100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 12:00

Meeting of the Council of Three with the Representative from Greece


1. The Conference had before it the conclusions of a conference held in the Hotel Astoria, Paris, on May 6th, 1919.

Mr Venizelos says that a Greek division could very well be sent from Macedonia; General Franchet d’Esperey has announced that the Greek Division is not required there.

Mr Lloyd George asks what troops Greece has immediately available to send to Smyrna.

Mr Venizelos says the total is two divisions without weakening the position in Macedonia, but troops cannot be spared from Thrace until Greek troops have been brought from Russia.

Mr Lloyd George asks how soon two divisions can be transported to Smyrna.

Admiral Hope says that a transport has been ordered to carry one division as soon as possible from Salonika and Kavalla to Smyrna. At the present time, however, the ships are very much scattered and, at the moment, he cannot say what ships can be made available in the Eastern Mediterranean, or how soon. Once the ships are assembled it will only take about a day to transport them from Salonika to Smyrna. In reply to President Wilson, he says he has no means of guessing how long it would take to assemble the ships. In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he says that he is going back to London tomorrow and in a day or two will be able to let him know the exact position.

President Wilson suggests that in the meantime the divisions should be got ready.

Mr Venizelos says that one division is ready now, and it is proposed that they should be embarked at the port of Leftera.

Admiral Hope says he understands that there is no heavy artillery attached to this division, only mountain artillery; in that case it could be embarked in the Bay of Kavalla, but heavy artillery could only be embarked from Salonika.

General Wilson, in reply to Mr Lloyd George, says that between Salonika and the Dardanelles the Turks only have about three divisions. During the war the strength of the Turkish division had been reckoned at about 6,000 men but towards the end of the war they had died down to almost nothing. Of course, however, a division could be filled up.

Mr Venizelos says that a Greek division comprises 9,000 rifles, and 16,000 of all ranks. He understands that many of the Turkish divisions were reduced to the size of a regiment.

General Wilson thinks that probably there is no very formidable Turkish force in this region.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the British ships at Smyrna might supply some information.

Admiral Hope doubts they have any facilities for obtaining information as to the military forces.

General Wilson says that his news all comes from Constantinople.

President Wilson says he supposes that the Armistice gives the Allies the right to send troops.

Mr Venizelos says that more than 30,000 Greek citizens in the town of Smyrna are in danger from the Turks.

President Wilson says that this provides a very strong reason for protecting them.

General Wilson says that it is true the Allies have power to land troops, but the Italians also have the right.

Mr Venizelos points out that the Italians have landed in Adalia without consulting the Allies.

President Wilson says that if Greek troops are sent, the Italians can hardly land troops unless they intend to break with the Allies.

General Wilson raises the question of the command of the troops. He understands that the Greek divisions are to come away from the command of General Franchet d’Esperey without being placed under the command of General Milne or any other Allied commander. They will constitute an allied force under Greek command.

M Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr Lloyd George agree in this.

President Wilson raises the question as to whether the Turkish Government ought to be warned of the intention to land troops.

Mr Venizelos thinks that they ought, but only just before the landing takes place. He, himself, knows the Turks well and he thinks that if they receive no warning, except just before the event, no resistance will be offered. Of course, however, there are some risks. All the facilities for landing were available.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether there is not a danger that the Commander of the Fort will fire on the Greek ships when the landings begin.

Mr Venizelos says that the danger will be of their firing from the forts when the ships are entering the Gulf of Smyrna.

President Wilson thinks that they will not fire on the transports.

Mr Venizelos agrees that they probably will not fire, if the transports were convoyed.

M Clemenceau suggested it would be safer to warn the Turks.

President Wilson agrees that this will undoubtedly be the correct procedure. But if the Turks are warned too far in advance they will make preparations. He suggests that no communication should be made to the Turks until the troops are on board.

Mr Lloyd George asked if Mr Venizelos had warned the Greeks to keep the matter quiet.

Mr Venizelos says he has taken all possible measures with this object. All available Greek ships are being collected but they are mostly very small. It will be necessary to crowd the ships very closely but Greek soldiers will not object to this. The ships should be dispatched as soon as possible.

Mr Lloyd George, summing up the conclusions of the meeting, said that:

1) Admiral Hope is to proceed to England to ascertain all details about the number of ships available for transport and the time required; to give orders for the concentration of these ships at Salonika; and to inform him as soon as possible of the results of his mission.

2) Mr Venizelos is to collect as many Greek transports as possible at Kavalla, and to arrange for the troops to be ready to embark.

Mr Venizelos says that one division is sufficient to start with.

M Clemenceau, in reply to Mr Lloyd George, said that General Franchet d’Esperey already knows of the expedition. He asked if anything is to be said to the Italians.

Mr Lloyd George is reminded by Sir Maurice Hankey that Admiral Calthorpe, who is at the same time the British Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and Diplomatic Representative at Constantinople, has repeatedly insisted on the importance of his being informed whenever any redisposition of troops was made in the Eastern Mediterranean. He had, for example, complained of not being informed when the Italian battalion was sent to Konia. The reason for this was that he wished to be able to make such dispositions as might be necessary to safeguard against the reaction of these movements in other parts of Turkey.

Mr Lloyd George says that the fewer people who are informed, the better.

Admiral Hope says that Admiral Calthorpe must be told, as he is Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. He suggests that this should be done by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

President Wilson suggests that Admiral Calthorpe should be cautioned as to the great importance of secrecy.

Mr Venizelos said that it would be extremely difficult to keep the matter secret as the concentration of ships will soon become known.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 7, 1919

PEACE CONGRESS

Trianon Palace, Versailles, Protocol No. 1, Plenary Session, 15:00


Nations Represented:

United States of America
Great Britain
France
Canada
Australia
South Africa
New Zealand
India
Italy
Japan
Belgium
Brazil
China
Cuba
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
The Hedjaz
Honduras
Liberia
Nicaragua
Panama
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Serbia
Siam
Czechoslovakia
Germany


M Clemenceau, President of the Congress, speaking in French, makes the following speech:

“Gentlemen,

This can be neither the time nor the place for superfluous words. You see before you the accredited Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, both small and great, which have waged without intermission for more than four years the pitiless war which was imposed on them. The hour has struck for the weighty settlement of our accounts. You asked us for peace. We are disposed to grant it to you. This volume, which the Secretary-General of the Conference will shortly hand to you, will tell you the conditions which we have fixed. Every facility which you may require for examining its text will be granted to you, including of course the usages of courtesy commonly practiced among all civilized peoples.

In order to acquaint you with another aspect of my thought, I am compelled to add that this Second Peace of Versailles, which is about to become the subject of our discussion, has been too dearly bought by the peoples represented here for us not to be unanimously resolved to secure by every means in our power all the legitimate satisfactions which are our due.

I will now make the Plenipotentiaries aware of the procedure in regard to discussions which has been adopted. If, thereupon, anyone desires to offer any remarks, he will, of course, be permitted to speak.

There will be no oral discussions, and their observations must be furnished in writing. The German Plenipotentiaries have a period of fifteen days within which to hand in their written observations, both in French and English, on the Treaty as a whole, the headings of which are as follows:

League of Nations.
Geographical boundaries of Germany.
Political Clauses for Europe:
Belgium, Luxembourg, Saar Basin, Alsace-Lorraine, Austria, Czecho-Slovak State, Poland, East Prussia, Denmark, Heligoland, Clauses in regard to Russia and Russian States, Recognition of new European States.
Political Clauses for Countries outside Europe:
General Renunciation Clause, Colonies, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and Bulgaria, Shantung.
Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses.
Prisoners of War.
Responsibility and Penalties.
Reparation and Restitution.
Financial Clauses.
Economical Clauses.
Aerial Navigation.
Ports, Waterways, Rivers and Railways.
Organization of Labor.
Guarantees and Occupation of territory.
Final Clauses:
Fulfillment of the Armistice; end of the war; state of peace.
Before this period of fifteen days expires the German Delegates will be entitled to send their replies or to put questions in regard to these matters. The Supreme Council, after examining the observations which may be furnished within the period laid down, will send a written reply to the German Delegation, stating the period within which it must hand in its final reply on all questions.

I will add that, when the Plenipotentiaries of the German Empire have given us a written reply, let us say within two, three, four, or five days, we shall of course not await the expiration of the fifteen days’ delay before acquainting them in turn with our answer. In order to lose no time, the discussion will be started as soon as possible in the form which I have described.

If anyone has remarks to make in this connection, we shall be at his disposal, as soon as this speech has been translated.”

(This speech is translated into English and German.)

(The text of the Conditions of Peace is handed to the principal German Plenipotentiary by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.)



Count Brockdorff-Rantzau (Germany) reads in German the following statement, which, at his request, is translated, sentence by sentence, first into French and then into English:

“Gentlemen,

We are deeply impressed with the lofty character of the task which has brought us together with you, namely, to give the world a speedy and enduring peace. We cherish no illusions as to the extent of our defeat - the degree of our impotence. We know that the might of German arms is broken. We know the force of the hatred which confronts us here, and we have heard the passionate demand that the victors should both make us pay as vanquished and punish us as guilty.

We are required to admit that we alone are war-guilty; such an admission on my lips would be a lie. We are far from seeking to exonerate Germany from all responsibility for the fact that this world war broke out and was waged as it was. The attitude of the former German Government at the Hague Peace Conferences, their actions and omissions in the tragic twelve days of July, may have contributed to the calamity, but we emphatically combat the idea that Germany, whose people were convinced that they were waging a defensive war, should alone be laden with the guilt.

None of us will wish to assert that the calamity dates only from the fateful moment when the Heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary fell a victim to the assassin’s hand. During the last fifty years the imperialism of all European States has chronically poisoned the international situation. The policy of retaliation and that of expansion as well as disregard of the rights of peoples to self-determination, contributed to the disease of Europe, which reached its crisis in the world war. The Russian mobilization deprived statesmen of the possibility of effecting a cure and placed the decision in the hands of the military authorities.

Public opinion in all the countries of our adversaries is echoing with the crimes which Germany is alleged to have committed during the war. Here, again, we are ready to acknowledge wrong which has been done. We have not come here to belittle the responsibility of the men who conducted the war politically and economically, and to disown breaches of international law which have been actually committed. We repeat the declaration which was made in the German Reichstag at the beginning of the war: wrong has been done to Belgium and we wish to redress it.

Moreover, as regards the methods of conducting the war, Germany was not alone at fault. Every European nation knows of deeds and persons on whose memory their best citizens are reluctant to dwell. I do not wish to answer reproaches with reproaches, but if it is from us that penance is demanded, then the Armistice must not be forgotten. Six weeks passed before we obtained it, and six months before we learnt your conditions of Peace. Crimes in war may not be excusable, but they are committed in the struggle for victory, in anxiety to preserve national existence, in a heat of passion which blunts the conscience of nations. The hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have perished since the 11th November through the blockade were killed with cold deliberation, after victory had been won and assured to our adversaries. Think of that, when you speak of guilt and atonement.

The measure of the guilt of all participants can only be determined by an impartial inquiry by a neutral Commission, before which all the principal actors in the tragedy should have their say, and to which all records should be disclosed. We have demanded such an inquiry and we repeat the demand.

Though we stand alone at this Conference, without Allies, and confronted by our numerous adversaries, yet we are not defenseless. You yourselves have brought us an ally: Justice, which was guaranteed to us by the agreement relating to the bases of Peace.

Between the 5th October and 5th November, 1918, the Allied and Associated Governments abandoned the idea of a peace of violence and inscribed the words ‘Peace of Justice’ on their banner. On the 5th October, 1918, the German Government put forward the principles of the President of the United States of America as a basis of Peace,1 and was informed on the 5th November by Mr Lansing, Secretary of State, that the Allied and Associated Powers had accepted this basis with two specific reservations. President Wilson’s principles therefore became binding upon both belligerent parties - upon you as well as upon us, and also upon our former allies.

These principles taken individually demand of us grievous national and economic sacrifices; but the sacred and fundamental rights of all nations are protected by this agreement. The conscience of the world is behind it; no nation will be permitted to violate it with impunity.

On this basis you will find us prepared to examine the Peace Preliminaries which you lay before us, with the fixed purpose of sharing with you the common task of rebuilding that which has been destroyed, of righting the wrongs that have been done, first and foremost the wrong done to Belgium, and of pointing mankind to new goals of political and social progress. In view of the bewildering number of the problems which beset the fulfillment of our common purpose, we ought to refer the principal questions individually at the earliest possible moment to special Commissions of experts, for discussion on the basis of the draft presented by you. In this connection it will be our chief task to build up anew the shattered human energy of the nations concerned, by international protection of the life, health, and liberty of the working classes.

I consider our next aim to be the restoration of the territory of Belgium and Northern France, which were occupied by us and devastated by the war. We solemnly accepted the obligation to do this, and are determined to carry it out to such extent as may be agreed upon between us. To do this we are thrown back on the cooperation of our former adversaries. We cannot complete the task without the technical and financial participation of the victors; you can only carry it through with our aid. It must be the desire of impoverished Europe that reconstruction should be carried out as successfully and economically as possible. This desire, however, can only be fulfilled by means of a clear and business-like understanding in regard to the best methods. The worst method would be to continue to have the work done by German prisoners of war. Such labor is certainly cheap. It would, however, cost the world dear, if hate and despair were aroused in the German people at the thought of their captive sons, brothers, and fathers continuing to languish in their former bondage after the Peace Preliminaries. We can attain to no enduring Peace without the immediate settlement of this question, which has dragged on far too long already.

Our experts on both sides will have to study how the German people can best meet its obligation of financial reparation without breaking down under the heavy load. Such a collapse would deprive those entitled to compensation of the advantages to which they have a claim, and would entail irreparable confusion in European economic existence as a whole. Both victors and vanquished must be on their guard against this threatening danger and its incalculable consequences. There is only one way of warding it off: unreserved recognition of the economic and social solidarity of peoples, of a free and comprehensive League of Nations.

Gentlemen, the lofty conception that the most terrible calamity in the history of the world should bring about the greatest advance in human progress has been formulated and will be realized. If the goal is to be attained, if the slain in this war are not to have died in vain, then the portals of the League of Nations must be thrown open to all peoples of good will.

The German nation is earnestly prepared to accommodate itself to its hard lot, provided the foundations agreed upon for peace remain unshaken. A Peace which cannot be defended in the name of justice before the whole world would continually call forth fresh resistance. No one could sign it with a clear conscience, for it would be impossible of fulfillment. No one could undertake the guarantee of fulfillment which its signature would imply.

We will examine the document submitted to us with all good will, and in the hope that the final result of our meeting can be subscribed by us all.”

(As nobody else asks leave to speak, the President declares the session adjourned at 16:00.)

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Grand Hotel Trianon, Versailles

Meeting of the Supreme War Council, 16:15

(This consists of the Leaders of Britain, France, Italy, and The United States - AKA the Council of Three, plus Italy.)


1. The Council has before them a document communicated by Mr Lloyd George at the morning meeting.

President Wilson asks if there are any islands besides New Guinea in the Pacific, the mandate of which went to Australia.

Mr Lloyd George says there are a number of smaller islands to the east of New Guinea.

M Simon said he agrees with Mr Lloyd George’s proposals subject to a reservation in regard to the Cameroons. Some inconvenience will arise to France as a Mandatory State owing to the fact that a part of the Cameroons will pass under the direct and unrestricted sovereignty of the British Empire. He then produces a form of agreement that he has prepared.

Mr Lloyd George deprecates the reference to the agreement of the 4th March 1916 in Article 1 of M Simon’s draft as he understands that there was not complete agreement about this.

M Clemenceau says he prefers Mr Lloyd George’s text.

M Simon draws attention to the fact that the British text makes no allusion to the portion of the Cameroons which Germany had forced France to give up in 1911 and which ought not to be subject to a mandate.

Mr Lloyd George says that this matter ought to have been raised in connection with the Peace Treaty. As it has not been raised it is difficult to prevent it being subject to a mandate.

M Simon says that if he understands the matter right there is a joint clause in the Treaty of Peace according to which all previous treaties with Germany disappear. This will cover the territory in question.

Mr Lloyd George points out that France and Great Britain in his draft are entitled to make recommendations to the League of Nations on this matter.

M Simon objects that Mr Lloyd George’s text provides that France should have the mandate of the Cameroons except in regard to one part.

Mr Balfour points out that this part only concerns the rectification of the frontiers.

Mr Lloyd George proposes that the difficulty will be entirely met by deleting the second paragraph relating to the Cameroons and altering the first paragraph to read as follows:

“Togoland and Cameroons. France and Great Britain shall make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations as to their future”.


2. S Orlando observes that in Mr Lloyd George’s scheme Italy is excluded from participation in the mandates in Africa. He has spoken of this question before and has said that if mandates are a burden Italy is ready to accept them. If mandates have advantages, then Italy has the right to share them. Moreover, Article 13 of the Treaty of London provides that Italy should obtain equitable compensations in those parts of Africa that specially concerned her in the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa.

M Simon then reads Article 13 of the Treaty of London.

Mr Lloyd George says he can state at once that he fully recognizes the validity of Article 13 and that the British Government is prepared immediately to enter into discussions on this matter. It is no use their doing it, however, unless France is prepared to.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Balfour points out that the phrase in Article 13 of the Treaty of London refers to augmentation of British and French territory and not to mandates which, strictly speaking, are not an augmentation. He does not press the point however.

(Mr Balfour withdraws at this point.)

The following decisions are reached:

1) Togoland and Cameroons. France and Great Britain shall make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations as to their future.

German East Africa. The mandate shall be held by Great Britain.

German South West Africa. The mandate shall be held by the Union of South Africa.

The German Samoan Islands. The mandate shall be held by New Zealand.

The Other German Pacific Possessions South of the Equator excluding the German Samoan Islands and Nauru, the mandate shall be held by Australia.

Nauru. The mandate shall be given to the British Empire.

German Islands North of the Equator. The mandate shall be held by Japan.

2) That an Inter-Allied Committee consisting of one representative each of the British Empire, France and Italy should be formed to consider the application of Article 13 of the Treaty of London, dated 26th April, 1915.

3) That the above decisions should be published.

[Jimbuna]

8th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Successes by General Denikin in S. Russia.

Numbers killed and wounded in Egyptian rioting published.

Journalist Edward George Honey proposes that a moment of silence should be observed to commemorate the anniversary of the Armistice signing.


Members of the Czechoslovak Legion, currently defending the Trans-Siberian railway against the Communists, in Vladivostok.


Navy-Curtiss Flying Boat NC-3 at Halifax, Nova Scotia, during its first trans-Atlantic journey in 1919. The NC-3 was in Halifax from May 8, 1919 to May 10, 1919.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. During a discussion on the subject of the meeting with the Germans on the previous day M Clemenceau says that he has heard on good authority that Count Brockdorff-Rantzau said he would not sign the terms of peace.

M Clemenceau raises the question as to whether Brockdorff-Rantzau’s proposal for joint Commissions to examine the proposals on technical matters in the Treaty of Peace should be adopted.

President Wilson says he thinks that Brockdorff-Rantzau’s proposal was related to the responsibilities of the war rather than to technical matters.

M Clemenceau says that the Commission he had proposed on this matter was a neutral one: he had really made two proposals. He then reads the draft of a reply which was to the following effect:

1) The proposed neutral Commission on responsibilities for the war would be contradictory to the articles in the Treaty of Peace on this subject.

2) In regard to the proposal for technical commissions he must inform Brockdorff-Rantzau that verbal communications are and remain excluded. The German delegation must have its own Commissions and send replies to the Secretary-General.

(Before finally approving this draft it is agreed that the text of Brockdorff-Rantzau’s statement on the subject should be consulted.

Later in the meeting Brockdorff-Rantzau’s statement is available from which the following extract is read:

“Having regard to the disconcerting multiplicity of the problems which are raised by this aim pursued in common we must as rapidly as possible have the principal matters discussed by special expert commissions on the basis of the draft which you are submitting.")

Mr Lloyd George suggests that this does not constitute a definite proposal which needs be replied to.

M Clemenceau agrees that it would be better to take no notice.

President Wilson agrees and suggests that one possible interpretation of the phrase is that if the Germans sign the Treaty they will want the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers in carrying it out.

(It is agreed that no reply should be made to this statement in Brockdorff-Rantzau’s speech.)


2. President Wilson reads a summary prepared by the American Delegation of the present position in regard to the settlement of the territorial boundaries of former Austro-Hungarian territory, as well as Bulgarian territory. The summary points out that the American, British and French experts are agreed in regard to Bulgaria, the Greek frontiers, the Czechoslovakian frontiers, the Romanian frontiers, and the Yugoslavian frontiers. The question of the frontiers between Belgium and Holland have not been dealt with. In regard to the Polish frontiers, agreement has not been reached, except with regard to Germany and the frontier between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. The frontiers of Albania and of Russia were also unsettled.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the best plan would be the one he had suggested on the previous day, namely, deal first with the frontiers of Austria and of Hungary, and to determine their boundaries and their conditions. Once these are out of the way, the more contentious questions which arose between the Allies can be dealt with.

President Wilson points out that once peace is made with Austria and with Hungary, and once these countries have been made separate, and the Treaties of Peace with them had been completed, the present Conference will have no further authority. To leave it to the component parts to arrange matters between themselves would cause very serious trouble. He urges the importance of retaining the peace-making power in the present Conference.

Mr Lloyd George says that the difficulty can be surmounted by inserting an Article in the Treaty of Peace binding Austria and Hungary respectively, to recognize the States contiguous to them within the boundaries arranged by the Allied and Associated Powers as a whole.

President Wilson points out that this clause would not bind the new States to respect the decision of the principal Powers. If they do not, this will mean launching out in a new sea of negotiation.

Mr Lloyd George said that if his Italian colleagues will pardon him, and he doe not ask them to agree or to disagree in what he is about to say, the present atmosphere was not a favorable one for settling the more controversial questions. There is great public excitement, which was partly artificial and partly genuine. The best plan would be to give time for that to subside. It was not essential to peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria and Hungary that these controversial questions should be settled.

President Wilson says that he is anxious to arrange that the boundaries between various States should not be left to separate agreement. He proposes, therefore, that it should be provided in the Treaty of Peace that Austria and Hungary respectively should recognize the States contiguous to them, within boundaries which should be stated, where possible, but where they could not be stated, are determined by some definite authority, for example, the League of Nations.

Mr Lloyd George suggested that the League of Nations ought not to be burdened at the outset with these tremendously difficult problems. They should be settled by the Allied and Associated Governments.

President Wilson suggests the best plan would be to have them settled by the principal Allied and Associated Governments. The important thing is that the latter should not divest themselves of their authority.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that the matter can be dealt with on these lines. Austria and Hungary are both starving and Peace Treaties with them ought to be concluded as soon as possible. The only part of Brockdorff-Rantzau’s speech on the previous day which had made him feel uncomfortable was the passage where he had alluded to the starvation which had occurred since the Armistice had been signed.

M Clemenceau says that his statement has to be proved.

Mr Lloyd George says that, at any rate, there is no doubt that Austria and Hungary are starving.

President Wilson tells M Clemenceau that we ought not to blink at facts because we are annoyed with Brockdorff-Rantzau. There is no doubt people have been starved because through no-one’s fault it had not been possible to get the Treaty of Peace ready earlier.

Mr Lloyd George draws attention to an Article by M Hervé in the Victoire, in which he said that after reading the summary of the Treaty of Peace, he withdrew all his attacks on the slowness in preparing the Treaty of Peace.

M Clemenceau tells President Wilson that he can give him an order to visit women from fourteen years of age to sixty who had been violated by the Germans.

Mr Lloyd George said that Sir Ernest Pollock had told him that documents before the Commission on breaches of the laws of war had been so bad that only parts of them were read. The Commission had become perfectly sick with reading them.

M Clemenceau says that they have an awful case against the Germans.

President Wilson sums up the decision as regards the boundaries as follows: Wherever they can be fixed, this shall be done, but where they cannot be fixed, the High Contracting Parties shall be bound to accept what the principal Allied and Associated Powers decide.

(There is no dissent from this.)

Mr Lloyd George raises the case of the Ukraine. Can the principal Allied and Associated Powers settle that?

President Wilson says they can settle the boundary between the Ukraine and Poland. One difficulty is that the Ukraine declared herself independent of Russia.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is part of the general Russian question, and he hopes that a special day will shortly be set apart for discussing this.

President Wilson suggests that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to make a comprehensive inquiry and to make recommendations as to all the frontiers of former Austro-Hungarian territory, except those specially concerning Italy.

Baron Sonnino recalls that there is one portion of the frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria which is closely connected with the Italian problem. He thinks the best plan would be for the Foreign Ministers to examine what the experts had proposed and to make recommendations.

(It was agreed:

1) That the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to consider at once, and to make recommendations in regard to the territorial boundaries of Austria and Hungary, and of the new States created out of former Austro-Hungarian territory, and States contiguous thereto, as dealt with in the reports of the various Commissions set up by the Preliminary Peace Conference.

2) That the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to hold their first meeting on this subject on the afternoon of to-day, May 8th.)

(Although no formal resolution is adopted, it is also substantially agreed that the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary should contain an Article binding the High Contracting Parties to recognize the frontiers of the various States formed out of the former Austro-Hungarian territory, within boundaries which should be fixed, wherever possible, but in cases where it is not possible to fix them in time for the Treaties, within such boundaries as might be decided by the principal Allied and Associated Powers.)


3. Mr Lloyd George suggests that this question should be referred to the same group of financial experts which had dealt with Reparation under the instructions of the Supreme Council, in connection with the German Treaty of Peace.

S Orlando says he understands that the reparation experts are meeting to consider this subject on that very day, more particularly in connection with the scheme that he himself had proposed for a debit and credit account in regard to the countries formerly constituting part of the Austrian Empire.

President Wilson says that nevertheless there would be no harm in approving Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal.

(The following resolution is agreed to:

That the group of financial experts which, under the immediate direction of the Supreme Council completed the Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Germany on the subject of reparation, shall re-assemble to prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council draft Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.)


4. Financial Clauses in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties

(There seems to be some notes missing, as this section repeats word-for-word the one above.)


5. Mr Lloyd George suggests that the Drafting Committee should be asked to start work on the Austrian Treaty and on the Hungarian Treaty.

President Wilson says that the Drafting Committee are entitled to a rest after their very heavy labors in preparing the German Treaty.

(This is agreed to.)


6. After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines is agreed to:

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, with whom shall be associated representatives of the Naval and Air Services of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy, should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers draft military, naval and air articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.

(It is also agreed that the exact text of this resolution should be left to M Clemenceau, who will then forward it as an instruction to the Military Representatives.)


7. After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines is agreed to:

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers a draft Convention in regard to the military occupation of the territories West of the Rhine, as provided for in Article 432 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Plenipotentiaries.

It is also agreed that the military representatives should invite the co-operation of a Belgian representative.

The exact terms of the reference to the Military Representatives is left to M Clemenceau, who undertakes to give the necessary instructions.


8. After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines was agreed to:

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers a scheme for the size of the Army of Occupation of the German territory West of the Rhine, as provided for in Articles 428 and 429 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Plenipotentiaries.

It is also agreed that the Military Representatives should invite the co-operation of a Belgian Representative.

The exact terms of the reference to the Military Representatives is left to M Clemenceau, who undertakes to give the necessary instructions.


9. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that the Supreme Economic Council has forwarded various resolutions for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, dealing with such matters as: Supply of Raw Materials to Czechoslovakia and Poland, Blockade of Germany and Hungary, and other matters.

He suggests that the most convenient procedure for dealing with these questions would be for the Supreme Council to meet the principal representatives of the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr Lloyd George points out that all these questions are bound up with the elaboration of some scheme for providing credits for European countries, in regard to which he had already submitted a scheme.

President Wilson agrees, but says it will be necessary to find some alternative proposal, as the scheme submitted by Mr Lloyd George did not commend itself to the United States experts.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the British Government is in the position not only of owing large amounts to the United States, but of being guarantors of what other countries owe to the United States. Great Britain is both a creditor and a debtor nation, but if she can collect all that is due to her from other nations, the balance would be on the right side. Hence, he feels in a good position to make this proposal. He points out that the United States of America had made large profits out of the belligerents during the early part of the war, when she had not herself been a belligerent. He does not say this in any spirit of criticism whatever, as she is merely in the position that Great Britain had been in 1870.

President Wilson pointed out that the wealth which the United States had drawn from these sources had not gone to the Government, but to particular financiers and to particular classes of the nation. Congress would take the view that the Government ought not to accept on behalf of the nation any obligations because certain interests in the nation had made profits.

Mr Lloyd George says that unless the United States of America and Great Britain agree on some scheme for re-starting Europe, a very serious state of affairs will arise.

(It is agreed that the leading representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the Supreme Economic Council should be invited to attend at 10.30 on the following day to raise the various questions referred to the Supreme Economic Council.)


10. Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram he has received from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission in London, to the effect that the Germans were continuing to delay the surrender of German merchant-ships in Spain by raising questions affecting cargoes, and neglecting to instruct their Captains to hand over the ships to the representatives of France.

On April 21st a warning had been sent to the German Government that if the matter was not expedited a reference would be made to the Supreme War Council. A consultation had since taken place at Rotterdam, but as no action had resulted the matter was now brought before the Supreme War Council with a recommendation that pressure should be put on the Governments concerned to proceed with the delivery to France of these ships.

President Wilson suggests that the pressure of the present treaty should be enough. In two weeks the Germans will be compelled to sign the whole treaty. He had only wanted to give them time to read and digest it, and get used to the idea that it would have to be accepted. He had never contemplated any additional matter being added.

(After some discussion it is agreed that Admiral Wemyss, on behalf of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, should be instructed, through the Armistice Commission, to draw attention to the failure to carry out this undertaking, and, in the event of no satisfactory reply being received, to make recommendations as to the action to be taken.)


11. President Wilson asks if it is necessary to go into the question of breaches of the laws of war in connection with the Austrian and the Hungarian Treaties.

Baron Sonnino says that there are a certain number of personal cases, although the question was less serious than in the case of Germany.

Mr Lloyd George points out that it has been agreed that the Austrian Emperor was not in any way responsible for the war.

S Orlando says that there was a terrible record of crimes against some Austrians.

Baron Sonnino points out that there are some bad cases in connection with submarines.

President Wilson asks if it is possible to distinguish German from Austrian submarines.

Baron Sonnino says that in most cases it is not possible, but there is evidence in some cases.

Mr Lloyd George points out that someone in Austria-Hungary must have taken the decision and given the necessary authority, so that there ought to be clauses in the Treaties on this subject.

(This is agreed to.)


12. It is agreed that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways should be instructed to prepare articles for inclusion in the Treaties with Austria and with Hungary.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


1. M Pichon says that it would be convenient to begin with the frontiers laid down for Romania, and he will ask M Tardieu to explain the finding of the Committee.

a) Mr Balfour thinks that before examining the particular reports it might be desirable to define what Austria and Hungary are to be, in terms of territory. He starts with the case of Vorarlberg. Is it to be Swiss or Austrian? In the former alternative, if Vorarlberg is allowed to split off, how is the Conference to prevent other fractions of previous Austrian territory to follow suit, in order to alleviate the debt on the population or for any other reason whatever? Before the Treaty can be made with Austria or Hungary this question must be settled in principle.

Baron Sonnino says that as far as he is concerned, Vorarlberg is part of Austria. He has no knowledge of this territory as an independent unit. Its recognition as such would lead to the secession of other populations, and result in endless confusion.

Mr Balfour says that if he understands Baron Sonnino rightly, it is intended that the discussion should result in a definition of Austria.

Baron Sonnino says that it should result in a definition of Hungary as well as Austria.

Mr Balfour agrees that the method of defining the frontiers by adopting the results reached by the territorial committees might perhaps be the best. The circuit would then be complete and the various difficulties arising on the way could be considered.

Mr Lansing says that in his view the Council is dealing with the territory which in 1914 had been the domain of Austria and Hungary. It was recognized that this territory was to be dismembered, that Austria and Hungary were to be made separate States, and that their lands were to be limited by new States, whose frontiers were to be determined. No definition of Austria and Hungary, therefore, appears necessary. The definition will arise automatically as a result of establishing the new States.

Mr Balfour said that the question still remains what will the conference do if any other part of Austrian or Hungarian territory wishes to split off like Vorarlberg?

Mr Lansing says that this question will have to come before the conference when it arises. In his opinion the population cannot be allowed to secede in order to avoid paying taxes.

Mr Balfour thinks that in the Treaty there should be a clause covering such cases. He points out that there is to be a plebiscite in Vorarlberg in fifteen days, and that the Conference is doing nothing to stop it.

M Pichon observes that the French Government has several times been informed by the Swiss Government that the adhesion of Vorarlberg is not desired. On the last occasion the Swiss Government said that they would not welcome Vorarlberg, unless a crushing majority in the plebiscite practically forced their hands. The question, however, has not yet arisen, and it does not appear necessary for the Council to deal with it before it arises. He will therefore ask M Tardieu to begin his explanation of the boundary adopted by the Committee for Romania.

(After a short discussion it is decided not to consider the boundary of Romania on the Russian side, but only to deal with its boundary on the Hungarian side.

Mr Lansing said that in his opinion when the delimitation of Romania and Russia is made, it will be necessary that Russia should be represented. The Peace Conference cannot adjudicate on territory belonging to a State with whom the powers represented were not at war.)

b) M Tardieu says that he will explain the finding of the Committee in respect of the Romanian-Hungarian boundary in Transylvania. Referring to the map attached to Report No 13 he explains that the red line indicates the demands of the Romanian Delegation, and the blue line the recommendations of the Committee. There have been long discussions on the subject of the frontier in question, occupying no less than twelve meetings. He will explain in a few words the reasons which had prevailed with the Committee. Had the demands of the Romanian Delegation been accepted without modification, a very large number of aliens would have been attributed to both sides. These numbers were halved by the recommendations of the Committee. Ethnologically, therefore, he thinks that the results obtained are satisfactory. It had also been thought reasonable to keep within Romanian territory a main line of communication running from North-East to South-West; from Szatmar-Nemeti to Nagy-Varad, while a parallel line connecting Szeged and Debreczen was left in Hungary.

Mr Lansing asks where the proper ethnic line would be.

M Tardieu says that the population is very mixed and that the blue line represents an equitable compromise. A truer line might perhaps in some cases be 20 kilometres east but on the whole, as he had explained, he thought the line would be satisfactory.

Mr Lansing asks why a more accurate ethnic line cannot be followed.

M Tardieu explains that it would cut the railway line and suppress continuous communication.

Mr Lansing asks if anywhere west of the line there can be found a preponderant Romanian population.

M Tardieu says that this might occur in certain isolated places.

In reply to further questions M Tardieu says that some 600,000 Hungarians would remain under Romanian rule while some 25,000 Romanians would remain within Hungary.

Mr Lansing expresses the view that this distribution did not appear very just; in every case the decision seemed to have been given against the Hungarians.

M Tardieu says that any other adjustment would have been all in favour of the Hungarians and correspondingly to the detriment of the Romanians. The whole question has been discussed with the very greatest care - the solution was adopted unanimously and represented, he thinks, the best that could be done in very difficult circumstances. In some places where the Committee had thought it possible for new lines of communication to be built they had adhered more strictly to ethnographical considerations, but on the main part of the frontier, by reason of the mountainous ground, it was impossible to substitute new lines for those already existing. By reason of the way in which the Hungarians were grouped in Transylvania, it was absolutely impossible to avoid attributing large numbers of them to the future Romanian State.

Mr Lansing says that he appreciates the efforts of the Committee to make an equitable distribution. After further consideration, he withdraws his criticisms and makes no objection to the recommendations of the Committee.

Mr Balfour also states that he raises no objection.

It is not possible for the Council to go over in detail the whole work of the Committee. As long as the Council is satisfied that the Committee has done the utmost to find an equitable solution, he feels that nothing can be done to improve the resolution, unless there had been disagreement within the Committee itself.

Baron Sonnino also expressed his agreement.

(No other objections being raised to the finding of the Committee, the frontier between Romania and Hungary, as proposed by the Committee from the former frontier of Russia at Khotin to the point of contact with the Danube is accepted.

It is decided that the frontier as between Romania and Yugoslavia in the Banat should be reserved for future discussion.)

The hope is expressed that a solution of the latter question will be reached by agreement between the Romanian and the Yugoslav Government.

c) M Tardieu says that the eastern frontier of Hungary has now been determined. There remains the southern frontier between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Referring to the map attached to Report No. 2 of the Committee he pointed out that there is a very considerable variation between the demands of the Yugoslavs and the recommendations of the Committee. The Committee had certainly excluded a large number of Slavs from the area to be attributed to Yugoslavia, but they are not in sufficient numbers in the Committee’s opinion to justify the line claimed by the Yugoslavs.

The Committee has therefore unanimously adopted the blue line from west of Mako to the point of intersection with the former boundary between Austria and Hungary.

M Pichon asks if any criticisms of this line are forthcoming.

No criticisms are made and the boundary proposed by the Committee from the angle west of Mako to the point of intersection with the former boundary between Austria and Hungary is accepted.

Baron Sonnino asks whether anything has been done regarding the boundary between Austria and Hungary.

d) M Pichon says that no Commission has been charged with this subject.

Mr Lansing questions whether it is necessary to make any alteration in this boundary.

Mr Balfour says that it might possibly be necessary to do so, as he understands that there is a German population in Hungary which might wish to join Austria. If so, it might be desirable to be prepared to deal with this eventuality.

Baron Sonnino points out that to date neither Austria nor Hungary has raised the question.

Mr Balfour said that the question does not greatly interest the Allies, unless the financial or economic terms are to differ as between Hungary and Austria. In that case, some trouble might arise.

Baron Sonnino says that he can see no reason why any difference in the treatment of the two countries should be made.

Mr Balfour says that if the Treaties in both cases were identical, it might not be necessary for the Conference to define the areas of the two states. In the other alternative, it might be desirable to do so.

M Pichon thinks it is unnecessary to deal with the question at once.

Mr Lansing says that, in his view, certain economic questions might arise which, unless the frontiers have been adjusted, might cause difficulties. As these two countries are now to be separated, he thinks it would be well to ask a Commission to make a report to the Conference as to whether the previous boundary lines require to be changed or not. The Conference will therefore be prepared beforehand to deal with any proposal that might be made either from the Austrian or from the Hungarian side.

Baron Sonnino says that if either the Austrians or the Hungarians had raised the question, he would be inclined to agree. As neither had done so, he could see no reason for setting a Commission to work. As far as he is concerned, he accepts the old frontier. Should either side desire an alteration, he would then be prepared to recommend examination by a Commission.

Mr Lansing observes that neither the Austrians nor the Hungarians are present to raise the question. He suggests that, as the Allies had so often been unready to deal with emergencies when they arose, they should in this case take steps to be prepared in advance.

Baron Sonnino points out that full liberty had been left to the Serbians and the Romanians to compose their differences. It was only should they disagree that the Conference would step in. He suggests that the same procedure be adopted regarding Austria and Hungary. He sees no reason for stirring them up. The Hungarians were not represented but had made a very considerable fuss about their frontier with Romania. It appears to him quite gratuitous to suggest to them that they should raise needless trouble. The two countries had not quarreled for fifty years over this frontier; their present Governments are very insecure and the time seems very inopportune for thrusting a controversy upon them.

Mr Lansing says that his suggestion is that the question should be dealt with without rousing either the Austrians or the Hungarians.

Baron Sonnino says that if it cam be done without the knowledge of either he would not object.

M Pichon said he understands the suggestion to be that a Committee should be asked to deal objectively with a possible rectification of boundary between Austria and Hungary.

(It is decided that a Commission be appointed to collect information regarding any possible rectification of frontier between Austria and Hungary which might be proposed by either of the parties concerned. The object of the investigation is to be to place the Council in a position to settle rapidly any trouble that might arise between Austria and Hungary on this subject. No action will be taken unless the question is raised by Austria or Hungary.)

e) M Laroche explains that the finding of the Committee was unanimous. From the point where the ancient boundary between Hungary and Austria met the Danube to the confluence of the Ipoli and the Danube, the frontier between Hungary and Czechoslovakia follows the stream. The reason for giving this frontier to Czechoslovakia is obvious. It is necessary to endow the new State with wide access to this important international waterway. A suggestion had been made to give up to Hungary the Grosse Schütt in exchange for a bridge-head across the Danube at Pressburg. This solution had been unanimously rejected.

Mr Lansing asks whether the population of the Grosse Schütt is Hungarian.

M Laroche replied that it is partly Hungarian and partly German, but that this area is closely connected economically with the Czechoslovak hinterland. The people desire to maintain connection with the Czechoslovak State, in order to save their economic interests. The problems in this region are complicated and have been studied very carefully at a great number of sittings. The Committee has adopted what appears to be the most reasonable solutions and unanimous agreements had been reached on all points.

Mr Lansing points out that, as a result of the findings of the two Committees, some two million Hungarians are to be placed under alien rule in Romania and in Czechoslovakia.

M Laroche observes that, as far as the Czechoslovak Committee is concerned, it has so reduced the claims of the Czechs that only 855,000 Hungarians instead of 1,300,000 would become subjects of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand a great number of Czechs and Slovaks lived outside the boundaries of the new State. According to M Benes, no less than 638,000 Slovaks would be left in Hungary. This figure might be exaggerated, but the number was considerable, and might be regarded as a guarantee for the good treatment of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia.

(After some further discussion, the line proposed by the Committee, from the intersection of the former boundary between Austria and Hungary up to the angle formed by the meeting of the Romanian and Ruthenian territory, is accepted as the Northern frontier of Hungary.)

f) Mr Balfour says that the problem of dealing with the Ruthenians is one which had not been settled. The Ruthenians had some affinity with the Slovaks, but not enough to be included without some precautions in the same State. Some kind of local autonomy has been suggested for them. The definition of the expression “some form of autonomy” is still sought. There are, he was told, some 400,000 Ruthenians. They are considered too few to form an entirely separate state. On the other hand, it might be desirable to save them from the various annoyances arising from association with a larger and, to some extent, alien population in the same State. The precise means of dealing with this difficulty has not been thought out. A similar difficulty however, will arise not only in the Peace with Austria and Hungary but elsewhere.

M Pichon says that the Committee had referred the question of Ruthenian autonomy to the Supreme Council. He suggests that a Commission be asked to make recommendations as to the form of autonomy suitable to the Ruthenians.

Mr Balfour thinks that the question might perhaps be referred to the Committee dealing with the rights of minorities.

Baron Sonnino said that he has no knowledge of this Committee, on which there is no Italian representative.

Mr Lansing says that he would prefer to name a new Commission with local knowledge of the area in question. He proposes that the question be referred to the Committee on Czechoslovakia.

Mr Balfour asks whether it is proposed to proceed in this manner whenever the question of autonomy should arise.

Mr Lansing says that he would support this, provided that the Council had the opportunity of examining the proposals, in order to ensure that contradictory principles were not applied in the various cases.

M Laroche says that the Committee on Czechoslovak Affairs will ask the Czechoslovak Government for its proposals. Should these proposals not meet with the approval of the Committee experts can be consulted and the Ruthenians themselves can be asked to make their own suggestions. As far as the Treaty is concerned, all that need be stipulated is that the territory of the Ruthenians be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers.

(It is decided that the Committee on Czechoslovakia be asked to make recommendations regarding the future status of the Ruthenians in relation to the Czechoslovak State.)


2. The frontiers of Hungary having been defined by the above resolutions, it is decided that the question of the frontiers of Austria should be discussed on the following day.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

9th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Afghans repulsed by British troops.

Curtiss NC-4 flying boat begins its journey as the first aircraft to fly across the Atlantic Ocean over a course of 19 days.


Verdun, France.


Spectators run towards Lt Elmer Bowling as he nears the ground in Van Cortlandt Park in the Bronx after making a 1500 foot parachute jump from a captive balloon in a demonstration to entertain wounded soldiers, New York.


Qinghua students burn Japanese goods in the field in front of the gym in protest against the Treaty of Versailles and the 21 Demands.


Ship Losses:

Factor (United Kingdom) The cargo ship collided with Ursus ( United Kingdom) in the North Sea 6 nautical miles (11 km) north east of Scarborough, Yorkshire and sank.
Peter (United States) Placed in a slough at Chena, Territory of Alaska in the autumn of 1918 before the onset of ice for the winter of 1918–1919, the 458-ton scow was carried away, crushed, and broken up by ice when the ice broke up in the spring while the river was unusually high.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 10:30

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. Lord Robert Cecil, speaking on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council, and on the invitation of President Wilson, states the general economic problem confronting the Associated Governments. He says that the most important part of the problem is to get Europe to work again. A great proportion of the population are out of work in most countries in Europe. It is useless merely to provide food; in fact the danger to social order is likely to become worse and not better if people are merely fed. It is essential that raw materials should be made available. Poland might be taken as a typical case. Her great textile industry, on which Lodz for instance is absolutely dependent, is entirely stopped for want of cotton and wool, although her factories and their machinery are practically intact. The trouble is simply that she has no money to buy raw materials and no exports (a large part of which formerly went to Russia) to send in exchange for them. Even agriculture is affected by the absence of raw materials, as the want of proper boots and clothing for agricultural laborers reduce their capacity to work. The problem then is how to provide credit. Personally he would not advise giving unlimited funds or even limited funds uncontrolled to the Polish Government who might spend them on military undertakings.

The problem, therefore, is twofold

a) to devise means of providing money, and

b) to devise means for seeing that it was used to set industry going.

As far as he can see the position is getting worse and not better. What he said of Poland, which he had taken merely as an instance, is generally true of Germany and other countries in Europe and the problem must be treated as a whole. Personally he regrets that there has not been a further relaxation of the Blockade some time ago. The problem is largely psychological and the continuance of the Blockade with a consequent feeling of distrust all over Europe is a large part of the difficulty. In the case of Belgium, for instance, it is clear that the provision of credit in itself is not sufficient as credits had there been offered without effecting a solution.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether prices do not constitute a large part of the difficulty, i. e. the anticipation that prices will fall has the effect of holding back orders.

Lord Robert Cecil agrees that this is a part of the difficulty but he says it is clear that it is necessary for a serious attempt to be made at once to see that raw materials are obtained by the countries to which he referred. This is mainly a financial problem.


2. In addition, however, Lord Robert Cecil desires to make two following specific proposals with regard to the Blockade:

a) That semi-public communications should be at once entered into with the border neutrals with a view to securing from them such undertakings as would, if necessary, enable the Blockade to be re-imposed even more effectively than before.

b) That a public statement should at once be issued making clear what modifications in the Blockade have already been made and concluding with a statement that all the rest of the Blockade against Germany will be removed the moment Peace was signed.

(It is agreed that the above action (a) and (b) should be taken, it being understood that the removal of the Blockade will not apply to Bolshevist Russia.)


3. Lord Robert Cecil, continuing, says that, personally, he has no specific financial proposal to make and considers the problem is one to which the experts should devote themselves at once. He wishes, however, to refer to a special and important difficulty in the case of Germany. We have provided Germany with the full amount of food she has paid for. In addition we have large quantities afloat for which payment had not been arranged. The Germans had always warned us that they could not find sufficient money to pay for their rations up to the harvest, and the attempts to help the situation by allowing exports had broken down. A paper has been prepared by the Finance and Food Sections of the Supreme Economic Council for delivery to the President of the German Financial Commission. This paper after describing the exact present position concludes with the statement that shipments will at once be stopped unless the German Government takes certain immediate measures to provide further gold. This memorandum includes the following statement as to the present position:

(i) Food delivered to May 10 £19,050,000
(ii) Foodstuffs afloat on May 10 or landed for delivery £14,850,000
(iii) Loading for May delivery £ 5,100,000
(iv) Balance collected for May delivery £13,750,000
(v) Foodstuffs collected for June delivery by German tonnage £10,670,000
(vi) Further United Kingdom supplies available for june £5,000,000
Total: £68,420,000
The payment situation is as follows:

Millions
(i) Original payments in gold and neutral currencies 6
(ii) First deposit in Brussels 11
(iii) Second Brussels deposit 7½
(iv) Further deposit promised 10
Total: 34½

showing a deficit of over £30 million even when the further deposit promised is paid.

In answer to a question by Mr Lloyd George, Mr Hoover states that he thinks that if the Germans could find £75,000,000 sterling in all (i. e. about £7,000,000 more than the amounts required for the supplies referred to above) they could with the addition of their foreign credits manage to carry through to the harvest.

Lord Robert Cecil continuing, states that one difficulty results from the smuggling of German private securities abroad. Some of these are said to be taken by aeroplane; others to have got across into the occupied territory and so to neutrals.

Mr Norman Davis says the German Government are in fact continuing to requisition securities.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether a large part of the Brazilian debt is not in fact in German hands.

Mr Keynes states that the part so held does not amount to very much. The German Government has obtained about £1,000,000 from this source.

It is resolved that the Memorandum prepared for communication to the German Financial Commission should not be presented in view of the possible effect at this moment of a formal document of that character on the Peace negotiations. It is agreed, however, that the representatives of the Associated Governments should discuss the question verbally with the German representatives along the lines of the statement.


4. President Wilson considers that the general financial problem cannot be discussed to a conclusion at the present meeting but that further expert advice must first be obtained. On his motion it was resolved that:

“A Committee composed of two economic advisers from each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers be requested to submit a systematic suggestion with regard to the means of assisting the nations which are in immediate need of both food, raw material and credit”.


5. Lord Robert Cecil raises the question of the control of the Danube. He states that the river is at present partly under French and partly under British control, that there is general agreement that it is desirable to co-ordinate the control under a Commission of Four representing the four principal Associated Governments, but that a decision is required as to who should act as Chairman of this Commission. He himself hoped that Admiral Troubridge would be chosen.

Mr Hoover explains the practical obstruction to barge navigation resulting from the present complicated permit system, and he agrees with the proposal.

M Clemenceau states that he considers it necessary that the whole should be under the supervision of the Military Authorities but that subject to that he thinks it would be suitable that Admiral Troubridge* should be Chairman of the Commission, and he agreed to write to General Franchet d’Esperey suggesting that he should propose the appointment of Admiral Troubridge to this position.


6. Mr Hoover raises the question of the restriction on export of food from the Banat to Austro-Hungary. He pointed out that the need for food in the latter country is desperate and that the Associated Governments are in fact with Hungary having much difficulty importing food from great distances.

At the same time there is actually a surplus of food in the adjacent Banat for which there are sufficient commodities in Austro-Hungary to provide payment. The Serbs, however, are refusing to allow the export of this food.

(It is agreed that M Clemenceau should communicate with the Serbian Government intimating that the Associated Governments regard it as of great importance that facilities for the export of foodstuffs from the Banat to German-Austria and, if a stable Government is established, to Hungary, should at once be given.)

*This is the same Admiral Thomas Troubridge who was court-martialled in 1915 for declining to pursue the fleeing SMS Goeben in the very first days of the war. He was exonerated, and despite never having a sea command again went on to a fairly good naval career.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:25

Meeting of the Council of Four


(Mr Hurst is introduced.)

President Wilson points out that the text of Article 430 of the Treaty of Peace differs from the instructions on the subject which were given to the Drafting Committee. The instructions to the Drafting Committee were as follows:

“In case either during or after this 15 years’ delay, the Inter-Allied Commission of Reparations recognize that Germany refuses to execute the whole or part of the conditions agreed upon by her according to the present Treaty, the international re-occupation of part or the whole of the areas defined by Article 2 will take place immediately.”

Article 430 of the Treaty reads as follows:

“In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the 15 years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany has failed to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present Treaty, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated forces.”

The essential difference between the two texts, President Wilson points out, is that in the Article in the Peace Treaty the words “Germany has failed to observe” have been substituted for the original words “Germany refuses to execute”.

Mr Hurst points out that the change is a very small one. It is an Article in regard to which no action will take place for at least five years, and then it will only affect a relatively small area of territory.

Mr Lloyd George points out that there is a considerable difference between refusal and failure to execute the Treaty.

President Wilson points out a further difference, namely, that the original draft, though loosely worded, is only intended to apply to Reparation, whereas Article 430 applies to the whole Treaty. The Reparation Commission has nothing to do with anything but Reparation. He agrees, however, that the original text was partly misleading.

Mr Hurst says that this will entail the modification of Article 430, and no doubt an opportunity will arise during the negotiations with the Germans. The alteration will be to Germany’s advantage, so that Germany is not likely to object. He undertakes to arrange for a Meeting of the Drafting Committee in the afternoon, and to present a fresh draft by the following morning.

President Wilson asks whether the word “may” should not be substituted for “will” in the last line.

M Clemenceau asks what the original text was.

Mr Hurst says it was “will”.

M Clemenceau said he would prefer to adhere to the original text, owing to the effect of a change on the French people.

Mr Hurst says the difficulty can be surmounted by using the future tense in the French text.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should prepare a fresh draft of Article 430 to be presented to the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the following morning.)

(Mr Hurst withdraws.)

(It is agreed in the afternoon to discuss the action to be taken in the event of a failure on the part of the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to circulate a memorandum by Marshal Foch.

He circulated at the Meeting the memorandum by the Allied Admirals on the Naval action to be taken.)

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


1. M Pichon says that the Council of Foreign Ministers will complete the examination of the remaining territorial frontiers of Austria, as presented in the reports of the Commissions appointed by the Conference. Questions have been left over from the meeting held on the previous day and he will ask the Council to commence with the examination of the frontiers between Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Mr Lansing inquires whether the members of the Committee on Czechoslovak questions have reached a unanimous conclusion on this question.

M Laroche says the Committee are unanimous in recognizing that the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Austria should, in principle, coincide with the administrative boundaries which formerly separated Bohemia and Moravia from the Austrian provinces. With respect to various rectifications asked for by Czechoslovakia in this frontier, the Committee are of opinion that for the most part these demands can only be decided by a boundary Commission on the spot. The Committee has, however, unanimously recommended that the town of Gmünd should be given to Austria, while the railway station of Gmünd should go to Czechoslovakia, for the reason that the railway station forms an important junction. The distance between the railway station and the town is about two miles, so that the inconvenience caused by this arrangement would not be very great. Furthermore, the Committee considers it to be of great importance that Czechoslovakia should be able to control the course of the Morava river in order to be in a position to construct canals to serve the provinces of Moravia. It has been recommended, therefore, that the frontier should be drawn so as to leave the Morava entirely within Czechoslovak territory, it being understood, on the other hand, that the railway which follows the Morava at varying distances would be left entirely within Austrian territory.

One important question, however, remains to be provided for in the Austrian Treaty, namely, the renunciation by Austria of the northern provinces of Galicia and Teschen, whose boundaries have not yet been delimited.

(It is agreed to accept the recommendations of the Committee on Czechoslovak questions in regard to the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Austria.)

M Tardieu says that the Committee has carefully studied the Yugoslav claims to the Austrian provinces of the valley of the Drave. After examining the ethnographical, historical, economical and political conditions, it has decided upon the following solutions for the two boundary regions which formed distinct basins, having as their respective centers, Marburg and Klagenfurt.

The United States, British and French Delegations note that the district of Marburg is inhabited by a population in which the real Slovene element possesses the majority. On the other hand, the Italian Delegation considers that Marburg, of which it recognizes the German character, depends on the Austrian economic system, and cannot therefore be detached from it without disturbing the economic life of the region and compromising the maintenance of peace.

In consequence, the United States, British and French Delegations propose to assign to Yugoslavia the basin of Marburg; while the Italian Delegation opposes to this proposal the reservation of principle formulated above.

The United States, British and French Delegations noted that the basin of Klagenfurt is inhabited by a mixed population, composing important Slovene elements, particularly to the east of Klagenfurt. This basin, moreover, constitutes a geographical entity separated from the south by the natural barrier of the Karawanken mountains. For this reason the basin, and not particularly the town, of Klagenfurt, constitute an association of economic interest more closely connected with the districts situated to the north than with those situated to the south. Nevertheless, the United States, British and French Delegations consider that the information at present in their possession does not appear to be sufficient to allow them to determine with certainty the natural aspirations of the nations of this district. On the other hand, the Italian Delegation considers that the Klagenfurt basin forms an integral part of the Austrian geographical system from which it cannot be separated, without disturbing the life of the region and compromising the general peace. For the above reasons, the Committee proposes that the frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria should follow the course of the Karawanken mountains from a point south-east of Eisenkappel as far as the Klagenfurt-Laibach road. At the same time, the United States, British and French Delegations propose that a local inquiry or consultation (under conditions to be determined by the Allied and Associated Governments) should be held, in order to afford the inhabitants of the Klagenfurt Basin an opportunity of protesting, should they wish to do so, against inclusion in Austria, and demanding union with Yugoslavia. The Italian Delegation, however, opposes to this proposal the reservation of principle formulated above. It declares, moreover, that in its opinion, any question of a consultation or inquiry, as well as of a plebiscite, bears an eminently political character which removed it from the competence of the Territorial Committees.

S de Martino invited the attention of the Council to the importance of Marburg as a railway center. In his opinion, the questions of Klagenfurt and Marburg were intimately connected. Consequently the two problems should be studied together and the study should be continued right up to the Italian frontier.

Mr Balfour says that before accepting S de Martino’s proposal he wishes to inquire whether the arrangement in regard to the boundaries in the district of Marburg had not been something in the nature of a compromise, whereby it had been agreed that a triangle situated to the north of Luttenburg should be left to Austria in exchange for Marburg and the adjoining territory, which was to be included in Yugoslavia. As a result, he considers that the Council cannot consider one question without the other, as it was by taking the two questions together that a compromise had been reached.

M Tardieu agrees that the question should be considered as a whole.

M Pichon inquires whether the Commission should not be authorized to study the question up to the Italian frontier.

Baron Sonnino considers that this can be done here and now. The Council of Four had charged the Council of Foreign Ministers to accept the proposals submitted by the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Yugoslavia, or to put up their own recommendations in regard to matters requiring amendment.

M Tardieu explains that the Committee had thought that a study of the frontiers beyond the Klagenfurt-Laibach road must involve the consideration of Italian claims which had been reserved by the Council of Ten.

Baron Sonnino says that if he has correctly understood the question, the Committee in fixing the frontiers between Austria and Yugoslavia had given careful consideration to the position of the existing railway lines in these regions, with the result that it had decided to leave the railway line between Klagenfurt, Assling and Trieste free, that is to say, outside the territories allotted to Yugoslavia. Now, to give effect to this principle, it would be necessary that the frontier which had been delimited up to the Klagenfurt-Laibach road should thence proceed in a southerly direction, remaining east of Assling, until it met the Italian frontier. In other words, it was essential that the whole of the railway line from Klagenfurt to Trieste, via Assling, should remain in Austria until it reached the Italian frontier. In his opinion, this was the idea which the Committee had meant to follow in accordance with the principle accepted in regard to railway communications by other Commissions. Under this arrangement one important direct railway line of communication would exist between Trieste and Vienna, whilst the other railway lines more to the east would pass through Yugoslav territory.

Mr Lansing says the Council of Foreign Ministers had received no specific reports on these various questions. The Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Yugoslavia had not reported on the particular questions under consideration. He proposes, therefore, that these should first be referred to that Committee for examination.

Baron Sonnino says that he will be prepared to accept Mr Lansing’s proposal. He would point out, however, that the Council of Four had directed the Council of Foreign Ministers to report on these very questions. Should his colleagues, nevertheless, insist on referring these questions to the Committee, he would bow to their decision, but only on the understanding that the terms of reference to the Committee should clearly lay down the principle he had just enumerated, namely, that the main line of railway communication between Trieste and Vienna, via Assling, and Klagenfurt should pass wholly through Italian and Austrian territory.

M. Pichon inquires whether the Commission should also be charged to deal with the question of the Italian frontiers in these regions.

Baron Sonnino replies in the negative. He invites the attention of his Colleagues to the fact that the Supreme Council has decided that all frontier questions affecting Italy should be settled by that Council. Consequently the reference to the Committee would relate only to the part between the Klagenfurt-Laibach road, where the Committee had previously stopped, and the frontier of Italy. Now, the principle which governed the Committee appeared to be to leave the Railway line between Trieste and Vienna outside Yugoslav territory. He thinks that question can, therefore, be accepted at once. Otherwise it should, in his opinion, be referred forthwith to the Supreme Council and not to the Committee on Yugoslavia.

Mr Lansing maintains that there is nothing either in the report or in the maps submitted by the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Yugoslavia, which supports Baron Sonnino’s contention.

Mr Balfour says that he understands Baron Sonnino to state that the Councils of Foreign Ministers are not competent at present to decide questions relating to the Italian frontiers. In this view he entirely concurs with Baron Sonnino, at all events as far as Great Britain and France were concerned, since there exist the additional complication in regard to the Treaty of London. On the other hand, for the Council to decide at this stage that a certain railway line must be left out of Yugoslavia and included in Italy and Austria seems to him to be hardly justifiable with the information at present available.

Baron Sonnino agrees that the Committee would be quite unable to discuss such a question, especially if the Foreign Ministers themselves could not do so. Consequently in his opinion the question should be referred to the Supreme Council.

M Pichon remarks that Mr Lansing has not said that the present Council were not competent to consider the question. He had merely asked that the Yugoslavia question should be referred to the Committee for study and report.

Mr Lansing agrees. He explains that he feels himself at present incompetent, because he has received no advice from his experts either on the ethnological aspect of the case or in regard to the Railways.

Baron Sonnino says that he asked himself what the Committee would do when it reached the Italian frontier, since it would not be competent to deal with the question further. The Committee could, therefore, only deal with another 20 kilometres of country beyond the Klagenfurt-Laibach road.

Mr. Balfour inquires whether it would not be an advantage that the question should be examined by a Committee before it comes under consideration either by the present Council or by the Supreme Council. So far the question has not been examined by the Committee because the Italian Delegation had held the view that for political reasons Committees should not do so. He quite agrees with the view put forward by the Italian Delegation in regard to the question of international policy: but the Committee could give the ethnologic and economic aspect of the case which will greatly help the Council to deal with the larger questions. For instance, the area which the Italians desired should be given to Austria and not to Yugoslavia was, he understood, largely inhabited by Yugoslavs.

That is a question on which the Committee could furnish a statement.

Again, the Italian Delegation maintains that for economic reasons a direct line of communication between Trieste and Vienna and Bohemia should pass wholly through Italian and Austrian territory without crossing Yugoslavia. That constitutes partly an economic point. Surely the two questions can be looked into by a competent Committee of experts. He understands that to be the suggestion made by Mr Lansing.

Mr Lansing agrees that Mr Balfour has correctly interpreted his proposal.

Baron Sonnino says that provided the Council of Ministers are willing to accept the lines proposed by the Committee on Yugoslav affairs, he will, himself, withdraw the reservation made by the Italian Delegation in regard to the districts of Marburg and Klagenfurt.

M Tardieu points out that two reservations have been made: one by the Italian Delegation in regard to the Klagenfurt Basin, which the Delegation considered should remain Austrian on account of its forming an integral part of the Austrian geographical and economic system. On the other hand, the United States, British and French Delegations, considered that a local inquiry or consultation should be held in order to afford the inhabitants of the Klagenfurt Basin an opportunity of protesting, should they wish to do so, against inclusion in Austria and of demanding union with Yugoslavia. It will be seen, therefore, that the Committee has not made any definite proposals. The Italian Delegation considers that the Klagenfurt Basin should be included in Austria, whereas the other three Delegations proposed that a line should be drawn south of the Klagenfurt Basin up to which the inquiry or consultation should proceed.

Mr Balfour inquired whether the procedure adopted in the case of Malmedy could not be followed in the present instance. Malmedy had been incorporated in Belgium, but provision was made in order to allow the inhabitants to protest against their inclusion in Belgium within a certain time; reference would then be to the League of Nations which would decide. He thought that procedure might be found a convenient method of dealing with the problem of Klagenfurt.

Baron Sonnino points out that the two cases are very different. In Malmedy there was a question of bringing Germans under Belgian sovereignty; whereas the people of Klagenfurt already formed part of the Austrian State.

M Pichon interprets the views of the Council to be that the question should be referred to the Committee on Yugoslav affairs to report as soon as possible, giving precise details to enable a decision to be taken.

M Tardieu points out that the Committee can give ethnic and statistical data relating to this region but it cannot give particulars relating to the railway line which would join the Italian frontier at an unknown point.

Mr Lansing agrees that the Council only requires the Committee to give ethnological and economic information.

(It is agreed that the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Yugoslavia should submit recommendations in regard to the frontiers between Yugoslavia and Austria, up to the Italian Frontier, based on ethnic and economic considerations; the Committee should submit their report on the morning of the 10th May, 1919.)


2. M Pichon reads the following letter which he had addressed to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Netherlands Government in Paris, dated 9th May, 1919:

“In a note dated 4th April, 1919, you were kind enough to inform me that the Royal Netherlands Government was prepared to take part in a discussion on the subject of the revision of the Treaties of 1839.

I am directed to inform you in reply to the Note above mentioned that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Great Powers has decided that a Conference, including the five Ministers of Foreign Affairs of those Powers, together with the representatives of the Netherlands and of Belgium should meet as soon as possible, in Paris, in order to examine the question of the revision of the Treaties of 1839.

I regret that up to the present, it has not been possible to fix exactly the date on which these discussions could commence; but as soon as the Supreme Council is in a position to reach a decision thereon, I shall have the honor of informing you immediately.

Pray accept, mon cher Chargé d’Affaires, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Pichon”

(It is agreed that M Pichon should forthwith issue a further communication to the representatives of the Netherlands and Belgian Governments, inviting them to attend the meeting as above arranged on Monday, 19th May, 1919.)


3. M Pichon draws attention to the following letter dated 6th May 1919, which had been addressed by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference to the American, British and Italian Delegations:

“The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference has the honor to forward herewith a copy of a letter which has been addressed to him by the Secretariat of the Belgian Delegation. In this letter the Belgian Delegation requests the Allied and Associated Powers not to recognize the new German flag in the event of the Colors of the latter being as announced, namely, the same as those of the Belgian flag. This question could, if so agreed, be placed on the Agenda paper for the next meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Mr Balfour says he cannot see what this has to do with the Peace Conference. It will obviously be impossible to add a new Article to the Peace Treaty on this question. He thinks the matter should stand over until the Germans had committed the anticipated outrage.

M Pichon suggests no action should be taken until Germany has declared her intention in the matter.

Baron Sonnino thinks that once Germany has decided on her action it will be far more difficult to insist on a change being made. In his opinion it will be easier to warn Germany beforehand and inform her that the Allied and Associated Governments endorse Belgium’s protest.

Mr Balfour draws attention to the fact that a letter on this subject had been addressed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American, British, French and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs in March last. To this letter the British Government had already forwarded the following reply, dated 8th May, 1919, which he thought fully met the case:

“I have the honor to refer to the Note of March 15th last in which Your Excellency called attention to a statement which had appeared in the neutral press that the German Republican Government intended to adopt for the Republican Flag the same colors as the Belgian national Flag.

Your Excellency asked for the assurance that His Britannic Majesty’s Government would not recognize such a flag.

In reply I have the honor to say that His Majesty’s Government while feeling it would be difficult to make a demand of the German Government not to choose red, black and gold for the national colors, are of opinion that the Allies might insist that these colors, if adopted, should be so arranged that no confusion between the Belgian and German Flags would be likely to arise”.

M Pichon explains that the French Government has also answered in the same sense.

(The question is then adjourned.)


4. M Pichon said that the following letter, dated Spa, 1st May, 1919, had been addressed by the Head of the Belgian Mission to General Nudant, President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission, on the subject of the retention and publication by Germany of the documents taken from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

“In compliance with instructions from my Government I sent to the President of the German Armistice Commission, under date of 10 April, 1919, a protest, of which I sent you a copy in regard to the retention and the publication by the Germans of documents belonging to the Department of Foreign Affairs of Belgium.

The note of which I send you a copy herewith, reiterates my protest. The Minister of Foreign Affairs believes that joint action by the Allies seems to be indispensable, and he asks whether it would not be possible to obtain the intervention of Marshal Foch against this open violation of the Armistice Agreement.

I have the honor to beg you to be so good as to investigate the possibility of satisfying this request”.

M Pichon, continuing, says that a clause in the Armistice exists which apparently deals with this question. Consequently, it would be sufficient to request Marshal Foch to enforce the provisions of the Armistice.

Baron Sonnino points out that Article 19 of the Armistice referred to by M Pichon merely deals with economic questions. It requires the immediate return of all the documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries.

Mr Lansing inquires whether any of the documents referred to by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs had actually been published in Germany.
M Pichon invites attention to the following letter, dated Spa, 1st May, 1919, addressed by the Head of the Belgian Mission to General von Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission:

“In my note of 10 April, I protested against the retention by the German Government, and the publication of political circulars or other documents of public interest belonging to the Belgian Government and I again requested the immediate return of all copies now remaining in Germany, as well as the cessation of the work of publication which is manifestly contrary to the letter and spirit of Article 19 of the Armistice Convention.

Up to the present time, I have as yet received no reply in regard to this matter.

The Minister of War informs me that, according to a report in the “Rhine and Westphalia Gazette” of 2nd April last, two fresh volumes of these circulars have appeared.

I reiterate my protest against this open violation of the Armistice Agreement, and I urge General von Hammerstein to inform me as to the measures taken by the German Government in compliance with the justifiable and repeated requests which I have made in regard to this matter.”

Mr Lansing proposes that Marshal Foch should be asked to report what Powers he possesses under the Armistice.

(It is agreed that correspondence received from the Head of the Belgian Mission at Spa, quoted above, should be referred to Marshal Foch with a request that he should report to the Council what powers he possessed under the Armistice to insist on the return of the documents taken from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)


5. Mr Balfour said that all the information which he received from Estonia as well as that received by the American Delegation goes to show that some kind of assistance and encouragement should be given to Estonia which for four months has been struggling against Bolshevism. Estonia does not require men; she requires equipment, food, and money, though not much. A small allowance of money, with some indication from the Allied and Associated Governments, that they support their cause would encourage the Estonians to continue their struggle against Bolshevism. In his opinion, the Allied and Associated Governments should recognize the Estonian Government as a de facto Government, and in addition they should even be prepared to give a certain amount of assistance in the work in which that Government was engaged. The matter is one of pressing urgency, as the fate of Estonia is hanging in the balance. These remote people are quite unacquainted with the temper of the Allies in Paris. He proposes, therefore, that some form of encouragement should forthwith be given to the Estonian Government by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The British Government has been giving naval assistance and stores to the Estonians, and largely owing to that small contribution, the Estonians have been able to carry on their struggles. But the British Government cannot continue this action except in conjunction with the Allied and Associated Governments. The British Government has already acknowledged the Estonian Government as a de facto Government, but as far as he knows this has not yet been done by any of the other Allied and Associated Governments. However, deeds are more important than words and he felt some action should be taken in the direction indicated.

Mr Lansing said that his recollection was that Great Britain had recognized the Estonian Government as a de facto Government about a year ago and had again confirmed the recognition in September last. The French Government had taken very much the same course.

M Pichon explains that the French Government has not so far recognised the Estonian Government, but it had had unofficial dealings with Estonian representatives and had thereby acted as if according recognition to a de facto Government.

Mr Lansing points out that at the bottom of the whole question lay a very important principle of policy. The recognition of de facto Governments in territories formerly Russian, constitute in a measure a dissection of Russia which the United States of America had carefully avoided, except in the case of Finland and Poland. In the case of Poland Russia herself had acquiesced.

Mr Balfour says he would, under the circumstances, withdraw his suggestion for the recognition of Estonia if the United States of America objects thereto, especially as he was more interested in the question of obtaining some material assistance for the Estonians.

Mr Hoover said that the Food Commission had established a systematic distribution of food in Estonia but the problem is inseparable from that of public order and means of communication. The Estonian Government, at the present moment, only possesses three locomotives, two of which are broken down and unserviceable. As a result, the people are dying of starvation, and it is impossible to get food into the interior of the country. The Army has succeeded up to the present in maintaining its position: it is sadly in need of ammunition, clothing and supplies, which were not available at the present time. The high rate of casualties is due almost entirely to death from starvation. The scenes witnessed in Estonia are most heartrending. The problem cannot be encompassed without means of transport and the restoration of public order. Humane and not political considerations should prevail.

Mr Balfour inquires whether Mr Hoover would not add to his statement of the requirements of Estonia a certain amount of financial assistance. Furthermore, he would be glad to know whether Mr Hoover has any plans for improving means of communication.

Mr Hoover explains that a section of the Supreme Economic Council deals with questions relating to communications. He thinks a certain number of Armistice locomotives and wagons obtained from the Germans could be set aside for work in Estonia. In this connection, he would invite attention to the fact that the Germans had converted the Russian into the German gauge which will greatly help in arriving at a solution. Food supplies can be sent to Estonia by the United States of America in accordance with the powers conferred by Congress, but no direct money loans can be made by the United States Government as no authority exists. In regard to shipping, the British control a large quantity of German tonnage which can be put aside for the purpose of bringing munitions and supplies to Estonia. He thinks the whole question is one of cooperation between Allies and if authority is given to the Supreme Economic Council and to the Military Authorities, a solution will be found without difficulty.

Mr Lansing proposes that the matter should be referred to the Supreme Economic Council to prepare definite plans.

Mr Balfour thinks that something more will be required. He thinks that the Supreme Economic Council, the War Department and the Admiralty should be instructed to prepare the necessary plans: the Supreme Economic Council to be authorized to take action without again referring the matter to the Council. He realizes that the American Government can do nothing in the way of advancing hard cash: but they did a great deal in the supply of food. On the other hand, only a very small amount of money, some £200,000 would make a great difference and he inquires whether France, Great Britain and Italy would be able to supply this sum.

Baron Sonnino does not think that Italy could advance any money for this purpose.

M Pichon points out that it would be necessary for him in the first place to obtain the sanction of the Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. He would have to address a certain request to that Committee shortly and he would then take the opportunity of pressing for an advance for this purpose.

Mr Lansing points out that in this connection the United States of America is already spending £400,000 a month in relieving the situation in Estonia.

Mr Balfour says that he had intended to make it clear that the United States Government cannot give money as such for technical reasons. But it is giving much larger sums of money in the shape of food and assistance. He would add that he was, himself, in M Pichon’s position. He would suggest that Great Britain should give an advance but he would have to get the permission of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister. He will, however, do what he can.

Mr Hoover asks permission in the next place to invite attention to the situation in Latvia and Lithuania. The Germans had arrested the Government of Latvia and the British naval authorities had prevented food supplies from entering the country. The difficulty arose from the fact that the Germans were living on the civil population; they were not fighting the Bolsheviks, and they prevented the local authorities from organizing the country.

The Bolsheviks have now retreated from Riga because no food is available. As a result the town of Riga is now in the hands of mobs and atrocities of a hideous nature are being committed. The American Food Commission are in a position to send food but this cannot be landed without the help of the Navy, since no Government, not even a Bolshevik government exists.

Captain Fuller reports that the British Admiralty is fully aware of the situation in Riga. A week or 10 days ago an invitation had been received from the Germans asking that the British Navy should help them to recover Riga, the conditions being that the British forces should act in conjunction with the German forces.

Mr Balfour thinks that Mr Hoover had not suggested that the British Navy should act in conjunction with the German forces: all he wanted was that the British Admiralty should send ships to Riga to ensure the landing of food.

Captain Fuller replies that it will not be possible to assure the landing of food at Riga unless the town itself is also occupied.

Mr Hoover says that he feels certain that if food is landed at Riga the Bolsheviks will promptly return.

Mr Balfour thinks that the question stands as follows. Food can only be got to Riga under the protection of the British Navy. In addition, the town must be protected against attack because as soon as food is available in the town the Bolsheviks would enter. The British Admiralty are of the opinion that Riga cannot be protected by marines, consequently, it will be necessary to consider whether any other forces are available to maintain order in the town.

Mr Hoover points out that a humanitarian policy would allow the Germans to do the work on land in co-operation with the British Navy acting at sea.

M Pichon thinks it will be impossible to accept German co-operation.

Mr Lansing maintains that unless a solution can be found the Allied and Associated Governments will be responsible for the death of the people. Should the British Admiralty refuse to cooperate with the Germans purely from fear of giving the latter some economic advantages, it would be wholly responsible for the deaths that would occur.

Mr Balfour thinks that Mr Lansing has spoken under some misconception. The British Admiralty has not considered either the economic or any other advantages. But so long as war lasts, it is rather a strong order to expect the British and German forces to co-operate. Everyone must feel the strength of the appeal made by Mr Lansing. But volunteers can be found to go to the scene of action if only paid. Consequently, inquiries should be made as to whether other forces are available before the Allies can agree to march shoulder to shoulder with the Germans, with whom they are still at war.

M Pichon entirely agrees with Mr Balfour’s standpoint. In Finland, in Russia, and in Scandinavia, other elements can be found to constitute volunteers to do the work required.

Mr Lansing says that, paradoxical as it might seem, the Allied and Associated Governments are, by the Armistice, Allies of Germany in the Baltic provinces. The reason the Germans had been asked to stay there was because the Allied and Associated Governments did not want them to leave.

M Pichon thinks it was one thing to tell the Germans to stay where they were and quite another thing to join and fight with them.

Mr Lansing inquired wherein lies the objection. Is it sentiment or danger to Allied forces?

M Pichon thinks it is both. In his opinion it would be very bad from a moral point of view. Furthermore, there is great danger in our troops supporting the action of the Germans in Russia.

Mr Lansing agrees that the point is that the Allies do not wish to support the Germans in Russia. At the same time, thousands of people are starving in Estonia. In his opinion, it is essential to put ideas of humanity above those of sentiment and to do everything possible to prevent people from starving.

Mr Balfour maintains that the question is not so simple as Mr Lansing believes. The Germans have been behaving disgracefully in the Baltic provinces and are acting for their own political ends. They are everywhere preventing and hampering the policy of the Allies which is to encourage the local people to do what they can to organize themselves. Sufficient reason might not exist to force the Allies to occupy Riga, but sufficient reason exists to justify an endeavor to obtain volunteers to do the work required. This is clearly better than to assist the Germans who were merely furthering their own political objects. He agrees that everything possible should be done to save the population from starving, but if it is true that volunteers are available, Mr Lansing and the Allies should be able to find some means to make use of them.

Mr Hoover thinks that the organisation of a mercenary army would require a considerable time.

Mr Lansing points out that he has heard what Mr Balfour has said in regard to the condition of Estonia with considerable interest. The American authorities have investigated the charges brought against the Germans and they have found that the Germans have been behaving far better than had been reported. General Von der Goltz appears to be behaving with considerable good faith, confining himself merely to military matters. The political situation is wholly due to the people quarreling among themselves. They have been trying to get a Cabinet that represented all parties, including the Baltic Barons. In his opinion, there exists no danger of German misbehavior.

Mr Balfour inquires whether Mr. Lansing intends to imply that the statement relating to the disarmament of the Letts by the Germans is untrue.

Mr Lansing replies that the Germans had certainly disarmed the Letts when a movement against the Government had been started.

M Pichon thinks the Allies at present posses no means to land forces to maintain order as suggested by Mr Hoover. He thinks that the Commanders of the local Allied Naval Forces should be called upon to make an inquiry and to report as to the means that could be taken to relieve the situation.

Mr Balfour invites attention to the curious difference existing between the information received from Estonia by Mr Lansing and himself. Under these circumstances he thinks it would be a good thing for the Delegates of the various countries who have representatives in the Baltic Provinces to join and consider the information received by their various representatives.

Mr Lansing suggests that Mr Hoover should be authorized to call such a meeting together and obtain a report. He would point out, however, that the question is also a food one.

Mr Balfour says that both Naval and Economic authorities will be available to represent the American, British, French and Italian views. These delegates should meet together to consider the facts available and submit a definite policy to be followed.

Mr Lansing thinks the proposal would be acceptable. But he thinks that even if the Germans were devils in Hell the people should still be fed. In his opinion, that was the only question regarding which the Commission should be asked to suggest the best policy, that was to say, the Commission should be appointed merely to report how best the Allied and Associated Governments could feed the people.

Mr Balfour thinks that the terms of reference to the Committee should not be such that the feeding of the people alone should be considered, and that no consideration should be given to the existing state of affairs in the country.

M Pichon agrees with the views expressed by Mr Balfour. He thinks the question should be considered as a whole; no aspect of the case should be neglected.

(It is agreed that a Committee consisting of an American, British, French and Italian, Economic, Naval and Military Representative should be appointed to report on the best means of keeping and maintaining order in the Baltic States and revictualling the population.

It is further agreed that the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France should consider the question of making a small money advance estimated at a total of £200,000 to the Estonian Government.

The following are appointed to form part of the Committee, with instructions to report as promptly as possible:

United States of America:
Mr Hoover.
Admiral Benson.
Colonel Logan.

Great Britain:
Sir E Howard.
Sir W Goode.
Admiral Hope.
General Thwaites.

France:
M Seydoux.
Admiral de Bon.
Colonel Georges.

Italy:
Admiral Grassi.


6. M Seydoux says that the Supreme Economic Council has for some time considered the question of the removal of the blockade restrictions on Hungary. It has been proposed to re-open relations with Hungary when the blockade restrictions on Austria had been removed. But on account of Bolshevik outbreaks in Hungary it had been found impossible on the 2nd April to give effect to this proposal. Indeed, it had been found necessary to insist on closing the frontier between Austria and Hungary. Now that the Government of Bela Kun is about to be upset, he thinks steps can be taken to remove all commercial restrictions. Hungary is self-contained up to a certain point, but the supply of food and raw materials is becoming an urgent problem. It appeared, however, that a considerable quantity of breadstuffs and meat exist in the Banat and surrounding countries in excess of requirements of Greater Serbia, and is consequently available for export to Hungary. As a result of a study of this question the Supreme Economic Council has decided to inquire from the Council of Foreign Ministers whether the time has not now arrived for the lifting of the blockade on Hungary. Furthermore, the Eastern Sub-Commission of the Blockade are taking measures to prevent the passing of food and other raw materials from Hungary into Russia.

Mr Hoover points out that the proposal referred to by M Seydoux has been reached by the Supreme Economic Council on the supposition that the Bela Kun Government would fall at once. So far that has not happened; but the Supreme Economic Council asks for a mandate to act as soon as that Government should disappear. The information available went to show that two days ago it appears certain that the Bela Kun Government will be upset. Unfortunately, the invitation to Austria to attend the Peace Conference has been interpreted to include the Hungarian Government with the result that Bela Kun’s Government has again been put on its feet.

Mr Balfour draws attention to the fact that no invitation has so far been delivered to the Hungarian Government.

M Pichon expresses the view that the authority asked for by the Supreme Economic Council could be granted - that is to say that as soon as the political situation permits, and order was reestablished in Hungary, the blockade should be removed.

Baron Sonnino inquired what interpretation should be placed on the words “reestablishment of order”. He inquired whether an unofficial notification could not be allowed to leak out that the blockade would be raised as soon as the Government of Bela Kun was overthrown.

Mr McCormick thinks that if Bela Kun is put out of office the blockade could be removed. In his opinion the matter was one of the greatest importance, as Hungary was the last barrier that is still standing and preventing the reestablishment of normal economic conditions in Southern Europe.

Mr Balfour thinks that the Supreme Economic Council and the General Staff should be the judges in regard to the re-establishment of order.

(It is agreed to authorize the Supreme Economic Council to take all preparatory measures to remove the blockade restrictions on Hungary without further reference to the Supreme Council as soon as the General Staff informed them that order has been reestablished in the country.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. Sir Maurice Hankey hands M Clemenceau the draft of a letter prepared at M Clemenceau’s request, and agreed to by Mr Hoover and the British Experts, inviting M Pashich to permit the export of foodstuffs from the Banat to Hungary.

M Clemenceau approves that the terms of the letter carry out the decisions reached in the morning, and undertakes to despatch it.


2. The Council has before them the following documents:

1) A Note from Marshal Foch as to the military action to be taken in the emergency contemplated if the Germans decline to sign the Treaty.

2) A Note from the Naval Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the Naval steps to be taken in the same contingency.

Mr Lloyd George points out that no very drastic proposal was contained in either of these documents.

President Wilson says that what is most disturbing him is that a certain period of time is allowed for the execution of the naval and military clauses, the maximum amount allowed being three months for the destruction of certain fortifications. For this period after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, a much larger force will have to be maintained on the Rhine than thereafter. As far as he can recollect, his military advisers estimate it at 30 divisions. The United States’ share of this would be such that they would have to stop sending troops home. By June 1st they will have reached the minimum contingent to be supplied by the United States - some 6 or 8 divisions. This is rather a serious problem and serious not only to the United States of America. It will mean a number of transports lying idle for some three months. Once ships are fitted as transports they were unsuited for commercial purposes. It will probably not be worth while to convert them for commercial purposes and then reconvert them for transport purposes.

Mr Lloyd George says that General Wilson had told him he was anxious and rather alarmed at the rapid withdrawal of the United States forces. He had asked him to speak to General Bliss on the matter before it was raised at the Supreme Council.

President Wilson says that at present the United States are shipping 300,000 men a month homewards.

Mr Lloyd George speculates as to the number of troops required for the occupation of Berlin. These are possibilities that ought not to be excluded from purview, and this was the reason for General Wilson’s anxiety.

M Clemenceau thinks 6 divisions will be enough.

Mr Lloyd George thinks to this it will be necessary to add the occupation of the Lines of Communication. He asks the distance, however, from Berlin to the Rhine, and to the sea.

Sir Maurice Hankey estimates the distance from Frankfort to Berlin at about 250 to 300 miles, and the distance from Berlin to Stettin about 90 miles.

(The discussion is adjourned at this point and resumed later. It will be more convenient to continue the record at this point.)

Mr Lloyd George says he would like the Military representatives at Versailles specifically to consider what forces would be required for the occupation of Berlin. It is unnecessary for the Council to commit itself to a decision because it asked for this information. In his view, there is a good deal to be said for the occupation of Berlin if Germany refuses to sign the Treaty. It will be the outward and visible sign of smashing the Junkers. They will never be convinced otherwise. He feels sure of this after hearing Brockdorff-Rantzau’s speech.

President Wilson says the hope rests on the remainder of Germany ridding themselves of the Junkers. Apart from Brockdorff-Rantzau, the other German delegates had looked reasonable men.

Mr Lloyd George points out that nonetheless they had allowed the Junker to take the lead. They could not free themselves from the sense of servitude to the Junkers.

President Wilson thinks that Mr Lloyd George’s theory is correct that the insolent parts of Brockdorff-Rantzau’s speech had been his own and the reasonable parts supplied by the other delegates.

Mr Lloyd George points out that there is no cohesion or unity of thought in the document.

M Clemenceau suggests that Marshal Foch should be invited to the Council to give his views as to the amount of force required for the occupation of Berlin.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that Marshal Foch should also be asked to consider whether the Poles ought to make any advance on Berlin.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch should be heard at 11:00 on the following day.)


3. President Wilson presents a military problem to his colleagues.

The United States, he says, as agreed between the Allied and Associated Powers some time back, has been trying to send supplies to the civilian population of Siberia from Vladivostok. By agreement between the Allies and a Mr Stevens, who, long ago in the days of the old regime had been in Siberia, had become the head of a somewhat inconvenient Commission to run the railroads of Siberia. The United States had agreed to police the railroads as far west as Irkutsk. The position was that the United States Government did not believe in Kolchak. The British and French military representatives in Siberia, however, were supporting him. Kolchak had become irritated by the presence on the railway of United States soldiers, whom he regarded as neutrals. Moreover, the impression had got abroad among the peasants of Siberia that the United States was the standard of a free Government which they ought to imitate. When they saw the attitude of neutrality taken by the United States soldiers, they thought there must be something wrong with the Government of Kolchak. Further, the Cossacks were out of sympathy with the United States soldiers and he suspected that the Japanese would be glad to have a collision between the Cossacks and American soldiers. As a consequence of this state of affairs the United States Government found itself faced with the two following alternatives:

1) To take sides with Kolchak and send much stronger forces to Siberia.

2) To withdraw.

If the former alternative were adopted and the United States increased their forces it was certain that the Japanese would increase theirs still more. The original agreement had been that the Japanese and the United States should send roughly equivalent forces. When the United States sent 9,000 men the Japanese sent 12,000 men. He had not objected to this slight discrepancy, but the numbers of Japanese had subsequently gone up to 70,000, which had afterwards been reduced to a nominal 30,000. This, however, left a great disproportion. If the United States troops continued merely to guard the railway and to maintain, as it were, a neutral position, he was advised that collisions were bound to occur. If United States soldiers were attacked, it could not be expected that they would do nothing. If they were withdrawn, the field would be left to the Japanese and Kolchak, who was supported by the Allies.

He then reads a series of telegrams from General Graves commanding the United States forces in Siberia, bearing out the above summary of the position, and pointing out that if the present policy were continued, there would almost certainly be a collision between the United States troops and Russian troops.

Mr Lloyd George says that this strengthens his view as to the need of arriving at a policy in regard to Russia. Kolchak is advancing westward at a very remarkable rate. He is in a position either to move Northwards and join hands with the forces based on Archangel, or to march on Moscow.

President Wilson says he has always been of opinion that the proper policy of the Allied and Associated Powers was to clear out of Russia and leave it to the Russians to fight it out among themselves.

Mr Lloyd George asked that before a decision should be taken, the Council should hear M Tchaikovsky.

President Wilson agrees.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that President Wilson should send a reply to General Graves asking him to take no action for the moment, as the whole problem is being considered by the Allied and Associated Powers.

President Wilson says the risk of this is that there might be a collision between the United States and Russian troops. He suggested that the Allied and Associated Powers should simultaneously ask Kolchak what his program is.

Mr Lloyd George suggests he might be asked two definite questions:

1) Will you allow the peasants to retain the land or do you propose to restore the old seigneurial rights?

2) Are you prepared to revive the Constituent Assembly?

President Wilson, in regard to the first point, says that a few days ago he had asked a very Russophile friend whether the peasants had really got the land out of all the chaos in Russia. His friend had replied that they had only got it in a very inequitable way, each man having seized the land nearest to him. The difficulty would not only be to distribute the land to the peasants, but to systematize the existing distribution involving in some cases dispossession of individuals and groups.

(After some further discussion during which Mr Lloyd George produces a map showing the great advance that Kolchak’s troops had made, it is agreed that Mr Tchaikovsky should be heard on the following day at noon.)

Mr Lloyd George undertakes that Mr. Philip Kerr, who knows his address, should summon him.

4. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that he has communicated to the Secretary-General the decision of the Supreme Council that the Commission on Responsibility for Breaches of the Laws of War should be asked to prepare draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria. In reply, he had merely received articles to the report of the Commission, with a letter stating that these were intended to apply equally to the cases of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Sir Maurice Hankey points out, however, that these draft articles had been superseded by other articles prepared by the Supreme Council.

(After a short discussion it is agreed:

1) That Articles 228, 229 and 230 of the Conditions of Peace handed to the German Delegates should be taken by the Drafting Committee as the basis for the preparation of corresponding articles in the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary.

2) That the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary should contain no article corresponding to Article 227 of the Conditions of Peace, handed to the German representatives, since it is not desired to arraign the Emperor of Austria.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


5. Sir Maurice Hankey produces a report signed by Admiral Benson, Admiral Hope, Admiral de Bon, Admiral Grassi and Admiral Isaur Takechita on the subject of the disposal of submarines. With the exception of Admiral de Bon, it is unanimously recommended that all the submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks surrendered by Germany should be broken up. Admiral de Bon does not, however, agree in this view and considered that the destruction of submarines and the future of submarine warfare cannot be separated.

(The subject is postponed for future consideration.)


6. Sir Maurice Hankey reads the following letter from Lord Cunliffe:

“Dear Sir Maurice; It has been suggested that before the Committee which is to report on what Austria could and should pay can make any real progress the “Big Four” must decide whether the new States, Poland, etc., are to bear any portion of the costs of the war.

Could you get this point settled? Yours very truly, Cunliffe.”

(The subject is postponed for further consideration.)


7. Mr. Lloyd George says he has a letter from Sir George Riddell drawing attention to the risk that when the German delegates make communications to the Allies, German journalists will telegraph them to Germany where efforts will be made to influence public opinion throughout the world in favor of the German point of view.

M Clemenceau says he did not much care if they do.

(It is agreed to take no action.)


8. Sir Maurice Hankey produces the formula which he has drafted in an attempt to give effect to a decision which, broadly speaking, he thinks had been arrived at on the previous day, concerning the Recognition of New States in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.

There is a short discussion in the course of which S Orlando said he would like to consider the draft carefully before taking a decision.

(The Meeting is then adjourned.)

[Jimbuna]

10th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Bolsheviks again repulsed in Archangel region.

Royal Air Force Handley Page Type O heavy bomber on patrol near Bonn in occupied Germany.


James Reese Europe, American ragtime and early jazz bandleader, is fatally stabbed after an argument, just months after he had returned from Europe.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


(Marshal Foch and General Weygand are introduced.)

1. M Clemenceau explains to Marshal Foch that the Council has under consideration the possibility, though not probability, that Germany might refuse to sign the Terms of Peace. They want Marshal Foch’s views as to the means available and the action to be taken in such an eventuality.

Marshal Foch said that on April 24th last he had held a meeting with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Belgian, British, French and American Armies. and they had made a sum of their total forces. It had been established that, for the whole of the month of May, at least 40 divisions with 5 cavalry divisions will be available to operate on the front of the Rhine. He requires 8 days’ warning to put them in a state to march. The reason for this is that many men are on furlough and many officers are away on commissions or leave. Everything is prepared, and, at the end of 8 days, the army will be ready to march. If and when the moment comes to intervene the action to be taken will be organized according to the objects aimed at. If it is a case of a regular Government refusing to sign, it will be necessary to strike at the center of that Government. For example, Weimar and Berlin. It might be, however, that the situation will be less clear and that the German Government might say that it cannot decide or that it requires a plebiscite. Still, if the resistance is that of a regular Government at Berlin or Weimar, this resistance must be broken. The shorter roads should be followed with the maximum possible forces. The army will start from its bases at Cologne and Mainz. Advancing from this base line towards Weimar and Berlin, the army will penetrate a zone very favorable to its advance, as its flanks will rest to the north on the River Lippe and to the South on the River Main. This zone is so advantageous for the advance that the enemy might be expected to capitulate before the armies reach their objective. Further, by advancing from the Rhine along the valley of the Ruhr, the result will be achieved of considerably reducing the enemy’s financial resources. Advancing from the Rhine by the valley of the Main, the armies of the Allied and Associated Powers will cut Germany off from Bavaria, and, in addition, will be in a position to join hands with the Czechoslovaks. This is a perfectly feasible and not dangerous operation, and might achieve results without bringing the operations to a conclusion. These lines of advance will take the Allied Armies into the heart of the German Government. In reply to M Clemenceau, he says that he envisages action by the Czechs, which will be combined.

General Weygand, in reply to Mr Lloyd George, says that the Czechs have 3 complete divisions formed, but these are now disposed along the Hungarian frontier. They have also several brigades, but a good deal of organisation will be required.

Marshal Foch says that information on this point has been asked for. He then explains his plan by reference to a large map. He adds one advantage to those he has already given, namely, that if, for any reason, the march has to be stopped, a line can be established on the River Weser parallel to the Rhine where the armies can rest in conditions very similar to those prevailing on the Rhine. In reply to President Wilson, he says there are no fortified places on the way and that neither Weimar nor Berlin are seriously fortified. In reply to Mr Lloyd George he says that he certainly contemplates action by Polish troops which are already in occupation of Posen. In reply to President Wilson, he says that the nominal strength of the German forces is 450,000 men, but they are disarmed and dispersed and practically Germany can offer no resistance at all. In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he adds that he does not contemplate action by sea, as this is not feasible with modern artillery. He sums up by saying that, with 8 days’ warning, he is prepared and is in accord with the various Commanders-in-Chief for an advance with incontestable superiority of forces and with his flanks secured. He will undertake to cut off Bavaria from Germany.

M Clemenceau asks whether he anticipates any danger from the mass of the working population.

Marshal Foch says mainly in regard to their feeding.

M Clemenceau alludes to Marshal Foch’s request for 8 days’ warning. This might be difficult for the Governments to give. He asks if Marshal Foch could reduce it, so that if the Governments see the storm coming they could give an order which would be followed by action in less than 8 days.

Marshal Foch says that this was practicable by stopping leave in the Armies.

Mr Lloyd George points out that if leave is stopped and the men come back, the Germans will at once know it.

M Clemenceau says that this would not be a bad thing.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that it might be done in such a way that Cologne and Mainz should see what was happening.

Marshal Foch says that he has prepared a series of measures with the object of impressing the German people. Next week, for example, he proposes to go to the Rhineland and inspect the troops.

General Weygand said that the great difficulty is that, if the Germans are given warning, they will denude the railways both of material and personnel, which will make the advance very difficult. Consequently, under Marshal Foch’s directions, he has prepared a surprise operation with motor cars and cavalry, in order to leap forward at a moment’s notice and seize certain junctions and important places. This could be done in a few hours.

Marshal Foch say that he contemplates a surprise operation of great range, which involves very few troops and which will produce a surprise and considerable effect. He is now studying the execution of this measure, but it involves having 2 or 3 divisions in each army ready to march at a moment’s notice and this can only be done by cancelling leave.

M Clemenceau asks when the plan could be ready.

General Weygand said it can be ready tomorrow.

M Clemenceau says there is no need for it for 10 or 12 days but it ought to be got ready.

Marshal Foch says he can stop leave in, say, 2 divisions of each army, which will be enough to carry out this part of his plan.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that it might be an advantage to have some demonstration at an early stage. The Germans are now making up their minds. Possibly they think that the Allied and Associated Powers would not march.

M Clemenceau says that this is exactly what the Germans are saying. They believe the French Army incapable of marching and that the United States Army is going home.

Mr Lloyd George says that it might be too late 10 days hence and he thinks some action ought to be taken now to show that the Allied and Associated Powers have made their minds up. He would like a demonstration made within a day or two. The most impressive form of demonstration would be to bring the cavalry to the front.

Marshal Foch says that his cavalry are too few for a great demonstration, but he proposes himself to make an immediate visit to the Commanders-in-Chief of the various armies in such a way that while apparently secret, it will be known to everyone and all Germany will be puzzling to know what he was up to.

President Wilson suggests a secret journey with careful leakage.

Marshal Foch says that this was what he intends.

Mr Lloyd George asks what he proposes to do about cancelling leave.

Marshal Foch says that during his trip he proposes to ask each Commander-in-Chief to stop leave in 2 divisions of his army and to get these divisions ready to march. In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he says that he can start any day next week.

M Clemenceau says the sooner the better.

President Wilson agrees in this.

M Clemenceau says he has received two documents, one of which states that Scheidemann and Ebert will sign and the other that they will not sign.

Mr Lloyd George says that the demonstration should be immediate, in order that Germany might know that we meant business. Monday will be too late. The Germans are making up their minds and it is important to influence them before they settle down in an attitude of refusal.

Marshal Foch points out that nothing can happen before the 22nd, when the Germans might refuse the peace terms, so that if he commences his visit on the 12th that will be soon enough. He will be back by the 18th.

M Clemenceau says that he is already receiving papers from the Germans. He suggests that Marshal Foch should support his tour by troop movements.

Marshal Foch agreed, and adds also movements of munitions.

Mr Lloyd George points out that it will take some time for the Germans to know that Marshal Foch is there The German mind is not a quick one. Consequently, Monday is, in his view, too late for Marshal Foch’s start.

M Clemenceau agrees with Mr Lloyd George that it is important to press the Germans as soon as possible.

President Wilson and S Orlando also agree.

Marshal Foch undertakes to leave at the earliest possible moment.

(Marshal Foch, accompanied by General Weygand, withdraws.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, 10 May, 1919.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:45

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. S Orlando says that he accepts the draft which had been submitted by Sir Maurice Hankey on the previous afternoon on the subject of the recognition of the various States formed out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and contiguous States.


2. M Clemenceau says that Mr Venizelos has asked that the Allied Powers should evacuate Corfu.

S Orlando, Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson agree.

(It is agreed that the Allied forces should withdraw from Corfu.)


3. S Orlando reminds President Wilson of a request he made to him on the previous day that he should prepare a text of a reference to the Committee dealing with Reparation in regard to Austria and Hungary.

President Wilson says that he has not had time up to the present, but that he will take it in hand as soon as possible.


4. Sir Maurice Hankey hand S Orlando a revised draft of Article 430 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Delegates, which had been prepared by the Drafting Committee, as well as an English translation of the Drafting Committee’s Note.

(The following text submitted by the Drafting Committee is approved:

“In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under Part VIII (Reparation) of the present Treaty the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Forces.”)

M Clemenceau undertakes to transmit this to the Germans through Colonel Henri, to be substituted for the original Article.

5. M Clemenceau hands round a communication he has received from the German Delegation, making some preliminary comments on the Treaty of Peace.

President Wilson suggests the following reply:

“In reply to the general objections which the German plenipotentiaries present to the provisions of the Treaty, it is only necessary to remind the German plenipotentiaries that we have formulated the terms of the Treaty with constant thought of the principles upon which the armistice and the negotiations for peace were proposed. We can admit no discussion of our right to insist upon the terms of the peace substantially as stated. We can consider only such practical suggestions as the German plenipotentiaries may have to present.”

(Further consideration of the matter is postponed until the afternoon Meeting.)


6. M Clemenceau reads the following note from the Japanese Delegation:

“The Japanese delegation presents its most respectful compliments to His Excellency, Monsieur Georges Clemenceau, President of the Conference of Peace, and has the honor of expressing to him its desire of being represented on the committees which are going to be set up to examine the observations which the German plenipotentiaries may have to make concerning the conditions of peace.”

(It is agreed that the Japanese request should be granted.)


7. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that the Secretary of the Japanese Delegation, Mr Saburi, had called on him that morning and had presented a verbal request from Baron Makino that a representative of the Japanese Delegation should be invited to attend the meeting of the Supreme Council when any question relating to the disposal of German warships or submarines was under consideration.

(It is agreed that this request should be granted.)


8. President Wilson says that Mr Lansing knows the Austrian Delegate, Professor Lammasch, very intimately, and knows him to be a very reliable man. Professor Lammasch is not well, and has asked that his wife and daughter might be allowed to accompany him to St. Germain.

M Clemenceau says he had already received a similar request, and had taken on himself to grant it. He says that the Austrian Delegates are expected on Wednesday.


9. Mr Lloyd George hands S Orlando a copy of the document signed by M Clemenceau, President Wilson and himself, in regard to the proportions in which receipts from Germany should be divided between the Allied and Associated Governments in accordance with Article 7 of the Reparation chapter of the draft Treaty with Germany. S Orlando undertakes to give it his careful consideration.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 12:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


(Mr Tchaykowsky is introduced.)

1. Mr Tchaykowsky says that he has spent 28 years of his life in England and 4 years in the United States of America, so that half his life has been spent in English speaking countries.

President Wilson says that the Council is very anxious to have his views as to the best policy to be pursued towards Russia. All those present are friends of Russia and anxious to help her, and would be glad of any suggestions Mr Tchaykowsky might have to offer.

Mr Tchaykowsky remarks that this is a large order.

President Wilson says that perhaps it would guide Mr Tchaykowsky if he was to state the difficulties. The principal feature in the situation is the growing strength of Kolchak and his rapid advance westward, which might presently enable him to get in touch with forces to the north and perhaps those to the south. He and his colleagues, however, are not entirely satisfied that the leadership of Kolchak is calculated to preserve what ought to be preserved of the new order of things in Russia. They have some fear that it will result in a policy of reaction and military power.

Mr Tchaykowsky says that he has already had the pleasure of presenting assurances on this point, both from Kolchak and from Denekin. Yesterday, a further definition of his policy was received from Denekin, who made his suggestion at the instigation of the various Attachés. This had appeared in the newspapers. He then handed in the original which had been received on May 8th.

M Clemenceau says that he had not seen this before.

Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson are in the same position.

Mr Tchaykowsky said that it was a despatch from Mr Neratoff to Mr Sazonoff, dated the 5th May, 1919, and had emanated from Constantinople.

(The document is then read by President Wilson.)

"On the initiative of the Allied and Associated Governments, the Commander-in-Chief (General Denekin) has communicated to the Head of the United States’ Mission, as well as to the Heads of the other Missions, the following decisions suggested by the said representatives, and he asked them to bring to the notice of their respective Governments the aims pursued by the Commander-in-Chief in South Russia in his struggle against the Soviet. His program was as follows:

1) The suppression of Bolshevist anarchy and the restoration of order in Russia.

2) The reconstruction of the Russian Army and of a united Russia.

3) Convocation of the Russian National Assembly, elected on universal suffrage.

4) Decentralization of administration. Local autonomy subject to a Central Government.

5) Religious liberty.

6) Land Reform.

7) Labor legislation, protecting the laboring classes against oppression either by the Government or by capitalists."

This bore the signature of the Commander-in-Chief and had been published locally.

This, continues Mr Tchaykowsky, is the fullest declaration that had yet been made. He explains that Mr Sazonoff is the head of General Denekin’s foreign department, but, during his absence in Paris, Mr Neratoff is acting for him.

President Wilson suggests that probably the military representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers had only suggested that the program should be communicated to Paris.

M Tchaykowsky says that this is Denekin’s program. Kolchak’s declarations are clear enough as to his aims.

President Wilson says that Kolchak’s proclamation had been in very general terms, particularly in regard to land reform. He did not obtain a distinct impression from it.

Mr Tchaykowsky says that in Siberia the land question is not nearly so acute as it is in European Russia. In the first place, the population is thin and there is plenty of land. In the second place, communal management of the land is in force. Hence, the land question is not so vital nor so epoch-making there as in European Russia. In the Northern regions also, there is the land problem. All they can do at present, until a Constituent Assembly has settled the fundamental principles, is to satisfy themselves that land temporarily taken should not be returned unless the interests of the State demand it. For example, in Archangel, there is a very important cattle breeding ground on which a considerable part of the population is dependent for its living. To deprive them of their forage and hay would be very detrimental to the public interest. In case of the appropriation of such land, the State would step in and see that the public interest did not suffer. The same applied to timber. There was an old law by which any peasant could obtain from the Government a plot of forest land for gradual cutting. In 40 years, this land became communal. Some peasants had spent a good deal of money and labor on such land and during the revolution both would be lost if the plot be seized. Here again, the State had to protect the rights of the worker who contracted with the State. The policy they pursued generally was to allow the occupied land to be kept until a Constituent Assembly finally decided the principles. The provisional government is the guardian of the common interest. It allows renting of land but does not allow its sale, since purchase is the foundation of ownership. It is quite clear to him that Kolchak is acting on the same principle and leaving the final dispositions to a Constituent Assembly.

Mr Lloyd George suggested that two things are essential. First, the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, which should be a bona fide Assembly and not gerrymandered. The suffrage should not be twisted about to suit particular interests, as had been the case in Germany, where the suffrage had been divided into three classes. The first thing, therefore, is to see that the Assembly was on a bona fide basis, and then the land question can be safely entrusted to it. The second essential is to define the attitude of the Central Government towards the small States, such as Finland, Estonia, Estland, Livonia, Lithuania, etc.

Mr Tchaykowsky says that in regard to Mr Lloyd George’s first point, he understands that the doubts and apprehensions that are felt arise from the fear of a military dictatorship menacing the functions of the Constituent Assembly. Once it has spread over political matters, military power might refuse to sign away its authority. There might be arguments at work. This, he understands to be the foundation of the doubts that were felt. As for Kolchak, in a speech to the Zemstvos, he had promised to resign his position immediately there was a chance of getting a Constituent Assembly. No one could ask more of him than that. Siberia, he points out, is more democratic than other parts of Russia. There has been no class of nobles or of large landowners, although there had been a few millionaires, but they do not now exercise former authority. There is only a small middle class and the bulk of the population consists of peasant proprietors. There is practically no reactionary class. The only reactionaries in Siberia are the military element and had only come temporarily. It is on this population that Kolchak is dependent in his government and for his military success. This was why Kolchak, although a dictator, both in a military and political sense, is constantly announcing democratic measures. This, indeed, is essential to his position. Denekin’s position is quite different. In his part of Russia, there are large numbers of landowners, from which class his military officers were largely drawn. This makes General Denekin’s declaration all the more significant. In reply to President Wilson, he says that Kolchak is much stronger than Denekin, who has largely exhausted his recruiting resources and can only be strengthened from outside. Kolchak, on the other hand, is entering a populous district and region from which he will be able to draw his recruits.

Referring to Mr Lloyd George’s second point, Mr Tchaykowsky says that the question of the relations between the Central Government and the smaller States is a most delicate and unsatisfactory one in Russia. One result of the over-centralization of Czardom and the treatment of those States by the Bolshevist population has been that all the national groupings that have sprung up have been seized by a fashion of independence. But when they look at the question coolly and view their economic position, they are far from suggesting any such solution. Economically, these small States are weak and they must inevitably fall into dependence on someone else. The Lithuanians, for example, he understands, have already received large sums from the Germans. The same would apply to Estonia and Latvia. He had had several conversations with Estonian representatives in Paris and they admitted the truth of this. They at first said that since Germany had overrun Estonia, they must consider themselves free of any ties with Russia and start afresh. He had replied that he understood their standpoint but could not admit such a tabula rasa argument since Reval stood at the gate of the Finnish Gulf and since it had been built by Russian energy. Eventually, they had promised that, if when the day came for the final reckoning, Russia would treat them as equal to equal and not as obligatory members of the Russian State, they would be prepared to deal. They had sent a telegram in this sense to the head of their Government, but, owing to the serious situation there and the elections, the reply had been delayed. In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he said that Estonia had two representatives in Paris. He believes, also, that Lithuania has representatives. These representatives have no authority to decide questions, but can negotiate.

Mr Lloyd George asks if Kolchak had a representative in Paris.

Mr Tchaykowsky says that all four Russian delegates have been confirmed by Kolchak, but Prince Lvov had been particularly delegated from Siberia. Mr Sazonoff in a similar way represented General Denekin. The constitution of Denekin’s Government at the present time is rather complicated. He himself has written several letters to members of Denekin’s Council, and had tried to persuade them to adopt the following principles:

i) To devote the energy of the Commander-in-Chief, principally to meeting the enemy;

ii) To organize the right system of power, the essential element of which is a clear demarcation between their military and their political functions.
The full power belongs to the Commander-in-Chief, but he ought to use all his energies for military operations, and not to interfere in policy nor to allow his subordinates to do so. The political Government, however, ought to have a military department to deal with such matters as the recruiting training and supply of the Army. He knows this well, because they have had great difficulties in Archangel region in this respect. Now, however, their system is functioning perfectly.

Mr Lloyd George reads the following quotation from a Memorandum from the Foreign Office, dated May 1st, 1919:

“The most recent telegrams refer to the fact that over 90% of the burgher population and 80% of Russian peasants are co-operators loosely associated with the right wing of the Socialist Revolutionary party, who greatly resent the indifference to public support shown by Kolchak’s Government, and more particularly condemn the Rinov policy of attack on all representative institutions, which is doing the greatest harm”.

He asks who Rinov is.

Mr Tchaykowsky says Rinov is not a Minister, and he does not know who he is. It is very difficult to judge of matters of this kind from a distance of thousands of miles.

Mr Lloyd George then continues to read:

“They are, however, represented as in no way objecting to recognition of Kolchak’s Government by us, as long as it is conditional on his taking a broader public basis.”

Mr Tchaykowsky says that he is a cooperator himself, and is indeed president of several Cooperative organizations. As far as he knew, however, the above information is contrary to the facts. He has personal friends in Siberia, who are high up in the Cooperative movement, and these are supporting Kolchak actually from the head offices of the Co-operative Societies. They would not dare do this if Kolchak were unpopular, as the Co-operative Societies are democratic in their organisation.

Mr Lloyd George again quotes from the same document:

“Kolchak’s recent brilliant successes on his front are neutralized to a certain extent by the growing unrest in his rear.”

Mr Tchaykowsky says he has a question to ask. Did this information come direct from Siberia, and, if so, what was the date of the report?

Mr Lloyd George reads the following note by Lord Curzon explaining the position of the memorandum from which he had quoted:

“As on many previous occasions I circulate this note by an able writer in the Foreign Office, not as committing the Foreign Office or the Secretary of State, but as representing the views of an expert authority.”

Mr Tchaykowsky says that this kind of report is often heard. Some facts took place, and were then exaggerated. For example, Kolchak himself is treated as the man who had carried out the coup d’etat. This is not correct. Others had carried out the coup d’etat, and had then forced the position of dictator on Kolchak by urging that if he would not accept it, his country would go to pieces. Kolchak had not pushed himself into it. In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he says that Kolchak is an Admiral who had during the war commanded with distinction at Sevastopol. He does not know exactly from what class he is drawn. Most of his Ministers are former Socialists.

President Wilson asks whether the people who carried out the coup d’etat are now Kolchak’s guides and counselors.

Mr Tchaykowsky says they are, and he mentions as an instance one of the Ministers who had been a well-known Social Revolutionary. His own position, he says, is very delicate in this matter. He stands between the two parties, and he does not want to be in the position of an arbitrator saying which was right and which was wrong. He stood only for the State, and his own position is midway between the parties.

Mr Lloyd George says that as President Wilson had explained, the Allied and Associated Powers do not want to associate themselves in the establishment of a militarist régime in Russia. He asks if Mr Tchaykowsky has any information about General Yudenich.

Mr Tchaykowsky says he had been a very successful General in the Army of the Caucasus. He is a man who can be thoroughly trusted in military matters, and he is a man who is not prepared to be guided by reactionaries, of whom there are some in Finland.

Mr Lloyd George asked whether, if General Yudenich were given the means to take Petrograd, he can be trusted to maintain the democracy there.

Mr Tchaykowsky thinks he can, and says that in any case he and his friends would look after that.

S Orlando asks whether Mr Tchaykowsky has considered the constitution in Russia of a Federated State comparable to the United States of America. Was this possible, he asked, in this vast country?

M Tchaykowsky says that absolutism in Russia has proved itself impossible. It means an absolute faith in the Head of the State, as though he were a god on earth. This had died out. No one ever speaks of it now. It is essential, however, to eradicate the most anarchic feelings in Russia, and some think that this can only be done by having a Constitutional Monarchy.

Mr Lloyd George asks whom they would choose for the throne.

Mr Tchaykowsky says there is no candidate. It is a mere abstract proposition. He himself does not wish it. Whether this temporary event should take place or not, he is convinced that Russia will eventually become not only a Republic, but a Federated Republic. He had made a speech twelve years ago in Chicago, where he had said that in ten years Russia would become a Republic. This had come true.

(General Wilson enters at this point.)

General Wilson explains on a map the military situation.

(The following addition is kindly furnished by Mr Tchaykowsky with his corrections):

In the course of this conversation Mr Tchaykowsky says, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George’s question, that it is very essential for the Russian interest now that Petrograd should be taken by an anti-Bolshevik force.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that this could be done by a Finnish force.

M Tchaykowsky says that if the appearance of Finns in Petrograd be inevitable, then Russian forces should also be there; otherwise a very delicate and complicated situation would arise seeing that the Finns are now claiming Russian territories.

General Wilson here produces a map on which he points out the line showing the present extent of the Finnish claims. It includes not only the whole of Carelia but the whole Murman Coast and the Kola Peninsula, also cutting the White Sea from the Kerne Town to the Gorge of the Sea.

Other approaches to Petrograd being mentioned, Mr Tchaykowsky answers some detailed questions as to the number of Russian forces available among the Russian prisoners of war now in Germany and also among Russian troops in Estonia.