100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

1st August 1919

Aftermath of War

Bela Kun's Government overthrown at Budapest.

The Prince of Wales (Edward VIII) and Mayor Church at the entrance to City Hall, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.


In the face of the Romanian offensive in Hungary, Hungarian communist leader Béla Kun (pictured) flees Budapest, causing the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.


U.S. Secretary of the Navy Daniels inspecting women serving in the U.S. Navy.


Ship Losses:

No. 2 (Soviet Navy) The gunboat was bombed and damaged by British seaplanes, then damaged further by White gunboats in Lake Onega and beached, abandoned. Retrieved by the Whites and put in service as Silny ( Russian Navy) White Movement.
No. 3 (Soviet Navy) The gunboat was bombed and damaged by British seaplanes or by White gunboats in Lake Onega and beached, abandoned.

[Jimbuna]

2nd August 1919

Otto Kissenberth, a German flying ace with 20 victories, dies in a mountaineering accident in the Bavarian Alps.


24-year-old J. Edgar Hoover is tasked at the Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation to target radical groups in the U.S.

[Jimbuna]

3rd August 1919

The first Romanian troops enter the Hungarian capital of Budapest as part of the Hungarian-Romanian War.


The Romanian army liberates Timișoara from the Hungarian occupation.


To avoid landing on a crowd WWI ACE Freddie McCall crashes ontop of a merry-go-round at the Calgary Stampede.


A Caproni Ca.48 airliner crashes in Verona, Italy, resulting in over a dozen deaths. It is the first commercial aviation disaster in Italy.

[Jimbuna]

4th August 1919

Aftermath of War

Romanian troops enter Budapest.

The bulk of the Romanian army begins entering the Hungarian capital of Budapest, completing the city’s capture.


German demonstrators protest in Berlin against the terms of the Versailles Treaty.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, August 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


(Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives enter the room.)

1. M Clemenceau states that he has received a communication from Berlin through General Nudant. It is to the effect that the German Government, as a result of the revelations made by Herr Erzberger, had been violently attacked from the Conservative and Independent Socialist Sections. The question most at issue was the surrender of the military officers demanded by the Treaty. Herr Erzberger asked that the provisions to that effect might not immediately be put into force.

S Tittoni says that as the Allies have representatives in Germany, it would be best to ask their advice.

M Clemenceau says that at the present moment the situation was not quite clear. The list of German Officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war comprises over 1,000 persons, of whom some were Princes of the Blood. He believes that the list of Naval Officers who were to be surrendered is not yet ready.

Mr Balfour replies that the list made out in Great Britain is ready.

M Clemenceau remarks that the Council must be clear as to the demands that it is going to make. It is dangerous to postpone executing the provisions relating to the surrender of German Officers, if, at the same time, German prisoners are to be repatriated. M Larnaude have made a report on the question of German Prisoners, and have pointed out that the problem of their repatriation was intimately connected with the surrender of enemy officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war. Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson had themselves recognised that the two questions emphasized in M Larnaude’s report should be considered together. He thinks that it would be improper to return German prisoners if the Germans did not themselves surrender the guilty officers. He proposes that no reply should be given at once. Herr Erzberger’s telegram might certainly be based on fact, but, on the other hand it might be intended to promote a hasty decision on the part of the Council. He asked whether the matter might not be referred to a Committee of experts.

Mr Balfour says that it is evidently the President’s opinion that an answer should not at once be given. At the same time, the Treaty does not, in itself, permit the return of German Prisoners to be much postponed, and, by its very provisions, prevented the Allies from making a delay in their repatriation a political weapon. If the detention of the prisoners was decided upon, it must be put into force before the Treaty receives general ratification.

M Clemenceau states, in reply to Mr Balfour’s question that the French ratification of the Treaty would probably take place in the first week in September. He suggested that Marshal Foch, who had agents in Germany, should make a report on the subject, and that he should be given the assistance of jurisconsults.

Mr Balfour states that the British agents in Germany will be asked for information, and he supposed that the question to be put to the jurists would be, whether we should be justified in adopting a measure for the detention of German prisoners if the Germans refused to surrender the culpable officers.

M Clemenceau then says that this is not quite his meaning. He wishes to point out that the Germans in their note were asking for a definite favour - the waiving of the stipulations with regard to the surrender of guilty officers. The Allies, if they granted this, might ask for certain military measures to be carried out on the part of Germany, to compensate them for granting the German demand.

S Tittoni points out that the Germans did not quite put forward their request as a favour, but were suggesting certain measures to us, on account of the social and political situation in Germany, which menaced the Allies’ interests as well as theirs. In these circumstances, would it not be advantageous to obtain further information, and come to a decision when it had been tendered.

M Clemenceau returns to his original proposal of referring the question to a Committee of jurisconsults and military men.

Mr. Balfour then remarked that such a Committee might say “You have a right to take what measures of security you please”. He asked what Marshal Foch thought.

Marshal Foch replied that the surrender of guilty officers was not a military question, but a political one.

M Clemenceau agrees with Marshal Foch, and said that he would like his opinion as to a suitable military compensation for the favour which would be granted to the Germans by acceding to their request.

Mr. Balfour asked whether we should not be asking the military men to verify political facts.

M Clemenceau says that he did not think so, since military men would only be advising on the subject of military compensation.

Mr. Balfour said that it would be necessary, therefore, to ask our diplomatic representatives for information. In the meantime, the Military Representatives at Versailles should endeavor to find out whether the statements in the German communication were correct, and should further advise the Council as to what military measures on the part of Germany would be adequate compensation to the Allies for acceding to their demand. Whatever questions were put to Versailles, the British War Office must refer the matter to its own military representatives.

S Tittoni said that the situation would be that each country would refer the matter to whatever agents or bodies it thought capable of making a suitable examination.

Mr Polk agrees with Mr Balfour and S Tittoni.

(It was decided:

1) That no immediate reply to the German Government’s request should be given.

2) That the Military Representatives at Versailles, in collaboration with Marshal Foch, should investigate the accuracy of the statements contained in the communication of the German Government, and should utilize all available sources of information at their command.

3) That Marshal Foch should report to the Council on such military compensations as might be demanded from Germany in return for a compliance with their present request.)


2. M Clemenceau circulates two telegrams from Germany stating

1) That Germany had at present 800,000 men under arms, and,

2) That the students in Munich were being armed in violation of the Peace Treaty. Information From Germany With Regard to the Number of Men Under Arms in That Country and the Arming of Students of Munich.

Mr Balfour states, that before proceeding further with the question, he would like to have comprehensive figures comparing the total number of enemy and Allied troops at present in the field. He feared that such figures might be alarming.

S Tittoni says that as Marshal Foch was going to study the questions put to him under decision


2. He would like him to state what force was now required in Germany for the maintenance of order.

Marshal Foch replies that the question is answered by the military provisions of the Armistice and of the Peace Treaty. He considers that the significance of the events at Munich lay in the fact, that the Germans wished to show, by what they were doing, that they knows that Allied control over their actions would soon cease.

M Clemenceau remarks that the communication circulated drew attention to the point.

(It is therefore decided that the two documents circulated should be submitted to Marshal Foch for examination and report.)


3. M Clemenceau reads a telegram from General Franchet d’Esperey with regard to the Allied occupation of Thrace.

He remarks that it is obviously necessary to rein force the Allied troops in Bulgaria although the measure presented practical difficulties.

Mr Balfour says that as he understands it the situation is serious and a comparison between the available Allied and Bulgarian forces would be disadvantageous to ourselves. He had received a report that the disarmament of Bulgaria was incomplete, on account of the different way in which demobilization was carried out in such countries as England and France, and in Bulgaria. In the former case, demobilization meant that soldiers returned absolutely to their civil occupations, and ceased to appear on the list of any military unit. This was not the case in Bulgaria, where demobilization meant no more than the reduction of a military unit, from war to peace strength. The Bulgarian Army had comprised ten divisions. Under the Armistice it had been allowed to keep three and had been ordered to demobilize seven. This meant no more than that, Bulgaria now had a powerful military force of three divisions on full war strength, and seven others on a reduced footing.

Marshal Foch says that he thinks Mr. Balfour’s remarks as a whole were correct, but he could not guarantee the accuracy of the details.

M Clemenceau said that General Franchet d’Esperey had been asked to give a detailed report, but that no very clear statement had yet been received from him.

Marshal Foch says that the Bulgarian Army had never even obeyed orders it had received from the Allies. It is quite possible that they would have a superior force to that of the Allies, at the time that the Peace Treaty was presented.

M Clemenceau said that he proposes that Marshal Foch should report on the situation, and asked the approximate time necessary for the preparation of such a report.

Marshal Foch said it would require several days, as he would be obliged to refer the matter to General Franchet d’Esperey.

General Weygand states that a certain amount of information was already at hand and that a report on the basis of the information available could be presented to the Supreme Council on the following day.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch should submit on August 2nd a report oil the present status of the Bulgarian forces, based upon information at present in his possession.)

(It is further decided that Marshal Foch should make investigations through General Franchet d’Esperey, and submit a full report when these latter had been received.)


4. M Clemenceau circulates a telegram from the Military Representatives at Klagenfurt.

Telegram From the Inter-Allied Military Representatives at Klagenfurt Relative to the Execution of the Decision of the Conference M Berthelot further explained the telegram stating that by the withdrawal of the Austrians and Yugoslavs from Klagenfurt a certain quantity of war material had been left behind, under the custody of a few Italian carabinièri. In view of the fact that the Supreme Council had asked that an Inter-Allied guard should be placed in charge of the material in question, it was now requested that it should be constituted, and, until it could be so constituted, two companies of Italian carabinièri should be authorized by the Council to form the guard. He pointed out that the value of the property in question was inconsiderable, and suggested that two platoons of Italian carabiniéri would be quite efficient to ensure the custody of the material.

(It is agreed that the Italian Command should be authorized to furnish two platoons of carabinièri, for the purpose of guarding the war material at Klagenfurt.)


5. The Council has before it a communication from Marshal Foch to the following effect:

“When the Army of Occupation shall have been organised, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western front, who was in command during the war, will no longer exercise this command.

However, it is necessary to maintain a superior After Germany Command for the group of Allied forces of occupation, were it only to establish a liaison with the High Commission who should communicate directly with the High Military Command (Art. IV of Memorandum of June 9th), also for regulating all military questions dealing with railway, river, telegraphic, telephonic and postal communications.

France, on account of the number of troops in her army of occupation, should place a General at the head of the Rhine Army. The other Nations will probably not do this.

It is proposed that this General be designated to command the group of Allied occupation forces, as soon as the command of Marshal Foch on the Western front shall have ceased, in other words, at the moment that the Peace Treaty goes into force.”

(The proposals which Marshal Foch’s communication contains are agreed to without discussion.)


6. (a) Frontier of Prekomurye.

M Tardieu states that the Roumanian and Yugoslav Committee had submitted on July 22nd a Memorandum with regard to two new claims which had been presented by the Delegation of the Yugoslav kingdom regarding the northern frontier of that State.

(It is decided to adhere to the boundary line in Prekomurye formerly adopted by the Supreme Council which line in general follows the watershed between the Mur and the Raab.)

(b) Baranya

M Tardieu reads the Memorandum regarding Baranya.

(It is decided to accept the proposal of the Committee with regard to Baranya, and the frontier which has been proposed by it.)


7. (a) Bacska.

M Tardieu reports on the notes submitted to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs dated 25th July, 1919.

(It is decided to accept the draft proposals of the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs with regard to the Bacska region; and to uphold the frontier line previously laid down, in view of the fact that the ethnographic conditions in the locality would not allow of the aforesaid frontier line being extended to the north. It was further decided to refer the question of laying down regulations of an international kind, with regard to the working of the Deak Canal, at present in Yugoslavia, by means of hydraulic installations now in Hungarian territory, to the Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways.)

(b) Banat.

M Tardieu draws the attention of the Conference to the Report of the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs on the subject of the Banat.

(It is decided to adopt the proposals contained in the report of the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs with regard to the Banat, as follows:

(1) Central Banat: The previously adopted frontier is to be upheld, and a notification to that effect sent to persons concerned. The Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways will take the necessary measures to maintain and to develop, the irrigation canals in the Banat, to the equal advantage of the States to which the Banat is allotted.

(2) Northern Banat: The question is to be adjourned for further study.


8. M Tardieu says that the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs had received a note dated July 10th from the Yugoslav Delegation, asking that their troops be allowed to occupy the territories granted to Serbia by the Conference, in the region in question. The Committee had submitted a reply dated 26th July. Since the Council had settled the territorial question in Prekomurye, he proposed that the suggested military occupation should be granted.

(It is decided that the Yugoslav State should be authorized to occupy the territory in Prekomurye bounded by the frontier laid down and notified.)


9. M Tardieu states that the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs had given him a report dated 30th July, to which he has nothing to add.

Mr Balfour says that the Commission, after its first examination of the question, had decided, that, for ethnographical reasons, the small territorial area under discussion could not be given to the Bukovina. The reasons in question still hold good, because the population of the district was more Ruthene than Romanian in character. In addition to this, Poland has received Eastern Galicia, and laid no claims to the area now being considered. The desires of the population affected were the real matter for study. He asks what was the reason given by the Committee in support of these proposals. The answer probably is that it would be advantageous, from a political point of view, to maintain the historical frontiers of Bukovina since that would be a measure which would please the Romanian Government, and Romanian public opinion. The Bukovina has never belonged properly to Romania, and he was not in favour of granting it to that country, until such time as its real attitude towards the Allies had been cleared up. Up to the present time, the wishes and instructions of the Conference had been grossly disregarded by Romania. That country had never acceded to our demands, and now that a territorial change, violating the principles of nationalities, is proposed in the interests of Romanian public opinion, he prefers to adjourn the question.

Mr Polk says that he had been told in the morning that the line shown in red on the chart, runs along the bottom of a Valley; and that he does not care for such a solution.

S Tittoni said that he would like to draw attention to the following point, which was, that the frontier now proposed had been promised to Romania when she entered the war. For this reason he would uphold it willingly. On the other hand, he recognised the strength of Mr Balfour’s argument, and thinks that Romania should be informed, that it would only receive the territory in question, if it were willing to carry out the wishes of the Allies, and to sign the Treaty. Romania was now in a state of discontent. The demands of that country in the Banat had been curtailed; and it would be unwise, therefore, to displease it with regard to Bukovina, unless there were important reasons for so doing. That is to say, the proposals of the Committee might be accepted under certain conditions.

M Tardieu says that the Bessarabian question had not been settled either. Since the Council could exert pressure, it could be announced that the report of the Committee would be accepted if Romania satisfied the Council in other ways.

Mr Balfour says that there are also numerous negotiations proceeding between Romania and Hungary, of a kind that did not arise out of the Treaty. It was nevertheless important that these negotiations should be concluded in a manner satisfactory to all. Romania is not only concerned in signing the Treaty, it is also called upon to manifest its general goodwill.

Mr Polk says that he accepted the proposal in principle; but that he would prefer that the question should again be referred to experts, since a frontier running through the bottom of a Valley seems to him unsatisfactory.

M Tardieu says that the question had been carefully examined by the Committee. The difficulty is that a part of the Bukovina has already been given to Romania, and had been occupied by that country. The alternative would be to give it to Poland, who does not demand it.

Mr Polk says that he raised no objection and that he is only insisting on a point of detail.

(It is decided to accept the Report of the Committee on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs, and to grant Bukovina to Romania, with the exception of the area traversed by the railway line - Zaleszczyki-Kolomea; on the condition that Romania should show goodwill towards the Allies, with regard to the signature of the Treaty, and to the other questions in which she is concerned.)


10. M Tardieu says he wishes to draw attention to a question not on the order of the day, but one demanding an early solution; the problem is that of Bessarabia, on which the Council had taken no decision.

Mr Maklakoff and S Bratiano had expressed the Russian and Romanian points of view. After they had been heard, the Council had discussed the matter briefly without coming to a decision. It remains to be known what solution the Council would adopt, for it is difficult to settle the Romanian question as a whole, and to make that country accept clauses in the Peace Treaty on the subject of minorities, if, at the same time, its frontiers have not been notified to it.

M Pichon says that the question is particularly important, in that the minorities question would arise in Bessarabia.

M Tardieu says that the Committee has been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Romania, but the Council had sent a telegram to Admiral Kolchak, which appeared inconsistent with that decision. In the telegram in question the council had only stated that the Roumanian rights in Bessarabia should be preserved in favour of that country.

M Clemenceau said that it is evidently important to be able to inform Romania what its frontiers exactly are.

Mr Balfour asks whether M Tardieu that the Committee would remain of the same opinion if the question were referred back to it for a further report.

M Tardieu says that the Committee had been unanimous when it had studied the problem. But they knew that certain Delegations had altered their opinions after the lapse of a few months. The difficult point was the telegram sent to Admiral Kolchak.

M Pichon says that he does not think that the Council has been inconsistent, since it had not stated to Admiral Kolchak that Bessarabia as a whole would be granted to Romania.

Mr Balfour asks whether M Pichon thinks the telegram to Admiral Kolchak was not binding on the Council.

M Pichon says that Admiral Kolchak’s attention had only been drawn to the fact that the Council upheld Romanian rights in Bessarabia.

S Tittoni said that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to an important point, which is that the Committee has justified its proposals by saying that it wishes to maintain the administrative and geographical unity of Bessarabia, and that it would give to Romania, in compensation, a strip of territory in the Dobrudja, which belonged properly to the Bulgarians. By such a measure Romania would be compensated for the Northern portion of Bessarabia left to Russia.

Mr Balfour says he does not think he can admit compensations, which consisted in balancing the cession of groups of human beings, by the cession of others to foreign sovereignties, as a matter of principle.

S Tittoni remarked that the question had therefore still to be examined.

M Clemenceau says that the problem ought to be solved rapidly, and he proposes to put it on the Agenda for the following day.

Mr Balfour said that he ought to call attention to the fact that Romania was actually protesting strongly against the minority clauses. It would therefore be sufficient to tell that country, that it would not receive the territory now being considered, unless it accepted the minority clauses and signed the Treaty. In addition to this, Romanian Statesmen did not really deny that the Southern part of the Dobrudja should be granted to Bulgaria. Had Romania been our enemy during the war she would have been obliged to cede the territory. By the fact that she had been our Ally, she could only be persuaded to accept our solution. is it therefore possible to say to that country, that it was going to receive a great extension of territory, but only under the condition that it would be willing to consent to the cession of the Dobrudja, which had been seized in 1913, and which, if left in her hands, would be a ceaseless cause of friction. The Romanians are difficult people to deal with, and M Bratiano is no exception.

S Tittoni said that he has heard that a new ministry had been set up in Romania, and that the President of the High Court had been instructed to form it.

Mr Balfour said that he had also heard that, but the Cabinet has not been formed, and the Bessarabian question was so important that he hoped that each one of his colleagues would give it his consideration.

Mr Polk said that the policy of the United States had been to oppose the division of Russia. Admiral Kolchak in his reply, had protested against his country being divided. He thought that the effect of dividing Russia would have a bad effect in that country, and was therefore of the opinion that it would be better not to settle the question straight away, but to await the return of ordered government in Russia.

S Tittoni remarks that Russia’s point of view had been presented to the Council.

Mr Polk said that the Romanians opposed any idea of a plebiscite in Bessarabia.

S Tittoni said that that was so, because the result of a plebiscite would be the establishment of Bolshevism.

Mr Balfour says he does not desire to settle the question on that day, but that he would be willing that it should be taken up again in a few days’ time, if it were possible to settle it then. He does not, however, believe that it would be. In his opinion, he thought it better not to consider Russia, and to regard our hands as free. He is willing to wait for the formation of the new Romanian Cabinet in the hope that it would be possible to negotiate with it and to settle outstanding problems.

M Tardieu says that it would undoubtedly be better to wait for the formation of the new Government, but even if it were favorable to our point of view, we should have to inform it of our opinions on the Bukovina, Bessarabian and Dobrudja problems. It is not possible to do this at present.

Mr Balfour says that if the new Romanian Government proved satisfactory, it would send a representative to the Conference with whom the Council could negotiate. It would then be possible to tell this new representative that the Council was favorably disposed towards territorial concessions advantageous to Romania, on the condition that the Romanians themselves should give evidence of goodwill in the discussion of problems not yet solved.

M Clemenceau says that it should be remembered that the Bulgarian Delegation was now actually waiting for the Conditions of Peace at Neuilly.

Mr Balfour says that the Peace Treaty with the Bulgarians could be discussed and settled whilst the present question remains open.

(It is decided to postpone the discussion on Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Dobrudja until the formation of the new Roumanian Government.

It is further decided that the above questions should be put on the Agenda as soon as the new Government had been formed.)


(M Sergent and M Cheysson entered the room.)

(M Clemenceau left the room and M Pichon took the Chair.)

11. M Pichon said that the Council had to examine the amendments brought forward by the Reparations and Finance Committee after hearing the Roumanian, Greek and Yugoslav Delegations.

M Sergent read the report prepared by the two Committees. He adds that the Reparations Commission has been presented with a note from the Serbian Delegation. The note in question has been examined and its suggestions adopted partially. On the day in question, however, at two o’clock, a new note, couched in the most violent terms had been received, stating that Yugoslavia refused point-blank to accept article 4 in the Reparation Clauses. In the Peace Treaty with Germany the article in question had laid down that Bulgaria should transfer her debt with Germany to the Allies. In article 4 of the Reparation Clauses with Bulgaria that country is called upon to recognize the validity of the transfer of all credits due to the Governments of Germany, of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey, to the Allied and Associated Governments comfortably with article 261 of the Peace Treaty with Germany; and to the corresponding articles in the Peace Treaties with Austria-Hungary and Turkey. At the same time, the Allied and Associated Governments had taken these debts into account, when they had considered the sums payable by Bulgaria, and had undertaken not to put forward any further claims under this head. Serbia stated in her note, that, while the Allied and Associated Governments might be in a position to forego later claims, they had no right to impose a corresponding renunciation upon Serbia. The note ended in what amounted to a threat to refuse to sign the Peace Treaty. The Reparation Committee had fixed the indemnity payable by Bulgaria at 2 billion francs. 250 million francs due from Bulgaria to Germany had been added to this sum. Since the Committee had taken the debt into account it thought that nothing further could be done.

Mr Balfour says that the principle guiding the Council and the Reparations Committee has been that Bulgaria should pay the maximum amount that her resources allowed. It is of little importance, from the Bulgarian point of view that the sum should be paid to any particular Ally, since Serbia would have her share.

M Sergent said that the Reparations Committee had first intended to divide the indemnity into two heads. Under the first head, would have been reparations amounting to 2 billion francs, and, under the second, 250 million francs owed by Bulgaria to Germany. This would have avoided giving the impression of renouncing the debt due to the Allies by Germany. It seems that Serbia had not taken this simple calculation into account.

M Pichon said that the Reparations Committee, being now informed of the issue, could submit a report, which should be waited for.

Mr Polk says that Serbia is dissatisfied on another point, which is the amount of livestock to be delivered to her by Bulgaria. is it possible to know what extra amount, under this head, had been granted to the Serbians?

M Sergent says that the original figures had been doubled except in the case of the oxen. Serbia was actually going to receive 6,000 milch cows 5,000 horses and mares, 1,000 mules, 4,000 yoke oxen and 12,000 sheep. Notwithstanding this, the Serbian demand amounts to ten times that figure.

M Berthelot says that in spite of the figures having been doubled, Serbia is only going to receive one tenth part of that which had been taken from her by the Bulgarians.

(It is decided to accept the Reparation Clauses, with the exception of article 4, dealing with the transfer of credits, and of article 6, dealing with the delivery of live-stock.)


(M Sergent and M Cheysson then leave the room and Generals Duval, Groves and Rear Admiral Orsini entered.)

12. General Duval says that he has to submit a report, dated 30th July, on the subject of the distribution of aeronautic material delivered by the enemy Governments.

Mr Balfour says that the Note brings forward two questions:

(1) What principle is to govern the distribution of war material - a difficult question which had already raised considerable controversy?

(2) How is this material to be dealt with when distributed between the Allied and Associated Powers?

The Committee proposes that the material in question should become the property of whatever Government it is given to, so long as this latter should undertake not to alienate it. He proposes to adjourn the first question and to accept the second principle enunciated.

S Tittoni says that he accepts Mr. Balfour’s proposal, but asks that the first question should be referred to Versailles, in order that the settlement should be made conformable to the general principles guiding the general distribution of war material, in general.

(This proposal is adopted.)

(It was therefore decided:

To request the Military Representatives at Versailles to submit a proposal regarding the principles to govern the distribution of all aeronautical war material turned over by the Central Powers in accordance with the Peace Treaty.

It is further decided that the Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be charged with the details of the distribution to be made in accordance with the principles established above. It is further decided that once this material has been allotted to and accepted by any one of the Allied and Associated Powers, it should become the property of such Government, which latter should agree not to alienate the material in question by any form of transfer.)


13. S Tittoni presents the President with a report from the Italian Delegation on the subject of the delivery of arms and munitions to Czechoslovakia by Austria.

[Jimbuna]

5th August 1919

Royal Navy cadets cheer passing boats during a naval pageant on the River Thames.


A refugee family living in a boxcar in Western Siberia.


Queen Marie of Romania visiting a hospital for typhus patients.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, August 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Clemenceau informs the Council that he has received a wireless message from Lt-Col Romanelli, commanding the Italian Military Mission at Budapest. This message was addressed to M Clemenceau.

M Mantoux then reads the dispatch.

S Tittoni says that he thinks there is some misunderstanding as to the acceptance of proposals by the Allied Powers. He does not think the Allied Powers have made any proposals, as was suggested in the message. He thinks that what was alluded to was the plan explained by General Boehm to the Allied Representative in Vienna. He has himself received a telegram from Vienna, which does not quite agree with the message read out. According to his information, General Boehm and Mr Peidl had told the Prince Borghese and Colonel Cunninghame that if the Romanians are stopped, they would be able to form a Government more completely representative of public opinion.

M Clemenceau asks whether it was General Boehm who had caused the Revolution.

S Tittoni said that the proposals had been made by General Boehm as representative of the Socialists and of the Labour Party. It is necessary that the Allies should take precautions not to be deceived a second time.

M Clemenceau observes that there is no motive for negotiating a second armistice. There already is one.

Mr Balfour says that he was in agreement. He thinks the proposals refer to were those contained in the message discussed on the 26th of July. He has no objection to these proposals, but what he does object to was that the responsibility for them should be laid upon the Allies. The Council was concerned with the armistice and its observance. It was not concerned with the internal Government of Hungary. No proposals had been made by the Council. That was the first point that should be made clear.

M Clemenceau says that the second point to make clear was that there is already an armistice, and no need of a new one.

Mr Balfour said that it was clear that hostilities must stop, but no new contract was required for this. The Romanians could be told to stop by the Council, and they must obey. The Hungarians must also be told that they were not authorized by the armistice to advance.

M Clemenceau says that on this subject he wishes to ask Marshal Foch a question. Is it not true that the present line of the Romanians was quite different to the line they held under the armistice?

Marshal Foch said that the line was in fact quite different. It was at the present time the line of the Theiss.

Mr Balfour said that the Council about the 13th of June, had ordered the Romanians to go back from the line of the Theiss within their own frontiers. They had not done so. Their excuse had been that as the Hungarians had not disarmed as they were bound to do under the armistice, it is impossible for them to risk giving up a defendable line for one which was strategically far worse. Under the present circumstances, he thought that the Romanians should be ordered to withdraw to the line originally laid down for them.

S Tittoni thought that an order of this kind should be deferred. He thinks for the time being that the Romanians should be ordered to stop on the positions they now held. If the Hungarians gave evidence of good behavior, the Romanians could then be told to withdraw within their own frontiers. If, on the other hand, the Hungarians are again deceiving the Allies, any withdrawal of the Romanians would be regretted. Should the Hungarians do all that was required of them, it would be easy to order the Romanians to withdraw, and they would certainly comply.

M Pichon said that there was another reason in favour of this. When the Romanians had been assigned the armistice line, they had made it clear that it was indefensible. Nevertheless, they had conformed to it. Then they had been attacked, and, in order to repel attack, they had advanced to the Theiss. It would clearly be unfair to them to order them now to abandon that line. It was the Hungarians who had really violated the essential clauses of the armistice by maintaining a larger army than was allowed to them. The first necessity, therefore, was to force the Hungarians to reduce their forces.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks there is no great difference between his views and those of S Tittoni and M Pichon. Historically, however, he thinks that M Pichon was not quite accurate. He does not think that the Roumanian advance to the Theiss had been made as a consequence of attack by the Hungarians. The Romanians had gone to the Theiss, and the Council had stopped them there. The Council had then ordered them to go back, and they did not do so. They had given no official reason for this, but, privately, S Bratiano had explained that he must keep a defendable line against the large Hungarian army.

M Clemenceau says that this explanation had also been given officially.

Mr Balfour said that he had not been aware of this. In any case, the Hungarians had attacked the Romanians on the plea that the latter had not observed the armistice. The Hungarians had been defeated, and Bela Kun’s Government had fallen. He quite agreed that the Council should avoid making the same mistake as before, but, personally, he would not make it a condition that they should have a humane and orderly Government or any specific kind of Government whatever. This was an interference in their domestic affairs. He would adhere strictly to the armistice, and call on the Hungarians to observe it. It might further be added that if the Government set up in Hungary were such as could be recognised, the Allies would make peace with it speedily.

S Tittoni says that he thinks there is really agreement. He points out that General Boehm at Vienna had not asked for a withdrawal of the Romanian troops, but for their advance to stop.

M Clemenceau said that the Council had no cognizance of General Boehm.

Mr Polk asks whether the Council has not made a declaration in any manner tying its hands.

M Clemenceau said that all that had been done was to make a general declaration to the world.

Mr Polk asks whether the Council is not tied in any other way?

M Clemenceau says it is not. It appears to him that the Council is agreed that the understanding alleged in the message, between General Boehm and Prince Borghese was not binding on the Council, and that it was unnecessary to negotiate any new armistice as the old one was still in existence.

S Tittoni says that though there is no agreement between General Boehm and Prince Borghese, nevertheless, the Allied Agents in Vienna had been instructed to conduct conversations with General Boehm, the result of which had been certain proposals agreed to by General Boehm.

(It is then decided to send a telegram in reply to the wireless message received from Lt. Col. Romanelli at Budapest, dated August 1st.)


2. M Clemenceau says that he has received a question from the Danish Government regarding the cost of the troops of occupation during the plebiscite period in Slesvig. The Danish Government wishes to know whether expenses under the head of “Plebiscite Expenses” are to include the maintenance of these troops.

(It is decided to notify the Danish Government in answer to their Note of August 2nd, that the Inter-Allied Military and Naval expenses of occupation during the period of the Plebiscite, should be included in the general expenses of the Plebiscite.)


3. M Clemenceau says that he has received a request from the Danish Government for the immediate despatch of warships to Flensburg, so that in case of need, order should be maintained by their help in the plebiscite zones of Slesvig.

(It is decided to notify the Danish Government in answer to their Note of August 2nd, that in the opinion of the Council, the British warship now present in Danish waters, together with a French warship at present on its way there, should suffice to maintain order. The British Admiral Commanding the Naval forces would be able to estimate the situation at Flensburg, and to take necessary measures.)


4. (It is decided to refer to the Commission on Political Clauses the Articles proposed by the Greek Delegation for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.)


(Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives at Versailles enter the room.)

5. Marshal Foch reads a statement regarding the Bulgarian Forces.

Mr Balfour says that his comment on the conclusion of the statement read by Marshal Foch, is that it would appear that the Allies must make a Peace agreeable to Bulgaria because they were unable to enforce a disagreeable one. He was not very willing to acquiesce in such a conclusion unless it were inevitable.

Marshal Foch says that Bulgaria had nine Divisions. These Divisions are easily convertible to war strength. Against them are very weak Allied Forces. The British force consisted of 40 men - the Italian of one Battalion - the French of two Divisions, which would be reduced by demobilization to 15,000 men. There were also two thin Romanian Divisions - one Serbian Brigade & six Greek Divisions. The last represented the bulk of the available forces.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch what he thinks of the military value of the Greek Divisions.

Marshal Foch said that he is not prepared to express any opinion.

M Pichon observed that General Guillaumat had thought well of them.

Marshal Foch says that the troops that General Guillaumat had thought well of, were National Defense troops. Since the check received at Smyrna by the Greek Army, it was not unlikely that the morale of the Greek troops had suffered.

Mr Balfour said he would like to inquire whether the Military stores, which, according to a clause of the Armistice, had been deposited under Allied guard within Bulgarian territory, could be seized by the Bulgarian Army should it wish to resist the orders of the Conference?

Marshal Foch replies that the Bulgarian Army could probably seize them.

Mr Balfour says it is regrettable that such a provision had been made in the Armistice.

Marshal Foch remarks that when the Armistice was made, better terms could not be obtained.

M Clemenceau asked whether a portion of the military material had not been withdrawn outside Bulgarian territory.

General Weygand said that the firing mechanism of one-twentieth of the rifles - one-tenth of the machine guns, and one-sixth of the guns, had been removed to Salonika. The remainder was still on Bulgarian soil under Allied guard.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Allied guard would be sufficient to protect these stores against the Bulgarian Army?

General Weygand replied that he thinks not, but he suggests that General Baird, who had just come from Bulgaria, should be asked to make a statement on the present condition of affairs there.

Marshal Foch says he thinks it would be well to hear General Baird. He thinks the Bulgarian Government is not inclined to resist the Conference, but it was possible that the population might rise and gain possession of these stores.

M Clemenceau says that he is not very much alarmed by the Bulgarian situation. He agrees with Marshal Foch that the Government was unlikely to resist. As to popular risings, he thought they would not be very serious. Popular forces did not count much against regular troops. There were in all 15,000 French troops and 6 Greek Divisions, which should, and must, act. Greece was particularly interested, and her troops would doubtless behave well when acting in a national cause. Moreover, some of the Greek troops in Asia Minor could, if necessary, be recalled. If, however, it were required, Great Britain and Italy would doubtless come to the rescue. Moreover, he did not think that Bulgaria by herself would defy the whole victorious Alliance. Germany had been defeated, and the only quarter to which Bulgaria could look was the Entente. Germany had not dared to defy the Conference, and it was most unlikely that Bulgaria would. He quite agreed, however, that it would be useful to hear General Baird, and, if then thought necessary, to make a communication to the Bulgarian Delegation at Neuilly.

Mr Balfour says that he is inclined to agree with M Clemenceau’s estimate of the situation. Unfortunately, Bulgaria is not the only quarter in which the Allies are weak. The American Congress, the British House of Commons and the French Chamber are all anxious to demobilize.

M Clemenceau says that modern war differs from wars in the past, and the weakness indicated by Mr Balfour, which came about at the cessation of hostilities, applied to the enemy as well as to ourselves. He himself had apprehended resistance by the Germans to the terms relating to Poland. Germany, however, had acquiesced. He felt sure that Bulgaria would do likewise.

(It is decided to request General Baird, through the British delegation, to be present at a meeting of the Council on August 4th, and to make a statement on the present situation in Bulgaria.)


6. General Weygand reads a letter from General Nollet and a covering letter from Marshal Foch on the subject of allowances for Allied Officers on the Missions of Control in Berlin.

It is decided to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles for study and report, the question of allowances for Allied Officers on the Missions of Control in Germany.


7. General Belin read the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles.

S Tittoni says that it was important that the prisoners should be repatriated in small groups. One of the reasons for obstacles raised by Poland, Lithuania and other neighboring States, was the fear that large batches of Russian prisoners should escape and take to looting.

General Belin said that this was a point of detail which the Commission might deal with.

Mr Polk asks whether General Belin could make any estimate of the time that the whole operation would take.

General Belin says that General Malcolm thinks it should be completed before the end of the year.

Mr Polk says that from the American point of view there was a difficulty. There were about 800 American Officers and men on duty with the American Mission in Germany. Owing to the American demobilization, no money would be available for the upkeep of this Mission, nor for the supplies of food for the Russian Prisoners of War for the length of time indicated by General Belin. He points out that there were originally two million Russian prisoners in Germany, but that this total had now been reduced to 200,000. He suggests that it would be as well to charge the German Government with the care of the remainder.

General Bliss said that the substance of what he means to say had already been explained by Mr Polk. He would recall that it was a report by Mr Hoover to the effect that the funds available for the upkeep of these Russian Prisoners, had been exhausted which had led to the examination of the subject at Versailles. He and Mr White had recommended in Washington that the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine should be made responsible for the care of these prisoners, but this view had not prevailed. It is now necessary to withdraw all American conscripted men from Europe. In support of this he reads the following letter:

"General Headquarters
american expeditionary forces
office of the chief of staff

August 2, 1919.

Dear General Bliss:

The Commander-in-Chief desires me to request you to use your best efforts with your colleagues to hasten the permission for him to withdraw our officers and troops in Berlin. At the time of the signing of the Peace orders had already been given for the withdrawal of the entire mission numbering approximately 700 persons. At the request of Marshal Foch on the 30th of June, General Pershing agrees to suspend the orders for a few days. On taking the matter up again on his return from London on the 24th of July, Marshal Foch informed him that the matter of the withdrawal of our representation there had been taken out of his hands and was vested in the Commission to Negotiate Peace. With the Conference between you and me, on the subject since that time, you are familiar.

Without assuming to discuss the desirability of the United States maintaining troops in Berlin after Germany has ratified the Peace, in connection with the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war, we have imperative orders from the War Department to get all temporary personnel home by a certain time. It is necessary from that standpoint that the most expeditious action be had and a decision reached at the earliest date possible which will enable General Pershing to withdraw all officers and men now on that mission.

May I ask that you will help us in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J G Harbord
Chief of Staff

General Tasker H Bliss,
American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Hotel Crillon, Paris.

He suggests that the only solution is for the Allies to relieve the Americans of their share in this work, or for Germany to take over the whole thing.

Mr Balfour says that he does not think the scheme elaborated at Versailles very practical. What is proposed is a Commission. A Commission alone could do nothing. The American share alone at present required the services of 700 men. The British Red Cross has, he believes, a considerable personnel, and undertook a considerable share of the work. Their funds were exhausted, and their personnel was being recalled. It was clear that this system could not be continued. A Commission without an Army behind it, could not act as substitute. The Americans could not provide men. Without consulting Experts, he was prepared to say that the British could not supply any. He doubted whether France or Italy could find them. The system would, therefore, break down. There was another objection. If the old arrangement is patched up, it would appear that the Allies still regarded themselves as responsible. If they undertake the responsibility and failed to carry out their undertakings, they would be discredited. He thinks the responsibility should be repudiated. After Peace, it was quite unnecessary for the Allies to continue supporting Russian prisoners taken by the Germans. He noticed that it was suggested that 145,000 Russians should be repatriated by rail. It would be extremely difficult to prevail upon the Poles and Lithuanians to forward them over land. Meanwhile, he wished to ask who should feed them. Another 70,000 or 80,000 were to go by sea. He had the greatest doubt whether shipping could be found for them except at the expense of more vital services. He therefore recommended that the responsibility be thrown on the Germans. It was a responsibility they should have always borne. If the Germans then applied to the Allies for assistance, it would be time to consider what could be done. This policy was clear and freed the Allies from a task which they could not undertake without incurring discredit.

Mr Polk then suggests the following resolution:

That the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers notify the Government at once that all restrictions heretofore placed on the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, are removed, and that henceforth the responsibility of supporting them must rest with the German Government.

(This proposal is accepted.)


8. M Clemenceau says that the question was whether or not the Baltic Commission should concern itself with the question of access to the Baltic.

Mr Balfour says that access to the Baltic from the North Sea at present depended not on any Treaty, but on immemorial custom. It was now suggested that this custom should be regularized by formal Inter-Allied sanction. This would establish a common régime for all the channels. In the Sound and the Great Belt, traffic, he believed, had never been stopped by the neutrals on their shores. They interfered neither with trading vessels nor with warships. In the Little Belt, however, the Germans had stopped traffic, and had laid mines. They could do so again, and this was not contrary either to the law of nations or to the practice thereof. If the proposals now before the Council were accepted, all the channels would be made free for traffic. Whether it is worth while to engage in difficult negotiations to obtain this, he does not know.

S della Torretta explains that the Commission has not examined the merits of the question, as it does not know whether it is empowered to examine it at all.

Mr Polk questions whether it would not be better to send the question to a Special Commission rather than to the Baltic Commission. He understands that the Baltic Commission was not composed of naval men. This appears to be a naval question.

S Tittoni suggests that naval experts be attached to the Baltic Commission for the purpose of examining the question.

(It is decided that the report of the British Delegation relative to access to the Baltic Sea be referred to the Baltic Commission, assisted by the naval experts, for examination and report.

The Baltic Commission should be responsible for summoning a joint meeting.)


9. (It is decided to refer the letter of the Roumanian Delegation dated August 2nd, proposing an amendment to the Economic Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty to the Economic Commission, for examination and report.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, August 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, August 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


(Marshal Foch, General Weygand, Mr Hoover and Mr Waterlow entered the room.)

1. Mr Hoover said that the situation had changed since since he last attended the Council. The Romanians were now entering Budapest. What he proposes is a relaxation of the Blockade, the opening of the Danube and the supply of foodstuffs to Hungary from the Banat. He thinks action should be taken without delay. The new Government though very radical, represents the Trade Unions. He thinks Trade Unionism is an instrument that should be used to upset Bolshevism. If this is a correct estimate the present Hungarian Government should be encouraged, as a very important reaction, even on Russia, might result. A member of the Food Administration in Vienna held the opinion that the new Government might take in a certain number of peasants. This might lead to a really representative Government.

Mr Balfour asks whether Mr Hoover has read the telegram sent by the Council. He thinks the conclusion of that telegram contains a policy very similar to that Mr Hoover recommended.

Mr Hoover says he has read the telegram. The only thing that it does not mention is relaxation of the Blockade, the opening of the Danube and the supply of food from the Banat. He thinks these measures represent the practical application of the policy outlined in the telegram, and that instructions to that effect should be given at once. As long as the Council is able to threaten a reimposition of the Blockade it will be able to control the situation. A week or two of relaxation would not give the Hungarian Government such economic strength as to make it independent. If the Government by then had not shown itself satisfactory by fulfilling all the conditions of the Armistice, by demobilizing and by doing what the Council wished, the Blockade could be reimposed. If, on the other hand, action were not taken at once the opportunity would be lost.

Mr Balfour says he thinks that the Council should both reopen the Danube and declare that it would close it again if it so wished.

Marshal Foch says that he has no objection to raise.

S Tittoni agreed but he thinks that it should be made clear that the Hungarians must conform to the Armistice.

M Clemenceau suggests that Mr Hoover should furnish a draft.

Mr Hoover then suggests a draft, which after some amendments suggested by S Tittoni, is adopted in the following form:

“It is agreed that instructions should be sent to the representatives of the various Allied Governments at Vienna and to the Blockade Commission in that area and to the Danube River Commission and to General Franchet d’Esperey that the Blockade on Hungary shall be lifted at once and that the Danube shall be opened and shall remain opened so long as the present Hungarian Government gives practical evidence of its intention to comply promptly with the conditions of the Armistice.”

Mr Hoover continuing says that there is a surplus of food in the Banat. The Council has tried to supply Vienna from this surplus. The Serbians, however, had stopped the exit of the supplies. The Banat was now the only source from which Budapest can be fed. One of the reasons for the obstacles raised is that German agents were offering bigger prices for the food than could be afforded by the Allies. The result of all this was that the relief of Vienna and Budapest is jeopardized. He asks whether the Council will be ready to address a request to the Government of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes not to hamper the export of food stuffs from the Banat.

Mr Balfour says that Mr Hoover puts the blame in one sentence on the Serbian Government for the stoppage of relief from the Banat, and in another says that the reason was that German Agents outbid everyone else. If the latter is the case, he cannot understand why the Serbian Government is to blame. No Government could make a merchant sell cheap if he could sell dear.

Mr Hoover says that the explanation is a very long story. The Economic Council has negotiated the cession of an iron bridge to the Serbians in exchange for food stuffs. The Serbian Government has put an embargo on all food exports from the Banat. By means of this, the Serbian Government entirely controls the direction taken by food exports. The intervention of the Germans has only complicated the question. The main element, however, remains the control of the Serbian Government. There are in the Banat 500,000 or 600,000 tons of food; the only source of supply from which Vienna and Budapest could be fed. He has prepared a draft to be addressed to the Serbian Government which might perhaps be too strong, but which might form the basis of the redraft. He then reads the following draft:

“The Council is informed by the Supreme Economic Council and by its various Allied representatives that there is a very considerable surplus of foodstuffs now lying in the Banat and surrounding counties and that with the impending favorable harvest in Greater Serbia there is now no reason for the reservation of these supplies from general distribution through Central Europe. The continuation of provisioning of Vienna is absolutely dependent upon the free shipment of these supplies to that city and the recent over-turn of Government in Budapest makes it of prime interest to the Allies and to all hope of stability in Central Europe that the City of Budapest should be given every facility for the purchase and export of foodstuffs from these counties.

Therefore, the Council wishes to urge upon the Serbian Government in the strongest terms that not only will the greatest contribution be made by Serbia towards the re-establishment of order and stability in the countries adjacent to her borders, but that the dictates of humanity demand that no obstruction of any character shall be placed in the way of food exports from the Banat to the surrounding counties and that, in fact, the Serbian Government is requested to join with the Allies and through their various agencies in promoting the export and distribution of these supplies. The Council hopes for an early and favorable reply to this representation, the importance of which it cannot over-emphasize, and it trusts that the Serbian Government will realize that unless the Allies can receive cooperation in the labors they have undertaken for the restoration of stability in Central Europe that it is impossible that the Allied Governments should continue the economic support which they have given and expect to continue giving to the Greater Serbian Government.”

M Clemenceau says that before pursuing this question any further, he wishes to inform his colleagues of two communications he had received - the first from Lt Col Romanelli and the second from the new Hungarian Government.

Under these conditions, M Clemenceau says that he approves Mr Hoover’s policy.

M Pichon says that he thinks it was overstepping the mark to threaten Serbia. The measures taken by the Serbian Government had been in accordance with the views of the Council at the time. The Government had acted in good faith. The Serbs were now to be asked to adopt another policy. This is not a sufficient reason for addressing any threats to them.

Mr Hoover says that he does not agree that the Serbian Government had acted in good faith. In respect of Vienna, the Serbian Government had refused to supply certain goods which had already been paid for. He agreed, however, that it might be as well not to threaten the Serbians.

M Clemenceau suggests that a redraft of Mr Hoover’s proposal should be made. He asks M Berthelot to make a draft.

Mr Polk said that the latest news received was to the effect that the Romanian advance guard had reached Budapest and that the Trade Union Government fears an occupation of the City by the Romanians and a further invasion by the Czechoslovaks. These fears would doubtless rouse nationalist feelings. At 14:00 the news was that 600 Roumanian cavalrymen were to the west of Budapest, where they had cut all communications with Vienna. Looting was said to have begun in the suburbs. To avoid worse trouble the Hungarians suggested that an inter-allied police force should be sent immediately to Budapest.

Mr Balfour asks what the Council can do to enforce good behavior on the Romanians.

Marshal Foch said that he does not know.

S Tittoni said that the Romanians have been invited to go to Budapest together with the Serbs and the Czechoslovaks. All they had done was to go there by themselves.

M Clemenceau said that as the Council can neither blame the Romanians nor praise them, it was perhaps best to say nothing.

S Tittoni said that he advocates sending an Allied Mission.

Mr Polk said that he agreed to this. He also thought it was essential that the Romanians should withdraw from Budapest.

Mr Balfour says that if the Romanians insisted on going forward and occupying Budapest the result would be the fall of the present Government in Hungary and an outbreak of nationalist feeling. He could not see what the Romanians could gain either for themselves or for the common cause by persisting in their present course. Their only excuse previously for not withdrawing was that they feared an attack by the Hungarians, this they had no reason to fear now. The Hungarians have said that they would observe the Armistice; the Council is therefore bound to give them an opportunity of proving that they meant what they said. It was not giving them a fair chance to send Romanians to plunder the suburbs of Budapest.

Marshal Foch says that an inter-Allied character could be given to the occupation of Budapest either by sending allied regiments as suggested by the Hungarian Government, or by sending Missions of Allied Officers. The former, under the circumstances, it was not easy to realize. On the other hand it was possible that the Romanian Government might wish to settle the whole situation by itself.

M Clemenceau says that the Romanian Government would then be solving the Council’s problems; if so the Council would settle theirs without them.

Mr Polk says that the Romanians had not shown all the respect for the Conference that was desirable. They are not likely to treat the Hungarians in accordance with the laws of war. If the Council allowed Budapest to be looted, the effect on Russia would be instantaneous. The whole effect of the overthrow of Bela Kun would be lost. Any Occupation of the city was dangerous. He asked whether the Romanians could not be required to remain outside.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Romanian army is not under the command of General Franchet d’Esperey.

Marshal Foch says that it was not.

M Pichon says that he had sent a telegram on the previous night to the French Minister at Bucharest, requesting him to ask the Romanian Government to stop the advance of Roumanian troops immediately on the positions then occupied. He had further asked the French Minister to inform him of the result of his démarche.

Marshal Foch says that the first thing that must be done is to disarm Hungary. The only guarantee of disarmament was the occupation of the country. This occupation must be effected with the available troops.

M Clemenceau asks whose the available troops were.

Marshal Foch replied that they were Romanian or Czech troops.

S Tittoni said that the worst possible results would be obtained by sending Czech troops into Hungary. The Hungarians detested the Czechs even more than the Romanians. He thought an Allied Mission, if sent at once, could judge on the spot what measures should be taken and would be able to exercise sufficient moral influence to have them carried out.

Mr Polk says that the occupation of Budapest would make it impossible for the Hungarians to surrender their arms. National feeling would prohibit this unless the Hungarians could rely on Allied protection. An Allied Officer (not American) had heard a Romanian General say that he expected to plunder Budapest. If this were to happen the Allies would be responsible should they take no steps to protest against the entry of the Romanians.

Marshal Foch says that he would agree to S Tittoni’s suggestion that a Mission composed of Allied Generals with an escort of one company from each Power should be sent to Budapest. This Mission could take charge of affairs and reduce the Romanian occupation to the strict minimum necessary. The President of the Mission could be chosen by the Great Powers.

Mr Polk agrees that this is desirable. He thinks action should be taken at once. In addition to this the Romanians should be warned that no abuses would be tolerated. He had already that morning sent word to the Romanian Delegation in Paris that if any incident occurred in Budapest likely to rouse American public opinion against them, the consequence must be that the Romanian Government could not rely on any further help from America in the future. He asks whether the Allied military Mission would have control over the Romanian army.

M Clemenceau says that it would only have a moral influence over it.

S Tittoni said that the Mission should have the right to tell the Romanians to withdraw if this appears necessary.

M Pichon said that the sending of the Mission reestablishes the situation existing before the establishment of the Bela Kun Government. There had then been a military Mission in charge of the execution of the Armistice.

Mr Polk says he thinks it will be necessary to obtain from the Romanian Government an agreement to accept the decisions of the Mission. The Mission would have no authority unless the Governments concerned are notified.

Mr Balfour says that he agrees to the despatch of a Mission provided it is endowed with all the authority the Conference could confer. Further, he thinks that the American member might be empowered to make the economic threat mentioned by Mr Polk. He suggested sending for Mr Misu and requesting him to telegraph to Bucharest that any excesses committed in Budapest during this needless occupation would have the most disastrous results. The Hungarian Government having promised to accept the Armistice it was for the Conference to see that it did so. He would suggest, like Mr. Polk, that the Romanians should occupy high ground outside Budapest, and Stop there. He would like to ask Marshal Foch whether if they did so, they would safely control the situation.

M Clemenceau observes that there is a hill in Budapest but that all the surrounding country is flat plain.

Mr Balfour asks whether an army in the vicinity could be itself safe and also able to control the situation.

Marshal Foch says that it depended on the size of the army.

Mr Polk asks whether the Allies could not make the same sort of economic threat as he had made on behalf of the United States. He further observes that it would be difficult for the moment to promise an American company as escort. He would however endeavor to find the men.

Mr Balfour says that he does not think that he can promise any British troops. Admiral Troubridge, however, had suggested going up the Danube with a Monitor.

M Clemenceau said that the Mission must have written instructions. These instructions he hoped Mr Balfour would draft as regards their political side. Marshal Foch might then add the military instructions. At the same time a telegram could be sent to Bucharest, stating that the Council considered the Romanians responsible for any disturbances that might take place in Budapest and that unless they conformed to the wishes of the Conference the economic consequences to themselves would be to their detriment.

M Pichon says that he thinks it is undesirable to threaten the Romanians. Even though they are not obeying orders they are helping the Allied cause. They do not deserve to be treated like enemies.

S Tittoni agrees. It was possible he thinks, that the withdrawal of the Romanians might not be desired by the Mission. He thinks they should be informed that a Mission was being sent under the authority of the Conference and that the Conference expected the Romanian Government to order their Generals to obey the instructions given by this Mission.

M Clemenceau asks if Mr Balfour would make a draft at once.

M Pichon says that the same communication should be made to the Czechoslovak and Serbian Governments. They would be pleased at receiving it and reassured that Romania is not to be allowed undue expansion.

Mr Polk says he has no objection. The American Delegation would like to go further and say that the Conference would hold the Romanians responsible for any untoward incidents that might take place. On this condition he was ready to waive the economic threat.

(After some further discussion a draft prepared by Mr Balfour to be addressed to the Romanian Government and one prepared by M Berthelot to be addressed to the Serbian Government are accepted.

(It is also agreed that the telegram addressed to the Romanian Government should be communicated to the Serbian and Czechoslovak Governments.)

(It is decided to proceed at once to the nomination of a Mission of Allied Generals to be sent to Budapest accompanied by a small escort of Allied troops.)

(It is agreed that written instructions should be given them to be prepared by Mr Balfour and Marshal Foch.)

(Mr Hoover withdraws and Count Wrangel, Count Ehrensvärd and Capt Akerblom enter the room.)

Hearing of Swedish Point of View on the Subject of the Aaland islands Count Ehrensvärd then reads a document.

(M Clemenceau thanks the Swedish Representatives, who then withdraw.)

(It is then resolved at Mr. Polk’s suggestion that the question of the Swedish claims to the Aaland Islands as embodied in the declaration read by Count Ehrensvärd, be referred to the Baltic Commission for examination and report.)


(The Military Representatives, General Baird, Colonel Mougin and Colonel Georges enter the room.)

3. General Baird says that it is doubtless the intention if the Great Powers to make a lasting peace in the Balkans. He assumes that was their first intention. The punishment of Bulgaria was their second purpose. It is therefore necessary to punish Bulgaria so as not to jeopardize a lasting peace. The most contentious questions in the Balkans are territorial questions. As regards Bulgaria there are two such questions which might be said to be analogous to that of Alsace-Lorraine. There is even possibly a third in Thrace. It was the question of Macedonia and the question of the Dobruja that had brought Bulgaria into the war against the Allies. Proof of this could be found in the fact that while the Bulgarian attitude was still undecided, the Allies had urged the Serbians and Romanians to make concessions in these very areas in order that the Bulgarians should be inclined to take the Allied side. What held at that time probably held now. If the Powers took no heed in this they would have to face the consequences. The Romanians had taken the Dobruja for strategic reasons, and also to penalize the Bulgarians. Their strategic reason need not prevail. The Bulgarian forces at the present time could be reduced to any extent desired, and it could also be laid down that no Bulgarian troops should be sent beyond a line from Varna to Ruschuk. The Romanians freely admit that the Southern Dobruja is Bulgarian in population; but no Romanian statesman would offer to return it, lest he be reproached for alienating his country’s possessions. It is therefore necessary to exert pressure on the Romanians, if a lasting bone of contention is to be removed. It would be easier for the Romanians to yield to Allied injunctions than to offer the country themselves. Macedonia had been taken by the Serbians in 1913 because they were in effective occupation; secondly on grounds of compensation, seeing that they had not obtained access to the Adriatic; thirdly to maintain a balance of power.

Mr Balfour asks whether Serbia has not claimed the country on the ground that it was peopled by populations of Serbian blood.

General Baird replies that in 1912 Serbia had admitted the country was not Serbian. Only one portion of it known as the “contested area” had been reserved for arbitration by the Czar of Russia. If the main purpose was to establish peace and not to punish Bulgaria, some other solution of the Macedonian problem must be found. No one could expect that Bulgaria after the war should be rewarded by an accession of territory. Macedonia was neither Greek nor Serbian, it was Bulgarian. Nevertheless it does not desire to be, and need not be placed under Bulgarian Government. The situation was now very different from that in 1912. Serbia had obtained her compensation towards the west, and there was no fear that Bulgaria would now become the most powerful military state in the Balkans. Very much the same might be said about the Greek claims to Thrace. In the opinion of all the Allied Officers in Sofia, there would be a repetition of the Smyrna episodes if Bulgarian Thrace were given to Greece. The population was principally Pomak, and the next most important element in it was Bulgar. He heard from General Bridges that General Franchet d’Esperey is opposed to the cession of Thrace to Greece. General Milne was also opposed to it as well as all the Allied Generals. The Greeks would not be able to administer the country. In addition, some of the Pomaks had appealed to General Franchet d’Esperey not to be put under the Greeks. He thought that should the Dobrudja be returned to Bulgaria, the Romanians would never go to war to get it back, because the Romanian people would feel no enthusiasm on the subject. He thinks the same applies to Macedonia and Thrace. Neither the Serbs nor the Greeks would willingly wage a war to regain those areas. On the other hand the Bulgarians would go to war wholeheartedly to regain them if they were taken from them. As to the present situation, he thinks a wrong impression prevails in Paris that Bulgaria has been turbulent since the armistice. Bulgaria complied with every demand made. Her army had been reduced below the figures required by the armistice. The armistice allowed an army of 4,000 officers and 80,000 other ranks. The Bulgarian army really numbered 3,500 officers and 55,000 other ranks. There were 8 infantry divisions instead of 10, and in each of them one class was serving instead of two. Bulgaria had attempted to do nothing against the interests of the Allies. Moreover, the Allies had no troops, and, if a national rising were provoked, it would be impossible to stop it. There would, moreover, be no Bulgarian Government to appeal to.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch whether the armistice enables Bulgaria to maintain 10 divisions.

Marshal Foch says that the Bulgarians have not been asked to reduce the number of their divisions, but to keep only 3 of them mobilized.

General Baird says the Bulgarians had not even kept 3 mobilized. He observes that the Bulgarians could be very heavily fined in money, cattle and corn. Moreover, the Allies could administer and develop certain state resources such as railways and mines, and thus obtain what they required without touching territory and incurring the permanent hostility of the Bulgarians and a readiness on their part to take the side of any possible enemy of the Entente. He suggested that the same kind of peace as the British Government had made with the Boers should be made with the Bulgarians. It would be better to have the Bulgarians on our side next time than against us.

Mr Balfour says that it might comfort General Baird to know that inside the Conference there had never been any idea of subordinating everything to a desire to punish the Bulgarians.

(M Clemenceau thanks General Baird, who then withdraws.)

M Clemenceau then asked Colonel Mougin to give an account of the present military situation of Bulgaria.

Colonel Mougin said that the clauses of the armistice had been carried out by the Bulgarians as regards the number of their troops. It might be possible, with tact, to induce the Bulgarians to disarm still further. This would be advantageous, seeing that if they disliked the treaty, they would only find weak Allied forces opposed to them. The bulk of the available Allied force would be French. It might not be numerous enough to cope with the situation. It would certainly not be adequate should a popular rising occur. It must be remembered that in these parts every man had a rifle, and since the war a great many had machine guns. The question then is whether the Greeks can be depended on. He thinks not. Of their 11 divisions, 5 were in Smyrna. Their policy in that region was such that they would require a large number of troops to enforce it. Of the remainder, the bulk must be kept in Macedonia, which was not Greek, but either Bulgarian or Mohammedan. Thrace also, if Greece should have it, could only be held by force. Unless the Allies supplied the force, Greece would have to do so. It followed that Greek troops could not be relied on to cope with the Bulgarians should they rise. This would not lighten the task of the French troops, which would also have to cope with difficulties of transport. The troops at General Franchet d’Esperey’s disposal might, if he were warned in time, be able to keep the railways, the stores of ammunition, and the arsenals, but it must also be borne in mind that the Turks would take sides in favour of the Bulgarians as a consequence of what had happened in Smyrna. They were now less anti-Bulgarian than anti-Greek. In a word, throughout Thrace the majority was Mussulman. The Turkish peasants might be armed by the Bulgarians, and all would make common cause against the Greeks. His personal opinion was that the Allies were in a fair way to making permanent enemies of the Turks, who lately had been friendly.

Mr Balfour asks what Colonel Mougin had meant by tactful methods of reducing Bulgarian armaments.

Colonel Mougin says that he thinks that the methods might be left to General Franchet d’Esperey. All the Council need do is to tell him what is desired.

(Colonel Mougin then withdraws).

M Clemenceau said that he was not sure that the discussion could be pursued with advantage. In any case, it must be understood that French troops would not fight alone against the Bulgarians in the interests of Greece. The Greeks had gone to Smyrna, with the result known. They would also have trouble in Macedonia. They courted further trouble by claiming Thrace. He was quite prepared to give them Thrace, but not to meet the trouble for them.

S Tittoni said that the Italian battalion was there for the purpose of bringing about peace, not for war.

M Clemenceau said that the same applied to the 15,000 French troops.

Marshal Foch says that whatever form the treaty takes, it is unlikely to be entirely to the taste of the Bulgarians. The question then arises: what can the Allies do? There are a few French troops under General Franchet d’Esperey. In front of them is the Bulgarian army and its store of arms. General Franchet d’Esperey might perhaps prevail on the Bulgarians to yield some of these arms. That would be so much to the good, but it must be done at once, because the process of demobilization would reduce his troops to a negligible quantity in a month. He therefore proposes to tell General Franchet d’Esperey to get possession of the Bulgarian guns. The Allies would be more able to cope with the situation when the treaty was signed. At that time only the small states - Greece and Serbia, and, possibly, Romania - would be able to furnish the police force. They would only be able to secure the execution of the Treaty if the Bulgarians had been disarmed before-hand. He therefore concluded that General Franchet d’Esperey should be ordered to disarm the Bulgarians as far as possible.

Mr Polk asks whether the Allies are entitled under the armistice to give him this order.

M Clemenceau said that no such order can be given to the Bulgarians. They might or might not comply with General Franchet d’Esperey’s request. He is inclined to ask Marshal Foch to do as he suggested under the reservation that the use of the French divisions remained at the disposal of the French Government.

Marshal Foch reads a draft telegram he proposes to send to General Franchet d’Esperey.

M Clemenceau suggests that it be made quite clear to General Franchet d’Esperey that he must obtain his results by diplomacy, and not by giving orders to the Bulgarians, who were entitled under the armistice to disregard them.

Mr Balfour thinks it most unlikely that the Bulgarians would agree, but, if the Military Authorities thinks there was some hope, he is quite ready to try.

(After some further discussion, the telegram is adopted, subject to final consideration at the next Meeting.)

S Tittoni suggests the holding of a plebiscite in Thrace.

M Clemenceau observes that as the population was predominantly Mussulman, the result would be a foregone conclusion.

M Pichon suggests the country should be given to the League of Nations.


4. The following nominations were made: Appointment of Allied Commissioners for Negotiation Between the German and Polish Governments

For France General Dupont.
For Great Britain General Malcolm.
For Italy General Bencivenga.

(The Meeting then adjourns).

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, August 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Draft Telegram Annexed as Appendix “F” to the Minutes of the preceding Meeting, H. D. 23, is finally adopted. Marshal Foch is requested to forward this telegram.


(Mr Hoover, M Seydoux, Mr J F Dulles and M Loucheur enter the room.)

2. M Clemenceau asks Mr Polk if he has any news of Budapest.

Mr Polk reads the following telegram:

“Hoover, American Relief, Paris. August 5th, 1919.

Last night there were 15 or 20 people killed in Budapest which I have definitely verified. It absolutely necessary that the Romanians be taken out of this situation as rapidly as possible and pending their departure General Gorton should act for the rest of the Commission. I was sure that these conflicts would take place. They also demand hostages and threaten definitely to kill 5 persons for each one who is injured in Budapest, naturally after their starting the killing further difficulties are apt to occur. The railroads are all tied up with machine-guns on the bridges. The Police Force has been dispossessed and whole city in absolute military control. This condition cannot continue and the movement to reorganize Hungary succeed. Gregory”

Mr Hoover says that half an hour before the meeting he had received a message for M Clemenceau, from Lt Colonel Romanelli:

“Budapest, August 4th, 1919.

“I have the honor to inform you that I communicated your orders to the High Command of the Romanian Army but the Romanian troops have advanced in spite of this and continue to come. At the present time they have occupied the city of Budapest, have cut communications, taken hostages and made prisoner one member of the new Government. The Serbians also are advancing from the South and pillaging. The situation makes it impossible for the new Government to explain itself.”

M Clemenceau says that under the circumstances it might be desirable to send a more threatening message than the one sent on the previous day.

Mr Polk says that the orders referred to in Colonel Romanelli’s telegram are probably those sent on the previous Sunday.

S Tittoni said that the moral of this was that the Military Commission should reach Budapest as soon as possible.

M Clemenceau asks if all the members had been nominated.

Mr Polk says that the American member had not yet been nominated, but informed the Council that General Bandholtz was appointed.

The Commission is composed as follows:

For the United States of America: General Bandholtz.
For Great Britain: General Gorton.
For France: General Graziani.
For Italy: General Mombelli.

(At this point Marshal Foch and General Weygand entered the room.)

Mr Balfour readd the following draft instructions for the Inter-Allied Commission to Budapest:

“The Mission are desired:

(1) To enter into communication with the Hungarian Government with a view of securing the observance of the Armistice.

(2) To report on the present position of this question, and its probable developments.

(3) To enter into communication with the Romanian Generals in order to prevent any action by the successful army which, by rousing nationalist sentiment in Hungary, or otherwise, may perpetuate the unhappy condition of that country and delay the conclusion of peace.

It may be of assistance to the Mission to remind them:

(a) That the frontiers of Hungary having been already determined by the Conference, and communicated to all the Governments immediately concerned, it is the policy of the Conference to remove without any unnecessary delay all foreign troops from the country. The Romanians, it should be noted, have promised to withdraw their Armies as soon as the disarmament of the Hungarians has been accomplished according to the terms of the Armistice.

(b) That orders have been given to terminate the blockade of Hungary and to further the immediate importation of necessaries.

(c) That the maintenance of this new condition of things must depend on the behavior of the Hungarian Government to the Allied and Associated Powers, and

(d) That while those Powers have not the slightest desire to interfere with the Hungarian people in their choice of a Government, they can only have dealings with one which can be trusted loyally to carry out its international obligation.”

Marshal Foch says that he agrees to these instructions, but would like to add to them certain more definite instructions regarding the Armistice. The Hungarians must have no more than six divisions. They must be made to deliver war material, not only Hungarian war material, but the war material left by General Mackensen’s Army. He therefore suggests the following draft instructions:

“The Mission of Allied Generals sent to Budapest in the name of the Supreme Council is to be entrusted with the duty:

(1) Of supervising the execution of the military armistice signed on 13th November, 1918, between the Allied Command and the Hungarian Government and in addition of the following measures:

(a) The establishment of the maximum number of effectives under arms, in each branch of the Hungarian Army, with the sole purpose of insuring the maintenance of internal order.

(b) The disarmament of all demobilized units and the dispersal of Depots or Centers of mobilization.

(c) Delivery to the Allies of arms, munitions and war material in excess of material necessary for the units maintained, including material having belonged to General Mackensen’s Army.

(d) In concert with the Allied Staffs, to regulate the distribution of this material among the Allied Powers concerned, in proportion to the military contribution made by each, and in consideration of the present war situation.

(e) Immediate stoppage of production in the arsenals or industrial establishments producing war material.

(2) The Mission will further:

(a) Determine according to present circumstances the strength and distribution of Romanian and Serbian troops which it may be necessary to maintain on Hungarian territory to ensure order and the execution of the Armistice.

(b) Arrange with the Romanian and Serbian Commands for the withdrawal of any superfluous troops.”

Mr Balfour says that he wishes to ask two questions regarding this proposal. Firstly, have the Allies any right to make the terms of the Armistice more onerous? In the Armistice, there had been no question of demobilizing six divisions. He thinks perhaps this might be justified on the ground that Hungary had, in the interval, made war. Secondly, he agrees that the evacuation of Hungarian territory should be gradual and under control. Unfortunately Marshal Foch was not Commander-in-Chief of the Romanian Army. He was afraid that four Generals escorted by two Companies of Inter-Allied troops would not be able to control the Romanian Army.

M Clemenceau says the violation of the Armistice gives the Allies a right to enhance the terms.

Mr Balfour observes that he feels uneasy in that not only are the Armistice terms made more onerous, but the increased severity of the terms is coupled with orders given to the Command of the Romanian Army. It was probable that the first part will be carried out by the Hungarians. Could he be assured that the second part would be carried out by the Romanians? If not, the Conference will incur great discredit. It might be argued that because the Hungarians had made war, they deserved severer terms, but it must be admitted that they had made war against people who had invaded their territory in spite of the orders of the Conference.

Marshal Foch says that he admits his proposals exceed the terms of the Armistice. The Armistice, however, had been made a year ago. At that time it had been necessary to leave the Hungarians a certain force on a war footing, in order that Hungary should be defended against the Germans, who were then still in the field. The situation is now quite different. It was quite unnecessary for Hungary to maintain any forces on a war footing. The Hungarian Army should be demobilized. As to the Romanians, he thinks that, if properly addressed, they will do as they are told.

General Weygand says that the Romanian Military Adviser to the Peace Delegation, Colonel Dimitresco, had called on him to say that the Romanian Army considers itself in Hungary as the mandatory of the Conference. It wishes to carry out Marshal Foch’s orders. In other words, he asks for instructions from Marshal Foch, although he is not in command of the Romanian Army. He adds that the Romanian Commander in the field has been instructed to send direct reports to Marshal Foch.

M Pichon says that the Romanians have not actually disobeyed the Conference. They have been given a certain frontier which they had declared they could not defend. While this was being discussed, the Hungarians had attacked them. In self-protection they had advanced beyond the line fixed for them.

Mr Balfour says that he has no wish to make a case against the Romanians, but he thinks that M Pichon’s statement is too favorable to them. On the 14th June, the Romanians had been ordered to retire by a certain date. They had not done so, and they had not given any explanation.

Mr Polk adds that in February last they had flatly refused to obey the orders of the Conference.

S Tittoni said that he has the greatest confidence in the moral authority of the four Generals who would go to Budapest. He believes that neither the Romanians nor the Serbians would disobey them. To reinforce their action, he suggests that a diplomatic démarche be made at Belgrade and Bucharest.

M Clemenceau suggests that the instructions drafted by Mr Balfour and Marshal Foch should be welded in one, and that S Tittoni should prepare a dispatch to be sent to the Romanians and the Serbians.

Mr Polk says that he wishes to inquire whether an alteration of the Armistice terms would not put the Council in contradiction with itself, seeing that on August 2nd the Council had addressed the Hungarian Government, and taken its stand on the Armistice as it originally stood.

Marshal Foch says that it is absolutely necessary to obtain demobilization in Hungary at the present time. A year ago, this had not been desired. The situation had entirely changed since then.

Mr Polk says that whatever the reasons might be, and however good they might be, the Council is committed by what it had said three days before.

Mr Balfour says that Marshal Foch wishes to reduce the Hungarian forces below the figures stated in the Armistice. He wishes to draw attention to the fact that the Armistice conferred on the Allies a right to occupy such places as they wished in Hungarian territory, in order to establish peace. Would it not be possible to offer the Hungarians the choice either to reduce at once to the allotment which was to be made to them in the Peace Treaty, in which case no occupation by Allied troops would be required, or to submit to occupation by Romanians.

Marshal Foch says that if the Hungarians are offered two solutions, they would propose a third. This would lead to endless argument. He suggests that the military Mission be instructed to obtain such reduction as they could.

Mr Polk says that he does not object to any attempt the Mission might make by persuasive methods, but he thinks the Council should not contradict itself and order the Generals to violate the Armistice.

Marshal Foch points out that the instructions he had drawn up were addressed not to the Hungarians, but to the Allied Generals.

Mr Polk observed that if the Romanians are asked to occupy Hungary in the name of the Conference, they would be entitled to demand the cost of occupation, presumably out of the available resources of Hungary.

M Clemenceau said that for the time being the Romanians are asking for nothing. Nor was it Marshal Foch’s idea to employ Romanians as agents of the Conference. He asks Marshal Foch if he requires a Company of French troops.

Marshal Foch replies in the affirmative.

S Tittoni says that he will supply a Company of Italian troops.

Mr Balfour says that Admiral Troubridge and a monitor will be available from the British side.

S Tittoni proposes a draft telegram to the Romanian and Serbian Governments.

(After some discussion, this telegram is agreed to in the form given in Appendix “A”.

It is agreed that this telegram should be communicated in toto to the Romanian and Serbian Governments and the first part of it to the Hungarian Government by M Pichon.

It is further decided that the instructions contained in Appendix “B” should be given to the Allied Military Mission to Budapest.

Marshal Foch is asked to transmit these instructions to each of the four Generals nominated.)


3. Mr Hoover makes the following statement:

“I desire to again raise to the Council the Coal situation in Europe.

Under the direction of the Supreme Council and the Supreme Economic Council, my Administration undertook the promotion of production and so far as possible to control the distribution of coal during the Armistice in Central and Eastern Europe. A considerable staff has been employed upon this labor and numerous agreements and undertakings entered upon, involving the old States of Austria, the Balkans, Poland and to some extent Germany. While the result could not be ideal they have at least served to maintain sufficient supplies for the transportation of municipal and domestic services necessary to maintain life. With the ending of the Armistice (and this authority) and with the super-imposition of the Reparation Commission over a considerable part of this problem, the supervision which we have exerted must necessarily cease.

Colonel A G Goodyear and Colonel W G Atwood of our staff have compiled a summary of the 1913 production and consumption of the principal countries in Europe (excluding Russia and the Balkan States) and have also conducted a careful inquiry into the probable production during the year 1919, based upon the experience of the first six months of the year. The net result shows that from a production of about 679,500,000 tons in the principal countries in Europe (except Russia) the production in these States has fallen to a rate of about 443,000,000 tons per annum. Of the 1913 production above mentioned about 614,000,000 tons were consumed in these States (i. e. outside the Balkan States and export markets foreign to Europe). In other words, the production has fallen approximately 236,500,000 tons, or down to 65% of normal production. The consumption cannot be decreased in this ratio (35%) upon certain vital consumers, such as transportation and municipal and other essential services, so that a shortage for manufacture and household use must be on a far greater ratio. Beyond this, the very natural tendency of productive countries to reserve a larger degree of their normal consumption will and does result in an under-supply to the non-producing countries far below a 35% reduction. Furthermore, the summer accumulation against winter use has not been in progress and therefore the hardships of the coming winter are even further increased.

It seems almost unnecessary to repeat the causes of this diminished production but they may be again summarized as due to certain specific causes which in fact are much the same in all productive industries.

To a minor degree, compared with the whole, there has been a loss of equipment and skill, due to the war; there has been a retardation of advance exploitation during the war; there has been a relaxation of effort as a reflex from the physical exhaustion of large sections of the population through privations and the mental and physical strain of the war; there is a shortage of railway rolling stock for prompt movement from the mines; there has been an unsettlement of political destiny of a number of coalfields by the peace terms; and, above all, the proper and insistent demand of labor for higher standards of living in the general unbalance of economic conditions has been manifested in repeated strikes and other deterrents to production. Unfortunately European labor at many points has become infected with the theory that the limitation of effort below physical necessity and the obstruction of labor-saving devices will increase their own comfort and improve their conditions. In turn, the reactions from undue profits earned by proprietors during the war has brought a shock to the theory of private ownership, which has discouraged further investment and consequently a renewed opening of new areas which the maintenance of production demands. All these causes are operating to varying degree in different localities but their summation is shortage of production below the living necessity of the population of Europe.

With the arrival of a harvest and thus the solution of immediate food pressure, the problem of coal now comes to the front as the greatest menace to the stability and life in Europe. It is a problem domestic to Europe and incapable of solution from the United States. Disregarding all other questions, an additional load of 1,000,000 tons per month on American ports would indeed be a large tax in the face of the trebling of the United States food exports above pre-war normal. Furthermore, even such a tonnage would entail a tax on the world’s shipping that cannot but affect freight rates generally. With a shortage in production of 20,000,000 tons per month a contribution of even double this amount from the United States would be but little help.

The solution of the problem demands, first, increased production and second, organisation of distribution.

It would perhaps contribute to the first problem if the coal miners and coal owners of all Europe could be brought to a realization that the fate of European civilization now rests in their hands to a degree equal to - if not greater than - in the hands of providers of food supplies during the next year.

The solution of the second problem - distribution - is vital if the non-producing States are not to collapse and in its conduct it should be possible to force the maximum production in those States who are partially supplied.

I urgently recommend that some form of coal control should be set up in Europe with view to the stimulation of production and to secure a distribution that will maintain the essential services upon which economic and political stability must rest. The problem cannot be solved for any one European country alone but the energies of all must be enlisted and the position of all must be considered. It is purely a domestic problem for Europe.”

He therefore proposes the following Resolution:

“That the Supreme Council should invite the British, French, Italian, Belgian, Polish and Czechoslovak Governments each to nominate one member to a European Coal Commission to be immediately set up to undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe. The Reparation Commission, the Teschen Commission, the Plebiscite Commission for Silesia, and the different Commissions charged with matters of transport by sea, railroad and canal, should all be instructed to co-operate with this Coal Commission and to assist the work of the Coal Commission to the full extent of their powers”.

M Loucheur agrees with Mr Hoover except in one particular. He considers that the United States should be represented upon the proposed Commission.

Mr Hoover states that American representation had been omitted because it was felt that this matter was a domestic problem of Europe. Furthermore, the United States is faced with a crisis at home. At the best, the United States can only ship to Europe about 500,000 tons in a year, by reason of Port troubles and lack of shipping. As production of coal in Europe had declined 35% this assistance was negligible. Under the authority of the Council he had been concerned with the coal production in Central and Eastern Europe, but the Reparation Commission set up under the Treaty was now taking charge of the mines, and his own work was therefore coming to an end.

Mr Balfour says that he is not quite sure that he understands what Mr. Hoover means by saying that the coal crisis was a European domestic problem. As the British representative, he might in the same way say that the problems of continental Europe are domestic problems in which Great Britain is not concerned. In reality, all countries of the world are inter-dependent, and their mutual interest in one another’s condition has never been better understood than by Mr Hoover himself. Therefore, he does not quite follow Mr Hoover’s reasoning in excluding America from representation on the Commission. He has no doubt, however, that the Port and Shipping difficulties mentioned by Mr Hoover make it difficult for America to do all she would wish to do to help Europe. One portion of the Resolution proposed by Mr Hoover appears to him a little obscure. He alludes to the passage in which it was said that the Commission should “undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe”. Does this mean that the Commission will take charge for instance, of the Belgium coalfields and the coalfields of Northern France? Will it attempt to regulate the conditions of production in England? As was well known to the Council, it was difficult to obtain coal from English coalfields even to keep British industries going. In what manner could the proposed Commission intervene in the internal affairs of the various countries?

Mr Hoover says that the question of the sovereignty of Commissions of this kind has always proved an insuperable difficulty. In practice, it has always been agreed that such Commissions have no authority. No Government can give a right, even to its representative, to dispose of its national resources. The Commissions therefore, confined themselves to giving advice as to ways and means, and the best methods of co-ordination. For instance, Germany is in a position to produce more coal than was required of her for indemnity purposes and for home consumption. Italy has offered a supply of skilled workmen; by offering a bonus on production, a surplus could be obtained for the benefit of the world at large. In Silesia, on the other hand, the production of coal had diminished 50% by reason of the political situation in that area. The Relief Commission which had formerly controlled the production of coal in Silesia had been superseded by the Plebiscite Commission; the resulting situation had had a detrimental effect on the output. In Teschen for similar reasons the production of coal had also diminished. The political situation there had re-acted on the mines. Czechoslovakia produced an excess of brown coal. This coal is useless for transportation purposes but is employed in certain industries which by reason of the political situation could not obtain it, and are now using black coal. An exchange of this brown coal for black coal could be suggested as a means of obtaining a more profitable distribution. In fact, the Commission could suggest many ways of co-ordination which the ordinary play of political affairs impeded.

M Loucheur suggests that if an American Member cannot be appointed to the Commission, Mr Hoover’s Agents should at least be allowed to continue their work in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Mr Hoover says that he thinks perhaps a solution could be found if he were allowed time for consultation with Mr Polk.

S Tittoni suggests that Mr Hoover might at least continue his activities for the first six months of the operations of the Commission.

Mr Balfour says that he is in entire agreement

Mr Polk asks that the question be left open for a decision between himself, Mr Hoover and M Loucheur.

It is then resolved:

“That the Supreme Council should invite the British, French, Italian, Belgian, Polish and Czechoslovak Governments each to nominate one member to a European Coal Commission to be immediately set up to undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe. The Reparation Commission, the Teschen Commission, the Plebiscite Commission for Silesia, and different Commissions charged with matters of transport by sea, railroad and canal, should all be instructed to cooperate with this Coal Commission and to assist the work of the Coal Commission to the full extent of their powers.”

It is further decided that Mr Polk, Mr Hoover and M Loucheur should confer regarding American representation on this Commission.


4. Mr Balfour says that he wishes to introduce a subject not on the Agenda. He does so with all due apologies. He would remind the Council that at the same time as the Treaty with Austria, the Treaty with Czechoslovakia must be signed. The latter has not yet been passed by the Conference. Seeing that the Austrian Delegation has been in St Germain since May, he thinks the Conference should be ready to deal with their final reply as soon as it comes.

(It is agreed that the question of the Treaty with Czechoslovakia, together with that of the Treaty with Romania should be placed on the Agenda for the following day.)


5. M Clemenceau says that after hearing General Baird and Colonel Mougin, he has come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to hear Mr Venizelos regarding some of the problems raised. He has taken the liberty of asking Mr Venizelos to address the Council, and he has also summoned M Tardieu. He has done this without consulting his colleagues, and hopes they will forgive him.

(At this stage Mr Venizelos, M Tardieu, and a number of experts on Bulgarian Affairs enter the room.)

M Clemenceau says that he wishes to have a conversation with Mr Venizelos about Thrace and Asia Minor. The troops of the Great Powers are being demobilized very rapidly. It will therefore be impossible for any of the Great Powers to undertake a new campaign. The situation in Asia Minor, according to his information, is not good, and as Mr Venizelos knows, a Commission of Inquiry has been sent. The Turks appear to be greatly incensed against the Greeks. The situation in Bulgaria, on the other hand, causes anxiety also. The Bulgarians have demobilized in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, but they still had a respectable force under arms. In Thrace, even should the Bulgarian Government not interfere, there might be popular risings against the Greeks, should the country be given to them. What has taken place in Asia Minor has produced the effect of making the Turk and Bulgarian in Thrace feel a common interest antagonistic to Greece. France has, in the Balkans, 15,000 men, but he must warn Mr Venizelos that the French Government has no intention of embarking those troops in a campaign. They are needed at home, and he wishes to recall them as soon as possible. All the Powers are in the same case. The evidence leads to the conclusion that if the Peace terms offered to Bulgaria are not to her taste, the resulting situation might be very serious. Greece, at the present moment, has five divisions in Asia Minor.

Mr Venizelos said that there were four Greek divisions in Asia Minor; owing to the improvement of the situation there, a fifth division, which had been forming, had been withdrawn to Macedonia.

M Clemenceau says he has not been made aware of any improvement in the situation in Asia Minor. On the contrary, he has heard that the situation there had reacted unfavorably in Constantinople. The Allies have somewhat ingenuously undertaken to disarm the Bulgarians beyond the stipulations of the Armistice. They would doubtless understand that this intention of disarming them is a prelude to something not to their advantage. They would probably decline to be disarmed. The question he personally wishes to ask Mr Venizelos is this: Can the Greeks undertake to defend themselves on two fronts - in Thrace and in Asia Minor - without any assistance from the Allies?

Mr Venizelos said that before replying to this question, he would like to speak a few words regarding the Greek Army in Asia Minor. He begs the Council to reserve its opinion on this subject. The Turks have made a great outcry, which has perhaps been too much attended to in certain quarters. No doubt excesses had taken place but there were extenuating circumstances. The troops have been attacked in the streets by people firing at them out of windows and from roofs. He does not attempt to exonerate the massacre of prisoners, but he will assure the Council that after investigation, it will be found that these are very rare and isolated instances. He need not remind the Council that the Greek troops which had fought in Macedonia and Russia side by side with the troops of the Great Powers had borne themselves well. Greek troops had been accused of excesses at Menemen. In all seventeen people had been killed and twenty wounded. Trouble had arisen there because a tired Greek Battalion withdrawing from Bergama had been attacked as it entered the town with sloped arms. Regarding what had been alleged at Aidin, he begs leave to read a telegram received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek forces. As to the effect of these events on the feelings of the Turkish population in Thrace, he thinks it would be a mistake to attribute much importance to it. On July 29th he had received a telegram from Kavalla, conveying the appeal of a number of Thracian Mohammedans for liberation from Bulgaria.

As to M Clemenceau’s question, whether Greece could undertake simultaneous action in Asia Minor and in Thrace, he is bound to answer in the negative, but he hopes that simultaneous action will not be required. The local situation in Asia Minor has improved, and he expects to reduce the Greek forces there by one division. Latterly, one Greek division from Bessarabia had been brought back to Greece, which it had been intended originally to send to Asia Minor. It might be possible therefore to leave only three divisions in Asia Minor, though doubtless it might be necessary to restrict the area occupied. This is all the easier as, in consequence of the agreement with Italy, there was nothing to fear on the side of Aidin, and only two roads of access to Smyrna needed guarding. This leaves eight divisions for use on the Greek front in Europe. He fully understands that the Great Powers cannot undertake to enforce the Peace for him. He fully understands that Greece must help herself in this respect. Two things are possible. Bulgaria will sign the Treaty, or will refuse to. If she signs it, he thinks she would also execute it and withdraw her troops from Thrace. The occupation of Thrace under these conditions would be an easy operation. All measures would be taken to avoid resistance by the population, and damage to property. He would like to suggest that the best means of obtaining these results would be to send British and French officers to advance in front of the troops. If Bulgaria refuses to sign the Peace, he thinks that not Greece alone, but Greece and Serbia, and perhaps also Romania will be together in forcing Bulgaria to comply. He has heard it said that the Southern Dobrudja is to be restored to Bulgaria. Should this not be the case, and should Bulgaria attempt to resist the Treaty, he is confident that Romania would help Greece and Serbia, though she was not definitely pledged to do so. He thinks it would be of advantage to let the Bulgarians understand that if they did not accept the Treaty offered to them, they would have to be coerced by their neighbors, who would compensate themselves at her expense and eventually impose upon them much harder terms. For instance the Dobrudja would not be left to them. He thinks this would make the Bulgarians think twice before resisting. There would be against the Bulgarians the overwhelming force of eight Greek divisions, two Serbian divisions, (at least two Serbian divisions can reasonably be expected) and five or six Roumanian divisions. Should the last not act, the eight Greek and two Serbian divisions, by prompt intervention, could easily take Sofia and dictate Peace.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Venizelos what he thinks about the Turkish population in Thrace. The information he has received is that these Turks are in league with the Bulgarians against Greece.

Mr Venizelos says that if it is only the Thracian population that gives trouble, eight divisions is an ample force to cope with the situation.

M Clemenceau says that he is not entirely reassured. Mr Venizelos answers his question by saying that though he cannot conduct a simultaneous campaign in Asia Minor and in Thrace, he hopes the Turks will be good enough not to attack him in both places at once.

Mr Venizelos says he had understood M Clemenceau to ask whether Greece can fight Bulgaria and Turkey at the same time. This, Greece cannot do, but she was not afraid of local risings in the population. Before concluding his remarks, he would like to draw the attention of the Council to a curious historical fact. It has often been alleged that the shape of Greece towards the East is such as to render her Eastern frontier untenable.

He shows by the help of an atlas the persistence throughout the centuries of a territorial distribution of the Hellenic world very similar to the territorial claims of the Greek Delegation.

(The work quoted is The Bulgarians and their historical ethnographical and political frontiers, 679–1917. Preface by Dr Rizoff, published in Berlin, 1917.)

M Clemenceau says that a suggestion has been made by Mr Venizelos which he will not accept. If he is unable to send French troops, he is equally unable to send French officers to risk their lives in Thrace.

M Pichon says that Mr Venizelos has only considered the hypothesis of resistance by Bulgaria to the Treaty. In that case the Serbians and Romanians are expected to make common cause with Greece. But is it not possible that Bulgaria will acquiesce in all the clauses concerning Romania and Serbia, in order to detach them from Greece and in order to be able to cope with Greece alone?

Mr Venizelos says that as to Serbia, he feels certain of her cooperation. He has stood by Serbia at the risk of civil war in his own country and he has no doubt of Serbia’s loyalty. There is, moreover, a Treaty between Greece and Serbia. There is none with Romania and he admits that Romanian co-operation is less certain. He does not, however, think that Bulgaria will abandon the Dobrudja without contest.

(Mr Venizelos then withdraws.)

M Tardieu then explains that the Commission has attempted to work on the lines suggested by S Tittoni, but that no agreement had been reached up to the present.

(Certain alternative suggestions are made and the question is deferred for discussion at a later date.)

[Jimbuna]

6th August 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: Peerages, etc., awarded to high Naval and Military Commanders.

Troop train carrying soldiers of the Czechoslovak Legion enter a town in Siberia.


With the Hungarian capital Budapest under Romanian control, Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Peidl is forced out of office after only six days.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, August 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. At the suggestion of Mr Balfour it is agreed to modify the text of the decision taken by the Conference on the 1st August, 1919 and to request Marshal Foch to submit a report on the military measures necessary order to oblige the German Government to surrender the persons guilty of breaches of the Laws of War.

(It is agreed that no compensation should be demanded from the German Government. The revised text of the decision taken by the Conference on the 1st August, 1919, would therefore read as follows:

It is decided

1) That no immediate reply to the German Government’s request should be given.

2) That the Military Representatives at Versailles in collaboration with Marshal Foch should investigate the accuracy of the statements contained in the communication of the German Government, and should utilize all available sources of information at their command.

3) That Marshal Foch should report to the Council on the military measures that might be enforced in order to oblige the German Government to comply with the Clauses of the treaty relating to the surrender to the Allies of officers guilty of breaches of Laws of War.)


2. Mr Polk says that before the questions on the Agenda paper come under discussion, he wishes to communicate to the Supreme Council the latest information received from Budapest.

(Mr Polk then distributes copies of the documents included in the relevant discussion.)

M Clemenceau says that from the telegram sent on the 5th August by Mr J A Logan, it would appear that the Romanians had proposed an armistice to the Hungarian Government. He does not think that the Romanians had been authorized by the Allied and Associated Powers to take such action.

S Tittoni thinks that the Roumanian Government had merely put forward certain proposals.

Mr Balfour says that the Romanian Government regards itself as absolutely independent, and had acted and put forward its conditions as if the Allied and Associated Governments did not exist. Technically, Romania is quite independent since Marshal Foch had not been placed in command of the Roumanian troops. Romania had quarreled with the Allies: S Bratiano had left Paris thoroughly discontented, and is now acting as the head of one independent State dealing with another equally independent State.

Mr Polk informs the Conference that he has that morning had a long conversation with Mr. Misu, shortly after the receipt of the documents he had just distributed. He has communicated the contents of those documents to Mr Misu and has explained to him that Romanian action amounted to an attempt to conclude a separate peace. He (Mr Polk) had pointed out that he did not consider it right that the Romanians should obtain the delivery of the war material referred to in the document under consideration. Mr Misu had replied that the measures taken were dictated by military necessity. He further stated that Romania had not been treated with justice in regard to the matter of reparations. He maintained that the Belgians, whose territory had similarly been invaded, had been permitted to appoint a representative on the Commission of Reparations and had thereby been able to look after their interests. On the other hand, Romania had not been permitted to appoint a representative on that Commission.

Mr Balfour suggests that Mr Misu should be invited to attend in order to discuss the question under reference. Mr Misu is a very sensible man with whom it might be possible to arrive at an agreement.

M Clemenceau sees no objection to Mr Misu being heard by the Council.

Mr Polk thinks it would be preferable for Mr Balfour in the first place to have a private conversation with Mr Misu. He thinks that procedure would yield better results.

Mr Balfour agrees that talking alone gives opportunities for the excuse of a certain flexibility of conversation that could not be got in a formal conference. On the other hand he thinks a greater impression would be produced by an interview with the Council as a whole. He proposes, therefore, that Mr Misu should be received in that room. Otherwise, that M Clemenceau be authorized to speak on behalf of the Conference.

S Tittoni inquired whether it will be possible for the Generals forming part of the Allied Mission to Budapest to start at once.

M Clemenceau thinks that a telegram should at once be sent to the Romanian Government stating that the Council does not recognize the right of Romania to conclude an Armistice. Should the Romanians fail to accept those instructions, the situation will become exceedingly grave.

Mr Balfour points out that the Armistice proposed by the Romanians will in addition deprive the Commission on Reparations of material and property which belonged to the whole of the Allies.

Mr Polk adds that Mr Hoover has also drawn attention to the fact that by withdrawing 50% of the rolling stock from Hungary, the Romanians will thereby render the distribution of supplies impossible.


(Marshal Foch, General Bliss, General Weygand, General Belin and Col Georges enter the room.)

M Clemenceau says that the Supreme Council has decided that the four Generals should forthwith be sent to Budapest. He inquired what measures Marshal Foch had taken to give effect to that resolution.

Marshal Foch replies that the four Generals who are to form part of the Military Mission to Budapest are scattered, consequently the following measures had been taken = General Graziani, being under the orders of General Franchet d’Esperey, a telegram had been transmitted to him through General Franchet d’Esperey together with copies of instructions. General Franchet d’Esperey had also been asked to forward copies of these documents to General Mombelli who is said to be at Sofia.

S Tittoni, intervening, says that General Mombelli is now actually in Turin. He will therefore himself send him copies of the instructions. General Mombelli had, as a matter of fact, already been warned and will be ready to start within six hours after receipt of orders to that effect.

General Weygand says that he has forwarded to General Bliss the instructions intended for General Bandholtz, the American Representative. In regard to the British General, he believed him to be at Pressbourg, and he has consequently asked General Sackville-West to forward the necessary instructions. He had, however, just learned that General Gorton had already reached Budapest. It will therefore be necessary to forward his instructions to that town.

Mr Polk wishes to call attention to a certain matter connected with the instructions to be issued to the four Generals. Yesterday S Tittoni had proposed an amendment in order that the Generals might fully realize that the instructions given them should be carried out in agreement with the Hungarian Government: that is to say, the required results were to be obtained rather by persuasion than by the issue of orders. The text of the telegram which he had received that morning from General Weygand does not appear to contain that amendment. He proposes, therefore, that the words “in agreement with the Hungarian Government”, should be inserted in paragraphs (b) and (d).

General Weygand thinks that the first paragraph of the instructions fully meet Mr Polk’s view, since it is therein clearly stated that the mission should place itself in communication with the Hungarian Government in order to obtain certain concessions which were detailed in paragraphs which follow. He thinks that sentence clearly indicated that an agreement should be reached between the mission and the Hungarian Government.

Mr Polk agrees that his objection has been fully met.

M Clemenceau suggests that the Council should proceed to draft the text of a telegram to be sent to the Romanian Government, stating that the Allied and Associated Governments would not admit her right to conclude an independent armistice with Hungary; that such an armistice would not receive recognition, particularly as it was intended to take away large quantities of material, the joint property of all the Allies and not of Romania alone.

Mr Balfour says he has prepared a draft telegram.

(After a short discussion, the following draft telegram is approved:

“Supreme Council have learnt that Roumanian Military Authorities at Budapest have imposed Armistice on Hungarian Government, to be accepted at a few hours’ notice. Terms of this armistice render it impossible for Hungarian Government to fulfill armistice concluded with Allied Powers on November 13th. Moreover, terms in themselves pay no regard to rights of reparation of other Allies. Supreme Council desire formally to record their refusal to recognize right of Roumanian Commander-in-Chief to impose any armistice without authority of Allied and Associated Powers.”)


(At this stage Mr Misu and Mr Vaida-Voevod enter the room.)

M Clemenceau says that the Council has invited Mr Misu and Mr Vaida-Voevod to attend in order to consider the situation in Hungary, which is very grave. The Romanians have seized Budapest.

Mr Misu, intervening, says that he has received no official communication on the subject.

M Clemenceau, continuing, says that information which leaves no doubt on the matter has been received from various sources. Furthermore, the Supreme Council had learnt that the Romanians has proposed an armistice to the Hungarian Government.

Mr Misu says he has received no information on that subject, with the exception of the telegram which Mr Polk had shown him that morning.

M Clemenceau, continuing, says that the Supreme Council has just decided to send a telegram to the Roumanian Government.

(M Clemenceau then reads the telegram above quoted.)

Mr Misu says he would forward a copy of the telegram to his Government, laying stress on the view expressed by the Council.

M Clemenceau says that the Allied and Associated Powers have given many proofs of goodwill to Romania. S Bratiano had not always received these in the spirit in which they had been meant. The situation to-day, however, is very grave, and he is authorized to say that the Supreme Council are determined that the Armistice of Versailles should be respected and executed everywhere.

Mr Misu draws attention to the fact that the situation has entirely altered in consequence of the last attack made by the Hungarians.

M Clemenceau remarks that the relative position of the Entente and Romania have in no way altered.

Mr Misu, continuing, says that Mr Polk had that morning communicated to him a list of the material which had been demanded by the terms of the alleged armistice. He wishes to point out that the Romanians demand the delivery of this material solely in the general interest. This material is being taken over solely with the view of disarming Hungary, since it is essential to disarm her as rapidly as possible. The measures so taken will not however, in any way prejudge the eventual distribution between the Allies of the material so obtained.

M Clemenceau says he wishes to read to the Romanian Delegation a copy of the instructions which had been sent to the Allied Generals who are proceeding to Budapest.

Mr Misu says he has received the text of the telegram that morning, and has already telegraphed the same to his Government. On the other hand, the Council should not lose sight of the fact that Romania has been treated unjustly by the Commission on Reparations from which she had been excluded. Romania has consequently not obtained the authority to seek out the material which had been looted from her territory by her various enemies.

Mr Vaida adds that the Romanians have merely claimed the return of their own property.

M Clemenceau inquired how the Romanians could pick out their own personal goods from the mass of material in question?

Mr Vaida points out that the Romanian rolling stock had been taken by the Bolsheviks with the result that at the present moment Romania only possessed some 50 locomotives. On the other hand, Romania has been obliged to incur serious expense in order to maintain the army at a time when their Allies had already begun to demobilize. Mackensen, during the course of his retreat, had carried off a large quantity of material, which had subsequently fallen into the hands of the Magyars. The Romanian Delegation has on several occasions requested the Conference to return this material, but no answer has ever been vouchsafed. It is essential that the material in question should be returned with as little delay as possible; otherwise the marks and signs, which will enable the Romanians to recognize their property, will disappear. Should this material at once pass into the possession of the Romanians, he thinks it will be quite as safe as if it remained with the Magyars, and should it subsequently be proved that the engines, which would be used to revictual his unhappy country, in reality belonged to any particular one of the Allies, the Romanians would be ready to surrender them without a murmur. The Council will undoubtedly agree that the material in the hands of the Romanians would be a safer guarantee than if left in the hands of the Magyars.

M Clemenceau fears he has explained himself badly. The exact question that he wishes to place before the Delegates is the following: The Council will not permit Romania to conclude an Armistice which will in any way hinder the Hungarian Government from executing the terms of the Armistice which she has already concluded with the Allies. For some months past the Principal Allied and Associated Governments had endeavored to enforce the execution of that Armistice. It has been agreed to enforce that Armistice, and even if possible to enlarge its scope by agreement, in order to obtain a more complete disarmament. The Romanians had now seized Budapest. Nevertheless, the conditions of the Armistice concludes with the Entente would have to be fulfilled. The Allied and Associated Governments intend shortly to make peace with Hungary, and they cannot allow the action of Romania to retard the conclusion of peace. With that object in view, the Generals had been sent to Budapest.

Mr Misu says that he will transmit the wishes of the Conference to his Government.

M Clemenceau points out that these are not the wishes, but the final decisions of the Conference. Furthermore, the Council wishes to know as soon as possible what action Romania intends to take in the matter. In regard to the material, he wishes to point out that the Allied and Associated Governments has no desire to deprive Romania of that portion of the material to which she was entitled; but the whole must enter into the common pool. That is the principle which Romania is required to accept.

Mr Misu points out that it is a matter of urgency that the Inter-Allied Commission should proceed to Budapest with as little delay as possible. The Commission would then be in a position to obtain particulars, and to give the necessary instructions.

M Clemenceau expresses the view that the situation at present in Hungary is so confused that it will be necessary, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, that all questions should be settled directly between the Conference and the Roumanian Government.

Mr Balfour says that he can add very little to what has been said by M Clemenceau. It is quite clear that Romania has been cruelly treated both by Germany and by Hungary. Without doubt, she will never recover all that she has lost, since an act of spoliation necessarily involved an act of destruction, and it will be impossible to get back material which has been destroyed. Romania will doubtless find herself in the same situation as Serbia, Belgium and France. It is equally true to say that the Magyars had taken from the Romanians the greater part of their rolling stock, but the fact that rolling stock constitutes the material which Europe most urgently requires in order to reconstitute her economic life should not be lost sight of. Consequently, in spite of her rights, Romania should realize that in the general interest this material must be distributed in an equitable manner for the benefit of all parties.

In regard to the proposed Armistice he wishes to invite attention to the following paragraph which the Romanian Government desires to impose on Hungary, namely:

“The factories existing in Hungary which may have served for the manufacture of arms and munitions of all kinds must be demolished to the benefit of Romania. This operation will be carried out by Romanian specialists with the help of Hungarian Officers”.

He need hardly point out that in Hungary, as in all Allied countries, every factory and every workshop has been utilized for the production of war material. Consequently, the whole of the Hungarian factories would have to be handed over to Romania. Such a solution was impossible for Hungary, and he thought that it would be equally unacceptable to the Allied and Associated Governments, since it contravened the principles which had hitherto guided the Conference in their labors.

Mr Vaida says that the opportunities of presenting their case to the Conference which has hitherto been offered to the Romanian Delegation had been so few and far between that he could not allow the present opportunity of making a statement to escape. He wishes to impress upon the Conference the fact that the Magyars had never complied with the conditions of the Armistice of the 13th November, 1918. The Entente had for many months past struggled against the situation so created, and had on frequent occasions issued instructions which the Romanian Government has always accepted whatever might have been the consequences entailed. On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers have never been able to compel the Hungarians to accede to their wishes. Finally, the Hungarians had attacked Romania thereby annulling the Armistice. In spite of the Armistice, the Hungarians had treated the Romanians as enemies and compelled the latter to take military measures to defend themselves.

He wishes on this occasion to beg the Conference to make certain alterations in the terms of the existing Armistice. He would ask the Conference to add to the instructions to be issued to the Generals a clause to the effect that the Armistice of the 13th November having been broken no longer existed, and that it must be replaced by a new Armistice to be imposed in Budapest by the representatives of the Entente. Many of the clauses of the Armistice of November, 1918, cab no longer be carried out; others have no further value. Yesterday, the Hungarians were the enemies of Romania, to-day they are conquered, and Romania in the future desires that they should become her friends. He begged the Conference therefore, to reconsider the text of the telegram which it was proposed to send to the Romanian Government and to modify it so as to add a sentence which would prove to his Government that it could still count on the same goodwill as the Conference has extended to himself personally. Every telegram issued by the Conference is invariably at once published in the newspapers of Vienna and Budapest. Consequently, it is essential that the message should not be open to the interpretation that the Conference desired to blame Romania when a word of encouragement would cause hope to arise, which will lead more easily to the desired goal.

M Clemenceau promises that this request would receive the favorable consideration of the Conference.

Mr Misu adds that the Roumanian Delegation merely asked for some sign of goodwill.

(Mr Misu and Mr Vaida-Voevod then withdraw.)

M Clemenceau expresses the view that the remarks made by the Romanian representatives are just, and that a sentence should be added to the draft telegram to give effect to their wishes.

S Tittoni points out that Mr Vaida-Voevod have also declared that the Hungarians have no further claim to the maintenance of the first Armistice, and that the four Allied Generals should be charged with the duty of dictating new conditions.

(After a short discussion it is decided to insert in the telegram above quoted the following sentence:

“Fully recognizing the just claims of Romania and her devotion to the common cause”.)

(It was agreed:

1) To transmit the following telegram with all due urgency to the Romanian Government through the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest:

“The Supreme Council has learned that the Romanian Military Authorities at Budapest have imposed Armistice on Hungarian Government to be accepted at a few hours notice. The terms of this Armistice render it impossible for Hungarian Government to fulfill Armistice concluded with Allied and Associated Powers on November 13, 1919. Moreover, the terms in themselves paid no regard to rights of reparation of other Allies. The Supreme Council, whilst fully recognizing the just claims of Romania and her devotion to the common cause, desired formally to record their refusal to recognize the right of Romania’s Commander-in-Chief to impose any Armistice without authority of the Allied and Associated Powers.”

2) To forward instructions to the four Generals, members of the Military Mission to Budapest, to proceed there without delay.


3. M Clemenceau says he wishes to communicate to the Conference, for information, the following telegram dated Constantinople, 4th August, 1919:

“The High Commissioners of Great Britain, France and Italy on the 3rd August, 1919, transmitted to the Turkish Government, the decisions of the Supreme Council in regard to the delimitation of the Greek and Italian zones of occupation and in regard to the creation of a Commission of Inquiry into the events which have taken place in consequence of the occupation of Smyrna.

“The Grand Vizier received this communication with great satisfaction and declared that the Conference had thereby increased by 50 per cent, the authority of the Government.

“An official communiqué dated on the 4th August ends as follows: “Without doubt the humanitarian decision of the Peace Conference will fill everyone with gratitude.”


4. M Clemenceau reads the following telegram, dated 5th August, 1919, which he has received from the French Ambassador in Washington, in reply to the request made by the Conference to the American Government on the subject of the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks in Siberia:

“The American Government possesses no tonnage which could serve for the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks, and does not believe that any other country is in a position to supply tonnage for that purpose. In view of the fact that the matter relates to the repatriation of people who would no longer fight, it inquires whether it would not be possible to send these people to the Black Sea passing through the region occupied by General Denikin.

The American Government is considering at the same time the repatriation which must soon take place of the 200,000 German-Austro prisoners still in Siberia.”

M Clemenceau, continuing, says that the Conference is faced with a cruel situation. The Military Experts at Versailles, to whom the question had been referred, have reached the conclusion that the Czechoslovaks could only be repatriated by the sea route. To the demand for tonnage made to the American Government, the reply was that no tonnage is available, and that the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks could only be made by the land route. The Conference feels obliged, therefore, as a last resort, to turn to the Japanese Government to whom the question had already been submitted.

Mr Matsui say that during the course of the Meeting at which this question of repatriation had first been discussed, the view had been expressed that the Czechoslovaks should be withdrawn from the Trans-Siberian railway and placed on the right of Kolchak’s army, in order to reinforce the latter. It had then been suggested that the Japanese Government should furnish military contingents in order to relieve the Czechoslovaks along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Later, the situation had altered, and it had been found that the Czechoslovaks could not be used to reinforce Kolchak’s army since they desired to be repatriated and refused to fight. The situation having thus altered, Baron Makino had telegraphed to the Japanese Government for fresh instructions. No reply had yet been received. He does not wish to prejudge the question, but he feels compelled to inform the Conference that he does not think the Japanese Government would be in a position to accept the proposal. He is led to that conclusion by the refusal of his Government to comply with a similar request made by the Romanian Government, who had asked for tonnage to repatriate the Romanians at present in Siberia, whose numbers fall far below those of the Czechoslovaks. Nevertheless, his Government has been unable to obtain the necessary tonnage.

M Clemenceau gathers that, under the circumstances, it would apparently be impossible to repatriate the Czechoslovaks either by the land or by the sea route. On the other hand, all information goes to show that they cannot spend the winter in Siberia.

S Tittoni inquires how the Czechoslovaks at present obtain their supplies?

Mr Balfour replies that they receive their supplies from America via Vladivostok.

M Clemenceau inquired whether the ships which bring these supplies do not return empty, and, if so, whether they could not be used for repatriating the Czechoslovaks.

Mr Balfour think that the steamers are not suitable for employment as troopships.

M Clemenceau thinks that the men would prefer to be repatriated in discomfort rather than not to be repatriated at all.

Marshal Foch expresses the view that the shortest route would be via Vladivostok and Vancouver and thence across the Atlantic to Europe. He inquired whether the ships which came to fetch the American troops could not be used for bringing the Czechoslovaks across the Atlantic.

M Clemenceau urges that some solution should be found.

Mr Polk said that if the Council would adjourn the question for a few days, he would again refer the matter to his Government.

(It is decided that Mr Polk should telegraph again to the American Government to urge the necessity of supplying the tonnage required for the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks, the American proposals to send the men across the territories occupied by General Denikin having been found to be unworkable.)


5. M Clemenceau says that the following telegram dated 3rd August, 1919, had been received from the French Military Attaché at Stockholm:

“From information supplied by our Military Mission at Libau, the Germans, far from evacuating Courland, as promised, continues to reinforce themselves by fresh drafts and additional materiel. They at present possess 35,000 men in that region.

Von der Goltz is determined not to leave. He encourages the entry of Russian Bolshevists, and German Spartacists who have considerable funds at their disposal. He counts on their action to provoke a revolutionary movement which would give him the excuse for intervention.

The situation is extremely critical and will become more so after the 10th August, the date from which the American revictualling must cease except for the children at Riga. Unless the Ulmannis Government receives at once the arms, material and money which the British Mission had caused it to expect, it cannot maintain itself beyond the 15th August, and will be replaced by extreme Socialists. This will bring about a Bolshevik Revolution. The Germans will then intervene as saviors and definitely occupy the country.”

M Clemenceau, continuing, calls on Marshal Foch to express his views on this question.

General Weygand said that the Conference had decided on the 30th July, to accept the proposals made by General Gough. The telegram giving effect to that decision has only been dispatched by Marshal Foch on the 1st August. The telegram to the French Military Attaché at Stockholm had been dispatched on the 3rd August, and he doubted whether Marshal Foch’s telegram which had to be forwarded through General Nudant in Berlin, could have reached General von der Goltz by the 3rd August.

On the other hand, that morning, Marshal Foch had received the following telegram from General Gough:

“Please thank Marshal Foch for the firm attitude taken by him in regard to von der Goltz. Should the latter carry out the orders now sent him, many of the difficulties will have been overcome. I shall do all that is possible in regard to the Lithuanian Polish question.”

He (General Weygand) thinks it would be best to await the receipt of later information.

(It is decided to postpone the consideration on this question until the receipt of further information.)


6. Mr Matsui proposes that the Japanese Delegation should be authorized to appoint a Japanese Officer to form part of the Allied Commission appointed on August 4th, 1919 to negotiate between the Polish and German Governments.

(It is agreed that a Japanese Officer should be nominated to represent Japan on the Allied Commission for negotiation between the German and the Polish Governments.)


7. Mr Headlam-Morley invites attention to the draft of a Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and Czechoslovakia on the other hand.

The Commission on New States are anxious that a copy of the Treaty should be communicated to the Czechoslovak Delegation, and he had been deputized to obtain the sanction of the Council to this procedure being adopted. The Treaty had been unanimously accepted by the Commission on New States, but it was considered politic that the Czechoslovak Delegation should at once have an opportunity of expressing their views. Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Czechoslovak State

(It is decided to approve the draft of the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia as submitted by the Committee on New States; the draft to be submitted to the Czechoslovakian Delegation by the Secretariat-General.)


8. Mr. Headlam-Morley says that the Commission on New States has proposed that the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Romania should also forthwith be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation.

The treaty deals with matters of very great complexity. The Commission has therefore refrained from entering into direct negotiations with the Romanian Delegation. It was now considered expedient that the draft Treaty in its final form, should forthwith be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation, with the intimation that though the general principles had been accepted, the Romanian Government would have the opportunity of making their observations on matters of detail. He pointed out that the same procedure had been followed with advantage in the case of Poland.

Mr Polk inquires whether any reservation had been made by any of the representatives on the Commission.

Mr Headlam-Morley replies that the American representative had made a reservation in regard to the clause dealing with navigation on the Dniester.

Mr Polk says that he can only accept the Treaty with the reservation on the question of the Dniester. President Wilson himself is greatly interested in this question.

Mr Hudson suggests that the clause dealing with the Dniester should not be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation. The Dniester is situated in Russian territory.

Mr Polk states that for that very reason, the inclusion of this clause might convey the idea to the Romanians that the Council accepts their claims in Bessarabia.

Mr Headlam-Morley maintains that if the Dniester is not mentioned, great difficulties might subsequently arise. He suggests that in communicating the Treaty to the Romanian Delegation, a forwarding letter should be sent explaining that certain questions could not be definitely decided until the frontiers of Czechoslovakia had been settled.

(It is decided to approve the draft of the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Romania as submitted by the Committee on New States; the clause concerning the Dniester River to be revised by the Committee to meet the objections of the American Delegation; the draft thus revised to be submitted to the Romanian Delegation at once by the Secretariat-General.)


9. Mr Headlam-Morley reads the following report submitted to the Council by the Commission on New States:

“Complying with the direction of the Supreme Council under date of 29th July, 1919, the Commission on New States has studied the comments of the Austrians on the clauses concerning the Protection of Minorities, as included in the Conditions of Peace, and the Commission has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council the attached draft of a reply to the Austrian counter-proposals.

“The Commission favors the revision of Articles 79 and 87 of the Conditions of Peace to which the Austrian comment has taken particular exception. This revision would have the effect of bringing the Austrian Treaty into conformity with the Treaty already signed with Poland, and the Treaties to be signed with Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, in that which concerns the League of Nations enforcement of the guarantees to minorities. The Commission on New States had previously made an informal suggestion that this course should be adopted. The Austrians, in their comment, have stated the objections which the Commission had anticipated. As originally presented to Austria, Articles 79 and 87 are far from clear and are perhaps not altogether consistent. In the opinion of the Commission, the suggested revision will in some points constitute a distinct mitigation of Austria’s terms, for the following reasons:

1) Whereas the former Article 79 conferred jurisdiction on the League of Nations over all obligations in this part of the Treaty, the revision would limit the jurisdiction of the League of Nations to the provisions regarding racial, religious and linguistic minorities.

2) Whereas the former draft outlined no definite procedure for the League of Nations and made it possible that appeals might be prosecuted by interested minorities, or even individuals, the revised draft would limit the League of Nations jurisdiction to disputes between States, and would prescribe a definite procedure to be followed. By recognizing the jurisdiction of the International Court, the judicial feature of disputes is emphasized and the possibility of political interference to which the Austrians object is greatly diminished.

3) Whereas the former Article 87 required the consent of the Council of the League of Nations for any modification of those clauses, meaning the unanimous consent of the Council, the revised draft would allow a modification to be made if it received the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

“The Commission on New States is convinced that the suggested revision will more effectively serve the purpose of the Allied and Associated Powers in including these clauses in the Austrian Treaty, at the same time that it more clearly meets the views of the Austrians, as expressed in their counter-proposals.”

Mr Headlam-Morley, continuing, says that the Commission on New States has prepared a Draft reply to the Austrian counter-proposals giving effect to the conclusions contained in the report just read.

(It is agreed:

1) To accept the draft reply to the Austrian Counter-Proposals on the protection of Minorities, submitted by the Commission on New States.

2) To forward the same to the Editing Committee for incorporation in the final and comprehensive reply to the Austrian Counter-Proposals.


10. Mr Headlam-Morley said that Mr Venizelos had submitted a report dealing with certain difficulties in the Balkans by the encouragement of voluntary emigration. Mr Venizelos’ proposals had been discussed unofficially by the Committee on New States, who considered these to be so good as to justify their extension to all the Balkan States. It had been suggested that an Inter-Allied Commission should be appointed by the League of Nations to control the proposed emigration. The Commission now seeks permission from the Council to discuss the question in the first place with Mr Venizelos and subsequently, should an agreement be reached, with the various Balkan States concerned. The Commission on New States had drawn up a report which has already been submitted to the Council.

s Tittoni says he would accept the proposal provided a strict control were established so that the suggested emigration should not be used by the Governments concerned as measures of expulsion.

Mr Headlam-Morley points out that the proposal to create a strong Commission of control under the League of Nations had been brought forward with the very object of preventing any such abuses.

M Clemenceau expresses the view that since the question had not been placed on the Agenda paper, it should be adjourned for further consideration at a later date.

(It is agreed to adjourn to a later date the further consideration of the report submitted by the Commission on New States on the proposals submitted by Mr Venizelos on the subject of encouragement of voluntary emigration in the Balkan States.)


(Mr Headlam-Morley then withdraws. M Laroche enters the room.)

11. M Laroche reads the note submitted by the Committee on Political Clauses on the subject of the eventual restitution to the Allies of Rolling Stock moved beyond the Armistice frontier in violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti.

(It is agreed to refer the question raised by the Italian Delegation to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles for examination and report.)


12. M Laroche reads the note submitted by the Committee on Political Clauses respecting the desirability of reconciling the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Austria with those of the Treaties to be concluded with the Allied States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

(It is agreed to accept the proposals contained in the note above referred to and to authorize the Committee on Political Clauses to prepare as soon as possible in conjunction with the Drafting Committee and the Commissions concerned, the new text of the Clauses of the Treaty with Austria therein referred to.)

(M Laroche then withdraws.)


13. M Dutasta reads the following Note, dated Paris, July 30th, 1919, addressed by S Tittoni to the President of the Peace Conference on the subject of the dispatch of war material to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

“Confirming declarations made yesterday to the Supreme Council, I have the honor to inform you that the Italian Delegation has telegraphed to the competent authorities in order that necessary steps be taken to avoid every obstacle to the passage through Italy of French trains transporting merchandise including these the destination of which was Serbia, as well as the military trains agreed upon between France and Italy.

As for the war material destined to Serbia, as I had the honor to ask of you in my note of the 20th instant, as well as at yesterday’s session, I would be infinitely obliged to you if you would be good enough to submit the question as soon as possible to the Inter-Allied Council of Versailles.

Please accept, etc. …”

Mr Polk draws attention to the fact that Mr Lansing has maintained the view that the Allied and Associated Governments have no right to prevent the material going to Serbia; but he, personally, would raise no objection to the question being discussed by the Military Representatives at Versailles.

(It is agreed forthwith to submit the question above referred to, to the Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, Versailles.)


(At this stage General Groves enters the Room.)

14. General Groves says that under the Peace Treaty, Germany is forbidden to have any Naval or Military Aviation, and was required to surrender all her service aircraft to the Allied and Associated Powers. The Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control appointed to supervise the carrying out of the Air Clauses would not be able to begin work until after ratification of the Treaty. Reports received from the British Military Commission at Berlin and from other sources, show that Germany is circumventing the Air Clauses by the following means:

1) She has sold and continues to sell her aircraft and aircraft material to various neutrals.

2) She was adapting her aircraft to commercial use.

3) She is also negotiating to sell to private companies for the sum of 400,000 marks some 500 aircraft engines captured from the Allies.

With regard to (1), namely, the sale of aircraft to neutrals, that entailed the securing of neutral markets at the expense of the Allies. Those markets would also support the German Aircraft Industry, which was the production of her air power, and also the basis of her commercial aeronautical development, which will be in competition with that of the Allied and Associated Powers. It is therefore suggested that this sale shall be forbidden through the Supreme Council, and that Germany shall be called upon to refund to the Allies the sums which she had already made out of such sales.

With regard to (2), that is, the conversion to commercial use of service types of aircraft, a service type of aircraft could be converted to commercial use by slight structural alterations within 48 hours. Such aircraft could equally well be re-converted to service use within the same period. It is suggested that the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise.

With regard to (3), that is the sale of aircraft material captured from the Allies, under the Military Clauses all war material captured from the Allies was to be returned. This material is required by the Allies, particularly the engines.

It is, therefore, suggested that the German Government should be informed that the 500 engines referred to shall be delivered to the Allies at once, at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the fact that the German Government had sold a certain number of captured aircraft engines to private firms re-acted in any way to the detriment of the Allies from a commercial point of view?

General Groves replies in the negative. He would point out, however, that the engines in question are in very good order; they have been well looked after; and they are urgently required by the Allies.

(It is agreed to accept the proposals made by General Groves, namely:

1) That the sale of aircraft and aircraft material to neutral Powers shall be forbidden through the Supreme Command, and that Germany shall be called upon to refund to the Allies the sums which she has already made out of such sales;

2) That the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types of aircraft are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise;

3) That the German Government be informed that the 500 engines sold to private companies shall be delivered to the Allies at once at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall forthwith be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.)


(General Groves withdraws, and Colonel Morgan enters the room.)

15. Colonel Morgan points out that the situation referred to in M Pachitch’s letter, on the subject of the immediate liberation of prisoners of war has already been covered by a decision of the Supreme Council taken on May 23rd, and, if that decision were duly acted upon, no difficulties should arise.

S Tittoni says that the Supreme Council had on May 23rd passed the following resolution:

“The Heads of Governments agree that all war prisoners, formerly nationals of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, now subjects of an Allied or an Associated Nation, should be immediately liberated in a measure to conform with transportation possibilities, and where the frontiers of the States shall have been definitely fixed. In any event, they should not be liberated later than the prisoners of war who are subjects of the new Austrian States.”

Since that date, the Italian Government has taken every possible step to give effect to that decision, with the result that 80,000 prisoners had been repatriated even though the frontiers of the new States had not yet been definitely fixed. 60,000 prisoners still remained in Italy. The Italian Government has no wish to keep those men: but, owing to want of coal at the present moment, fewer trains are running than in wartime. The immediate repatriation of all prisoners of war no doubt deserved every consideration: but the essential needs of the population must in the first place receive attention. His Government had done, and would continue to do, all in their power to repatriate the prisoners in question at the earliest possible date.

(The Supreme Council takes note of S Tittoni’s statement.)


16. Colonel Morgan explains that at the present moment there are 112,000 Turkish prisoners of war in Egypt. The safe custody of these men called for the maintenance of a considerable force. The British authorities feel they cannot afford the man-power required for the purpose. The British War Office is therefore very anxious to repatriate anticipation of the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The British Government considers that it cannot authorize the execution of these measures without first obtaining the approval of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers thereto.

(It is agreed to authorize the British Government to undertake the immediate liberation of the Turkish prisoners of war in Egypt.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

7th August 1919

French pilot Charles Godefroy flies through the Arc de Triomphe to protest the fact that airmen had to march on foot during the victory parade last month.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, August 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


(M Tardieu, M Laroche, M Aubert, Colonel Peel, Colonel Castoldi, Mr Coolidge, S Adatci, Mr Kato, and Mr Shigemitsu enter the room.)

1. Mr Polk hands to M Clemenceau a telegram, which M Clemenceau asked M Mantoux to read.

(The following telegram is read:

1) Vienna, Aug 7, 1919, 12 noon.

“Causey will stay Budapest until General Bandholtz arrives and you can phone him easily from Prague, situation in Pest more nasty than ever. You have already been told of changes and situation becoming very acute on account of stoppage of boats on river which are preparing to move this morning in accordance with James plans, also on account of cutting all lines of communication, including blowing up of railroad to Vienna, also manner of military occupation and treatment of inhabitants, their property and supplies. General Gorton, Causey, Romanelli and James went to Roumanian General with written protest against these things, acting under their authority given in the several different ways by the Entente. Romanian General declined to permit them to read statement, acted very discourteously, and was told so. He declined to receive communication, stating that it should be sent to Romanian General Headquarters, which of course is out of reach of communication, even if they knew where it was. He also stated he was acting under orders when he destroyed all communications out of city, which of course cuts off supplies coming in from country, of which there were eighty carloads vegetables in one lot. I plan to go to Buch tonight, meeting you there. I will arrive in time to have conference with General Bandholtz there, who I understand leaves tonight. Will you tell him to be looking for me? There is nothing to be done with this situation except to settle whether Romanians are going to loot this country under one guise or another and if France is going to back them; then to determine whether other members of Entente are going to have a voice in determining the future policy of Central Europe. It is just as difficult, perhaps even more so, to utilize Hungarian equipment of railways and Danube in this situation as it was under Bela Kun. There is no resistance their troops, no necessity for their occupying with the force they have, except for a misguided military policy or a selfish desire on their part which is not in accord with broad principles of reconstruction and future peace of this country and the world.”)

Mr Polk says that as he has already informed M Clemenceau, all supplies to Hungary have been stopped by Mr Hoover, who does not propose to supply the Romanian Government with food that was meant for the Hungarians. He also asks that the following telegrams be heard:

2)“A. R. A. Received Aug 7, 1919.

Budapest Aug 6, 1919.

Supreme Council Paris.

As indicated in telegram sent by me earlier tonight the Archduke Joseph with three members of the new cabinet called on myself and the representatives of the Italian and American Governments to announce the partial selection of his cabinet and to state that he was forming a coalition government in line with the suggestions made by the Supreme Council in Paris. The Archduke is known as the Governor of the State. He is accompanied by Friedrich the Minister President; General Schnetzer Minister of war; General Tanczos Minister of Foreign Affairs; Bleyer Minister of nationalities; Caillery Minister of Health. The other ministry appointments to be made tomorrow to complete the cabinet will consist of two agrarians, one or two of the Szeged party and a social Democrat. The Minister President is a bourgeois. The Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are both late Generals in the Austro-Hungarian army. The Minister of Nationalities is a university professor. The Minister of Health a physician. Other details will be wired later. General Gorton and Causey just reported from Budapest that Romanians under the pretext of searching for arms are entering and pillaging a great many different houses in outlying districts as well as in town. The army is living on the country and taking for both animals and men.

Gregory”

3) “A. R. A. Received August 7, 1919. For Action.

Budapest Aug. 6, 1919.

Supreme Council, Paris.

The Hungarian Gendarmerie arrested at 18:30 today the Social Democratic Government while the latter were holding a sitting at the National Palace. The coup d’état was carried out without any disorder. The Archduke Joseph is head of the new Government. General Schnetzer was sent here at ten o’clock tonight to impart this information and to state that policy and other details of new Government will be handed later tonight.

General Gorton”

4) “A. R. A. Received Aug. 7, 1919.

Budapest Aug. 7, 1919.

Supreme War Council, Paris.

The Romanians have informed the Hungarian Government that as the latter have not accepted the terms of their armistice they intend to cross the Danube tomorrow, August seventh. I have ascertained that General Holban refused to let appear in the press today the publication of M Clemenceau’s telegram of fifth instant to the Hungarian Government. The Romanians continue to perpetrate acts which are most discreditable to a power associated with the Entente. Harmless individuals are assaulted, food, live stock, agricultural implements, and rolling stock are requisitioned and sent to Romania and through the purposeless blockade and destruction of railways, Budapest is on the verge of starvation. The latest act of wanton destruction is the demolition of the railway between Budapest and Vienna. Unless instant measures are taken to compel the Romanians to evacuate Budapest and cease their predatory operations in Hungary, the confidence of the Hungarians in the good will of the Entente will be destroyed.

General Gorton”

M Clemenceau expresses the view that the Romanian action cannot be tolerated.

Mr Polk says that in the opinion of the American Delegation, interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary will do more to encourage Bolshevism than any event in the last six months. Lenin would point to the example of what had taken place on the downfall of the Soviet Government in Hungary, in order to scare Russia and preserve his own regime. The setting up of a reactionary Government in Hungary in place of a moderate Socialist Government was a very threatening feature in the situation.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Romanian General committing these follies and wickednesses is the same man that had put himself under Marshal Foch’s orders.

M Clemenceau says that as the General is not named, it is impossible to know.

Mr Polk said that one of the American Experts on the Economic Commission had prepared a memorandum showing in what way the armistice demanded by the Romanians interfered with the Reparation terms of the Conference.

M Clemenceau says that an energetic telegram must be sent to the Romanian Government.

Mr Balfour entirely agrees. He adds that the Commission of Generals should be informed of the message sent to Bucharest, and asks to communicate it to the Romanian Government. If the Romanians still persist in going forward it will be necessary to break off relations, or to do something very serious. He asks whether there is any economic weapon that could be brought to bear on Romania.

Mr Polk said that Romania would soon be quite independent of the Allies in this respect for a short time. There is a good harvest about to be reaped, and abundant rolling stock is being stolen from Hungary, but, for the future Romania will not be able to count on any assistance from the United States.

S Tittoni said that on the previous day he had heard a rumor that the King of Romania is to enter Budapest.

Mr Balfour suggests that the telegram to be sent to Romania should begin by a brief recital of the various things which had been required of the Roumanian Government by the Conference, and of the omissions by the Roumanian Government to fulfill these requests. This part, he thinks, will be easy, as it amounts to a list of requests by the Conference and of disobediences by the Romanians, but it is harder to discover exactly what threat should be added at the end. No opinion has as yet been expressed in the Council as to how far it was desirable or possible to go.

M Clemenceau suggests that it be stated that Romania has broken the Alliance and must suffer the consequences.

M Pichon agreed that the Romanians has proposed an armistice which was not in harmony with the armistice made by the Allies, and that they had set up a reactionary Government which was contrary to Allied policy.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Council would agree to a threat of blockade by sea.

M Clemenceau says that he would prefer to threaten Romania for the time in general terms. He thinks that the mere breach of the alliance would frighten her sufficiently.

Mr Balfour says that the result of this action should be borne in mind. This would be the first public quarrel in the alliance. It is also taking place in a part of the world where the tension was very great. The fact must be faced that the consequences might be very serious.

M Clemenceau says that the alternative is to submit to the insolent defiance of the Romanians. He is not prepared to submit to it. He would rather leave his place in the Council. The Romanians have always behaved like this, and deserved to be told that if they continue they will be regarded as having broken the alliance. They were in conflict with the Conference, and must suffer for it.

M Tardieu inquired whether there really exists any alliance with Romania. It has been declared at the Peace of Bucharest that the Romanians have ceased to be Allies.

Mr Polk says that even after this, when they desired to raise a loan in America, the Romanians have declared themselves to be among the Allies. They cannot be Allies only for financial purposes.

M Tardieu suggests that the Romanians be told that they must leave the Conference and suffer all the consequences of ceasing to belong to it. The Conference is a definite thing. The alliance is a vague thing. The Romanians would be able to estimate advantages and disadvantages more clearly.

Mr Balfour then undertakes to draft a telegram. He says that what he is about to read should be prefaced by a recital of the various instances in which the Roumanian Government had refused to carry out the policy of the Conference. After some discussion the following draft was accepted as the conclusion of the telegram to be sent to the Romanian Government:

“The Conference in the face of these facts is compelled to believe that the Roumanian Government intends to defy the Conference and to sever themselves from the Allied and Associated Powers. If the Conference is mistaken in these views it desires that the Romanian Government will give it an immediate contradiction not only in words but by acts which will prove to all the world that Romania accepts and is prepared to carry out in good faith the policy which the Conference has thus laid down”.

(It is also agreed that the telegram should be transmitted to General Gorton at Budapest for communication to his colleagues and to the Romanian Commander.)


2. M Clemenceau asks M Tardieu if he has anything new to say about Thrace.

M Tardieu says he has nothing to add to what he said the day before.

Mr Balfour says that he has had a talk with Mr Polk. The original proposal of the Committee was strongly objected to by the American Delegation, which is supported by the Italian Delegation. He had himself on the previous day suggested a compromise which restored to Bulgaria a large population in Western Thrace, but gives the coast to Greece as a line of communication with Eastern Thrace. Mr Venizelos had not liked this solution. As an alternative he had proposed that Thrace be made an autonomous State like Ruthenia under Greek sovereignty. This solution did not commend itself very much nor did it meet the American objection which he understood to be that Bulgaria could not now be deprived of access to the Aegean which had been given her before the war by a Treaty. The American Delegation believed that this was bound to lead to war very soon. They said they also thought it was useless to allege that Dedeagatch is an indifferent port not worth a quarrel. Whatever its merits the Bulgarians we are attached to it, and it has a sentimental value about which there can be no argument. If peace in the Balkans is to be established, Dedeagatch must be left to Bulgaria. This he understood to be the American view. To meet this view a suggestion had been made that a corridor to the Aegean including Dedeagatch be given to Bulgaria under full sovereignty, the allotment of Thrace, both Eastern and Western, being left very much as the Committee had proposed. It had then been agreed between himself and Mr Polk that the American and British experts should set to work on this suggestion to see if it could be geographically carried out. They were then to see Mr Venizelos without committing either of their Principals or the Conference.

Mr Polk says that one argument has weighed considerably with him. All military authorities say that the cession of Thrace to Greece means war in the Balkans. They added that of the Balkan States Bulgaria was the best able to wage war. It was therefore imperative to find some compromise which had a chance of lasting at least for a while.

M Tardieu says that he is not much in favour of the ‘corridor’ proposal. In another instance a ‘corridor’ had been proposed to link Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia. This had been rejected by the Council as impracticable, though it would have been a matter of European interest and favorable to two of our Allies, as well as separating Austria from Hungary. As to the military opinion mentioned by Mr Polk, he does not like to pit himself against the military authorities, but the Conference had been repeatedly told that all the enemy countries would go to war. Germany had not done so. He personally thinks it most unlikely that Bulgaria would defy the Conference.

Mr Polk points out that in the case of Germany the Allies are in possession of a good argument namely, Marshal Foch and his armies on the Rhine. No similar argument exists in Bulgaria.

M Tardieu said that Mr Venizelos has declared himself ready to cope with the situation. In any case he thinks, as the corridor would include Dedeagatch, a Greek town, and other towns also Greek, that it should, like Danzig, be made into the territory of a Free State.

S Tittoni said that he had previously suggested an alteration of the line in Eastern Thrace; now Mr Balfour suggests one in Western Thrace. He thinks perhaps the two might be combined.

M Tardieu says that if Western Thrace is not to be Greek there is no special reason why it should be Bulgarian. The population is Turkish.

Mr Polk observes that the country is at the present time Bulgarian.

M Tardieu says that Western Thrace is held by the Bulgarians just as Southern Dobrudja was held by the Romanians. The American Delegation wishes to take Southern Dobrudja from Romania because it is Bulgarian and to give Bulgaria Western Thrace because it is Turkish.

Mr Polk says that the question is whether Greece has a better claim to the country than Bulgaria. Secondly, if the transfer means war is it advisable to make it?

M Tardieu says he would agree if necessary not to give the country to Greece but he would not agree to give it to Bulgaria.

Mr Polk observes that the American suggestion had been to attribute the country to an international state. This had been scoffed at.

M Tardieu says that possibly a working arrangement might be made giving Dedeagatch as a commercial outlet to Bulgaria, under international administration as a free city. An international administrative commission would also control the railway leading to it. Thrace, both Eastern and Western, might be granted autonomous rights, similar to those granted to Ruthenia, under the sovereignty of Greece. It might even be possible to re-enforce the arrangement made for Ruthenia by an international commission. This scheme would take into consideration all the observations made, except that it would not permit direct access of Bulgaria to the Aegean, but he thinks Bulgaria could do without this and the Allies have no real interest in furthering this desire. In any case he thinks it is more inexpedient to work for the party of Constantine in Greece than to annoy the Bulgarians who, after what they had done, must expect severe treatment.

Mr Polk agrees that it is desirable to uphold Mr Venizelos. He has no desire to favor the Bulgarians but it was not always advantageous to give even a good boy all he wanted. In Western Thrace, the figures of the 1914 census showed 100,000 Bulgarians against 30,000 Greeks. It is true that this proportion had been different in 1910 but present figures showed a great preponderance of Bulgarians. The American Delegation is convinced that to give this country to Greece was dangerous and would do no good. In Eastern Thrace, by changing the Enos-Midia line, it might be possible to give Greece a larger Greek population. The Greeks were more numerous towards Constantinople and less numerous towards Adrianople where the Bulgarian population was denser. He urged that 100,000 Bulgarians should not be placed under Greek rule. What had happened in Smyrna would happen again in Western Thrace. Mr Venizelos had quoted a number of Bulgarian atrocities. Out of the Carnegie report an equal number of Greek atrocities could be cited. The Turks in Western Thrace spoke Bulgarian and preferred Bulgarian to Greek rule.

M Tardieu says that his own experience has satisfied him that the inference from language to political preference was false.

Mr Polk said that this might be so. Nevertheless, there still remain 100,000 Bulgarians as against 30,000 Greeks.

M Clemenceau asks what Mr Polk thought of the proposal to make Dedeagatch and the corridor a free city.

Mr Polk says that this solution would still give the uplands of Thrace where the Bulgarian population was densest to Greece. The corridor is on the Eastern rim of Western Thrace.

M Tardieu says that he sees no possibility of giving to Bulgaria, Greek or Turkish territory. The figures of the 1914 census did not deserve any attention. The reduction of the Greek population had been obtained by wholesale massacre. He could not admit that massacre created title.

Mr Polk said that he has taken care to say that no title arises from massacre. What he had drawn attention to was the actual condition of the population.

M Tardieu says that under a Greek or International Government, the Greeks would flock back to the country.

Mr Polk says they would doubtless do so if the Bulgarians allowed them. That was the point. His instructions from President Wilson are very clear that a large Bulgarian population was not to be handed over to Greece.

M Tardieu asks whether a commercial outlet for Bulgaria to Dedeagatch through an internationalized territory was consistent with Mr Polk’s instructions.

Mr Polk says that this might be consistent with the instructions. He is not quite certain, as there has been some confusion in the cable. What is quite positive was that the transference of a large population in Western Thrace to Greece was not approved.

M Tardieu asks whether autonomy similar to that given to the Ruthenians or even reinforced by further guarantees would be accepted by the American Delegation.

Mr Polk says that only international control would be accepted.

M Tardieu asked if Mr Polk would oppose the cession of any part of Western Thrace to Greece.

Mr Polk says his instructions do not amount to this. He will be prepared to accept the compromise suggested by Mr Balfour. The whole matter might, as Mr Lansing had suggested, be referred to an International Commission.

Mr Balfour points out that the present Council is, in itself, an International Commission. He thinks that for the time, being, no further progress could be made in the discussion and suggested that the views of Mr Venizelos on the various compromises should be obtained.

M Tardieu says that he knows what Mr Venizelos’ views are. He has seen him since his conversation with Mr Balfour and Mr Polk. Mr Venizelos is not willing to give up the numerous Greeks of Eastern Thrace merely on account of a few thousand Bulgarians in Western Thrace.

M Clemenceau asks whether Mr Polk accepts autonomy for Thrace under Greek sovereignty.

Mr Polk replies in the negative.

M Clemenceau says that he does not think that the granting or the withholding of Dedeagatch from Bulgaria will put an end to conflict in the Balkans. On one thing he is determined - that no territorial reward should be given to Bulgaria.

(It is decided to adjourn the discussion.)


3. M Tardieu says that a small piece of frontier remained unsettled. He alludes to the frontier between Romania and the Ruthene territory attached to Czechoslovakia. The recommendations of the Committee on the Territorial Questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia are to be found in Report No. 1 of April 6th, 1919. Frontier Between Romania and the Czechoslovak State

(It is then decided to accept the frontier between Romania and the Czechoslovak State (Ruthene territory) as drawn by the Committee for the study of Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs in Report No. 1 of April 6th, 1919, and to notify this line to the two Delegations concerned.)


4. M Cambon says that the Czechs and Poles have not been able to reach a solution on the question of Teschen. Mr Paderewski had suggested that the negotiations should be resumed in Paris. Dr Benes, who feels that he will not be able to yield, had asked to be heard by the Council. The Council had already had discussions on the question of Teschen, and is doubtless unwilling to hear lengthy statements on the subject again. He therefore suggests that Dr Benes and Mr Paderewski be heard before a joint meeting of the Polish and Czechoslovak Committees. As neither side will yield it is obviously to the advantage of both to have a solution imposed by the Conference. The joint meeting would then make a short report to the Council.

(It is decided to accept M Cambon’s proposal regarding the reference of the Teschen question to a joint meeting of the Polish and Czechoslovak Committees for speedy examination and report.)


(M Cambon withdraws and Mr. Strachey enters the room.)

5. Mr Strachey says that on May 7th the Supreme Council decided that the mandate for German East Africa should be given to Great Britain. This decision is published. M Hymans thereupon addressed a protest to M Clemenceau as he considered that the claims of Belgium to receive a mandate for the portion of the colony occupied by her troops should not have been overlooked. Lord Milner is asked by the Prime Minister to discuss the matter with M Hymans. M Hymans delegated M. Orts to represent him, and Lord Milner has meetings with M Orts and also correspondence during the month of May. On the 1st June Lord Milner informed the Secretary of the British Empire Delegation that he had agreed with M Orts to join with him in a proposal to the Supreme Council that Belgium should be allowed to retain, under mandate, a certain portion of the territory of German East Africa occupied by her troops. The limits of this territory so retained were marked on a map, a copy of which was submitted by Lord Milner. Lord Milner adds: “It is clearly understood that in recommending this solution, which I am personally prepared to support, I have not in any way committed the Supreme Council”. The decision to create a special Commission to consider, among other things, the claims of Belgium in German East Africa, was taken on June 27th. The Meeting of that Commission which heard the Belgian claims took place on July 17th, and the above-mentioned agreement between Lord Milner and M Orts was communicated by Baron de Gaiffier d’Hestroy.

M Clemenceau asks how much of German East Africa would thus pass under Belgian mandate.

Mr Strachey replies that it would be about one-twentieth of the Colony and the most thickly populated part of it, containing about 2,500,000 people.

Mr Balfour says that he supports the views of Lord Milner. He understands that there are some objections as Belgian administration, owing to its past achievements, does not inspire universal conviction.

Mr Strachey says that this point has not been raised by the United States representative. A different point had been raised by him at the meeting of the Mandate Committee.

S Tittoni says that, in consideration of the great sacrifices made by Belgium during the war, this satisfaction could not be denied her. He is in favour of ratifying the agreements made between the British and Belgian Delegates.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Polk asks if he might for the time being reserve his vote, as he wishes to consult an American Expert who was not present. He would notify the Secretariat later.

(With the reservation that Mr Polk would inform the Secretariat-General at a later date whether he was able to accept or not, the agreement is accepted by the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

8th August 1919

Aftermath of War

Afghan War ends.

German prisoners of war filling up holes caused by artillery at the former battlefields in France.


Archduke Joseph August of Austria also declares himself Regent of Hungary. As a Habsburg, he is opposed by most Allied governments.


István Friedrich, a Hungarian right-wing counterrevolutionary, becomes the new Prime Minister of Hungary with the backing of the occupying Romanian forces.


That wonderful sight to so many American soldiers, The Statue of Liberty, as it greeted the 2nd Division as it arrived at New York. August 8, 1919.