100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 12:30

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance) with the Delegates from Japan


I. In reply to questions by President Wilson, the Japanese Delegates declare that:

“The policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao.

The owners of the Railway will use special Police only to ensure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purpose.

The Police Force will be composed of Chinese, and such Japanese instructors as the Directors of the Railway may select will be appointed by the Chinese Government.”

(At this point there is a more or less prolonged conversation between President Wilson and the Japanese Delegates which at a certain point develops into a general discussion. It is only possible to record the salient features of the general discussion.)

Viscount Chinda makes it clear that in the last resort, if China fails to carry out the agreements - if for example, she will not assist in the formation of the Police Force or the employment of Japanese Instructors, the Japanese Government reservs the right to fall back on the Agreements of 1918.

President Wilson points out that by that time Japan and China will be operating under the system of the League of Nations and Japan will be represented on the Council of the League. In such an event, he asks why should not the Japanese voluntarily apply for the mediation of the Council of the League of Nations.

Viscount Chinda says that even if the case was sent to the League of Nations, nevertheless Japan must reserve her right in the last analysis to base her rights on her special Agreements with China. If the Chinese Government acts loyally, such a case would not arise, but if the Chinese Government refuses to do so, the only course left to Japan would be to invoke the agreement.

President Wilson says that what he wants to urge was this; he does not want a situation to arise which would prove embarrassing. As the Japanese representatives know, the United States Government has been much distressed by the twenty-one demands. These negotiations were based on the Notes of May 1915, and this exchange of Notes had its root in the negotiations connected with the twenty-one demands. In the view of his Government, the less the present transactions are related to this incident, the better. He would like, as a friend of Japan, to see no reference to the Notes of the last few years. If an occasion such as Viscount Chinda has postulated should arise, he hopes that the Japanese Government would not bring it before the Council of the League of Nations with a threat of war, but merely for friendly council, so that the Council of the League might make the necessary representations to China.

Baron Makino says that this is possible eventuality but that so far as Japan is concerned, if the Chinese people co-operate with goodwill, he thinks no such eventuality would arise. So far as Japan is concerned, she looks to the engagement with China, but hopes that no difficulty would arise.

Viscount Chinda said that the difficulty is that President Wilson on his side does not admit the validity of these Agreements but Japan does. He only mentions the fact so as not to be morally bound not to invoke these Agreements. In the meanwhile he hopes that there would be no occasion for the refusal of the Chinese to carry out the Agreements.

President Wilson says that frankly he must insist that nothing he said should be construed as any admission of the recognition of the Notes exchanged between Japan and China.

Viscount Chinda says he had mentioned the point in order to remove any moral engagement on behalf of Japan not to invoke the Agreements in question.

President Wilson says that the Japanese representatives propose to make public the policy declared at the outset of this discussion by means of an interview. He supposes he is at liberty to use the part of the declaration that most concerned him as he understood it.

Baron Makino says that the Japanese representatives attach the greatest importance to no impression being given that this decision was forced. They wish it to be clear that this is a voluntary expression of the Japanese Delegates’ interpretation of the policy of their Government in regard to the restitution of the Province of Shantung. He hopes that this will be made quite clear.

President Wilson says that the following point had occurred to him. He had not appreciated from the map which had been shown him whether the Forts which Germany had built were taken over in the area of the settlement.

Viscount Chinda draws a sketch to illustrate the exact position and shows that the settlement would be part of the Town of Tsingtao and would not include the fortifications.

In reply to President Wilson, Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda give an assurance that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn as soon as practicable.

Sir Maurice Hankey asks what he is to send to the Drafting Committee.

Viscount Chinda produces a revised draft of the clause to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace which includes the alterations agreed to on the previous day. He gives the following explanation as to the reasons of the various alterations that have been made:

“The instructions of the Japanese Government state expressly that the surrender of the German public property should be unconditional and without compensation. Compliance with the above instruction makes it absolutely necessary to modify the Articles I and II of our claims by adding at their ends the phrase: ‘free of all charges and encumbrances’, in order to exempt them from the general application of Article IX Financial Clauses.

As regards our claim upon the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, the Japanese Government regards the railway as German public property, but contention may possibly be advanced claiming it to be private property. In case the contention should be well established, the Japanese Government would be willing to pay for the same. In the meantime, the question is left open. This explains why the addition of the same phrase as above is not proposed in respect to the second paragraph, Article I of our claim.”

(The Articles in the Appendix relative to Shantung Province are approved. Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to forward them to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


II. Mr Lloyd George hands to the Japanese Representatives the following proposal which had been made by an Expert Committee, to which the question had been referred:

“Belgium shall sit, as originally proposed, as one of the five members of the Commission for all general discussions and for all other questions except those relating to damage by sea, for which Japan snail take her place, and those relating to Austria-Hungary, for which Serbia shall take Belgium’s place. This Commission will thus always be limited in number to five, and the Japanese and Serbian representatives, on the occasions on which they are entitled to sit, will have the same power of voting as the delegates of the other four Powers.”

Baron Makino says that the arrangement should be altered to provide that the Japanese should be represented on the Commission (wherever their interests are concerned). There are a certain number of Japanese interned in Germany.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is not a matter for the Reparation Commission.

Viscount Chinda points out that the necessity for such provision arose in connection with Article 13 in the Financial Clauses.

(After some discussion, it is agreed that Japan should be represented on the Permanent Reparation Commission whenever questions relating to damage by sea were under consideration (as already provided) and in addition whenever Japanese interests under Article 13 of the Financial Clauses are under consideration.)


III. Viscount Chinda draws attention to Article 16 of the Financial Clauses which is as follows:

“The High Contracting Parties waive reciprocally all claims on account of the expenses of all kinds incurred by them in connection with enemy prisoners of war.”

He points out that there are between 4,000 and 5,000 German prisoners in Japan. These have not been used for any sort of work as had been possible in European countries, but have been maintained at the expense of Japan under the provisions of the Hague Convention. It has been entirely a one-sided expense. In view of the fact that in the case of most other countries, the numbers of prisoners had been fairly well balanced, Japan stands in a unique position and is therefore entitled to an exceptional treatment in this respect.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is not the case in regard to civilian persons interned. The British have had four or five Germans to maintain for one British maintained in Germany.

Viscount Chinda said that German prisoners in Japan are military. They constitute the garrison of Kiaochow and had been in Japanese hands ever since the early stage of the war.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Japan has inherited the German rights in Kiaochow which might be set off against the cost of maintaining these Germans.

Baron Makino says that that had not been taken into the calculation.

Mr Lloyd George pointed out that every time one country or another brings up some new point difficulties arise. The sums mount up and up and Germany will not be able to pay for the Reparation. Hence it was decided hitherto to stick rigidly to the principles. Japan will, of course, receive a share of reparation for pensions.

Baron Makino says that Japan has lost less than 2,000 lives and would not receive much on this account.

Mr Lloyd George says it is very awkward to put in a special claim for one country, as then all other countries would wish to put in their claims.

Baron Makino says that if great difficulties will be created, Japan will not press her demand.

Mr Lloyd George, President Wilson and M Clemenceau thank Baron Makino for this declaration.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


1. An American proposal for the Policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in the Baltic States

A discussion arises between Mr Balfour, who wishes for the British government to examine it in detail and Mr Lansing, who says the document is still internal for the Americans and in no way complete.

(It is agreed that the question be postponed to a later meeting and that the subject should be brought on the Agenda at the instance of the American Delegation. Mr Balfour observes that, as the situation is critical, it would be desirable that a decision should be taken as early as possible.)


2. M Pichon reads the a memorandum concerning the Delegates from Sweden and Norway regarding the evacuation of the province of Flensborg. There follows a lengthy discussion concerning whether Military forces should be used or the Naval Forces can accomplish this without aid.

(It is then decided that the naval advisers of France, Great Britain and the United States of America should meet to devise means of carrying out the policy outlined in the memorandum. They should, if necessary, confer with the military advisers of the same Powers, with the object of supplementing naval by military effort on land. The memorandum quoted above is adopted.)


3. M Pichon says that a Treaty had been signed between the Government of the French Republic and the Prince of Monaco, copies of which have been circulated to the various Delegations. At the time this had been signed, there was a fear that the German branch of the dukes of Urach might urge their claim to the succession. The Treaty had then been made by common accord between the Government of the French Republic and the Prince of Monaco, ensuring that his successor should be his grand-daughter. It would be necessary to guarantee this Treaty by an article recording the fact that the High Contracting Parties had cognizance of the agreement.

Mr Lansing inquires whether the High Contracting Parties were asked to recognize the validity of the Treaty.

M Pichon replies that they were only asked to recognize that they had taken cognizance of the Treaty.

Mr Lansing said that he could see no reason why the Allies should not go further and recognize the Treaty.

(It is then decided unanimously that an article to the following effect should be included in the Supplementary Clauses of the Treaty of Peace:

“The High Contracting Parties recognize the Treaty signed by the Government of the French Republic on July 17th, 1918, with His Serene Highness, the Prince of Monaco, defining the relations between France and the Principality.”)


4. Question of German Submarine Cables

Mr Lansing says that Article 38 of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses had been, he understood, drafted on the resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour after a long discussion on March 24th. The record of the meeting is that, “in order to meet the general view, Mr Balfour proposes the following resolution:

“The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her own expense any parts which had been cut out from such cables, or which, without having been cut, are now in use by any of those Powers.”

(After an extremely long discussion it is decided to refer this question to the Council of the Heads of States.)


5. Mr Lansing says that there is a question connected with that of submarine cables which he would like on a future occasion to discuss. The question was whether in the interests of cable communication it would not be desirable that the Island of Yap be internationalized, and administered by an international commission in control of the cable lines.

(It is decided to defer the question until after the signing of the Peace Treaty, at which point it can be discussed among all the Allies.


6. Mr Lansing observes that some of the Reparation Clauses in the Treaty are clauses with a continuing effect which might last for 30 years. It had been proposed that the interpretation of these clauses whenever difficulties arose should be left to a Reparation Commission, representing the Five Powers. It had further been proposed that the interpretation must be unanimous. It is probable that the representatives on such a Commission will not be jurists. He thinks it would be far better to appoint a single judge, whose finding should be final on all points of interpretation. He would, himself, suggest that this function of arbiter be exercised by the Lord Chief Justice of England.

Mr Balfour says that he has had no notice of this proposal and asks whether Mr. Lansing had circulated any memorandum on the subject.

M Pichon says that he was also taken unawares by this proposal. He would like time to consider it and asked Mr Lansing to set forth his reasons on paper.

Mr Balfour asks whether this provision will have to be inserted in the Treaty.

Mr Lansing says that the Germans will have to agree to it. He agrees, however, to circulate a memorandum on the subject.


7. Baron Makino asks whether the text of the Treaty will be made public when it was handed to the Germans. Peace is to be established when the Treaty is ratified, and it is the general hope that this will be achieved in one or two months after the signature. He points out that it will take a long time to telegraph the whole Treaty in cipher to Japan. It will take less time should the Treaty be made public and should it be possible to telegraph it in plain language.

Mr Balfour thought that it would be possible to telegraph the Treaty in plain language the day it is communicated in a plenary session to the Powers with special interests.

Baron Makino further asks that the French Government should facilitate the telegraphing of the Treaty to Japan.

M Pichon undertakes to do this.

Mr Lansing says that the Treaty will be telegraphed to the State Department in Washington and that he will arrange that it be communicated to the Japanese Ambassador who will be able to forward it thence to Japan. He would ask, however, that the Treaty be not made public until communicated to the Germans.

(This is agreed to.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. Mr Lloyd George says that he had learned that at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers Mr Lansing had made a very powerful statement in which he had said that the German Constitution provided that the Central Government had full powers to make peace and war.

M Clemenceau says that had not been the case in 1871.

President Wilson says it was a long time since he had studied Constitutional history, but he felt fairly sure that the Constitution of the German Empire had been drawn up since 1871, and that in it had been included the powers of making peace and war.

M Clemenceau says that great care ought to be exercised lest we should make a peace, and find a few minutes after that the German States had not accepted it.


2. Mr Lloyd George proposes that during the following week while the German Delegates are studying the peace treaty, the Supreme Council should study the question and get with a general idea of the line they were going to take in regard to the re-arrangement of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He proposes that in the following week the Delegates of Austria and Hungary should be invited to Paris. There follows much discussion over the questions of when and where the Meeting should take place, and who should be responsible for inviting the Austrian Representatives to the Meeting.

(It is agreed that M Clemenceau, as President of the Preliminary Peace Conference, should invite the representatives of the Austrian and Hungarian Governments to come to Chantilly on May 12th.)


(3) There is a short discussion in regard to the position in North Russia, in the course of which Mr Lloyd George suggested that he and his colleagues should see Mr. Tchaikowski, the head of the Archangel Government, who is very hopeful that the Russians at Archangel might, by their own efforts, establish contact with General Kolchak. His information in regard to the Bolsheviks does not correspond with that in the possession of the French Government. He undertakes to distribute a memorandum prepared by the British Intelligence Department in regard to the situation in Russia. He suggests that a similar document should be prepared by the French and the United States Military Departments.

President Wilson said he thinks little good will be served by seeing Mr Tchaikowski. His views have been received by telegram. The United States only has one regiment at Archangel, and United States public opinion would not tolerate sending any more troops.

Mr Lloyd George says that the British Government has called for volunteers, and had received more offers than they could accept. The lists had had to be closed because they were full.

President Wilson thinks perhaps experts might hear Mr. Tchaikowski’s views.

(It is agreed that as the basis for discussion the United States, British and French Military Departments should prepare memoranda for circulation.)


4. Sir Maurice Hankey says that in consultation with Mr. Dutasta he had prepared a scheme for dealing with questions raised by the Germans in connection with the Treaty of Peace.

(This scheme is approved.)


5. Sir Maurice Hankey recalls the decision that had been taken in the morning that the proportions in which the successive installments paid over by Germany in satisfaction of claims against her should be divided by the Allied and Associated Powers. This should be determined by the Reparation Commission set up in the Reparation Articles, in proportion to the claims allowed by the Commission.

He asks for instructions as to what action should be taken to give effect to this decision. It is not a matter which would affect any clause in the Treaty of Peace, and as these Minutes were not circulated, he feels some doubt as to the best method of placing it on record so that it should not be overlooked. He had contemplated writing a letter to M Loucheur, Mr Norman Davis and Mr Keynes, so that the experts of France, the United States of America, and Great Britain, might be apprised of the decision.

Mr Lloyd George says that the matter is one of so great importance that he thinks it should take the form of a letter or a formal minute signed by M Clemenceau, President Wilson and himself.

(This is agreed to and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft the letter.)


6. It was decided provisionally and subject to possible revision in the event of good reason being shown to the contrary that Article 46 of the Military terms of Peace should be suppressed.

Note: Article 46 is as follows:—

“The Armistice of November 11th 1918 and the Convention subsequent thereto, remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with tie above stipulations.”

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


(7) Sir Maurice Hankey points out that Article 45 is reserved.

President Wilson asks how the Allied and Associated Powers could change the German laws.

Mr Lloyd George points out that if the German Military Service Law is not abolished, military recruits will automatically be called up for service.

(It was agreed that the form of the Article should be altered so as to provide that the German Government should undertake within a period not exceeding three months from the ratification of the Treaty to modify their law.)


8. Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram from the British Admiralty urging that an alteration should be made in Article 32 of the Naval Clauses, specially providing for the surrender of Floating Docks, and calling attention to the sale of a large Floating Dock now at Hamburg to an Engineering and Slipway Company at Rotterdam which is not prevented by the Armistice terms.

(It was agreed that no alteration should be made in the Treaty in this respect.)

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


The Council has before it Articles prepared by the experts present, with others, on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine.

M Tardieu says that the only points in dispute are Articles 12, 24 and 30.

Article 12:

After M. Tardieu explains the object of Article 12, Mr Lloyd George withdraws the reservation which had been made by the Representatives.

(Article 12 is accepted.)


Article 24:

M Tardieu, in explanation of Article 24, says that the balance of the property in Alsace-Lorraine under the general economic clauses of the Peace Treaty ought to be used for satisfying the economic claims of the pre-war period. This balance, according to the general rule, should be part of the general fund for reparation.

The French Government asks for a special privilege in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, because of the economic situation of the German private properties which was the result of the systematic germanization of Alsace-Lorraine. They ask that the balance of the property should be attributed to Alsace-Lorraine itself.

Mr Lloyd George says that this was not the proposal. It was that the balance should be handed over to the French claim for reparation.

Mr Klotz does not admit this.

Mr Lloyd George says he is afraid he must contest this clause very strongly. Its effect is to give priority to special claims in Alsace-Lorraine, which, though of low category, are in reality general claims. He only asks for the application of the usual rule that the surplus should go into the general pool. The balance should go into the pool and be distributed according to the principles of distribution adopted. Under the present proposal the Alsace-Lorraine claims, though of low category, would have priority over our reparation. M Tardieu had spoken of germanization. This is true to the extent that German skill and brains had greatly increased the wealth of these provinces. Nevertheless, the balance ought to go into the general pool. He was informed that one effect of this clause would be that pensions would be given to German officials in front of pensions to Allied soldiers.

M Clemenceau withdraws the proposal.

(It is agreed that Article 24 should be suppressed.)


Article 30:

M Tardieu says that Article 30 refers to reparation to Alsatians and Lorrainians. France asks that they should be treated in the same way as other French citizens under Annex I of the Reparation Clauses. The first article of the Reparation clauses declare Germany to be responsible for losses. Article 2 provided for reparation for the civilian population. It is impossible to say that Alsatians and Lorrainians are not French citizens and part of the French population. He feels he was entitled to put forward claims for them on the same ground as for other French citizens. Otherwise, France would have two classes of citizens. It was a matter of sentiment for France, and he asked that these people should be put on the same footing as other French citizens.

Mr Lloyd George says that the principle has already been considered and decided in respect to Poland and Czechoslovakia.

There had been considerable devastation in Poland, but Poland had nominally been at war against us, even though it had been against the will of the Polish people. Poles had actually taken part in the devastation of France. Similarly, soldiers from Alsace-Lorraine had taken part in the devastation of France. It had been decided against the Polish claim. If, however, it were now granted to Alsace-Lorraine, it must be granted to the Czechs, Poles and Yugo-Slavs.

The French Government stands to lose a good deal by this.

The second point is that the destruction in Alsace-Lorraine had been mainly wrought by the French armies when redeeming these provinces. He doubted if much destruction had been done by the German Armies. In these circumstances, he felt the claim was not one that could be justified.

M Tardieu says that the material devastation in Alsace-Lorraine was insignificant. What they wanted was pensions for widows, orphans and mutilated.

Mr Lloyd George says that these were due to French bombardments and British bombing. It is rather difficult in these circumstances to allow any claim.

President Wilson points out that many of them would be widows and orphans of German soldiers. He says his advisers take the same view as Mr Lloyd George. He can see the sentimental importance of the matter for France, but to agree would be to upset the general principles of reparation.

The French Representatives withdraw the proposal.

(It is decided that Article 30 should be suppressed.)


Article VII:

President Wilson says he was informed that the missing Article VII affected Belgium and the redemption of marks. Its object was to provide for the redemption of German marks.

Mr Lloyd George says he understands it had been only discussed on the possible assumption that the Belgian claim in regard to the redemption of marks was accepted. That claim had been refused.

Mr Tardieu says that the Article had only been adopted on that assumption.

Dr Young (United States) says the Germans only acknowledge by this clause their mark debt. By it they would have to agree to redeem the marks at some future time under a convention to be concluded between France and Germany.

President Wilson says that if this Article is passed, it ought to be applied to Belgium also.

Dr Falk (Britain) points out that the Belgians can sell marks on the market. This clause provides little more than this for France. France is entitled either to sell marks on the market, or to make an arrangement with Germany.

President Wilson says that this Article would make the public impression that it authorized the French Government to secure a redemption of the marks at a better rate than the market rate. The same advantage would have to be provided for Belgium.

Dr Falk suggests that it would be better to suppress the Article altogether.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Article does not really amount to anything. It would give the impression to the Germans of some advantage being given to France, and make difficulties in their signing the Treaty of Peace without corresponding advantage.

M Klotz says that the Article merely contained a statement of fact. It would be an advantage to Germany that France should not keep marks in hand, otherwise they were in a position to destroy the exchange. It merely provided for a Convention between the German and French Governments. In the course of the armistice discussion, the Germans had told M de Lasteyrie that they were afraid to let so many marks remain in French possession, and they had offered to buy them back at the rate of 70 centimes. The Belgians would not agree, in which they made a mistake, and the plan had fallen through.

President Wilson points out that France could enter into a Convention with Germany on this subject at any time, there is no need to authorize it in the Treaty of Peace. What is the object of inserting a clause that really adds nothing to France’s power, but gives the impression of something disadvantageous to the Germans?

Mr Lloyd George agrees and points out that it would also cause difficulties with the Belgians.

(It is agreed that Article VII should be dropped except the last paragraph.)


Note: This is all in relation to a section of the Peace Treaty that will give the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, taken by Germany in 1871, back to France.
-Steve

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:30

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. M Klotz points out that the first part of the reparation clauses say that Germany acknowledges liability to pay. The question arises as to whether in drafting this should be stated as “Germany” or “Germany and the enemy States.” The most important instance is that if joint liability is admitted, Italy might be in a position to claim the total of the damage inflicted on her against Germany. If this is accepted without qualification, it will reduce what France and Great Britain can obtain for reparation. One plan would be to state that joint liability should be pro rata with the military effort. For example, in applying the case of Germany’s liability to Italy, it might be said that Germany had sent divisions corresponding to, say, one-tenth of the total number of divisions used, thus Germany would only be responsible for one-tenth of the damage inflicted. Without some such qualification the acceptance of the principle is very dangerous.

Mr Lloyd George says that this point has always puzzled him. All he wants to do is the fair thing. As a matter of fact the German forces had not been anything like one-tenth of the total on the Italian front. He believed only five German divisions had been employed out of a total of about sixty, and these for only a very short time. Moreover, Italy had never declared war on Germany for thirteen months after she entered the war with Austria, consequently, when claiming pensions, she would be claiming them for the time when Germany was at peace with Italy. There would be no justice in this.

President Wilson points out that there will be other complications. He remembers that in conversations with the Italian representatives they always claimed that they identified more German divisions on their front than other nations did. He remembers they claimed there had been six divisions.

Mr Lloyd George says that in Serbia Germany had taken a leading part. Under M Klotz’s principle, Serbia could make out a substantial claim for reparation. The same applies to Romania, but it would not apply to Italy, except in the case of the battle of Caporetto.

President Wilson points out that Italy will have a good claim in the case of submarines against Germany.

Mr Lloyd George agrees, and suggests that the basis should be the relation of the military and naval effort. The Italians cannot complain at this.

M Klotz proposed the following draft:

“War damages resulting from hostilities on any one of the fronts shall be compensated by Germany and her allies pro rata with the military and naval force supplied by each of them on that front. The proportions win be determined by the Reparations Commission.”

(This is accepted.)

[Jimbuna]

1st May 1919

In Munich, the anti-Communist Freikorps breaks through Communist defenses and capture the city after heavy street fighting. Anti-communist troops leading Red Guard prisoners.


Lenin making a May Day speech in Red Square, Moscow.


Ship Losses:

Ilim (Soviet Navy Red Movement_ The gunboat was rammed and sunk on the Kama River by Pronzitelnyy ( Soviet Navy). Raised on 12 June, repaired and returned to service.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. It is agreed that:

Mr. Balfour should communicate the decision taken on this subject of Kiauchau and Shantung to the Chinese Delegation.

(An immediate message is sent to Mr Balfour, communicating this decision.)


2. Mr Lloyd George brings to note certain criticisms that had been made by the British Solicitor-General and Attorney-General against the articles on this subject, drafted by the Drafting Committee on the basis of the instructions given to them. In regard to Article 1, attention has been drawn to the words “not for an offence against criminal law but”. It has been pointed out that the draft as it stands might possibly be construed as an admission on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers that the German Emperor had not committed any offences against criminal law. He proposes the omission of these words.

President Wilson agrees.

(It was agreed that The first clause, Article 1, should read as follows:

“The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”)

In regard to Article 2, Mr Lloyd George says that criticisms have been made against this Article on the ground that it might be construed to enable the German Government to secure immunity to persons who are accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war by trying them in a German Court and passing a nominal sentence.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should be instructed to devise some means of avoiding this interpretation and the following draft of the first clause of Article 2 is suggested:

“The German Government engages that the persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war shall be brought before military tribunals by the Allied and Associated Powers and if found guilty sentenced to the punishment laid down by military law.”)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate these alterations to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


3. M Clemenceau asks if there is any news from the Belgians.

President Wilson says he has received none.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Belgian financial experts had asked to see Mr Keynes, but he did not know on what subject.

President Wilson said that Mr. McCormick had told him that the Belgian Delegation wished M Cartier, who was the Belgian Minister at Washington, to see President Wilson, in order to place before him certain aspects of the question with which he was not familiar. He, himself, had refused to see them, as he did not think it was right to conduct, as it were, a separate negotiation. Mr McCormick had also had conveyed the impression that the Belgians were alleging that the French and British Governments had in some special way granted them the value of the German marks in Belgium. He emphasized that this was only a general impression and not an exact statement.


4. M Clemenceau reports that the Credentials Committee will see the German Delegates at 15:00. The German Delegates have asked for the credentials of the Allied Delegates and Associated Powers. There has been some delay in regard to those of the Czecho-Slovaks and Poland.


5. M Pichon said that there will certainly be an incident when the Germans ask for the Italian Credentials and M Jules Cambon is unable to produce them. It should be made clear, in his opinion, to the world and to the Italians that Italy is responsible for this state of affairs. Recalling the Pact of London, to which Italy adhered, whereby France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia had agreed not to make a separate peace, M Pichon says that we must show clearly that it was Italy who had separated. He proposes, therefore, that the incident should be notified by telegram to Italy through the President of the Conference and that Italy should be allowed to hear of it only through the Press. The message should not contain any invitation to the Italians to return. The responsibility for this should be left to the Italians themselves. The message should merely show that the absence of the Italian Credentials is their fault and not ours. In reply to President Wilson he says he contemplates that the message should consist merely of a simple relation of the incident. For example, that credentials had been exchanged with the German Delegates; that Germany had asked for the Italian credentials. And that M Jules Cambon had replied that we had not got them. If the Germans do not ask for the Italian credentials, then no incident will arise.

Mr Lloyd George doubts if the Germans will ask for the Italian credentials.

M Clemenceau says that in their case he would certainly ask for them. M Jules Cambon will certainly make no answer today about the Italian credentials, beyond merely stating that he had not got them. The Germans might raise this when they meet the representatives of-the Allied and Associated Powers. But M Jules Cambon will simply say he had no power to discuss.

Mr Lloyd George asks what attitude should be taken if the Germans pressed the question when they met our plenipotentiaries.

M Clemenceau said that we should simply reply that we are ready to make peace and leave on Italy the responsibility for breaking the Treaty.

President Wilson pointed out that Italy had broken the Treaty or was contemplating breaking the Treaty in a most peculiar way. They said they would not agree to sign the Treaty with Germany because the Treaty with Austria was not settled, which was an irrelevant matter.

Mr Lloyd George points out that they represented that the League of Nations was their difficulty in the circumstances.

M Clemenceau says the Italians had promised to him, in front of his colleagues, to telegraph from Rome if they were coming back. They had not done so.

President Wilson says he thinks it inadvisable to send any message, even of the most formal character. By implication, it would constitute an invitation to the Italians to return. His interpretation of the news from Rome is that in reality they are anxious to come back and he thinks if they are left alone they might come back in 10 days’ time.

In the course of the discussion, Mr. Lloyd George read the following message from M. Poincaré to Italy:

“Italy and France, closely united in the war, remain united in peace. Nothing shall separate them. A cooling of their friendship would be a catastrophe for Latin civilization and for humanity. France, faithful to her engagements, to her sympathies and to her traditions, will keep her hands joined with the hands of Italy.”

There Is some discussion on this subject, in the course of which it Is pointed out that this message might be construed as a declaration on behalf of the French Government. Under ordinary circumstances the message is perfectly beyond criticism, but at the present juncture it is susceptible of misinterpretation.

M Pichon says he attaches no importance to it.

Mr Lloyd George points out that to some extent it might be taken as confirming the impression conveyed in the Italian newspapers to the effect that French public opinion is rather rallying to the side of Italy.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed that no message in regard to what might occur at Versailles on the subject of the Italian credentials should be sent to Italy.)


6. After a short discussion, it was agreed that:

(The question of submarine cables should be discussed with the Foreign Ministers at the Quai d’Orsay at 16:00.


7. M Pichon asks for a reconsideration of the decision taken on the previous day to invite the representatives of Austria and of Hungary to Paris on the 12th May. He observes that, at Vienna, there is in Austria a Government with which the Allied and Associated Powers can negotiate. In regard to Hungary, however, the news is to the effect that the Government is tottering and that the country is not behind it. This makes it desirable to wait some days before sending an invitation. This will also have the advantage of giving a few more days to see what happens on the side of Italy and it must be remembered that the great question in the Austrian settlement was the frontier of Italy. Hence, it will be better not to act too soon. If something is to be done immediately, it will be a good plan to bring the Hungarians to Paris by the middle of May. The Treaty could be ready for them, but it is not desirable to have the Austrians and Hungarians before we are ready.

President Wilson says that the principal reason for inviting the Austrians is to steady the Government at Vienna by showing to Austrian public opinion that we are ready to deal with it. According to his information, no delay in this matter is possible. The case of Hungary is different, and, as Mr Lloyd George had said, perhaps stronger. Even there, we might help to prevent constant changes of Government. Our expectation of [omission] was less strong. He hopes, however that the invitation will not be delayed and he, himself, would like to have it sent in 6 hours.

M Clemenceau agrees and says he will discuss the details with M Pichon later.

Mr Lloyd George agrees with President Wilson.

(M Pichon withdraws.)


8. President Wilson says it has been brought to his attention that the Jews are somewhat inhospitably regarded in Poland. In Romania also they depend only on statutory rights. While we cannot deal with Romania, we can deal with their position in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Certain safeguards have been suggested to him.

(He then reads the following two clauses, one of which he had drafted himself, while the other had been prepared by a United States legal draftsman:

1) The State of . . . . . . . . . . covenants and agrees that it will accord to all racial or national minorities within its jurisdiction exactly the same treatment and security, alike in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of its people.

2) The State of . . . . . . . . . . . covenants and agrees that it will not prohibit or interfere with the free exercise of any creed, religion or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals, and that no person within its jurisdiction shall be molested in life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness by reason of his adherence to any such creed, religion or belief.”)

Mr Lloyd George says he was going to propose that some similar provisions should be introduced in the Mandates.

President Wilson then reads a draft of clauses for the Treaty of Peace which had been prepared by Dr Miller concerning the protection of minorities in Poland, He says that the draftsman had consulted the representatives of smaller nations and of the Jews in preparing this draft.

Mr Lloyd George says that this really forms part of a bigger subject. He himself has received a note on the subject from Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith which opened up some wider aspects of the conditions which should be accepted by the new nations. He asks why some such provision should not be laid down as a condition for admission to the League of Nations.

President Wilson says these States are already admitted to the League.

Mr Lloyd George says that M Paderewski had made to him a very able defense of the attitude of Poland towards the Jews, and had pointed out that the Jews had themselves to blame to a considerable extent.

President Wilson says that the reason the Jews had caused trouble was because in those countries they were not really welcome citizens. They do not care for any country where they were badly treated. In the United States of America, Great Britain or France, those questions do not arise. They are only disloyal in countries where they are not treated properly.

Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau say that the Jews are very good citizens in their countries.

Mr Lloyd George says that in Poland he understands the Jews are really more efficient men of business than the Poles.

M Clemenceau said that in Poland a Pole who wants to carry out any transaction - for example, to buy a horse - will send for a Jew.

President Wilson points out that in England the Jews had been bad citizens before they were properly treated.

Mr Lloyd George remarks that Cromwell was the first person to recognize the importance of treating the Jews properly.

President Wilson proposes that a body of experts should be got together to draw up clauses, if not for the present Treaty, at any rate for subsequent Treaties.

Mr Lloyd George thinks the matter should be put in hand at once.

President Wilson suggests that his documents should be sent to this Committee as a basis for their inquiry. His draft about the protection of religious minorities will probably be sufficient.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Lloyd George says that there are other more mundane matters referred to in Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith’s memorandum. He points out that the new States ought to assume the same obligations as other States in regard to matters adhering to general Conventions such as the Postal & Telegraph Convention; Industrial, Property and Copyright Conventions; and International Transit Conventions. He suggests that Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith’s memorandum should also be sent to the Committee.

President Wilson agrees.

President Wilson suggests that the Committee should examine how these questions are to be fitted into the Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George says the difficulty was that the new States had already been recognized, but they had not been created.

President Wilson asks what is the act of creating a new State?

Mr Lloyd George says that the Treaty will be the act of creation, since, until the Treaties were signed, they will be part of Germany or Austria.

(It was agreed that a Committee composed as follows:—

Dr Miller for the United States of America;
Mr Headlam-Morley for the British Empire;
A French Representative to be nominated by M. Clemenceau;
should meet immediately to consider the International obligations to be accepted by Poland and other new States created by the Treaties of Peace, including the protection of racial and religious minorities and other matters raised in the following documents:

a) The two drafts produced by President Wilson and quoted above;

b) The clauses forwarded by Dr. Miller;

c) Memorandum by Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith;

all of which should be regarded as an indication to the Committee of the subjects they were to consider.)


9. Mr Lloyd George points out that no arrangements have been made to regulate the post-bellum occupation of German territory. It is important that provision should be made for the relations between the Army and the civil authorities, etc. He is informed that General Weygand is discussing this with General Thwaites and General Bliss, but, in the meantime, some provision has to be made in the Treaty of Peace. He suggests the following clause:

“All matters regarding occupation not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated by a subsequent Convention or Conventions which shall have the same force and effect as if embodied in the present Treaty.”

(This is agreed as a basis for the preparation of an Article by the Drafting Committee.)


10. Mr. Lloyd George urges that the conditions of the Mandates should be fixed. He asks if they ought not to be inserted in the Treaty with Germany.

M Clemenceau says this is unnecessary.

President Wilson agrees.

Mr Lloyd George says that at any rate there ought to be a clear understanding on the matter. The British Dominions lay great stress on this.

President Wilson says that there is a tacit agreement as to the assignment of the Mandates.

Mr Lloyd George says it is rather the conditions of the Mandates he is referring to.

President Wilson says that the Supreme Council is too much pressed to take up that matter.


11. M Clemenceau says he does not think that the Treaty of Peace will be ready before Monday. He suggests that the plenary Conference at which he would read the summary to the States with special interests should be held on Sunday.

President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George both demur to a Sunday meeting.

M Clemenceau says it will have to be held on Saturday.


12. Enemy ships in United States ports There was a short discussion on the subject of enemy ships in United States ports, which is postponed for further consideration.


13. There is a short discussion in regard to the opinions expressed by the American, British and Italian Delegations on the Supreme Economic Council in favour of relaxation of the blockade.

President Wilson says that if the blockade is not removed until the Peace has been ratified, Germany would go to pieces.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the real difficulty in revictualling Germany is not so much the blockade as the fact that Germany has no financial resources wherewith to pay for food or raw material, hence it is necessary to provide some means for supplying credit. He has put forward a scheme which he understands is not acceptable to the United States experts. He does not attach any special importance to any particular scheme, but he feels sure it is necessary to have some scheme, and the subject ought to be discussed. All his information tends to show that Germany’s signature to Peace will depend mainly on her prospects of getting food and raw materials.

President Wilson suggests that it will not be necessary to propound any particular scheme. It will be sufficient to say that effective cooperation will be given.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not think this will suffice. The Germans will say that promises of the kind are held out to them in the Armistice discussions, but that nothing had resulted. It is necessary to propound a definite scheme which would be acceptable to the Germans.

(The Subject is adjourned.)


14. The formal Minute in Appendix I [III] is signed in triplicate by M Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George as giving effect to the decision taken on the previous day as to the proportions in which the receipts paid by Germany for reparation were to be divided between the Allied and Associated Governments.

One copy is kept by President Wilson, one by M Clemenceau and one by Mr Lloyd George.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:00


M Clemenceau calls on M Pichon to explain how the suggestion of submarine cables now stands.

M Pichon says that on the 24th March, 1919, the following Resolution proposed by Mr Balfour had been passed by the Council of Ten, namely:

“The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense submarine cables cut by the Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which had been cut out from such cables or which, without having been cut, are now in use by any of those Powers”.

It had been agreed that this text should be referred to the Drafting Committee for the submission of a draft clause for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace. The Drafting Committee had prepared a text which, however, was only accepted by the American representative subject to the approval of his Government. At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers held at the Quai d’Orsay on the 30th April, 1919, the text in question had again come under discussion. Mr Lansing had been unable to accept the draft text proposed by the Drafting Committee and had proposed certain amendments, which both Mr Balfour and Admiral de Bon had been unable to accept. Consequently, it was decided to refer the whole question to the Heads of Government for final decision.

President Wilson inquires whether Mr Balfour holds the view that the Article, as drafted by the Drafting Committee, carries out the intentions of the Resolution passed on the 24th March, 1919.

Mr Balfour, in reply, says he would like to give his version of what had occurred. On the 24th March, 1919, at the Conference of the Ten, which Mr Lloyd George had not attended. A prolonged discussion of the cable question had taken place. A Resolution had been unanimously accepted, which was to be referred to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Articles of the Peace Treaty. Both Mr Lansing and he had adhered to that Resolution, which was to govern the action of the Drafting Committee. The question had now arisen as to the correct interpretation to be given to the original Resolution. Mr Lansing would no doubt explain his point of view. He, himself, interpreted the clause to mean that all acts taken by the Allies in connection with enemy submarine cables during the war should stand, and that Germany should have no claim to compensation. Thus, for instance, should a cable line have been cut and diverted, the new system so established should stand. On the other hand, Germany would have a perfect right to reconstruct her former cable system as it stood before the war. To illustrate his argument, he would ask the Council to imagine a German cable line going from A to C through B. During the war the cable was cut at B and connected up with a new line from B, to D, so that the line went from A to B to D.

Under these conditions, Mr Lansing held that the piece A–B should now be restored to Germany, whereas the British, French and Japanese representatives contended that as A–B was an essential part of the new line A–B–D, it could not be restored to Germany, though she should have a right to join up the piece B–C with a new line to be laid by her from B to A.

Mr. Lloyd George inquires whether the Germans would have the right to the use in common of the line A–B.

Mr Balfour explains that it would not be practical for two separate systems to use the same cable line. Consequently, the part A–B would have to be owned by the country that had laid down the line B–D. In his opinion, unless the British interpretation is accepted, the Allies and not the Germans will have to spend an enormous sum of money in making their new cable lines effective. He fully agrees that the number of cables should not be diminished and that the more cables there are, the better it will be; but he thinks that it is Germany who should be required to make the expenditure to reconstruct her lost cables. Great Britain has already spent over £400,000 on the changes necessary for adapting the lines taken over from Germany to the new cable systems.

President Wilson says that when he took part in the discussion, it had been with an unfortunate ignorance of technical details. He had not known that the main trunk line could not be used by two parties. He had supposed that the Germans could, at their own expense, connect up their end and operate through the common trunk line. As the trunk line lay at the bottom of the sea, in what might be called no-man’s-land, it was not subject to capture, but was subject to use. He realized that there was no International law on this question. He had assented to the resolution, therefore, under an erroneous impression, which was entirely his own fault. He would take an example. There had been a cable line from Emden by the Azores to New York. The European end had been diverted to Brest, and the American End to Halifax. This had caused great inconvenience to the United States, and he had supposed that a new branch line to New York could be attached to the main trunk line without disturbing the communication with Halifax and similarly that a new German end could be installed without disturbing the line to Brest. But, under the interpretation now given to the resolution, Germany would not have the use of the main trunk line and only the abandoned short ends of the original cable lines would be restored to her, and she would have to replace the main lengths of the line extending to a length of some 3,000 miles. In addition, Germany would have to obtain the right to land in the Azores. This was not what he had assented to, but the error was due to his ignorance. He thought that in a war in which many nations had participated and expended their share of blood and treasure, these indispensable instruments of international communication should not pass into the hands of only three of the parties in the war. He has no desire to re-establish the German cable system, but he had a very decided interest in ensuring the means of obtaining quick cable communication. Wireless, as now developed, has not the same value as cables, since anyone can pick up wireless messages. On the other hand, cables possess a certain degree of privacy, depending on the good faith of the employees. Again the cable lines across the Pacific passed through the Island of Yap, which thus became a general distributing center for the lines of communication of the North Pacific. Yap should not, therefore, fall into the hands of one Power.

In his opinion, the case has assumed a new aspect, since he has heard the interpretation now given to the resolution. It is proposed that the German cables are to be turned over entirely to those who had cut them during the war, even though one particular line, Pernambuco to Monrovia, actually terminates at both ends in neutral countries. If any method could be devised to put the cable systems under International control he would be quite satisfied; but it seems to him a very serious matter that all Powers should not have a common interest in them. He thinks a satisfactory solution will be reached, if the enemy cables can be turned over to the Allied and Associated Governments as trustees, and managed under the terms of an International Convention. He asks to correct a slight mistake made in his statement. He found there had actually been two cables from London to New York. One of these lines had been diverted so as to operate between Brest and New York, thus constituting a Franco-American line. The second line had been connected to run from Land’s End to Halifax.

Mr Balfour says that he wishes to repeat the statement made by him at a previous meeting, when discussing the same question, to the effect that he was entirely against monopolies. But the existing cable systems could not be described as monopolies in the bad sense of the word. The Cable Companies in question though registered in Great Britain are actually owned by a majority of American shareholders, which rather disposes of the idea that any undue monopoly exists.

President Wilson points out that in accordance with the laws of the United States of America a majority of directors would have to belong to the country in which the Company was registered.

Mr. Lloyd George does not think that the same law applies to Great Britain in the case of international companies. He understands that, although these cable companies are owned by British companies, they are actually operated by American companies.

Mr Lansing thinks that the whole question is merely one of investments. The control of the cable lines is wholly in the hands of the British.

Admiral de Bon says that two definite questions call for decision by the Council, namely: Firstly, the use to which the captured German cables should be put, and secondly, the regulations which the Allies, and especially the United States of America, wish to apply to the use of cables crossing the high seas.

(He then makes a very long speech detailing the situation of each cable involved.)

Sir Robert Borden says that he has not been able to study the cable situation under discussion very carefully; but Canada is deeply interested in the cables crossing the Atlantic. Though many of the cable lines land at Halifax, the Canadian Government had no control over that line; the control being American.

Mr Lansing, intervening, points out that only the control was American, the property itself being vested in the United Kingdom.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that the Americans, at all events, control the rates to be charged for cables.

Mr Lansing doubts the correctness of that statement. The Western Union Cable Company of America merely controls the working of the cables; but the cables themselves were owned by British Companies.

Sir Robert Borden, continuing, says that he is certain of one thing, namely, that the Canadians do not control these cable lines. The Canadian Government has been requested by the British Government to allow the cable line in question to land at Halifax. The permission asked for had been granted and he would now strongly object to its removal. In his opinion, the whole question of cable control requires careful consideration by the Governments concerned.

President Wilson points out that he does not wish Sir Robert Borden to imagine that anyone holds the idea of diverting the cable from Halifax.

Mr Lloyd George holds that if the line in question is handed back to Germany, it would as a natural consequence be diverted to New York.

President Wilson expresses the view that the meeting has to decide only the two following definite questions, namely:

(i) Are submarine cables proper objects of appropriation and can they be aretained without reckoning them in the total bill of reparations?

(ii) Can any means be devised to place the cable lines under international control?

He thinks if these principles can be accepted, a satisfactory agreement will easily be reached.

Sir Robert Borden invites attention to the fact that six or seven years ago the Canadian Government had endeavored to exercise some control over the rates charged for cables. The Government eventually only succeeded in obtaining a reduction by threatening to lay cables of their own.

Mr Lloyd George maintains that whatever President Wilson’s intention might be in connection with the cable line in question, the effect will obviously be to divert the cable from Halifax. The right to take cables is just as strong as the right to capture ships. He agrees that cables had not heretofore formed the subject of capture; but there has never been a war of the same kind before, and serious risks and heavy expenditure had had to be incurred in order to obtain possession of these cables. He, himself, will be quite prepared to consider the question of the payment of some sort of compensation to Germany for the surrender of the cables, but this is a new proposition and will require careful examination. A direct line of communication to Canada having now been established, the people of Canada who have suffered much in money and life during the war will feel deeply deserted if the suggestion is accepted to return these lines to Germany. In conclusion, he wishes to support very cordially what Admiral de Bon had said, namely, that after peace had been established the Governments should meet together and endeavor to arrive at some agreement on the question of the international control of cable lines. The only point, however, now to be decided is whether these particular cables should be restored to Germany or not. He holds the view that if such a step is now taken very bitter feeling will be raised.

President Wilson points out that there is a side of the question to which Mr Lloyd George had not referred. If it were merely a question of returning the cables to Germany or not, the solution would be comparatively easy, as this could only be answered in the negative. But the Council is asked to decide whether these cables should remain exclusively in the hands of those who had taken them over, though all parties had taken part in the war. Should a decision to that effect be taken, that might prejudge any ulterior arrangements, whereas, in his opinion, the Treaty of Peace ought to leave the question open.

Mr. Lloyd George inquires whether President Wilson could make some definite proposal.

President Wilson suggests that the Peace Terms should require the cables in question to be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers as Trustees; who would be authorized to determine the future working of the cables in the interests of the Powers concerned.

Mr. Lloyd George inquired whether the Trustees would have the power of diverting the cables to other places.

President Wilson expresses the view that the Trustees would only be empowered to do this as a result of a unanimous decision, on the grounds that such a diversion would be in the interest of the whole of the Powers concerned.

Sir Robert Borden explains that the Canadian Government had intended to make the cable in question State property to be linked up with the land telegraphic system, which already belonged to the Government. In this way, it was thought measures could be taken to reduce rates.

President Wilson thinks that the question raised by Sir Robert Borden is not in contradiction with his own proposals, and should be considered when the question of drafting the international convention relating to cables was undertaken.

Mr Lloyd George points out that President Wilson’s proposal will apply to all cables, and consequently will also affect the French and Japanese Governments.

Baron Makino says he wishes to state Japan’s position in the matter. At the last meeting on this subject, Mr Balfour had proposed a resolution which had been accepted after long discussion. He had not then had time to catch the real purport of the resolution. Accordingly, he had wished to obtain some explanation, but he was told that after the text came back from the Drafting Committee, he would have an opportunity of discussing the question further. At the present moment, he is prepared to accept the policy contained in the resolution proposed by Mr Balfour on 24th March last.

In regard to the appropriation of the cables in question, he would invite attention to the policy that had been pursued, vis-à-vis, Germany, as expressed in the Peace Treaty. It will be found that a certain number of questions have been settled not strictly in accordance with the recognized usages of international law. For instance, in regard to the taking over of private property. Again, Article 13 of the Financial Clauses authorizes the taking over of undertakings of public utility. That is to say, the Allied and Associated Governments have, in his opinion, gone very far in taking over German rights and much further than had ever been done heretofore. In his opinion, the same procedure could therefore well be followed in regard to cables. The Cable Company taken over by the Japanese Government has a capital of 15 million marks at its disposal and in addition received from the German Government an annual subsidy of 1½ million marks. These facts clearly prove that the undertaking had not been a commercial one; but part and parcel of the German political system. For this reason, taking into consideration also the general policy introduced elsewhere in the Treaty to which he had just alluded, it is not unreasonable that this cable should be taken over by Japan. That clearly is the Japanese point of view, and after very careful consideration he has been led to the conclusion that the best policy would be to adopt Mr Balfour’s original resolution.

Next, in regard to the International Convention relating to the future management of cables, his personal opinion is that such an arrangement would be desirable. Such a Convention could be drawn up on the same lines as the International Postal Convention, subject to International agreement. But for the moment he is only willing to accept the proposals contained in Mr Balfour’s resolution adopted on March 24th last.

Mr Lloyd George says that President Wilson had put forward a new proposal. So far, he has only been able to have a short consultation with Mr Balfour, who agreed with him that their experts should be consulted before reaching a definite conclusion. He would therefore ask the Council to adjourn the further discussion of the question, in order to give time for proper consideration of the new proposal. He feels very hopeful that an agreement will be reached; but he would like to consult his experts. In his opinion, it would be a mistake to discuss the proposal until it had received further consideration.

President Wilson explains that he has put forward his proposal for two reasons. Firstly, because he thought it was right and, secondly, because he thought it afforded a solution in the general interest, which will have the effect of creating a solidarity among the Allied Powers.

Mr Lloyd George agrees provided financial solidarity alone is not intended.

Sir Robert Borden is particularly anxious to avoid private companies acquiring too large a monopoly. For instance, he is anxious to approach the American Government with a view to reducing cable rates and ship rates.

President Wilson expresses his complete agreement with Sir Robert Borden’s purpose. The common trusteeship he had proposed was intended to bring about these very objects. He thought that one reason why the German cable referred to by Baron Makino had not paid was because it constituted merely an independent piece, which did not enter into the general system. With the permission of the Council, he would formulate a definite draft resolution for discussion at the next meeting of the Council.

Mr Lansing thinks that the draft resolution might very well be drawn up on the lines of the Article dealing with the surrender of German Colonies.

(It was agreed that President Wilson should formulate a draft resolution for discussion at the next meeting of the Council of Ten to the effect that all German Cables seized during the war should be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers as trustees, who would determine the future working of the cables in the interests of the Powers concerned).

The meeting then adjourned.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 17:45


1. M Jules Cambon gives an account of his interview with the German Delegates. Having been charged with the verification of their credentials, and having invited them to meet him at Versailles, he received a telegram stating that the German representatives would be presided over by Herr Lanisberg, the German Minister of Justice, and would include Herr Simons, the Commissary-General for Judicial Questions, and Director of the Department of Justice, Foreign Office, the Advocate Counsel, Counselor of Legation Gauss, who would be at the Trianon Palace to bring the German credentials and would ask to receive in exchange the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers. He had then sent a message to suggest that Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau as Head of the German Commission, should accompany the delegates. He had addressed a few words to the German delegates, and had asked for their credentials, which had been handed over. They had then asked for the Allied and Associated credentials and he had handed them over. He had told them that if they had any observations to make on the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers, they would meet again. After that they separated. He had received the impression that Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau and his colleagues were profoundly moved and that their attitude towards the Allied and Associated Powers was what it should be. Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, who knows and speaks French fluently, as well as his officials, had said what they had to say in German, and had brought an interpreter. He felt it his duty to submit to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers that it was within the right of those Governments to decide whether the Germans should be permitted to speak German or should have to speak French or English.

M Clemenceau says you cannot forbid them speaking in their own language. He said that in the negotiations of 1871, Bismarck had spoken French when he was pleased, and German when he was not.

Mr Balfour points out the inconvenience of having the interpreter for speech into two languages.

President Wilson says that the exchange of views would be in writing and that there would be very little speech-making.

Mr Lloyd George asks if M Cambon had ascertained anything as to the German views of publicity of the Peace Treaty.

M Cambon says the question had not been raised. In reply to Mr Lansing, he says that the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers were in the hands of the Germans for determination and vice versa.

In reply to M Clemenceau, he says he had not fixed the date of the next meeting. Knowing the Germans as he did, he felt sure it would take them some time to examine all the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers. The same applied to his own Commission, which he proposed should meet the following afternoon. He asked for 48 hours for examination of the German credentials, and would not be prepared to make any report before Saturday.

President Wilson says it has just been learned that the Drafting Committee will probably require until Tuesday, as the date for handing the Treaty to the Germans. He suggests, therefore, that M Jules Cambon’s Committee should make a careful scrutiny of the German credentials.

(This M Cambon undertakes to do.)

(Mr White, M Cambon, Lord Hardinge and Mr Kimura withdraw.)


2. Mr Lloyd George raises the question of whether some communication should not be made to the Italians. He suggests that a message should be sent to the Ambassador to the effect that for drafting reasons the handing over of the Treaty has been put off until Tuesday.

Mr Balfour suggests the communication should be made to the Marquis Imperiali. When the Italian Delegation left, Baron Sonnino had written him a civil note to say that the Marquis Imperiali was left in charge.

President Wilson thinks that the Marquis Imperiali is the person to address with any communication or approach we might have to make. This, however, in his view, should not be a communication from the Conference, but merely a communication from M Pichon to the Italian Ambassador in Paris.

M Clemenceau asks what exactly M Pichon should say.

President Wilson suggests he should say that as a mere matter of opinion, the Drafting Committee does not expect to be ready with the Treaty until Tuesday.

Mr Lloyd George suggests he should add that we expect to meet the Germans on Tuesday.

(It was agreed that:

(1) M Pichon should inform the Italian Ambassador in Paris that the Drafting Committee does not expect to have the Treaty ready for the Germans until Tuesday, and that the Allied and Associated Powers expect to meet the Germans on Tuesday.

(2) That this should merely be a message from M Pichon to the Italian Ambassador and not a formal message from the Conference to the Italian Government.)


3. M Pichon says he has some information to the effect that there is a certain movement against the Italian Government, from the Socialist side on the part of M Lussati and from the opposite side on the part of M Tittoni.

(At this point M Pichon and Mr Lansing withdraw.)


4. President Wilson communicates a number of reports he has received about the attitude towards the Peace Treaty of the various members of the German Government including Herren Brockdorff-Rantzau, Ebert, Scheidemann, Bernsdorff, and others.


5. President Wilson reads a letter he has from General Bliss describing the conversation with Marshal Foch on the subject of the elimination of Article 46 from the Military Terms.

(This is the Article keeping the Armistice in force so far as not inconsistent with the Treaty.)

The tenor of Marshal Foch’s replies has rather been that he does not know enough of the stipulations of the Peace Treaty to judge of the matter.

President Wilson recalls the previous provisional decision to eliminate this Article and proposes that it should now be regarded as settled.

M. Clemenceau says he has no objection.

Mr Lloyd George agrees, unless his experts should raise any objection.

M Clemenceau said he has been seeking the formula for his communication to the Austrian and Hungarian Delegates.

The following is a rough translation of the Note as agreed to:

“The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has decided to invite the Hungarian Delegates furnished with full powers, to come to St. Germain on the 15th May in the evening, in order to examine the conditions of Austrian Peace. The Hungarian Government is therefore invited to communicate forthwith the number and quality of the Delegates they propose to send to St. Germain, as well as the number and quality of the persons who will accompany them. The Mission will have to remain strictly confined to its role, and should include only persons qualified for their special tasks.”

Note: The reason for inviting the Austrians and Hungarians on different dates is that the two Governments are not friendly.

(It is agreed:

1) That M Clemenceau should, on behalf of the Preliminary Peace Conference, dispatch a Note on the above lines to the Austrian and Hungarian Governments.

2) That M. Pichon should be authorized to notify this to the Italian Ambassador at the same time as the information referred to in Minute 2 above.)

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to ask the Secretary-General to speed up various Commissions dealing with subjects affecting Peace with Austria, and to inform them that their reports should all be complete not later than May 12th.


(M Dutasta entered the room.)

M Dutasta reads a communication from the Belgian Delegation, asking for:

1) The text of the Articles in the Treaty of Peace, which they would have to submit to the King of the Belgians.

2) A wording of the Articles in regard to the surrender of the German Colonies.

3) That the summary of the Peace Treaty might be communicated in advance to the Belgian Delegation, in order that it might be published in Brussels at the same time as in Paris.

(It is agreed to discuss this question on the following morning.)

[Jimbuna]

2nd May 1919

Anti-communist Freikorps patrol the streets of Munich after recapturing the city from the Communists.


Troops of the Russian Red Army celebrating May Day in the streets of occupied Riga, Latvia. Latvia is currently fighting for its War of Independence against Soviet Russia.


New York, New York: The mightiest war spectacle ever staged in New York was held this day on Fifth Avenue. Cannons, tanks and thousands of field pieces were drawn through the streets amid the cheers of thousands. Here is a big gun mounted on a tank, which has never been exhibited in NY.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. President Wilson says that the representatives of Azerbaijan are anxious to come to Paris. They have had a deputation at Constantinople for a long time, waiting for permission to come to Paris. He understands that the French Government has not given the necessary authorization. The Georgians and other representatives of the Caucasus republics are all in Paris, and there seems to be no reason for this exception.

M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George undertake to look into the matter.


2. M Clemenceau urges that the letter signed by Mr Lloyd George and himself, and handed to S Orlando on April 24th, should be published. He suggests that it should be published with a preamble somewhat as follows:

“In order that there may be no misunderstanding about the attitude of Great Britain and France in regard to Fiume, M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George have authorized the publication of the following letter to M. Orlando in regard to these matters:"

Mr Lloyd George says he has received a letter from the Marquis Imperiali, which he proceeds to read. The gist of it is that S Orlando thinks it better that the memorandum presented by M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George should not be published, as it would not help public opinion in Italy in its attitude towards Great Britain and France. S Orlando had been begged by a very able French diplomatist in Rome not to read the memorandum. He felt sure that this was right, as it had made a very painful impression on the Parliamentary Commission to whom he had read it. The Marquis Imperiali urged, in these circumstances, that the memorandum should not be published.

President Wilson thinks that it should be published.

M Clemenceau says that the Drafting Committee does not know whether to insert Italy or not.

Mr Lloyd George says he understands that the Drafting Committee has been instructed on this subject.

Sir Maurice Hankey said that he has not been authorized to make any formal communication to the Drafting Committee on the subject. Under Mr Lloyd George’s instructions, however he had asked Mr Hurst, the British member of the Drafting Committee, to try and arrange throughout the Treaty to avoid mentioning either the word “Italy”, or the words “The five Allied and Associated Powers”. At an interview he had had with the Drafting Committee yesterday, however, he had gathered that they had not been able to do this.

He has one other item of information he ought to mention, namely, that it has come to his knowledge that one of the Commissions, either the Economic Commission or the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, has sent a telegram warning the Italian representative that Austrian questions would be considered on Monday.

(The view is generally expressed that this ought not to have been done in the present situation with Italy, without authority.)

M Clemenceau says that M Pichon had carried out his instructions the previous evening to see the Italian Ambassador, and had told him that the Germans were to be met next Tuesday, and that the Austrians and Hungarians were being asked to Paris. M Bonin did not like it at all.

Reverting to Sir Maurice Hankey’s information about the communication by a Commission to Italy, he said that M Klotz had reported the receipt of a letter from S Crespi, dated April 30th (which M Clemenceau proceeds to read), in which he had made a number of criticisms about the reparation decisions, and had made unqualified reservations in the name of the Italian Government. Is this sort of thing to continue? M. Clemenceau asks.

Mr Lloyd George asks how S Crespi had received word of those decisions. He wonders whether he had yet learnt of the decision that in reckoning claims for reparation against Germany, account should be taken of the proportion of the German effort on the particular front.

M Clemenceau asked what was to be done regarding M Crespi’s letter.

President Wilson says it would be sufficient if M Klotz’s secretary were to acknowledge receipt. He would not do more than this.

Mr Lloyd George says he will ask him the straight question as to whether he was a member of the Conference or not. He will say he wished to know because other decisions affecting Italy are being taken.

Sir Maurice Hankey mentions that whenever he had known that reparation, economic, or ports, railways and waterways, or financial questions were to be considered he had sent a telephonic communication to S Crespi, just as he had done to the other experts. S Crespi had usually replied that he was unable to be present. This did not apply, however, to the meeting at which the decision referred to by Mr Lloyd George had been taken, because that had not been a meeting specially organised for the subject. The experts had been present in connection with another question, namely, that of Alsace-Lorraine, and advantage had been taken of their presence to settle this question.

Mr Lloyd George say it is necessary to be very careful over this matter; if a break - and by break he does not mean hostilities - occurs with Italy it would be a very serious matter. In these moments small matters and the methods in which things were done were apt to tell. We must avoid even the appearance of incivility. He would give an air of over-courtesy. He thinks that M Klotz is entitled to write and say that other amendments are being made to the reparation clauses which affected Italy, and that he thinks he ought to afford an opportunity to M Crespi to be present.

President Wilson fully agrees as to the importance of courtesy. He thinks, however, under all the circumstances, the only proper course is for M Klotz’s secretary to send a courteous acknowledgment of the receipt of the letter. At the present time M Klotz’s relations with the Italian representative were undefined. It would be as irregular for M Klotz to make an official communication as undoubtedly it had been for M. Crespi to do so.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that nevertheless M Klotz is entitled to ask if S Crespi is a member or not.

President Wilson says he would not answer.

M Clemenceau says he would at once telegraph the Italian Government.

Mr Lloyd George says he has not been feeling comfortable about the decision on the subject of joint and several responsibility which has been taken in the absence of Italy, though it is to the detriment of Italian interests. He thinks undoubtedly that both France and Great Britain would make a good deal out of this decision at Italian expense; France twice as much as Great Britain, and the decision had been taken the moment the Italians left.

President Wilson says we ought not to be too soft-hearted about the Italians, who had withdrawn from the negotiations with Germany because they could not get what they wanted about the negotiations with Austria, which were a separate matter.

Mr Lloyd George thinks the decision look rather like sharp practice.

President Wilson suggests that a letter should be drafted for M Klotz to send.

(Mr. Philip Kerr is then invited into the room, and is given an outline of the question, and asked to draft a reply. Mr. Kerr retires.)

Mr Lloyd George thinks that before a decision is taken as to the publication of his and M Clemenceau’s memorandum to S Orlando, it should be carefully studied.

(Sir Maurice Hankey hands him the memorandum, which he proceeds to read.)

M Clemenceau says he thinks we cannot abstain from publishing the letter.

President Wilson reminds him that the original understanding was that some document was to be published by Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau on the morning following the publication of his own statement. The impression had been created that the United States of America stands alone in their attitude and M Poincare’s declaration had rather heightened the impression that Great Britain and France are not with him. In these circumstances he feels that the memorandum ought to be published.

Mr Lloyd George says the effect must be very carefully considered. If the Italians do not want to come back, they will be glad of some excuse which would throw the blame on to their Allies.

President Wilson fee;s sure they want to come back.

Mr Lloyd George says that might be the case, but you do not want to put them in a position of saying President Wilson drove them away from the Conference, and M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George prevented them from coming back.

President Wilson says it is not fair to the world to abstain from publishing. The idea has been put about that Italy was expecting some arrangement to be offered them about Fiume, such as some form of independence under the League of Nations. The world needs some assurance that the Allied and Associated Powers collectively intend to do the right thing.

Mr Lloyd George says that the first thing is to patch up an arrangement with Italy if it can be patched up honorably. He would like Italy to be represented at the Council if this can be arranged without any sacrifice of principle.
(President Wilson agrees.)

The second point is that if they do not come back the responsibility must not be with the Allied and Associated Powers. He is afraid that publication will prejudice the position. He is not sure that publication will not make it impossible for the Italians to return. It is well known that a letter had been written, and he and his colleagues, with whom he had discussed it, took the view that the longer the declaration was withheld, the greater would be the effect. British public opinion is not with the Italians in this matter, but it really has no great interest in it. It wants it patched up. It was not indifferent to principle, but it really does not know the question or understand it.

President Wilson says that public opinion in the United States is intensely interested. It cannot understand why the United States is apparently left in isolation. United States public opinion is much more important than Italian. If the United States again becomes isolated it will break up the whole scheme on which the Peace Conference is working. He himself has less contact than Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau with Italian opinion, but his experts, with whom he had discussed the matter assured him that the only way was to show Italy that she was in an impossible position. Once Italy realizes that, a result is much more likely. If Italy is kept in a state of hope as regards Flume, she will go on scheming and putting her views in the Press, and will get no further. M Clemenceau’s and Mr Lloyd George’s memorandum is unanswerable. It would show clearly to Italian public opinion that Italy was in an impossible situation and must get out of it if she wants to be in the great world movement. In the meanwhile, if nothing is done, work will have to be continued on the same difficult basis, that is to say, one of constant embarrassment in taking decisions adverse to Italy in the absence of its representatives, and not knowing whether Italy is in or out of the Peace Conference.

Mr Lloyd George says he would put some considerations on the other side. He thinks President Wilson is wrong in assuming that the United States is regarded as standing alone. His opinion is that Italian public opinion regards Great Britain as more hostile than she really is. They really think that the British representatives have acted against them. This is undoubtedly a good deal due to the attitude of The Times, which is still regarded as an official or semi-official organ in Italy. Only the previous evening a British soldier had told him that British officers were insulted in the streets in Italian cities, and the feeling was running strong against us. It is assumed that Great Britain stand with the United States of America. He thinks that the contrary opinion has been disseminated in the United States mainly by Mr Hearst’s papers, which are always trying to make trouble between Great Britain and the United States. It is assumed that Great Britain was pro-Yugoslav, but as a matter of fact British opinion knows and cares very little about the Yugoslavs. If he thought that public opinion would bring matters to a head and force Italy to take a decision, he would agree to it. But he fears it might only prolong the crisis by making it difficult for Italy to come in. Sooner or later, Italy must come in, and must do so voluntarily. Publication might cause a ministerial crisis in Italy, and bring back S Giolitti and S Tittoni, which would not be at all desirable. Moreover, to publish in the face of the Marquis Imperiali’s letter, which is based on information from S Orlando, would, he thinks, be a very serious matter.

President Wilson said he thinks he is the best judge of opinion in the United States of America, and the impression there he has no doubt from daily communications is that the United States are getting no support.

Mr Lloyd George suggests the publication of some semi-official communiqué that is obviously inspired.

President Wilson thinks that we should prolong the present situation longer by the present method of leaving matters alone than by a drop in the test tube which was to produce precipitation.

(Mr Lloyd George interjected that he is afraid it might produce an explosion.)

He believes that the only way to get the Italians back will be to make a declaration. We have now sent to the Austrians, and we should show them that if they do not come back they will be out of it altogether. He understands that they have sent a ship to Fiume and that they are increasing the number of troops in Fiume. He has learned this very morning from Mr Lloyd George that they have sent a battleship, two cruisers and a destroyer to Smyrna. This confirms what S Orlando had told the United States ambassador in Rome, that they will not go into the League of Nations unless they get what they want. At Brest there is one of the latest United States battleships waiting to take him home, but this could be sent to Smyrna or Fiume.

M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George say they would send it to Fiume.

President Wilson says that of course the danger is if a force is sent, some incident might happen. The Italians seem to be sending forces to several places.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has sent Lieut. Harmsworth to Mr Venizelos with a telegram that he had received from the Central Committee of unredeemed Hellenes at Athens, to the effect that recent events, especially in the Smyrna district, indicate that the Turks, stimulated by some outside power (this, no doubt, is Italy) are continuing their policy of oppression and massacre; and the telegram concludes by asking for forces to be sent. Mr Venizelos had replied that the Italians were undoubtedly stirring up the Turks, and no doubt there was an understanding between them. This strengthens the view that an Inter-Allied force should be sent to Smyrna.

President Wilson says that the Italians would probably say they are sending battleships to Smyrna to protect their compatriots in Turkey.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the three nations should all send forces. Great Britain has a battleship in the Black Sea.

M Clemenceau said that France has battleships in the Black Sea also.

President Wilson says he will see Admiral Benson about it at once.

M Clemenceau said that this is the application of the principle of the League of Nations. What, he asks, are we going to do about the Italians at Versailles?

Mr Lloyd George says that the Germans know the position.

M Clemenceau says his information is that the Germans do not take much interest in the Italian position.

President Wilson says that this confirms the information he read yesterday.

Mr Lloyd George says that the peace of the world really depends upon the United States of America, France and Great Britain hanging together.

M Clemenceau says that the Italian policy is clearly to lead the Allied and Associated Powers to the point where they cannot make peace in common because Great Britain and France are bound by the Treaty of London which President Wilson could not recognize. We ought to let them know beforehand that by not coming to Versailles they have broken the Pact of London to which they had adhered, and by which it was agreed not to make peace separately. We should show that if they broke the Pact of London we are not bound.

President Wilson points out that it depends upon how the promise not to make a separate peace is interpreted. The Italians had been a party to the Armistice, they had been a party to the preliminary peace, a party (as Mr Lloyd George pointed out) to the basis of the peace, and a party to the discussions on the peace. On the very eve of the negotiations with the Germans, they had withdrawn on a matter that had nothing to do with those negotiations.

M Clemenceau says that we should let them know that if they withdraw they are breaking the Pact of London, and we are not bound by the Treaty. We must let them know that if Italy breaks it, she must take the consequences.

President Wilson says it must be made clear that it is Italy and not France and Great Britain that are breaking the Treaty.

M Clemenceau says the day is coming when this must be made known.

President Wilson doubts if it is necessary to let it be known before next Tuesday when the Germans come.

M Clemenceau thinks it should be made known before.

President Wilson thinks it will be sufficient to say that we have signed the Treaty of Peace whereby Italy not signing had broken the Pact of London.

M Clemenceau recalls that when the decision had been taken to invite the Germans to Versailles, President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George had agreed, but S Orlando had written to him making all reservations. He has that correspondence. The communication has not been sent to the Germans with S Orlando’s consent.

President Wilson says that except as regards certain matters of detail, the main elements of the Treaty with the Germans has been urged with the co-operation of the Italians. They now refuse to sign this Treaty unless another Treaty was settled first.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the Italians ought to be informed if the Drafting Committee is instructed to leave Italy out of the Treaty.

President Wilson says that if some communication is sent every day to Italy in this sort of way, she will only be encouraged in her attitude. Surely M Klotz’s reply to S Crespi was enough.

At this point Sir Maurice Hankey, under instruction, reads extracts from the previous Minutes showing that Mr Lloyd George had asked S Orlando whether, in the event of Italy’s absence from the meeting with the Germans, the Allied and Associated Powers were entitled to put forward demands on Italy’s behalf, and that M Orlando had made it clear that they were not.

Mr Lloyd George says he had told the Marquis Imperiali that if Italy abstained from being present it would be an end to the Pact of London. Unfortunately there is no note of this conversation.

President Wilson recalls that Mr Lloyd George had told him.

(It was agreed that the question should be studied by M Clemenceau and his advisers, and by Mr Lloyd George and Mr Balfour, and that a form of communication to Italy should be prepared for consideration.

(The draft of a letter from M Klotz to S Crespi prepared by Mr Philip Kerr is read and approved. M Clemenceau takes the letter to communicate to M Klotz.)


2[bis]. There is a short discussion on the question of German ships in American ports, in which reference is made to a scheme that had been drawn up between British and United States Experts.


3. Mr Lloyd George reads the following telephone message from Mr. Keynes:

“Mr. Keynes said that there had been a meeting with the Belgians at which were present M. Loucheur, an American representative and [Page 415]himself. The Belgians had made a number of new demands, the following being the most important:—

1) To waive all claims for repayment of loans to Belgium on the ground that we were going to get them out of Germany.

2) Out of the first £100,000,000 sterling that we were going to get as priority, we should make no claim for repayment of certain reconstruction loans which we and the French had made to Belgium since the Armistice on condition that they were repaid out of the first money received by Belgium from Germany.

3) The Belgians wanted to get after the first £100,000,000, 15 per cent, of any monies paid over by Germany until their total reparation demand was satisfied.
In the end, the Americans, M Loucheur and Mr Keynes had agreed to recommend to their respective authorities one concession, namely, that in regard to number (2).”

President Wilson says that M Lamont had given him rather a more hopeful message to the effect that an understanding might be reached.


4. A Note from the Secretary General of the Conference, dated May 1st, 1919 is read and the following decisions are taken:

1) To hand over to the Germans the credentials of the Delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay.

2) To place the aforesaid four Powers among the Powers to which the Treaties are to be communicated before being delivered to the Germans.


5. Mr Lloyd George hands to M Clemenceau a memorandum by General Sir Henry Wilson, criticizing the scheme of gradual withdrawal at intervals of five years from the German provinces west of the Rhine. General Wilson had considered that the scheme was worked out on a wrong basis, and the first withdrawal should be from the south and not from the north.

(The Meeting then adjourned until 16:00 at the Quai d’Orsay.)

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. M Clemenceau says that he has nominated M Berthelot of the French Foreign Office as the French member of Committee for the Acceptance of New States, which it was decided on the previous day to set up on this subject.


2. Military Naval & Air Terms of Peace. Article 46 The previous decision that Article 46 should be suppressed.

(It is agreed that the Articles should be redrafted so as to indicate the actual Articles of the Armistice of November 1918, and of the Convention subsequent thereto, which were to remain in force.

The following is approved as the basis of an Article to be prepared by the Drafting Committee:

“The following portions of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918:

Article VI; the first two and the sixth and seventh paragraphs of Article VII;

Article IX; Clauses I, II and V of Annex 2; and the Protocol dated 4th April 1919, to the terms of the Armistice of Nov. 11th, 1918 remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.”


(M Loucheur is present during the following discussions.)

3. A revised version of Annex IV, para. 6, to the Reparation clauses is approved.


4. M Loucheur reads the claims made by Belgium for reparation.

M Loucheur urges the acceptance of the claim for the Belgians that after the first hundred million pounds, they should receive 15% of any monies paid by Germany until their total reparation demand was satisfied.

President Wilson says that in the case of Belgium we are dealing as it were with a sick person. The sum involved is not large, and it is hardly worth contesting.

Mr Lloyd George says he cannot agree. Belgium must come in on the same terms as everyone else. Great Britain has a debt of some 8 or 9 thousand million pounds. Belgium was a very near neighbor and the greatest competitor of Scotland, which has an enormous debt. He cannot accept any specially favorable system for the Belgians.

M Loucheur urges that it be taken into consideration that the Belgian claim for the redemption of the mark has been refused. Belgium would lose 3 milliard of marks by this.

Mr Lloyd George says that after the armistice Belgium had taken 4½ millions of marks and she expected to make a profit on them.

M Loucheur says that 7 millions of marks had been gathered in Belgium, and Belgium would lose about half their value.

Mr Lloyd George says they had not been forced on Germany.

M Clemenceau says not since the Armistice.

M Loucheur says that this is a veritable loss to Belgium.

Note: The Secretary has not been furnished with any document indicating the nature of the Belgian claims, which are highly technical and he is unable to follow exactly the other points.

It is understood that some proposal be accepted in principle that the Belgians should not be compelled to repay immediately an advance of 2½ billion francs that had been made to her by the Allied and Associated Powers.


5. Article IV, dealing with the ports of Strasburg and Kehl, is approved for incorporation in the Articles of the Treaty of Peace dealing with Alsace-Lorraine.

(M Loucheur withdrew.)


6. M Clemenceau says that he has received a letter from M Hymans asking for an alteration in the text of the Peace Treaty Articles concerning the German Colonies. The alteration he proposes is that the rights of Germany instead of being transferred to the five great Allied and Associated Powers, should be transferred to the United States of America, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Belgium and Portugal. M Hymans has drawn his attention in the letter to the fact that Belgium had taken an important part in the military operations in Africa, notably, in German East Africa, and that Belgium had conquered there the territories which she occupies and administers.

Sir Maurice Hankey reports that the Secretary-General of the Belgian Delegation has approached him on the same subject.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it a most impudent claim. At a time when the British Empire had millions of soldiers fighting for Belgium, a few black troops had been sent into German East Africa.

President Wilson points out that the present draft of the Articles has not shut Belgium out. The German colonies would be held by the Allied and Associated Powers as Trustees until the distribution of mandates.

Mr Lloyd George says that this question is one to be considered in allotting the mandates.

President Wilson suggests that a reply should be sent in the sense that the Belgian interests will be in the hands of the Council of the League of Nations, on which Belgium would be represented.

M Clemenceau undertakes to answer in this sense.

(M Fromageot, who is shortly followed by the other members of the Drafting Committee, enters.)


7. There is a considerable discussion as to the action to be taken pm Italy and the in drafting the Peace Treaty in view of the uncertainty as to whether the withdrawal of the Italians from the Peace Conference is permanent or temporary.

(It was agreed:

(1) That the preamble to the Peace Treaty should contain a definition of the “principal powers” in which should be included the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Japan, and Italy only if Italy is represented in all other parts of the Treaty Except the preamble, these Powers will not be mentioned by name, but only collectively as the “principal powers.” Almost the only part of the Treaty where the name of Italy would appear would be in the preamble, and if the Italian delegates should return, the alteration required would be a small one.

(2) In cases where boundaries commissions are set up by the Treaty of Peace, provision should be made for four instead of five members.)


8. The question of the date by which the Treaty of Peace with Germany would be ready was discussed with the Drafting Committee, and it was decided:—

(i) That the Drafting Committee should aim at handing over the Treaty of Peace to the printer by the evening of Sunday, May 4th.

(ii) That the Drafting Committee should be authorized to reject all corrections except those sent from the Supreme Council.

(The Drafting Committee withdraws.)


9. Later in the afternoon a letter is received from the Drafting Committee asking whether mention of Italy should be removed in the Covenant of the League of Nations as well as elsewhere in the Treaty.

It is pointed out that there was already one non-signatory State, namely, Spain, provided for in the Council of the League, so that Italy could be left out without difficulty.

(After some discussion it is decided that Article IV of the Covenant of the League of Nations should be redrafted, instead of appearing as at present, namely:

“The Council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy, and of Japan, etc.”

It should take the following form:

“The Council shall consist of representatives of the principal powers, together with, etc.”)

President Wilson undertakes to discuss this matter with Lord Robert Cecil and others, with a view to the introduction of the necessary amendments at the next Plenary Meeting of the Preliminary Peace Conference.

(The latter decision is communicated to the Drafting Committee verbally by Sir Maurice Hankey. At the same time the drafting Committee informs him that in the Covenant of the League of Nations they propose to remove Italy from the list of signatory to the list of non-signatory powers.)


10. Mr Lloyd George draws attention to the fact that if Italy does not sign the Treaty with Germany, she will not be a member of the League of Nations, and will not be represented on the Council of the League. The result will be that there will be eight instead of nine members, and that the smaller Powers would have as many members as the Great Powers. The Chairman might be a member of one of the smaller Powers, and might have the casting vote in cases where a decision was by a majority. He points out that this might have great inconvenience in some questions, particularly those of Mandates.

President Wilson points out that the question of the allocation of Mandates will not be dealt with by the League of Nations, but will be settled by the Great Powers.


11. An Article submitted by M Clemenceau in regard to Russia is agreed to for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Drafting Committee.


12. After some discussion an Article based on a draft submitted by M Clemenceau regarding Austria, is approved for incorporation in the Treaty of Peace.


13. President Wilson says that he has arranged for an American battleship of the latest type to proceed from Brest to Smyrna.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has also ordered a ship there. Mr Venizelos had wanted to do the same, he was advised to wait until the ships of the Allied and Associated Powers had arrived there.

M Clemenceau says that France already has a battleship at Smyrna.

Mr Lloyd George asks if any announcement should be made that these naval movements were taking place in consequence of the massacres of Greeks by Turks.

M Clemenceau deprecates any announcement, and the proposal is dropped.

(The experts on the subject of Cables are then introduced, and the subsequent discussion is reported as a separate Meeting.)

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon's Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 17:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. M Clemenceau says that the Japanese Representatives have not yet been able to reach the Meeting. He thinks, however, that a preliminary discussion might be held in regard to the draft resolution, which has been prepared by President Wilson, and which reads as follows:

“It is agreed:

(1) That an article shall be inserted in the Treaty of Peace whereby Germany shall on her own behalf and on the behalf of German nationals renounce in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers jointly all rights, titles and privileges of whatsoever nature possessed by her or her nationals in the submarine cables or portion thereof mentioned below:

(There follows a long description of 13 undersea cables, with the termination points at each end, routes of the cables and split-off rerouted cables.)

(2) That the Five Allied and Associated Powers shall jointly hold these cables together with any rights or privileges pertaining thereto for common agreement as to the best system of administration and control; and

(3) That the Five Allied and Associated Powers shall call as soon as possible an International Congress to consider and report on all international aspects of telegraph, cable and radio communication, with a view to providing the entire world with adequate communication facilities on a fair, equitable basis.”

Mr Lloyd George thinks it would be unwise to take any decision on this question in the absence of the Japanese Representatives.

President Wilson expresses the view that a preliminary discussion could be held in regard to the Atlantic cables.

(At this stage Mr Yamakawa, Mr Saburi, and Vice-Admiral Take****a enter the Council Chamber.)

Mr Balfour says that since the last meeting he has been able to make careful inquiries in regard to the actual position of the Atlantic cables. This aspect of the case, he thinks, is very important as being relevant to the final decision, and it will throw light on what had actually happened. He feels bound to confess that he had only on that day been able to discover the actual position of affairs and, he thinks, Mr Lansing’s previous information must have been equally imperfect, since he (Mr Lansing) had told the Council at a previous meeting that Great Britain had control of too many cable lines. Now, the fact of the case is that Great Britain has control of no cable lines, with the exception of the one recently captured from Germany. This statement had greatly surprised him and it had led him to make further inquiries in order to obtain an explanation. It appears that there exist 13 cable lines between the United Kingdom and America. Seven of these lines were actually owned by American companies, and the remaining 6 though owned by British companies were leased to American companies for a period which still has some 90 years to run. The explanation for this surprising state of affairs is, however, a very simple one. It shows how monopolies, to which the Heads of Government objected, worked. The fact is that a cable running, say between Land’s End and New York, would be of no use unless the company owning the cable was able at New York to make satisfactory arrangements for the further transmission of messages along the internal telegraph lines. In Great Britain, the State owns all land telegraph lines, but in America these are apparently owned by two private companies, who so arranged their rates as to “freeze out” British owned cables. In consequence British companies have been driven to say to the American companies: “As we cannot work our cable lines under these conditions, we will lease them to you”. The result is that all cables running between Great Britain and America were either owned or leased by American companies. The British do not grumble at the service, which is efficient and good, though the rates were somewhat high; but the fact remains that the whole control was American.

President Wilson thinks the inference contained in the last part of Mr Balfour’s statement should be completed. In his opinion it is just as necessary to obtain land connections at the British end of the cable lines as it is at the American end.

Mr Balfour explained that the difference lies in the fact that in Great Britain the land telegraph lines are State-owned and the policy of the British Government has been to encourage the laying down of cables, and with this object in view, very favorable terms had been given to the cable companies; so much so that the American Companies actually contemplated increasing the number of their cable lines. However that might be, the last thing he wishes to do is to make a complaint about American companies. But he does wish to point out that one of the morals of the existing state of affairs is that it is no use to obtain the control of cable lines crossing the Ocean unless international agreements can, at the same time, be made in regard to the rates charged over land lines. Thus, if the Great Powers decide to take over, as suggested in President Wilson’s resolution, the Trans-Atlantic cables, and if they quarrel with the great American Companies owning the land lines, they will be just as helpless as the British cable companies have been and will be “frozen out”. Consequently, the American Government will have to consider whether it will not have to modify its system, so as to obtain some control over its land lines. So much in regard to the question of the control of cables in time of peace. On the other hand, in time of war it will never be possible to take away the control which every nation naturally possesses over the landing places situated in her own country. No nation will agree to give up her sovereignty over such landing places. Thus, for instance, Great Britain will never agree to hand over Land’s End. Consequently, in time of war, every nation will use its powers to prevent messages hurtful to its own national interests being transmitted from the landing stages. He fully admits that his statement is based on the system which has existed in the past, and he agrees that other conditions might prevail in the future, owing to altered international relations. It will, however, be an illusion to suppose, firstly, that any international arrangement in regard to cables will necessarily yield satisfactory results unless the land telegraph lines are also controlled and secondly, that effective control can only be exercised over cables which land in a country which is at war.

Furthermore, he thinks it will not be wise to try to limit the power of nations to lay cables between the different parts of their own Dominions, if they so wish. Thus, for instance, he thinks the United States of America should have perfect liberty to lay cables, for instance, between America and the Philippines and America and Panama, and he holds that a cable which begins and ends on American soil should be wholly controlled by America. He doubts the propriety of preventing any such arrangement. On the other hand, it should be realized that as a result Great Britain will thereby be placed in a position to apply Empire preferential cable rates. He thinks that this introduces a question which cannot, however, be decided before the International Congress referred to in paragraph 3 of President Wilson’s draft resolution, has been appointed.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that the strongest argument against the kind of international control proposed by President Wilson in the event of war, is that it might become impossible any longer to cut enemy cables. Thus, for instance, had the Atlantic cable lines been controlled in 1914 by America, France, Great Britain and Germany, it would not have been possible to cut the cables, as had been done.

Mr Balfour agrees, but maintains that each nation could have stopped messages from passing through their territory. In his opinion this question chiefly affects the Great Sea Powers, for it is particularly advantageous to them to be able to cut cables in the event of war.

President Wilson inquired whether the Council is not arguing a question which is not yet in debate. In his draft resolution he had merely attempted to make arrangements so that the cables in question could be placed under the best system of administration and control. As Baron Makino had stated at yesterday’s meeting, the Allied and Associated Governments had taken certain liberties with international law in the Peace Treaty, and in his opinion a new decision in international law is being made in regard to taking possession of cable lengths which lay in No Man’s Land, at the bottom of the sea, in order to connect the ends to form new cable systems. He agrees that no clear ruling on this point exists in international law; and such action can only be justified by analogies such as the seizure of private property. The point he wishes to make, however, is this, namely, that it is not proposed to assign to one or two of a number of partners in the war, the indispensable means of international communication, though the other belligerents are also vitally interested. He thinks, therefore, that all partners of the war should have a voice in the system of administration and control to be adopted in future. The five Allied and Associated Powers who would hold these cables as trustees in accordance with his draft resolution, are the very Powers upon whom the whole system of peace and international understanding will henceforth rest. Consequently power should be conferred upon this group of Great Powers to decide the whole question, and he feels confident they will be in a position to do so equitably. He fully agrees that it will be impossible to interfere with sovereign rights.

In regard to the question of rates and monopolies, he agrees that at the present moment the proposals contained in his draft resolutions will merely be applied to a small number of cables; but he thinks means might eventually be devised to break down the existing high rates. It will be admitted that no international understanding can be effective unless international means of exercising pressure are at the same time accorded and, in this connection, it might be found useful for the Great Powers to lay additional cables in order to make new and better communications, and so obtain the means of controlling rates and of preventing the creation of monopolies. But these results cannot be reached by conversations which will be held after the property in question had been definitely assigned to particular Powers.

Mr Lloyd George says that he cannot altogether accept President Wilson’s conclusion. At the present moment the Atlantic cables are almost wholly in the hands of American monopolies, which had been very skillfully engineered. These American companies prefer London for their operations, as it suits them better for practical reasons. The greater part of their business is in London, which is a great cable distributing center; and, in addition, the British Post Office has been extremely liberal in its arrangements for the transmission of messages over British land lines. The fact remains, however, that the existing 13 cable lines are all controlled by Americans. During the war the British had captured a German cable and connected it with Canada, and the line now constitutes the only Canadian State-owned line. The Canadian Government has recently contemplated laying a second cable in order to bring pressure to bear with a view of reducing the rates charged by the monopolist companies. President Wilson, however, now proposes that the cable line in question should be placed under international control. If America desires to break down American monopolies, he thinks the only way will be for additional cable lines to be laid. To lay a cable across the Atlantic cost between £700,000 and £800,000. Consequently, whoever wants to break monopolies will have to pay that sum. On the other hand, he fails to see why Canada should be deprived of something which had been captured during the war just as legitimately as the capture of a ship; the latter representing communications over the seas, the former, communications under the seas.

To sum up, he fails to see the point of dispossessing Canada in order to set up a kind of international control over something which she regards as essential to her business success, and which had cost her over £200,000 to organize.

President Wilson thinks that Mr Lloyd George has, in his statement, made various assumptions which are not necessarily justified. In the first place, it is not correct to say that America wants to deprive Canada of the cable in question. Secondly, he did not propose to establish a permanent international control over the particular cable in question. His proposal had merely contemplated the setting up of some authority, which would possess the right to inquire as to how all existing systems could best be administered and controlled. In other words, should the cable in question be assigned to Canada by the Treaty of Peace; the United States of America would thereafter have no right to ask what it was intended to do with the cable, for the obvious reply would be that the cable belonged to Canada, and America could not interfere in its management. But since, at the present moment, the Allied and Associated Governments, are partners of war, he considers it to be part of his privilege to inquire what is to be done with the cable in question. He merely asks, therefore, that an initial inquiry should be made as to what is to be done with the cables mentioned in his draft resolution.

Mr Lloyd George says that he does not for a moment challenge President Wilson’s right to examine what is to be done with any piece of property that had been seized from the enemy during the war. On the other hand, he thinks it would be wiser to accept the proposal made by Admiral de Bon at yesterday’s meeting, namely, that Germany should be informed that the cables which during the period of the war had been cut and utilized by the Allied and Associated Governments, will not be restored to her, and that they will remain the property of the Allied and Associated Governments. At the same time, an International body could be appointed to consider and report on the whole question of ocean cables.

President Wilson thinks that the only difference between the two plans is that in accordance with his own proposals the cables would during the intermediate period be vested in trustees. With this exception, his proposal does not differ in principle from Admiral de Bon’s.

Mr Balfour proposes the following amendments to President Wilson’s draft resolution:

“(a) Para. 1.

The word ‘jointly’ to be omitted.

(b) Para. 2.

To be amended to read as follows: ‘These cables shall continue to be worked as at present without prejudice to any decision as to their future status which may be reached by the five Allied and Associated Powers mentioned in the next paragraph.’”

President Wilson says he will accept the amendments proposed by Mr Balfour.

Mr Balfour, continuing, says that Sir Robert Borden had suggested the following addition to the end of the new paragraph 2, namely:

“And without prejudice to any vested right that may be claimed by reason of cutting, possession, expenditure and utilization.”

President Wilson thinks that the latter addition is quite unnecessary. He suggests that the whole of the resolution be re-drafted to embody Mr Balfour’s amendments and taken the first thing at the meeting to be held on the following day.

Viscount Chinda wishes to call attention to one important point in the draft resolution. He thinks the submarine cable lines Chefoo-Tsingtao-Shanghai; Tsingtao-Chefoo; and Tsingtao-Shanghai should be omitted from the first paragraph of the resolution, since it has already been agreed by the Council of Four that these cables ware to be renounced by Germany in favour of Japan.

(This is agreed to.)

Mr Rogers invites attention to the fact that Mr Balfour’s amended paragraph 2 merely relates to cables at present being worked. He thinks the wording should be amended so as to include cables and parts of cables not at present in use.

(This is agreed to.)

(It is agreed that the following draft resolution, as amended, should be considered at a Meeting to be held on Saturday, May 3rd, at 11:00:

—1—

“Germany renounces, on her own behalf and on behalf of her nationals, in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Sall rights, titles or privileges of whatever nature in the submarine cables set out below, or in any portions thereof:

(The 13 cables are listed.)

—2—

Such of the above-mentioned cables as are now in use, shall continue to be worked in the conditions at present existing; but such working shall not prejudice the right of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to decide the future status of these cables in such way as they may think fit.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers may make such arrangements as they may think fit for bringing into operation any of the said cables which are not at present in use.

—3—

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall as soon as possible arrange for the convoking of an International Congress to consider all international aspects of communication by land telegraphs, cables or wireless telegraphy, and to make recommendations to the Powers concerned with a view to providing the entire world with adequate facilities of this nature on a fair and equitable basis.”

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

3rd May 1919

Polish children in Kowel (Kovel, Ukraine) wave flags to welcome the arrival of the Red Cross.


View of a captured German U-Boat.


Anti-communist Freikorps march in Munich after recapturing the city from Communists. The short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic is dissolved.


Afghan troops under Amānullāh Khān invade British India to secure full political independence for Afghanistan, starting the Third Anglo-Afghan War.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 10:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. M Klotz is introduced by M Clemenceau and reads the letter which is to be sent to S Crespi, in reply to the latter’s letter referred to in the Minutes of the previous day. This reply is identical with the draft approved on the previous day, except for an introduction in the following sense:

“I already had the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter etc.”

(M Klotz’ letter is approved and M Klotz withdraws.)


2. Mr Lloyd George suggests that the Foreign Ministers should be introduced for the discussion on the subject of Italy.

M Clemenceau says he was willing.

President Wilson said it is not a matter of foreign affairs but rather for the Conference. There is no technical reason why the Foreign Ministers should be present.

Mr Lloyd George says that the decision to be taken is so important that he would like to have the presence of Mr Balfour, who has come over under the impression that the question of submarine cables is to be discussed at 10:00 o’clock.

(This is agreed to.)

(Mr Balfour enters, and M Pichon is telephoned for.)

President Wilson reads a dispatch from the American Ambassador in Rome, who, he says, is sympathetic to the Italians but thoroughly understands his own point of view. The gist of it is that May Day has been quiet in Rome; that excitement has largely subsided; that the Italian Government has realized the dangerous position; that the troops as well as the gendarmes have been removed from the American Embassy; that there is a real desire for a settlement, but that the only possible settlement is a concession by the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to Fiume; if this can be agreed, everything else can be arranged; but that nothing will content Italy which left out Fiume.

He points out that the Italian Government has only themselves to blame for this result, as they have worked up public opinion.

Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Erskine, the British Chargé des Affaires, has telegraphed that he had seen Baron Sonnino; that the latter had said he was doing his best to quiet excitement; but had ended by saying that the next move ought to be from Paris.

President Wilson says that these telegrams show that the things that Baron Sonnino had contended were not popular items. What the public wanted was the items Signor Orlando had contended for, namely, those outside the Pact of London. Mr Baker, who is in charge of the press arrangements for the United States Delegation says that his Italian colleague has not latterly come to see him, but yesterday he saw him and he had asked when the Italians were going to be invited back to Paris. His reply had been: “Who invited you to go?"

M Clemenceau is handed a dispatch from M Barrère, the French Ambassador in Rome, which has just arrived. M Barrère says that he was telegraphing at midnight and has just received a letter from Baron Sonnino, commenting more particularly on the fact that the Delegates of Austria and Hungary had been asked to Paris without consultation with the Italians. This compelled him to give to some observations he had forwarded the character of formal protest.

(At this moment a message is received by Mr Lloyd George from the Marquis Imperiali, who telephoned to the effect that he had received a cipher despatch from Rome and will postpone his visit to Mr Lloyd George until it has been deciphered.)

President Wilson says that Baron Sonnino did not state the whole of the facts. The Italians had been informed of what was intended before they left for Rome.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the decision to invite the Austrians and Hungarians had been taken after the Italian Delegation had left. How, he asked, could the Italians have been consulted?

M Clemenceau says that they had been informed immediately the decision was taken.

President Wilson asks if the telegram drafted by Mr Balfour to which Mr Lloyd George had alluded in conversation before the meeting, might be read.

Mr Lloyd George reads the first draft, which has been prepared by Mr Malkin, a legal expert, and does not pretend to give more than a rough outline of the legal position in which Italy will be if she does not sign the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The gist of this is if Italy breaks the Pact of London, the Allies are no longer bound by the Treaty of London.

Mr Balfour said that his own draft is based on the idea that there will be great disaster to the world if Italy does not come back to meet the Germans. The breach between Italy and her Allies will become wider. There will be one Power outside the grouping of Great Powers and it might be impossible for that Power to come back. His idea is to give Italy a bridge, or at least the means of coming back.

Mr Lloyd George points out the difference between the effect the document will produce if signed simply by the British Government as a friendly warning and its dispatch as a formal warning from France, Great Britain and the United States of America. He then reads Mr Balfour’s draft.

President Wilson says that the first document is not adequate since it does not recite Italy’s participation in all these transactions. For example (a) the Armistice; (b) the basis on which the Peace negotiations were undertaken and (c) Italy’s share in drawing up the Peace Treaty itself, and (d) finally, Italy’s withdrawal.

M Clemenceau then produces a document that he had prepared which, at his request, President Wilson reads.

(During the reading of this document M Pichon entered.)

President Wilson points out that each step of this kind tends to emphasize the isolation of the United States of America.

M Clemenceau says the document had been prepared by M. Tardieu under his instructions entirely from the point of view of the signatories of the Treaty of London.

President Wilson points out that in effect this document does indicate that if Italy comes back on the basis of the Treaty of London, some agreement might be reached. The world knows, however, that the United States cannot be a party to an agreement based on the Treaty of London and he will have to say so. This document amounts to a virtual promise to stand with Italy and the isolation of the United States will become more serious than ever. He wishes to add that he is saying this in the most friendly spirit.

Mr Lloyd George says he had put precisely the same difficulty to his colleagues and had pointed out that we are in danger of a quarrel either with the United States or with Italy. The former would be far the more serious of the two. Putting the matter at its lowest, Germany will not sign the Peace in the former event so that this is a very serious possibility. This makes him almost more afraid of the return of the Italian Delegates than if they stayed away.

Mr Balfour says that this is his view.

Mr Lloyd George says that Mr. Bonar Law, who has been in contact with elements in England that are perhaps less imbued with the principles on which the Peace is being based, is inclined to take a somewhat different view. He asks Mr Balfour what the feeling is in England according to his information.

Mr Balfour says he had shown Sir Rennell Rodd the memorandum handed by Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau to S Orlando. His view had been: “Are you really going to quarrel with Italy over a thing like that?” Sir Rennell Rodd had, however, rather changed his view after their conversation.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not wish to put S Orlando in the position of being able to cast the responsibility on his Allies for their remaining away. Unless France and Great Britain say clearly: “We stand by the Treaty of London” M Orlando could say: “You threw me over.”

President Wilson thinks that the same object could be secured in a different way although he is not prepared there and then to say exactly how. As he told M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George on the previous day, the whole trend of the Press is to show that France and Great Britain were not acting with the United States and that he had not the support of the Heads of these States. This is why he wanted the memorandum to S Orlando to be published so as to show clearly that their views are similar to his own. This would show United States’ opinion that he is not standing in isolation in this matter. It had been stated in Rome that President Wilson’s declaration had been inspired by M Clemenceau. He was informed that the French Embassy had issued an official denial to this. One Italian newspaper had said that M Clemenceau had neither inspired or knew of his declaration.

M Clemenceau asked M Pichon if this is correct.

M Pichon says he has no information.

President Wilson says that it had only been in one newspaper. Whichever way, however, his statement was taken, it was news to him that his colleagues did not know, or that he had sent out his statement arbitrarily. He wants to warn his colleagues that if they are not careful an impression will be given that there is a serious rift between France and Great Britain on the one hand and the United States on the other. The effect of this will be that Americn opinion would say: “We will get out of this.”

Mr Lloyd George says it is necessary to speak very frankly in the intimacy of these conversations. It must not be forgotten that there is a growing feeling that Europe is being bullied by the United States of America. In London this feeling is very strong and that matter has to be handled with the greatest care. Any such rift will be the saddest possible ending to the present Conference. It will put an end to the League of Nations. He understands that the London Press has behaved extremely well and has not gone as far as British public opinion. The position is one of real danger and wants to be handled with the greatest care, otherwise we might have the worst catastrophe since 1914.

President Wilson says he does not speak with authority in regard to British public opinion. Nevertheless, he is sure of the fact that the so-called bullying is recognized by the common man as based on the principles which inspired the Peace. In his view, it is indispensable clearly to show Italy that in all essentials Great Britain, France and the United States were united, otherwise the Italians would continue to be troublesome.

Mr Lloyd George says that in fact they are not completely united. In regard to Fiume they are united. M Clemenceau and he, however, are not in the same position as President Wilson, owing to the fact that they are bound by the Treaty of London.

President Wilson points out that Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau have both signed the memorandum to S Orlando. This shows that they are united with him in judgment even though not in position.

Mr Lloyd George says that it is no use being united in judgment when a decision is wanted. France and Great Britain are bound by the Treaty of London. If Italy insists he is bound to stand by the Treaty. He cannot possibly help that. This is the bottom fact of the whole situation.

President Wilson thinks that this is a position which cannot be got out of. Moreover, it is an indefensible position. The Treaty has been entered into when only a little group of nations was at war. Since then half the World had joined in. There can be no right in coercing other Parties to this Treaty which are just as much bound by conscience as Great Britain and France are by the Treaty. It is neither good morals nor good statesmanship.

Mr Lloyd George says that Great Britain had been brought into the war largely in protest against the breach of a Treaty. She cannot contemplate herself breaking a Treaty at the end of the war when the other partner of the Treaty has lost half a million lives in giving effect to it. This has been worrying him for several days past.

President Wilson says this makes it the more important to find some way out. The stage ought to be so set as not to encourage the Italians to come back. M Clemenceau’s document is more than an invitation for them to return. It is a challenge. He would prefer the first document that had been read with a recital of the facts added. A clear narration should be given of the facts and a very important statement in S Orlando’s letter to M Clemenceau dated April 23rd in which he stated that:

“The terms of Peace with Germany may henceforth be considered a settlement in their essential elements” should be referred to. Then the case will be clear that if Italy were to break off the responsibility would be theirs.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Italians will then formulate a long reply, and a controversy will be commenced. He agrees to every word that President Wilson has said but he is really afraid that they might come back.

Mr Balfour says that as he understands the matter the policy that we wish to pursue is the same policy as the United States of America wishes to pursue, and vice-versa. Our difficulty arises from the fact that we are bound by a formal treaty, which, however, it was true, had been concluded in entirely different circumstances from those now applying. The difficulty is how to get a real agreement in conformity with our treaties. The only way seems to be to get the Italians to admit that they had broken the treaty which they really had done.

President Wilson says that Italy had broken both treaties, because her demands were more than the Treaty of London gave her. He has never for a moment given the smallest indication that he agreed to the Treaty of London.

Mr Lloyd George says he cannot altogether accept any suggestion that President Wilson’s statement voices the British view. He thinks that Italy has a real case connected with her security in demanding the Islands in the Adriatic. President Wilson had agreed that the ethnic principle was not the only one that could be adopted by admitting that Italy should have great part of the Tyrol. He himself would apply the same principle to the Islands, in default of which, Italy’s east coast would be seriously menaced.

President Wilson agrees that against Austria-Hungary this is the case.

Mr Lloyd George says the same applies if Austria-Hungary has allies. If we were to say “you have broken the treaty”, there would be an end of the matter. In M Clemenceau’s document we say “you will have broken if you do not come back”. If there must be a break, a break with Italy will be bad enough, but not a disaster; a break with the United States would be a disaster.

President Wilson asks why the Treaty of London should be mentioned in the Note. Mr Lloyd George had been almost brutally frank with S Orlando on this point. He wished that the memorandum to S Orlando might be published. (M Clemenceau interjects that this is his view.) All that is now necessary is to show that Italy is breaking the Pact. The first document read, however, does not prove the case sufficiently.

Mr Balfour explains that the first document is only a very hasty draft in which his legal adviser had jotted down his view on the legal point.

Mr Lloyd George adverts to a matter of drafting in M Clemenceau’s document. It calls attention to the fact that the Treaty of London assigns Fiume to the Croats. In his view, it is imperative to point out that this means Serbia - another Ally. He asks if the Serbs had known of this Treaty.

Mr Balfour thinks not.

President Wilson says that this had been argued and set before the Italians sufficiently.

Mr Lloyd George says it is not quite sufficient to say that Fiume had been given to the Croats. There was no feeling for the Croats in the United Kingdom, but there is very strong feeling for the Serbs.

M Pichon says that the Treaty of London had not been communicated to the Croats. At one of the conversations at the Quai d’Orsay, M. Vesnitch had said that he did not know the Treaty of London, and took no cognizance of it.

M Clemenceau says he would prefer to publish the memorandum signed by Mr Lloyd George and himself first. If any other document were published first, the public would not understand the situation, which could not be made clear without the memorandum. There are certain objections, but by this means alone could the position be fully explained. He and Mr Lloyd George have all along approved of the general lines of President Wilson’s statement, and it must be made clear that they had not differed from it. On the eve of very serious events, it must be shown that Great Britain and France have always stood with the United States of America, otherwise if some other document were published first, it would be said that they had wavered. It is true that S Orlando does not want the memorandum published, but this is a case of a choice between two evils and the least disadvantageous is to publish the memorandum.

Mr I Lloyd George says he must make it clear that President Wilson had not put the view of the British Government in his statement, and that was why he had wanted a separate document to be sent to S Orlando. Without it, S Orlando would not know what the British attitude was.

President Wilson says that memorandum showed clearly what the British and French view was as matters stood. He said that he had to keep his private secretary in the United States reassured that there was no difference between him and Great Britain on this point.

Mr Balfour confirms this by stating that he has received a telegram from Lord Reading who was about to make a speech in New York, and who had indicated that there is this idea of a separation between the American view and the British and French view. He had telegraphed back that there is not the smallest difference in policy between them.

President Wilson says that his private secretary, Mr. Tumulty, has an almost uncanny appreciation of public opinion in the United States. He himself had had to keep Mr. Tumulty reassured that there was no difference between himself and his British and French colleagues. If this opinion continues to gain ground American public opinion will be asking what he is going to do.

Mr Lloyd George asks what action is contemplated if Italy does not come back. “What would be done if Italy remained in Fiume: Would she be left there? It would be no use sending her letters, in which we should merely have to say that the Austrian Peace had been settled on certain principles and that Fiume was to be a free port. Should we have to say to her, you must clear out?"

M Clemenceau says not at present.

Mr Lloyd George says he is not shrinking from the results of our policy. The League of Nations, however, will be finished, if the first Power that defies it does so with impunity. Moreover, if Italy is left in Fiume there will be fighting between her and the Yugoslavs. are we to allow the Italian armies to march to Belgrade? He only says these things to show that we are really determining a great policy at the present time.

President Wilson suggests that Mr Lloyd George has been arguing that if the memorandum ire published, it would prevent the Italians coming back.

Mr Lloyd George says he is, because the indications at the present time are that if the Italians came back, they will ask for impossible terms. He himself hopes that Italy might still be willing to accept the compromise that he had proposed, namely, that Fiume should remain an absolutely free port; that they should evacuate Dalmatia, perhaps with some provision for free cities; and that they would take the Islands. M Clemenceau doubts if this is possible.

(The Meeting then adjourns to the room upstairs for the Meeting on Cables.)