100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Five with a Council of Experts on Austrian Affairs


A draft clause providing that Austrian property in the territory ceded by Austria should not be subject to retention or liquidation under the Economic Clauses of the Treaty, is placed before the council.

President Wilson reads the draft and asked Dr Taussig to explain it.

Dr Taussig explains that under the Economic Clauses as originally drafted, Austrian property in the ceded territories is subject to retention and liquidation by the Governments acquiring the territories. It was felt that the maintenance of such a provision would inflict a fatal blow on Austrian financial stability, and the Council had accordingly agreed at their meeting on the 16th June that Austrian private property within the territories in question should not be treated as enemy property. It had been referred to a Committee consisting of Mister Baruch, Colonel Peel, Monsieur Loucheur, and Monsieur Crespi to bring up a draft clause giving effect to this decision.

Mr Lloyd George agrees.

Colonel Peel calls attention to the fact that the substance of the new Article had not yet been communicated to the Czechoslovaks and the other smaller powers affected by it.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it essential that they should be informed of the Article.

President Wilson concurs.

It is therefore decided that the Article should be approved and should be communicated to the Delegations concerned, i.e. the Delegations of the countries which would acquire territory from Austria under the Treaty.

(The Article is initialed and Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to communicate it to the Secretary General for the information of the drafting Committee.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Five with a Council of Experts on Belgian Affairs


1. The Council has before them proposals for meeting the Belgian claims for priority in reparation payments.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has had no time to consider those proposals; so far as he can make out those that had been submitted to him were the result of agreement between two Delegations only. He asks that the question might be referred again to the financial experts of all the Delegations who are dealing with the matter, and that their report should be referred to the Supreme Council.

(This is agreed.)


2. M Loucheur proceeds to describe his negotiations with the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Serbia and Romania, in regard to their claims for reparation and the proposed payment by them of contributions towards the cost of the war of liberation. As regards claims for reparation, he instances the settlement suggested by him and his colleagues to Serbia. They had made an offer of Fr 500,000,000 as reparation, half of this sum to be paid in priority: Serbia to assume a part of the pre-war Austrian debt on account of the newly acquired territories but not to be liable for payment for the public property taken over in those territories. The Serbian representatives are not disposed to accept this offer and prefers to have their claims dealt with under the general provisions of the Treaty; and this is generally the view of the Delegations of the other states in question.

As regards the payment of contributions towards the cost of the war, all the states in question appear to be ready to agree to pay a sum equal to 20 per cent of the Austrian war debt held in the newly acquired territories; this sum in the case of Serbia and Romania to be set off against their claims for reparation. He desires, however, the further instructions of the Council in regard to dealing with claims for reparation: The Serbians, e. g. had suggested an extravagant sum - 5 milliards of francs - and he is disposed to suggest that these states should be dealt with under the general provisions for reparation.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether he is to understand that if, for instance, 20 per cent of the Austrian war debt in Yugoslavia amounts to 100 millions and the Serbian claim for reparation amounted to 150 millions, the Yugoslav state would receive 50 millions.

M Loucheur says that he assumes that the contributions would be payable in local currency, while reparation received would be in gold. He adds that he cannot recommend demanding a higher payment from Serbia and Romania, having regard to the fact that they have already borne the expenses of a war. He thinks, however, that Poland and Czechoslovakia should be treated on different lines and that from those two latter states payment might be demanded in external debt. He is disposed personally to suggest that no contribution should be asked from Serbia and Romania.

Mr Lloyd George points out that this latter proposal would appear to ignore the large increase of wealth accruing to these states as a result of their acquisition of territory.

Mr Lamont then recalls to the minds of the Council the history of the negotiations with those new states on the question of the payment of contributions, which he, and subsequently, M Loucheur, had conducted.

In the first instance he had been instructed by the Council to negotiate as follows:

In the case of Serbia and Romania the agreed payments contributory to the cost of the war are to be set off against their claims to reparation. Poland and Czechoslovakia, which are not entitled to claim reparation, were to be called upon to make a contributory payment. Subsequently M Loucheur had proposed to relieve the new states of any responsibility for Austrian war debt. But this suggestion, which is inconsistent with the proposed financial clauses, had been abandoned. The difficulty is, however, that Serbia and Romania are not disposed to agree, at the present juncture, to an assessment of the amount of their reparation claims.

Mr Lloyd George points out that this does not appear to be material: if they accept the principle, the Reparation Commission can fix the sum, and the amount of their proposed contribution can then be deducted.

(It is agreed that a settlement with Serbia, Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia in regard to their proposed contribution to the cost of the war should be communicated on the following lines:

The existing financial and reparation clauses to remain.

Each of the countries to which Austro-Hungarian territory passes shall pay as a contribution to the expenses of their liberation a sum equal to 20 per cent of that portion of the bonded war debt of Austria-Hungary as legally constituted on October 27, 1918, apportioned to such territory on the same principle as the pre-war debt.

Those countries to which reparation is due shall set off the amount of the contribution referred to above and the value of the public property taken over by them in the newly acquired territory against their claim to reparation.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 17:00

Meeting of the Council of Five meets with a group of Legal and Naval Experts


1. M Clemenceau requests M Mantoux to read the following text prepared by the Legal Advisers:

"The terms of the Armistice signed by Germany on the 11th November, 1918, provided as follows:

'Article XXIII. The German surface warships which shall be specified by the Allies and the United States shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, failing them, in the Allied ports designated by the Allies and the United States. They shall there remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States, only care and maintenance parties being left on board.'

On June 21st the German warships which had been handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers and were at anchor in the roadstead at Scapa Flow, with the German care and maintenance parties on board as provided in the Armistice, were sunk by these parties under the orders of the German Admiral in command.

According to the information which has been collected and transmitted by the British Admiralty, the German Admiral in command of these parties of the German naval forces has alleged that he acted in the belief that the Armistice expired on June 21st at midday, and consequently in his opinion the destruction in question was no violation of its terms.

In law, Germany by signing the terms of Article XXIII set out above, entered into an undertaking that the ships handed over by her should remain in the ports indicated by the Allied and Associated Powers and that care and maintenance parties should be left on board with such instructions and under such orders as would ensure that the Armistice should be observed.

The destruction of these ships instead of their preservation as had been provided, constituted at once a violation of the Armistice, the destruction of the pledge handed over, and an act of insubordination towards the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Admiral in command of the care and maintenance parties belonging to the German naval forces has, while recognizing that the act was a breach of the Armistice, attempted to justify it by alleging his belief that the Armistice had come to an end.

This alleged explanation is not well founded as, under the communication addressed to the German Delegation by the Allied and Associated Powers on the 16th. June, 1919, the Armistice would only terminate on refusal to sign the Peace or, if no answer were returned on the 23rd June at 7 o’clock.

According to international law, as embodied particularly in Articles 40 and 41 of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention in 1907, every serious violation of the Armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right to denounce it and even in case of urgency to recommence hostilities at once. A violation of the terms of the Armistice by individuals acting on their own initiative only confers the right of demanding the punishment of the offenders and, if necessary, indemnity for the losses sustained.

In these circumstances and without taking account of other grounds on which responsibility might be based, the violation of the Armistice by the German naval detachments, the destruction of the pledge placed in the hands of the Allied and Associated Powers, and the act of “sabotage” committed give them a right to reparation for the loss caused and to the punishment of the offenders, and in consequence a right to proceed to such further measures as the Allied and Associated Powers may deem appropriate.

As regards the question whether and in what manner the authors of the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow are liable to prosecution and punishment, the committee of Legal Advisers are of opinion that there is justification in accordance with Article 228 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany for the prosecution of these individuals before Military Tribunals, and for the application to them of penalties legally provided for suitable to the case."

Mr Lloyd George inquires why reference had not been made to Article 31 of the Armistice.

Mr Hurst replies that the Legal Advisers in drawing up their note had thought it desirable to avoid the employment of any argument open to doubt. Article 31, it might be argued, does not apply to the case in question. The word “restitution” in that article appears to refer to the terms of the immediately preceding article.

Mr Lloyd George says that the article appeared to him to cover all possibilities. There must be no destruction.

Mr Hurst explains that the article forbids destruction before evacuation, surrender, or restoration. The destruction in question had not taken place before evacuation or surrender. The word “restitution” could not apply.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that the article covers everything. The Germans surrendered ships to the Allies who could either restore them or keep them. In either case the Germans were forbidden to destroy them.

President Wilson says he thinks Mr Hurst’s reasoning is quite clear. The Germans were required to refrain from any destruction before certain things happened. These things had taken place, and this destruction had occurred long afterwards. He does not think that it is necessary to invoke Article 31 as the case made out by the Legal Advisers is quite strong enough without it.

Mr Lloyd George expresses the opinion that the word “restitution” in Article 31 related to restitution of the German ships to the Germans.

President Wilson thinks that the reasoning in the legal report is quite convincing, and that it is unnecessary to reinforce it by quoting an article the application of which is questionable.

M Clemenceau says he cannot accept that theory. He would be asked why he had not made use of that text. He would reply that authorized international interpreters of the text had told him it does not apply. This would not satisfy his critics, who would say that it was for the Governments to decide and not for the interpreters.

Mr Balfour inquires whether a case is made worse in law if in addition to good arguments a doubtful argument is used.

Baron Sonnino points out that the article was clearly intended to deal with the case of restitution by Germany to the Allies.

M Clemenceau said he does not accept this interpretation. In his view the case was as follows:

German ships were sent to ports designated by the Allies. Thereafter, there were two alternatives. The ships might be surrendered or they might be returned to Germany. If the text did not mean that, he gives up all faith in texts. The interpretation of texts must be ruled by sound sense.

President Wilson says he does not know what appearance the text might present in French. The English text did not mean what M Clemenceau said.

M Clemenceau says that about the word “evacuation” there could be no ambiguity, either in French or in English, as it is derived from the Latin “Vaccuus”, meaning empty. Evacuation consequently means to make empty, to quit.

Baron Sonnino again points out that Article 31 must be read in conjunction with Articles 29 and 30, to both of which it refers.

Mr Balfour questions whether it is material to settle the point. The Council desires to punish the culprits and squeeze the utmost out of Germany. It appears that they are in a position to punish the culprits, whichever of the two interpretations (M Clemenceau’s or President Wilson’s), is the right one. As to squeezing the Germans...

(At this point M Dutasta, followed by Colonel Henri and Captain Portier enter the room, with a Note from the German Delegation expressing willingness on behalf of the German Republic to sign, under compulsion, a dishonorable peace.)

(Orders were given for guns to be fired. No further discussion took place.)


The Letter From the German Peace Delegation:

German Peace Delegation,
Versailles, June 23, 1919.
German acceptance of peace terms

Translation From the German of Note From German Delegation

No. 88

His Excellency Monsieur Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference.

Sir: The Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed me to communicate to Your Excellency the following:

“The Government of the German Republic has seen with consternation from the last communication of the Allied and Associated Governments, that the latter are resolved to wrest from Germany by sheer force even the acceptance of those conditions of peace which, though devoid of material significance, pursue the object of taking away its honor from the German people. The honor of the German people will remain untouched by any act of violence. The German people, after the frightful sufferings of the last few years, lacks all means of defending its honor by external action. Yielding to overwhelming force, but without on that account abandoning its view in regard to the unheard of injustice of the conditions of peace, the Government of the German Republic therefore declares that it is ready to accept and sign the conditions of peace imposed by the Allied and Associated Governments.”

Pray accept [etc.]

Von Haniel

[Jimbuna]

24th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Truce between Hungarian and Czecho-Slovakian armies.

An armed uprising in Budapest against the Soviet Republic of Hungary is crushed.


Francesco Saverio Nitti becomes the new Prime Minister of Italy after the previous government resigned after failing to secure territorial gains at the Paris Peace Conference.


[June 24th, 1919] "Germany Will Sign"- Newspaper placard for the Times.


HMS Sword Dance (Royal Navy) The Dance-class minesweeper struck a mine and sank in the Dvina River in Russia. One crewman killed.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, June 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five meets with a group of Legal Experts


1. The Council has before them proposals relating to Belgian claims for priority in reparation payments, which have already been approved by financial experts.

The following documents are approved:

1) An agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, and Italy. This document is signed by the representatives of the four Governments.

2) An annex prepared as an illustration of the method of applying the foregoing provisions. This document was initialed by the representatives of the four Governments.

3) A letter to M Hymans which is signed by M Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr Lloyd George.

(M Loucheur takes custody of the originals of the first two documents, and undertakes to prepare a letter for M Clemenceau’s signature covering their despatch to the Belgian Delegation. He also takes custody of the third document to dispatch it to the Belgian Delegation.)

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, June 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:15

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a long report from the British Admiralty regarding the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow. The case for the British Admiralty is that, at the time of the Armistice, the French the Orkneys and British naval representatives had pressed for the surrender of the German Fleet. Admiral Benson, however, had urged very strongly that surrender should not be demanded and that the Armistice should not be risked for this purpose. Marshal Foch had supported Admiral Benson very strongly. He had said that he did not wish to risk the lives of good soldiers for bad ships which had never fought a decisive battle. The Supreme War Council, consisting of the Prime Ministers and of Colonel House, had over-ruled the French and British Admiralties and unanimously agreed to ask only for the internment of the German ships and only for the surrender of certain submarines. It had been decided originally that the German ships to be interned should be interned in a neutral port. On further examination, it had been realized that this was impossible and the Allied Naval Council had chosen Scapa Flow as a suitable spot for the concentration of the German ships under surveillance. Then came the question of determining what kind of surveillance could be exercised. The British Admiralty had come to the conclusion that none but German crews could be put on board, as the removal of the German personnel would have been a breach of the Armistice. All that could be done was to exercise general surveillance over the fleet. He had seen the instructions issued by the British Admiralty. He quoted certain passages of those instructions. The latest report was that the Baden and Hindenburg had been saved or could be salvaged. There were, therefore, two capital ships available. He wished to add that Baron Makino had just informed him that the Japanese Admiralty did not consider the British Admiralty in any way to blame.

M Clemenceau then hands in the opinion of the French Admiralty.

Mr Lloyd George says that, as Admiral Hope had pointed out, if the original intention of interning the ships in a neutral port had been adhered to, it would not have been possible to place Allied crews on board.

President Wilson says that Admiral Benson, who had been present at the discussions at the Armistice time, had unfortunately gone home. His substitute at present is Admiral Knapp. At Mr Lloyd George’s request, he had obtained his opinion on the point.

Admiral Hope explains that the British Admiralty could not have demanded the complete removal of the German crews. This would have been equivalent to a surrender of the German ships. With any German personnel on board, it was impossible to safeguard the ships completely. Very large parties would have been required to take charge of every compartment in each ship and this could not have been done consistently with the retention of any German crews on board.

President Wilson says that he trusted Admiral Hope would not think he had expressed any opinion on the subject. All he had done was to furnish Admiral Knapp’s personal views in compliance with Mr Lloyd George’s request. The chief interest of the Council was to see what ought to be done. He thinks it is clear that the German Admiral could be held responsible and punished. It also seems clear that the German Government could be held responsible, but what profit could be derived from the responsibility of the German Government is not so clear. The object of the Allies cannot be to renew the war but to obtain some reparation, placing them in the same situation as if the fleet had not been sunk. He assumes that enough German ships remain to make the contemplated distribution, with the exception of the share due to the British Navy. This share being, of course, a very large one could not be furnished, but he thinks that there is perhaps enough to compensate the weaker navies.

Mr Lloyd George observes that there are two first class ships, one a battleship and one a battlecruiser.

M Clemenceau says that he wishes to make a few observations. First, as to the question of right. According to the legal advisers, Germany had violated the Armistice. On the previous day, the application of Article XXXI of the Armistice had been discussed. It seems clear to him that it does apply, and, in addressing the Germans, he thinks that advantage should be taken of that article. There is, further, an anticipated violation of the Peace Conditions and this must be taken into consideration. If this were all, the stories told by the German Admiral that he believed, on the strength of a newspaper, that the Armistice was over, might be alleged in defense of the act. This however, is merely an instance of German mendacity. There is further evidence of the deliberate intention of the Germans to violate not only the Armistice but the Conditions of Peace in anticipation. French flags which, under the Peace Terms, were to be restored had been burned in Berlin. This incident had been deeply felt in France both by Parliament and people. There was, moreover, a telegram seized by the Polish authorities to the effect that an insurrection was to be organised in Upper Silesia. The movement would be disavowed officially but aided unofficially in every possible manner. Von Haniel had warned the Conference that there would be an insurrection against the Polish clauses. There is a clause in the Treaty requiring the withdrawal of the German troops from Upper Silesia within 14 days after the ratification of the Treaty. It had been hard enough to get the Treaty signed, but this evidence shows that there will be even greater difficulty in obtaining its execution. He proposes, if there are no objections on the part of his colleagues, to have this intercepted telegram published in the Press to show the Germans we are awake to their intentions.

As to reparation, he is told that there might be enough ships to indemnify the French Navy. He can make no judgment on this. In regard to responsibility, he leaves the matter entirely in Mr Lloyd George’s hand, but he wishes to say that material reparation is not enough. He now formally makes a demand that reparation be exacted for the burning of the French flags, an act certainly done by order like the sinking of the ships. The question arises as to what form this reparation should take. He will not ask for money. Money can only be obtained at the expense of France and her Allies. He will take ships, if he can get them, but even that is not enough. He wishes, by a striking act, to show that the Allies do not mean to tolerate the conduct evidenced by the burning of the flags, the sinking of the ships and the plot against Poland. It must be remembered that it is difficult to bring aid to the Poles and the forts of Danzig will be able to repel a naval attack. It is quite evident that the Germans mean to violate the Treaty which they are to sign in two days. No one who was not deaf and blind to evidence can doubt it. He regrets that President Wilson is shortly to leave, but he recognizes the urgency of his business in America. The American flag, however, will remain side by side with those of the Allies. He desires that a military act be accomplished, showing the will of the Allies quite clearly not to submit to any fraudulent breach of the Treaty by Germany. He does not wish this act to precede the signing of the Treaty, and, for the present, all he will ask is that a note be sent referring to the incident at Scapa Flow and to the burning of the flags and stating that reparation for these acts will be required. The note should further state that the Allies are aware of what Germany is plotting in Silesia and that precautions will be taken to prevent the execution of the plot. He will not mention what reparation or what precautions would be taken. That is all he will say for the present, with the object of establishing the position of the Allies and their right to act. But he will state what he has in mind very clearly.

He thinks the Allies should take possession of Essen. M Loucheur, whom he has asked to come, informs him that Essen is still at the present time making armaments. It is the most powerful center of munition production in Germany. He has no intention of keeping Essen, but only of preventing supplies being made there to munition the attack on Poland. There can, in the nature of the case, be no military opposition to the operation. It will show the Germans quite clearly that their game js up. The Germans will yield and public opinion, which had supported the Allies throughout the war, will be satisfied. Failing this, there is a fear that the Germans will, one by one, get back every concession they had made. This will result in the necessity of remobilizing to engage in definite acts of war. He recognizes that it is necessary to act prudently for the time being, in order not to jeopardize the signature of the Peace, but it must be made clear to the enemy that Allied will would prevail.

President Wilson asks whether M Clemenceau would allow the discussion of this proposal to be deferred until the afternoon.

Mr Lloyd George joins in this request.

Mr Balfour asks if he understands M Clemenceau aright in thinking that his proposal is to write a letter at once or on the following day, regarding the sinking of the ships, the burning of the flags and the plot against Poland.

President Wilson asks whether M Clemenceau has corroborated the last.

M Clemenceau says that he will produce full evidence.

Mr Balfour, continuing, asks whether the letter would state that those acts violated the Armistice and therefore gave rise to a claim for reparation.

M Clemenceau observes that the case of the flags and of the ships go together and give rise to a claim for reparation. As regards Poland, a case will be made out. Reparation is not in question in regard to that.

Mr Balfour says that the proposal will be then to continue the arrangements for the signature of the Peace, whether the German answer to this letter comes before the signature or after. If he understands M Clemenceau’s intention, he would prefer it to come after. Then, if the answer is unsatisfactory, which in all probability would be the case, the Allies will have to take action, and the action proposed by M Clemenceau is to occupy Essen.

M Clemenceau says that Mr. Balfour had quite understood his policy. Of course, it will be necessary to hear Marshal Foch regarding the execution of the plan. He wishes to add that he has no intention of keeping Essen for any length of time and would, of course, give it up as soon as the Polish difficulty had been cleared up.

[Jimbuna]

25th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Bolsheviks 20 miles from Perm, and advancing east of Ufa.

An American platoon of 72 men repelled an attack by a Red Army force of 400 men at their base camp in Romanovka, Siberia, Russia, killing between 41-57 Russian soldiers while suffering 24 killed and 25 wounded.

The Junkers F 13, the first all-metal transport aircraft, makes its first flight in Germany.


Siberian Bicycle and Autocycle Fighting Squad.

[Jimbuna]

26th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Fighting at Berlin and Hamburg.

American Commission to the Paris Peace Conference, led by President Wilson, at Hotel Crillon, Paris.


Demonstrators march in London to urge the government to protect Jews in Poland as pogroms occur across Eastern Europe.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


(Captain Portier is present during this discussion.)

1. M Clemenceau reads the following letter from the German Delegation:The Rhine Convention

“Versailles, June 24th, 1919.

Mr President,

In accordance with instructions received from the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, I have the honor to inquire from the Allied and Associated Governments when the negotiations can begin on the subject of an agreement relating to the occupied Rhenish territories.

Von Haniel.”

Sir Maurice Hankey, at M Clemenceau’s request, reads the pertinent article of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, namely, Article 432.

“All matters relating to the occupation and not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated by subsequent agreements which Germany hereby undertakes to observe.”

Mr Lloyd George says he will take no risks and will insist on the Germans signing without any discussion.

President Wilson and Baron Sonnino agree.

M Mantoux, at M Clemenceau’s request, then reads the following draft of a letter prepared by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference:

“Monsieur le Président,

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of June 24 with reference to the agreement as to the military occupation of the territories of the Rhine, I have the honor to remind you that under Article 432 of the conditions of peace, now accepted by the German Government, Germany is bound thereby to accept the terms of this agreement.

There is therefore no need to open negotiations on the subject and the instrument in question must be signed under the same conditions as the Treaty.”

M Clemenceau suggests that in the last line the words “under the same conditions” should be deleted, and there should be substituted the words “at the same time.”

(This is agreed to, and Captain Portier is asked to prepare a text for M Clemenceau’s signature.)

Captain Portier on his return states that M Fromageot does not like the use of the words “at the same time”. His objection is on the ground that Article 432 speaks of “subsequent agreements”, whereas if signed at the same time, it would be a “simultaneous agreement”.

(It is agreed to ignore this objection and M Clemenceau signs the letter, which is dispatched to the German Delegation.)


2. President Wilson reads the Report furnished by the Allied Admirals.

M Clemenceau says that for reasons he has already given, he cannot confine himself to a purely naval point of view. The action of the Germans in sinking their ships at Scapa Flow must be considered in connection with the information as to their intentions in Poland, which is confirmed from many quarters.

Mr Lloyd George comments on the fact that the information from Poland had been published in the newspapers without any explanation being asked for from the Germans.

M Clemenceau says it is useless to ask for explanations, as the Germans will only say that we had falsified the document. His view is that nothing should be done to delay the signature of Peace. All he will do today is write to the Germans on the questions of the sinking of the ships and the burning of the flags. The Polish affair will grow in a day or two, and give ample reasons for action.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it would be much better to take action to stop the development on the Polish front. The Germans now know that the Allies are aware that the movement there was not spontaneous, and could probably be stopped.

M Clemenceau agrees that it is worth trying.

President Wilson recalls that an alleged letter from Erzberger, which had been alluded to before at the Council, had turned out to be false. It had been traced to Polish sources. While he has the utmost confidence in Mr Paderewski (Mr Lloyd George says he also has this confidence), he suspects Polish sources of information. Consequently, he would like to have confirmation of the information as to German intentions on the Eastern front from other sources, before taking action.

M Clemenceau says that he is thinking of sending an officer today to Warsaw to photograph the intercepted document.

Mr Lloyd George points out that all that has been done up to the present was to publish it in the “Matin”. We ought to write to the Germans and say that this document had come into our hands, and to inform them that if the information should prove correct, the Germans would be held responsible.

Baron Sonnino agrees, provided that the signature of the Treaty of Peace was not retarded.

M Clemenceau says he has received a dispatch from Poland to the effect that the Polish Government are doing their best to prevent the peasants in Upper Silesia from being goaded into a rising against the Germans.

Mr Lloyd George says that riots must be expected though he does not anticipate serious fighting. The German Government ought to be told that they will be held responsible.

M Clemenceau offers to bring all the papers on the subject to the afternoon meeting.

President Wilson says that the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow has been a constant subject in his thoughts. The more he considers the matter, the more doubtful he feels. On the previous day he had met his four colleagues of the American Delegation, in order to learn their views. Mr Lansing, who is a very experienced international lawyer, said he seriously doubts whether the German Government could be held responsible for something that had happened outside their jurisdiction. If the ships had been sunk on the High Seas, or in a German Port, his doubts would be removed, but he very much doubts whether the German Government could be held responsible in International Law for what had happened in Scapa Flow. About the responsibility of the German Admiral, he has no doubt. The Allied and Associated Powers are now about to make Peace. They are dealing with a people of such a character that this new act makes no difference to our knowledge of it. Difficulties of this kind will often occur in connection with the carrying out of the Treaty. The Germans will be tricky and would perhaps often destroy things that they had undertaken to return, alleging that the destruction had been perpetrated by irresponsible persons over whom they had no control. Hence, it is necessary to face the issue as to whether if they did so, we are prepared to renew the war. All we can say at present is that the sinking of these ships is a violation of the Armistice. If we treat it as a violation of the Armistice, it will lead to an outbreak of war. He recalls that the Armistice continues in operation until the ratification of Peace by Germany and three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Until these ratifications are deposited, the Armistice will prevail. To take any military action is to abrogate the Armistice and to create a state of war while we are awaiting ratification. It would be a very serious step after we had signed the Treaty of Peace, thus to abrogate the Armistice and renew the war.

M Clemenceau suggests that it will not be the Allies who renew it.

President Wilson points out that if action is taken by the Allies, they will have to sweep the Armistice aside and there will be a state of war.

M Clemenceau does not agree in this. He points out that in the paper by the legal advisers, the action of the Germans gives the right to proceed to such further measures as the Allied and Associated Powers might deem appropriate.

Mr Lloyd George does not consider this would entitle them to occupy a city which was left to Germany under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, which had been signed.

Baron Sonnino says that if action is taken after signing, it will be taken in France as a great recoil and a surrender of victory, as well as an act of violation of the Armistice undertaken by the Allies.

M Clemenceau says that there are two questions; one of International Law, and one of policy. As regards the first, the Council had all agreed yesterday that the action of the Germans constituted a violation of the Armistice. His own opinion is unchanged. The Allies are free to take note of it, or to say nothing about it, or to say it was an excellent thing, but they cannot say it is not a violation of the Armistice. In his view, they are either forced to act, or otherwise to find some further means of protest. It is impossible for them to do otherwise. No Parliament in France will tolerate inaction. France alone has suffered from this action. Coming to the question of policy, President Wilson said he was not prepared to renew the war. The losses of the French had been greater than those of their Allies. In all quarters, demobilization was demanded. In the lobby, on the previous day, many Deputies had spoken to him of this. Consequently, he has no desire to reopen the war. But there is a great and supreme political interest at stake which prevails over these considerations. Germany has shown every possible proof of bad faith at every point. She has committed a number of violations of the Armistice. Germany is not now in a position to resist, but if the Allies were to wait each time and take no action, the day would come when Germany would violate the Treaty of Peace, when the Allies were no longer together and when the soldiers had all been demobilized. Hence, in his view, this was the psychological moment at which to say that we insisted on proper reparation. To take action now will have a very great influence on the future doings of Germany. If this opportunity is lost, he begs President Wilson to remember that the Treaty will be in great danger.

Mr Lloyd George says he is most reluctant to intervene in this discussion. Although the British Admiralty had made the strongest possible protest against interning instead of surrendering the German Fleet, nevertheless, the ships had been sunk in a British Port and under British care. This is the reason of his reluctance. He had consulted such of his colleagues as were in Paris, and they were quite clear as to their views. It is not a question as to whether to allow flagrant violation of the Armistice by Germany to pass without protest, or for not exacting punishment or compensation. That is not the point. The real point is that the form of compensation should have some relation to the offence. Hence, the question arises as to whether in compensation for the sinking of the ships, the Allies are entitled to seize a town after the signature of Peace. This offence had taken place last Saturday. The Treaty would be signed a week later. In the meanwhile, the Treaty contained a precise definition of the areas of occupation. In these circumstances, to occupy other territory would be a little bit tricky.

If Essen is to be occupied, the Allies ought to do so now. The only reason we did not do so was because we were afraid the Germans would not sign. This was admitted in these conversations, and this was the reason why it was proposed not to tell them. At the present time the whole feeling of the world is against Germany, and their action at Scapa Flow, and more especially in burning the French flags, had accentuated this feeling. The burning of the flags is felt to be a wanton insult. But to get the Germans to sign, knowing perfectly well that after their signature we did not intend to adhere to the letter of the Treaty, but proposed to advance further into Germany, would outrage the sense of decent people. The position of British public opinion is different from that of the French, and he does not want to have trouble with it. The Germans are old enemies of the French, and were the enemies of the British for the first time. Although British public opinion had been solid to march to Berlin if the Germans would not sign, nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that there is some feeling against the Treaty, including a considerable feeling among intellectuals. He instances Lord Robert Cecil and the two Archbishops. What he wants to avoid is causing a feeling that the Allies are not exacting justice, but were trampling on the fallen foe. Hence, he begged his colleagues not to advance into Germany after Peace has been signed.

M Clemenceau, interrupting, says that the French troops would never advance without the consent of their Allies.

Mr Lloyd George says that M Clemenceau asked what was to be done. Would we allow the incident to pass? Certainly not, but whatever is done must be announced before the signature of peace. He will take the risk of that. First he would punish those who were responsible, and this would apply not only to the German Admiral, who should be court-martialled, but to those persons who had destroyed the flags, who should be put in the same category as the other Germans to be tried.

Secondly, he thinks that the Allied and Associated Powers are entitled to relevant compensation. If some action of the same kind had taken place on land, no-one would ever dream of asking for compensation on the sea. The punishment must fit the crime, and consequently must be Naval. Two German ships of the first class had been saved, namely the battle-ship Baden and the battle-cruiser Hindenburg, which he supposes is better than any battle-cruiser the British Navy had. He would say at once that as those ships had been sunk in British ports, subject to the consent of his colleagues, France must have first claim to them. To show the importance of battle cruisers, he recalls that he had had a conversation during the war with Admiral Sims, who had pointed out that in 1921 the Germans would have had a superiority in battle-cruisers, a superiority which could have been countered only by obtaining battle-cruisers from Japan. If the Germans had a superiority of one battle-cruiser it would have been extremely difficult to bring their fleet to action. In addition to the Hindenburg and the Baden, some light cruisers had been beached at Scapa, and he would say at once that so far as the British Empire was concerned, he waives all claim to them and would allow France to have them, subject to the consent of his colleagues.

President Wilson interpolated that, for his part, he agrees.

Mr Lloyd George says that as regards the rest of the German fleet, the report of the Admirals showed that it was of two categories. The first category consisted of some very useful light cruisers. Great Britain does not require these, and if France wishes to have them, he will support her claim. As regards the second category, they are said not to be of much value, but he recalls that during the war old material had often proved to be useful. He does not know what more he can offer. In regard to the flags, it is more difficult to provide for compensation. He begs, however, that France would on no account act alone in occupying some city.

M Clemenceau said he would not do so without the agreement of the Allies.

Mr Lloyd George says that nothing could be more fatal. He does not anticipate real trouble with Germany for at least ten years.

M Clemenceau thinks he is wrong, and that trouble might come at once.

Mr Lloyd George says that even if it were in five years, it is just as important that the Allies should hold together.

He feels himself to be in the position of a supplicant, handicapped by what had happened in a British port, but nevertheless he hopes that France will not insist on any action being taken as an act of retaliation after the signature of peace.

(M Clemenceau withdraws at this point to speak to M Fromageot, and on his return,)

Mr Lloyd George says that the British Government will give up all claim to the German destroyers at Scapa Flow.

President Wilson says he will give expression to the fear that had been in his mind for many weeks. So far as he can recall, the Treaty of Peace only gives one method of securing compulsion on Germany for its execution, namely that the period of occupation can be extended by the Council of the League of Nations. He has asked himself, supposing Germany acts in bad faith and does not fulfill the Treaty what can we do? In his view, any exercise of force will be an act of war and the whole Treaty would be at an end. Everyone agrees that the action of the Germans at Scapa Flow was a breach of the Armistice. But if we are to retaliate the Armistice will be off, and the war would be on.

Mr Lloyd George says that the action taken by the Germans on Saturday had been an act of war.

President Wilson says he thinks the best plan is that proposed by Mr Lloyd George, namely, to write to the Germans and tell them that the act of the German Admiral was a breach of the Armistice, and that he will be tried. Also that the Allies feel it right to demand that the German Government should make restitution as far as possible. We cannot get more than Mr Lloyd George proposed, because the Germans have no more ships. He thinks, however, that we ought to avoid military action or anything that would give the impression that we are renewing the war.

M Clemenceau says he has tried his best to agree with his colleagues, and he hopes that they will try to do something to agree with him. He had asked M Fromageot whether the occupation of Essen would be a renewal of the war, and M Fromageot had replied that it looked very much like it. It would be an act of reprisal. He will, therefore, let this drop, though he still thinks that it is the best thing to do and that this fact will be especially decisive on the Polish question. There are three questions:

First, the juridical question as to whether the Germans had broken the Armistice, and the Council are all agreed on this.

Secondly, the question of punishment of the Admiral. They are agreed on this also.

The third is the question of reparation in kind and in amount. He will acknowledge that if adequate reparation can be made in kind, this will be the best solution, but it is not easy to arrange and he does not think it is possible. He asks himself, however, whether France cannot demand some of the mercantile marine left to Germany. M Bérenger had written him yesterday and said he ought to ask for some petroleum ships. He thinks something might be done in this direction. He considers Mr Lloyd George’s proposals as to warships satisfactory in proportion to their number. Perhaps some others can be salved. His idea today is to send the Germans a letter based on the text of the report from the Legal Advisers. He will accept this report subject to the few corrections as the basis of the letter to the Germans but will add a paragraph about the burning of the flags. He will add that the Allies would demand reparation as soon as the investigations they are making allows them to do so. Today he does not wish to go further than this. A remark of President Wilson’s had put into his mind the thought that it might be useful to add a warning that if the Germans continue in this war it will be necessary for the Allies to consider the prolongation of the military occupation. This will make them think a good deal, and will be a certain compensation for public opinion in France. In the meanwhile, the naval experts should be asked to give further information about oil vessels and the merchant fleet. Consequently, he thinks he is not so far from what President Wilson had proposed.

President Wilson then reads the report by the Legal Advisers.

(It is agreed to adopt this as the basis of a letter to the German Delegation, subject to the following modifications:

In the following sentence:—

“The destruction of these ships, instead of their preservation as has been provided, constituted at once a violation of the Armistice, the destruction of the pledge handed over, and an act of insubordination towards the Allied and Associated Powers,”

It was agreed to substitute the words “Gross breach of good faith, (felonie)” for “insubordination”.

In paragraph 3 it is agreed to insert the last sentence, beginning “As regards the question whether …” as an allusion to Article 31 of the Armistice Convention of November 11th, 1918, in some such terms as the following: - “According to the principles acknowledged in Article 31 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.”

President Wilson says he will accept it provisionally, although he does not believe Article 31 is applicable.

Baron Sonnino points out that even if the Article is not directly applicable, the principle might be applicable.

At the end of the first sentence of Para. 4, M Clemenceau suggests to add, after the word “appropriate”, the following words: - ”as reparation for the loss caused.”

(This is agreed to.)

M Clemenceau suggests an addition at the end of the memorandum in some such terms as the following:

“The fact of sinking the German Fleet not only constitutes by itself a breach of the Armistice, but the burning of French flags in Berlin, taken in conjunction with it, constitutes a deliberate and systematic breach of the Articles of the Treaty of Peace. Consequently, the Allied and Associated Powers take official cognizance of these acts of breach of faith, and as soon as they have investigated all the circumstances of the act, they will demand the necessary reparation.”

President Wilson proposes that an English and French speaking person should be nominated by the Council to draft a letter to the Germans on the above basis. He proposes that the final sentence should be put in some such manner as the following:

“These articles are in effect a breach of the terms of the Treaty in anticipation, and inevitably create an impression that shakes the confidence of the Allied and Associated Powers in the good faith of the Germans, and makes it necessary to warn them of the consequences.”

M Clemenceau urges that the prolongation of the period of occupation should be specifically referred to.

President Wilson suggests some such phrase as the following:

“Makes it necessary to suggest the probable necessity of resorting to the means provided for in the Treaty of Peace.”

He thinks, however, it would be advisable to leave the matter to the Drafting Committee.

(It is agreed that Mr Balfour and M Loucheur should prepare a letter to the Germans, based on the above discussion.)

(M Loucheur, accompanied by Mr Hurst and M Fromageot, enters the room to receive instructions from M Clemenceau.)

Mr Lloyd George undertakes to communicate with Mr. Balfour.


3. M Clemenceau says that the Germans will arrive on Friday morning, but their credentials would first have to be checked.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has been informed that a telegram received on the previous day by the German Delegation had caused great hilarity. It was rumored that the Germans were sending some persons of minor importance to sign the treaty. He recalls that they had attempted the same thing in connection with the Armistice, and suggested that an immediate demand should be made to them to state who their delegates would be.

(M Clemenceau sends for M Dutasta and instructs him to make this demand immediately to the Germans.)


4. The following resolution is approved and initialed by the five Heads of Governments, and given to Captain Portier, who accompanied the Secretary-General:

“The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference is instructed to make the necessary arrangements for the signature of the Treaty with Poland not later than the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.”

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

(M Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, is introduced.)


1. M Dutasta said that he had seen von Haniel, who told him he had telegraphed twice to Berlin asking who the German representatives would be and when they were due to arrive, but had received no answer. Von Haniel had added that the German Government had moved from Weimar to Berlin and that their first Cabinet Council in Berlin was to be held this morning. On the conclusion of that, he expected an answer. M Dutasta had asked him to communicate again and he had promised to do so immediately. According to von Haniel, the German Government was encountering great difficulty in finding persons ready to sign the Treaty. He had made von Haniel understand that an answer was expected this evening, or tomorrow at the latest.

M Clemenceau instructs M Dutasta to proceed to Versailles tomorrow morning at 09:00 unless he has heard in the meanwhile from Colonel Henri.


2. M Mantoux says that M Tardieu is in attendance to obtain a decision of principle on a point connected with the desire of the French Government to be allowed to buy or to borrow United States ships for communication with the French Colonies, for which France has a great insufficiency of shipping.

M Clemenceau says the question should first be sent to experts.

(It is agreed, on President Wilson’s suggestion, that M Tardieu should arrange for a joint memorandum to be prepared by the experts of the Allied and Associated Powers.)


3. M Clemenceau, in reply to Mr Lloyd George, says it is his intention to hand the Treaty of Peace to Parliament as soon as possible after the signature. He will not make any explanatory speech and the next step will be for the examination of the Treaty by the Commissions of the Chamber and Senate. He does not expect to make his own statement until after the various Commissions have reported, perhaps not for three weeks.

President Wilson says that he, himself, will leave Paris immediately after the signature of the Treaty. As soon as he arrives in the United States, he will take the Treaty to Congress.

M Clemenceau thinks there are advantages in President Wilson making the first speech on the subject.

President Wilson says that, in his country, questions will then be asked as to why other Governments had done nothing.

Mr Lloyd George says that he could fit in his speech about the same time as President Wilson’s, although he is anxious to be away for the second and third weeks after his arrival in England.

Baron Sonnino says that the responsibility will be with the new Italian Government, but he thinks there is little doubt they will proceed as rapidly as possible. In view of the necessity of reports by Commissions, probably a fortnight or so will elapse before the Treaty can be ratified.


4. Mr Lloyd George brings forward a proposal he had received from Sir Ernest Pollock, the English Solicitor-General, suggesting that, in the light of the experience gained at Scapa Flow and the burning of French flags, steps should be taken to make the execution of Clauses 214 to 224 (Repatriation of Prisoners) and Clauses 227 to 230 (Penalties) interdependent.

(It is generally agreed that this suggestion is a useful one and should be taken note of, but that no immediate decision should be taken for its adoption.)


5. Mr Lloyd George suggests to his colleagues that the Trial of the Kaiser should take place in some Allied country removed from those where resentment at the Kaiser was naturally the most acute. He suggests that either Great Britain or the United States of America would be the most advantageous from this point of view.

President Wilson suggests that the Trial of the Kaiser should not take place in any great city.

M Clemenceau says he would like to consult his colleagues on the subject and would give a reply on the following day.


6. Mr Lloyd George reads a Note from Admiral Hope regarding the disposition of surrendered German and Austrian surface ships and submarines.

Sir Maurice Hankey points out that a report has already been furnished by the Allied Admirals in regard to submarines, Admiral De Bon having made a minority report.

(It is agreed that the Allied Admirals should be asked to prepare a report advising the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to what course they now recommended on all three heads.)


7. M Clemenceau adverts to the point he had raised at the morning meeting, namely, that France should be compensated for the loss she had incurred by the sinking of German ships at Scapa Flow, by being given some of the remaining German merchant ships and particularly oil tankers.

(It is agreed that a Commission, composed as follows:

Mr Baruch for the United States of America,
Mr Hipwood (or representative) for the British Empire,
M Monet (or representative) for France,
M Crespi (or representative) for Italy, and
A Japanese representative to be nominated by Baron Makino,

should meet to consider the possibility of exacting from Germany some reparation for the sinking of warships at Scapa Flow in the form of further merchant ships, special consideration being given to the case of oil tank vessels.)


8. President Wilson reads the following questions presented by the Superior Blockade Council:

1) Does the Supreme Council, in view of the authorization given by the Weimar Assembly to the German Delegates, desire that all restrictions upon trade with Germany shall be rescinded immediately upon the signatures of the Treaty of Peace by the German Delegation?

2) If not, upon what date shall these restrictions be rescinded?

3) When is the German Delegation expected to sign? If the Supreme Council desires that the blockade restrictions shall be raised upon the signature of the Treaty by the German Delegates and if the signature is likely to take place on Saturday, it is desirable that the Blockade Council should be so informed today. At least two days are required in which to terminate the present restrictions.

At M Clemenceau’s request the following note prepared by M Mantoux is read:

“Provision ought to be made for the eventuality of the German Government signing the Treaty of Peace, but delaying its ratification in the hope to embarrass the Allies and to take advantage of any incidents that might arise.

In 1871, it was stipulated by Article 3 of the Preliminaries of Peace that the German troops were to evacuate Paris and the forts on the left bank of the Seine immediately after the act of ratification. Much to the surprise of the Germans, the Preliminaries which had been signed on February 26th, 1871, were ratified by the Bordeaux Assembly as soon as March 1st, and the exchange of ratifications took place at Versailles the day after. Paris was evacuated at once, after less than two days of occupation, and the triumphal entry of Wilhelm I, which had been prepared for March 3rd, was cancelled.

It may be useful today to remind the Germans of the fact that the blockade shall cease at the same moment as the state of war, and that legally what brings the state of war to an end is the exchange of ratifications. But for the sake of humanity, the Allied and Associated Governments may concede that as soon as they have been officially notified the ratification of the treaty by the National Assembly of Germany the blockade shall be raised.

Such a declaration would encourage Germany to ratify the Treaty without delay, without fixing a narrow time limit to the debates in the representative Assemblies of the Allied and Associated countries.”

Mr Lloyd George said that this seems reasonable.

President Wilson reminds his colleagues of his reluctance to make women and children suffer for matters over which they exercised no influence. Nevertheless, the course proposed seemed the best in the circumstances.

M Clemenceau says that in the Rhine provinces there is little hardship.

President Wilson says that in the interior of Germany Mr Hoover reported great shortage.

(It is agreed that the Blockade should cease on the same date as the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, as provided for at the end of the Treaty.)


9. Mr Lloyd George suggests that a special Committee should be set up to consider the working out of the various measures for putting the Treaty of Peace with Germany into effect.

(The proposal is accepted in principle, and it is agreed that the members should be designated on the following day.)


10. The Council has before them a report by the Commission on Baltic affairs on the question submitted to it by the Council on the 23rd June, as to the effect which the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany would have on the food supplies in this region, in the event of the removal of the rolling stock by the Germans.

President Wilson, after reading the report aloud, suggests that the second proposal of the Commission should be adopted, but he considers that the first proposal to take advantage of Article 375 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany is not feasible. He suggests that Marshal Foch should be asked to take the necessary action through the Armistice Commission.

(It is agreed that a copy of the Memorandum by the Baltic Commission should be sent to Marshal Foch, who should be asked to demand from the Germans that when evacuating the Baltic provinces they should leave behind the German railway material now in these provinces as part of the railway material which Germany was bound to deliver to the Allies in accordance with the terms of Clause VII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, and which has not yet been delivered. The railway material so left would legally be the property of the Allied and Associated Powers and not of the Baltic States.

It is further agreed that it is to the interest of the Allied Powers to secure the restoration as soon as possible in the Baltic provinces of the Russian gauge on the railways in view of the closer economic connections of these provinces with Russia than with Germany.)


11. The Council has before them a report from the Commission on Baltic Affairs, covering the recommendation made by the United States, British and French representatives at Libau.

President Wilson, after reading the Report and enclosure aloud, remarks that the program unhappily is not one that is practicable.

Mr Lloyd George comments on the fact that peoples fighting for their liberties want to have even their soldiers paid by the Allies.

President Wilson says that probably they have no resources for paying them themselves.

Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram from the British Commission at Helsingfors in regard to the complicated position that has arisen involving fighting between Estonians and Latvians.

(In the course of a short discussion it is pointed out:

1) That a military mission of the Allied & Associated Powers under General Gough, has already been sent to the Baltic Provinces.

2) That Marshal Foch has already ordered the Germans to evacuate the Baltic provinces under the terms of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

3) That the Council has sanctioned supplies being given to the Baltic provinces, and that General Gough has been asked to advise as to what these supplies should consist of, as a preliminary to arrangements being made as to who is to give the supplies.

It is agreed that no further financial assistance to the Baltic provinces can be at present given.)


12. Following on the remarks he had made at the morning meeting, Mr Lloyd George proposes the text of a note to the German Delegation in regard to their intrigues on the Eastern frontier.

After the note has been read and a few suggestions made, it is approved and signed by M Clemenceau on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers in the attached form.

(It is agreed that the letter and the enclosure should be published.)


13. Mr Lloyd George says that the present military position in Russia is that Kolchak’s thrust, intended eventually to reach Moscow, had failed. The intention had been as a first step to unite at Kotlas with the forces based at Archangel. The Bolshevists there had driven Kolchak’s army back. Meanwhile, in the south Denikin had inflicted a severe defeat on Kolchak. The Don Cossacks had risen, and had taken 50,000 prisoners and 300 guns from the Bolshevists, and were now just outside Tsaritzen. Hence the latest information is that Kolchak is doing badly but that Denikin had routed his adversaries. Russia.


14. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a note from Mr Churchill submitting a proposal for cooperation of the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia with the right wing of Admiral Kolchak’s army, and requesting that the matter might be dealt with as one of extreme urgency.

(It is agreed that the question should be referred to the military representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, a Japanese and a Czechoslovak military representative being added for the purpose.)


15. M Clemenceau says that he has received a letter from the Chinese Delegation stating that they will sign the Treaty of Peace with Germany, with a reservation relating to Shantung. He replied that they must either sign the with the intention of abiding by it or not sign. They are just as much bound to honor their signature as the Germans were.

President Wilson says that Mr Lansing had spoken to him of this, and had said that any sovereign Power could make reservations in signing.

M Clemenceau reminds President Wilson that when the Romanian and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations had spoken of signing with reservations, they had been asked to say what they intended by this. A Treaty which was signed with reservations was not a Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Italians had said they made certain reservations, but they would sign the German Treaty without any reservation.

Baron Makino says that the Japanese Delegation had objected to many of the decisions of Commissions, but had bowed to the decision of the majority. The Treaty would have no effect if anyone could make reservations.

President Wilson suggests that someone should be asked to inquire from the Chinese Delegation what was reserved and what was intended by their reservation. If it is merely a protest, they are entitled to make this. He understands the Chinese Delegation are acting under specific instructions from their Government.

M Clemenceau instructs Captain Portier to ask M Pichon to see a representative of the Chinese Delegation and to inquire the subjects on which they were making reservations, and whether their reservation amounted to more than a protest.

(Captain Portier telephones this decision immediately to the Quai d’Orsay.)


16. Mr Lloyd George asks that the question of Turkey might be considered. President Wilson will shortly be leaving. It is unreasonable to maintain a state of war with Turkey for the next two months. Would it not be possible, he asks, to agree on some Peace Terms which would put Turkey out of her misery, outlining the frontiers of Turkey, but leaving the final dispositions of the territory that had not to remain Turkish until it was known whether the United States would accept a mandate.

President Wilson agrees that the final dispositions of Turkey ought not to be left for two months. His colleagues know his mind on the subject, and can discuss the future arrangements of Turkey. He suggests that the portions which Turkey is to lose might be cut off and the Treaty might provide that she should accept the dispositions of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to them, just as had been done in the case of Austria.

M Clemenceau points out that this involves the question of Constantinople.

President Wilson says that the amputations will involve Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia. The Allied troops will remain there to keep order until the final settlement between the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Lloyd George asks what will be done about Armenia. There are no Allied troops there. Turkey at present has some responsibility for the maintenance of order. If Armenia is cut off from Turkey, the Turkish troops will be withdrawn, and the Armenians will be left at the mercy of the Kurds. It will involve putting in some garrisons.

M Clemenceau asks what will be done about the Italians in Asia-Minor.

President Wilson says that this will not concern the Turks. He thinks some formula might be worked out.

Mr Lloyd George says that the district in question either belongs to the Turks or it does not. If it does, the Turk will say “What are the Italians doing here?”, and the Allies can only reply that the Italian occupation has been made without their knowledge or consent.

Baron Sonnino demurs to this statement.

President Wilson says that his proposal in regard to Turkey would be to cut off all that Turkey was to give up, and to oblige Turkey to accept any conditions with regard to oversight or direction which the Allied and Associated Governments might agree to. His present view is that a mandate over Turkey would be a mistake, but he thinks some Power ought to have a firm hand. Constantinople and the Straits should be left as a neutral strip for the present, and it is already in Allied occupation. He would make the Sultan and his Government move out of Constantinople and he would say what was ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. He is only arguing now as to what could be legally settled as a basis for a Treaty, and he is not attempting to decide an ultimate settlement. He only proposes an arrangement similar to what is being made in the case of Austria.

Mr Lloyd George points out that this involves the question of whether the Turk is to go out of Constantinople.

President Wilson says that so far as his judgment is concerned, that is decided. He has studied the question of the Turks in Europe for a long time, and every year confirmed his opinion that they ought to be cleared out.


17. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a telegram from Feisal in regard to the United States Mission complaining of a breach of faith that the Commission is not an Allied Commission. Feisal had interpreted a telegram that General Allenby had sent him, as suggesting that Great Britain would take a mandate for Syria if no other Power would do so. At his request Mr Balfour had drafted a telegram to General Allenby stating in the most specific terms that in no circumstances would Great Britain take this mandate, and calling his attention to Mr Lloyd George’s statement on this subject made at an earlier Meeting in General Allenby’s presence.


18. President Wilson says that the hour is approaching when some demand will have to be made to Holland in regard to the surrender of the Kaiser. He is anxious that the demand should be made in such a form as would relieve Holland of any appearance of breach of hospitality.

Mr Lloyd George points out that a new principle is involved in this Treaty. A great crime had been perpetrated against the nations of the world. It had taken five years to bring this question to fruition, and the Allies cannot afford to allow Holland to stand in the way.

President Wilson agrees that Holland is morally obliged to surrender the Kaiser, but he wishes to make it as easy for her as possible.

M Clemenceau said he would be surprised if Holland objected.

(It is agreed that Mr Lansing, who had acted as Chairman on the Commission on Responsibilities, should be asked to draft for the consideration of the Council, a despatch to the Dutch Government. President Wilson undertakes to inform Mr. Lansing.)


19. The Council takes formal note of the Note prepared for them by the Drafting Committee.


20. The Council approves the Note to the Polish Government submitted by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

(The following Note is signed by the five Heads of Governments:

“June 25, 1919.

Polish Government, Warsaw.

With a view to protecting the persons and the property of the peaceful population of Eastern Galicia against the dangers to which they are exposed by the Bolshevist bands, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to authorize the forces of the Polish Republic to pursue their operations as far as the river Zbruck.

This authorization does not, in any way, affect the decisions to be taken later by the Supreme Council for the settlement of the political status of Galicia.”

The Note is signed by the representatives of the Five Powers, and is communicated by Captain Portier to a messenger who had brought it from the Council of Foreign Ministers.)


21. The Council agreed that the final text of the Note to the Turkish Government, together with the document read by the Turkish Delegation to the Council of Ten,6 should be published after it had been sent to the Turks.


22. The Council has before them the Note from the Turkish Delegation dated June 23rd, which is read aloud by President Wilson.

(It is generally agreed that the document was not a very serious one.)

Mr Lloyd George asks that before a reply is sent, a full discussion on the Turkish question should take place. It would be a great advantage if a short, sharp Peace with Turkey could be decided on while the Turkish Delegation are still in Paris.

M Clemenceau said he is not very hopeful of reaching a result.

(The proposal is agreed to.)


23. (It is agreed that, if possible, the questions of Reparation and Finance in the Austrian Treaty, which are at present the result of negotiation with the New States formerly forming part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, should be considered on the morrow.)


24. The Council has before them a draft letter to the German Delegation prepared by Mr Balfour and M Loucheur, with the assistance of M Fromageot and Mr Hurst, concerning the sinking of the German ships.

(The letter is approved with the substitution in the seventh paragraph of the word “justification” for the word “explanation”.

(It is agreed that the letter should be sent to the Germans immediately, and published in the newspapers on Thursday, June 26th.)


25. Mr Lloyd George insists on the importance of settling the form of the Mandates.

President Wilson agrees, but says he wishes to read the question up.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, June 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. Mr Lloyd George announces his intention of making a protest against some of the statements made in public speeches by Signor Tittoni, the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. His protest will be made in particular against the reference to the agreement of St Jean De Maurienne and to statements about African Colonies.

Baron Sonnino, in reply to a question by Mr Lloyd George, says that the proper medium for communicating such a protest would be through the British Ambassador in Rome.


2. M Dutasta says that he had during the morning seen Herr von Haniel who informed him that the Germans have already nominated two of their plenipotentiaries, namely Herr Müller, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and Herr Giesberts, the new Postmaster-General. The third member will probably be Herr Leinert, the Chairman of the Prussian National Assembly. The German plenipotentiaries are due to arrive on Saturday morning early by the ordinary train, to which special carriages will be attached. Herr von Haniel had spoken to him as to the verification of the credentials and he had replied by proposing that it should take place at 10 a.m. on Saturday, June 28th. Von Haniel had agreed, and had undertaken to wire to the Germans accordingly. Later, von Haniel had spoken of the need of verifying the text of the copy of the Treaty of Peace to which the signatures were to be appended, in order to ensure that it was identical with the 200 copies that had been sent to the German Delegation. He had replied that this would be a long operation. Von Haniel had agreed, and had said that the German Government would be willing to give up this formality if the Allied and Associated Powers would guarantee that the text to be signed was the same in every particular as the 200 copies.

Mr Lloyd George recalls that a global list of amendments had been sent and that it is important the Germans should realize that these are included.

(It is agreed that the President of the Conference should give the German Delegation the assurance they desired.)

M Clemenceau instructed M Dutasta to prepare the necessary letter.

(It is further agreed that the signature of the Treaty of Peace should take place at 15:00 on Saturday, June 28th, and that the verification of credentials should take place at 10:00 on the same date.)


3. M Dutasta says that von Haniel had wishes to know whether M Clemenceau proposes to make a speech. He had said that he could give no official reply, but unofficially he was sure Affixing of Seals that M Clemenceau had no such intention, and that the ceremony would be confined to the formality of signature. Herr von Haniel had then asked about affixing seals.

(It is agreed:

1) That the seals of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers should be affixed to the Treaty of Peace at the Office of the Secretary-General, Quai d’Orsay, on Friday, June 27th, at 14:00.

2) That the Secretary-General should arrange with the Secretaries of the various Delegations to bring the seals at that hour.

3) That the seals of the German Delegates should be affixed to the Treaty on Saturday morning at the meeting held to verify credentials.)


4. M Clemenceau states that the French Government proposes to hold a review of troops on July 14th, when the representatives of the Army would march under the Arc de Triomphe, down the Champs Elysées and thence to the Place de l’Opera. He hopes that General Pershing and General Sir William Robertson will be able to march with the French Generals at the Head of the procession and that the American, British and Italian contingents will be furnished. He also asks that any Japanese Military representatives in Paris might take part. He makes a special appeal that Naval contingents might in addition be available.

President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George, Baron Sonnino and Baron Makino agree to give the necessary instructions to the United States, British, Italian and Japanese Military and Naval Authorities.


5. M Clemenceau hands to M Mantoux, in French the following document, which M. Mantoux reads in English.

“The German Government possesses information according to which the populations of the territories in the East, which, according to the conditions of the Treaty, are to be separated from Germany, have doubts and erroneous views as to the date of the cession of these territories; the same applies to the local authorities and Military Chiefs. In order to prevent misunderstandings and disagreeable incidents, it seems desirable in the interests of the two Parties, to notify the interested circles without delay, of the fact that the Treaty of Peace will not come into force from the signature, but only at the moment provided in the definite stipulations of the Treaty, and that until then the present situation is maintained. For the territories in question which are on our side of the line of demarcation, the necessary action has already been taken on Germany’s part.

The Allied and Associated Governments are asked, so far as concerns the territories situated on their side of the line of demarcation, to take as soon as possible the proper steps.”

Mr Lloyd George says that this is the letter of a man who does not wish to see trouble.

President Wilson thinks it a perfectly reasonable request. He supposes that by “line of demarcation” is meant “the Armistice line”.

M Clemenceau says he did not understand exactly what the Germans want done.

President Wilson says it is for us to let the people on the other side of the Armistice line know what has been arranged.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the document should be referred in the first instance to the Legal Advisers for their views.

(This is agreed to.)


6. President Wilson reads a letter he has received from Mr Lansing covering a draft of a communication to the Government of the Netherlands.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks that this was a very able document. He questions however whether it would be advisable to postpone sending this document until the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. He says he received information that morning (as he had notified his Colleagues on arrival) that the Crown Prince had fled from Holland, and had been identified driving to the East in a motor car in company with a German Staff Officer. He presumes that the Crown Prince’s flight is for mischief. The fact that he had gone with a Staff Officer gives the impression that there is some conspiracy. He had seen in the newspapers that an attempt was being made by the Military party in Germany to upset the Treaty of Peace. This makes him wonder whether it is safe to leave the Kaiser in Holland. He has often thought that action ought to have been taken before in this matter.

President Wilson questions whether action can be taken before ratification.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that action could be taken on the ground of public safety. If the Kaiser reached Germany a dangerous situation might arise, and war might be facilitated.

President Wilson says he does not dispute this. He is only seeking for the legal basis for action.

M Clemenceau says that the demand could be based on the escape of the Crown Prince and the danger of renewing the war if the Kaiser escaped.

President Wilson suggests that it would be sufficient to approach Holland at once with urgent representations, begging them that the Kaiser should not be allowed to leave the country. At present the Crown Prince and the Kaiser both had the right to leave the country if they wished, but in view of the signature of the Treaty of Peace he thought that Holland would have the right to refuse their departure.

Mr Lloyd George says that he would put the matter on the ground of the inflammable state of Germany.

M Clemenceau suggests that Mr Balfour should be asked to draft a dispatch to the Dutch Government.

(It is agreed:

1) That Mr Balfour should be asked to draft a dispatch to the Dutch Government, asking them to take precautions to prevent the departure of the Kaiser.

2) That Mr Lansing’s dispatch to the Government of the Netherlands requiring the Dutch Government to hand over the Kaiser should be approved for use when the occasion arises.)

Baron Makino reserves his assent to this despatch until he has had an opportunity to study it more closely.


7. M Clemenceau again asks that time might be given to him before he gives his final assent to the trial of the Kaiser in England.


8. The Council has before them a proposal which has been forwarded to President Wilson by Mr. McCormick recommending that after the Bela Kun Government of Hungary has withdrawn its military forces within the line fixed by the Allied and Associated Powers, and after the Bela Kun Government of Hungary has suspended military operations against the surrounding States as specified by the Allied and Associated Powers, the Blockade of Hungary be raised in the same manner as has been done for German Austria, to permit shipments of food, raw materials, animal products, manufactured articles and all ordinary commodities, excluding, however, all implements of war, gold, securities or other values which would reduce the power of Hungary to complete such reparations as may be imposed upon her.

(It is agreed that the Superior Blockade Council should be authorized to carry out this recommendation as soon as they are notified by the Allied and Associated Powers that Hungary has actually complied with the requirements of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.)


9. M Clemenceau communicates the letter which he had received from Bela Kun stating that the Romanian Army had not conformed to the formal request of the Peace Conference to put an end to all bloodshed.

It is agreed that the telegram should be sent to General Bliss, who should be asked if Bela Kun’s statement in regard to the attitude of the Romanians is correct.


10. M Mantoux reads a dispatch from the Military Representative in Paris of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State addressed to Marshal Foch, indicating that Italian units had attacked Yugoslav units and occupied certain districts in the region of Tarvis.

Baron Sonnino says he knew nothing about any action in the region of Tarvis. All he knows is that at an earlier date some Italian troops on the invitation of the four Military representatives of the Allies had advanced in the region of Villach. If he is given a copy he will undertake to make inquiry.

M Clemenceau instructs Captain Portier to send him a copy.


11. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a letter from Dr Benes.

(It is agrees that this letter should be circulated both to the Military Representatives of the Supreme war Council at Versailles and to the Members of the Council.)


12. Mr Lloyd George points out that a question of shipping the Czechoslovak forces from Vladivostok was raised by the above letter. He asks that President Wilson and Baron Makino respectively would inquire as to whether any United States shipping or Japanese shipping is available for this purpose.

President Wilson said that most of the United States shipping had been taken away from the Pacific Coast and he doubts whether much could be done. He agreed however to make inquiries.

Baron Makino said that a similar inquiry had been made by the Romanian Government who wished to repatriate Hungarian prisoners in Siberia and natives of the districts which were being transferred to Romania. He will undertake to make inquiries.


13. it is agreed that the Committee proposed on the previous day should be set up to inquire how far steps have already been taken by the Allied and Associated Powers to carry out the various provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and to make recommendations as to such further measures as should be adopted for this purpose.

M Clemenceau nominates M Tardieu to represent the French Government; President Wilson says that Mr Lansing should be asked to nominate a representative of the United States of America; Baron Sonnino undertakes to nominate an Italian Representative; Baron Makino undertakes to nominate a Japanese Representative and Mr Lloyd George undertakes to nominate a British Representative.


14. (It is agreed that the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, with whom should be associated Belgian and Japanese Military Representatives as well as Naval and Air Rep-representatives of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, should work out for the consideration of the Council all details of the Inter-Allied Military, Naval and Aerial Supervisory Commissions of Control to be set up to ensure execution by Germany of the Military, Naval and Aerial clauses in the Treaty of Peace.)


15. (It is agreed that a proposal by the Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers that the Commission to supervise the destruction of the fortifications, etc. of Heligoland, should be a Sub-Commission of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control, should also be referred to the Military Representative[s] as above.)


16. Sir Maurice Hankey draws attention to the Report that had been furnished by the Prisoners of War Commission as to the measures to be adopted for the fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty of Peace in regard to Prisoners of War.

M Clemenceau asks that the subject should be reserved for the present.

M Mantoux, at M Clemenceau’s request, reads a telegram from General Dupont on the subject of Polish prisoners in Germany.

President Wilson points out that no steps can be taken for the repatriation of Polish prisoners until after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace.


17. President Wilson says that the only forms of mandate that he has seen were some that had been prepared by Lord Robert Cecil.

Mr Lloyd George says that he would circulate Lord Milner’s proposals on the subject.


18. Sir Maurice Hankey says that he and Captain Portier had made inquiries and had ascertained that the Reparation Commission had failed to secure an agreement with the states acquiring territory formerly part of the Austrian Empire in regard to the reparation and financial clauses.

A further Meeting is to be held at 11:00 that morning.


19. (It is agreed that the letter to Mr Paderewski that had accompanied the Polish Treaty should not be published until the signature of the Treaty.)


20. Sir Maurice Hankey hands round a document relating to the size of the Army of Occupation on the Rhine for consideration at an early date.

Note: It has since been ascertained that the document handed round is incomplete. The complete document will be circulated.


21. M Clemenceau says that he thinks the Council ought to hear the views of Marshal Foch as to what action should be taken if trouble should arise on the Eastern Frontier of Germany in connection with the Treaty of Peace. The Allied and Associated Powers have the duty to help the Poles to defend themselves if attacked, but it is a very difficult thing to do as if the Germans oppose, it will not even be possible to send any supplies through Danzig.

(After a short discussion it is agreed that the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should be asked to consider the following questions:

1) In the event of trouble in the area ceded by the Treaty of Peace with Germany to Poland, what would they advise as to how the Allied and Associated Powers could best assist the Poles to establish their authority.

2) The composition and size of the Army of Occupation of the Plebiscite area in Upper Silesia, and the method of occupation of this area.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, June 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George's Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. M Clemenceau says that Mr Wellington Koo had informed him that the Chinese Delegation would make a protest in order to satisfy public opinion in China. This would be done only in the hope that later on the clauses in the Treaty relating to Shantung would be revised. He wished to ask his Colleagues whether they thought the protest should be made before or after the signature of the Treaty. For his part, he would prefer that it should be after.

Mr Lloyd George agrees.

M Clemenceau points out that otherwise Romania might be encouraged to follow suit.

Mr Lloyd George says that it might even set a bad example to the Germans.

(It is agreed that M Clemenceau should ask M Pichon to request the Chinese Government to make their formal protest at the very last possible moment.)


2. The telegram drafted by Mr. Balfour regarding the sanctuary for the Kaiser and the escape of the Crown Prince is agreed to.

(M Clemenceau undertakes to dispatch it to the Dutch Government on behalf of the Conference.


3. M Clemenceau says that he has allocated 15 places in the Hall at Versailles for French soldiers who had specially distinguished themselves in the war, to witness the signature of the Treaty of Peace, and he will be glad to offer the same facilities to the British and American Governments.

Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson thank M Clemenceau for his offer, which they accept.

Mr Lloyd George asks what reply is to be given to the Turks.

President Wilson observes that Mr Balfour had already made a reply.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is not his meaning. He wishes to know whether the Turks are to be allowed to go or whether they are to be asked to meet the Representatives of the Powers, or should they be sent a letter suggesting that they should go home and return later on when summoned.

President Wilson expresses the opinion that it would be better to let them go. They have exhibited complete absence of common sense and a total misunderstanding of the West. They had imagined that the Conference knew no history and was ready to swallow enormous falsehoods.

Mr Lloyd George observes that this is Turkish Diplomacy.

President Wilson remarks that no promise had been made to reply to what they might say.

M Clemenceau agrees that they had only asked for a hearing.

President Wilson says that the Conference had given them sufficient attention. They had been treated favorably. They had been asked to come to the Conference and all they had wished to say had been listened to. They had been better treated in this respect than the Austrians.

Mr Lloyd George says that the question he had alluded to on the previous day was whether it was expedient to try and make Peace with Turkey without coming to a decision on the question of Mandates.

President Wilson says that he has reflected on this subject. It might be possible to tell the Turks that they must abandon their possessions in Europe and in certain specified territories in Asia, or else they might be told “Your territory will be bounded as follows - Turkey must renounce all rights over territories outside this boundary and accept in advance the disposal of these areas to be made by the Allied and Associated Powers.” Furthermore, “Turkey must accept in certain Departments of State - Finance, Police, supervision of the Coasts, the assistance of a Power, hereafter to be designated.” This appeared to him to be practicable and settlement of all other questions could be adjourned.

Mr Lloyd George says that this proposal is practicable if it be decided at once to take Constantinople from the Turks.

President Wilson observes that Constantinople is not a Turkish City; other races there were in the majority.

Mr Lloyd George says this amounts to a final expulsion of the Turks from Europe.

M Clemenceau says that he has an objection to make. If this solution is proposed to the Turks, they will refuse and will remain where they are. There is nothing ready to enforce immediate execution. What can the Allied and Associated Powers do? The whole of this question can only be settled at one time. For his part he agrees that Constantinople should not remain Turkish. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks had been, when it occurred, a very great event which had shaken up all Europe. Since then Europe has made every effort to maintain the Turks there.

President Wilson says doubtless because no successor could be found for them.

Mr Lloyd George says it is chiefly by reason of the fear of Russia.

M Clemenceau asks what immediate solution is in view. Constantinople had been offered to President Wilson, but he did not seem anxious to accept it.

President Wilson says he would take the proposal to the Powers but for the situation brought about by Italian action. The Italians had continued to land troops in Asia Minor. S Tittoni no doubt would cause these troops to advance still further. Conflicts are to be feared. What Italy aims at is to obtain a position such that she could not be evicted without hostilities. Should she continue this Policy, she would place herself outside the law. A great Nation which behaves in this manner loses all its rights. The problem of Asia Minor would be easily settled if Italy were not concerned.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it would be safer to say that Asia Minor would be “easier to settle”.

M Clemenceau agrees and points out that there would still be ticklish problems. He reminds the meeting that the Indian Mohammedans had protested against any division of Turkish Asia.

Mr Lloyd George says that they meant Anatolia.

M Clemenceau points out that the Greeks are in Smyrna and are extending up to Aidin. This was part of Anatolia. There is a considerable Turkish population in Smyrna itself. He is making no protest, merely drawing attention to facts. As to the Italians, they have seized ports and had stayed there in spite of clear warnings, they have advanced inland and are continuing to penetrate. He does not think that they will withdraw if asked to by the Council. S Tittoni now says “Smyrna was promised to us.” This means “Italy is a great nation which might perhaps make concessions. It will not leave Smyrna to others except for compensations”. He asks what is to be done.

President Wilson expresses the opinion that the Italian Government will not last. It will come to Paris and make claims which will not be accepted. These claims will be categorically refused and the Italian Government will be forced to withdraw.

M Clemenceau says that he is inclined to refuse discussion of Asiatic questions with the Italians for the present. He will say to them “We are now making Peace with Austria and we cannot allow negotiations to be suspended. The first question we must settle is that of the Adriatic.”

President Wilson says that he agrees.

M Clemenceau says that any haste in dealing with the Turkish question would be dangerous. For instance, there is the French view. France has a disagreement with Great Britain. He does not wish to raise this question until Peace with Germany had been signed. Fortunately, public opinion is not for the time being exerting any pressure. This is a piece of good luck. If, unfortunately, this question gets entangled with European questions, he is much afraid of what might be said and done by certain persons devoid of self control. If the Conference can reach satisfactory solutions of more important problems, public opinion will be greatly appeased and subsequent discussions will be rendered easier.

President Wilson says that for the time being all he proposes is to fix the frontiers of Turkey.

M Clemenceau said that is all that can be done and that as no immediate means of execution exists, the result would be deplorable.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Italian danger in Asia Minor is a matter of deep concern to him. The Italians are advancing straight before them and seizing in the interior everything that suits them. Great Britain has no ambition in this region, but he fears what the effect might be in Muslim Countries. This concerns Great Britain in Egypt and in India and France in North Africa. S Tittoni said that what Italy desires in Asia is mining concessions, but the Italians were now seizing everything that might be of use to them.

President Wilson observes that what they want is things it would be impossible for them to obtain under a mandate.

Mr Lloyd George observes that Italy alone among the Powers had not demobilized. She is afraid to do so out of fear of internal disorder. She has her troops and she is sending them to Asia Minor, to the Caucasus, and wherever she wishes.

President Wilson says that he has reason to anticipate a period of famine in the Caucasus, when British troops are withdrawn, by reason of a momentary influx of population. This is a problem to which his attention has been drawn and which must be borne in mind. As to the Italians, he thinks they should be asked clearly to state whether they remain in the Entente or not. If they do, they must take part with their Allies in the negotiations with Turkey and do nothing independently.

Mr Lloyd George points out that even according to the agreement of Saint Jean de Maurienne, the Italians have no right to the forcible occupation of all the places they have seized.

President Wilson says that he cannot go back and tell the United States Senate “Here is a Treaty re-establishing Peace”, if Italy is left a free hand. It would be on the contrary a Treaty preparing war and cannot be guaranteed by the Powers.

M Clemenceau says that as far as he is concerned, he will put the question to the Italians as clearly as possible. Fiume is at the present time administered in the name of the King of Italy. The local Government has lately asked the French General to expel the Serbians. The General had refused. The Italians had then expelled them themselves. The town is surrounded by barbed wire. This is a state of war. Is this the intention of the Treaty of London? The Italians are breaking their word there and everywhere else.

President Wilson says that they justified their presence in Fiume on the pretext that the Armistice granted them the right of advancing to reestablish order.

M Clemenceau says that they have gone so far in the last few days as to ask France for a small bit of French territory in the County of Nice to improve their frontier which according to them was ill-drawn.

Mr Lloyd George observes that this is madness.

[Jimbuna]

27th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Turkey's case and Allied Reply published.

Bolsheviks abandon Kharkov.

The Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles being prepared for the signing of the Peace Treaty tomorrow.


Ship Losses:

Thomas (United Kingdom) The schooner caught fire in the Atlantic Ocean 80 nautical miles (150 km) north east of Barbados and was abandoned. Her crew were rescued by Lillian ( United Kingdom).

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, June 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


Under consideration is the Report of those members of the Reparation Commission, who had been deputed to negotiate with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Romania with regard to the payment of contributions towards the cost of the war.

I. Colonel Peel explains that they had initiated negotiations on the basis of the instructions given at the last meeting of the Council on this subject. Taking the value of the Kroner at 25 per cent of its value had finally suggested a total sum in respect of the four states amounting to 2 milliards Francs Swiss gold. Generally speaking these states are reluctant to undertake this liability though Czechoslovakia had undertaken to do so if the other three would consent. Serbia and Romania had not absolutely declined but he doubts whether they are seriously willing to pay. He does not know what decision had been taken by the Polish representatives as they had not been present at the last discussion on the subject. He points out therefore that this liability must either be imposed on these States, or the sum might be discussed and proposals for its revision considered or the matter dropped altogether.

President Wilson asks what method is proposed to adopt to impose this obligation on the States in question.

Mr Dulles suggests that they should be told that in the event of a refusal they will again come under the terms of the Austrian Treaty and be liable to pay reparation.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that this is the best method of dealing with them, and reminds the Council that, as he had pointed out before, with regard to Serbia and Romania, a kind of book-keeping transaction could be conducted i. e. the amount of their contributions could be deducted from their claims to reparation.

M Loucheur said that in his opinion to impose on these small Powers the sum of 1, 1½ or 2 milliards is to incur a great deal of odium for very little profit. His attitude might be different if substantial sums were in question. He reminds the Council of the burden of war expenses which would have to be borne by Serbia and Romania. If, however, it is decided to impose this obligation on these States, he agrees that Mr Dulles’ suggestion is the right one. He adds that he had understands from a Romanian Delegate on the previous day that these States are prepared to offer 1½ milliards.

M Clemenceau said that he adheres to M Loucheur’s opinion.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether in effect M Loucheur intends that Serbia and Romania should present in full their reparation claims against Germany, while acquiring between them something like half the former Austrian Empire.

M Clemenceau explains that he has not looked at the matter in this light. Serbia and Romania would certainly have to diminish their claims against the reparation fund.

M Loucheur thinks that Mr Lloyd George’s position is right but in view of what had been embodied in the German Treaty with regard to the principle of “solidarity” he does not think that his attitude could now be maintained.

Mr Lloyd George says that he is not calling in question the principle of solidarity. His point is that the Reparation Commission must strike a balance in the case of Serbia and Romania and deduct the amount of their contributions from their reparation claims.

M Loucheur says that the negotiations which, as had been reported, had proved unacceptable to these smaller States, had been conducted on this basis. In any case the balance would be enormously in favour of Serbia and Romania and he adheres to his opinion that the amount in question is not worth the trouble involved. The reparation claimed by these States would very likely amount to 20 milliards and contributions as suggested to 2 milliards only.

Mr Lloyd George says that if this position is taken up with regard to Serbia and Romania, the Czechoslovaks would, he supposed, agree to make a payment. He adds that it is well known that in Czechoslovakia there are a very large number of rich Germans. He cannot consent to a proposal which would relieve them of the burdens to be borne by men in similar positions in the Allied countries.

M Loucheur suggests therefore that the total amount of contributions to be demanded should be 2 milliards of francs.

Mr Lloyd George says that he will not express an opinion as to a figure and thinks that it should be left to the Reparation Commission, when this comes into being, to assess it.

Mr Davis says that they have attempted, without success, to persuade these States to agree to this proceeding.

Colonel Peel suggests that the experts there present and previously delegated for these negotiations should have authority to settle a figure at once.

(It is agreed:

That Poland, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Romania should be called upon to accept liability for the payment of contributions in respect of the expenses of the liberation of formerly Austrian territory to be acquired by them.

That the amount of the contributions should be fixed by the experts of the Reparation Commission who will already be deputed to negotiate with them.

That if these States refuse this settlement they should be liable for the payment of reparation under the Clauses of the Treaty with Austria.)


II. The Council approves the following provision for insertion in the Financial Clauses of the Polish Treaty:

Poland shall undertake responsibility for a part of the Russian Public Debt and of all other financial obligations of the Russian State as these shall be determined by a special Convention between the principal Allied and Associated Powers of the one part and Poland of the other. This Convention shall be drawn up by a Commission appointed by the said Powers. In case the Commission should not arrive at an agreement, the questions in dispute shall immediately be submitted to the League of Nations.

(A copy of the above provision, initialed by Council of Five is handed to M Cheysson for immediate communication to the Drafting Committee.)

Baron Makino says that he initialed the document on the assumption that provision would be made for the representation of Japan when the matter in question was under consideration.


III. The following addition to paragraph 3 of Section 3 of Annex II of the Reparation Clauses was initialed for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, to follow immediately after this clause, “the composition of this section . . . . . . claims”.

When voting takes place the representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy shall each have two votes.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, June 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 12:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


(As the 11:00 Meeting is breaking up the following decisions are made.)


1. The Council approves the attached additional Clause for inclusion in the Treaty with Poland.

"Poland agrees to assume responsibility for such proportion of the Russian public debt and other Russian public liabilities of any kind as may be assigned to her under a special convention between the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand and Poland on the other, to be prepared by a commission appointed by the above States. In the event of the Commission not arriving at an agreement the point at issue shall be referred for immediate arbitration to the League of Nations."

(The Clause is initialed by the representatives of Treaty with the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and is taken by M Cheysson for immediate communication to the Drafting Committee, since the Treaty with Poland is to be signed on Saturday, June 28th.)


2. The Council takes note that since the last meeting the attached resolution in regard to their decision on the subject of the raising of the Blockade of Germany had been approved and initialed by the representatives of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and, after being initialed, had been forwarded by Sir Maurice Hankey to the Secretary-General for the information of the Superior Blockade Council.

(It is agreed that the above decision in regard to the raising of the Blockade should be communicated to the German Delegates in writing by M Clemenceau on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Peace.)

M Clemenceau reads the draft of the letter he proposes to send to the German Delegation.


3. The Council takes note of the immediate telegram to the Dutch Government, which has been drafted by Mr Balfour, and which had been approved for dispatch on behalf of the Council on the previous day by M Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George, but had immediately been communicated to Baron Sonnino and Baron Makino.

Baron Makino asks that, in the sentence “He is also the potentate” the word “was” might be substituted for “is”.

(This is approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to use the utmost expedition to endeavor to secure the change before the telegram is dispatched.

It is further agreed that this telegram should be published in the morning papers of Sunday, June 29th.)


4. Baron Makino says he will agree to Mr. Lansing’s draft telegram to the Dutch Government.

(This telegram is accordingly taken note of for use when the time comes to give effect to Article 227 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.)


5. (It is agreed that, as soon as the Reparation and Financial Clauses have been approved, the outstanding portions of the Treaty of Peace with Austria should be communicated to the Austrian Delegation by the Secretary-General.)

(It is agreed to hold a Meeting of the Council at Versailles on the conclusion of the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.)