Why did the IJN lose most all sea battles?

[thegrindre]

Hi all,
I've been watching the History Channel's Battle 360 series about WWII's Pacific Navel battles.
In most cases, 'we' (USA) were out numbered, out witted and out skilled yet we won. WHY did the IJN lose most all battles??? I don't understand. They were better then we were most of the time.
It puzzles me...

Waddaya think?

Thanks

[nikimcbee]

Smart ass answer.
Jesus.

Actual answer.
ULTRA.

[Betonov]

One of the reasons I heard was that the Japaneese rigid hierarchy worked against them.
If a shell hit a Japaneese ship and the section commander was killed, the crew did nothing because they were allowed onyl to act on orders from superior officers. Before a CO could assign a new commander the ship would already fill with water.
Amercian crews were allowed a lot of self initiative. The hole was pluged before the new commander was assigned.

But this could be busted, It was just something I heard in a documentary.

[Oberon]

ULTRA, lack of decent command and communications, lack of decent radar.

Basically, once they got to a battle they were very good, but actually getting to the battle and not being jumped first was the biggest problem.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by thegrindre

Hi all,
I've been watching the History Channel's Battle 360 series about WWII's Pacific Navel battles.
In most cases, 'we' (USA) were out numbered, out witted and out skilled yet we won. WHY did the IJN lose most all battles??? I don't understand. They were better then we were most of the time.
It puzzles me...

Waddaya think?

Thanks

I don't know if I would call the US out numbered. The first carrier battle at the Coral Sea was basically a even match two fleet carriers versus two fleet carriers. One US carrier was sunk, but the two Japanese carriers were scratched from the upcoming Midway operation. And Midway was a far closer battle than most would think. You could really qualify more as a carrier ambush on the Japanese than the miracle it was often described as.

Certainly one huge US advantage was the ability to out-produce and replace losses. Every Japanese ship that went down often had no replacement available in the wings anytime soon. For example, the US put 65 carriers of every size and shape into the water in 1943. Japan, just two. Mere attrition wasn't going to serve Japan well.

[CCIP]

One of the things that often gets cited in the context of Japan's overconfidence in the IJN is:

"It takes the Navy three years to build a ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition." -Adm. of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham

[Raptor1]

In terms of actual losses, the IJN came out pretty evenly in the few major battles they had parity with the US navy, with the obvious exception of Midway which they lost due to a combination of intelligence, poor planning and general luck on the American side. When they had the right conditions on their side, they even managed a couple of clear victories (Savo Island and Tassafaronga being the obvious examples). By the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, they were clearly outmatched in technology, training and numbers and had very little chance of any sort of victory.

I think rigid ideology and command structure was the downfall of both japan and Germany as there are many examples where soldiers were unwilling or not allowed to think for themselves and do what needed to be done to win during battles and instead were forced to wait for orders of what to do and let many opportunities for victory slip past them.

I think a lot of the reason we did so well is because we are used to being unorganized and not rigid to following orders to the letter so we adapted to things as they happened which was not allowed to happen with our opponents soldiers

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by CCIP

One of the things that often gets cited in the context of Japan's overconfidence in the IJN is:

"It takes the Navy three years to build a ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition." -Adm. of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham

One of the most succinct statements that came from the Japanese naval authorities after the war was that they lost by "battling " instead of "warring" --"We conceived the war with America on a far smaller scale, studied it as a battle. We never became aware of this mistake, much less outgrew it."

The misapplied and probably out of date doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan and the concept of the "Decisive Battle"certainly came back to haunt them. They kept chasing for that decisive battle until they had no fleet left.

[thegrindre]

We seem to be bumbling bozos that never give up. We were a proud nation back then.

[Oberon]

Originally Posted by Raptor1

In terms of actual losses, the IJN came out pretty evenly in the few major battles they had parity with the US navy, with the obvious exception of Midway which they lost due to a combination of intelligence, poor planning and general luck on the American side. When they had the right conditions on their side, they even managed a couple of clear victories (Savo Island and Tassafaronga being the obvious examples). By the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, they were clearly outmatched in technology, training and numbers and had very little chance of any sort of victory.

Nah, admit it Raptor, they kept rolling ones.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by Oberon

Nah, admit it Raptor, they kept rolling ones.

"I fear we have awoken a sleeping giant and loaded his dice."

[Raptor1]

Originally Posted by Oberon

Nah, admit it Raptor, they kept rolling ones.

The dice were loaded! The cards were stacked!

I still haven't gotten revenge for the Marshalls, have I?

[Wolferz]

The melted down beer cans they used for shells didn't help much either.

The IJN just didn't have the numbers in assets and their failure to catch our carriers at Pearl was also an ingredient in the recipe for failure.

We have only succeeded in awaking a sleeping giant.
Admiral (I think I'll take a trip in a Zippo plane) Yamamoto

[Subnuts]

As far as post-1942 goes, I imagine having superior numbers, reliable radar, better surface fire control, vastly superior damage control, and ULTRA probably gave the USN a decided advantage. Having a massive industrial base and the ability to easily replace losses didn't hurt, either. During the Guadalcanal campaign, the USN lost almost twice as many cruisers and more destroyers than the IJN, along with two aircraft carriers. However, the Japanese had completely lost control of the sea around Guadalcanal by February 1943. The sinking of the battleships Hiei and Kirishima within 24 hours of one another were the kind of crippling losses the IJN just couldn't recover from.

I know I've mentioned it before, but anyone seriously interested in the Pacific War needs to read Shattered Sword. It explains the inner workings of the IJN and the Japanese naval mindset in way more detail than I could ever hope to do in a single message board post.