. If the Entente does not desire to see the whole country thrown into anarchy there remain only these two possibilities:—

1) A military occupation of all Germany by Entente troops. If this were done at once it would not be necessary to send more than 10 or 12 divisions - provided the action were accompanied by skillful propaganda. If it is done only when anarchy has spread further, it will need several armies.

2) A purely socialist Government, regarded as a remodeling of the present government and supported by the Entente in respect of still further supplies of food, concessions as to the independent purchase of food by Germany from Neutrals and the importation of the most necessary raw materials such as cotton, wool, iron-ores etc.

With regard to raw materials, the entente is in a position to control the supply so that only such amounts are imported as a [are] necessary for Germany’s internal needs, so as to avoid any conceivable danger of dumping.


7. Should the Entente Governments decide that such a modification of the present Government is desirable, it is suggested that a hint might be given to Ebert in the form of a confidential note through, say, the Swiss Minister to the effect that “The Associated Governments are inclined to form the opinion, on the basis of information received, that the government in its present form does not enjoy the confidence or represent the feelings of the people, that under the circumstances they feel that its signature to the peace treaty does not afford a sufficient guarantee for its execution, and that though the Associated Governments are far from having any desire to interfere in Germany’s political affairs, they feel they are entitled to the assurance that the position of the government with which they are to negotiate is perfectly clear.”


8. A reconstitution of the Government on the above lines would certainly clear the political atmosphere, and would make it possible that peace be signed. It could not however stand more than a month, unless its position were strengthened by an immediate announcement from the Entente that the necessities of the industrial situation were realized and raw materials in considerable quantities were introduced.

[Jimbuna]

21st April 1919

Polish Army entering the city of Wilno (Vilnius, Lithuania) after taking the city from the Russian Red Army.


Jules Védrines, French aviator known for being the first pilot to fly faster than 100 mph, is killed in an aviation accident.


British soldiers and German children enjoying a carousel ride at Easter fair in occupied Cologne, Germany.


New York: The 332nd Infantry marches up Fifth Avenue on their way to Central Park, where they will receive medals from the Italian Attache for fighting in Italy against the Austrians.


Ship Losses:

AG-21 (Imperial Russian Navy White Movement) The AG-class submarine was scuttled at Sevastopol by the British.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, April 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


1. M Pichon says that the first item on the agenda paper concerned the enrollment of German subjects in foreign armies. The following article has been drafted by Mr Lansing for insertion in the Treaty of Peace:

“Germany hereby agrees from and after the signature of the present treaty not to accredit to any foreign country or [Page 597]to send or to allow any military mission to leave its territory for any foreign country, and Germany further agrees to take appropriate measures to prevent German nationals from leaving its territory to become enrolled in the army of any foreign power or to be attached to such army for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof, or otherwise for the purpose of giving military, naval, or aeronautic instruction in any foreign country.

The Allied and Associated Powers agree, on their part, from and after the signature of the present treaty not to enroll in their armies, or to attach to their armies or naval or air forces, any German national, for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof, or otherwise to employ any such German national as military, naval or aeronautic instructor; and the Allied and Associated Powers further agree not to enroll or employ as aforesaid, any former German national.”

M Pichon, continuing, says that he understands that the draft article will apply only and solely to military instructors, and on that understanding he would be prepared to accept it. He will, however, be glad to have an assurance on that point.

Mr Lansing replies that M Pichon has correctly interpreted the intention of the article. It is merely intended that Germans should not be employed as instructors in any armies. He himself, would however, be quite prepared, with M Pichon’s approval, to prohibit the enrollment of any German nationals in foreign armies; and, to give effect to this suggestion, he will propose that the concluding portion of the first paragraph of the draft article be altered to read somewhat as follows:

“… and Germany further agrees to take appropriate measures to prevent German nationals from leaving its territory to become enrolled in the army of any foreign Power or for the purpose of instruction in the military training of such army to be attached thereto, or otherwise for the purpose of giving military, naval, or aeronautic instruction in any foreign country.”

Should this proposal be accepted, he will ask that the whole text should be referred back to the Drafting Committee to be redrafted in such a manner as to prohibit the employment of any German nationals in any army.

M Pichon says that, in his opinion, if the Article is redrafted as suggested by Mr Lansing, it would prevent the enrollment of German nationals in the French Foreign Legion. He would point out that according to the existing regulations no inquiries were made as to the nationality of men wishing to join the Foreign Legion; but he agrees that the men so enrolled cannot be defined as instructors.

Mr Lansing expresses the view that the procedure followed by France in regard to their recruitment for the Foreign Legion would, if retained, leave a very wide door for the enrollment of Germans in large numbers by other countries. The American Army, for instance, contained large numbers of Germans; but the United States’ Government are anxious to get rid of them.

M Pichon says that, if Mr Lansing’s proposal were adopted, he could only accept the clause under reserve, for the following reasons. Firstly, recruitment for the French Foreign Legion, constituted a military question, which the President of the Council as War Minister would alone be competent to decide. Secondly, the employment of any German nationals in foreign armies constituted a political question, which he thought would have to be submitted to the Council of Four for final decision. Subject to those reservations, he was prepared to accept the draft clause.

Mr Lansing suggests that a new paragraph should be drafted, whereby the Germans would further agree not to admit into Germany persons of foreign nationality either for instruction at a military school or for the purpose of receiving military instruction of any kind.

S de Martino inquires what is the correct interpretation to be given to the last four words of the draft article, namely: “any former German national”, particularly in regard to the word “former”. If those words are intended to mean that Germans who had acquired the nationality of a new country would be excluded from enrollment in the army of the country of their allegiance, he thinks very important questions of national law would thereby be involved, and very serious difficulties would arise.

Mr Lansing agreed with S de Martino, and suggests that the words quoted might be modified to read as follows: “Any person of German origin naturalized after the signature of the Treaty of Peace.”

Lord Robert Cecil asks why so much importance is attached by Mr Lansing to the second paragraph of the draft article. He asks why the Allied and Associated Powers should not be left a free hand in the matter.

M Pichon agrees. Furthermore, he wishes to point out that the clause would be in entire contradiction with the existing laws of France, which allow the enrollment of volunteers after naturalization. In his opinion, the second paragraph as it stands at present cannot be accepted as long as the present laws exist in France.

Mr Lansing points out that unless some regulation to that effect were included in the draft article, certain nations not represented at that Meeting, whose armies had always been organised by German instructors, would continue to employ such instructors, merely naturalizing them for the purpose.

M Pichon agrees. On the other hand, he thinks it would be impossible to adopt a text which would be in direct contradiction with the existing laws of the country.

Lord Hardinge inquired whether the difficulty would not be met by omitting the last two lines of the draft article, namely, the words: “and the Allied and Associated Powers further agree not to enroll or employ as aforesaid, any former German national.”

(This is agreed to.)

(It is agreed to accept the following draft article, which will be referred to the Council of Four for final decision in view of the reservation made by M Pichon.

“Germany hereby agrees from and after the signature of the present treaty not to accredit to any foreign country or to send or to allow any military mission to leave its territory for any foreign country, and Germany further agrees to take appropriate measures to prevent German nationals from leaving its territory to become enrolled in the army of any foreign power or to be attached to such army for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof, or otherwise for the purpose of giving military, naval or aeronautic instruction in any foreign country.

The Allied and Associated Powers agree, on their part, from and after the signature of the present treaty not to enroll in their armies, or to attach to their armies or naval or air forces, any German national, for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof, or otherwise to employ any such German national as military, naval or aeronautic instructor.”)


2 M Pichon says that the next question on the Agenda Paper relates to the creation of a German Commission at or near Paris to facilitate the conduct of economic negotiations. The following memorandum dated April 15th 1919, submitted by the Supreme Economic Council had been circulated to the delegates of the Five Great Powers:

“With a view to facilitating, giving unity to, and expediting the current negotiations in Germany of the Associated and Allied Powers, in connection with the provision of foodstuffs to Germany, the Supreme Economic Council strongly recommends that the German Government shall be requested to send immediately to a place to be designated in the very near neighborhood of Paris technical experts on food, shipping, finance, raw materials, trade, and communications.

These delegates should be entrusted by their Government with full power to decide on all questions arising out of the provision of foodstuffs to Germany and on immediate economic relations with Germany.

They should be provided with proper and sufficient means of communication with their Government and with all necessary facilities to enable business to be transacted conveniently and rapidly.”

(It is agreed to accept the proposal to establish a German Commission at or near Paris to facilitate the conduct of economic negotiations, as above proposed.)


3. M Pichon said that a memorandum has been submitted by the Supreme Economic Council dealing with such questions as are not economic in their nature, and fall therefore outside the scope of the Supreme Economic Council. The proposals contained in the memorandum had received the approval of the French authorities. Briefly those proposals could be summed up as follows:

“1) That an Inter-Allied Commission, consisting of four Commissioners, one from each Ally concerned with the administration of the occupied territories, should, together with an Italian liaison officer, be set up with full authority to co-ordinate the administration of the four Army Commands on all economic, industrial and food questions, in accordance with the policy laid down from time to time by the Supreme Economic Council.

2) That orders should be issued under the authority of the Supreme War Council to the Army Commands in the various areas, that directions given by the Commission shall be uniformly executed throughout the whole area.”

Mr Lansing inquires for what period of time the proposed Inter-Allied Commission will be expected to function.

M Pichon explains that the Supreme Economic Council had only been created for the period of the armistice. Consequently, as soon as the Peace Treaty came to be signed, the armistice will end, and the Supreme Economic Council would cease to function, unless steps were taken to prolong its existence. The same procedure would obviously apply to the new proposed Inter-Allied Commission.

Lord Robert Cecil agrees.

Mr Lansing said that on that understanding he is quite willing to accept the proposals contained in the memorandum submitted by the Supreme Economic Council for the Council of Ten.

(It is agreed to accept the proposals contained in the Memorandum submitted by the Supreme Economic Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourns to Tuesday afternoon April 22nd at 15.00.)




President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. Mr Lloyd George tells President Wilson the suggestion he made at the end of the meeting in the morning*, namely that, in order to give Italy the strategical requirements for her defense, which is the principal case on which the claim for Dalmatia is based, she should be allowed to have the islands off the coast, but not the mainland. Mr Philip Kerr, he said, had met a Yugoslav, who had told him that if the Italians hold Fiume the Yugoslavs will fight them. If they hold Dalmatia there will be sniping. But that he had not expressed any strong views about the islands.

President Wilson says that he himself had talked about the island of Cherso with M Trumbitch, who had pointed out that, owing to its position across the Gulf of Fiume, the Italians, if they held it, would make trouble up and down the Gulf.

Mr Lloyd George suggested that, if the Italians held Cherso, there ought to be a stipulation that the channel between that island and Istria should not be regarded as territorial waters. There should be some clause providing for free access through the channel except in time of war.

President Wilson says even then there should be free access if the Yugoslavs are neutral.

Mr Lloyd George says M Clemenceau, to whom he had spoken, is convinced that the Italians would not accept his proposal. He suggests, therefore, that perhaps Baron Sonnino could be induced to agree by some offer in Asia Minor.

At Mr Lloyd George’s request, M Clemenceau produces a map giving a new scheme for the distribution of mandates in Turkey, whereby Italy would secure a mandate over a considerable part of Anatolia touching territory mandated to Greece in the region of Smyrna, and the territory mandated with Constantinople, and Armenia.

President Wilson says the real trouble is that the Greeks and everyone else appear to dread the Italians as neighbors. The Patriarch of Constantinople had called on him the other day and had expressed strong objections to having the Italians as neighbors. He feels great care will have to be exercised in this matter for inasmuch as we are endeavoring to secure the peace of the world we cannot enter into any arrangement that will not make for peace.

Mr Lloyd George suggests there should be an Italian sphere of influence such as the British had in various parts of the world.

President Wilson says that the British Empire, through a long experience, has learned all sorts of lessons and gained all sorts of ideas in administration of this kind, and does not interfere unduly. The Italians, however, have no such experience. The Italians also have no ethnological claim to this territory, such as the Greeks have. In the case of the Greeks, we only desire to make them comfortable masters in their own home. The Italians have not inherited any traditions of colonial administration.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the Italians should merely have a sphere of influence and it should be made clear that their authority is limited to commercial and railway development, and that they are not to interfere with the people more than necessary.

President Wilson points out the trouble is that the Turks could not govern anyone.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Turks do not interfere much in railways; they are a quiet docile people except towards Armenians and those whom they do not like.

M Clemenceau agrees with this.

President Wilson points out that he does not like, as it were, paying the Italians for something they have no right to.

Mr Lloyd George points out that there is some strength in the Italian case that they had come into the war on the basis of a certain agreement and that Baron Sonnino’s position would be extremely difficult if it were not fulfilled.

M Clemenceau points out the inaccuracy of statements that had been made to the effect that the Italians could have obtained almost as much from Austria without fighting as they were going to obtain in the Treaty as at present contemplated. He had consulted the Green Book on the subject and found that in fact they had been offered very little.

President Wilson suggests that perhaps the Italians might take the line their position being what it was they must go home and report to their Parliament and ask for instructions.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that it is better politically for them to present Parliament with an accomplished fact. Supposing he were to go and ask the British Parliament for instructions about indemnities, the position would not be very satisfactory. It is better to give Parliament a lead in matters like this.

President Wilson suggests that the Italians will not be in the position of having to say to their Parliament: We have surrendered. On the contrary, they could say: We refused to surrender, but we now want your advice.

There is some further discussion at this point on the subject of the Italian Parliamentary position and generally as to the attitude to be taken towards the Italians in the existing position. It is eventually agreed that Sir Maurice Hankey should be sent to deliver a verbal message to S Orlando and Baron Sonnino, reminding them of Mr Lloyd George’s proposal made at the end of the morning meeting, which they had now had some time to consider, and asking if they would consider it worth while to meet their colleagues and discuss the question on this basis.

Sir Maurice Hankey reports that he had seen S Orlando, Baron Sonnino and Count Aldrovandi. He had delivered his message in the very words that President Wilson had used. After recalling Mr Lloyd George’s proposal made at the morning meeting, which they had had some hours to consider, he had asked whether they would consider it worth while to discuss the question of the Italian claims on the basis of the cession of a series of strategic islands off the coast. S Orlando had asked him if he could give the proposal in writing, but he had replied that he had only authority to deliver a verbal message. The proposal had not commended itself to S Orlando and Baron Sonnino, who had absolutely rejected it as a basis for discussion. They had said that, of course, they were always prepared to discuss anything with their colleagues if asked to do so, but they would be in the wrong if they encouraged any hopes that this could be a basis for a solution. S Orlando had elaborated his objections to the proposal a little. He had explained that even from the point of view of defense in its narrower strategic aspects the proposal did not commend itself. He had, however, always regarded defense in the wider aspect of the defense of the Italian populations in the towns on the east of the Adriatic. He mentioned in this connection especially Fiume, but also referred to Zara and Sebenico. Questioned as to the precise terms of Mr Lloyd George’s suggestion, Sir Maurice Hankey says he had been given to understand that it did not include islands such as Pago, which were almost part of the mainland, but would doubtless include the other islands allotted to Italy in the Treaty of London. Sir Maurice Hankey mentions that S Orlando had said that the question had rather retrograded within the last two days, owing to the proposal for the establishment of a free port and city at Fiume similar to that to be established at Danzig having been dropped.

On the conclusion of Sir Maurice Hankey’s statement there is some discussion as to the desirability of President Wilson publishing a statement on the subject which he had prepared.

M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George urge that he should not do so. Their grounds for this are that the statement rather assumed that Italy had closed the door to an agreement and will be regarded as a final act. It will make it difficult for Italy to recede from her position.

President Wilson points out that his statement as drafted does not close the door to negotiations, but in deference to his colleagues he agrees not to publish immediately.


2. President Wilson reports a conversation he had that morning with Baron Makino and Count Chinda. He had made the suggestion that Mr. Lansing had already made at the Council of Foreign Ministers, namely, that all claims in the Pacific should be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers as trustees leaving them to make fair and just dispositions. He had, at the same time, reminded the Japanese Delegates that it had been understood that Japan was to have a mandate for the islands in the north Pacific although he had made a reserve in the case of the island of Yap, which he himself considered should be international. He had suggested that, similarly, in the case of Kiauchau, where there was a definite Treaty relating to Kiau-Chau and Shantung, Japan should place the question in the hands of the 5 Powers. He had asked whether there could not be some modification of the Treaty with the consent of both parties. The Powers have no right to force Japan but they have the right to try and persuade her to make some agreement with China on the subject. The Japanese had been very stiff about it. They had said that they would return Kiauchau to China, the only reservation being the retention of a residential section and a free port for China. In regard to the railway, they surrendered all control except the joint interest with China in the railway and certain concessions. He had pointed out that China had no capital and had asked whether in that event China could take advantage of this position. They had replied that she could and quoted another instance where they had for 10 years shared some concern of the kind with China, which was run on the same lines. They were absolutely set on obliging China to carry out the bond. They insisted that Germany should resign the whole of her interests in Kiauchau to the Japanese and that the Powers should trust Japan to carry out her bargain with China.

Mr Lloyd George asks why Japan should have a different treatment in regard to Kiauchau to what other Powers had in respect to German colonies.

President Wilson says the reason is because in the Treaty it had been made clear that the transfer was to precede the return of the territory to China.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that it ought to be ceded by the League of Nations.

President Wilson says that the Japanese are too proud to accept this solution. He had then repeated to the Japanese the proposal he had already made to his colleagues that the spheres of influence in China should be abrogated. They had replied that they were ready to do this. They had defined spheres of influence to include the right of putting in troops and extraterritoriality. He thinks it would be a great thing if we could get rid of the right of Japan to maintain troops in Kiauchau.

Mr Lloyd George says that he thinks it is very important that in the Treaty with Germany all the Powers should be put on the same footing. Japan should not have a special position.

President Wilson then read the notes which had been exchanged between China and Japan. The first note from Japan to China had been sent before the entry of China into the war and had been to the effect that when, after the war, the leased territory had been left to the free disposal of Japan the latter would restore it to China under conditions which included a free port in Kiauchau Bay: a concession for Japan; the disposal of property is to be effected by mutual arrangement between the two countries. China’s answer had merely been to take note and President Wilson did not think the Government had accepted. Another declaration had been made by Japan on September 24th, 1918. Japan then proposed to adjust the questions in Shantung on the following lines:

1) All Japanese troops, except those at Chinan Fu the terminus of the line, to be withdrawn to Tsingtau.

2) The Chinese Government to be allowed to organise a police force for the railway.

3) The railway to pay for this police.

4) The Japanese to be represented at the headquarters of the police, at the various stations, and at the training establishments for the police.

5) Part of the staff of the railway to be Japanese.

6) The railway to become a Chino-Japanese enterprise.

7)
The Japanese civil administration to be abolished.

The Chinese reply had been that she was “pleased to agree in the above mentioned articles.” Thus it was not a Treaty but an exchange of notes.

Mr Lloyd George says that he can see no ground for differentiating in the case of Japan. This territory should be placed on exactly the same footing as all other German territory.

President Wilson says that to be perfectly fair to the Japanese he thinks they will interpret this as a challenge of their good faith. He had put it to the Japanese representatives that the peace of the Far East depended more on Chino-Japanese relations than on anything else. China is full of riches. It is clearly to the advantage of Japan to take the most generous position towards China and to show herself as a friend. The interest of the world in China was the “open door”. The Japanese had assented and expressed benevolent intentions.

Mr Lloyd George points out that it is the triumph of the Great Powers in the west that enabled Japan to make this arrangement. He feels strongly that Japan should be in the same position as other States. Otherwise other nations could insist on the same right.

(It is arranged that the next meeting should take place on the following morning at 11:00. M Clemenceau says that he hopes by that time he will have a reply from the Germans. It is agreed that this is a question which will properly be discussed with the Japanese. As, however, M Clemenceau has certain questions relating to the Western Front to raise, Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to invite the Japanese for 11:30. He is also authorized to telephone to Count Aldrovandi to let him know of the Meeting that has been arranged.)

*The Minutes of this morning's Meeting are not in the Records

[Jimbuna]

22nd April 1919

Armed workers’ militia march in Munich. Bavaria is currently controlled by the Communist Party of Germany and fighting against the anti-Communist Freikorps.


Carrier pigeon Cher Ami who carried messages on the Verdun front on trips that averaged 30 km in 24 minutes. She lost her leg carrying messages from the “Lost Battalion” of the US 77th Division.


American soldiers march past the “Victory pyramid” made up of captured German helmets in New York City.


San Francisco hosts one of the most joyous parties ever seen on Market Street as thousands of soldiers returned from World War I. The 91st Division, nicknamed the Wild West Division, had been in France for more than a year, fighting in the Ypres-Lys and Meuse-Argonne offensives.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, April 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. It is agreed that:

Alsace-Lorraine Draft Articles prepared by the French Government in regard to Alsace-Alsace-Lorraine should be examined in the firs instance by a Committee composed as follows:

Dr. Haskins, for the United States of America.
Mr. Headlam-Morley, for the British Empire.
M. Tardieu, for France.


2. President Wilson informs his colleagues that M Orlando has sent word that he is unable to be present.


3. M Clemenceau hands Mr Lloyd George a copy of a letter he had written to the Emir Feisal. The Emir Feisal Commission had replied that he was satisfied and that he expected soon to be back in Paris. M Clemenceau undertakes to give Mr Lloyd George a copy of the Emir Feisal’s letter. He asks what is to be done about the Commission.

Mr Lloyd George says that he thinks the Commission should soon start. It is settled so far as he was concerned.


4. M Clemenceau hands round copies of the German official reply to the last communication in regard to their coming to Versailles. He says that he cannot undertake to guarantee to the Germans entire free intercourse.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that they must have communication with their Government at Weimar.

M Clemenceau agrees.

President Wilson says that was all they asked for.

M Clemenceau says that he will have to take precautions that they should not have free movement at Versailles as there would be a serious danger of their being mobbed. He is responsible for their safety. At M Clemenceau’s request President Wilson drafts the following note on which the reply should be based:

“The Allied and Associated Powers will, of course, grant to the German Delegates full freedom of movement for the execution of their mission and unrestricted telegraphic communication with their Government.”

(This is agreed to.)


5. M Clemenceau hands round a draft representing the agreement reached as regards the demilitarization of the west bank of the Rhine.

President Wilson says he has already communicated it to Sir Maurice Hankey.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that it is comprehensive enough.

The draft is approved and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to send it to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.


6. M Clemenceau hands round the “Articles concerning Guarantees of Execution of the Treaty of Treaty”, which has already been agreed to by President Wilson on April 20th.

Mr Lloyd George comments on the length of the period contemplated for occupation, namely, 15 years, which seems considerable. He supposes that the British Government is not asked to keep troops there so long.

M Clemenceau says all he asks is a battalion with the flag.

Mr Lloyd George says he must insist on the difficulty which the British Government would have in maintaining any larger number of troops. The people of England insisted on the disappearance of compulsory service immediately the war was over. He had had considerable difficulties at home since the election owing to the extension of compulsory service for 12 months.

M Clemenceau draws attention to the words “by International forces” in Article I, which apparently had not been included in the copy he had left with President Wilson. He said he could not go to his people and say that there were no forces of the Allied and Associated Powers. He only asks for a flag to be shown.

Mr Lloyd George asks if 15 years was the maximum. He hoped it was not conditioned by the extension of the Treaty. Indemnities, for example, could not be paid within 15 years. He hopes he understood correctly that there would not be any question of retaining forces after that,

M Clemenceau says that is not the intention.

The document is agreed to and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.


7. M Clemenceau hands round a document entitled “Treaty between France and the United States”, which had been approved by him and President Wilson on April 20th.

President Wilson explains to Mr Lloyd George that he had made a point that it was not wise in this matter to have a tripartite agreement but a Treaty between the United States of America and France and another Treaty between Great Britain and France.

Mr Lloyd George said he thinks that would do for Great Britain and instructs Sir Maurice Hankey to show it to Mr Balfour.

Subject to Mr Balfour’s agreement, this is accepted.

(Mr Balfour agreed to it after the Meeting.)


8. M Clemenceau hands round an Article concerning the independence of German-Austria.

This is accepted and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.


9. M Clemenceau reminds President Wilson that he had undertaken to complete the Articles in regard to Danzig in accordance with certain alterations that had been agreed.

President Wilson then produces the document and proposed that it should be sent direct to the Drafting Committee.

Mr Lloyd George agrees and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward the document to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.


10. President Wilson asks Mr Lloyd George if the British Government were sending additional troops to Archangel. He had had a communication from General Bliss which seemed to indicate that the local British Command instead of contemplating withdrawal intended to take steps to link up the Russian forces in the north with those in Siberia, which would involve an advance to Kotlas and Viatka. General Bliss’s communication had also suggested that 12,000 British reinforcements were being sent.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks there must be some misunderstanding. Great importance is attached to secrecy in regard to the withdrawal from north Russia and possibly this is some local bluff to convey the impression that no withdrawal was intended. He does not think that the reinforcements contemplated were nearly so large. He will undertake to inquire into the matter.