100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, April 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:30

Meeting of the Council of Four


President Wilson explains that M Orlando had written to say that he was unable to be present.


1. Baron Makino reads the following statement:

"In January last I had the privilege to present and explain before the Supreme Council Japan’s claims which we deemed as just and fair in the light of the circumstances which led Japan to take part in the war and of the actual situations created or found in the regions to which the claims related. I wish to take advantage of the opportunity now offered me to explain more fully that part of our claims which relates to the leased territory of Kiao-chow and Germany’s rights in respect of Shantung province. As will be remembered the Japanese Government sent an ultimatum to Germany on the 15th of August 1914, inviting her to unconditionally hand over the territory to Japan which she intended to restore to China. Germany failed to give answer within the specified time limit and this obliged Japan to have recourse to military and naval forces. In all those steps we acted in consultation and co-operation with England.

The German stronghold at Kiaochow was captured on the 7th of November, 1914, and has, together with the Shantung Railway, remained to this day under Japanese occupation.

Looking to the eventual termination of the war, Japan approached China in January, 1915, with a view to reaching beforehand an agreement as to the basis of the restitution to China of the leased territory of Kiaochow and of disposing other German rights in relation to Shantung, so that Germany might find no pretext to refuse acquiescence in Japan’s demands at the final peace conference and that she might not find it possible to recover her influence in China, thereby becoming again a grave menace to the peace of the Far East.

As a result of the negotiations that ensued, a treaty respecting the Province of Shantung, accompanied by an exchange of notes, was signed on the 25th of May, 1915. In that treaty China engaged to recognize all matters that might be agreed upon between the Japanese Government and the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which Germany possessed vis-a-vis China in relation to the Province of Shantung.

By the exchange of notes, Japan declared to China her willingness, in case she acquired the rights of free disposal of the leased territory of Kiaochow, to restore it to China on the following conditions:

1) Opening of the whole of Kiaochow as commercial port;

2) Establishment of a Japanese settlement in the locality to be designated by the Japanese Government;

3) Establishment, if desired by the Powers, of an international settlement;

4) Arrangement to be made, before the return of the said territory is effected, between the Japanese and Chinese Governments, with respect to the disposal of German public establishments and properties and with regard to the other conditions and procedures.

These terms explain themselves, but a few words on some of the points may be found useful. The Japanese settlement, or concession, whose establishment is provided for under condition 2, refers to only a part of urban District to be set apart from the settling of Japanese as well as other nationalities, including Chinese, under a special system and jurisdiction that are found in many of the principal open ports or marts of China.

In reference to the words “the other conditions and procedures”, found in condition 4, I may state that they refer to those minor working conditions and procedures to be determined and observed in effecting the restitution of the Leased Territory to China.

Early in the year 1917, Japan began, in conjunction with her Allied Powers, to direct her efforts in inducing China to sever relations with, and if possible to declare war against Germany. China severed her diplomatic relations with Germany on the 14th of March, 1917, and finally on the 14th of August of the same year, she declared war against the latter; that was more than two years after the signing of the aforementioned treaty between Japan and China had taken place.

Later, on the 24th of September, 1918, more than one year after the declaration of war by China and more than three years after the conclusion of the agreement of the 25th of May, 1915, the Chinese Minister at Tokyo exchanged with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan a series of notes, the translations of which have already been presented to the Supreme Council. The notes provide, among other things, for the withdrawal of the Japanese Civil Administration, the management of the Tsingtao-Chinan Railway as a joint Sino-Japanese undertaking upon determination of its ownership, and the guarding and policing of the Railway. The Chinese Minister also solicited the aid of the Japanese Government in the matter of arranging for loans for building two railway lines connecting with the Tsingtao-Chinan Railway and practically coinciding with the lines projected by Germany. To this, the Japanese government consented. The preliminary contract covering these loans was made between the Chinese Government and the Japanese bankers, and the Chinese government actually received from the bankers an advance of twenty million yen according to the terms of this contract.

From the aforementioned facts which I have attempted to lay out as clearly as possible, it will be seen:

First, that Japan has undertaken to restore Kiaochow to China on conditions, none of which can be regarded in any sense as unjust or unfair, considering the part Japan took in dislodging Germany from Shantung.

Secondly, that the declaration of war by China against Germany could have no relation whatever to the validity of the treaty and the appended agreement which was concluded between Japan and China more than two years prior to the declaration of war, nor could it alter or affect in any wise the situation in connection with which the aforesaid treaty and agreement were made.

Thirdly, that the arrangements of September 1918, which were made more than one year after China’s declaration of war, could not have been entered into without presupposing the existence and validity of the treaty of May 1915. Some of the provisions of the former dealt with the subject-matters or furthered the aims, set forth in the latter. In fact, the arrangements of 1918 were intended to be, and are, a supplement and sequel to the treaty of 1915. It is to be noted that China has actually received the advance of twenty million yen according to the terms of the above arrangements.

To those summaries and deductions, I may add that as between Japan and China there is a well-defined course laid out, for effecting the restitution. Any other course, could be against the definite arrangement which has been agreed to between the two governments concerned. What Japan now seeks is to obtain from Germany the rights of free disposal of the leased territory and Germany’s rights, privileges and concessions in relation to Shantung for carrying out the provisions of the treaty of 1915 as well as of the arrangements of 1918.

It is claimed that the declaration of war abrogates ipso facto treaties of lease of territory. Such a claim can not be regarded as warranted by the established rules of International Law. From the very nature of the Lease Convention, which provides for the exercise by Germany of rights of Sovereignty within the territory the lease of Kiaochow may be regarded as a cession pure and simple with the exception of the time limit of 99 years. And it is commonly accepted principle that a declaration of war does not abrogate a treaty of cession or other territorial arrangements.

I feel firmly convinced that full justice will be done to the claims of Japan based upon her sacrifices and achievement and upon the fact of actual occupation, involving the sense of national honor.

I now beg to submit to you a draft containing the clauses to be embodied in the Preliminary Peace Treaty with Germany."

Baron Makino then hands around a draft of the clauses which the Japanese Delegation wished to have included in the Peace Treaty with Germany. He said it has been based on similar clauses inserted in other treaties.

President Wilson asks whether the following cables, mentioned in Article I were referred to in the original concession by China of Kiauchau to Germany, viz:

Tsingtao-Shanghai and Tsingtao-Chefoo.

Baron Makino replies they were German concession, though not in the original concession. He says they are Government cables.

President Wilson asked if they are submarine all the way to Shantung.

Baron Makino says they were the same line - a continuation of the same line.

President Wilson says that he has already taken the liberty of describing as well as he could to M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George what happened in his conversation with Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda. Their minds, therefore, are in the midst of the subject. He had laid what was in his own mind before all present. He does not know what was the impression formed by Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau.

Mr Lloyd George says that so far as Great Britain is concerned they are in the same position towards Japan as towards Italy. They have a definite engagement with Japan, as recorded in the Note of the British Ambassador at Tokyo, dated 16th February, 1917. Hence, so far as Great Britain is concerned, there is a definite engagement. The only doubt he feels is as to whether the ultimate destination of Kiauchau is a matter for inclusion in the Treaty with Germany.

In the case of the other German possessions in the Far East the Japanese Government has undertaken to support the British claims South of the Equator, and the British Government has undertaken to support the Japanese claims in the islands North of the Equator. So far as Great Britain is concerned, it is not proposed to press for the immediate allocation of the mandates for these islands, but only for their surrender by Germany to the Allied and Associated Powers. The allocation is left for settlement afterwards.

When the time comes, we should have to press the claims of Australia and New Zealand to the islands South of the Equator.

Baron Makino says that Japan has expressed her willingness to support the British claims.

Mr Lloyd George points out that if the Japanese claims for the surrender of Kiauchau by Germany are put in the Treaty, Australia might demand the same treatment as regards the islands South of the Equator, and South Africa might make the same claim as regards German South-West Africa. There is hardly time to settle all these details before the treaty with Germany.

Viscount Chinda said that he does not know if Mr Lloyd George had in mind that the leased territory of Kiauchau should be put on the same basis of the mandatory system as the South Pacific Islands. In that case the Japanese Delegation thinks that Kiauchau ought to be on a definite basis. The mandatory system rested on the basis that those islands are in a state of civilization which necessitates their being taken care of by other people. This does not apply to the case of Kiauchau.

Mr Lloyd George says that is true.

Viscount Chinda, continuing, asks if it is merely proposed to postpone this question: to put it in abeyance? The Japanese Delegation are under an express order for the case that the question was not settled. The Japanese Government has a duty to perform to China in this matter, and they cannot carry out their obligation to China unless Kiauchau is handed over to them. The Japanese Delegates are under an express instruction from their Government that unless they were placed in a position to carry out Japan’s obligation to China, they are not allowed to sign the Treaty. Consequently, they have no power to agree to a postponement of this question.

Baron Makino says that if the Treaty is ignored, it would be a very serious matter for Japan.

Viscount Chinda says it seems to them to be a very simple question in its nature. No long deliberations were involved. They cannot persuade themselves that the question is one that ought to be postponed.

President Wilson asks if it would be possible for the Japanese Government more particularly to define the arrangements she would expect to maintain with China in the Shantung Province. In the paper he had been given, the statements were sufficiently explicit as regards the town of Kiauchau and the bay of Kiauchau, but not so explicit in regard to the railway and the administration.

Viscount Chinda says that the notes explain that the administration of the railway would be a joint undertaking.

President Wilson says it is not very explicit. Some further definition is required of the term “joint administration”. The document is explicit about the establishment of a police force by China towards the cost of which the railway would make a contribution. He understood that at each station, by which he supposed was meant railway station, as well as at the training school, there would be Japanese. The document did not explain the position to be taken by these Japanese.

Viscount Chinda says he thinks they were only intended to be instructors. He pointed out that there were many foreign instructors in the Chinese administrations.

Mr Lloyd George says there are, in the Customs, for example.

President Wilson says this is part of a series of things which had been imposed on China.

Mr Lloyd George says they had asked for the Customs officials.

President Wilson says they had done so after a certain experience. He is fairly clear about the railway concession. He asks if there were not included in the lease to Germany certain concessions about exploitations.

Viscount Chinda suggests mines.

Baron Makino says the mines were amalgamated into the railway.

Viscount Chinda says there were three mines.

Baron Makino says that the mines had not paid, and had therefore been amalgamated in the railway, mainly for the use of the railway. The coal was not of very good quality. Germany had given up their concessions. One of the mines is not of much value.

President Wilson asks if there are any great iron deposits.

Mr Lloyd George suggests they had not been made much use of.

President Wilson agrees, not up to the present.

Mr. Lloyd George says he fears that if this arrangement is included in the Treaty, the question of mandatories would have to be settled. This might create difficulties and delays. Other interested parties might complain if this were not done when the Treaty handed over Kiauchau to Japan.

President Wilson says that Viscount Chinda’s answer to this had been that the islands were in such state of development as to require someone to look after them, whereas Kiauchau is the case of a concession in a self-governing country. He asked Viscount Chinda if the railway was a joint enterprise with China.

Viscount Chinda replies in the affirmative.

Baron Makino says that Japan has already worked joint undertakings very well with China. In the case of the Sino-Japanese Timber Company, for example, where Japan and China had the same number on the Directorate and where the dividends were paid in equal proportions. There were several similar concerns, the directorates always consisting of equal numbers of both nationals.

President Wilson asks if there are any restrictions on these railways. His interest was to keep open the door with China.

Baron Makino says there is nothing in the agreement with China against the open door.

President Wilson points out that, as has happened in many instances, he is the only one present whose judgment was entirely independent. His colleagues are both bound by Treaties, although perhaps he might be entitled to question whether Great Britain and Japan had been justified in handing round the islands in the Pacific. This, however, was a private opinion.

Mr Lloyd George points out that there were only the German islands.

President Wilson points out that in the circumstances he is the only independent party present. He would like to repeat the point of view which he had urged on the Japanese Delegation a few days before. He is so firmly convinced that the Peace of the Far East centers upon China and Japan that he is more interested from this point of view than any other. He does not wish to see complex engagements that fetter free determination. He is anxious that Japan should show to the world as well as to China that she wants to give the same independence to China as other nations possessed; that she does not want China to be held in manacles. What would prejudice the peace in the Far East was any relationship that was not trustful. It is already evident that there was not that relationship of mutual trust that is necessary if peace was to be ensured in the Far East. What he fears is that Japan, by standing merely on her treaty rights, would create the impression that she was thinking more of her rights than of her duties to China. The world would never have peace based on treaty rights only unless there were also recognized to be reciprocal duties between States. Perhaps he is going a little too fast in existing circumstances but he wishes to emphasize the importance in the future that States should think primarily of their duties towards each other. The central idea of the League of Nations is that States must support each other even when their interests are not involved. When the League of Nations is formed then there will be established a body of partners covenanted to stand up for each other’s rights. The position in which he would like to see Japan, already the most advanced nation in the Far East with the leadership in enterprise and policy, is that of the leader in the Far East standing out for these new ideas. There can be no finer nor more politic role for her. That was what he has to say as the friend of Japan. When he had seen the Japanese Delegates two days ago he had said that he was not proposing that Kiauchau should be detached from the treaty engagements but that it should be ceded to the Powers as trustees with the understanding that all they were going to do was to ask how the treaties were to be carried out and to offer advice as to how this could best be done by mutual agreement. The validity of treaties cannot be called in question if they are modified by agreements between both sides. What he is after is to attain a more detailed definition as to how Japan is going to help China as well as to afford an opportunity for investment in railways etc. He had hoped that by pooling their interest the several nations that had gained foothold in China (a foothold that is to the detriment of China’s position in the world) might forego the special position they had acquired and that China might be put on the same footing as other nations, as sooner or later she must certainly be. He believes this to be to the interest of everyone concerned. There is a lot of combustible material in China and if flames were put to it the fire could not be quenched for China had a population of four hundred million people. It is symptoms of that which fill him with anxiety. Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda know how deep-seated is the feeling of reverence of China towards Shantung which was the most sacred Chinese Province and he dreads starting a flame there because this reverence is based upon the very best motives and owing to the traditions of Confucius and the foundations of intellectual development. He does not wish to interfere with treaties. As Mr Lloyd George had remarked earlier, the war had been partly undertaken in order to establish the sanctity of treaties. Although he yields to no-one in this sentiment there are cases he feels where treaties ought not to have been entered into.

Baron Makino, referring to President Wilson’s remarks in regard to the larger ideas of international relationship, says that the best opinion of Japan is at that point of view. For China, the best opinion in Japan wants equal opportunities or the “open door”. He has convinced himself of this and is very glad of it, for he feels it would be to the advantage of both countries. He recalls, however, that international affairs in China have not always been conducted on very just lines.

(Mr Lloyd George interjects that this was undoubtedly the case.)

He does not want to go into past history or to inquire where the responsibility lies, but this has been the source of the present situation. Once the unjust methods had been begun other nations followed. The best opinion, however, in Japan based itself on fairness and justice. Before he left Japan he had had a conversation with one of their older statesmen, who had remarked to him that Japan would have to enter into a good many joint undertakings with China and must content herself to share equally, half in half, in them. This had been one of the most influential men in Japan and he himself shared his views.

President Wilson says that he is satisfied on that point and he hopes Baron Makino will not interpret him to have expressed any doubts. He wants that principle, however, to be shown in a concrete way to China.

Baron Makino then refers to the President’s remarks on Shantung. There, Japan had only entered into an agreement, whereas Germany had assumed almost complete sovereignty. All Germany’s concessions over and above the agreement between Japan and China will now fall through. There remains only the concession mentioned in the Treaty which had already been discussed. Reverting to the larger views expressed by President Wilson he says that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, in a speech made at the opening of the session (in January he thinks), had sketched the line of policy which was proposed towards China. He had said that the Japanese Government was ready to help and contribute towards anything just that was proposed in China. As regards more concrete matters by which he meant such matters as extraterritoriality, maintenance of foreign troops, spheres of influence and the Boxer Indemnity - the four principal points which China had most at heart - on these matters he gathered from the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Japanese Government is ready to discuss them with the Great Powers. These are concrete matters which can be worked out with the Great Powers. If this can be done it would do much to allay the feelings of injustice and bad tradition that still are lurking in China. Japan would be glad to discuss these questions. Extra territoriality was a matter which would take some time. Japan had accomplished it and China could follow her footsteps. In the matter of prisons, for example, considerable progress has already been made in China. As soon as the Powers felt that they could trust Chinese Courts there need be no delay in rectifying matters.

President Wilson asks what is the idea of Japan as to extra territoriality in the settlement contemplated at Kiaochow.

Baron Makino says that as matters stand extraterritoriality is considered as an established principle all through China. If, however, the principle changed, Kiaochow would form no exception.

President Wilson says that he feels that he realizes the situation in a fuller light than ever before. He asks whether the Japanese representatives would prefer to draw the Chinese representatives into conference in which they would take part or would they prefer that their colleagues should see them separately, as China was a full member of the Peace Conference final judgment could not be passed without seeing them.

Baron Makino says that he does not in the least object to China being heard but he does not want to enter into discussion with them. It is difficult to discuss with people who have preconceived ideas. To remove these needs time and it is difficult to dispel them in one or two conversations. He greatly regrets that they should exist.

Viscount Chinda represents that Japan has the right to be present when the Chinese Delegates attend although her Delegates do not wish to be drawn into discussion.

After some further discussion it is agreed that:

Japan will not exercise her right to be present and that the best plan would be for the discussion with the Chinese representatives to take place in their absence.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the opportunity of the presence of the Japanese delegates should be taken to refer to some of the general questions relating to the Treaty with Germany in which Japan was interested. Up to now the Supreme Council has concerned itself almost entirely with questions of European interest, such as the boundaries of Germany and related questions, the Saar Valley and Danzig. Other more general questions, such as the League of Nations and Labour had been discussed outside in Commissions. Japan had been consulted about the question of breaches of the laws of war. The great outstanding question was compensation and indemnity.

Baron Makino says that Japan is interested in this question. She had lost ships and would have a considerable claim. She has representatives on the Reparation Commission.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Reparation Commission has found great difficulty in reaching agreement; these questions were now being discussed by a special Committee.

President Wilson suggests that the Japanese Delegation should place themselves in communication with Mr. Norman Davis, who is the American representative on a Committee which also included Loucheur, Lord Sumner and M. Crespi.

Baron Makino undertakes to do this.

A few further explanations are given of the progress made in the Treaty of Peace.

Baron Makino says that before the end of the Meeting, he wishes to say one word about the form of restitution of Kiau Chow to Japan. The Japanese Government attaches supreme importance to the form which had been submitted that morning. Today, fresh instructions from Government have been received and he cannot lay too much stress on the matter.

(The Japanese representatives then withdraw.)

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, April 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (minus Signor Orlando who is unable to attend) with Representatives from China. Signor Orlando cannot be present.


1. President Wilson opens the meeting, saying that the Chinese Plenipotentiaries know the interest he feels in the Kiauchau-Shantung settlement. On the previous day he had a Conference with the Japanese representatives, and this morning they had come to confer. Since he had last seen Mr Koo, he had carefully read the documents, from which he gathered the following was the chain of events.

Before China entered into the war, there had been an exchange of Notes. He thought in 1915 (Mr Koo says it was May 25th). In that exchange of Notes, the Japanese Government had said that when the German rights in Kiauchau were transferred after the war to Japan, Japan would return them to China. The Chinese Government had taken note of this. Subsequently, there had been a further exchange of notes, and he believed, also a treaty although he had only seen Notes, in which the Japanese Government laid down certain conditions. The Chinese Government had accepted these conditions. Great Britain and France (Mr Lloyd George says that this had occurred between the two exchanges of Notes between China and Japan) had entered into a similar but not identical agreement with Japan to the effect that they would support the claims of the Japanese Government on the Continent and in the islands North of the Equator. In the case of the British Government it had been on the understanding that Japan supported her claim to German islands South of the Equator. Hence, Great Britain and France were in much the same position in the matter.

Mr Lloyd George explains that at that time the submarine campaign had become very formidable. Most of the British torpedo-boat-destroyers were in the North Sea, and there was a shortage of those craft in the Mediterranean. Japanese help was urgently required, and Japan had asked for this arrangement to be made. We had been very hard pressed, and had agreed.

President Wilson then reads extracts from the exchange of Notes printed on page 62 of the official Claim of China for direct restitution to herself of the leased territory of Kiauchau, etc., circulated by the Chinese Delegation:

“When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiauchau Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions.”

He then reads the following reply of the Chinese Foreign Minister, in which, after rehearsing the whole of the Japanese Note, he had said “In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of this declaration”. He then reads an extract from page 82, namely, exchange of Notes dated September 24, 1918:

“The Japanese Government, mindful of the amiable relations between our two countries and out of a spirit of friendly co-operation, propose to adjust all the questions relating to Shantung in accordance with the following articles.

1) Japanese troops along the Kiauchow-Chinan railway, except a contingent of them to be stationed at Chinanfu, shall be withdrawn to Tsingtau.

2) The Chinese Government may organize a Police Force to undertake the policing of the Kiauchow-Chinan railway.

3) The Kiauchow-Chinan Railway is to provide a reasonable amount to defray the expense for the maintenance of the above mentioned Police Force.

4) Japanese are to be employed at the Headquarters of the above-mentioned Police Force, at the principal railway stations, and at the Police Training School.

5) Chinese citizens shall be employed by the Kiauchow-Chinan Railway Administration as part of its Staff.

6) The Kiauchau-Chinan Railway, after its ownership is definitely determined, is to be made a Chino-Japanese joint enterprise.

7) The Civil Administration established by Japan and existing now is to be abolished.

The Japanese Government desires to be advised of the attitude of your Government regarding the above-mentioned proposal.”

To this the Chinese Minister replied:

“In reply I have the honor to state that the Chinese Government are pleased to agree to the above articles proposed by the Japanese Government.”

The Chinese Delegation would see, President Wilson continues, the embarrassing position which had been reached. Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau are bound to support the claims of Japan. Alongside of them the Chinese had their exchange of notes with Japan. He reminds Mr Koo that when urging his case before the Council of Ten at the Quai d’Orsay, he had maintained that the war cancelled the agreement with the German Government.1 It did not, however, cancel the agreement between China and the Japanese Government, which had been made before the war. What he had himself urged upon the Japanese was that, as in the case of the Pacific Islands, the leased territory of Kiauchau should be settled by putting it into the hands of the Five Powers as Trustees. He did not suggest that Treaties should be broken, but that it might be possible, in Conference, to bring about an agreement by modifying the Treaty. He also proposes to them that all Governments should renounce the special rights they had acquired in China, so as to put China in a position free from the special limitations which had been imposed upon her. The Japanese are not willing to have Kiauchau handed over to the Five Powers, and the British and French Governments were embarrassed by their Treaties. When he pressed the Japanese for explanations of the meaning of their agreement, they had replied that the exploitation of two coal-mines and one iron-mine had not proved a successful venture, and were now bound up with the railway. They stated, however, that they would withdraw the civil administration; that they would maintain troops only on the termini of the railway; and that if a general agreement was reached, they would withdraw their extraterritoriality. They urged that they wanted a community of interest with the Chinese in the railway, and the only reserve they made was for a residential district in Kiauchau.

Mr Koo says that the Treaties of 1915 and the subsequent exchange of Notes were the outcome of the 21 demands which Japan had made on China and were all part and parcel of one transaction. He hoped he had made this clear before the Council of Ten. He felt that the Treaties and Notes which had been exchanged after Japan had delivered an ultimatum stood outside of the regular procedure and course of Treaties. They dealt with matters arising out of the war.

Mr Lloyd George asks what ultimatum he referred to.

President Wilson asks if Mr Lloyd George had never heard of the twenty-one points.

Mr Lloyd George says he had not.

Mr Koo says that in January 1915 after the capture of Kiau Chau that port had been opened up to trade; China then asked Japan to withdraw her troops from the interior of the province. The Japanese took occasion to treat this note as though it were an unfriendly act and shortly after sprung on China twenty-one demands divided into five groups - for example, that China should accept Japanese advisers; that they should give up railway concessions in which Western Powers were concerned, and he would draw Mr. Lloyd George’s attention to the fact that Great Britain was concerned. China was put in an extremely embarrassing position. She resisted and resisted and only gave up when she was absolutely compelled to. On May 7th the Japanese sent China an ultimatum in regard to the majority of demands giving China only 48 hours within which to accept; otherwise Japan would consider herself free to take such steps as she thought fit to enforce them. This caused absolute consternation to the Chinese Government which eventually had to submit to force majeure.

Mr Lloyd George asks if they had not appealed to the United States of America.

President Wilson says they had and the United States had intervened in regard to the infringement of sovereignty and political independence. The whole transaction, however, had been kept extremely secret and the United States only learned of it in a roundabout way.

Mr Koo says that secrecy had been imposed upon China by Japan under severe penalties. It had been said that Japan had informed the Allied Governments and the United States Government that there had been only 11 Demands; but actually 21 Demands had been made on China. The Chinese Government felt that the Treaties and Notes exchanged as a result of these demands followed by an ultimatum were on a different footing from the ordinary. China had always endeavored to carry out to the letter all engagements made in good faith. These, however, had been made against China’s free will, and the same applied to the notes exchanged in the previous year. For the last four years since they had captured Kiauchau, Japanese troops had penetrated far into the Province of Shantung, where there was a population of 36,000,000 people. This had been very uncomfortable for the general population, and the results had been disturbance and trouble. The Chinese Government had protested, and asked Japan to withdraw her troops who were stationed 250 miles up the railway, but they had refused and had established civil administration bureau in the interior of Shantung and extended their control even over the Chinese people by levying taxes on Chinese people and asserting judicial power over them. The feelings of the Chinese people against the extension of Japanese control were so strong that the Chinese Government felt constrained to take some immediate step to induce Japan to withdraw her troops and remove the civil administration bureau, the object being to relieve the tense situation until the question could be finally settled at the Peace Conference.

Mr Lloyd George says that it looked that by the Treaty with China; the Japanese Government would get more than the Germans had had. He asked Mr Koo which he would prefer - the Treaty with Japan, or the transference to Japan of the German rights?

Mr Koo says that the situation is so difficult that he feels he must speak very frankly. The Japanese position was so close to China; especially in Manchuria, where they occupied a railway which was connected with Peking; that merely to transfer German rights would create a very serious situation. With the Japanese on the Manchurian railway, and the Shantung railway, Peking would be - as it were - in a pincers.

President Wilson points out that the Japanese claimed that the administration of the Shantung railway would be a joint one, and they proposed to withdraw the Japanese administration.

Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Koo had not quite answered his point. Supposing the Great Powers had to decide (and this really is his position since he is bound by a Treaty) between Japan inheriting Germany’s rights in Shantung or exercising the rights under the treaty with Japan, which would China prefer? He points out that Great Britain is only bound by the rights which Japan inherited from Germany.

President Wilson says that if Japan inherited the German rights, it would involve her retaining the leased territory. He thought Mr Lloyd George’s point was that possibly Japan was claiming greater rights than Germany had exercised. As the British and French Governments had to support the Japanese claim to what Germany had had, they wanted to know whether China would be better off according as Japan could exercise the rights that Germany had or those that she obtained by her Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that this was the point, and says the real question is whether the Treaty with Japan was better for China than Germany’s rights.

(At this point there is an interval to permit the Chinese plenipotentiaries to confer.)

Mr Koo says that he has now consulted his colleague. He can make no choice, because both alternatives are unacceptable; he will merely compare them. The Treaty and Notes with Japan provide for restoration of the Leased Territory to China on certain conditions, but such restoration would be only nominal. Between the two, he thought that the German rights were more limited than the rights claimed by Japan under her Treaty and Notes with China. Even mere succession to the German rights, however, would create a grave situation for China’s future. In claiming direct restitution of German rights, he was not asking for any compensation or remuneration for China as a result of her entry into the war, but only for what was necessary for peace in the Far East. The experience of the last three years made it so clear what the Chinese position would be if Japan was allowed either to succeed to the German rights in Shantung or to retain the rights she claimed under her treaty with China. It is an uncomfortable position both to the Chinese people and the Government. He is not in the least exaggerating, but only saying what is necessary to explain the situation.

President Wilson says that M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George would bear witness that he had put the Chinese case as well as he could to the Japanese Delegation in the morning. He had emphasized the great need of trust and friendship between Japan and China, which he regards as essential to peace in the Far East. He had urged that China should be free and unfettered to carry out her development. What he asked now was only a means of getting out of a position that was extremely difficult. In this Conference the United States of America was the only power that was entirely unbound. Great Britain, France, China and Japan are all bound by Treaties. They are bound to keep these Treaties because the war had largely been fought for the purpose of showing that Treaties could not be violated.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that in the exchange of notes of September 1918, China might have stood out.

Mr Koo says that the exchange of notes in 1918 was the result of the Shantung Treaty, made in consequence of the 21 demands. It was part of the same transaction.

President Wilson says that the exchange of notes had grown out of the previous agreement. He looked for the Shantung Treaty.

Mr. Koo says that it was on page 59 of China’s Claim for Direct Restitution of Kiaochow, etc.

President Wilson reads the following extracts from the treaty and said that China had then had to accept and had had no other choice:

“Article 1: The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2: The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Chinanfu railway, if Germany abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Wehsien line China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.”

Mr Lloyd George says he would like to have the two positions examined by British, French and American experts, and to learn their views as to which course would be best for China.

M Clemenceau says he had no objection.

Mr Lloyd George says that it is also only fair that China should be given more time to consider this question. This seems to be the only alternative there is to acquiescing in the Treaties between China and Japan. Great Britain and France, however, were not bound by this latter Treaty, but only by their own arrangements with Japan.

President Wilson then reads the following extracts from the 21 Demands on page 52 and 53 of the Chinese Document.

"Group IV

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbor or bay or island along the coast of China.

Group V

Article 1: The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs.

Article 3: Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police department of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

Article 4: China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50% or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government) or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.”

President Wilson recalls that there were other demands designed to exclude other Powers from the commercial and industrial development; (Mr Koo says, on page 52).

President Wilson reads Article I of the Group III as follows:

“The Two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her act dispose of the rights and property of whatever nature of the said Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same.”

Mr Koo points out that the Hanyehping Company was the largest coal and iron mining Company of China, situated in the Yangtze Valley. He requests the reading of Article 2 which, he says, was even more serious.

President Wilson reads the following:

“Article 2: The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of these owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside the said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests’ of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.”

Mr Lloyd George asks whether China had agreed to this Article.

Mr Koo said that the Chinese Government had had to accept most of the 21 Demands with slight modifications. That was why China is seeking some redress.

President Wilson asks if the following point of view would make any appeal to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries? Hereafter whatever arrangements are made both Japan and China would be members of the League of Nations, which would guarantee their territorial integrity and political independence. That is to say, that these matters would become the concern of the League and China would receive a kind of protection that she had never had before and other nations would have a right which they had never had before to intervene. Before it had been, comparatively speaking, none of our business to interfere in these matters. The Covenant, however, laid down that whatever affected the peace of the world is a matter of concern to the League of Nations and to call attention to such was not an hostile but a friendly act. He, himself, is prepared to advocate at the Council of the League and at the Body of Delegates that the special positions occupied by the various nations in China should be abandoned. Japan declared that she was ready to support this. There would be a forum for advocating these matters. The interests of China could not then be overlooked. He is stating this as an element of security for China in the future if the powers were unable to give her what she wanted now, and he asked the Chinese Delegates to think the matter over. While there is doubt as to the Treaty and Notes between China and Japan, there is no doubt whatsoever as to the agreements entered into by France and Great Britain. Hence, even if the agreements between them and Japan were abandoned, these two Governments are bound to support Japan in getting whatever rights in Shan Tung Germany had had. Hence, the question which the Chinese Plenipotentiaries had to consider was, would they prefer to retain the rights which Japan had secured in their treaty with her or would they prefer that Japan should inherit the German rights in Shan Tung.

Mr Koo says that he could not lay too much emphasis on the fact that the Chinese people were now at the parting of the ways. The policy of the Chinese Government was co-operation with Europe and the United States as well as with Japan. If, however, they did not get justice, China might be driven into the arms of Japan. There was a small section in China which believes in Asia for the Asiatics and wanted the closest co-operation with Japan. The position of the Government, however, is that they believed in the justice of the West and that their future lay there. If they failed to get justice there, the consequential re-action might be very great. Further, he wished to suggest that the validity of the arrangements was questionable owing to the following facts: (1) They arose out of the war: (2) China had subsequently come into the war herself: (3) New principles had now been adopted by all the nations as the basis of the peace and the agreements with Japan appeared to be in conflict with them. Consequently, in thanking the Supreme Council for hearing the views of the Chinese Delegation, he wishes to state the great importance of attaining a peace which could be relied on to endure for 50 years instead of a peace so unjust that it would only sow the seeds of early discord.

President Wilson says that these were serious considerations, but he would not like Mr Koo even personally to entertain the idea that there was injustice in an arrangement that was based on treaties which Japan had entered into. The sacredness of treaties had been one of the motives of the war. It had been necessary to show that treaties were not mere scraps of paper. If treaties were inconsistent with the principles on which the peace was being formed, nevertheless we could not undo past obligations. If that principle were accepted, we should have to go back and France would have the treaty of 1815 and there would be no end to it. He would not like to feel that because we were embarrassed by a treaty we were disregardful of justice. Moreover, the unjust treatment of China in the past has not by any means been confined to Japan. He hopes that the quandary in which the Powers are would be stated to the Chinese people. He hoped that it would be shown to them that the undoing of the trouble depended on China uniting in reality with other nations, including the Western Nations. He feels absolute confidence that the opinion of the world had the greatest sympathy for the realm of China. The heart of the world goes out to her 400 millions of people. Much depends on the state of mind of these 400 million people. Any statesmen who ignores their fortunes are playing a dangerous game. But it would not do to identify justice with unfortunate engagements that had been entered into.

Mr Koo says he believes prevention to be better than cure. He thought that it would be better to undo unfortunate engagements now, if they endangered the permanence of the future peace.

Mr Lloyd George says the object of the war was not that. The war had been fought as much for the East as for the West. China also had been protected by the victory that had been won. If Germany had won the war and had desired Shan Tung or Peking, she could have had them. The very doctrine of the mailed fist had been propounded in relation to China. The engagements that had been entered into with Japan had been contracted at a time when the support of that country was urgently needed. He will not say that the war could not have been won without this support. But he can say that Kiau Chau could not have been captured without Japanese support. It was a solemn treaty and Great Britain could not turn round to Japan now and say “All right, thank you very much. When we wanted your help, you gave it, but now we think that the treaty was a bad one and should not be carried out.” Within the treaties he would go to the utmost limits to protect the position of China. On the League of Nations he would always be prepared to stand up for China against oppression, if there was oppression. China is a nation with a very great past and, he believes, with a still greater future. It would, however, be of no service to her to regard treaties as Von Bethmann Hollweg had regarded them, as mere scraps of paper to be turned down when they were not wanted.

M Clemenceau says that Mr. Koo can take every word that Mr. Lloyd George had said as his also.

President Wilson asks whether assuming for the sake of argument that the engagements were unfortunate nevertheless they had been entered into for the salvation of China, because they had been entered into for the salvation of the world, of which China was a part. In fact, it would be said that the very engagements were instruments for the salvation of China.

Mr Koo says they had been designed apparently to meet a situation in Europe and not in the Far East.

Mr Lloyd George points out that if Germany had won the war in Europe, she would have won it in the Far East also. The world would have been at her feet.

M Clemenceau agrees.

President Wilson points out that the German project was not only domination from Hamburg to Baghdad but also the control of the East. Germany knew China to be rich. Her objects were mostly material. The Kaiser had been the great exponent of what was called the “Yellow Peril”. He had wanted to get France and Great Britain out of the way and afterwards to get everything else he could. One result of the war undoubtedly had been to save the Far East in particular, since that was an unexploited part of the world.

Mr Lloyd George says that he wishes to consider the question further before arriving at a decision.

President Wilson asks the Chinese Delegates also to give further consideration to the question and hopes that it could be taken up soon again.

(The Chinese Representatives then withdraw.)

[Jimbuna]

23rd April 1919

Third Army Air Service of the U.S. Army holds an aviation show at Coblenz (Koblenz), occupied-Germany.


Captured German 60-pounder guns displayed at Mainz, currently occupied by French troops.


Devastation remains in many parts of the former battlefield in France. The boy pictured was injured in Armentieres when he was playing with unexploded ammunition.


The U.S.S. Mobile's arrival in New York, April 23, 1919 with soldiers, most from the 130th Field Artillery (a Kansas unit of the 35th Division), returning from World War I.


Demobilised British men handing in their rifles before boarding the Rhine steamer at Cologne, which took them to Rotterdam, on their way home to England, on April 23, 1919 (Daily Mail)

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


The Council has before it a printed Memorandum on the various documents prepared by the Committees in connection with Reparation.

1. Mr Lloyd George doubts the expediency of only having one representative for each nation on the Commission. He thinks the number should be two as it might be desirable to Members on have two types of men, for example, a financial and judicial expert.

Mr Davis points out that substitute members are provided for.

Mr Lamont says the point has been carefully considered and provided for by means of coadjutor delegates. It had been considered that if there are two delegates for each of the five nations the Commission would become unwieldy and it would hamper progress. In any case delegates would require experts and sub-commissions would have to be appointed.

President Wilson points out that it was the difference between the Quai d’Orsay Council of Ten and the recent conversations of the Council of Four. Mr Lloyd George agrees this is a very substantial difference.

M Clemenceau suggests that the coadjutor delegates practically provide what Mr Lloyd George asked for.

Mr Lloyd George says he would not press the matter.


2. Attention is next drawn to a clause prepared by the American Delegation providing for the right of withdrawal upon six months notice by any nation on the Commission.

President Wilson explains that, in his opinion, no nation ought to withdraw from a Commission but his legal advisers have informed him that no Treaty can be withdrawn from, or even renounced, unless there was a provision to that effect. He thought that public opinion in the United States would demand that there should be such a clause, although he hoped it would never be necessary to use it.

Mr Lloyd George asks for the substitution of 12 months notice instead of 6.

President Wilson agrees to accept this substitution.

(It is agreed that the clause providing for the right of withdrawal should be adopted with the substitution of 12 months notice instead of 6.)


3. Mr Davis says that the American Delegation considers that the secrecy provision should be withdrawn. The feeling is that to set up a secret clause in a public Treaty would make a bad public impression. If the delegates on the Commission are honest, they will not give out information; if they are dishonest, they will do so whether the clause is there or not.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the object of the clause is not to exclude Governments from making announcements but to prevent the officials on the Commission from doing so. He points out that it is vital in matters of finance that information which might affect the money markets should not be allowed to leak out.

President Wilson says that their objections are not to the actual secrecy but they wish to protect the Peace Conference against the attacks of those who declare that everything should be public. He agrees with Mr Davis that if discreet people are put on the Commission they will not give information away.

Mr Lamont suggests that every Government will give its own instructions to its own Delegates.

(It was agreed that Article 8 should be deleted.)


4. Arrangements for Determining the Amount and Conditions of Bonds, etc. Mr Davis says that the French and Italian Representatives are in agreement with the American Proposal.

Lord Sumner says that the Italians agree with the British Delegates; the United States and French Delegates are opposed to the British and Italian Delegates.

Mr Lloyd George explains that the British experts apprehend that if one Power is in a position to veto an issue of Bonds, it might be able to use this power to extort special terms. They might refuse to agree to an issue of Bonds, unless some special conditions were agreed to.

M Loucheur says that he agrees with the United States proposal.

Mr Lloyd George says that as he is alone in this matter, he will not press the objection.

(The American proposal for Clause is adopted.)


5. Determination of the Rate of Interest.
M Loucheur says that a point affecting the rate of interest has been overlooked from Article 20. He then reads the following extract from an Article prepared on the subject:

“La Commission déterminera périodiquement, à la majorité, le taux de l’intérêt (au maximum 5 p. 100) dont sera débitée l’Allemagne sur sa dette, telle que l’aura fixée la Commission, et aussi les dates à partir desquelles l’intérêt sera débité sur les montants respectifs de a dite dette.”2

This, M Loucheur says, is an American proposal. He says that originally a different text had been proposed based on the principle that a rate of 5% should be fixed leaving the Commission the right to fix a lower rate. Mr Norman Davis had objected to this. M. Loucheur’s recollection was that Mr. Lloyd George had supported Mr. Norman Davis on the ground that he considered it better from a political point of view to determine the rate of interest on the lines now proposed. The original proposal would appear to make concessions to the Germans and would create a bad impression from a political point of view.

Mr Lloyd George says that if the Germans are given a lower rate than 5% when the Allied and Associated Governments had to pay 5% themselves, public opinion would ask why the Germans should be allowed to pay less. On the other hand, if the general rate of interest should fall, he thought that Germany should have the benefit thereof and that the Commission should have the right to fix a lower rate of interest. So long as we pay 5%, the Germans should pay 5%. The Commission should not have the power to give the Germans any preferential rate of interest. He thought that it was more a question of form than of substance. Do not the American delegates agree that if we paid 5% the Germans should do the same?

President Wilson says that they all do. The only question is as to who should have power to lower the rate.

Mr Lloyd George proposed to leave this to the Commission. He would rather regulate the payment of interest altogether than the rate.

M Clemenceau and M Loucheur say that they agree.

(On Mr Lloyd George’s proposal, the drafting of a revised paragraph is left to the Expert Committee.)


6. Interest on Pensions. M Loucheur reads the following clause, which is a continuance of the clause quoted in the preceding section and which it is proposed should be added to Article 10:

“L’intérêt sera débité:

1) sur le montant des dommages matériels (pour la fraction correspondant à la valeur d’avant guerre), à partir du 11 novembre 1918;
2) pour les pensions, à partir du jour où elles sont payées par chaque pays intéressé.”

Mr Lloyd George considers a proposal as regards interest on material damage to be a mistake. If repairs are made in kind, it will mean interest is being paid on things rebuilt and it would be very difficult to assess the value. He does not, however, press the point. He does object strongly, however, to the arrangement for pensions under Clause (2). He explains that he only wants equal treatment for damage of all kinds. He cannot acknowledge that damage to houses was more important than damage to human life. The latter is irreparable. No fair interest on this could be paid unless the value of the pensions was capitalized. The same thing should be done whether it refers to a house or to a man. Supposing by May 1st, 1921, the Commission had established that the Bill for Housing was five thousand million pounds and for pensions three thousand million pounds. Both ought to be in the same category. He then calls attention to Annex I, Article I, Clause (e) and suggests that a clause based on the following words should be substituted for M Loucheur’s proposal:

“The amount due to the Allied and Associated Governments to be calculated for all of them as being capitalized cost of such payments on the basis of the scales in force in France at the date of the signature of this Treaty”.

This, he points out, will provide that Germany should not be responsible to go on paying for 60 years. The sum would be capitalized as arranged by the Commission.

M Loucheur says that French delegates will agree.

(Mr Lloyd George’s proposal is accepted.)


7. M Loucheur points out that the original date for the calculation of pensions, namely, November, 1918, does not take into account the fact that pensions have been paid by the various Governments long before that date. He suggested that some provision should be made for this.

Mr Lloyd George pointed out that this would be covered if the words “at the date of the signature of this Treaty” were added in the above clause after the words “capitalized cost”.

(The addition of these words is approved.)


8. Participation of Germany in the Proceedings of the Commission - Appendix: Annex 2, Article 13 Mr Lloyd George says he does not like the proposal that the Germans should not have power to challenge any proposal of the Commission. He agrees that they should not be able to prolong the discussion for years. Nevertheless, they ought to be able to make representations on any subject.

(At this moment Mr Lloyd George withdraws to keep another appointment.)

Lord Sumner says that Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal is to leave out the following words: “in the discussion of the general rules as to the measure of damages only”.

President Wilson pointed out that this clause contravenes the original bases laid down in Clause 3 of the Reparation Provisions. He proposes to cut the whole clause out.

(After some discussion, it is agreed that the Clause should read as follows:

“The Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard but not to take part in any decision of the Commission whatever”.)


9. President Wilson draws attention to the article the American Delegation proposed to substitute.

Basis for Estimating Germany’s Capacity To pay.—Appendix: Annex 2, Article 15 (b) Lord Sumner says that the fact is that at present the burden of taxation is heavier in Allied countries than in Germany. Yet Germany might plead her poverty, and say she could not pay. It was common ground that the actual taxation was a related matter that must be taken into account.

(President Wilson agrees.)

What the British Delegation submitted, and thought it was not too much to ask, was that the Commission should not have the right to relieve Germany until Germany had made an attempt to raise her taxation to the amount borne by the most heavily taxed of the Allied Powers represented on the Commission. They recognized that additional taxation would not necessarily bring in money which could be used to pay outside Germany. They recognized also that such taxation might even depreciate Germany’s capacity to pay. That was the reason why they said that if the taxation was too high the Commission should be permitted to accept the plea of poverty. The British Delegation felt that it was not right that the Commission should be able to remit, unless German taxation was proportionately as high as that of the most heavily taxed Allied country. He agrees it is certainly necessary to trust the Commission, but the whole of these arrangements would be subjected to very close criticism, and it would be difficult to convince public opinion if it thought that Germany could be relieved of taxation on the ground of its poverty, whilst we ourselves were more heavily taxed and had equally heavy engagements to meet. If the Commission exercises great wisdom, he agreex that the difficulty would be avoided.

President Wilson says that under the American scheme the Commission would not be able to admit the plea of poverty unless Germany had taxed herself to an extent at least equal to the taxation of other Powers. He agrees that the Commission must be given some standards of taxation by which to judge of Germany’s ability to pay. It might be, however, that an additional burden would not give a greater yield of power to pay. He feels, however, that it is making a mistake to try to foresee situations too far in advance. If this were done, only second-rate men would be induced to serve on the Commission. He wishes to get the biggest men possible, since the financial arrangements of the world would depend on its operations. Hence, he would deprecate definite and rigid instructions, and his French colleagues agree with him. He thought that the standard of justice was as distinctly laid down in one draft as in the other.

M Loucheur says he agreed with the American draft.

Mr Lloyd George (who has meanwhile returned) says he would withdraw his objections.

(The American proposal with the French additions is adopted.)


10. Issue of Certificates by the Commission Regarding Bonds Held for the Benefit of Different Government. Appendix: Annex 2, Article 16 Mr Lloyd George accepts the French proposal.


11. Sanctions. Appendix: Annex 2, Article 18 President Wilson points out that the United States representatives have accepted the principle of Sanctions, but are not prepared to approve the form of words proposed in the draft. He then reads a simpler and shorter formula.

M Klotz said that he would accept, with the addition of the words “or financial” after “economic”. The following substitute for the second and third sub-paragraphs of this Article is adopted:

“The measures which the Allied and Associated Governments shall have the right to take, and which Germany hereby agrees not to consider as acts of war may include economic or financial prohibition and reprisals, and in general such other measures as the respective Government may determine to be necessary in the premise”.

(Just as the Meeting is breaking up, it is agreed in addition to omit the last paragraph of Article 18.)


12. Form of Payment. Appendix: Annex 2, Article 19 Mr Lloyd George thinks that this Article is too stiff. It would give the Commission power practically to take any property or material to which it took a fancy.

President Wilson agrees with Mr Lloyd George. He is seeing this clause for the first time. What he wants is to avoid even the appearance of a Brest-Litovsk forced Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that his objections would be surmounted by omitting in line 3 “demanded or”. He has no objection to the Commission accepting payment in the forms proposed, but they should not have power to demand it.

President Wilson agrees.

(It is agreed to omit in line 3 the words “demanded or”, and in addition, to omit the second sub-paragraph of Article 19.)


13. Merchant Shipping. Appendix: Annex 3 German Ships in American Ports President Wilson draws attention to amendments proposed by the United States Delegation.

President Wilson says that the claim for the German ships seized in United States ports was almost the only reparation claim put forward by the United States of America. Other powers, with their full acquiescence, were to be reimbursed for pensions. In the course of the war, the United States of America had taken over the German ships in their ports and had secured their title to them by law. The ships had been so damaged that millions of dollars had had to be spent on their repairs and new methods that had to be devised. Throughout, these ships had been used for the indispensable transport of the American armies to France. It would not be tolerable to public opinion in the United States if their title to these ships was not recognized. This had nothing to do with the payment of owners which the United States contemplated, but only to their title. It would be intolerable if anyone questioned the title which had been legally established under full process of their rights as a belligerent.

Mr Lloyd George says that if he goes into the whole case, he would show there were serious grounds which made it impossible for the British Government to accept. If he accepts it would not be merely a matter affecting the United States of America. This is an easy matter which he would not contest. It would, however, affect neutrals and other belligerents. Neutrals would benefit by this to the extent of 794,000 tons of shipping. Brazil to the extent of 216,000 tons. This means a loss not only of cash but of ships which were even more important. Brazil lost 25,000 tons and had seized 216,000 tons in her ports and would consequently profit enormously by the transaction. France lost 950,000 tons and would only be able to keep 45,000 tons; that is to say, France would only get less than 1/20th of her loss. The United States lost 389,000 tons and would get 628,000 tons. The British Empire lost 7,740,000 tons and would only get 400,000 tons. During the war Great Britain after allowing for shipbuilding had lost a balance of 4,500,000 tons. There is a great difference between the value of ships to Great Britain and the United States. It is like the value of ships to a fisherman compared with ships to a swell yachtsman. Great Britain lives on ships and it is a very serious matter to her. There is first the case of the neutrals who would walk off with 800,000 tons. In reply to President Wilson’s suggestion that this could be avoided he thought it would be difficult. The German ships in American ports had been driven to take refuge there by the action of the Navies of France and Great Britain. They only escaped capture because they took refuge in United States ports. He could not help thinking that the whole of shipping should be put in “hotchpot”. The United States would then certainly get all that she had lost.

President Wilson says they had lost not only ships but thousands of lives. In other countries such lives were being provided for by reparation arrangements, but that America was making no such claim and it would be intolerable to public opinion if it were not agreed that the United States should retain these ships.

Mr Lloyd George says he would be glad to enter into an arrangement but objected to the participation of Brazil, who had no claim for walking off with so many ships. Brazil’s whole trade was protected by our Fleet.

President Wilson says this argument does not apply to the United States, who had made an invaluable contribution to the war. The United States does not mean to take over the ships without payment.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not object to some arrangement whereby the United States would retain all of the enemy ships which they had taken over, but that he did object to the proposed American clauses being put into the Peace Treaty which would permit other countries whose rights were not the same as those of the United States, to retain the enemy ships taken over by them.

Mr Lloyd George proposes, therefore, that Annex III should stand as at present for insertion without alteration in the Peace Treaty, but that an agreement be made by the Allied Governments with the United States, providing for the retention by the United States of enemy ships now in its possession, against payment.

President Wilson states this would be acceptable to him provided a satisfactory agreement in accordance with the American amendment is drawn and executed by the Allies with the United States prior to the execution of the Treaty.

(The following alterations are made during the interval when the Conference had broken up into groups. The Secretary is unable to follow the precise reasons for the decision.)


14. Payment in Kind. Appendix 1, Annex 4. After some discussion it is agreed to omit para 2(c) and (d) and the last para of 6.


15. Legislation by Germany. Main Clauses Para. 10

(It is agreed to omit the following words at the end of para. 10:”and to the decisions and orders of the above named Commission from time to time.” The para. therefore reads as follows: ”Germany undertakes to pass any legislation and to issue any orders and decrees that may be necessary to give complete effect to these clauses”.)

16. Mr Lloyd George asks what would be the position of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

President Wilson considers that these would not be entitled to claim reparation since they had been part of enemy countries.

Mr Lloyd George asked what would be the position of Romania and Serbia, which had annexed very large territories in Transylvania and Yugoslavia respectively. These countries would not only escape the debts of the Austrian Empire to which they had formerly belonged, but would also escape the burdens imposed on the Allies. He thought the best plan was that proposed by S Orlando, that there should be a sort of ledger account in relation to these territories. On one side of the account would be the liability that the annexed territories would have had for a share of the Austrian debt and indemnity and on the other side of the account would be their share in the claim of Romania and Serbia respectively for indemnity. This would be set off one against the other and they would be credited with the balance.

Mr Norman Davis asks what would happen if the balance was a debit instead of a credit.

Mr Lloyd George says in that case there would be no claim.


17. (The above arrangement is agreed to.) M Klotz asks what would be the position of the subjects of Allied and Associated countries established in a country like Poland whose property had been destroyed. They would not claim compensation from Poland; ought it not to be provided that they should claim against Germany?

Mr Lloyd George points out that they are provided for by Annex I, Article I (a).

It is also pointed out that they are provided for by Article 3, where the words used were “wherever situated”.


18. Consultation With the Smaller Powers: After a somewhat prolonged discussion, the following arrangements are agreed to for consultation with the Powers with special interest on the subject of the reparation clauses. The Expert Committee, which had been advising the Supreme Council, should divide itself into groups and each group should see a group of nations of the Powers with special interests. M. Loucheur undertook to organize this arrangement. Those States which have observations to make should subsequently have the right of consulting the Supreme Council.


19. The Return of Animals Taken From Invaded Territories

M Loucheur proposed the following addition to Article 7 of the reparation clauses:

“Si une moitié au moins des animaux pris par l’ennemi dans les territoires envahis ne peut être identifiée et restituée, le reste, jusqu’à concurrence de la moitié du nombre enlevé, sera livré par l’Allemagne à titre de restitution.”

(After considerable discussion, it is agreed that M Loucheur’s proposed addition to Article 7 should not be inserted in the Treaty of Peace; his proposal should, however, form the subject of a separate agreement between the Allies, a draft text of the agreement to be prepared and submitted by M Loucheur.)

20. Categories of Damage: M Klotz proposes the addition of the following new category of damage:

“Dépenses engagées par l’Etat, ou pour son compte et avec son autorisation, pour ravitailler, transporter ou secourir la population civile des territoires occupés et la population civile réfugiée ou évacuée.”5

Mr Lloyd George says that if new categories are put in, the British Government would have a number of new categories which it would wish to introduce.

(It is agreed that the addition proposed by M Klotz related to a question of the interpretation to be given to the categories already accepted and should be referred without delay for consideration to the Commission on Reparations.)


21. Valuation: M Klotz makes a proposal for putting a valuation clause in the Treaty in regard to property for which reparation was to be given. This is necessary owing to the change of value between 1914 and the present time.

(It is agreed that the Expert Committee should meet to prepare a text.)

The Conclusions, as revised by the Expert Drafting Committee, will be forwarded later.



[Appendix I to IC–176A]
Reparation

1. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of herself and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of the enemy States.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the financial resources of Germany are not adequate after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other treaty clauses to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and the German Government undertakes that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied or Associated Powers and to their property by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air.

3. The amount of such damage (as set forth under the specific categories attached hereto) for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be constituted in the form and with the powers set forth hereunder and in the Annexes hereto. This Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard. The findings of the Commission as to the amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to Germany on or before the 1st May, 1921, as representing the extent of their obligations. The Commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from the 1st May, 1921. In the event, however, that within the period mentioned, Germany shall have failed to discharge her obligation, then any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the Commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years: or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments, acting through the Commission, shall determine.

4. The Inter-Allied Commission shall thereafter, from time to time, consider the resources and capacity of Germany and, after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to extend the date, and to modify the form of payments, such as are to be provided for in Clause 3: but not to cancel any part, except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented upon the Commission.

5. In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claim, Germany shall pay in such installments and in such manner (whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise) as the Inter-Allied Commission may fix, before the 1st May, 1921, the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gold marks and pending payment of this sum she shall deposit bonds as security in the manner prescribed in Clause XV (c) (1) of Annex 2 attached hereto. Out of this sum the expenses of the army of occupation subsequent to the armistice shall first be met, provided that such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Allied and Associated Governments to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation may also, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments, be paid for out of the above sum, and the balance shall be reckoned towards liquidation of the above claims for reparation. She shall further deposit bonds as prescribed in Clause XV (c) of Annex 2 attached Thereto.

Ships shall be handed over by Germany to the Commission at the time and in the manner stated in Annex III and in all respects in compliance therewith.

6. The successive installments including the above sum paid over by the enemy States in satisfaction of the above claims will be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance, on a basis of general equity, and of the rights of each.

7. In addition to the payments mentioned above Germany shall effect restitution in cash of cash taken away, seized or sequestrated, and also restitution in kind of animals, objects of every nature and securities taken away, seized or sequestrated, in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them in enemy territory.

8. The German Government undertakes to make forthwith the restitution contemplated by Article 7 and to make the payments contemplated by Articles 3, 4 and 5.

9. The German Government recognizes the Commission provided for by Article 3 as the same may be constituted by the Allied and Associated Governments in accordance with Schedule II attached hereto, and agrees irrevocably to the possession and exercise by such Commission of the power and authority given it by Articles 3, 4 and 5. The German Government will supply to the Commission all the information which the Commission may require relative to the financial situation and operations and to the property, productive capacity and stocks and current production of raw materials and manufactured articles of the German Government, its States, Municipalities and other governmental subdivisions and of its nationals and corporations, and accords to the members of the Commission and its authorized agents the same rights and immunities as are enjoyed in Germany by duly accredited diplomatic agents of friendly Powers. The German Government further agrees to provide for the compensation and expenses of the Commission and of such staff as it may employ.

10. Germany undertakes to pass any legislation and to issue any orders and decrees that may be necessary to give complete effect to these clauses and to the decisions and orders of the above-named Commission from time to time.

11. These shall be reckoned as a credit to the German Government in respect of the payments due from it under the above clauses, the following items arising out of other Articles of this Treaty and its Annexes:

i) Any final balance in favour of Germany under Article of Part IV of the Economic Terms.

ii) Any sums due to Germany in respect of property or material delivered under the Armistice Terms or its extensions.

iii) Any sums due to Germany in respect of transfers under Article XIII of the Financial Terms.

iv) Any sums due to Germany in respect of transfers under Articles 19, 37 and 51 of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Terms.




Two more Appendices and six Annexes were attached to the original document. To include them would have taken several times the space and they are all detail lists of what is to be paid for what Items. I would not normally included the one I did but it gives the actual summary of what Germany was expected to pay by the Allies.
-Steve

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. Mr Lloyd George produces a communication he has received from S Orlando giving the latest Italian proposal.

He feels this offers no basis for negotiation. He suggests it might be desirable to ask the Italian delegates whether they intend to meet the Germans when they come to Versailles.

M Clemenceau thinks it iss a good idea.

President Wilson suggests that when we come to deal with Austria, if the Italians are standing out of the Conference the boundaries should be settled as fairly as though Italy were in. Italy should be treated on absolutely fair lines and shown that their interests were taken care of.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that if Italy was not present in the negotiations with Germany it would be difficult for the Allied and Associated Powers to put forward claims on their behalf for reparation, for example.

President Wilson refers to a report which he has received from a Mr Pupin, a scientist of Yugoslav nationality, who was working in Columbia University. The memorandum is by no means of a menacing character, but it does convey the impression that the result of a peace unsatisfactory to the Yugoslavs would be to drive them into the hands of the Bolshevists. They would unite with the rest of the Slav peoples. One interesting point in M. Pupin’s memorandum was a reference to an Italian Socialist meeting which had been held at Rome at which Italian claims, as recognized by the Socialists, had been outlined. No mention was made of Dalmatia, Fiume, Gorizia, or of Carinthia.

After some further discussion on this subject, which is taken up after other subjects have been discussed, President Wilson says that it is his intention to publish his memorandum on the Italian question this evening.

Mr Lloyd George reads a memorandum which Mr Balfour had prepared at his request and which presented the point of view of France and Great Britain. In the course of the reading of Mr. Balfour’s memorandum the following corrections are suggested:

1) An alteration in certain phrases which convey the impression that Fiume was not mentioned in the Treaty of London. It is pointed out that Fiume was mentioned in a note to Article 5.

2) Fiume, it is pointed out, is not on the Dalmatian but on the Croatian coast.

3) The addition, after a sentence in which it is mentioned that Fiume is one town and not two, of the following words “and that is Slav.”

4) That it would be better to omit a passage on the last page referring to the forthcoming withdrawal of Italy from the Conference. It was pointed out that although Italy had withdrawn from these conversations they had not formally withdrawn from the Preliminary Peace Conference. It was suggested it would be better to prepare the memorandum to deter Italy from doing so rather than to suggest that it was a probable contingency.

Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau agree on the following:

1) That the letter should be revised on the above lines.

2) That a copy should be sent to M Clemenceau for him to have translated and examined.

No decision was taken as to when the letter should be forwarded to the Italian representatives.

There is some discussion as to the difficult position which would arise if Italy persists in her present attitude. It was pointed out that if Italy should insist on holding on to Fiume, this would be itself a breach of the Treaty which definitely allotted Fiume to Croatia. If, on the other hand, Italy should abandon her position in Fiume, the situation would be very difficult, because then France and Great Britain would be bound by their Treaty to sign a Treaty with Austria which President Wilson did not feel himself in a position to sign, since Italy could insist on the portion of Dalmatia comprised in the Treaty being transferred to her sovereignty. It is generally agreed that anything which caused a difference between Great Britain and France on the one hand, and the United States of America on the other, would be most deplorable, since the future peace of the world depends so much on these three nations standing together. The danger of uniting the whole of the Slavs in a possible Bolshevist regime was also commented on.

Attention is also drawn to the fact that Italy had, on the 26th April 1915, adhered to the Pact of London of the 5th September 1914, thereby engaging herself mutually with Great Britain, France, and Russia, not to conclude a separate peace in the course of the War, and that when there was a question of discussing the terms of peace none of the Allied Powers should propose conditions of peace without previous agreement with each of the other Allies.


2. Mr Lloyd George says that he has just seen Captain Gibson, an officer who had returned from Berlin and who had given us consistently very valuable information. Captain Gibson said that the best of the German Delegates was named Melchior, who desired peace. Melchior was very much in with the industrialists, who desired peace. Rantzau, whom he did not think very much of, was, he believed, opposed to peace.

M Clemenceau doubted if the present German Government could make peace.


3. Mr Lloyd George says that Captain Gibson had explained that the most important factor inducing the Germans to sign peace was their desire to restart their national life. This brings him to the question of a scheme for restarting Europe. No trade is at present moving anywhere in Europe. In Belgium there are many unemployed, and the same is true of other countries and particularly of Germany. Mr Keynes had prepared a scheme, the broad outline of which was that the first thousand million pounds which Germany had to pay should be taken and guaranteed by all the Powers. Cash should be raised on it in order to enable all countries, including Germany, to get raw material and re-start their industries. Unless something of the kind was done, Melchior would not be able to make peace.

President Wilson says he has given Captain Gibson’s paper to Mr Hoover, who has some 40 agents travelling about in Europe in connection with relief work. Mr Hoover had said that the paper was extraordinarily correct, but he thought nothing could be done unless the people could get food and start their industrial life. At present, they were in a hopeless position. The ordinary life could not grow on the present soil and Bolshevism was the only system it could. Hence, he thought that the blockade ought to be raised.

Mr Lloyd George points out that there was the same paralysis in countries that had no blockade.

M Clemenceau thinks it would be a great mistake to raise it.

President Wilson points out that it could be reimposed.

M Clemenceau said that the moment was bad for raising the blockade. The Germans are about to arrive for the purpose of signing peace and we must not appear to be weakening.


4. M Clemenceau reads information which shows that the German Delegation contemplates bringing journalists to Versailles. He asks whether the French ought to allow them to come to Versailles. His own view is strongly opposed, and he would like authority not to admit them. His information is more and more in the direction that Rantzau is coming to cause a breakdown in the negotiations.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Melchior is not coming with this object.


5. President Wilson considers that, in view of Melchior’s presence, the attitude of the Germans will depend largely upon the economic terms. If the Germans find that chains are to be imposed on them, they will not sign, but if a fair basis is offered, they would. He has talked to the United States experts on the subject and the attitude they took was that the Allied and Associated Powers should only require that there should be no discrimination by Germany against any particular belligerent. That is to say, all should have the most favored nation terms.

6. M Clemenceau reads a telegram from the Chief of the Military Mission at Warsaw to Marshal Foch, reporting that by midnight of the 20th, 12 trains had passed through Warsaw conveying a portion of General Haller’s Army. He reported a number of incidents where the Germans had molested the trains and broken open wagons and taken foodstuffs, such as biscuits, preserved meat and sacks of oats and clothing. These incidents had mainly taken place at Glogau.

Mr Lloyd George says he was surprised that the troops had got through with so little trouble. He thought the attention of Marshal Foch ought to be called to the matter and that he should be directed to make representations.

President Wilson agrees.

(It is agreed that M Clemenceau should instruct Marshal Foch to call the attention of the Germans to the molestation of trains conveying General Haller’s Army to Poland and should insist on their carrying out their engagements.)

7. President Wilson says he has received an appeal from Persia, who had sent a Delegation to the Peace Conference, and complained that not only had she not been admitted or heard at the Peace Conference but that no reply had even been made to communications addressed to the Bureau of the Conference.

Mr Lloyd George says that he was informed by Sir Maurice Hankey that Mr Balfour was opposed to the admission of Persia to the Conference, though he does not know the reasons. He asks that the matter might be postponed until he had consulted Mr Balfour.


8. President Wilson says the time has come for holding a Plenary Conference. Lord Robert Cecil had written to him about the desirability of discussing the League of Nations Covenant there. He proposes that the Covenant should be laid before the Plenary Conference without any further speech making, although he would make a statement to the effect that the last revision which had been made to consider such criticisms as had been offered only clarified certain points. After this, anyone who wanted to discuss the question could do so. There would probably be only a few speeches. There were also several other reports which had been called for by the Plenary Conference which should be laid before them.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that there must be a meeting.

M Clemenceau also agrees.

(After some further discussion, it is decided:

1) That a plenary meeting of the Preliminary Peace Conference should be held on Monday, April 28th, when the following reports should be considered:
The League of Nations Covenant
The Labour Clauses
Responsibility and Breaches of the laws of War.

2) That the clauses being drafted by the Drafting Committee to give effect to the conclusion of the Supreme Council on the subject of the Responsibility and Breaches of the laws of war should be circulated for the meeting.

3) That a second plenary meeting of the Conference should be held on the day preceding the night on which the Germans were due to arrive at Versailles. The object of this meeting would be to communicate the contents of the Peace Treaty.)

9. The question of publicity is discussed several times during this meeting.

M Clemenceau strongly urges that the Treaty should be published when it is communicated to the Germans. It would not be fair to our own people to let the Germans see the Treaty and to conceal it from them. His own position would be an impossible one if the Treaty were not published. It is absolutely certain that the Germans will publish it, particularly if they wish to make mischief for us and it would make a very bad impression in the countries of the Allied and Associated Powers if the public first learnt of the terms of the Treaty of Peace from the German wireless.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the Germans might not want to publish the Treaty and that negotiations would be easier for all concerned without publicity.

Both Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson lay the utmost stress on the preparation of a good summary for publication.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the reception of the Peace Treaty would depend largely on the first impression made.

M Clemenceau said he is preparing a summary for communicating to the Preliminary Meeting and he thought this might also serve for the Press. He will undertake to communicate it to and discuss it with his colleagues.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that a notice ought to be issued to the Press of the Allied and Associated Powers to the effect that the moment for publication would be after the communication of the Treaty to the Germans and that premature publicity might have very serious effects.

(M Clemenceau undertakes to draft a preface notice on the subject.)


Appendix I Italian Proposals

I The line of the Alps (Brenner) to the sea, East of Volosca.

II Fiume under the sovereignty of Italy.

Italy will establish in the port of Fiume free zones in accordance with the terms of articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Peace clauses drawn up by the Commission of Ports, Waterways, and Railways and will extend to Fiume those facilitations which may be arranged for later on in a general convention with reference to free ports.

III Italy will have all the islands mentioned in the Pact of London except Pago.

IV Zara and Sebenico will be placed under the League of Nations with Italy as Mandatory Power.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


1. M Pichon asks Mr Henry White to read the draft Article which he understands has been prepared by the American delegation.

Mr White reads the following draft which has been prepared by Mr Lansing, in accordance with the general principle agreed to by all Powers:

“Germany hereby agrees not to make any pecuniary claim of any kind directly or indirectly against any of the Allied and Associated belligerent Powers, or against any of the Powers which have severed diplomatic relations with her, based on events which occurred at any time before the coming into force of the present treaty. All such claims, whether by Governments, states, municipalities, corporations, or private individuals, are hereby declared to be barred, and finally extinguished.”

M Pichon inquires whether any delegates have any comments to make on this draft.

Mr Balfour says that the draft appears to him to be unobjectionable, but he would inquire whether it has been before the Drafting Committee; if not, it would seem reasonable that it should be referred to it after the meeting has considered it in principle.

Mr White concurs that if the Council approves the tenor of the proposed Article, the draft should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(The proposed Article is approved in principle, and the American draft was referred to the Drafting Committee for adaptation and insertion among the clauses of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace.)

2. The following draft is before the meeting:

1)“The aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall be accorded full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of Germany, and shall while exercising any rights of passage or landing in Germany enjoy full national treatment particularly in case of distress by land or sea.

2) The aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall, while in transit to any other State, enjoy the right of flying over the territory and territorial waters of Germany without landing.

3) All aerodromes in Germany open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of Allied and Associated States, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with German aircraft as regard charges of every description, including charges for landing and accommodation. In addition to the aerodromes mentioned above Germany undertakes to provide and construct aerodromes in such other places as may, within one year from the date of the signature of the Treaty of Peace, be designated for this purpose by the Allied and Associated States and the provisions as to charges mentioned above shall apply in the case of any such aerodromes.

4) All certificates of nationality, certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency and licences, issued or rendered valid by any of the Allied or Associated States shall be recognized by Germany as valid and as equivalent to corresponding certificates and licences issued to German aircraft.

5) As regards internal commercial air traffic the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall enjoy throughout Germany treatment accorded to aircraft of the most favored nation.

6) Germany undertakes to adopt measures to ensure that every German aircraft flying above its territory shall comply with the Rules as to Lights and Signals, Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic on and in the vicinity of aerodromes contained in the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made between the Allied and Associated States.

7) The obligations imposed by these clauses shall continue until such time as Germany (is admitted either to the League of Nations or,) by consent of the Allied and Associated States, is permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made by the latter States.
Note: Similar clauses can be adapted for application to other enemy powers.”

M Pichon says that he understands this draft was agreed to by the French and British Delegations.

Mr Balfour says that he has examined the draft together with his experts, and the only article which appears to him questionable is Article 3. The second clause of this Article stipulates that the Germans should construct aerodromes wherever it might appear convenient to the Allied and Associated Powers to have aerodromes established. This, he thinks, is an irritating clause, and one from which the Allies would derive little benefit. He raises no objection to the first clause in the third Article, but the second clause appears to him unreasonable, and he would prefer to suppress it.

Mr White expresses agreement with Mr Balfour.

S de Martino said he was informed that the object of this provision is to give power to demand the creation of aerodromes in Germany, which might be required for the establishment of big International air routes. It is quite possible that the Germans might exhibit systematic ill-will towards international arrangements of this kind. Without some such clause as the one under discussion the Allies would have no power to enforce compliance from them.

Mr Balfour admits that there is much force in the argument put forward by S de Martino. He points out, however, that for traffic from east to west, there already exists in Germany a sufficient number of aerodromes. The use of these aerodromes by the Allied and Associated Powers is insured by the first part of Article 3. The second part of Article 3 stipulates that the Allied and Associated Powers must signify their wishes within one year of the date of the signature of the Treaty of Peace. He questions whether this interval is sufficient to give the means of fulfilling S de Martino’s purpose.

S de Martino says that he does not wish to insist, in as much as he feels that the obvious advantage of facilitating international traffic would ultimately be sufficient to prevail over any remaining ill-will from the Germans. It would alone in time, induce them to build the desired aerodromes.

Baron Makino agrees to the suppression of the second clause of Article 3.

M Pichon then declares this clause suppressed and the remainder of the Article accepted.

Captain McNamee says that he has a comment to make on Article 7. This Article provides for the admission of Germany to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation, either as a consequence of admission to the League of Nations, or by consent of the Allied and Associated States. He points out that this was inconsistent with the Convention, itself, which contains no provision for the adhesion of Germany. Article 40 of that Convention provides that powers which had not taken part in the present war should be admitted to adhere, but there was no provision for Powers other than the signatories which had taken part in the war.

Mr Balfour suggests that the matter be referred to the Drafting Committee with the object of reconciling the two texts.

Captain Roper says that there is really no contradiction as the Commission dealing with the Convention on Aerial Navigation had never intended to exclude Germany forever from the Convention. He thinks the period after which Germany might be admitted is a matter for the Supreme Council to decide. The present text of the Convention is not final, and is being considered by the Drafting Committee of the Commission. A change could easily be made in order to produce harmony between the Convention itself and the clauses to be inserted in the Treaty.

Captain McNamee expresses the opinion that there should be a time limit expressed; otherwise there was an appearance of tampering indefinitely with the sovereignty of Germany.

M Pichon says that if this were regarded as a derogation to German sovereignty, Germany would have to complain of many other such. The same might be alleged with regard to her admission to the League of Nations, which could only be by the consent of the original members.

Mr Balfour observed that the clause contained two alternatives; one, that Germany should become a party to the Convention as soon as admitted to the League of Nations; secondly, that she might become a party to the Convention when the Allied and Associated Powers consented. He is personally willing only to state the first alternative, should the American Delegates prefer it.

Captain McNamee said that he prefers the second alternative.

M Pichon says in that case, it would be preferable to maintain both.

Mr White says that he would prefer to reserve consent of the American Delegation to this Article until he had had time to consult Mr Lansing, who is an authority on International Law.

Captain Roper observes that the preservation of both alternatives in the Article is advantageous to Germany, as she might be admitted to the Convention before becoming party to the League of Nations. Commercial reasons might make it desirable to allow this.

(The draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty as stated above, with the omission of the second sentence in Article 3, and subject to the agreement of Mr Lansing, are adopted.

It was further decided to ask the Drafting Committee of the Commission framing the Convention on International Air Navigation to adapt the Convention to the above Articles.)


3. The Meeting has before it a French proposal for the text of Appendix “A”.

Articles for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace Regarding the Disposal of the German Colonies

Mr Balfour says that he has one general observation to make. The French Delegation proposes an elaborate code applicable only to German Colonies. He asks whether it would not be simpler to apply to such territory stipulations already made for European territory to be ceded by Germany. He is not aware of any reason which necessitated a different system in Togoland, for instance, from the system imposed in territory to be ceded to Poland, or to any other country in Europe.

M Pichon says perhaps the Drafting Committee might be able to judge whether there are colonial cases which are not covered by the principles laid down for European territory. It is desirable to see that all cases are covered, and he therefore suggests that the proposals be referred to the Drafting Committee.

M Simon said that there was little analogy between the way Germany was asked to part from European territory, and that in which she was compelled to cede territory in Africa or in the Pacific. He gave as an example the demand made on Germany that all European Germans in the Colonies should be repatriated within a certain time.

M Pichon says that this makes it clear that a comparative study is necessary.

Mr Balfour observes that he did not deny the existence of differing cases. The differences, he thinks however, were rather between the conditions of the various Colonies than between Colonial territory as such and European territory. He suggests, with reference to the former, that it might be better to leave the Mandatory Power freedom to deal with German subjects and property in the territory entrusted to them.

M Pichon says that, even so, mention of the matter must be made in the Peace Preliminaries. Otherwise the Powers to whom control of Colonial territories is entrusted would be without legal status as regards Germany to take any action concerning German subjects. Some general principles should, therefore, be inserted in the Treaty.

Mr Balfour then suggests that as the matter is one of policy it might be as well, before referring it to the Drafting Committee, to have it dealt with by a Commission composed of one expert from each of the five nations.

Mr White expresses the opinion that many of the questions involved have already been dealt with by the Economic and Financial Commissions. The remainder, he thought, should be left to the League of Nations.

M Simon said that the task of the Commission suggested by Mr. Balfour would be to adapt to Colonial territory the principles already adopted by the Economic and Financial Commissions.

Mr Balfour asks whether it would be possible to refer the question to the Economic Commission.

It is pointed out that this Commission had terminated its work.

Baron Makino says that he noticed after reading the proposed Articles that some were of general application while others appeared to concern French interests alone. There are other special interests to be considered. He therefore thinks that there should be a body whose task it would be to see that no special cases are missed. He is afraid that the conclusions reached by the Economic Commission might not cover all the special cases relating to the Colonies. The intervals could be filled by the Commission proposed by Mr Balfour. He therefore supports Mr Balfour’s proposal.

S de Martino also expresses his agreement.

M Pichon says that the task of the Commission would be to take into consideration the decisions of the Economic and Financial Commissions affecting the subject under discussion, to examine to what extent they cover the cases of Colonial territory and, if necessary, to suggest supplementary clauses for insertion in the Preliminary Peace Treaty.

(It is then decided that a Commission, with the terms of reference expressed by M. Pichon, be set up immediately, and that it be asked to report to the Council as early as possible. The following Members were then nominated:


4. M. Pichon proposes the following draft:

“Germany undertakes to recognize and approve special provisions agreed upon or to be agreed upon by the Allied and Associated Powers with all other Powers, relating to traffic in arms and spirits, as well as other substances considered in the general Convention of Berlin of February 26th, 1881 and of Brussels of July 2nd, 1890.”

(This Article is adopted for insertion in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace.)


5. M Pichon said that as M Cambon is detained in a Meeting of the Central Committee he would ask Mr Laroche to explain the question.

Report on Czecho-Polish Frontiers:

a) Mr Laroche says that there are three questions for examination, that of Teschen, that of Spisz and Orava and that of Ratibor. The line of demarcation between Czechoslovakia and Poland in the East had first been fixed so as to follow the crest of the Carpathians. There are a few Polish villages south of that line, but it had been held preferable to follow the crest as offering a natural frontier, which, moreover, had the advantage of being identical with the administrative frontier between Galicia and the Hungarian province south of it. This solution preserves established administrative habits.

At the request of the Polish delegates who appealed to ethnic considerations, the matter was studied afresh by the Commission on Polish affairs and the Commission on Czechoslovak affairs jointly.

This re-examination confirmed the conclusions previously reached regarding the region of Orava. The frontier following the watershed appeared incontestably the best.

As regards the region of Spisz, the Special Commission made some modifications; the frontier in this region did not follow the crest of the mountains. A frontier geographically more satisfactory was adopted which yielded some dozen villages to the Poles. The possession of Orava, on the other hand, would have given the Poles a footing in the upper valleys of Czechoslovakia.

Mr Balfour says that he has no criticisms to make. The question has been studied in a most careful manner, not by a committee which might have been suspected of partiality, but by two committees jointly, both extremely well informed of the questions in hand. This mixed commission had reached an almost unanimous conclusion and he did not feel competent to question what had been decided.

(The Report of the Joint Czechoslovak and Polish Commissions dated April 6th, 1919 relating to the regions of Spisz and Orava is adopted.)

b) Region of Teschen: M Laroche says that this region has been the subject of bitter contest between the Poles and the Czechoslovaks. The larger part of the region is Polish but it also contained a considerable number of Czechs. The object of the controversy was firstly, the mining district of Karwin, secondly, the railway line running east and west from Krakow to Ratibor and the line Oderberg–Teschen–Jablunkau, requisite to establish communications in the Czecho-Slovak State with the Slovak regions south of the Carpathian.

The Duchy of Teschen is part of regions attached to Austria and the view had been frequently put forward in the Commission that the Duchy should be attached to Galicia, also formerly part of Austria. In reality the district had been chiefly connected with Hungary, whereas Poland would mainly be constituted out of territory taken from Russia and Silesia.

The ethnological question had been taken into account. One district had been assigned to Poland and the three districts of Friedek, Freistadt and Teschen were assigned to the Czechoslovak State. The question is really a larger question - that of reconciling the Czechs and the Poles. On the Czech side the economic argument has been used showing the absolute necessity of coal and coke for the new State. On the Polish side ethnological reasons have been given first place and economic reasons had also been alleged; but Poland is able to find coal elsewhere. As to the railway lines 4 delegations voted in favor of the partition described; the Italian Delegation offered a line more favorable to the Poles.

At an earlier stage a solution had been unanimously accepted which left the eastern portion to the Poles, keeping for the Czechs the railway line Oderberg-Jablunkau, giving to the Poles the town of Oderberg and the line Krakow-Ratibor. This solution was impracticable.

At the request of a delegation from Teschen the creation of an independent State was considered but the proposal was rejected. It would have set up in the center of Europe at a very point where national struggles are so acute, a frail state unable to survive.

It then became necessary to consider the attribution of this region as a whole to one State or its partition. Partition was unanimously agreed on, even by the Italian Delegation, though the latter proposed a slightly different line of demarcation.

This long summary indicates the care with which the Commission had dealt with this delicate matter. Though there was not unanimity, delegates had adopted a line slightly at variance from the first; because, seeing that an ideal line was not to be found, they thought it best to disturb as little as possible the administrative habits of the populations concerned. The division proposed left Bielitz to the Poles and gave to the Czechoslovaks 3 districts, one of which was undoubtedly Czech - that of Friedek and the other Freistadt and Teschen, mainly Polish. The Czechs further obtained the mining district of Karwin and the line connecting Moravia and Slovakia. The Commission was in the following dilemma; it must either reject the ethnological principle or sacrifice the economic future of the country. The Teschen Commission had proposed a line ethnologically more accurate but it was thought undesirable to cut in two the mining district of Karwin which represents an economic unit chiefly in relation with Czechoslovak districts. Many of the delegates reluctantly abandoned the ethnological principle, but nevertheless did so in the hope that in a few years the passions of the moment would be appeased and that economic interests would preserve their importance. The Italian Delegation nevertheless had held fast to a slightly different line. The majority was unwilling to neglect ethnological considerations entirely and concluded that the feelings of the populations might more easily be appeased if they were not too directly in contact with Czechoslovak administration. In consideration of the mixture of races, tempered no doubt by community of interest, it appeared desirable to arrange for local autonomy in as large measure as possible for this region, by common agreement between the Czechoslovaks and the Poles. Finally, though the economic reasons were more vital to the Czechs than to the Poles, the latter had not been sacrificed in this respect and the Commission had suggested that an economic agreement be made at once in favor of the Poles in order that friction should in future be avoided.

M Martino says that he proposes to explain briefly the slightly different point of view of the Italian Delegation, especially as the American Delegates at the beginning had appeared to share that point of view themselves. The Italian Delegation is of the opinion that the solution just explained to the Meeting does not take sufficiently into account the Ethnological conditions, and that it damaged Polish economic interests. No doubt economic unity deserved consideration, but as regards communications this consideration should not be too narrowly adhered to, seeing that there are quite separate mines in the district. Many Polish industries in these areas depend on local coal; these industries should not be sacrificed. It is true that Poland has coal elsewhere but this coal was far distant. The solution adopted by the majority gives no coal to Poland. The Italian proposal would give Poland three to four million tons out of a yearly output of eleven million tons. From the ethnological point of view the majority solution handed over to Czechoslovakia a Polish population of 167,000 souls. This is a great danger and various persons lately returned from these regions asserted that this would produce a very perilous future for the country. The Italian Delegation considers therefore that the line it proposed safeguarded national sentiment to a greater degree, as it only attributed 50,000 Poles to the Czecho-Slovak state. It also divides the mining resources more equitably, in the proportion of one quarter to Poland and three quarters to Czechoslovakia. Finally, out of the four railway lines, the frontier only cuts the line Oderberg-Teschen. To preserve Czechoslovak interests all that is required is to put down a connecting line, no longer than 15 kilometres, which would make the whole line independent. While this work is in hand the line might be worked under the control of the Allies. Further, this shortening of the line would be very favorable to the Czechoslovaks as goods sent from Prague to Jablunkau would be saved the detour to the North via Teschen. It would seem therefore that the connecting line was sure to be built at some date. Lastly, the agitation among the mining population of Karwin must be taken into account. There were among this population more than 20,000 Poles absolutely determined to be attached to Poland. The Italian Delegation does not think that the proposal for wide local autonomy would satisfy the ethnological and economic desiderata of the Poles. The Italian Delegation therefore requests the Council to consider their proposal, which like the proposal of the majority, only seeks the best means of reconciling two future states which ought to preserve friendly relations.

Mr White says that Mr Lansing who is unfortunately unwell, had asked him to make a statement on his behalf. He greatly regrets that Mr Lansing has been unable to attend as he had studied the question very carefully. Mr Lansing does not consider that the decision on the subject of Teschen is very urgent, as it does not affect the frontiers of Germany with which the Conference was at present concerned. Mr Lansing thinks that it would be far better that representatives of the two states, namely, M Paderewski and M Benes, should discuss this problem in order that, failing complete agreement, they should at least reduce the divergences of view to the finest possible point. Should there remain any difficulties, an umpire could then be appointed. Mr Lansing further proposes that the Drafting Committee should slightly modify the article by which Germany undertakes to recognize new states, among others, the Czechoslovak Republic, in such a way as to require from Germany recognition of this state “within the frontiers subsequently to be laid down for it by the Allied and Associated Powers.” Mr. Lansing’s impression was that there had already been conversations between M Paderewski and M Benes and that little remained to bring about an agreement between them. Both these statesmen are Allied statesmen and it is in the interests of all that they should come to a mutual agreement if possible, without having any solution imposed upon them by the Conference.

Mr Balfour says that the statement just made by Mr White is very important. He was not aware that M Paderewski and M Benes were on the point of reaching an agreement; such a solution is undoubtedly the best as it would avoid any dictated agreement. For this reason, even if the chances are very small, he would prefer to adjourn the discussion, seeing that an immediate solution was not indispensable for the framing of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. He therefore supports Mr White’s proposal.

M Pichon agrees that this appears to be the best solution and asks whether the Commission has any objection.

M Cambon says that he sees none. He would point out, however, that the matter must form part of the Treaty with Austria. The solution therefore should not be too long delayed.

Mr White says he would see M Paderewski this evening and would, if so desired, beg him to hasten the solution as much as possible.

M Cambon says that, as Mr Lansing had been informed of these conversations, he thought it would be as well if he begged the Polish and Czechoslovak Ministers to reach not only a speedy agreement, but one likely to avoid any sense of soreness in future for either party. It must be remembered that Czechoslovakia is a state with a curious outline; this state would have to reorganize its means of communication radically. The connecting line proposed by S Martino might appear trifling in itself, but is not unimportant in connection with many other works of this kind that would have to be undertaken.

S Martino says that he very willingly supports Mr White’s proposal and is glad to learn that there was good hope of a solution. He had been quite unaware of any such conversations, but he has hopes that an agreement would be reached, as on November 5th last the two governments had already signed a compact, both concerning territorial questions and the possession of the mines.

Mr White says that he will inform Mr Lansing of the opinions just expressed. Mr Lansing had not been present at the conversations mentioned but had only been informed that they had taken place.

M Cambon said that as the Council proposed to allow conversations to continue between M Paderewski and M Benes, he could only express the wish that they would reach a satisfactory conclusion. He would point out, however, that the agreement of the 5th November had never been executed and for this reason the Commission had prepared a Note, in view of the decision to be taken by the Council, with the object of requesting the Governments at Prague and Warsaw to see that any decision reached should be executed. He suggests that this point should be made clear by Mr Lansing.

Mr White says he will inform Mr. Lansing.

(It is decided to postpone for the moment any solution of the Teschen question in the hope that M Paderewski and M Benes would reach an agreement).

c) Region of Ratibor: M Cambon says that this question is intimately connected with the question of Teschen. He thought that the Council might wait for the solution of the latter question.

Mr Balfour pointed out that it is urgent to settle the Ratibor point as it concerns the frontiers of Germany.

M Laroche says that the Commission has unanimously adopted a line which was submitted to Council. The object of this line was to attach to Moravia certain islands of Moravian population while respecting the Leobschutz-Ratibor line of communication which remains in Polish territory.

(The line of demarcation proposed by the Commissions on Polish and on Czechoslovak affairs in their report of April 6th is accepted.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Annexure “A”
Clauses Relating to the German Colonies, To Be Inserted in the Preliminaries of Peace

I The German subjects of European origin may not own property, reside, trade, or practice a profession in the former German colonies except by special authorization to that effect granted by the local authority.

II Goods of former German colonies shall, upon entering Germany, enjoy without reciprocity the treatment accorded to goods of the mandatory country.

III All personal and real property of the German State in former German colonies, pass in full right, without any compensation, to the Mandatory Power.

IV All personal and real properties, belonging to Germans of European origin in the former German colonies, shall become the property of the Government of the Mandatory Power, and the price of these real properties, as fixed by experts, shall be applied in deduction of the sums which Germany will have to pay in as reparation for damages caused by the war. The German Government shall indemnify the German owners.

V The German Government shall repatriate, at its own expense, within a period of three months from the date of the signing of the Preliminaries of Peace, those of its European nationals who still actually reside in the German colonies. It shall repatriate, on the same terms, those of its subjects who are from the mother country and who have taken refuge in the Spanish colonies of the Gulf of Guinea. Natives of the German colonies, now in refuge in these Spanish possessions, shall be left free by the German authorities, upon the signing of the Preliminaries of Peace, to return to their country of origin.

VI Conventions concluded for the construction or exploitation of public works in the German colonies, as also the sub-concessions or contracts resulting therefrom, whether for the advantage or at the cost of German nationals are cancelled outright.

The compensations to be paid under this head to German nationals, after having been determined by the local courts, shall remain a charge upon the German Government. The total of the amounts thus expended by the German State shall be allowed in deduction of the sums which Germany will have to pay out for reparation of damages caused by the war.

VII The German Government undertakes to pay, in accordance with the estimate to be presented by the French Government, reparation for damages suffered by French nationals in the former colony of the Cameroons or in adjoining regions by reason of the acts of the German civil and military authorities and of German private individuals before or during the period of hostilities.

VIII The conventions which determined the ownership of territories situated formerly in the German zones of the continent of Africa, having now given place to the provisions of the present treaty, the German Government recognizes that claims which might be presented in reliance upon the terms of those earlier instruments, are hereafter without purpose. Surety-bonds, guarantees of accounts, advances, etc., which would have been realized, by virtue of these instruments, in favor of the German Government, are transferred to the French Government.

IX Germany renounces in favor of the five Allied and Associated Powers all rights and titles in her overseas possessions.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


The Council has before it a printed Memorandum on the various documents prepared by the Committees in connection with Reparation.

1. Mr Lloyd George doubts the expediency of only having one representative for each nation on the Commission. He thinks the number should be two as it might be desirable to Members on have two types of men, for example, a financial and judicial expert.

Mr Davis points out that substitute members are provided for.

Mr Lamont says the point has been carefully considered and provided for by means of coadjutor delegates. It had been considered that if there are two delegates for each of the five nations the Commission would become unwieldy and it would hamper progress. In any case delegates would require experts and sub-commissions would have to be appointed.

President Wilson points out that it was the difference between the Quai d’Orsay Council of Ten and the recent conversations of the Council of Four. Mr Lloyd George agrees this is a very substantial difference.

M Clemenceau suggests that the coadjutor delegates practically provide what Mr Lloyd George asked for.

Mr Lloyd George says he would not press the matter.


2. Attention is next drawn to a clause prepared by the American Delegation providing for the right of withdrawal upon six months notice by any nation on the Commission.

President Wilson explains that, in his opinion, no nation ought to withdraw from a Commission but his legal advisers have informed him that no Treaty can be withdrawn from, or even renounced, unless there was a provision to that effect. He thought that public opinion in the United States would demand that there should be such a clause, although he hoped it would never be necessary to use it.

Mr Lloyd George asks for the substitution of 12 months notice instead of 6.

President Wilson agrees to accept this substitution.

(It is agreed that the clause providing for the right of withdrawal should be adopted with the substitution of 12 months notice instead of 6.)


3. Mr Davis says that the American Delegation considers that the secrecy provision should be withdrawn. The feeling is that to set up a secret clause in a public Treaty would make a bad public impression. If the delegates on the Commission are honest, they will not give out information; if they are dishonest, they will do so whether the clause is there or not.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the object of the clause is not to exclude Governments from making announcements but to prevent the officials on the Commission from doing so. He points out that it is vital in matters of finance that information which might affect the money markets should not be allowed to leak out.

President Wilson says that their objections are not to the actual secrecy but they wish to protect the Peace Conference against the attacks of those who declare that everything should be public. He agrees with Mr Davis that if discreet people are put on the Commission they will not give information away.

Mr Lamont suggests that every Government will give its own instructions to its own Delegates.

(It was agreed that Article 8 should be deleted.)


4. Arrangements for Determining the Amount and Conditions of Bonds, etc. Mr Davis says that the French and Italian Representatives are in agreement with the American Proposal.

Lord Sumner says that the Italians agree with the British Delegates; the United States and French Delegates are opposed to the British and Italian Delegates.

Mr Lloyd George explains that the British experts apprehend that if one Power is in a position to veto an issue of Bonds, it might be able to use this power to extort special terms. They might refuse to agree to an issue of Bonds, unless some special conditions were agreed to.

M Loucheur says that he agrees with the United States proposal.

Mr Lloyd George says that as he is alone in this matter, he will not press the objection.

(The American proposal for Clause is adopted.)


5. Determination of the Rate of Interest.
M Loucheur says that a point affecting the rate of interest has been overlooked from Article 20. He then reads the following extract from an Article prepared on the subject:

“La Commission déterminera périodiquement, à la majorité, le taux de l’intérêt (au maximum 5 p. 100) dont sera débitée l’Allemagne sur sa dette, telle que l’aura fixée la Commission, et aussi les dates à partir desquelles l’intérêt sera débité sur les montants respectifs de a dite dette.”2

This, M Loucheur says, is an American proposal. He says that originally a different text had been proposed based on the principle that a rate of 5% should be fixed leaving the Commission the right to fix a lower rate. Mr Norman Davis had objected to this. M. Loucheur’s recollection was that Mr. Lloyd George had supported Mr. Norman Davis on the ground that he considered it better from a political point of view to determine the rate of interest on the lines now proposed. The original proposal would appear to make concessions to the Germans and would create a bad impression from a political point of view.

Mr Lloyd George says that if the Germans are given a lower rate than 5% when the Allied and Associated Governments had to pay 5% themselves, public opinion would ask why the Germans should be allowed to pay less. On the other hand, if the general rate of interest should fall, he thought that Germany should have the benefit thereof and that the Commission should have the right to fix a lower rate of interest. So long as we pay 5%, the Germans should pay 5%. The Commission should not have the power to give the Germans any preferential rate of interest. He thought that it was more a question of form than of substance. Do not the American delegates agree that if we paid 5% the Germans should do the same?

President Wilson says that they all do. The only question is as to who should have power to lower the rate.

Mr Lloyd George proposed to leave this to the Commission. He would rather regulate the payment of interest altogether than the rate.

M Clemenceau and M Loucheur say that they agree.

(On Mr Lloyd George’s proposal, the drafting of a revised paragraph is left to the Expert Committee.)


6. Interest on Pensions. M Loucheur reads the following clause, which is a continuance of the clause quoted in the preceding section and which it is proposed should be added to Article 10:

“L’intérêt sera débité:

1) sur le montant des dommages matériels (pour la fraction correspondant à la valeur d’avant guerre), à partir du 11 novembre 1918;
2) pour les pensions, à partir du jour où elles sont payées par chaque pays intéressé.”

Mr Lloyd George considers a proposal as regards interest on material damage to be a mistake. If repairs are made in kind, it will mean interest is being paid on things rebuilt and it would be very difficult to assess the value. He does not, however, press the point. He does object strongly, however, to the arrangement for pensions under Clause (2). He explains that he only wants equal treatment for damage of all kinds. He cannot acknowledge that damage to houses was more important than damage to human life. The latter is irreparable. No fair interest on this could be paid unless the value of the pensions was capitalized. The same thing should be done whether it refers to a house or to a man. Supposing by May 1st, 1921, the Commission had established that the Bill for Housing was five thousand million pounds and for pensions three thousand million pounds. Both ought to be in the same category. He then calls attention to Annex I, Article I, Clause (e) and suggests that a clause based on the following words should be substituted for M Loucheur’s proposal:

“The amount due to the Allied and Associated Governments to be calculated for all of them as being capitalized cost of such payments on the basis of the scales in force in France at the date of the signature of this Treaty”.

This, he points out, will provide that Germany should not be responsible to go on paying for 60 years. The sum would be capitalized as arranged by the Commission.

M Loucheur says that French delegates will agree.

(Mr Lloyd George’s proposal is accepted.)


7. M Loucheur points out that the original date for the calculation of pensions, namely, November, 1918, does not take into account the fact that pensions have been paid by the various Governments long before that date. He suggested that some provision should be made for this.

Mr Lloyd George pointed out that this would be covered if the words “at the date of the signature of this Treaty” were added in the above clause after the words “capitalized cost”.

(The addition of these words is approved.)


8. Participation of Germany in the Proceedings of the Commission - Appendix: Annex 2, Article 13 Mr Lloyd George says he does not like the proposal that the Germans should not have power to challenge any proposal of the Commission. He agrees that they should not be able to prolong the discussion for years. Nevertheless, they ought to be able to make representations on any subject.

(At this moment Mr Lloyd George withdraws to keep another appointment.)

Lord Sumner says that Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal is to leave out the following words: “in the discussion of the general rules as to the measure of damages only”.

President Wilson pointed out that this clause contravenes the original bases laid down in Clause 3 of the Reparation Provisions. He proposes to cut the whole clause out.

(After some discussion, it is agreed that the Clause should read as follows:

“The Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard but not to take part in any decision of the Commission whatever”.)


9. President Wilson draws attention to the article the American Delegation proposed to substitute.

Basis for Estimating Germany’s Capacity To pay.—Appendix: Annex 2, Article 15 (b) Lord Sumner says that the fact is that at present the burden of taxation is heavier in Allied countries than in Germany. Yet Germany might plead her poverty, and say she could not pay. It was common ground that the actual taxation was a related matter that must be taken into account.

(President Wilson agrees.)

What the British Delegation submitted, and thought it was not too much to ask, was that the Commission should not have the right to relieve Germany until Germany had made an attempt to raise her taxation to the amount borne by the most heavily taxed of the Allied Powers represented on the Commission. They recognized that additional taxation would not necessarily bring in money which could be used to pay outside Germany. They recognized also that such taxation might even depreciate Germany’s capacity to pay. That was the reason why they said that if the taxation was too high the Commission should be permitted to accept the plea of poverty. The British Delegation felt that it was not right that the Commission should be able to remit, unless German taxation was proportionately as high as that of the most heavily taxed Allied country. He agrees it is certainly necessary to trust the Commission, but the whole of these arrangements would be subjected to very close criticism, and it would be difficult to convince public opinion if it thought that Germany could be relieved of taxation on the ground of its poverty, whilst we ourselves were more heavily taxed and had equally heavy engagements to meet. If the Commission exercises great wisdom, he agreex that the difficulty would be avoided.

President Wilson says that under the American scheme the Commission would not be able to admit the plea of poverty unless Germany had taxed herself to an extent at least equal to the taxation of other Powers. He agrees that the Commission must be given some standards of taxation by which to judge of Germany’s ability to pay. It might be, however, that an additional burden would not give a greater yield of power to pay. He feels, however, that it is making a mistake to try to foresee situations too far in advance. If this were done, only second-rate men would be induced to serve on the Commission. He wishes to get the biggest men possible, since the financial arrangements of the world would depend on its operations. Hence, he would deprecate definite and rigid instructions, and his French colleagues agree with him. He thought that the standard of justice was as distinctly laid down in one draft as in the other.

M Loucheur says he agreed with the American draft.

Mr Lloyd George (who has meanwhile returned) says he would withdraw his objections.

(The American proposal with the French additions is adopted.)


10. Issue of Certificates by the Commission Regarding Bonds Held for the Benefit of Different Government. Appendix: Annex 2, Article 16 Mr Lloyd George accepts the French proposal.


11. Sanctions. Appendix: Annex 2, Article 18 President Wilson points out that the United States representatives have accepted the principle of Sanctions, but are not prepared to approve the form of words proposed in the draft. He then reads a simpler and shorter formula.

M Klotz said that he would accept, with the addition of the words “or financial” after “economic”. The following substitute for the second and third sub-paragraphs of this Article is adopted:

“The measures which the Allied and Associated Governments shall have the right to take, and which Germany hereby agrees not to consider as acts of war may include economic or financial prohibition and reprisals, and in general such other measures as the respective Government may determine to be necessary in the premise”.

(Just as the Meeting is breaking up, it is agreed in addition to omit the last paragraph of Article 18.)


12. Form of Payment. Appendix: Annex 2, Article 19 Mr Lloyd George thinks that this Article is too stiff. It would give the Commission power practically to take any property or material to which it took a fancy.

President Wilson agrees with Mr Lloyd George. He is seeing this clause for the first time. What he wants is to avoid even the appearance of a Brest-Litovsk forced Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that his objections would be surmounted by omitting in line 3 “demanded or”. He has no objection to the Commission accepting payment in the forms proposed, but they should not have power to demand it.

President Wilson agrees.

(It is agreed to omit in line 3 the words “demanded or”, and in addition, to omit the second sub-paragraph of Article 19.)


13. Merchant Shipping. Appendix: Annex 3 German Ships in American Ports President Wilson draws attention to amendments proposed by the United States Delegation.

President Wilson says that the claim for the German ships seized in United States ports was almost the only reparation claim put forward by the United States of America. Other powers, with their full acquiescence, were to be reimbursed for pensions. In the course of the war, the United States of America had taken over the German ships in their ports and had secured their title to them by law. The ships had been so damaged that millions of dollars had had to be spent on their repairs and new methods that had to be devised. Throughout, these ships had been used for the indispensable transport of the American armies to France. It would not be tolerable to public opinion in the United States if their title to these ships was not recognized. This had nothing to do with the payment of owners which the United States contemplated, but only to their title. It would be intolerable if anyone questioned the title which had been legally established under full process of their rights as a belligerent.

Mr Lloyd George says that if he goes into the whole case, he would show there were serious grounds which made it impossible for the British Government to accept. If he accepts it would not be merely a matter affecting the United States of America. This is an easy matter which he would not contest. It would, however, affect neutrals and other belligerents. Neutrals would benefit by this to the extent of 794,000 tons of shipping. Brazil to the extent of 216,000 tons. This means a loss not only of cash but of ships which were even more important. Brazil lost 25,000 tons and had seized 216,000 tons in her ports and would consequently profit enormously by the transaction. France lost 950,000 tons and would only be able to keep 45,000 tons; that is to say, France would only get less than 1/20th of her loss. The United States lost 389,000 tons and would get 628,000 tons. The British Empire lost 7,740,000 tons and would only get 400,000 tons. During the war Great Britain after allowing for shipbuilding had lost a balance of 4,500,000 tons. There is a great difference between the value of ships to Great Britain and the United States. It is like the value of ships to a fisherman compared with ships to a swell yachtsman. Great Britain lives on ships and it is a very serious matter to her. There is first the case of the neutrals who would walk off with 800,000 tons. In reply to President Wilson’s suggestion that this could be avoided he thought it would be difficult. The German ships in American ports had been driven to take refuge there by the action of the Navies of France and Great Britain. They only escaped capture because they took refuge in United States ports. He could not help thinking that the whole of shipping should be put in “hotchpot”. The United States would then certainly get all that she had lost.

President Wilson says they had lost not only ships but thousands of lives. In other countries such lives were being provided for by reparation arrangements, but that America was making no such claim and it would be intolerable to public opinion if it were not agreed that the United States should retain these ships.

Mr Lloyd George says he would be glad to enter into an arrangement but objected to the participation of Brazil, who had no claim for walking off with so many ships. Brazil’s whole trade was protected by our Fleet.

President Wilson says this argument does not apply to the United States, who had made an invaluable contribution to the war. The United States does not mean to take over the ships without payment.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not object to some arrangement whereby the United States would retain all of the enemy ships which they had taken over, but that he did object to the proposed American clauses being put into the Peace Treaty which would permit other countries whose rights were not the same as those of the United States, to retain the enemy ships taken over by them.

Mr Lloyd George proposes, therefore, that Annex III should stand as at present for insertion without alteration in the Peace Treaty, but that an agreement be made by the Allied Governments with the United States, providing for the retention by the United States of enemy ships now in its possession, against payment.

President Wilson states this would be acceptable to him provided a satisfactory agreement in accordance with the American amendment is drawn and executed by the Allies with the United States prior to the execution of the Treaty.

(The following alterations are made during the interval when the Conference had broken up into groups. The Secretary is unable to follow the precise reasons for the decision.)


14. Payment in Kind. Appendix 1, Annex 4. After some discussion it is agreed to omit para 2(c) and (d) and the last para of 6.


15. Legislation by Germany. Main Clauses Para. 10

(It is agreed to omit the following words at the end of para. 10:”and to the decisions and orders of the above named Commission from time to time.” The para. therefore reads as follows: ”Germany undertakes to pass any legislation and to issue any orders and decrees that may be necessary to give complete effect to these clauses”.)

16. Mr Lloyd George asks what would be the position of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

President Wilson considers that these would not be entitled to claim reparation since they had been part of enemy countries.

Mr Lloyd George asked what would be the position of Romania and Serbia, which had annexed very large territories in Transylvania and Yugoslavia respectively. These countries would not only escape the debts of the Austrian Empire to which they had formerly belonged, but would also escape the burdens imposed on the Allies. He thought the best plan was that proposed by S Orlando, that there should be a sort of ledger account in relation to these territories. On one side of the account would be the liability that the annexed territories would have had for a share of the Austrian debt and indemnity and on the other side of the account would be their share in the claim of Romania and Serbia respectively for indemnity. This would be set off one against the other and they would be credited with the balance.

Mr Norman Davis asks what would happen if the balance was a debit instead of a credit.

Mr Lloyd George says in that case there would be no claim.


17. (The above arrangement is agreed to.) M Klotz asks what would be the position of the subjects of Allied and Associated countries established in a country like Poland whose property had been destroyed. They would not claim compensation from Poland; ought it not to be provided that they should claim against Germany?

Mr Lloyd George points out that they are provided for by Annex I, Article I (a).

It is also pointed out that they are provided for by Article 3, where the words used were “wherever situated”.


18. Consultation With the Smaller Powers: After a somewhat prolonged discussion, the following arrangements are agreed to for consultation with the Powers with special interest on the subject of the reparation clauses. The Expert Committee, which had been advising the Supreme Council, should divide itself into groups and each group should see a group of nations of the Powers with special interests. M. Loucheur undertook to organize this arrangement. Those States which have observations to make should subsequently have the right of consulting the Supreme Council.


19. The Return of Animals Taken From Invaded Territories

M Loucheur proposed the following addition to Article 7 of the reparation clauses:

“Si une moitié au moins des animaux pris par l’ennemi dans les territoires envahis ne peut être identifiée et restituée, le reste, jusqu’à concurrence de la moitié du nombre enlevé, sera livré par l’Allemagne à titre de restitution.”

(After considerable discussion, it is agreed that M Loucheur’s proposed addition to Article 7 should not be inserted in the Treaty of Peace; his proposal should, however, form the subject of a separate agreement between the Allies, a draft text of the agreement to be prepared and submitted by M Loucheur.)

20. Categories of Damage: M Klotz proposes the addition of the following new category of damage:

“Dépenses engagées par l’Etat, ou pour son compte et avec son autorisation, pour ravitailler, transporter ou secourir la population civile des territoires occupés et la population civile réfugiée ou évacuée.”5

Mr Lloyd George says that if new categories are put in, the British Government would have a number of new categories which it would wish to introduce.

(It is agreed that the addition proposed by M Klotz related to a question of the interpretation to be given to the categories already accepted and should be referred without delay for consideration to the Commission on Reparations.)


21. Valuation: M Klotz makes a proposal for putting a valuation clause in the Treaty in regard to property for which reparation was to be given. This is necessary owing to the change of value between 1914 and the present time.

(It is agreed that the Expert Committee should meet to prepare a text.)

The Conclusions, as revised by the Expert Drafting Committee, will be forwarded later.



[Appendix I to IC–176A]
Reparation

1. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of herself and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of the enemy States.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the financial resources of Germany are not adequate after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other treaty clauses to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and the German Government undertakes that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied or Associated Powers and to their property by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air.

3. The amount of such damage (as set forth under the specific categories attached hereto) for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be constituted in the form and with the powers set forth hereunder and in the Annexes hereto. This Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard. The findings of the Commission as to the amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to Germany on or before the 1st May, 1921, as representing the extent of their obligations. The Commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from the 1st May, 1921. In the event, however, that within the period mentioned, Germany shall have failed to discharge her obligation, then any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the Commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years: or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments, acting through the Commission, shall determine.

4. The Inter-Allied Commission shall thereafter, from time to time, consider the resources and capacity of Germany and, after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to extend the date, and to modify the form of payments, such as are to be provided for in Clause 3: but not to cancel any part, except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented upon the Commission.

5. In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claim, Germany shall pay in such installments and in such manner (whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise) as the Inter-Allied Commission may fix, before the 1st May, 1921, the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gold marks and pending payment of this sum she shall deposit bonds as security in the manner prescribed in Clause XV (c) (1) of Annex 2 attached hereto. Out of this sum the expenses of the army of occupation subsequent to the armistice shall first be met, provided that such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Allied and Associated Governments to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation may also, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments, be paid for out of the above sum, and the balance shall be reckoned towards liquidation of the above claims for reparation. She shall further deposit bonds as prescribed in Clause XV (c) of Annex 2 attached Thereto.

Ships shall be handed over by Germany to the Commission at the time and in the manner stated in Annex III and in all respects in compliance therewith.

6. The successive installments including the above sum paid over by the enemy States in satisfaction of the above claims will be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance, on a basis of general equity, and of the rights of each.

7. In addition to the payments mentioned above Germany shall effect restitution in cash of cash taken away, seized or sequestrated, and also restitution in kind of animals, objects of every nature and securities taken away, seized or sequestrated, in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them in enemy territory.

8. The German Government undertakes to make forthwith the restitution contemplated by Article 7 and to make the payments contemplated by Articles 3, 4 and 5.

9. The German Government recognizes the Commission provided for by Article 3 as the same may be constituted by the Allied and Associated Governments in accordance with Schedule II attached hereto, and agrees irrevocably to the possession and exercise by such Commission of the power and authority given it by Articles 3, 4 and 5. The German Government will supply to the Commission all the information which the Commission may require relative to the financial situation and operations and to the property, productive capacity and stocks and current production of raw materials and manufactured articles of the German Government, its States, Municipalities and other governmental subdivisions and of its nationals and corporations, and accords to the members of the Commission and its authorized agents the same rights and immunities as are enjoyed in Germany by duly accredited diplomatic agents of friendly Powers. The German Government further agrees to provide for the compensation and expenses of the Commission and of such staff as it may employ.

10. Germany undertakes to pass any legislation and to issue any orders and decrees that may be necessary to give complete effect to these clauses and to the decisions and orders of the above-named Commission from time to time.

11. These shall be reckoned as a credit to the German Government in respect of the payments due from it under the above clauses, the following items arising out of other Articles of this Treaty and its Annexes:

i) Any final balance in favour of Germany under Article of Part IV of the Economic Terms.

ii) Any sums due to Germany in respect of property or material delivered under the Armistice Terms or its extensions.

iii) Any sums due to Germany in respect of transfers under Article XIII of the Financial Terms.

iv) Any sums due to Germany in respect of transfers under Articles 19, 37 and 51 of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Terms.




Two more Appendices and six Annexes were attached to the original document. To include them would have taken several times the space and they are all detail lists of what is to be paid for what Items. I would not normally included the one I did but it gives the actual summary of what Germany was expected to pay by the Allies.
-Steve

[Jimbuna]

24th April 1919

A British military policeman and a German policeman outside the Cathedral in occupied Cologne. The notice board behind them lists procedures if a civil disturbance breaks out.


A despatch rider of the Army Signals, Royal Engineers, in mackintosh riding kit by his motorcycle. Near Cologne.


The German submarine, U 53, at New York, April 24, 1919. U-53 is noted for sinking USS Jacob Jones (DD 61) on December 6, 1917. She surrendered on December 1, 1918 and was broken up at Swansea in 1922.


Zhan Tianyou, engineer known as the “Father of China’s Railroad” for constructing the first railroad in China without foreign assistance, has passed away.


Ship Losses:

LV-51 (United States Lighthouse Service) The lightship was rammed and sunk while relieving Comfield Point Station.
Solid (Sweden) The cargo ship, en route from Montrose to Karlstad, struck a mine at a position northeast of Skagen Lighthouse, and sank quickly. The crew was saved.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, April 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. Mr. Lloyd George reports a conversation that he had with S Orlando that morning, in which he pointed out the whole of the difficulties in which S Orlando is placed. S Orlando had said that he was contemplating a reply to President Wilson’s manifesto. Publication of President Wilson’s manifesto had been held up and it would only be published together with S Orlando’s reply. This reply S Orlando had promised would be couched in moderate language and would not close the door to further negotiations. Mr Lloyd George had specially pressed that it should not commit the Italians in regard to Fiume. S Orlando had agreed on this point. S Orlando had said that he was willing to leave Baron Sonnino in Paris. Mr Lloyd George’s impression, however, was that S Orlando would like to stay. He had intimated that it would help him if a communique could be issued in the Press to the effect that at the request of M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George, as representing the countries signatory to the Treaty of London, he had agreed to defer his departure.

President Wilson points out that this would place him in an invidious position. The issue is fundamental to him as to whether the United States can take part in any part of the Treaty of London referring to districts south of Istria. The impression has already been conveyed in the Press that the Signatories of the Treaty of London are divided from the United States of America. It has not been possible for him to let the Italian people get their version of what had occurred from a poisoned Press; consequently, he had been bound to issue his manifesto. It was a friendly message to set out the case to the Italian people. If only some time were gained, he thinks that the Italian people would realize their position and that the present ferment would settle down. Hence, he would be glad if S Orlando could remain in Paris at least a week.

Mr Lloyd George asks M Clemenceau whether he is satisfied with Mr Balfour’s draft letter to S Orlando.

M Clemenceau says that with a few verbal alterations he is satisfied. He says he will bring these in the afternoon.

President Wilson says he has not seen the latest version of the draft.

Mr Lloyd George promises him a copy.

After some further discussion, the following conclusions are reached:

1) Mr. Lloyd George should ask S Orlando if he would issue the following communique:

"At the request of President Wilson, Monsieur Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George, Signor Orlando has agreed to defer his departure to Italy with a view to seeing whether it is not still possible to accommodate the difficulties which have arisen about Fiume and the Dalmatian coast."

2) Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau should arrange for the final draft of the letter to S Orlando and sign it jointly.

3) Mr Lloyd George should send President Wilson a copy of the proposed letter to S Orlando.

Mr Philip Kerr is sent by Mr. Lloyd George with the draft communique to S Orlando but the latter does not consider publication desirable. At the very end of the meeting, at the moment of adjournment, Count Aldrovandi arrives with a message from S Orlando to the effect that he and his colleagues had come to the conclusion that the best plan would be for them to meet the Supreme Council that afternoon at President Wilson’s house.

(This is agreed to.)


2. M Clemenceau says that since the discussion of previous day the Germans have announced officially that seven journalists will accompany their Delegation. He asks what attitude he is to take.

President Wilson points out that although he does not much care to have the journalists present, nevertheless, they will be confined by the same restrictions as the Plenipotentiaries.

M Clemenceau said that he cannot have them free to move about in Paris.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that, so long as they are restricted in the same manner as the Plenipotentiaries, the German papers are entitled to receive such information as they can obtain from them.

(It was agreed that journalists should be allowed to accompany the German Delegation but should be confined by the same restrictions as the Delegation itself.)


3. Mr Lloyd George again reverts to the question of publicity on which he says he felt very strongly, so strongly, indeed, that he would almost have to make a protest. Since the previous discussion he has seen Captain Gibson, an Officer just returned from Berlin, who had expressed the view that if the terms are published it might be impossible for the Germans to sign, as publication will strengthen the hands of the extremists. He himself feels that it would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Allied and Associated Powers to give way on points that really were not of very great importance. There is a long discussion on this subject, which follows much the same lines of the discussion on the previous day.

M Clemenceau’s point of view is that publication is quite unavoidable. If the Allied and Associated Powers do not publish the Germans will. He has had to grant them free telegraphic and telephonic facilities; the German Delegation will be accompanied by 40 telegraphists; and it is certain that within three days the whole Peace Treaty will be published by the enemy. The Allied peoples ought not to learn the contents of the Peace Treaty first from enemy sources. Public opinion will, in a few days, compel publication of the Peace Treaty. In any case there will be leakages.

Mr Lloyd George’s view is that leakages are not of very material consequence. In Great Britain the public does not attach much importance to leakages. Once everything is announced officially they know it to be true and it will be extremely difficult to recede from any position taken up.

President Wilson’s point of view is that although publication is undesirable it is, he believes, also unavoidable. He quotes some information that he had received from an Officer in the United States 3rd Army, who had had a talk with Brockdorff Rantzau. The latter expressed surprise at receiving an invitation to Versailles and assumed that it meant that Germany would be asked to sign practically an imposed Peace. He had considered the terms, as published, to amount to slavery for Germany and had referred particularly to the Saar Valley and Silesia. He said that he should never consent to a Peace giving up these districts, even temporarily, and that the German Ministry could not agree to such terms. He had believed that the German people would support them in not signing such terms. When asked as to how Germany could continue to exist without outside relief, in the event of her not signing, he had given no reply, though he had thrown out the suggestion that they might turn towards Russia. The American Officer had gathered that there would be no strong protest against the provisions as regards Alsace-Lorraine and Indemnity, although some difficulty would be made over Danzig. The serious points of the Treaty, however, would be the Saar Valley and Silesia. Brockdorff Rantzau had appeared very depressed. The same informant had stated that the idea of a plebiscite was being discussed a good deal in Germany and might be carried out. The independent socialists would accept it.

President Wilson interprets this telegram to mean that Brockdorff Rantzau typifies the extreme point of view. In the background he believes there is a more submissive body of opinion. His informant had suggested that the German people ought to know that a certain amount of discussion would be permitted. He himself is inclined to agree in the proposal that the discussion should take place in writing. As regards publicity, he inclines towards Mr Balfour’s view that a summary rather than the actual text should be published in the first instance. The preparation of the summary was a matter of the very first importance.

M Clemenceau says he will consult M Tardieu in regard to this. He asks how long the summary should be.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it should be as short as possible.


4. President Wilson reads a report from the Ports and Waterways Commission, which had been asked to consider the question of the Kiel Canal. The only controversial point is Article 7, in regard to which two versions had been submitted, one by the United States of America, British, Italian and Japanese Delegations, and one by the French.

M Clemenceau says he is particularly anxious that Admiral de Bon should be heard on the subject of the fortification of the Canal.

President Wilson says that his feeling on this matter is that if Germany had no fortifications, she might be unable to carry out her obligation to keep the canal open if she ever becomes involved in war with any power. The provision for no fortification is not consistent with the provision for keeping the Canal open.

(It is agreed that Admiral Hope, Admiral Benson, and Admiral de Bon should be seen that afternoon.)

Note: This is subsequently cancelled in consequence of the receipt of a communication from S Orlando.


5. Mr. Lloyd George reads a memorandum which was presented to him by Mr. Headlam-Morley on the subject of the Saar Valley.

(After a short discussion, it is agreed that the United States, British, and French experts should be authorized to visit the Saar Valley, in order to advise on the question.)


6. Sir Maurice Hankey states that the report of the Economic Commission has been circulated. He learned by telephone from Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith that some of the principal delegates on the Commission, namely M Clémentel, M Crespi, Mr. Baruch, and himself, had met on the previous evening, and after a very long discussion, had agreed to four out of the five outstanding points.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to summon the Economic experts for 16:30 hours.)

Note: This is subsequently cancelled, owing to the receipt of a communication from S Orlando.

[Jimbuna]

25th April 1919

ANZAC troops marching in London, passing Australia House, for ANZAC Day.


First Anzac Day parade on Queen Street in Brisbane.


Air Commodore Alfred Cecil Critchley who served in the British Royal Air Force with Sir Henry Worth Thornton president of Canadian National Railways. The men are arriving in New York City on the ship Aquitania.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, April 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. M Loucheur says that he, Lord Cunliffe and Mr Lamont, in accordance with the decision taken the previous day, had interviewed the representatives of Belgium, Serbia, Portugal and Brazil, and had explained to them the reparation clauses. The results of the interview had been set forth in a memorandum which M Loucheur had prepared, but might be summarized as follows:

Belgium demands the costs of the war, provisions as regards certain works of art and certain new categories of damage.

Serbia demands to be represented on the Commission and had made some small demand in regard to categories.

Brazil claims the same treatment as the United States of America in regard to captured enemy ships.

Portugal claims the costs of the war and reparation for shipping.

All ask to be heard by the Supreme Council.

M Loucheur suggests that, as Belgium was the most important, her representatives should be heard separately.

President Wilson thinks this is quite right.

Mr Lloyd George says he has received a letter from Lord Sumner describing the interview which he and some of his colleagues had had with the representatives of Romania, Greece and Japan. Romania has said nothing, but has given the impression of being not very contented. Greece has been satisfied. The Japanese representative has been enigmatic and they have not been able to judge of his attitude.

No complaints nor demands have been made. This is a matter that will have to be dealt with by the Supreme Council. In regard to the ships, he has always felt that Brazil would take this attitude.

President Wilson remarks that the difference between the case of Brazil and that of the United States is very great.


2. The Supreme Council has before them the articles prepared by the Economic Commission.

Economic Commission: Articles To Be Inserted in the Treaty of Peace With Germany.

President Wilson says that the differences between the experts are now very few and he proposes that they should only discuss those articles to which his colleagues wished to draw attention.

a) President Wilson says that one of the points in which the United States of America are especially interested is raised in Part I, Chapter D, Article 1. Although it is a matter of policy, it does not directly affect the United States of America. The point he wishes to raise refers to the limitation to be imposed on the duration of these clauses. What the United States are particularly interested in is a uniform provision as to the length of time for which these articles are to be applicable. They desire an automatic application of a term of 5 years, at the end of which the articles should cease to be operative except under some action by the League of Nations. The alternative proposal is that they should remain operative until they are terminated by some affirmative action by the League of Nations. The United States’ view is that they ought to terminate automatically unless renewed.

Sir Robert Borden says that the discussion at the British Empire Delegation centered on this point. The general view had been that the articles should be terminated unless renewed by the League of Nations.

President Wilson says this is precisely his view.

Mr Lloyd George asks how the matter stands in the report.

M. Baruch says that the articles would continue until terminated by the League of Nations.

M Clémentel says that there are two classes of articles to be considered. The first class deals with customs and the second class deals with the treatment of nationals of Allied and Associated Powers in ex-enemy countries, etc. and shipping. In regard to customs, it has been generally accepted that the provisions should terminate automatically at the end of 5 years, unless renewed by a decision of the League of Nations, which, he remarked, was rather difficult and uncertain, because a unanimous decision is necessary and any one party is at liberty to refuse assent. He asks that it should be remembered what Germany had done not only during the war but before the war. Countries like France, for example, had suffered very much from Germany’s action before the war, in her attempts to capture the iron trade; to obtain control of such articles as bauxite in order to get the aluminum trade under control; and in regard to dyestuffs, where she had checked competition. To this must be added what had happened during the war, when prodigious damage had been inflicted by Germany, both of a material and personal character. When this was borne in mind, the difficulty would be realized for peoples who had so suffered to forget within so short a term as 5 years. If the provisions came to an end at the end of 5 years, those countries would be obliged to receive the Germans in the same position as before the war. If they refused, they would, of course, be exposed to reciprocal treatment by Germany. It has been suggested that the invaded countries should receive separate treatment, and that the provisions should continue automatically unless stopped.

President Wilson says that M. Clémentel’s argument proved too much. If the League of Nations could not extend the period because it would not be able to reach a unanimous decision, it would equally be unable for the same reason to terminate the operation of the provisions. He, himself, thinks that it is a mistake to suppose that the League of Nations would not be able to reach unanimity.

M. Clémentel says that it is realized that the system cannot be permanent. What is proposed is a maximum period within which the provisions should operate. The first proposal is for 20 years. Now, however, this has been reduced to 10 years. Five years is, in his opinion, too short a period. The result of fixing only 5 years would be that France would have to shut the Germans out, in which case they would receive reciprocal treatment in Germany.

M Clemenceau says that he would accept the demand for 10 years as a maximum for countries that had been ravaged.

Mr Baruch says that the United States Delegates on the Commission think five years is too long. He hopes, therefore, that five years would be accepted as the maximum unless the League of Nations decides to prolong it. His personal view is that five years is too long.

M Clemenceau says that it should be taken into account that the different nations had not been affected during the War in the same manner. In France damage had been done which would be perceptible for more than a century. Nations which had taken part in the War and had not been exposed to the same terrible suffering as France naturally had not the same mentality as a country which could not be completely repaired for more than a century. In his view, five years might be adopted for all countries but a special provision should be made for countries like France which were in a different position.

Sir Robert Borden suggests that the five years which has already been fixed should be adopted as a minimum and ten years should be taken as the maximum period. The League of Nations should have power to appoint a Commission which should, by majority, fix a period for which in particular cases an extension should be granted, such extension not to go beyond a maximum of ten years from the original date.

M Clemenceau says France would accept that proposal.

Mr Lloyd George also agrees in the proposal.

President Wilson says that one aspect is constantly in his mind in regard to the whole of the Treaty with Germany. When the German plenipotentiaries come to Versailles they will be representatives of a very unstable Government. Consequently, they will have to scrutinize every item, not merely to say that it was equitable, but also as to whether it could be agreed to without their being unseated. If the present Government is unseated, a weaker Government will take its place. Hence the question has to be studied like a problem of dynamics concerning the action of forces in a body in unstable equilibrium. Any special restrictions on their nationals which they cannot meet by corresponding restrictions will place them in difficulties. The Treaty will hit them very hard since it will deprive them of their Mercantile Marine; will affect their international machinery for commerce; will deprive them of their property in other countries; will open their country by compulsion to enterprising citizens of other countries without enabling their enterprising citizens to try and recover their position in foreign countries. He does not think that the fact has been sufficiently faced that Germany cannot pay in gold unless she has a balance of trade in her favour. This means that Germany must establish a greater foreign commerce than she had before the war if she is to be able to pay. Before the war the balance of trade in Germany’s favour had never equaled the amounts which she will now have to pay. If too great a handicap is imposed on Germany’s resources we will not be able to get what Germany owes for reparation. Moreover, if the business world realizes that this is the case the securities on which the payment of reparation will depend will have no value. If this reasoning is sound it provides a formidable argument. He only looks towards reaching a peace and in doing so putting Germany in the position to build up a commerce which will enable her to pay what she ought to pay in order to make good the robbery and destruction she had perpetrated. But if the robber was to be in such a position that he cannot pay the penalties will be inoperative. These penalties ought to be operative and real. We ought to see that Germany can put herself in a position where she can be punished. At the present time we are sending food to Germany but she will not be able to pay for that for more than about two months.

M Clémentel says he thinks there is some misunderstanding. There is perfect agreement as far as customs clauses are concerned, namely, that they should terminate at the end of five years or that at the end of four years the League of Nations should consider whether there is to be any extension. As regards persons it is not desirable from Germany’s point of view that it should be automatically terminated too soon, as if it were, Germans in countries like France would be exposed to violence. He will be quite satisfied if Sir Robert Borden’s proposal is adopted. The countries concerned will then have a right to state before the Commission set up by the League of Nations whether public opinion would enable them to terminate the provisions at the end of five years or would render it desirable to extend the term of their operation. Nothing will be gained by Germany by unduly shortening the period. In accepting Sir Robert Borden’s proposal France is making a considerable concession when it is remembered that 20 years had been the period originally proposed.

President Wilson says he does not much like Sir Robert Borden’s proposal and he thinks it is a mistake. He thought it would be quite safe to decide that the provisions should terminate in five years unless continued by the League of Nations. He would point out that the term used should either be ‘Council of the League’ or ‘Body of Delegates’.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is the case.

President Wilson says that he wants in every possible case to yield to the desire of his French colleagues. He realizes to the full the position of the French Government and people and the suffering which France had undergone. Although it is a serious matter for the treaty as a whole, therefore, he would accept Sir Robert Borden’s suggestion but he urges that the clauses should be very precisely drawn.

Sir Robert Borden says he will be glad to cooperate with the Drafting Committee.

(Sir Robert Borden’s proposal is accepted, namely that the period during which the provisions should apply should be fixed at five years unless extended by the League of Nations. The maximum period to which the extension could be made should be ten years from the original date. The League of Nations should by majority vote set up a Commission which by majority vote should decide the length of any extension within the total period of ten years.)

The Drafting Committee of the Commission should formulate the necessary amendments to be forwarded to the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference.


3. President Wilson asks Dr Taussig to explain points which arose on the clauses in Article 4.

Dr Taussig illustrates the point raised by Article in the following manner:

Supposing a German subject possesses property in Italy, the Article provides that such property could be utilized towards the payment of amounts due to subjects of the Allied or Associated Powers in regard to property which they had in German territory. The question is whether, in the event of there being a surplus on the German property, it could be used to make good debts owed to Allied and Associated subjects in Austria or other enemy territory. The Italian Delegation had taken the view that it could be so used, but the United States Delegation had reserved their adhesion.

Mr Lloyd George says he agrees with the Italian view. The principle of joint liability by enemy powers had been accepted in regard to reparation, and he thought it would be difficult to avoid applying the principle here also.

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith points out that compensation to the enemy subjects in such case is provided for, but will have to be paid by the enemy Government concerned.

President Wilson says he does not much like the Article, but he will not press his objections.

(The Article was accepted.)


(Conclusion: Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward the Report of the Economic Commission to the Secretary General for Conclusion communication to the Drafting Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference as soon as the expert Drafting Committee has completed the necessary alterations in the Articles.)
__________________

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, April 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:30

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. The Supreme Council has before it the draft of articles concerning the Kiel Canal for insertion in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the French and Italian delegates have put forward a proposal for the destruction of the fortifications of the Kiel Canal. Pie (this seems to be a person not on the Delegate's List whose first name and position I can't find - Steve) understands that the subject of fortifications was dealt with in the Naval Terms, which only permitted Germany to retain works of a defensive nature. The result of the application of this principle was that no works of defense will be allowed at the Kiel end of the Canal, because these would have an offensive character since they would threaten the entrances to the Baltic.

Admiral Benson says that the object in prohibiting these defensive works at the Kiel end is not connected with the Kiel Canal at all, but is to prevent interference with the natural waterway into the Baltic.

Mr Lloyd George points out that against the proposal to destroy the defensive measures at the Elbe end of the Canal is the argument that in 15 minutes the Canal could be rendered unnavigable by dropping mines in it.

Admiral de Bon says the reason for which the French and Italian Admirals have proposed the destruction of the defenses at the Elbe end of the Canal is because, if the navigation of the Kiel Canal is to be free at all, it must be absolutely free. As regards the argument that the Canal could be rendered unnavigable by laying mines, he points out that by doing so the Germans would deprive themselves of the use of the Canal. Nothing could suit us better than that. The Kiel Canal doubles the efficiency of the German Fleet, and if they deprive themselves of it, nothing could be better. From a commercial point of view, the traffic through the Kiel Canal might become very important. It is capable of carrying 11,000,000 tons a year, and might become as important a waterway as the Belts. As regards the argument which has been used in informal conversation while the Council was assembling, that fortifications could be rapidly improvised, this is equally true as regards the Belts. Fortifications could be improvised here also. Hence, there was no argument in regard to the Belts that could not be equally applied to the Elbe.

Mr Lloyd George says that in the Naval Terms it had been decided that Germany should be in a position to defend her ports against the enemy. We could not deprive the Kiel Canal of its fortifications without leaving the Elbe unfortified.

Admiral Benson raises the question of the removal of the fortifications at the Kiel end. He is inclined to question whether we are not going too far. This will leave a large part of the Baltic coast totally undefended. The British representative had suggested that Germany might be allowed some fortification at the Kiel end of the Canal. The general principles to which we are working is that natural waterways should not be fortified. There should be free communication through them both in Peace and in War. It has been decided to remove the defenses at the Kiel end because the range of modern guns placed to command the approaches to the Belts happened to take in the Kiel Canal and Baltic Coast of Germany.

Mr Lloyd George say he hopes the French Delegation would not press for the inclusion of this Article.

President Wilson says that as a matter of fact the provisions it is proposed to impose for the Kiel Canal are practically identical with the United States arrangements for the Panama Canal, which had been arranged between the United States of America and Great Britain. These provisions were based on the principle of the Canal being available for use on the same terms by ships of all countries, except in time of war. The Panama Canal, however, was very vulnerable to attack, and provision had had to be made for its defense. Consequently, it has been very heavily fortified.

M Clemenceau points out that the Suez Canal has no fortifications, and these are prohibited.

Admiral Hope points out that we cannot use the Canal if we are at war with Germany.

Admiral Benson says that nothing could suit the enemy better than to get ships into the Canal in the event of war, and then to block them in there.

M Clemenceau said that Admiral De Bon’s point is that such arrangements ought to be made that if we could not use the Kiel Canal in time of war, neither should Germany be able to.

President Wilson points out that the Kiel Canal is entirely within German territory and sovereignty. This is not true of the Suez Canal, which is not in the body of any single country.

Admiral Benson says that his feeling is very strong that it is a mistake to touch the Kiel Canal at all. It establishes a precedent of a very dubious character. If it is regarded as a purely punitive measure, then he would have nothing to iy. But to go into a country and make special provision for a Canal is very similar to going in and taking its railways. The Kiel Canal had been a German national enterprise, and is no concern of the outside world.

Admiral Hope points out that we have Bismarck’s declaration that the Kiel Canal had been built solely for strategic purposes. It is for this reason that Admiral de Bon goes so far as to say it ought to be destroyed. In these provisions, however, Germany had been treated more leniently.

President Wilson says the Canal has some commercial importance.

Admiral Hope says that this is not great. The greatest distance saved between the nearest Dutch port and the nearest Baltic port is only 200 miles as compared with the route through the Belts.

Admiral de Bon points out a certain inconsistency between our attitude with regard to the Kiel Canal and the other provisions that had been made for internationalizing the course of the Elbe and many other waterways. If these waterways are to be internationalized, why not the Kiel Canal also? Surely it ought to be on the same basis!

(It is decided to omit Article 8.)

Mr Lloyd George asks whether it is worth while setting up an International Commission to control a purely German Canal. This Canal has no very great value from a commercial point of view. Most ships would still prefer to use the Belts, and only a few ships trafficking between Dutch and Baltic ports are likely to use the Canal. The reason for this is that there are no dues in the Belts, and there must be dues in the Canal. He asks if it is worth while to hurt German pride and add to our own difficulties for so small a matter.

M Clemenceau agrees that it was not, and withdraws the French draft of Article 7.

(The British, American, Japanese and Italian proposal for Article 7 is adopted.)


2. Admiral Hope says that the first question raised is as to whether surface ships enumerated in the Article are to be sunk.

President Wilson asks whether after these surface ships are handed over, Germany will retain any surface ships.

Admiral Hope replies that they will

Admiral Benson considers that too much is at stake to settle this Article in a hurry. He points out that the ships now lying in the British Port of Scapa Flow had not been surrendered but were merely interned.

Admiral Hope points out that by Article 24, the ships interned in compliance with the Armistice were to be definitely surrendered. This Article has already been accepted.

Admiral Benson presses that the disposal of the surface ships should be definitely dealt with in the Peace Terms. What, he asks, would happen if it had not been decided before the Peace Terms were signed, what should be done with these ships now in German ports. are the British or French Navies prepared to take them into British and French ports, and look after them? To decide this question now would ease the situation as far as Germany was concerned. To leave it unsettled was to risk misunderstandings.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that no prolonged discussion on this should be embarked on, as there are still many questions to be settled before the Germans arrive at Versailles. A discussion on this point might last a day or two. In the meanwhile, he proposes that the terms should simply state that the ships are to be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers. He is desirous of reaching some arrangement; for example, it might be agreed to sink some of the German ships.

President Wilson suggests that a promise might be given to Germany that a decision would be reached on the subject before the Treaty of Peace was actually signed. The question could be discussed while the Peace Treaty was being examined by the Germans.

Admiral Benson asks what will happen if a decision has not been reached.

President Wilson says his proposal is to say definitely that a decision would be reached, and then it would have to be reached.

Admiral Benson points out that any decision, except to sink the ships, means an increase of armaments.

Mr Lloyd George says he can give Admiral Benson his proposal for stopping the increase of armaments, and even bring about a decrease, but he doubts if the Admiral would accept it. The British Government does not want these ships and are ready to discuss even the decrease of Navies, provided all would agree. This, however, is a very big question.

President Wilson says he understands the French have made a reservation in regard to this Article. He asks for the reason.

Admiral de Bon says the reason is, first, that by sinking the ships, valuable property will be destroyed, and there will be an increase in the general losses of the war. French public opinion will be strongly against this. A more especial reason is, however, that if the ships are divided among the Allied and Associated Powers, it will make a considerable addition, perhaps not of great fighting value, but nevertheless, a useful addition to the peace strength of the French Navy. During five years, owing to the immense efforts of French industries in supplying the armies, it has not been possible to complete any capital ships. These ships would be very useful to show the French flag and spread the national influence in the world. France’s naval strength is greatly reduced, especially as compared with other nations. For no aggressive desires of any kind, France does not want to lose this opportunity for repairing her losses.

Mr Lloyd George says that Admiral De Bon is also well aware that the French taxpayer will not be content to pay for more ships. He fully agrees that the French position in this matter ought to be considered. His idea is that France should have some of these ships, and sink a corresponding number of old ships, or if unwilling to sink them, she might break them up, which Admiral Hope told him would be a business proposition.

President Wilson proposes that if the German Peace delegates should raise the question, a promise should be given them that the question will be settled for the signing of the Peace Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau agree in this.

(Article 25 as finally revised is as follows:

Within a period of two months from the coming into force of the present stipulations, the German surface warships enumerated below will be surrendered to Allied and Associated Governments.

These warships will have been disarmed as provided in Article 23 of the Armistice dated the 11th November, 1918. Nevertheless they must have all their guns on board.

Battleships

Helgoland
Nassau
Oldenburg
Ostfriesland
Posen
Rhineland
Thüringen
Westfalen

Light Cruisers

Augsburg
Danzig
Kolberg
Lübeck
München
Stettin
Strassburg
Stuttgart

And in addition forty-two modern destroyers and fifty modern torpedo boats, as chosen by the five Allied and Associated Governments.)


3. Admiral Hope says that the reserved portion of this Article relates to the question of whether surrendered submarines are to be destroyed and broken up.

Mr Lloyd George asks what objection there is.

Admiral de Bon says it is the same objection as before, namely, the destruction of material.

Mr Lloyd George demurs to the idea that any nation should add to its submarines.

President Wilson says that he himself is opposed to submarines altogether, and hopes the time will come when they will be contrary to International Law. In his view, they should be regarded as outlaws.

Mr Lloyd George points out that many of the submarines that have been handed over by the Germans had been broken up altogether. A decision to this effect had been taken earlier.

M Clemenceau says that this has been agreed to, but when he discovered it he had intervened.

President Wilson points out that M Clemenceau’s objection was to the destruction of material. If the submarines were broken up, the material would not be wasted.

M Clemenceau asks Admiral De Bon what his policy towards submarines is.

Admiral de Bon says that his policy is to keep the German submarines, of which France had received some 50. France had very few of her own.

Mr Lloyd George says that he does not think that Navies ought to be strengthened by submarines.

M Clemenceau says that if ever France has another war with Germany they might be useful, although he hoped long before that they would be obsolete.

Mr Lloyd George says he would like to destroy all the German submarines.

M Clemenceau says that France has very few, whereas Great Britain has very many.

Admiral de Bon says the question has never been discussed by experts.

(It is agreed:

1) That the words in the second clause of Article 28 “there to be destroyed or broken up” should be struck out.

2) That the Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers should further consider the question of the disposal of the German submarines.)


4. Admiral Hope suggests that the following words in Article 32, which had been reserved, “such arms, munitions, and war material will be destroyed or rendered useless” should be omitted as a corresponding article had been inserted in the Military clauses.

(This is agreed to.)


5. Admiral Hope pointed out that the question of Heligoland has already been dealt with.


6. Article 38 - Kiel Canal This question was dealt with earlier in the meeting.


7. Article 40. Submarine Cables: President Wilson says that this is not a matter for the Naval Terms.



Appendix
Draft Articles Concerning the Kiel Canal for Insertion in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace With Germany

Article I

The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality.

Article II

The nationals, property and vessels of all States shall, in respect of charges, facilities, and in all other respects, be treated on a footing of perfect equality in the use of the Canal, no distinction being made to the detriment of nationals, property and vessels of any state, between the latter and the nationals, property and vessels of Germany or of the most favored nation.

No impediment shall be placed on the movement of persons or vessels other than those arising out of the police customs sanitary, emigration or immigration regulations, and those relating to the import or export of prohibited goods.

Such regulations must be reasonable and uniform, and must not unnecessarily impede traffic.

Article III

Only such charges may be levied on vessels using the canal or its approaches as are intended to cover in an equitable manner the cost of maintaining in a navigable condition, or of improving, the canal or its approaches, or to meet expenditures incurred in the interests of navigation. The schedule of such charges shall be calculated on the basis of such expenses and shall be posted up in the ports. These charges shall be levied in such a manner as to render any detailed examination of cargoes unnecessary, except in the case of suspected fraud or contravention.

Article IV

Goods in transit may be placed under seal or in the custody of customs agents; the loading and unloading of goods, and the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, shall only take place in the ports specified by Germany.

Article V

No charges of any kind other than those provided for in the present regulations shall be levied along the course or at the approaches of the Kiel Canal.

Article VI

Germany shall be bound to take suitable measures to remove any obstacle or danger to navigation and to ensure the maintenance of good conditions of navigation. Germany shall not undertake any works of a nature to impede navigation on the canal or its approaches.

Article VII

(English, American, Japanese and Italian Proposal) (French Proposal)
In the event of violation of any of these conditions, or of disputes as to the interpretation of the present Convention, any interested State can appeal to the jurisdiction instituted for the purpose by the League of Nations and can demand the formation of an International Commission.

In order to avoid reference of small questions to the League of Nations, Germany will establish a local authority at Kiel qualified to deal with disputes in the first instance and to give satisfaction so far as possible to complaints which may be presented through the Consular representatives of the interested Powers.

The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be under the control of an International Commission which shall include:

2 representatives of Germany.
1 representative of Great Britain.
1 representative of France.
1 representative of Poland.
1 representative of Denmark.

This International Commission shall meet within three months from the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty and shall proceed immediately to prepare a project for the revision of the existing regulations. This project shall be drawn up in conformity with the General Convention on International Navigable Waterways, should such Convention have been previously concluded; in the absence of such Convention, the project for revision shall be in conformity with the provisions of the preceding articles.

Article 8

French and Italian Proposal

The following shall be demolished or suppressed under the direction of the Allied and Associated Powers and within the period fixed by such Powers:—

All fortified works situated within 50 km of either bank of the Canal or of the mouth of the Elbe, and all means of obstruction the object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of navigation.

Germany shall be prohibited from erecting any new fortifications, from installing any battery within the zones specified above and from placing any obstruction in the approaches or in the Canal.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, April 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 18:30

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. M Clemenceau hands to Mr Lloyd George a new set of articles concerning the guarantees for the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany. President Wilson, he says, has agreed to these.

Mr Lloyd George says he considers Clause 2 (c) to be a very dangerous one, although he realizes M. Clemenceau’s difficulties. He undertakes to examine the question.


2. Sir Maurice Hankey says that Mr Hurst, the British Representative on the Drafting Committee, has told him that the Drafting Committee is now waiting for more material on which to work. Mr Hurst has represented to him that a decision in regard to the language of the Peace Treaty is urgently required. In reply to President Wilson, he says that the Italian representative has throughout pressed strongly that Italian, as well as French and English, should be the official languages in the Peace Treaty. On the previous day, however, S Orlando had stated that he could not say definitely whether Italy would be present at Versailles to meet the Germans. Moreover, Mr Hurst informs him that the Italian representative has withdrawn from the Drafting Committee and there was no one on that Committee who can put the clauses into Italian. In view of the uncertainty as to whether the Italians will be at Versailles at all; in view of the withdrawal of the Italian representative from the Drafting Committee; and in view of the very short time available for printing and setting up the Peace Treaty, he says the Drafting Committee urgently requires a decision.

(It is agreed that the Peace Treaty should be printed in the French and English languages, which should be the official languages of the Treaty.)


3. The Supreme Council has before them the following documents:

A letter from the Marquis Saionji to M Clemenceau, asking him to press on the settlement of this question.

A Report by the Expert Committee appointed by the Supreme Council.

A Statement by the Chinese Delegation.

President Wilson says that this question is almost as difficult as the Italian question. After calling attention to the reports mentioned above, he asks if the British and French were bound to transfer Kiauchau and Shantung to Japan.

Mr Lloyd George says that sooner or later they are.

M Clemenceau agrees.

President Wilson says that, on a previous occasion, Mr Lloyd George had said that he was in a position to insist in common that the islands south of the Equator, Kiauchau and Shantung should be transferred in trust to the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Lloyd George says he has discussed the question with Mr Balfour, who has made a useful suggestion. His suggestion was that we are bound to transfer the German rights in Shantung and Kiauchau to Japan, but we should like to talk over the terms on which Japan would hand them back to China. That proposal would meet the Japanese sentiments of pride, which compel them to insist on the transfer of Kiauchau and Shantung to them and not to the Allied and Associated Powers. There is something to be said for Japan in this respect, since the Far East is the only sphere in which Japan is greatly concerned. She is not much concerned in the Western settlement. Then there is a suggestion which has been made by the Chinese and excepting for their first proposal, Mr Balfour thinks the Japanese might accept it and he thinks there is something to be said for starting on that basis.

President Wilson points out that the treaty between China and Japan gives to Japan more and not less than Germany had had. In fact, Japan will practically hand back nothing to China. In the meantime, if his information is correct, Japan has gained possession of the foreshore of Kiauchau bay.

Mr Lloyd George said that we ought to discuss with Japan the conditions in which she would cede the territory to China. Undoubtedly, we should get the conditions which were best for China. He feels that he must point out that, if it had not been for Japanese intervention, the Germans would still have been in Shantung. The Chinese did nothing to help get rid of them. We must not forget that Japan rendered considerable assistance in the war.

Sir Maurice Hankey, at Mr Lloyd George’s request, explains the naval assistance that Japan had given. By capturing Kiauchau, she had deprived Germany of her naval base in the Far East and her ships had had to leave the Pacific and had eventually been brought to action and sunk off the Falkland Islands. Japan, after helping to clear the seas and to escort the troops from Australia and New Zealand, had continued to police the Far East, thus setting free cruisers for operations elsewhere and particularly in the North Sea. She had also sent 12 or more destroyers to the Mediterranean.

Mr Lloyd George points out that, but for the assistance of Japan, it would have been difficult to transport the Australian and New Zealand troops.

President Wilson doubts if the Germans would have remained in possession of Kiauchau even if Japan had not captured it. The representatives of Japan have said they are willing to discuss with the other Powers the renunciation of the unusual rights which the Powers possessed in China. This would be a great relief to China, although these rights possess no practical importance to the Powers. If Japan will agree to discuss with us the terms on which these rights could be ceded to China, then we can agree as an inducement to liberal terms to allow Kiauchau and Shantung to be ceded direct to Japan.

Mr Lloyd George says that the British Government cannot agree to Japan having a special position in Shantung as well as a general position in the Yangtse Kiang. The Japanese, however, want special powers for exploitation in the territories they occupy.

President Wilson says his object is to take the chains off China.

Mr Lloyd George says that the difficulty is that we cannot allow other nations to cooperate in the Yangtse Kiang, although we should like to, since we have not sufficient capital ourselves for development. The reason we cannot do so is because we should have to allow the Japanese in.

President Wilson says that he understands this and that the Japanese are apt to make special arrangements, which exclude other people.

Mr Lloyd George says that when the British build railways they hand them over to China. The Japanese, however, are apt to keep the railways and exploit them.

President Wilson points out that the larger part of Japanese territory is barren and consequently they required room for their population. They have found some space in Korea and Manchuria but they are now seeking more in China.


Mr Lloyd George suggests the best plan to be for someone to sound the Japanese before they see the Supreme Council.

President Wilson suggests that they should be told that the Allied and Associated Powers cannot consent to the return of Kiauchau and Shantung to the Japanese on the terms on which they have agreed with China. He suggests that Mr Lloyd George and Mr Balfour see Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda.

(Mr Lloyd George undertakes that Mr Balfour should see the Japanese Representatives, and instructs Sir Maurice Hankey to inform Mr. Balfour accordingly.)


4. Mr Lloyd George informs President Wilson that he has now ascertained the numbers of British troops sent to Archangel, which reached a total of 5,000.


5. There is some discussion on the question as to whether the Syrian Commission should start.

(The following decisions are reached:

1) The French Government should immediately nominate their representatives.

2) The Commission should start as soon as possible.

3) No announcement should be made until the Germans have come to Versailles.


Appendix I: Articles Concerning the Guarantees of Execution of the Treaty
Paris, April 24, 1919

1) As a guarantee of the execution by Germany of the present treaty, German territories west of the Rhine, including the bridgeheads, are to be occupied by allied and associated forces during fifteen years.

2) If the conditions of the treaty are executed by Germany, occupation to be successively reduced according to following schedule:

a) to be evacuated after 5 years: the bridgehead of Cöln and the territories north of a line running along the Roer, then along the railroad: Jülich, Düren, Euskirchen, Rheinbach, then the road Rheinbach to Sinzig, and reaching the Rhine at the confluence with the Ahr river (the roads, railroads and localities above mentioned included in the occupied territory.)

b) to be evacuated after 10 years: the bridgehead of Coblentz and the territories north of line to be drawn from the intersection between the frontiers of Belgium, Germany and Holland, running about 4 kilometres south of Aix-la-Chapelle, then to and following the crest of Forst Gemund, then east of the railroad of the Urft Valley, then along Blankenheim, Valdorf, Dreis, Ulmen to and following the Mosel from Bremm to Nehren, then passing along Kappel, Simmern, then following the ridge of the heights between Simmern and the Rhine and reaches the river at Bacharach (all localities, valleys, roads and railroads above mentioned included in the occupied territory.)

c) to be evacuated after fifteen years the bridgehead of Mainz, the bridgehead of Kehl and the remainder of German territories still occupied. If at that time the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered satisfactory by the present allied and associated Governments, Germany consents to accept such similar guarantees as they may require.


3) In case, either during or after this fifteen years delay, the Inter-Allied Commission of Reparations recognize that Germany refuse to execute the whole or part of the conditions agreed upon by her according to the present treaty, the reoccupation by Allied and Associated forces of part or the whole of the areas defined by article 2 will take place immediately.

4) If, before fifteen years, Germany meets all the engagements taken by her according to the terms of the present treaty, the withdrawal of the Allied and Associated troops would immediately follow.


Appendix II
Paris, April 25, 1919.

Marquis Saionji to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)

Mr President: The Chiefs of Government of the Great Powers having already heard the Delegates of China on the subject of the question of the Province of Shantung, I wish to express in the name of the Japanese Delegation, the desire to see as soon as possible a further meeting to expedite the definitive settlement of this question.

Considering the peculiar importance of this question for Japan, I would be grateful, Mr President, if you would keep us, so far as possible, informed of all steps in its furtherance.

Accept,
Saionji


Appendix III
Report of Committee on Shantung and Kiachow

Chinese Statement

In regard to the Kiaoehow-Shantung settlement, the Chinese Delegates have carefully considered the question which the Council of Four put to them at its meeting of April 22nd,2 namely, Which China would prefer - the treaty with Japan, or the transfer to Japan of the German rights? If they find neither alternative acceptable, it is only because they see difficulties in both. To hold China to the treaty and notes of 1915 would be to give countenance to serious encroachments on Chinese sovereignty committed without provocation and consummated only after the delivery of an ultimatum on China; while to substitute Japan for Germany in Shantung would be to create a graver situation because of Japan’s propinquity to China, and because of her domination of Manchuria, which lies closely to the north of Shantung.

As regards the notes of 1918, they grew out of treaty and notes of 1915. They were made by China out of a desire to relieve the tense situation in Shantung Province. The presence of the Japanese troops along the railway and the establishment of Japanese civil administration offices in the interior of Shantung evoked such opposition from the people thereof that the Chinese Government were obliged to take some step to induce Japan to withdraw her troops and remove her civil administration establishments, pending a settlement of the whole question by the Peace Conference.

The Chinese Delegates regret that there exist certain secret agreements between France and Japan, and between Great Britain and Japan, pledging to support Japan’s claims to the German rights in Shantung. China was not consulted when they were made; nor was she informed of their contents when she was invited to join the War. But she, on her part, has been a loyal co-belligerent on the side of the Allies. Is it just that her rights and her future welfare should be thus sacrificed to the policy of aggrandizement of Japan?

The Chinese Delegates desire to point out that since the said agreements were made, France, Great Britain and Japan as well as China and other Allied and Associated Powers have all accepted, as the basis of the peace now being made, certain principles with which the said agreements appear to be in conflict. As it is an established principle that a subsequent act supersedes a previous one in case of their incompatibility, the agreements in question would appear to be no longer applicable to the claims of Japan.

The Chinese Delegates are in full accord with the desire of the Council to uphold, as a principle, the sanctity of accepted obligations, but they question themselves whether there is not a higher obligation resting on the Council now to remove serious obstacles to the maintenance of a durable peace in the Far East as elsewhere. The Council now has the solution of the Kiaochow-Shantung question in its hands; if it makes a settlement compatible with justice, it means peace in the Far East at least for half a century; and if it declines to make a just settlement merely because of the existence of certain obligations either imposed on China by threat of force or contracted by France and Great Britain in circumstances since entirely changed, it may be sowing seeds of a grave discord in the years soon to come.

Besides, China is now at the parting of the ways. She has come to the West to ask for justice. If she should fail to get it, her people would, perhaps, attribute the failure not so much to Japan’s insistence on her own claims as to the attitude of the West, which declined to lend a helping hand to China merely because some of its leading Powers had privately pledged to support Japan.

Appreciative, however, of the sympathetic interest of the Council of Four in this question and desirous to aid it in every way possible in its earnest effort to find a solution at once compatible with China’s welfare and conducive to peace in the Far East, the Chinese Delegates beg leave to submit the following four propositions as a settlement thereof:

I. Germany renounces to the Five Allied and Associated Powers her holdings, rights and privileges in Shantung for restoration to China.

II. Japan, being in possession of the said holdings, rights and privileges, engages to effect the said restoration to China within one year after the signature of the treaty of peace with Germany.

III. China agrees to make a pecuniary compensation to Japan for the military expenses incurred in the capture of Tsingtao, the amount of the said compensation to be determined by the Council of Four.

IV. China agrees to open the whole of Kiaochow Bay as a commercial port, and to provide a special quarter, if desired, for the residence of the citizens and subjects of the treaty powers.

Hotel Lutetia, Paris , April 23, 1919.

[Jimbuna]

26th April 1919

British troops near Cologne burn off German cordite as part of Germany’s disarmament process.


Men of the 77th Division of the “Lost Battalion” fame come back home to New York City.


Napoleon Cybulski, discoverer of adrenaline, dies.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, April 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


The Council meets to discuss the latest report from the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways. Items discussed are:


1. Should the Commission continue its work or should it start changing its goal to preparing a preliminary report for the League of Nations?

(It is agreed that the Commission should prepare a report on the question of a general treaty applicable to all countries.)


2. The Transfer to France of Germany’s Riparian Right to One Half of the Rhine Water.

(After much discussion it is agreed that Germany should have the right to compensation either in money or power. The drafting of this decision is left to the experts on the Commission.)


3. Time Limit for the Operation of the Clauses.

(It is agreed that the question as to whether the shipping Articles in the Economic Report should be transferred to the Articles dealing with Ports and Waterways, or whether the relevant Ports and Waterways Articles should be transferred to the Economic Articles, is referred to the Drafting Committee.)


4. Mr Lloyd George draws attention to Article 39, which reads as follows:

“Subject to the preceding provisions, no works shall be carried out in the bed or on either bank of the Rhine without the previous approval of the Central Commission or of its agents.”

He asks if this does not only apply to the Rhine between France and Germany. Surely it would not apply to Holland.

M Claveille says that this will suffice for France but the Belgian representatives want to construct a canal to connect the Rhine and the Meuse. For them it is important to prevent Germany from doing anything at the Rhine end of the canal which would affect the navigation of the approaches. Consequently, it is necessary that the Commission should have power to control the German works.

President Wilson says that the present Treaty will only bind its signatories.

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith says this is the case unless Holland adheres to the Treaty, which is important, as Holland was a party to the Mannheim Convention. Holland, however, has said with no uncertain voice that she will not come in if this Clause stands.

President Wilson asks if Belgium will adhere if this clause is amended.

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith says that Belgium is protected by the Mannheim Convention, Article 30. This has been explained to the Belgian Representatives, and he thinks that they now understand the matter and are satisfied.

General Mance says he thinks the Belgians are satisfied with an explicit assurance which he had given them at the last meeting, that they are covered by Article 30 of the Mannheim Convention.

M Claveille said that if Belgium is satisfied, he will have nothing to say, but, in his view, the Mannheim Convention does not cover the point. It only provides for the prevention of artificial obstacles to navigation, such as bridges, mills, barrages, etc., but it does nothing to compel the Germans to keep the river dredged. The Belgians are afraid of this, and this could best be prevented by giving the International Commission the powers proposed in this Article.

President Wilson asks whether, as a matter of right, we are not obliged to confine the Treaty to the portions of the river over which the Allies would have jurisdiction.

M Claveille draws attention to Article 34 of the Treaty, which, subject to certain reservations, continues the Treaty of Mannheim. This provision also reserves the right of Holland to agree or not to agree.

Mr Lloyd George says that he thinks Article 39 is a very stiff claim to put forward. He understands France wanting to protect herself, but why should she say that Germany could not construct works in a portion of the river running through the middle of German territory, without the approval of an International Commission. It seems to him an intolerable claim which in no way protects France, and only interferes with Germany.

President Wilson suggests the difficulty will be met if the Article is confined to works that would interfere with navigation.

M Claveille agrees.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Lloyd George says he supposes that the phrase would be: No works “that will cause material impediment to navigation.”

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith asks whether the Article is now confined to the part of the river between France and Germany.

Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson reply that it is.

M Claveille says there is no French objection, but he thinks Belgium will object.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the question should be decided, and Belgium should be left to raise the question if necessary.

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith says he thinks the Belgians might be got to agree.

(It is agreed that Article 39 should be confined to the portion of the Rhine where it forms the boundary of France and Germany.)


5. Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith draws attention to Article 47 which has been inserted with the object of providing facilities for railway communication with inland States like Czechoslovakia. Among other provisions it is laid down that Germany should forward trains with a speed at least equal to that of their best trains on the same lines. This would mean that if Germany were to put on some very fast trains between two business centers, she would have to run the traffic on the lines referred to in this Article as fast as these special rapid trains. As the distances might be very long this is obviously undesirable and impossible. He suggested that the phrase: “long distance trains” should be inserted.

(The above proposal is accepted.)


6. Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith points out that the first paragraph of this Article gives the right to any Allied State for the next 25 years to require Germany or Austria to construct lines for through communication. The State making the demand has to defray the cost. The demands might be unjust, but no tribunal is contemplated. When the line is completed, there is no power after five years to make Germany or Austria work it. At the end of five years it might become a useless, derelict line. Either the first paragraph should be struck out, or some provision should be made under the League of Nations for supervision.

M Claveille said this provision does not interest France, but has been put in for the benefit of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs. The fact, however, that these small states will have to pay the cost of the lines limits it to such as would have practical use. These countries will not face the expense unless there is some important object to be gained. If, however, there is a desire to have each case tested by the League of Nations, he has no objection.

(It is agreed that the construction of lines under this clause should be subject to the authority of the Council of the League of Nations.)


7. President Wilson says that although the Italians are not represented, attention ought to be given to their reservation to Article 45.

Sir Maurice Hankey says that the Italian technical representatives had been invited to attend.

General Mance said that this Article has only been agreed to by the British and United States Delegates on the understanding that it comes within a time limit. S de Martino had agreed to this. At a subsequent meeting a subordinate Italian official had reserved this clause for further instructions.

Mr. Lloyd George asks if they want to strike it out.

President Wilson says they do not.

General Mance says that the Italian objection is that they want it to be a permanent provision.

President Wilson says this is impossible, and suggests that it should be agreed that the clause should be a temporary provision.

(President Wilson’s proposal is accepted.)


8. Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith draws attention to a new typewritten Article; relating to an eventual Rhine-Danube Canal. In the report, provision is made for an International Commission in regard to the Rhine, and another for the Danube. Many States are represented on both. In 25 years’ time the question of connecting the Rhine and the Danube might become important, and it is proposed to provide for the establishment of a connection. The Clause provides that if all the Allied and Associated Powers on either the Rhine Commission or the Danube Commission consider within 25 years’ time that a canal ought to be built, the German Government or its successors will not be able to oppose its construction. The tribunal provision for allocating the cost is not, in his view, very satisfactory, and he thinks that the League of Nations would be more satisfactory. The tribunal proposal is to be composed of the Rhine Commission, enlarged by the addition of a representative of each of the Allied and Associated Powers represented on the Danube Commission but not represented on the Central Commission for the Rhine. He would prefer an arbitration tribunal nominated by the League of Nations.

President Wilson agrees that this would be better.

M Claveille says he will accept.

(It was agreed that an Arbitration Commission set up by the League of Nations should be substituted for the Commission proposed in draft Article 33 A.)


9. Mr White draws attention to the recommendation contained on page 4 of the report for the establishment of a provisional régime in regard to the Danube, and, more particularly, to the following passage:

“The Commission, moreover, is unanimous in its desire that this provisional régime be replaced, with the shortest possible delay, by a definite statute governing the river, and proposes - at the same time without expressing this wish in the form of a peace clause binding the Allied or Associated Powers - that a Conference composed of representatives in equal number of each of the following States - United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Romania, Serbia, and the Czechoslovak Republic - should meet within three months after the ratification of the Preliminary Peace Treaty for the purpose of drawing up a definite statute governing the Danube.”

He asks if this proposal was accepted.

Mr Lloyd George says that the British Delegation agrees.

(The proposal quoted above is accepted.)


10. Sir Robert Borden says that the British Empire Delegation favors a suggestion that provision should be made for the application of the general convention to all territories the sovereignty of which would be transferred from the Enemy States as a condition of such transfer.

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith suggested that the best plan would be to refer this to the Commission when it re-assembled.

Mr Sifton says that the Commission as now formed will not agree to a clause applicable to the enemy being applied to territory which was being separated from the enemy.

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith says that there was little doubt that the Smaller States will not agree to the proposal. Poland does not disguise her intention to adopt a policy of separate discriminatory bargains with other States in regard to commercial matters. It will be a great advantage if she can be persuaded to agree to equal treatment with all nations.

Mr Lloyd George says that Poland will be making a great mistake if she starts her new career with the policy Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith anticipates.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General of the above decisions for the information of the Drafting Committee.)