The CHN/ China thread

[Jimbuna]

Originally Posted by mapuc

Watched one of these video clip Jim posted in our Share Your Favorite Naval Pictures and Videos thread.

While watching it I came to the conclusion

I may not know much about military strategy, but I do know that if China turn their theoretical threat into practice, the number of causality on both side will be huge.

The question is of course who will benefit from this major lost of life and materials ?

My hunch says me that it really doesn't matter if China should lose 100.000 men during one day.

Losing 100.000 men would be devastating for USA and Taiwan.

I could be wrong though.

Markus

You're probably right Markus because I don't think China values lives all that much and they certainly have a much bigger number to sacrifice for their cause.

[Skybird]

The Neue Zürcher Zeitung writes:
https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/bald-krie...lle-ld.1612685


Xi Jinping caught in the superiority trap - why China could soon be tempted to open war against Taiwan



What will happen in the future on the Taiwan Strait is a core question of world politics, which also determines the prosperity in Europe. Xi Jinping is thinking of making the dream of a united China come true under his leadership - with violence if necessary.

The figures speak for themselves: In 2020, Chinese military aircraft violated the “air defense and identification zone” designated by Taiwan for over 100 days. According to the Ministry of Defense in Taipei, this was the case again on 75 days by mid-April 2021. The number of machines involved is in the hundreds; These are slow-moving, propeller-driven reconnaissance aircraft, but also modern fighter jets and strategic bombers that can carry nuclear weapons. In March, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense had to admit that, due to the strain on resources for the aging air fleet, it would no longer be possible to deploy its own interceptors and that it might be necessary to limit oneself to watching the People's Liberation Army fighters only on the anti-aircraft screens. -

Against this background, the Commander in Chief of the US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip Davidson, spoke at a hearing in the US Senate in March that China could attempt to invade Taiwan within six years. The publicist Anne Applebaum exaggerated this on Twitter in April when she put forward the thesis that the Biden administration must be prepared for an invasion of Taiwan that is imminent at any time. -

In striking contrast, there is the sober, almost provocative serenity in Taiwan itself, where there is no sign of an imminent threat of war. The democratically governed island republic has come to terms with the threat that has persisted for decades. Domestically, issues such as stagnating wages, the rights of the LGBTQ community and the energy transition dominate. It was not until American pressure that a Taiwanese chip company recently ceased business with a company in the Chinese supercomputer program, which, according to US reports, is working on the most modern weapons that pose a serious military threat to Taiwan as well. -

The military performance of the Chinese army, which has not been involved in a war for decades, remains completely unclear. -

In view of this, what is the current situation? Is the danger of war in the West exaggerated by interested parties or is Taiwanese politics and society simply underestimating the Chinese determination to solve the "Taiwan question" by force? The answer to this can be summed up in a very simple formula. The decisive factor is a look at the time axis: in the short term, before the 100th birthday of the Chinese Communist Party in July and its next party congress in autumn 2022, no dramatic escalation is to be expected. After that, however, the Chinese patience with the status quo under the increasingly personalized rule of Xi Jinping is likely to come to an end, and Taiwan is likely to become the focal point in the looming comprehensive system and great power conflict between China and the USA. -

For years it has been a popular occupation among military planners and strategists: To assess the threat situation in the Taiwan Strait, military hardware (e.g. aircraft, submarines) is counted, the balance of power between those involved is analyzed, and the prerequisites for a Conquest of Taiwan by China is being scrutinized. The findings here are unmistakable: the military weight in the Taiwan Strait has shifted in favor of China, the USA has already fallen behind the People's Republic in important categories (such as the number of land-based short- and medium-range missiles). -

Even analysts in Taiwan attest to its own army that it is just an “empty shell”. The topography of Taiwan (a few flat, shallow stretches of beach in connection with mostly steep rocky coasts) and the climatic conditions (including a typhoon season lasting several months), on the other hand, make a landing operation on Taiwan seem like an incalculable game of vabanque. -

However, all of these investigations are the easier part for outside observers; it is much more difficult to look at the “software”: What does China want with the new military material? What can China do with it? Publicly available strategy papers and the Chinese military give an answer to the first question: Put Taiwan under military pressure, in particular to intimidate the pro-independence advocates and deter the USA from intervening in a conflict over Taiwan by incalculable costs. The military performance of the People's Liberation Army, which has not been involved in a war for decades, remains completely unclear. The interaction of branches of arms (so-called “combined warfare”) tends to exist on paper, the level of performance of a Chinese pilot in an aerial combat can at best be simulated. -

More important than the primary view of the military dimension, however, is the appreciation of the context. The "Goldilocks" era that has lasted since the beginning of the nineties is over, namely the best of all worlds for the Taiwan Strait, when the goals and means of all parties were essentially in harmony: no incalculable shaking of the status quo as well relying on economic interdependence between China and Taiwan. - Everyone involved believed that time was on their side. In the USA and Taiwan it was hoped that political reforms would take place on the mainland, in China that the ever closer economic exchange would automatically pave the way to unification with Taiwan. This phase is irrevocably over, all sides have contributed to it. -

In Taiwan, social and demographic change over the years has led to a specific “Taiwan identity”. Young Taiwanese today sometimes compare China with the Netherlands or Portugal, the former colonial powers that left their mark on the island, but with whom there is nothing beyond that. Under Trump, the US pushed for the delivery of modern weapons to Taiwan and sent high-ranking delegations to Taipei. US President Biden has continued this policy with other omens (emphasis on human rights and inclusion of the allies) up to now. -

The most important changes, however, are clearly to be found on the part of China under Xi Jinping. The pragmatism towards Taiwan that we encountered until a few years ago has come to an end; a climate of nationalistic upsurge and ideological backwardness now dominate. The economic rise of China, especially the pull of its own market on western companies, has changed the risk calculation in China. Under the slogan “the East is rising, the West is falling”, the conviction that originated from Marx's historical materialism is breaking through that China will win in the systemic struggle with the West, as it were, according to the laws of nature. -

This does not automatically lead to a military conflict over Taiwan. In the short term, Beijing will continue to rely on a combination of military pinpricks, diplomatic isolation, economic incentives, cyberattacks and the infiltration of the political system against Taiwan. The role of the head of state and party leader Xi Jinping personally will be decisive, both positively and negatively. Viewed positively, he is the only one who, because of his standing and personal power, can put a stop to escalating nationalist demands. -

On the other hand, all signals indicate that he sees himself as the only guarantor of securing China's rise to a great power, symbolized not least by the reintegration of Taiwan. In a political system with totalitarian tendencies that is now highly tailored to him, his personal willingness to take risks will be a central variable in the future. One would expect from the outside that a rational view of the possible costs of a military adventure would have to prevent Beijing from unconditional escalation. -

However, this point of view only covers part of the Chinese calculation. One should not lose sight of the heroization of their own glorious willingness to make sacrifices (which, for example, led to victory in the Korean War), which is widespread among political decision-makers in China and repeatedly instrumentalized by Xi, opposed to a war-weary, exhausted, internally torn USA . A fatal momentum of their own could easily feed from these ideological narratives. -

What will happen on the Taiwan Strait in the future is a key question that will also determine prosperity in Europe. China and Taiwan are the decisive links in transnational value and supply chains for high-tech products of all kinds. If an unusual drought in Taiwan is already having an impact on the chip production of the world market leader TSMC and the availability of semiconductors in the West, everyone can imagine for themselves what would be at stake in an armed conflict in the Taiwan Straits involving the United States.

[mapuc]

^ Reading most of this makes it clear for me. China is 80-100 % determined in attempting to take Taiwan if it's going to happen within the next 0-6 years I don't know.

What is more interesting for me as a citizens in a western country is what type response I can expect from us-The West(NATO/USA)

Some of our leaders will not be sitting and crocheting while Taiwan is under attack.

Markus

[Skybird]

Its not so much what the West wants to do but what it can do.


If the Chinese strategy of denying US air power and carriers access to the combat zone, can keep them away, then its over. Submarines will not change that then, and will become the hiunted themselves if they dare trying to interrupt Chinese operations for invasion in the strait. Its too small an area, we talk about a waterway 300km long and 150 km wide, thats roughly just one quarter of the central and southern part of the Baltic that separated West Germany from the USSR in the cold war, and its roughly as wide as the Persian Gulf, but not even half as long. The Chinese can bring up more own submarines there than the US could ever hope.

[mapuc]

I don't think the US military is an organization who could be seen as an old lion without teeth.

I think US military can do much damage to Chinese..with conventional weapons

The question is how much damage can China take before they think twice and return to port ?

Markus

[Skybird]

I think the Chinese must not just collect hits, but can dish out heavily as well. Both against Taiwan and the US Navy. And Taiwan is immobile, cannot swim away. It is fully covered by the Chinese missile rain from static platforms - and that still excludes Chinese fighter- and bomber- and naval-assets-lauched missiles.

In WW1, they had battleships dominating and winning the war. Then it was thought that battleships wiould win the next big war, WW2, but the carriers had something against that, and took victory instead. Now it is thought carrier would win the next big war. I do not necessarily think so. Its technology and paradigm from an old, past era. The dimension of cyberspace did not exist, long ranmge ,mi8ssiles and autonomous drones did not exist, the orbital space as an extension of the principle to dominate the higher altitude did not exist. And former turned into carrier killers did not exist. Carriers are weapons from a past, old war, nice to impress inferior small enemies - but one on same eye level...?

There is also a clash of different war cltures. In Asia, the war of patience and attrition is the big thing, in the West powers aimed more at enforcing the last, the winning decisive battle. War of attrition versus quick decision seeking. Two very different tempers clash here. You can see that in Yamato's decision at Pearl Harbour to maximise chances for preserving the Japanese fleet by folding over the chance to send a third attack wave and searching the carriers that had escaped. The historians verdict on this decision is split. What I described has something to do with his decision.



Militaries are very prone to imagine that the next war will be won by the strategies and tools that were used to win the last war. When one realsies that that has been once again a mistake, it usually is too late (again).

[Rockstar]

"Hybrid warfare is a military strategy which employs political warfare and blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy, lawfare and foreign electoral intervention. By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution."

April 30, 2021 The U.S. is Trying to Light the Match of Islamic Extremism in China’s Xinjiang

by Vijay Prashad – Jie Xiong

https://www.counterpunch.org/2021/04...inas-xinjiang/

"Accusations by the United States government and its allies about genocide and forced labor in Xinjiang have brought China’s westernmost province into the gaze of the international media. This approach toward Xinjiang defines the information war prosecuted by Washington. In our conversations with Professor Li Bo and Professor Wang Yiwei, director of the Institute of International Affairs at Renmin University, as well as intellectuals from Kashgar and Ürümqi (Xinjiang’s capital), we developed a storyline that includes the dynamics of Xinjiang’s social development, the threats of extremism, and the enfolding of its problems into the wider hybrid war unleashed against China."

While Germany builds windmills and flower gardens in Afghanistan. We're waging a hybrid war. Taiwan in the east, Xinjiang in the west, Mongolia in the north. With many allies, Brits, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Malaysia.

[Rockstar]

Originally Posted by Rockstar

...We're waging a hybrid war. Taiwan in the east, Xinjiang in the west, Mongolia in the north. With many allies, Brits, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Malaysia.

Opps I forgot to mention the Phillippine hybrid warriors too.

The Philippine foreign minister on Monday demanded in an expletive-laced Twitter message that China’s vessels get out of disputed waters, the latest exchange in a war of words with Beijing over the South China Sea.

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-p...te-2021-05-03/

[Catfish]

Originally Posted by Rockstar

April 30, 2021 The U.S. is Trying to Light the Match of Islamic Extremism in China’s Xinjiang
[...]
While Germany builds windmills and flower gardens in Afghanistan. We're waging a hybrid war. Taiwan in the east, Xinjiang in the west, Mongolia in the north. With many allies, Brits, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Malaysia.

Always a good idea to wage war against the biggest banker that got you by the balls.
https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-debt-...it-own-3306355
The "Brits" of course urgently need war too, to divert from their homemade mess. And why not involve all of NATO? I mean China is about torture and brain washing, all join the humanitarian effort to bring freedom and democracy (we all know it is about hegemony, power and money alright).
There should be other means to talk with China, but the last four years have left their mark.

I wish you good luck with your war, but after leaving Afghanistan and the brilliant successes there, in Iraq and Iran (anyone remember the Shah and what led to what they have today) some might want to abstain for now.

[Skybird]

Phillipiney hybrid warriors? Where? As all others they get massively harassed at sea by hundreds of chinese coastguard cutters and fishing boats in international waters.

[Rockstar]

I get a kick out of this several years ago Trump starts a trade war and slaps sanctions on China in a bid to check their expansion. Dem fanbois were livid how dare he!


Now that Biden is in office and not only does it continue. But more join in! LOL

Since then, the EU’s executive branch and Germany have each formulated legislation that would make life harder for Chinese entities to invest, while joining the U.S. in swapping tit-for-tat sanctions with Beijing. Italy’s government has turned from an enthusiastic backer of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative to blocking planned acquisitions by Chinese companies. And in France, China’s ambassador didn’t even show up when summoned in March, citing “agenda reasons.”

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china...230112672.html


Welcome aboard Germany thanks for joining the financial sector of the hybrid war

[Rockstar]

Australia is reviewing China’s ownership of key port: Report

The National Security Committee of Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s Cabinet had asked the defense department to advise on the ownership, Dutton said in an interview with the Sydney Morning Herald published late Sunday. Asked whether the government was mulling forced divestment, the minister said it would consider the national interests.

https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/20...&ICID=ref_fark

[Catfish]

^ "Defense department", national interests always fill the pockets of the arms industry, nice that China helps.

Or not:
"China Is a Paper Dragon
U.S. policy makers should look to the future with a little more confidence and a lot more trust in trade, markets, and the superior potential of a free people."

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ar...dragon/618778/

[Skybird]

Oh no, not that naive and historically rejected "change by trade" nonsense again. Has not worked on Russia. Has not qwiorked on China. Over decades. Has not worked at all. Never.

Not. One. Bit.
And we alos shoudl stop assuming that the idea of what freeedom is, is the everywehre the same, necessarily. The willingness in Asia to wear Covid masks and the lack of discipline to folow that exmaple in the West, tells something.

Trade wants predictable law enmviuronments, whether that law comes from a free or a tyrannic regime, doe snto matter that much for globla actors. And ordinary working class people are more concerned for running their lives and getting over the month, than global idealism.

[Catfish]

Originally Posted by Skybird

Oh no, not that naive and historically rejected "change by trade" nonsense again. Has not worked on Russia. Has not qwiorked on China. Over decades. Has not worked at all. Never.

Please explain how trade has ignited wars in the last 60 years? Has not worked with Russia? My take is they changed, wanted to make this the future basis, and were rejected by western FAIL. So Putin was in a way inevitable.

Trade wants predictable law enmviuronments, whether that law comes from a free or a tyrannic regime, doe snto matter that much for globla actors. And ordinary working class people are more concerned for running their lives and getting over the month, than global idealism.

"Predictable law environments", right, now who was it who screwed that up four years ago? Trump or Jinping? You think that those "peasants running their lives" are worse than your global idealism and going to war for it?