100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, May 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


...

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, May 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


...

[Jimbuna]

20th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Rhine Army ready to march into Germany in case of refusal of Peace Terms.

German troops again occupy Riga.

German prisoners put to the work of collecting unexploded shells in the former battlefields of France.


French children in the war-torn city of Reims wait for supplies to be distributed by the Red Cross.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, May 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four



1. The Council has under consideration the German note on the economic effect of the Treaty of Peace, and a draft reply agreed to by American, British, French and Italian representatives.

Mr Lloyd George considers that, in paragraph 2, a statement should be given as to Great Britain’s imports of food and iron ore, in order to show that Germany would only be in the same position as Great Britain had been in for years. In paragraph 5, Mr Lloyd George suggests that the actual figures of shipping losses should be given, in order to bring home to the German people the reasons why they would suffer in common with the rest of the world from the shortage of shipping.

President Wilson comments that the last paragraph is somewhat weak. If any part of the German case is true, it is a bad reply to point out that the millions of German citizens who had been engaged in military matters could turn their activities to works of peace.

Mr Lloyd George says that the case of Great Britain is the answer to this part of the German contention.

President Wilson points out the omission from sufficient emphasis on the fact that all countries would be embarrassed by lack of raw material owing to the shortage of shipping.

Mr Lloyd George says his general comment on the letter is that this is the most important of the replies to any of the German letters. It is very important to make a thoroughly good case, which should be supported by figures.

President Wilson agrees in this view. It should be pointed out how small the proportion of imports that Germany would lose would be to the total losses due to the war.

S Orlando said that Italy before the war could only import one seventh part of the raw materials she required in Italian bottoms. After the war, she could only import 1 fourteenth in Italian bottoms.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that someone with the gift of writing should be asked to re-draft the reply.

(After some discussion, it is agreed that Lord Curzon should be asked to re-draft the reply for the consideration of the Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.)


2. M Clemenceau signs a French translation of the reply to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter of May 13th on the subject of Reparation and Responsibilities.

(It was agreed that the two letters should be published as soon as they have been sent.)


3. Mr Lloyd George reads extracts from views expressed by Herr Dernburg, German Minister of Finance, on the Peace Terms, to Colonel Thelwall of the British Mission, Berlin.


4. Committee on New States: Reference to Drafting committee of Draft Treaty with Poland Sir Maurice Hankey reads a letter from Mr Headlam-Morley urging that the Draft Treaty with Poland attached Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(The following is accepted and initialed:

“It is agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference should carefully review the draft of a Treaty with Poland attached to Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States. The Drafting Committee should suggest any alterations that may seem to them advisable in order to carry out more effectively the principles and objects with which this Treaty has been drawn up. If there are any material alterations which the Drafting Committee wish to suggest they should confer with the Committee and render a joint report to the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.”

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward the resolution to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.)


5. Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram from British GHQ, Constantinople, dated May 17th, to the effect that the Greeks on landing had been fired on by Turkish gendarmes and that firing had continued all day, the Greeks attacking and killing Turkish soldiers whenever they were seen. It was further alleged in the telegram that the wounded were killed and some of them thrown into the sea and that the Greek Officers had made no attempt to restrain their men.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to bring this to the attention of Mr Venizelos.)


6. The following resolution, carrying out the decision of the previous day, is initialed by M Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George:

“The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have considered the attached letter from M. Fromageot and have agreed that the following words ‘during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany’, which had been omitted from the French text but retained in the English text of Article 232 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, should be re-instated in the French text.”

S Orlando, however, points out that the question had been examined by an expert Committee which had voted unanimously an American proposition in favour of the omission of the words quoted and the addition of other words at the end of the article. He asks if this had been in mind when the decision had been taken on the previous day. He suggests that before a final decision is taken, the experts should be seen.

President Wilson says he had some vague recollection of the incident. The proposal had been made by Mr Dulles, one of the American lawyers, whose thought had been for United States citizens on board the Lusitania who, unless some special provision was made, would get no reparation. From a pecuniary, though not from a sentimental, point of view, this was a relatively small matter. Whatever had been the attitude of the experts, however, it was evident that nothing had got into the Treaty.

S Orlando points out that M Fromageot’s letter explains that the purpose is to exclude the claims by New States.

Mr Lloyd George says this is not the case. He proposes that the decision of the previous day should be adhered to.

M Orlando reserves his consent, but undertakes to consider the matter with experts.


7. The Council has before them a copy of the reply by the Bolshevists to Dr Nansen’s letter, together with a Memorandum agreed to by Mr Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, M Clémentel, and Professor Attolico, with a covering letter from Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey.

After a prolonged perusal of this document M Clemenceau says he does not see how any change could be made in what the Council had tried to do. There is no doubt that the Bolshevists are now going down hill. Dr Nansen had suggested a humanitarian course, but Lenin was clearly trying to draw it into a political course.

President Wilson says that Lenin’s argument is that the price the Allied and Associated Powers are trying to exact for food was that their enemies should beat the Bolshevists by compelling the latter to stop fighting. What was really intended was to stop aggressive fighting by the Bolshevists, because this was inconsistent with food distribution. They were perfectly correct in claiming that the Allies were supporting Kolchak and Dennikin, and not putting pressure on them to stop fighting. Lenin’s argument is that for him to stop fighting is to sign his death warrant.

M Clemenceau points out that Lenin was not in the hands of the Allies.

President Wilson replies that if supplies are stopped, Kolchak and Dennikin would have to stop fighting too.

M Clemenceau says it is impossible to stop Lenin fighting, and his word cannot be trusted.

President Wilson says he does not feel the same chagrin that he had formerly felt at having no policy in regard to Russia. It had been impossible to have a policy hitherto.

Mr Lloyd George says there had been very little choice. There had been a lunatic revolution which certain persons, in whom little confidence was felt, were trying to squash. The only reason why the Allies had encouraged them was to prevent Germany from getting supplies. They are, however, now entitled to say, having supported us so far “you cannot leave us in the lurch.”

President Wilson says that the Americans had only gone to Siberia to get the Czechs out, and then the Czechs had refused to go.

Mr Lloyd George says that his Government’s object had been to reconstitute the Eastern front. They had succeeded in doing this, though somewhat East of the line on which they had hoped to establish it. Nevertheless, the reconstitution of the front did prevent the Germans from getting supplies, with which they might have broken the blockade. The feeling in Great Britain was that it was impossible now to leave these people in the lurch.

President Wilson says that at least pledges could be exacted for further support.

M Clemenceau fully agrees.

Mr Lloyd George agrees, and says it could be done in either of two ways:

1) By a formal dispatch;

2) By summoning the representatives of the various Russian groups now in Paris and putting the conditions to them.

President Wilson prefers the first proposal. The second would be contrary to the idea that had been at the basis of the Prinkipo scheme, namely, that it would not be fair to hear one party without hearing the other. His view was that a formal demand and notice ought to be sent to the various Russian groups. He had himself sent something that was almost equivalent to this, as he felt he was entitled to do.

(After some discussion it is agreed that Mr. Philip Kerr should be asked to prepare a draft for the consideration of the Council.)

Mr Kerr is sent for.

While awaiting Mr. Kerr President Wilson reads extracts from a document which had been alluded to at a discussion on the previous day, signed by Mr Kerensky and some of his friends, and which contained a number of proposals, including the following:

i) That the Powers should only help the various Russian groups on certain fundamental conditions for the establishing of Russia on a democratic basis with a constituent assembly, and Governments which declined to agree should not be supported.

ii) That as a Constituent Assembly could clearly not be called at the present time, Regional Assemblies should be elected on a democratic basis for the re-establishment of Local Government.

iii) That a representative mission should be sent by the Great Powers to Russia to give assurance of sympathy and assistance.

iv) That proposals for supplying food are harmful.

These proposals in short, President Wilson continues, are that the Powers should obtain an assurance from each group that it would be united with the other groups to form an all Russian Government on a constituent basis, and that in the meantime each group should do what it could in its own area.

Mr Lloyd George is afraid of splitting up Russia.

President Wilson says it is merely proposing to substitute a democratic for an autocratic basis.

(After some further discussion Mr Kerr entered.)

President Wilson informs Mr Kerr that the Council desired to make a further effort with Russia along the lines of definite assurance to the several groups as to what they were aiming at. They have been reading a document prepared by certain Russian groups in Paris who, though anti-Bolshevist, are suspicious of reactionary tendencies among the groups fighting the Bolshevists. These suggest that pledges should be demanded from the various groups fighting the Bolshevists to establish a government on a democratic basis. In the meanwhile it was proposed to establish a democratic Government in these Regions by setting up Provincial Central Assemblies. The idea of the Council is to embody these demands in a message to the several Governments, and they hoped Mr. Kerr would prepare a draft for their consideration.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the question of the Baltic Provinces had not been discussed. All the other Russian groups fighting the Bolshevists were violently opposed to any recognition of Estonia and Latvia and the other Baltic provinces. They alleged that to recognize them would be to tear up Russia and to bar access to the sea.

Mr Kerr asks what promise is to be given to the various Russian groups to encourage them to give these undertakings.

Mr Lloyd George says it is not a question of promising more, but of continuing the assistance which was now given.

President Wilson says that the dispatch should intimate that without satisfactory guarantees no further help would be given.

Mr Kerr asks if they are to accept the frontiers laid down by the League of Nations.

Mr Lloyd George says they must.

President Wilson says there is no other solution. He then produces a letter from Mr Hoover on the subject of the Baltic Provinces, where there is an appalling shortage of food. This was due, according to Mr Hoover, not to lack of financial or shipping facilities, but to the absence of order. He suggests that enough naval force should be given to provide for the protection of relief in the coast towns, and for its distribution along the coast. In this way the established governments should be helped to preserve order. The situation is so appalling from the humanitarian point of view, that he hoped the Council would be willing to hear a deputation composed of the British and the United States Naval authorities and himself.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that in the first instance Mr Hoover should discuss the matter with the Admirals.

(This is agreed to.)

(Mr Kerr withdraws with instructions to draft a letter for consideration.)


8. The Council has before it a draft reply prepared by Mr Philip Kerr, under instructions from Mr Lloyd George, to Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter of May 10th on the subject of prisoners of War.

(The reply is approved.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to ask the Secretary-General to translate it into French for M Clemenceau’s signature.)

(It is agreed that Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter, together with the reply, should be published after despatch to the Germans).


9. The Council has before them a letter from the Serbian Delegation urging that out of the initial one thousand million pounds to be paid by Germany, eighty-million pounds should be specifically assigned to Serbia, together with a Memorandum by the Committee considering the question of Reparation in the Austrian Treaty, to whom it had been referred on May 13th.

(The Memorandum of the Committee is approved, subject to the omission of the first paragraph of Clause 2, and the first four words of the second paragraph.)

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, May 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


...

[Jimbuna]

21st May 1919

American troops piling 60,000 sacks of bran and oats destined for the U.S. Army of Occupation in Germany.


Ship Losses:

Demosthenes (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The minelayer was damaged and abandoned after the explosion of Revel ( Soviet Navy).
Gelma (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The auxiliary vessel was destroyed by the explosion of Revel ( Soviet Navy).
Moskvityanin (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The Emir Bukharski-class destroyer was sunk by ships of an improved British flotilla, or beached and abandoned after failures of gun and electrical systems during the battle, in Tyub-Karagan Bay in the Caspian Sea. The destroyer was bombed and damaged the next day by an aircraft from HMS Aladir Useynov. She was refloated on 10 January 1920 by White forces.
No. 2 (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The floating battery was shelled and sunk by HMS Kruger ( Royal Navy). 12 crewmen were killed.
No. 107 (Soviet Navy Red Movement) Russian Civil War: The gunboat was rammed and sunk on the Kama River by Tovarishch Markin ( Soviet Navy).
Revel (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The depot ship, loaded with a cargo of fuel, was shelled, caught fire and exploded.
Schastlivvy (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The patrol boat was wrecked while trying to decoy the British ships during the battle.
Tuman (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The mine carrier was destroyed by the explosion of Revel ( Soviet Navy).
Zoroaster (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The vessel was destroyed by the explosion of Revel ( Soviet Navy).

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. M Clemenceau passes out copies of a request from the Germans for an extension of the time limit on signing the Peace Treaty.


2. French Chief-of-Staff General Albi is brought in. M Clemenceau has a dispatch from the French Military Mission at Prague saying that General Haller's Polish troops have attacked Ukrainian troops at Przemysl and are threatening Borislav. The Ukrainians have asked for help from the Czechs, but the Czechs in their turn are afraid of attacks by the Bolshevists should they agree to help.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is a breach of faith by General Haller, who had absolutely no right to take this action. He says that General Botha is much impressed with the Ukrainians’ case, and has suggested that the Council of Four should see the Ukrainians. The Poles are helping to crush an independent movement against the Bolsheviks.

President Wilson says that Mr. Hoover has suggested that the whole group should be informed that supplies of every kind would stop if fighting did not cease.

Mr Lloyd George says that Sir Esme Howard, who had always been favorable to the Poles, has sent him a memorandum advising that the Poles ought to be stopped on their present lines.

M Clemenceau asks if President Wilson’s memorandum has been sent to the Poles.

President Wilson reminds him that it had been suspended owing to the receipt of Mr Paderewski’s telegram.

Mr Lloyd George urges that the Ukrainian Delegation should be heard. These small nations are going straight to perdition, and adopting all the worst vices of which the Prussians had been accused.

President Wilson says that the first question seems to be to define the boundaries. Until that is done, it is difficult for the Council to take up an intelligible position for stopping the fighting between these States.

Mr Lloyd George advocates the stoppage of food and munitions as a means of bringing the fighting to an end. The Polish Ukrainian Armistice Commission has defined the boundary. General Botha told him that the Polish population in the Lemberg region was only about one-sixth of the total.

President Wilson says that Mr Paderewski has told him that Lemberg was Polish.

Mr Lloyd George says that according to General Botha, Lemberg is a Polish town in the Ukrainian district.

(It is agreed that General Botha and the Members of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, as well as the Ukrainian Delegation should be seen on the same afternoon at 16:00)

(General Albi withdraws.)


3. President Wilson reads a draft reply to the German proposals on the subject of the League of Nations. This reply has been prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Conference, of which Lord Robert Cecil had acted as Chairman.

(The reply is approved. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to inform the Secretary-General, and ask him to prepare a French translation for M Clemenceau’s signature.)

(It is at this point that Colonel Henri was seen.)


4. Mr Lloyd George hands round a scheme in regard to Italian claims, covering both Fiume and Turkey, which he has prepared for a basic of consideration. S Orlando has been called away to meet his colleagues on the borders of Italy, and has suggested that the opportunity might be taken for a private discussion between the other three members of the Council in regard to Italian claims, and it was for this reason that he had prepared this Scheme.

(There is a short adjournment for reading this proposal.)

Mr Lloyd George says that perhaps the Council would be glad to hear his reasons. He had discussed the matter for two days with some of his colleagues in the British Cabinet, who had come from London for the purpose. He first refers to the question of Asia Minor. He points out that there is undoubtedly a good deal of unrest in the Mohammedan world, in regard to the future of Asia Minor and Turkey generally. Great Britain is, perhaps, the greatest Mohammedan power. There were some 70 millions of Mohammedans in India and several millions in Egypt and the Sudan. There has lately been a good deal of trouble in both these countries. Now Afghanistan is in ferment, and the Amir has declared war. About one and a quarter millions of troops have been raised in India, a large proportion of the fighting men being Mohammedans. These had done the bulk of the fighting against the Turks. It is true there had been some French troops in Gallipoli and a large number of British troops had been used both in Gallipoli and in the subsequent campaigns against the Turks. Nevertheless, in the campaigns subsequent to Gallipoli, the Indian troops had preponderated. The Mohammedan world realized this. Undoubtedly, the partition of Asia Minor would cause anger in the Mohammedan world. The more he thinks the matter over, the less is he, as head of the Power which had done nine-tenths of the fighting against Turkey, willing to agree to the partition of Asia Minor. This was the view of the British Cabinet. Not only would it create permanent trouble in the East, but they had come to the conclusion that it would be unjust. The Allies have no more right to split up Turkey than Germany, in former days, had had to split up Poland. Germany had had exactly the same justification in the case of Poland as there was now in the case of Turkey, namely, that the Government was incompetent. The Allies had a perfect right to say that the Turks should not rule over alien races like the Greeks, Armenians and Arabs, whom they had always misgoverned. But this argument does not apply in those parts of Turkey where the population is overwhelmingly Turk. If Smyrna, and Constantinople and Armenia are ruled out, the population of Anatolia would probably be more than 90% Turk. As an instance of the danger of partition, he mentions the division of Bengal, which has caused trouble for years. Supposing Anatolia were divided, with the French in the North and the Italians in the South and the Sultan were at Brusa, would it be possible for the French to avoid interference? How could they help it with the Sultan in their sphere?

M Clemenceau himself has said that this was an impossible situation and had suggested that there should be two Sultans, one in the North and one in the South. But it is unjustifiable to tear the population in half. It will cause constant unrest and trouble throughout the Mohammedan world and the British Delegation cannot agree to it. He would like the same power which had the mandate for Constantinople to have the mandate for Anatolia. This is the view of the British Delegation after two days largely devoted to the study of the question. They considered that one power ought to control both, and that power should be the one in Constantinople. In Armenia and Mesopotamia and in Syria where there were non-Turkish races, other powers could govern. But in the case of Anatolia there should be some sort of Government by men of the Turkish race. Some sort of control, however, is desirable. Otherwise there might occur massacres of such Greeks and Armenians and the inhabitants of such other races as remained. The British Delegation would prefer America to exercise this control. The reason for this - and it is necessary to speak very plainly in considering these great problems affecting the future of the world - is that the United States of America would be more acceptable to the Mohammedan world than any other party. One reason was that America is known to have a very great respect for liberty and would consequently be expected to be very fair. Another reason was that America has no past in dealings with Mohammedans. This was not the case either with France or Great Britain. The Mohammedans are honestly afraid lest the Algerian experiment should be tried in Turkey, involving the complete subservience of Mohammedans to Christians. No doubt there would be the same feeling towards Great Britain. A second reason was that if France were given the mandate for Anatolia, Italy would have the right to complain under the Treaty of London. Italy fears lest France should regard herself as the only Mediterranean Power. This is really the basis of the whole of Baron Sonnino’s case. Italy must also be ruled out from a mandate for the whole of Anatolia. This is hardly arguable. To give it to France, however, would make the position of Italy impossible. Hence, he could see nothing for it but for the United States of America to accept the mandate.

If, however, the United States cannot see its way to accept a mandate, he sees no alternative but to continue the present system with the Turks in entire control. In reality, however, it would not work like the present system. America would have a mandate for Armenia and for Constantinople and it would not be possible for the Turk to remain absolutely free to misrule as he wished. As far as he knows the Turk never had perpetrated any very serious atrocities in Anatolia, even if he had never governed it particularly well. Moreover, the present system included certain restrictions on Turkish administration. There is a debt under an International Board; as France is the largest holder of the debt, the Board had a French President. This would continue. As regards concessions, this was probably a more nominal than real difficulty, since no one, except the United States, has any money. Hence, a scramble for concessions among the European Powers was a scramble for nothing. France has the Cameroons and Togoland to look after, both requiring a good deal of development. Moreover, his proposal gives France a provisional mandate for Syria until the report of the Commission is received. If the report is against France, there might have to be some reconsideration by the Powers in common. It is, however, essential for President Wilson to get home before very long, and the same applied to himself, and some provisional arrangement was necessary. These are his views, which had been prepared in consultation with his colleagues. He does not pretend that he had not vacillated. He had come to the conclusion, however, that any other solution would cause trouble to France and to Great Britain, and to the peace of the world. Hence, he cannot consent to the partition of Anatolia. Finally, until Russia is settled, he thinks it would be necessary for the United States to control the Caucasus also. The British are in control at present, but they cannot see their way to remain there.

He wishes to point out that these proposals are closely linked up with his proposals in regard to the Adriatic. In the interests of the peace of the world, he thought it would be worth while to press these on the Yugoslavs.

President Wilson points out certain inconsistencies in Mr. Lloyd George’s plan. Very good grounds are found in Asia Minor against handing over the population against its will to a Mandatory. But in the case of Yugoslavia the same principle is not applied. The only way to remove that inconsistency is to adopt the principle of the plebiscite which he had advocated. For example, in the case of the Islands, the only way to settle the question of which population predominates is by a plebiscite since the official statistics were disputed both by the Italians and the Yugoslavs. Whenever the Yugoslavs had been forced to intervene with a plebiscite, the figures had gone against the Italians. Even in regard to Lissa an inhabitant of that Island had told him that the population would not vote for the Italians. He, himself, all along had been willing to say to the Italians you must evacuate the whole territory which will then be put provisionally under the League of Nations, Fiume for the time being becoming a free City giving full access to the district served by the Port.

This access would continue until the construction of a Port of equivalent usefulness at Buccari. Then he would take the vote of the population in regard to Fiume.

In regard to the other territories, the League of Nations would arrange a plebiscite and Italy should be allowed to have any considerable district other than a mere Township that voted for her. This plan would square with the principles proposed by Mr. Lloyd George for Anatolia. His idea is the same as Mr Lloyd George had suggested in a conversation with him just before the meeting in regard to Silesia, where Mr. Lloyd George had suggested doubts as to whether the population was Polish in sentiment. There might be cases where the preference of the population was stronger than the nationality. For example, there might be people in Silesia who, though Polish in origin, prefer to remain German. The same principle might apply to the Adriatic. On the coast of Asia Minor on the Aegean littoral there is a considerable Greek population. He is fully in favour of giving the Turks complete access to the sea but he is apprehensive of extending Turkish sovereignty to the coast in the neighborhood of the Dodecanese. If Turkish sovereignty extended to these shores, the Turks would always remember that the Islands had not long since been taken from them.

To illustrate this, President Wilson brings out an ethnographical map of Turkey pointing out that the population of the coast was very similar to the population of the Island. There was a close similarity between Mr Lloyd George’s plan and his own proposals. He himself, had suggested that the Turks should retain full sovereignty in Anatolia but that the Sultan should be allowed to inhabit a reserved area in Constantinople in the territory of the Mandatory for the Straits. Nevertheless, he will not be hampered in his administration of Anatolia by the Mandatory of the Straits though he might sometimes be guided by the Mandatory’s advice. If the United States were the Mandatory of the Straits they would not in the least object if the Sultan were advised in stipulated matters by other Powers on the subject of the government of Anatolia.

Mr Lloyd George considered that if the United States could not take a Mandatory over Anatolia, it would be better for the Sultan to clear out of Constantinople. The Sultan’s Court and guards comprising a very large number of people, would be a great inconvenience to the Mandatory Power.

President Wilson suggests the guards might be limited in number. Since Saturday he has been considering the question very carefully and he doubts the advisability of accepting a Mandate for Anatolia. If the same Power is Mandatory in Constantinople and in Armenia, it would be very difficult for the Sultan to cause much trouble.

He then adverted to the Commission for Syria. The Delegates whom he had nominated were men of such standing that he could not keep them waiting any longer in Paris, consequently he had instructed them to leave for Syria on Monday and to await there their colleagues on the Commission.

Mr Lloyd George says the same applied to the British Delegates and he thinks he will give them the same orders.

M Clemenceau says in this case he must drop out. He says that the promises made to him have not been kept. General Sir Henry Wilson had apparently not been in a position to discuss with M Tardieu the question of the sphere of occupation in Syria.

In reply to Mr Lloyd George who had asks in what way the promises made to him had not been kept, he says that in the Autumn of 1918 when he saw how the British were acting in Syria, he had come to London and had asked Mr Lloyd George to say exactly what he wanted. Mr Lloyd George had said Mosul and Palestine. He had returned to Paris, and in spite of the objections of M Pichon he had conceded it. Then Mr Lloyd George had said that France and Great Britain would get along all right. Nevertheless they had not succeeded in getting along all right. Early in the year the proposal had been made for the evacuation of Syria by British troops and the substitution of French troops. Lord Milner had asked him to put this aside for the moment and had undertaken to discuss it with him. He had never done so. Then Lord Milner had promised to help M Clemenceau with Emir Feisal. He had never carried out his promise. After this, Lord Milner had produced a map by which Syria was divided in order to provide a railway for the British to Mesopotamia. Later, Mr Lloyd George had suggested that President Wilson should have part of Silesia. He had even agreed to this. Thus, he had given up Mosul and Silesia and some more territory for the sake of the British Railway.

Mr Lloyd George, interrupting, asks what M. Clemenceau's grievance was? What constitutes a breach of faith?

M Clemenceau continuing, say that the latest phase had concerned the withdrawal of British troops. It had been agreed to arrange for zones of occupation. It had been agreed that M Tardieu and General Sir Henry Wilson should study the question. After three days of consultation, General Wilson said that there could be no arrangement unless the limits of Syria were fixed. M Tardieu had quite properly said that this was not a matter that he could deal with.

France, having given up Mosul and some region required for the Railway and Silesia, thought she had a right to compensation. He had then suggested that France should have a Mandate over part of Anatolia. Of course he recognised that no promises had been given, but the idea had been proposed in the course of their conversations. He himself had just listened and had shown no undue hurry about it. Only yesterday it had been suggested that France should have a Mandate for the whole of Anatolia. Today however, Mr Lloyd George came forward with fresh combinations. He knew the cause of this. It was the arrival of Lord Curzon. He had heard all about this from London where Lord Curzon had spoken very freely. Lord Curzon was the fiercest friend France had in England. He regarded it as a good thing to take from France Mosul and part of Syria for a railway and Silesia, and to do nothing in return. He had another objection. Throughout this Conference his policy had been the closest union between France, Great Britain and the United States of America. He had made great concessions in this respect. Only this morning he had had a meeting of certain representatives from the right of the Chamber and he had reminded them of the great service that Great Britain and the United States had rendered to France, and had insisted that their close cooperation must be continued. Was it a good thing though that France should be excluded from Asia Minor because of the susceptibilities of the Italians? He had public opinion in France to consider. France being the country with the greatest financial interests of any country in the world in Turkey surely ought not to be expelled from Asia Minor on two such grounds as the Mussulman question and the Italian question. He, like his colleagues, had been impressed by the Mohammedan Deputation. He had a genuine respect for the Moslem religion, and the Deputation had made an impression on him. He had thought that something ought to be done for them. He had no proposal to make today, but while something might be done for the Turkish people, he is unable to accede to Mr Lloyd George’s proposals. He considers the two hypotheses which he attributed to Lord Curzon dangerous. He considers it dangerous to introduce the United States of America in Asia Minor. To say that the United States are to have a Mandate not only for Constantinople and Armenia, but for the whole country between them would cause a bad ferment and division in the whole of the European world. It would introduce the ideas of men who had not thought of the repercussion of these events in Europe. He did not know what the effect would be in the United States of America, nor could he speak definitely for any country but France, but as regards France, though the feelings in favour of the United States are strong and of long standing, this proposal, if carried out, would not produce a good opinion. He recognizes that the United States has done a great deal for France. They had struck the last blow in the war, and France was eternally grateful for it, but if the idea got about that Great Britain had brought the United States in to get France out, public feeling in France would not stand it. He does not say the idea was correct but that it will get about. Rather than sign any such agreement, he would not leave the Conference but it might be necessary for him to leave the Government. He does not say this in order merely to use a threatening argument, but he should not be doing his duty unless he gave this answer. He need hardly say that he is not going to conspire with S Orlando and Baron Sonnino in this matter but it would be impossible to prevent public feeling in France from joining with public feeling in Italy. It should not be forgotten that beyond the military and political decisions to be taken, there were human feelings and hearts to be considered, hence he begged that it would not be decided to keep France out as well as Italy by bringing in the United States of America. He is quite willing to admit, if his colleagues wished him to, that the Government of some other Power might conceivably be better in these regions but it is impossible to ignore Italy and the very bad consequent effect that such exclusion would have in France. When he had begun to speak he had had it in his mind to ask for time to examine the proposition coolly, and today he would make no proposal, but after having been led to believe that matters were to be arranged satisfactorily, this proposal had taken him by surprise.

If his colleagues really wish to induce him to believe that Mesopotamia and Palestine should go to Great Britain and Asia Minor to America, he is quite ready to think the matter over. He hopes his colleagues will not think he had forgotten the past. He would never allow any impression to be given outside that he had forgotten what Great Britain and America had done for France. He would do his duty to the Peace of the world, but he hoped before any further discussion, his colleagues would think these matters over.

Mr Lloyd George says that he must answer one or two of M Clemenceau’s observations. France has no right to complain of the loyalty of Great Britain which had given substantial guarantees for France’s security. Great Britain had volunteered to make these guarantees without any pressure being put upon her. She had volunteered to put her whole strength in support of France.

As regards the charge of a break of faith, this is without any foundation. On the occasion of the London visit, Mr Lloyd George had promised Syria to France provided that he gave up Mosul.

M Clemenceau said that France had had a definite agreement before as to Syria.

Mr. Lloyd George said that in London it had been agreed that Syria should go to France and Mesopotamia to Great Britain, but that Mosul, which was in the same watershed as Mesopotamia, should form part of that country and go to Great Britain. In his statement M Clemenceau had entirely ignored the article of his scheme which gave the Mandate for Syria to France. This is clearly stated in the document. Is this a case of bad faith? He recalled the proposal that he had made for a redistribution of the forces in Turkey in order to relieve the British Army which had a very large force there, occasioning demobilization difficulties. He himself, had gone away to London and for some reason he had never quite understood, the scheme had fallen through. On his return, President Wilson had proposed the Commission to Syria. The United States and Great Britain and Italy had their Delegates all ready. It was France who had never appointed their Delegates.

This is a formal document and had been signed by all of them. M Clemenceau had not carried out his part of the bargain. He did not say that M Clemenceau had not kept faith, but he certainly had not carried out the bargain.

As regards General Wilson’s conversations with M Tardieu, his account was that he had gone to M Tardieu with a map, as it was absolutely essential to delimitate the sphere of occupation. In this map the whole of Syria had been attributed to the occupation of France. M Tardieu replied he knew about the subject. Surely it was plain common sense to delimitate the spheres of occupation on a map. It was quite unwarrantable to charge him with a breach of faith because of this incident. As a matter of fact, no counter-proposal had been made by M Tardieu. As regards the railway to Syria, this was part of a proposal under which half the oil of Mesopotamia was to be given to the French. The railway was essential to the transport of the oil and was in the interests of the French. It had not been a bargain but was merely a proposal that was under discussion, and there was no breach of faith here. As regards Asia Minor, he had never heard of a French claim until the previous day. There had never been the smallest indication that France wanted a mandate for Asia Minor. The project had arisen out of a discussion of the Italian claims. M Clemenceau had himself made the proposal that France should have a mandate for the northern half of Anatolia. When the proposal was made, however, it was found that the claim included priority for concessions. Then President Wilson had pointed out that under the mandate scheme, priority for concessions was not permissible. It was not true that France had the greatest claim in Turkey. Within the last few days he had had the interests of the various Powers in Turkey examined, with the result that Great Britain was found to have the largest trade, Germany the second, France being a bad third. It was true that France had a large claim in the Baghdad railway, but the Baghdad line would not run mainly through the part of Anatolia which had been contemplated in the French mandate. It would run through all the mandated territory, American, French and British. Hence the basis of this claim was not in the French zone at all. He did not believe that French public opinion had made any claim for a mandate for Anatolia. He had carefully studied the French newspapers, and had only found one reference to it, namely, in the newspaper Temps, and he believed that to be Italian propaganda. He did not want to discuss in detail the agreement signed between Lord Grey and M Cambon, but he meant to point out that it had always been understood that the two countries were to do their utmost to attack the Turks. He had tried to carry out this part of the agreement. He had met M. Ribot and M. Painlevé, and Marshal Foch at Boulogne, and Marshal Foch had produced a plan by which the French were to attack from the north and the British from the south. The French Government, however, would not agree. Afterwards, a document had been prepared by the military representatives at Versailles. M Clemenceau, himself, however, had been against it. Hence, the whole policy was on the understanding of a co-operation in overthrowing the Turks, which had never been carried out on the French side. All sorts of plans had been discussed. At one time the British would have liked to have landed at Alexandretta, but could not go there, owing to French susceptibilities. There had been a project for a French landing at Tripoli, but the French had never gone there. Great Britain was the largest Eastern Power, and now the greatest of all Mohammedan Powers. This was the reason for the objections made to a French mandate over Anatolia. It was not in the least fair to suggest Lord Curzon was anti-French. It was not right to make a just peace in the West and not to make a proper peace in the East. It was solely in the interests of peace in the East that he had been unable to agree to a division of Anatolia. It was for this reason that he had come to the conclusion that the better plan would be for the United States of America to have the mandate. If M Clemenceau said that this was because Great Britain was jealous of France, he made a suggestion that was not a very worthy one to a Power that had done and guaranteed so much for France.

President Wilson says he hoped, in the first place, the consideration of this question would be postponed for a time, since great issues were involved. He would contemplate with the greatest uneasiness and distrust any misunderstanding that might arise in this matter. He must say at once that the United States would find it very difficult to take any part in Asia Minor where they had no material interests. Any part in the sacrifices and burdens of this mandate would be politically disadvantageous to America. Hence, America desired nothing in Asia Minor. What they did desire most of all was first, the accord between the great powers, and second, peace with the world. He hoped therefore, that the question would be viewed solely from these points of view. Mr Lloyd George’s plan might or might not be the best. But whether they agreed or disagreed in this particular plan, they must find one which would be best for the peace of the world. He had formed no judgement on the scheme for himself, and would think it over. He could only say at this stage, that he feared it is impossible for the United States to take a mandate for Asia Minor. It is difficult for her to take a mandate even for Armenia, where she had permanent interests of long standing, and where a good deal of money had been spent by Americans for the relief of the Armenian people. As regards Constantinople, he thinks that even some of the public men who were opposed to him politically would support him in taking a mandate. He does not, however, think that he can persuade them to accept a mandate for Asia Minor. Although he des not exclude the possibility of altering his opinion, his present conviction is that it would be better not to divide Anatolia, and that the Sultan should be left in Constantinople. If that causes too great complications, he should be removed to Brusa. His present judgement also is that it would be dangerous to bring the Turks to the coast in the neighborhood of the Dodecanese, supposing that these islands were to go to Greece. He suggested that instead of a mandate to the United States, something should be laid down to provide for giving advice to the Turks. What had been suggested was that the Sultan should accept advice in regard to certain specific matters, for example, finance, commercial matters and gendarmerie. In discussions with his United States colleagues, he had told them that France is already in the position of advisor as regards the Ottoman debt. He had told his colleagues that he thought the other processes of advice might come from the French Government, He thought that M Clemenceau had misunderstood his proposal that the United States Delegates on the Syrian Commission should proceed to Syria to await their colleagues. At any rate, they were men of such standing that he could not keep them waiting in Paris. If they did not go to Syria they must go back to the United States.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks they ought to go to Syria.

M Clemenceau says that he is ready for the French representatives to go, as soon as the British troops in Syria had been replaced by French. The question had been referred to Sir Henry Wilson and M Tardieu. He does not think that General Wilson could have reported the result of this interview correctly. General Wilson had said that the limits of Syria must be fixed and M Tardieu had replied that only the Council of Four could do that.

Mr Lloyd George says that General Wilson had submitted a document to M Tardieu. There had been no breach of faith here.

Sir Maurice Hankey says possibly the misunderstanding was due to him. The conversation between General Wilson and M Tardieu had been interrupted in order that certain decisions might be taken, which could only be taken by the Council of Four. On the previous day, just as he was entering the meeting, a large map had been thrust into his hand, containing the proposal for the line of delimitation for Syria, which General Wilson had put forward. At the morning meeting he had had no opportunity to bring this matter forward, and there was no afternoon meeting and the map is still lying in the room.

Mr Lloyd George insists that the negotiations in regard to the railway are to the advantage of France. However, he must put a stop to these negotiations until the present misunderstanding is cleared up.

(It is agreed that the Syrian question should be discussed the same evening.)

(The Meeting then adjourns until 15:00 the same afternoon.)

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


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[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:45

Meeting of the Council of Four with the Polish-Ukrainian Commission


...

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 18:15

Meeting of the Council of Three


...

[Jimbuna]

22nd May 1919

Aftermath of War

Allies stern reply to German protest.

British tank passes through the streets of occupied Cologne, Germany.


A 12th Battalion tank, serial number 9339, on the Rhine embankment near the Hohenzollern Bridge in Cologne, 22 May 1919.


Demobilized British soldiers on a barge in Rotterdam on their way home.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr. Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


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[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:45

Meeting of the Council of Four


...

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


...

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:15

Meeting of the Council of Four


...