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Old 11-17-19, 07:48 AM   #4246
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17th November 1919

A Renault tank converted to be used as a snowplow in Paris.


General elections are held in Italy, with the Sociality Party led by Nicola Bombacci receiving the most votes and seats.
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Old 11-17-19, 07:01 PM   #4247
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Monday, November 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation, a historical résumé of the question by Captain Fuller and a new British proposal dated November 14th, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he has asked the British naval representative to summarize the proposals made by the British Admiralty, which he hopes will be approved by the Council.

Captain Fuller reads and comments upon the Historical Summary on the distribution of enemy war-ships, and upon the new British Proposal.

M Clemenceau wishes to ask whether this proposition which had just been read is an entirely new one?

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that it is. The American and French Delegations had discussed this proposition but had not read the new text. The Italian naval expert had read the proposition and agreed with it.

M Clemenceau says it is impossible for him to make up his mind on a proposition which is quite new to him; he should first have to discuss the proposition with his naval experts.

Mr Polk asks Captain Fuller with reference to paragraph 3 what could prevent any country breaking up ships allotted.

Captain Fuller explains it is a question of labor and of shipyard facilities.

Mr Polk also asks why battleships, etc., should be loaned for one year.

Captain Fuller replies this is for experimental and propaganda purposes. The percentages laid out in the proposition are based only on information in their hands; other countries can furnish their own figures and it will be possible to come to an agreement.

M Clemenceau asks that the further examination of this question be postponed until the next day as he wishes to examine the question closely with his naval experts.

(The question is adjourned until the next day).


2. Mr Polk states that in the discussion which had taken place at the meeting of November 14th he had omitted to bring out an important point and wished to make the record complete. He had omitted in his discussion to go into the history of the question. Originally it had been agreed that all the German ships should be turned over to the Allies, who were to use them to furnish to Germany food which she needed, the charges to be attributed to the Reparation fund. At a meeting which had taken place at Brussels it had been voted that the 14 German oil tank ships should not be delivered. The Germans had asked to use these. At that time Messrs Hoover and Davis had talked with their colleagues about the question of letting the Germans get oil; no record was made of these conversations, but the resolution read that temporarily the ships should be exempted from allocation. Since that time the American contention was that the Germans could operate the vessels under the Inter-Allied Flag and with an Inter-Allied representative on board, but it had been said that this could not be done. According to his information their records showed that exceptions had been made and that the Germans had operated certain ships with German crews on board, for instance: The Fritz von Straus from Hamburg to Hull, the Kehrweider and the Paul from Hamburg to New York, to obtain oil, also a number of other ships in the Baltic Sea, also certain ships used in the Mediterranean to repatriate German prisoners. In the discussion which followed the Scapa Flow sinking the question again came up; they maintained that it was not contrary to the Allies’ views to let the Germans operate these ships to bring oil to Germany. On July 13th the question was again discussed in the Reparation Commission; but on August 15th the President of the ANAC had cancelled the exemption without giving notice to the United States representative until the following day. The United States had always questioned that decision. The difficulty arose in this way: their understanding was, first, that the ships should be exempted to get oil and secondly that the ships could be operated by German crews under the Inter-Allied flag and with an Inter-Allied Representative on board. They held further that other German ships had been given a free sailing to Constantinople and other ports. They had taken this to constitute a precedent.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it seems to be a question of whether or not German crews should be used on these steamers. He confesses it puzzles him very much why the American Government insists upon the use of German crews. He asks what inspired that policy.

Mr Polk says that was the original American view and that contracts for transporting oil to Germany should be carried out.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that oil could reach Germany without using German crews; there must be another reason.

Mr Polk says there is no mystery about this. It is simply the question of the disposal of the ships: they wanted to let the Germans have a temporary use of the ships until the permanent title was decided upon.

Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that the United States’ position amounted to ignoring the unanimous decision of the Supreme Council which had attributed the temporary management to the Allies.

Mr Polk repeated the view of his Government that the question had been discussed and agreed upon at Brussels.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that he must insist that at the time of the decision the Germans had made no demand for oil. The Allies did not take these ships simply because they had no need of them.

Mr Polk regrets the unfortunate situation created by the lack of minutes; there were the recollections of Mr Hoover on the one hand and those of his colleagues on the other.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that with regard to the precedents which Mr Polk had cited, he wishes to make the following remarks. First, in the Baltic, the Germans had long been allowed to navigate. As for the particular case of the Fritz von Straus, this is a ship of only 800 tons: There is very little interest to the Reparation Commission in this boat on account of its small tonnage. As to the other ships mentioned, it would be easy to ascertain the reason for their operation, and probably their small tonnage was again the reason. As for the German ships in the Mediterranean, that is a different question; the crews are Turkish and not German. The Supreme Council, as a matter of fact, had decided that the Allied Naval Armistice Commission was wrong and insisted on taking those crews off and putting on the Inter-Allied flag in place of the German. Under these conditions it appears that the precedents cited by Mr Polk do not carry much weight. He emphasizes the fact that he had received formal instructions from his Government that these ships should not sail with a German crew. No other position could be taken by the British Government.

S de Martino states that he has no objection to the first trip being taken, even with German crews on board, provided that the final distribution of these ships should not be prejudiced by this trip, and as a matter of fact, the final distribution belongs to the Reparation Commission.

M Clemenceau then reads a telegram from Admiral Goette to ANAC, dated November 15th, from which it appears that the Germans had informed the Allies that steps were being taken for the delivery of these steamers. That appeared to him to be a decisive fact which did not leave them any choice. What impression would the Council give to the whole world if it were to let the Germans keep these ships at that time? There seems to him to be two questions. First, there is the question of final ownership which the Council had agreed should be settled by the Reparation Commission. There remains the question of operating the ships. He does not quite understand the position of the United States. What objection do the Americans have to an Allied rather than a German crew? He personally sees a very grave political and moral objection to German crews being used which he thinks is even more important than the economic objection. There have just occurred at Berlin demonstrations in favor of Hindenburg which are of a disquieting nature and had given a great deal of trouble to the German Government. These seem to bear the marks of a Nationalist uprising. Therefore would it be opportune to let those ships sail with German crews and under the German flag? For himself, he had the greatest objections. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Principal Powers had pledged themselves to stand by the decisions of the Reparation Commission; that was full security for America. He therefore earnestly requests Mr. Polk to accept Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal so as to not make the situation more difficult. It seems to him all the more important to come to an agreement on this question as there are a number of vital matters to be settled with the Germans, such as the delivery of guilty individuals. Should the Germans be allowed to operate these ships there would be general stupefaction in France. He has often shown readiness to make concessions, but always on one condition that public opinion should understand them. This would not be the case in the present instance. He understands there might be some American emotion on the subject, but he feels sure that America would understand France’s position in the matter and he hopes that secondary considerations which moved American opinions would give way to the stronger, and, to his mind, more justified feeling of public opinion in France.

S de Martino states that in view of the strong case presented by M Clemenceau he is ready to agree with his views.

Mr Polk remarks that M Clemenceau’s declarations carry much weight and he also sees that the use of the German flag at this time might be misconstrued in France. They maintained however, that an arrangement had been made which had not been carried out. He also wishes to point out that his position with his Government made it difficult for him to give his entire approval to the Chairman’s views. As he understands the proposal which Sir Eyre Crowe had made at a preceding meeting, the 14 oil tank ships were to go to the Firth of Forth; 5 were to be operated, and 9 were to remain there until a compromise had been reached. He would recommend that proposal to his Government. He wishes, however, to have the Council take note of the feeling in the United States on the question of the allocation of these vessels. He had not put up an imaginary case; they did not agree and had not accepted the present system of distribution. He refers to the last sentence of the telegram from the British Ministry of Shipping to the British Delegation and he wishes to ask Sir Eyre Crowe whether this phrase does not sound like a threat.

Sir Eyre Crowe explains that the phrase occurred in an Interdepartmental telegram and represented simply the attitude of the Shipping Controller which was uncompromising.

Mr Polk asks whether it is not advisable to instruct the Naval Armistice Commission that no disposition of these 9 oil tank ships be made at this time.

S de Martino wishes to ask what is to be done with the other 5?

M Berenger replies that according to his information only 11 ships remained which therefore would leave only two for the Allies.

S de Martino adds that should this information be correct it would be very serious for Italy, as she had counted absolutely on sharing the 5 ships with France and Belgium to remedy the scarcity of oil fuel.

M Berenger wishes to point out how important it is to prevent a further waste of these tank ships considering the shortage of oil fuel in Europe. Mr. Dulles, an American representative on the Committee of Organization of the Reparation Commission, had written to M Loucheur on August 28th protesting that such a waste of fuel oil should not be permitted. Since that time these ships which could carry 60,000 tons could have made two trips and thus been able to bring 120,000 tons of fuel oil which had been lost to the Allies and Germany as well. If Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal were to be sustained by the Council, that would mean a continuation of this waste for three months or more as the Reparation Commission would not be taking a decision in the matter until then. The explanation of the Brussels meeting given by Mr. Polk could not be accepted. If Mr Hoover had promised the Germans to give them exemption in favor of certain ships in order to get them oil, this was something that the Allies had never heard of and it did not figure in a single Allied record. On March 29th M Clementel had written, as President of the Supreme Economic Council, a letter which clearly showed that the Germans at that time were not in need of fuel oil, and he was not aware that an agreement had been reached between Mr Hoover and the Germans. The Germans had emphasized on July 30th for the first time their need for fuel oil, and the real reason for exempting those tank ships had been that at that time there was sufficient tonnage in the way of tank ships. He could not tell whether the rumor were true that there had been an agreement between Messrs Hoover and Davis and the Germans, and that a part of the payment had been made by the latter without any knowledge of the Reparation Commission.

Mr Polk states that there had been no secret agreement between Mr Hoover and the Germans. He could assure the Council of that.

M Clemenceau asks how it comes that there should be at this time such a need for oil tonnage when a few months previous that tonnage had been sufficient?

M Berenger explains that the use of fuel oil had been authorized recently by a law which had been passed by the French Parliament. This law had resulted in a great demand for fuel oil all the more as there was a great shortage of coal, and oil was needed for lighting, heating and transportation. He had asked the Standard Oil Company for tank ships and had been told that not a single one could be spared.

M Clemenceau asks M Berenger to let him have the exact figures of the needs of France and Italy in fuel oil.

M Berenger says he will.

M Clemenceau hopes that in the cable which Mr Polk will send his Government submitting Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal, he will also point out the needs of France and Italy, and ask it to take into consideration this aspect of the question.

Mr Polk says he hopes they can reach a compromise on the distribution of those ships.

M Berenger says that they have considered the question of using a part of these German oil tank ships after a first trip by the Standard Oil Company.

M Clemenceau says he trusts Mr Polk would explain the whole question to his Government with his customary liberality.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks he had based his proposal on Mr. Polk’s hope of arriving early at an arrangement.

Mr Polk agrees.

S de Martino says he had just been informed that there actually were fourteen tank ships in German ports which would therefore leave five ships instead of the two which M Berenger had previously spoken of.

M Berenger says there are nine oil ships claimed by an American corporation. There were two boats according to his information at the disposition of the Allies.

M Clemenceau says they will await the result of Mr Polk’s cable for instructions.

Sir Eyre Crowe summed up that meanwhile they would instruct the Allied Naval Armistice Commission in the sense of his proposal.

(It is decided:

(1) To instruct the Allied Naval Armistice Commission to take delivery of the German oil tank steamers for the Firth of Forth;

(2) To retain the nine oil tank steamers claimed by American interests without using them pending a further decision by the Council;

(3) That the remaining ships be delivered for temporary management to the Allied and Associated Governments according to the decision taken by the Allied Maritime Transport Executive September 7th, 1919;

(4) That Mr. Polk, while agreeing to the three above points, reserves to himself the right of again raising the question in the event of not obtaining his Government’s approval;

(5) That Mr. Polk should call his Government’s attention to the very urgent needs of oil by France and Italy, which make necessary an immediate decision on the temporary allotment of the German oil tank ships.)


3. The Council has before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 13th.

Sir Eyre Crowe reads and comments upon Sir George Clerk’s telegram. This telegram shows that Friedrich is very obstinate and that the formation of a coalition cabinet met with great difficulties. Sir George Clerk had felt it necessary to inform Friedrich that his mission would come to an end if the present situation continued. He, Sir Eyre Crowe, had also read a telegram in the Morning Post that a coalition government had been formed at Budapest and would assume office. However, he had only seen this in the newspaper; and it seems that Mr Polk had received a telegram from General Bandholtz stating that the situation is still very acute at Budapest, and that Sir George Clerk has declared he would have to leave.

M Berthelot alludes to declarations which the Hungarian War Minister had made on the entry of the National Hungarian Army in Budapest. These declarations are of a purely monarchist tendency and are clearly in favor of the return of Archduke Joseph.

Mr Polk says that from a telegram he has just received from General Bandholtz, Admiral Horthy is making a number of arrests and that Sir George Clerk and the Inter-Allied Military Mission threaten to withdraw if these arrests are continued.

M Clemenceau thinks it advisable to await further information before doing anything.

(The question is then adjourned.)


4. M Clemenceau states that Mr Venizelos had made a protest against the declaration in the letter which the Supreme Council had recently sent to him to the effect that the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks should have a temporary character. He would like the question brought up at the next meeting as he did not wish such a statement to go unchallenged.


5. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated November 14, 1919 on the subject of Detention in the United States of Ex-German Passenger Vessels Allocated to Great Britain for Management.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he feels all the more embarrassed at raising a subject which he knows is likewise embarrassing to his American colleague especially after the conciliatory spirit just shown by Mr Polk; he is obliged, however, to bring it up according to the instructions he had received. He believes it was not claimed by anybody that the Shipping Board had any right to retain the ships in question, but unfortunately, perhaps on account of the President’s illness which gave opportunities of administrative independence, nobody seemed to be in a position to give the Shipping Board the necessary instructions. Possibly also the Board was confusing this question with that of the oil tank-ships and was adopting an attitude which seemed to him one of mere retaliation. The need for these ships is very acute. A very large number of passengers are awaiting transportation. Civilians, including business men, could not go to the East this year owing to the lack of passenger vessels. The vessels in question have enormous tonnage and include the Imperator, a ship of over 50,000 tons. These vessels had been temporarily allocated to the United States for the repatriation of its army. As it had been unanimously decided at a meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive in July 1919 that all the Steamers under discussion should be allocated to Great Britain for management, British crews had been sent to New York to bring them back but the Shipping Board had refused to give them up. The State Department agreed with the British Government but said it had no authority over the Shipping Board. The British Government had instructed him to present this memorandum to the Supreme Council believing that a resolution of the Council would oblige the Shipping Board to deliver the vessels and that it might help the American Government to get over the difficulty.

Mr Polk says that he cannot quite agree with all Sir Eyre Crowe had said on the subject. It seems impossible for the Council to arrive at a resolution, which requires a unanimous vote, as he can hardly be expected to join in a formal request to his own government. He will, however, cable to Washington Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal and state that such a resolution is before the Council.

(It was decided that the American Delegation will cable to Washington the resolution proposed by the British Delegation to the effect that the Supreme Council address a formal request to the United States Government to hand over without delay, to properly appointed agents of the British Government, the passenger vessels illegally detained in United States ports.)


6. The Council had before it the report of the Special Committee.

M Laroche reads and comments upon the report. He adds that the paragraph on page 56 of the report relating to the credentials of the Ambassador should be modified in accordance with the present attitude of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers toward Germany.

Mr Polk states that the United States is not now in a position to send representatives, but he will make no objection to the report.

(It is decided to accept the report as presented by the Special Committee, it being understood that the credentials of the Ambassador should be modified to agree with the attitude of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers toward Germany.)


7. The Council has before it a note of the Drafting Committee on the question of Instructions to General Masterman Regarding the Disposal by Germany of Aeronautical Material.

M Berthelot reads and comments upon the proposed instructions.

(After a short discussion it is decided to accept the report of the Drafting Committee relative to instructions to be sent to General Masterman on the disposal by Germany of Aeronautical material.


8. The Council has before it a note of the Drafting Committee on the subject of a signature by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Romania of the Financial Arrangements of St. Germain.

M Berthelot reads and comments upon this note.

(After a short discussion it is decided to invite Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to sign the two financial arrangements along with the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty.)


9. The Council has before it a note from the Austrian Delegation dated October 31st, 1919.

(After a short discussion it is decided to approve the request made by the Austrian Delegation regarding the return of Austrian prisoners from Serbia.)

(The meeting then adjourns)
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Old 11-18-19, 12:05 PM   #4248
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18th November 1919

Red Army recaptures the city of Kursk from anti-Bolshevik forces, concluding the Orel-Kursk offensive.

Edward, Prince of Wales, arrives in New York City as part of his tour of Canada and the U.S.


Crowds gather around to see the captured German submarine U-155 displayed on the Thames River, London.


HMA submarine J1 being refitted in Sutherland Dock, Cockatoo Island Dockyard, Sydney Harbour.
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Old 11-18-19, 07:17 PM   #4249
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Tuesday, November 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a note from the Reparation Commission dated November 17th on the observations presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation November 5th on the subject of the distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage.

M Loucheur fee;s that a certain confusion has arisen on this question. The note which the Council has before it comes from the old Reparation Commission which had prepared the Peace Treaties. The Committee on Organization of the new Reparation Commission, over which he presided, had also had the question put before it, but had not yet considered it. As it is a question concerning the application of the Treaty, he thinks that the Committee over which he presides is alone competent, and he asks that the discussion be adjourned. He believes he will be in a position to present a report to the Council on the following day at noon.

(The discussion of this subject is adjourned until the following meeting.)


2. M Pichon observes that this question depends on the decision to be taken on the previous question, which had been adjourned. He proposes likewise to adjourn the discussion of this point to the following meeting.

(This is agreed to.)


3. M Clemenceau states that it is necessary to fix a date for signing the Treaty with Bulgaria.

M Berthelot points out that certain questions of detail have still to be settled before the signature can take place. The signature of Serbia is dependent on a prior settlement of the question of distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage. Within eight days the Council will know whether or not it can count on obtaining the signature of Romania. Moreover, the Council has decided, upon the request of Switzerland, to insert in the Bulgarian Treaty articles guaranteeing Swiss neutrality. As far as the Bulgarians are concerned, no difficulties will be raised in this connection, but it will still be necessary to inform them of this matter upon the arrival of their delegates in Paris, which will take place the following day. These various considerations make it evident that the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty cannot take place before the following Wednesday or Thursday.

(After a short discussion, Thursday, November 27th, is settled upon as the date for the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty.)


4. M Clemenceau feels inclined simply to reply to Mr Venizelos that the Council adhered integrally to the text of the letter it had sent him on November 12th. M Berthelot can undertake the preparation of this letter.

S de Martino agrees entirely with M Clemenceau’s suggestion. He wishes to correct a misleading phrase in Mr Venizelos’ letter of November 15th. It is there said that the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims had categorically approved the Greek claims on Smyrna and the neighboring region. He feels obliged then to point out that the Italian representative on that Commission has always contested the Greek claims.

(It is decided:

(1) That M Berthelot prepare a letter to be sent to Mr Venizelos informing him that the Supreme Council adheres integrally to the point of view set forth in its letter of November 12th;

(2) That the above letter be signed by the President in the name of the Supreme Council and dispatched immediately.


5. The Council has before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 16th, concerning the situation in Hungary.

Sir Eyre Crowe reads and comments upon this telegram. He points out that the information contained therein is less satisfactory, that arrests of certain political leaders are taking place at Budapest, and that if the situation does not improve, Sir George Clerk might be obliged to carry out the threat which he had already several times made of leaving Hungary.

(Discussion of this question is adjourned pending the receipt of more precise information.)


6. M Clemenceau states that as a result of the conversation he had that morning with the French Naval Expert it has become apparent that the point of view set forth in the latest British proposition was an entirely new one. He finds it difficult to reach immediately a decision on such an important point in the absence of the Minister of Marine who was at that moment not in Paris. He feels that the Minister of Marine will not be disinclined to agree with the British proposals. Up to that time his own point of view has been somewhat different, but the new arguments presented to him have rather shaken his convictions and he is quite ready to change his previous point of view in order to arrive at an agreement. Nevertheless he wishes time for reflection. He cannot indeed pretend that the idea of destroying the vessels would not be very unfavorably received by French public opinion. If a solution of that nature were adopted, at the very least it would be necessary to draw up a statement clearly setting forth the reasons which militated in favor of that solution. Unfortunately the present state of the French navy is so regrettable that French public opinion would not understand why the navy should not use the share of German ships which were allotted to it. At any rate it would be necessary to act with due consideration for French public opinion which is acutely interested in this question.

(The discussion of this question is adjourned).


7. Mr Polk wishes to call attention to the fourth paragraph of the decision relative to German Oil Tank Ships in the Minutes of the preceding meeting, which does not entirely conform to what he had said. What he had actually said was that he would undertake to transmit to his Government Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal, recommending its adoption, and that in the ships meantime the 9 oil tank ships of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft should be retained without being used.

M de Percin asks if the remaining tankers can at once be used, as is set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the decision in question.

Mr Polk replies in the affirmative.

(It is decided that paragraph 4 of the decision relative to German Oil Tank ships should be modified to read as follows:

“(4) that Mr. Polk would transmit to his Government the foregoing proposals of Sir Eyre Crowe and recommend the adoption thereof, and that in the meantime the 9 oil tank ships claimed by American interests should be retained without being used.”)


8. M Fromageot explains that the question of German ships transferred to Dutch Navigation Companies had been brought up by a note of the Council demanding that the Germans retain the 5 vessels in course of construction which they claimed to have legally transferred to Holland in 1915 and 1916. The Dutch Government had protested against this note and maintained that the Dutch Navigation Companies were legal owners of the vessels in question. The Dutch note had been replied to and Germany had replied to the note which had been sent it. The question raised was the validity of a change of flag during the course of a war of a vessel belonging to a belligerent country. That question had not been juridically decided in an identical manner by all the Allied and Associated Powers. In France a very ancient rule was followed which had been laid down at the time of the war of American Independence by an Ordinance of 1778. That ordinance settled that no ship could avail itself of a neutral flag if that neutral flag had been acquired in the course of the war. The French had never ceased to apply that rule. In America and England the system followed was apparently different, and a transfer made in good faith was considered valid in principle; but if account were taken of the jurisprudence of prize courts it would be seen that in practice decisions were in general similar to those arrived at in France. In any case, as it might well be embarrassing to ask their Allies to adopt a course that would not be fully consistent with the juridical principles which they accepted theoretically, he thought, in agreement with his colleagues, that it would be preferable not to reply to the German note until the Treaty had come into force. The Treaty specified (See Part VIII, Annex III, paragraph 7) that Germany must secure for herself the full title to the property in all those ships that were transferred during the war. Basing their position upon that very definite text, the Allied and Associated Powers would be legally justified in demanding from the Germans delivery, pure and simple, of those vessels, without needing to engage in theoretical and obscure discussions upon the validity of the transfers.

(After a short discussion

It is decided not to reply before the Treaty came into force to the German note upon the German vessels transferred during the war to Dutch navigation companies.)

(The meeting then adjourns).
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19th November 1919

Aftermath of War

U.S. Senate defeats motion of Ratification (with 15 reservations) of Peace Treaty 51 to 41. Treaty shelved.

Another source states: U.S. Senate rejects the Treaty of Versailles by a vote of 39 to 55. The U.S. never ratifies the treaty or join the League of Nations.
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Wednesday, November 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a report from the Committee on New States, and a draft treaty annexed thereto.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the report. He adds that the only point on which the members of the Committee do not agree is who should sign the treaty. The majority is of the opinion that as the Principal Powers had imposed Article 56 upon Bulgaria, they should all sign this document, but the minority, that is to say the American Delegation, has made reservations on that point.

Mr Polk says he will put it up to his Government but he doubts that the United States Government will sign this Treaty; his feeling is that it will say “no”, as it had done in the case of the Treaty with the New States.

M Kammerer asks whether the other Powers should sign in case America will not, and thinks that has already happened in the Treaty with Austria.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that the precedent points the other way; when America refused to sign, it had been decided that the other Allied Powers should also refrain from signing, this occasioning a delay which had prevented the Treaty being presented for signature to the smaller Powers.

Mr Polk says he sees the force of Sir Eyre Crowe’s argument and will refer this question to his Government.

S de Martino thinks that the Great Powers cannot refuse to take their part of the responsibility for the settlement of Balkan affairs. The question of immigration is one of the most important, and one which might permit grave abuses. As they all know, racial rivalries are very frequent between those countries. He thinks they will be abstaining from a duty which befalls them as a moral obligation if they did not take an effective part in the execution of these clauses with Bulgaria by affixing their signatures thereto.

M Matsui says he has not yet received an answer from his Government on the subject. He believes it will be impossible for Japan to sign if one of the other Powers does not, but it is his opinion that all the Powers should sign.

M Kammerer said there remains a second point, namely, should the Treaty be submitted to the Bulgarian Delegation? It has already been sent to the Greeks and approved by M Venizelos. He adds that the American Delegation feels they are morally obliged to submit the text of this Treaty to the Bulgarians; the majority does not feel it as a moral obligation, but think it might be opportune to do so.

Mr Dulles asks whether the Treaty could not become effective even if only Greece and Bulgaria were the signatories. It would be up to Greece and Bulgaria to carry their agreement into effect under the aegis of the League of Nations.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he sees no objections to submitting it to the Bulgarians and if it is found that they and the Greeks are prepared to sign it, perhaps by that time the other Powers would be ready too.

M Kammerer asks whether a delay of two days could be given Bulgaria for accepting this text?

(This is agreed to.)

(It is decided:

(1) To submit to the Bulgarian Delegation the Treaty between Greece and Bulgaria with regard to reciprocal immigration;

(2) That two days’ time be given to the Bulgarian Delegation to consider this text;

(3) That the question whether the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign this Treaty will be considered later.)

(It is further decided that Mr Polk should refer to Washington the question of the signature of this Treaty by the United States.)


2. The Council has before it a note from the Committee on New States.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the report. He adds that on October 12th when the Supreme Council had notified the Romanian Government that they must sign the Minorities Treaty it was added that the Supreme Council would examine any modifications of text presented by the Romanians provided that the general principles were not altered; but the Roumanian Government has been notified that it must sign the Minorities Treaty before the Bulgarian Treaty. The period granted to Romania has almost expired. He asks whether a communication should be sent to the Romanian Delegation asking them to submit observations without delay?

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the situation was less complicated than it appeared unless the Romanians should happen to create difficulties. The Council has presented its ultimatum. The period expires on the following Sunday. Romania will have to accept the principle of the Minorities Treaty but might suggest modifications for the Council’s discussion, provided these modifications are confined to such articles as concerned. Romania, for example, articles 10, 11, and 12. They understand that the Romanian objections referred more specially to general principles, and obviously the Romanians would have to abandon these objections on account of the ultimatum sent them. He understands that no great value attaches to articles 10, 11, and 12 either by the Romanians or by the Council and the Council would therefore be ready to grant concessions if not to abandon the articles. It will be necessary to come to an agreement with Romania within 24 hours.

Mr Polk says he would not like to commit his Government to accept these modifications at this time but he thinks they probably can agree to some compromise when he receives an answer from Washington.

S de Martino agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe and adds that in order to facilitate the signature of the Treaty by the Romanians, a declaration might be made to them such as the one which had been made to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation. That declaration stated that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers did not have in mind to confer special privileges to any Minority, but only to prevent racial conflicts by giving the Minorities an equitable protection, and that they were ready to give the same assurance to any State which will sign the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities.

M Kammerer says there is no objection to such a declaration being made to the Romanians, but he asks whether this should be done at once or whether it would be advisable to await such a request from the Romanians.

M Clemenceau says he thinks it would be wiser to await the reply of the Romanians to the Council’s ultimatum.

(It is decided:

(1) That no answer is called for by the Romanian note relating to the Minorities Treaty, and that no further action be taken until an answer has been received from the Romanian Government to the note of November 15th;

(2) That if that answer is in the affirmative the Romanian Delegation should be required immediately to put their observations before the Committee on New States;

(3) That the Committee on New States should within twenty-four hours present a report to the Supreme Council on those observations; it being understood that the Minorities Treaty cannot be modified in its general principles, but only in respect of such articles, e.g. 10, 11 and 12, as purely concerned Romania.)


3. The Council has before it a telegram from the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated November 12th.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the telegram. He says that this request tends to replace the local troops in those territories by Allied troops. He thinks this will not be an enviable position for the Allies to be in between the Bolshevists and the Baltic States, and that it will imply a sort of agreement between the Allies and the Bolshevists.

M Clemenceau says that he feels perfectly sure that it is the unanimous opinion of the Council that such a request should not be granted.

(It is decided not to grant the request of the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs for the establishment of a neutral zone between the Baltic States and Russia under the control of a third State, to be appointed by the Conference.


4. The Council has before it a letter from the Secretary General of the Polish Delegation, requesting That the Arrangement Regarding Galicia Be Communicated to Them.

M Berthelot reads and comments upon the letter. He adds that the Council has already decided on November 11th to hear the Polish Delegates without communicating the report to them. He will ask the Polish Delegates to appear before the Council at the following meeting.


5. General Le Rond says that the question of transferring the sovereignty over the territories subject to a plebiscite has to be settled between the Commissions of the Allies and the German delegates, who have just arrived. The different plebiscite commissions have been organized since November 10th, but they have had great difficulty in getting their personnel; some of the members are still in Rome, others in London, trying to get it together. That is one reason why the discussion with the German delegates has not started.

The questions to be discussed with the Germans arise from the application of the Treaty:

First, there is the question of administration of the plebiscite areas. There is no difficulty about that as it passes automatically to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Second, there is the economic organization which presented difficulties. As those economic services are administered mainly from Berlin, the relations between Berlin and those territories cannot be suspended. It is necessary to provide for some liaison between the several Commissions and the Central Government at Berlin. The best solution would be to invite the Berlin Government to send an official belonging to the German Central Administration who would act as a sort of liaison officer between the Government and each of the Commissions. This official would have to be accepted by the Commission and must not belong to the province where he is to go, so that the local population should not be under the impression that the German Government is still keeping a hold over them. This official will be at the disposal of the Commission for all matters which concern railways, postal, telegraph and mining questions, etc.

Third, there are also financial questions. Under the Treaty, all expenses are to be charged against local revenues; this should be interpreted to mean future as well as present revenues. The present local revenues will be insufficient to cover the charges set against them; in Upper Silesia for instance, the charge for military occupation alone would amount to fifteen million francs a month. In consequence, several solutions can be devised: a local loan guaranteed by resources of the territory, and which of course, will be borne ultimately by the Power to whom the territory would be attributed. Such a solution can be contemplated only in case of occupation for a long period, as in the case of Upper Silesia. The expenses to be incurred can be divided in three classes:

First, expenses of administration by local officials. This is merely a continuation of the previous regime; therefore, it is natural that the Germans would have to find the funds.

Secondly, the cost of maintaining forces of occupation, It will be difficult to ask the Germans to bear that expense; they would be justified in objecting and serious difficulties might be encountered. Another solution is to be found, and it will be necessary for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to advance these funds, either by bearing the expense each of their own forces of occupation, or by establishing a common fund.

Third, the cost of maintaining the Commissions. This cost will be a much lighter charge, and funds can be advanced in two ways either by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or by Poland. This latter method would be an equitable one and might well be accepted by Poland, as she had asked for the plebiscites.

He wishes to point out that those expenses would only be made as advances, and that the whole amount would be refunded by the Powers to whom attribution of the territories would be made after plebiscite.

Sir Eyre Crowe says it is difficult to solve that question without the advice of financial experts. The argument, however, does not take into account cases like Danzig and Memel. Neither Poland nor Germany are concerned there. The matter would have to be referred to his Government.

General Le Rond thinks that the point relating to the liaison between the Central German Government and the Commissions could be settled at once.

S de Martino says he does not think this question is on the agenda, and he is not ready to discuss it; as it is a financial matter he will have to refer it to his Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks the point just referred to can be accepted at once.

M Clemenceau asks General Le Rond to prepare a report suggesting a solution to the financial questions.

General Le Rond replies that financial representatives should be appointed by each of the Powers to discuss this question.

Mr Polk says that as the United States Senate has not ratified the Treaty, the United States cannot be represented.

(After some further discussion, it is decided:

(1) That in the course of negotiations with the German Delegates appointed to sign the protocol the German Government should be asked to appoint to each Government Commission an official who, having been accepted by the Commission, would act as an intermediary between the Central German Government and the Commissions;

(2) That financial representatives be appointed by each Power to prepare, together with General Le Rond, a report on the financial questions relative to the organization of plebiscite areas and to the occupation of Danzig and Memel.

Mr Polk makes the reservation that the United States Government cannot be represented on this Commission as the Treaty with Germany has not yet been ratified by the Senate.


6. General Payot says that Marshal Foch’s staff had examined the question of transportation of troops and supplies with the representatives of the Allied armies and had drafted a memorandum which could be transmitted to the German Delegates who would have 48 hours to examine the proposal. If the Germans accept this the question will be settled; otherwise the Allied Delegates might see the German Delegates and come to an agreement with them. He points out that in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans, the question who would pay those expenses arises and as he had not known what the Council’s decision would be, a non-committal formula had been adopted.

Sir Eyre Crowe says there can be no doubt whatsoever that the cost of transportation of troops and of supplies is included in the costs of occupation and therefore should be borne by the States to whom attribution of territories would be made.

General Payot remarks that the cost of the transportation of troops alone will amount to approximately 5,000,000 marks.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that, in order not to give the Germans the impression that all costs were being imposed on them, it should be made clear in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans that the costs of transportation were to be borne by the States to whom attribution of said territories will ultimately be made.

(It is decided:

(1) That a memorandum should be submitted to the German Delegates regarding the transportation of troops and supplies in the plebiscite areas;

(2) That the cost of transportation of troops and supplies in the plebiscite areas should be a charge against the States to whom attribution of these territories would be made and that a phrase to that effect would be put in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans;

(3) That a delay of 48 hours be given them for examination.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)
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20th November 1919

Bucharest: Allied supreme council tells Rumania to sign the Peace Treaty or be dropped from the Allies.

USS CALIFORNIA (BB44) Launching Ceremony, Mrs Barbara Zane, ship's sponsor, crashing the christening bottle on the side of the ship.
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Thursday, November 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. Sir Eyre Crowe calls the Council’s attention to the importance of definitely settling the conditions of Peace to be submitted to the Hungarians. The latest news from Budapest indicates that a coalition Government is in process of formation. He has just received two telegrams from Sir George Clerk which contained favorable news. A final, definite draft should be ready for submission by the time the Hungarians are in a position to send negotiators to Paris. But to arrive at such a final draft certain questions which are still undecided will have to be settled. The most important one relates to the expenses caused by Romanian occupation of Hungary and the means of meeting the same. If that point is now brought up for discussion it might take months to settle it. He thinks it would be well to study the suggestion of the American legal experts that a clause should be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary giving the Reparation Commission power to settle that whole question in view of existing circumstances. The Drafting Committee might be asked to come at once to an agreement with the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission in order to draft such a clause. Another question to be settled related to the cession of Fiume; a formula to that effect would have to be found which could be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He thinks that the Drafting Committee could likewise be charged with that task.

M Berthelot observes that as soon as the two points mentioned by Sir Eyre Crowe had been settled the Hungarian Treaty would be entirely ready for submission to the Hungarian Delegates.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Drafting Committee, in agreement with the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, should prepare a draft article to be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary giving the Reparation Commission full power to settle the questions raised by the expenses of Romanian occupation of Hungary;

(2) That the Drafting Committee be charged with the preparation of a draft clause to be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary relating to the cession of Fiume by Hungary.


2. The Council has before it a report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relating to the demands of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of the distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage.

M Loucheur reads and comments upon that report. He is glad to be able to state that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, at a meeting attended by Italian and Yugoslav Representatives, has reached a unanimous decision. The formula agreed upon seems to him a good one. With respect to vessels of less than 2,000 tons the owners are to be left a free choice of flag in accordance with their nationality. It is understood that further agreement will be reached with respect to vessels of greater tonnage and that the Yugoslav Delegates will be heard at the moment of reaching such an agreement.

S de Martino wishes to emphasize the importance of this solution which had been made possible as a result of a spontaneous agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia. He is glad to note that M Loucheur himself had brought up that point.

M Loucheur replies that he appreciated the conciliatory attitude of the Italian Delegates on that point. He likewise felt called upon to note that Mr Trumbitch had likewise abated his original claims.

S de Martino wishes to bring up a related point on which he has come to an agreement with the Yugoslav Delegate, namely; that the delivery of Austro-Hungarian Mercantile tonnage in the Adriatic should take place within the period laid down by Part VIII, Annex 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, that is to say, within two months after the coming into force of the Treaty.

M Loucheur sees no objection in principle to the arrangement proposed by S De Martino; he desires, however, further time to examine the question more closely.

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the recommendations of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage;

(2) That S De Martino’s suggestion, relative to the period within which such distribution should be made, be referred to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.)


3. The Council has before it a report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the provisional distribution of rolling stock between states forming part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

M Loucheur pointed out that the situation with respect to the rolling stock in the States forming part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is very serious. The majority of the States concerned had kept the rolling stock which they had at the termination of hostilities, and refused to let said rolling stock circulate beyond their respective boundaries. The result is that railway traffic is almost entirely stopped. To remedy this condition it seems necessary to establish at Vienna a Commission charged with effecting arrangements with a view to reciprocal exchange of cars, without prejudice to established or alleged ownership of said rolling stock. A Commission charged with deciding questions of ownership of this rolling stock does indeed exist but it seems essential to create a new Commission, charged with taking the necessary provisional measures, and which should be composed of representatives of each interested Government. This Commission is in principle favorable to the British proposition, but some objections having been raised by the American and Italian Delegations this proposition will have to again be examined by the sub-commission specially charged with questions concerning Austria. As the question is a very urgent one he asks that, if that sub-commission should reach a unanimous conclusion favorable to the British proposition - which will probably be reached that very day - he be authorized to take, in the name of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, the measures necessitated by the adoption of the British proposition. If on the contrary, a unanimous solution is not reached, the question will be resubmitted to the Council.

(It is decided:

(1) That the question of the nomination of a Commission to sit at Vienna for the distribution of rolling stock between the States forming a part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy be referred to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission which, if its sub-commission specially charged with Austrian questions should reach a unanimous decision in favor of said nomination, should take the measures necessary to carry such decision into effect;

(2) That if the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission or its sub-commission should not reach a unanimous decision, the question should again come before the Council at an early meeting.)


4. The Council has before it a report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the terms of a loan of $100,000,000 by way of payment for the provisioning of Austria during the next six months.

M Loucheur says that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had examined the unanimous report submitted to it by the sub-commission sitting at Vienna. That sub-commission recommended as essential a loan to Austria of $100,000,000 to cover the supply of food-stuffs and coal of which Austria would have need during the next six months. The action contemplated was of a very important character and evidently necessitated a careful study on the part of the Governments interested. Moreover a loan, however large, will not suffice to smooth away all difficulties. It is not only money that was needed, cars and food are especially necessary. He had recently had a conversation with Dr Benes. Apparently everything needed in the way of sugar, coal and shoes can be found in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia has shown a willingness to join the consortium to be created with the object of restoring the economic life of Austria. On the other hand, it was essential to supply Vienna with grain. Grain is already scarce in Vienna and within three weeks it will be completely lacking. The Serbian portion of the Banat alone seemed in a position to furnish the necessary grain. He expects to see Mr Trumbitch very soon and, if the Council does not object, to bring some pressure to bear on him to hasten the despatch to Austria of the grain which Yugoslavia had contracted to deliver and of which it had not yet delivered half. He himself thinks that it becomes a question of a direct loan from Serbia to Austria and he will likewise confer with Mr Trumbitch on that point. The Allied and Associated Powers in his opinion should only concern themselves with additional loans. Each Government will of course have to determine the extent of the financial aid which it was ready to give to the work of the rebuilding of Austria. He has not yet been able to see the French Minister of Finance on that point. He points out that the Government of the United States has several times declared that it could not participate in the loan question. The United States points out that as they had made large advances to the Allies it is incumbent upon the latter to make the financial arrangements which they judged essential with the States of Central Europe.

Mr White observes that the Government of the United States has already several times defined its position on that question. In order to summarize the question without unduly taking up the Council’s time, he wishes simply to read the following memorandum:

“Paris, November 19, 1919.

The United States Government understands that this note from the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission must be passed on to the governments or the treasuries of the several Allied and Associated Powers.

The American Delegation desires to point out that the point of view of the United States was brought to the attention of the O. C. R. C. by a note presented at the Plenary Meeting of Friday, September 17, 1919, and by numerous notes and memoranda presented to the O. C. R. C. and its several sub-committees from time to time since then. All these notes and memoranda have been distributed among the various Delegations.

It is requested that the various governments or treasuries consider carefully the various American notes and memoranda in reaching a decision.

The American Delegation refers particularly to the American memoranda presented at the meeting of the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission on November 6, 1919 (17th Meeting) and the Extraordinary Plenary Meeting of November 11, 1919.”

S de Martino says that in short it is a question of making an important loan to Austria. It seemed to him that it was not for the Council, but for the respective Governments, to reach a decision on that question.

M Loucheur says that it is only a question of the Council submitting a plan for the approval of the respective Governments.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the situation is as follows: The Council has before it a unanimous report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission. He had transmitted the same to his Government. It does not seem to him that M Loucheur’s views correspond entirely with the plan of action which was to reach an agreement between the various Governments as soon as possible. He feels obliged to state, moreover, that he has been informed from London that Great Britain cannot consent to make a loan if America does not make one. He has received two telegrams from Vienna which showed the situation to be desperate. The first telegram, dated November 19th, says that within a week flour would be completely lacking at Vienna unless immediate measures are taken, and that snow-falls threaten to interrupt traffic between Vienna and Trieste, which will have disastrous consequences. The Communist Party intends to take advantage of the threatened famine to create disorders, and as the Government is greatly weakened serious consequences are to be expected. A second telegram dated the same day states that the railroad from Trieste is still open thus permitting the immediate dispatch of flour to Vienna. The telegram adds that strikes are imminent in Vienna, and also in the Province of Styria. The result of this is that the situation is most alarming and that some action must be taken within a week. He is informed that negotiations have taken place between Great Britain and Italy with a view of sending to Vienna a part of the grain then at Trieste, which would be paid for by the remainder of a loan of $2,000,000. It seemed to him that the grain can be shipped to Vienna without awaiting a final settlement of the question of credits.

S de Martino says that he will recommend favorably to his Government Sir Eyre Crowe’s suggestion. He wishes also to point out that Italy has already sent a large quantity of food to Austria.

M Loucheur agrees fully with Sir Eyre Crowe. He thinks it absolutely essential that the grain then at Trieste be immediately sent to Vienna. Moreover, he will see the Minister of Finance. He thinks it important to submit immediately to the respective Governments the report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission then before the Council. Modifications, which a closer study of the question might seem to render necessary, can later on be suggested.

S de Martino calls the Council’s attention to the first paragraph of the conclusions of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission. It is there stated that the Austrian Government should forthwith prohibit by law the sale, transfer or disposal, outside of Austria or to other than Austrian nationals, of any assets of the country, either publicly or privately owned. That provision seemed to him unduly restrictive; its effect would be to prohibit all commerce with foreigners. The measures proposed should, he thinks, only affect public property, or at the very most, real property belonging to individuals.

M Loucheur says that the paragraph criticized by S De Martino will be studied anew; that, however, should not hinder the submission to the various Governments of the report in its present form. He wishes to point out that said first paragraph, among other points, is aimed at the question of works of art, which had given rise to certain difficulties.

S de Martino replied that, in conformity with the Treaty of Saint Germain, his Government is conducting pourparlers on that subject with the Austrian Government.

Mr Matsui fears that the geographic situation of Japan will make it difficult for his Government to render effective aid in a matter of such great urgency. However, he will not fail to telegraph his Government.

(It is decided:

(1) That the report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the terms of a loan of one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000) by way of payment for the provisioning of Austria during the next six month be submitted by the various Delegations for the examination of their respective Governments;

(2) That the first paragraph of the conclusions of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, beginning with the words, “First: Require the Austrian Government forthwith …” be examined again by the said Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.)


5. M Loucheur, before leaving the room, wishes to call the Council’s attention to the serious results, from the point of view of the execution of the Treaty, of the delay in the exchange of ratifications. The Germans have to make a series of deliveries the details whereof had to be settled before December 31st. With respect to coal, for instance, under the terms of the Treaty the Germans have to furnish fifteen hundred thousand tons per month; as the Treaty is not yet in force they have furnished only five hundred and ten thousand tons the preceding month and it is probable that their November deliveries will be even smaller. On the other hand, with respect to personal property, the Allied and Associated Powers are unable to consummate any of the necessary arrangements. It will be easy to cite examples showing how serious a matter was the delay in the deposit of ratifications.

M Berthelot says that the date of exchange of ratifications cannot be fixed before Germany has made known its intentions with respect to signing the Protocol. Moreover, the organization of the Plebiscite Commissions will have to be completed. Everyone is unanimous in wishing that the Treaty enter into force as soon as possible, but certain questions have to be settled first. Among them might be mentioned the negotiations between Poland and Germany, whose transfer to Paris had been requested by Poland.

M Loucheur thinks certainly that before the exchange of ratifications the Germans should be made to sign the Protocol relative to violations of Armistice clauses. But, it does not seem to him that the question of Germano-Polish negotiations is germane to the putting into force of the Treaty. With respect to the Commissions, he thinks that the Allied and Associated Powers can dictate their decisions to the Germans and that long negotiations will consequently be unnecessary. In any event, he wishes to insist that the putting into force of the Treaty should not be indefinitely postponed. The Allied and Associated Powers are running the risk of being foreclosed with respect to certain of their demands. The Germans should at once be notified of a date on which the Treaty will be put into force. If they create difficulties the responsibility for delay will at least lie at their door. Moreover, the Allied and Associated Powers possess the means of bringing effective pressure to bear upon the Germans. The latter can be prevented from disposing of their foreign securities which they had great need of selling in order to procure foodstuffs.

General Le Rond calls the Council’s attention to the difficulties experienced by the Commissions in recruiting the necessary personnel. The British Treasury has not yet given an answer on the question of allowances to members of Commissions. That delay makes recruiting very difficult. A Commission has been established to examine into the financial organization of plebiscite zones and it is necessary that an agreement on that point be reached before the negotiations with the German Delegates can advantageously be begun.

M Pichon proposes to settle upon December 1st as the date of exchange of ratifications.

Sir Eyre Crowe adds that the Germans must be notified of that date and told that they would accordingly have to sign the Protocol before December 1st.

(It is decided:

(1) That the first of December be fixed as the date for the deposit of ratifications;

(2) That the Secretary General of the Conference notify the German Delegation of the foregoing decision, and inform it at the same time that the Protocol relating to the non-fulfillment by Germany of certain Armistice Clauses must be signed by the German Delegates before that date.


(At this point Mr Patek and Mr Grabski entered the room).


6. M Pichon asks the Polish Delegates to be good enough to give the Council their views on the status of Eastern Galicia.

Mr Patek replies that they would be glad if they could first obtain the new draft which had been submitted to the Council.

M Pichon explains that the Council wishes to know their feeling on the general question.

Mr Patek says that Mr Paderewski and Mr Dmowski have already had occasion to speak to the Council on the status of Galicia. He wishes to add several general words on the proposal under discussion, as well as on the impression which its adoption would certainly create in Poland. Until the present time, Eastern Galicia had formed an integral part of Poland. Even during the partition Eastern Galicia had not been separated from the Polish provinces annexed to Austria. At the present time Poland is being offered a mandate for a territory which had never ceased to belong to it. Poland had indeed been told that the terms of this mandate were especially favorable; nevertheless, it means separating Eastern Galicia from Poland. When Spisz and Orava were under consideration it was a question of territories belonging to Hungary which had not formed a part of the former Kingdom of Poland. Furthermore, the Poles had had to reach an agreement with the Czechoslovaks. But in Eastern Galicia they have no opponents. In fact, opposition cannot be predicated of the Ukraine, which has no real existence, nor of Russia, which has no concern with Eastern Galicia. Therefore, if Eastern Galicia is no longer to be directly attached to Poland, the unanimous impression in his country would be that the Allies were taking away a province which belonged to Poland, and which was claimed by no other Government. Three days from that time Lemberg would celebrate the anniversary of its liberation from the Ukrainian yoke. Is he then to be told that a city in whose defense all classes of the population had freely shed their blood, was no longer on Polish soil? On the very day when celebrations will be held in honor of those who had heroically fallen in the streets of Lemberg, will it be announced in Paris that they had fallen on soil foreign to Poland? The Polish Army is at that very time opposing the Bolsheviks. Is it not to be feared that that Army will become demoralized if it suddenly learns that the city for which it had fought, that the territory which it had freed, are no longer to be considered as belonging to Poland. If the Polish troops get the impression that their leaders have deceived them when telling them a year ago that they were fighting in defense of Polish territory, it is to be feared that they will again believe themselves deceived when they are told that the Bolsheviks are the enemy to be fought. The objection indeed was made to the Polish argument that the population of Eastern Galicia is mixed and that hatred existed between Ruthenians and Poles. His reply is that in Eastern Galicia the proportion of mixed marriages was more than 35%. How can one speak of hatred under these conditions? The conclusion is inevitable that selfish intrigues of neighboring countries and Austrian, and especially German money, which had sown seeds of discord in Eastern Galicia, are responsible for the bloody conflicts of recent times. It has been proven that Ruthenian agitators prior to the war had received money from German sources. That question had been brought up in the Reichstag and in the Parliament at Vienna, and no denial had been made of the specific facts adduced at that time. He recalls that the Germans had played a prominent part in the conflict which ravaged Eastern Galicia, and that in many cases, Ukrainian troops had been commanded by German officers. At the time when he spoke all conflict had ceased and calm had returned in Eastern Galicia. The representatives of the western nations found it difficult to appreciate the conditions existing in countries possessing less culture than theirs. The Ukrainian and Polish peasants had fought without being too clear as to the reasons therefor. While he speaks they are once more working shoulder to shoulder and living in perfect harmony. He also wishes to present geographical considerations of great weight. Free access to the sea is a necessity for Poland. It does indeed reach the sea at Danzig but only by a narrow corridor which is constantly threatened by Germany. It is essential for Poland to obtain access to the Black Sea through Romania, and possession of Eastern Galicia is vital from that point of view. He wishes to add a word on the internal situation. The Diet at Warsaw had unanimously voted that there could be no Poland without Eastern Galicia. It is far from his intention to wish to use Poland’s internal situation as a threat but the Allied and Associated Powers must understand that the unanimous opinion of the Polish people has to be considered. Mr Paderewski had been obliged to declare in parliament that he would not sign a Treaty which would take Eastern Galicia from Poland. If the solution of a mandate is imposed upon Poland, Paderewski’s cabinet will have to resign; the Polish army, ill fed, ill clothed, engaged in a severe struggle against the Bolshevists, would be threatened with demoralization. The Polish people, finally, will not understand how its Allies could have taken from it Galicia which had always formed part of Poland and which no one was claiming. It was important that the Council should realize the gravity of the situation in Poland; on one side Bolshevism, on the other, German revolution. In the interior a threatened famine. The Polish army is strong and Poland counts on it as an element of order. If the Army becomes demoralized Poland’s situation will become most serious and it will be threatened with extinction. That would be a catastrophe which would certainly have an effect on the situation of the western Powers. The only solution is to allow Eastern Galicia to become an autonomous province of Poland, subject if necessary, to an effective international control. Any other solution will entail consequences for Poland which were greatly to be dreaded.

Mr Grabski desires to add a few words to what Mr Patek had said in order to show the Council the serious economic results for Eastern Galicia of any solution which would not make it an integral part of Poland. The situation in Eastern Galicia was in no way comparable to that of other regions which had suffered damages by the war. By virtue of the Treaty the Allied and Associated Powers are entitled to reparation for damages caused by the war, provided that they had taken part in the struggle on the side of the Entente. The Countries which during the whole war had been part of Austro-Hungary, which was the case of Eastern Galicia, had no legal right to any reparation. Eastern Galicia, however, was one of the regions which had suffered the most. It had been devastated successively by the Russians, Austrians and Ukrainians. If to these devastations, estimated at 22,000,000,000 crowns, were added the loss resulting from the depreciation of Austrian currency, the economic situation in Eastern Galicia would be seen to be desperate. Out of 2,500,000 hectares of agricultural land, 2,000,000 hectares were not under cultivation. If left to its own resources Eastern Galicia would be unable to bear the burden placed upon it. It had a vital need of the help of all Poland. Poland had not waited for Eastern Galicia to be given it to come to the help of its inhabitants which it justly considered brothers. Although Poland itself lacked rye and wheat and had had to solicit the help of the United States she had not hesitated to share her meager resources with Eastern Galicia. If the solution of a Mandate prevails, separate liabilities will have to be established which Eastern Galicia cannot meet. France, which so admirably understands the duty of national solidarity towards its devastated regions must understand that Galicia can only exist with the support of the remainder of Poland. Galicia’s resources in petroleum will not suffice to amortize the numerous sums which would have to be advanced if its economic rehabilitation were to be made possible. The situation of Eastern Galicia had been compared with that of Austria, but it had been forgotten that there are still large fortunes in Austria and that Austria had not been devastated by the war. Any solution which would paralyze Poland in the work of rehabilitation she had undertaken in Galicia would be disastrous to the economic future of that province.

Mr Patek says that the Poles had been told that there was little difference between a long term mandate given to Poland over Galicia and an annexation pure and simple of that province to Poland. In reality the difference was considerable, especially if account were taken of the fact that four plebiscites had already been imposed upon Poland, which had not failed to have a depressing effect on Polish public opinion. In conclusion he wishes to point out that Poland is not asking her Allies to give her anything at all; she is only asking not to be deprived of the territory which she considers belongs to her as of right.

(At this point Mr Grabski and Mr Patek leave the room.)

M Pichon asks whether any member of the Council thinks that the views just expressed by the Polish Delegates necessitated a change in the conclusions already reached by the Council.

S de Martino is struck by Mr Patek’s observations on the necessity of a territorial connection between Poland and Romania through Eastern Galicia. He does not propose, however, to reopen the discussion.

M Laroche reads and comments upon the report of the Committee on Polish Affairs dated November 20th. The Commission had been unanimous on all the articles considered, except on the second paragraph of article 2, where the majority of the Commission had proposed to insert after the words, “The Council of the League of Nations”, the words, “deciding by a majority of votes”.

M Pichon points out that according to the covenant of the League of Nations the general rule is that a decision should be by unanimous vote, but that when it is a question of the status of certain territories in analogous circumstances - like that of the Sarre - a majority of votes sufficed.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to point out that he had had some difficulty in inducing his Government to make the concessions which had finally rendered a unanimous agreement possible. If the question has to be reopened he cannot be responsible for the consequences. That is why he prefers to abide by the text proposed by the British Delegation which, moreover, corresponds to that which had been adopted at a meeting of the Council.

M Laroche says that there might be serious disadvantages if the opposition of a single power can render impossible the adoption of a measure agreed upon by all the other Powers represented in the Council of the League of Nations.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that as the other Delegations are favorable to a mandate of unspecified duration, he cannot see why they should feel the adoption of the principle of a unanimous vote to be dangerous.

M Pichon remarks that possibly in 25 years Germany would be represented on the Council of the League of Nations. He asks if it would not be dangerous to give Germany the possibility of preventing the unanimous will of the Allied and Associated Powers from taking effect.

Sir Eyre Crowe repeats that he is most reluctant to reopen that question. Moreover he points out that an agreement had been reached by the Council on the text presented by the British Delegation. It was on the Commission’s own initiative that the question had again come before the Council at a time when it had a right to consider it finally settled.

Mr White says that he cannot agree with Sir Eyre Crowe’s arguments. He feels that it is after all a question which concerns Poland rather than Great Britain.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquires if it was not the American Delegation itself which had insisted that the question of a mandate should receive a permanent rather than a provisional settlement.

Mr White says that he was informed by his experts that this interpretation of the attitude of the American Delegation was not exact.

M. Laroche explained that the text referred back to the Commission by the Supreme Council is open to revision. The jurists had brought up the question of the procedure to be followed by the Council of the League of Nations. Moreover, it should be noted that there was a great difference between a mandate of unlimited duration and a mandate perpetually renewed. If the Poles had been offered a mandate of unlimited duration their objections would have probably been much weaker. The attitude of the British Delegation did not seem to him entirely logical. That Delegation had insisted that the mandate be open for revision at the end of 10 years, it should, therefore, not favor a solution which would make any modification in the existing situation very difficult.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the arguments advanced by Mr Laroche runs counter to the resolution previously adopted by the Council.

M Pichon says that he favors the point of view of the majority of the Commission but in order to arrive at an agreement he is ready to support the text proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe.

Mr White states that he is obliged to maintain his point of view and he asked M Pichon to call upon Dr Bowman who had some additional information to give.

Dr Bowman thinks that it would be well to define clearly the American Delegation’s point of view, which does not seem to have been entirely understood. The statements of the American Delegates on the Commission of Polish Affairs show that they had desired a mandate of unlimited duration. On the other hand the British Delegation wishes the mandate to be open for revision at the end of 10 years. By way of compromise a term of 25 years is agreed upon, and this had been accepted by the Council. When the question had come back to the Commission a further question had arisen as to the procedure to be followed by the Council of the League of Nations. That was an entirely different question from the previous one, and one on which no agreement had as yet been reached. If a unanimous vote is necessary, a single nation, possibly Germany, could prevent the opinion of all the Allies from taking effect. If what is aimed at is to reserve the possibility of taking Galicia from Poland, in the event of the latter committing abuses, it is necessary to provide for a decision to be reached by a majority vote. That would constitute a sufficient guarantee. On the contrary, if a unanimous vote is required, that would mean practically giving Poland a free hand. The idea of a majority vote is perfectly consistent with the idea previously expressed when asking that the mandate should be of unlimited duration. In both cases it had been desired to ensure to the League of Nations an effective control over the mandatory power. The original proposition of the American representative on the Commission on Polish Affairs was that at any time the Council of the League of Nations, deciding by a majority vote, could revise the mandate.

M Pichon said that Dr Bowman’s arguments only strengthen the opinion he had already expressed, but in consideration of the attitude of the British Delegation, which had already made numerous concessions, he remains inclined to support Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposition.

S de Martino says that he was likewise disposed to support Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposition, always provided that a unanimous agreement could be reached on that very day. Personally he remains convinced that the solution of the majority of the Commission was preferable and he retained his freedom of action if the United States maintained its point of view.

Mr White asks if the question could not again be referred to the Commission, which should try to reach an agreement.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that that would mean reopening the whole question.

M Laroche points out that the Commission has already tried in vain to reach an agreement and he does not believe that a further discussion would succeed.

Mr White asks to have until the following day to think the matter over. He feels that the question under discussion involves the very principle of the solution to be reached, and that that principle might become of vital importance. It would have seemed to him more natural for an agreement to be reached in favor of the majority point of view, rather than that the majority should abandon its original point of view to agree with the ideas of a single Delegation. A very dangerous situation would be created if Germany might become a possible arbitrator of the decisions of the Allied and Associated Powers in such a grave question.

M Pichon says that for practical reasons, in view of the necessity of reaching a conclusion, and of the fact that the attitude of the British Government does not seem likely to be modified, he hopes that the Council could agree on the following day on the text proposed by the British Delegation.

(The discussion of this question is adjourned until the following meeting).


7. At the request of Mr White this question is adjourned as well as the question relative to the request of the Polish Delegation that the negotiations between Poland and Germany on questions relative to the execution of the Treaty of Versailles be transferred to Paris.

(The meeting then adjourns.)
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Old 11-21-19, 10:28 AM   #4254
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21st November 1919

[November 21, 1919] To the Ash Heap!, The Evening World, cartoon.
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Friday, November 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Cambon says that the British and American Delegations will make known their views on the text of Article II of the Eastern Galician Treaty.

Mr White summarizes the American point of view. He adds that he thinks it advisable to do so as at the preceding meeting the impression seems to have been conveyed that the American position on the question is illogical.

Sir Eyre Crowe repeats that he cannot change his attitude, and if the Council decides otherwise he will have to refer the question to his Government.

M Cambon says it is important to come to a decision on this vital matter and that he hopes the Council will give its decision at that meeting. As the Council has adopted Sir Eyre Crowe’s views, he will ask Mr White whether he cannot modify his conclusions.

Mr White then reads an alternative text which he suggests be inserted in place of the present second paragraph of Article II of the Eastern Galicia Treaty: “At the expiration of twenty-five years the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or the Council of the League of Nations, to whom the Powers may delegate their rights under this Treaty, shall have full power to maintain, revise or change the status of the present Treaty”. He thinks this text will meet the objection that the requirement of unanimous decision of the Council of the League of Nations might render impossible a state favorable to Poland through the ultimate opposition of Russia in Eastern Galicia; and further that a second objection would be made, namely, which might arise from the provision forcing upon the entire League of Nations the responsibilities of a Treaty concluded by the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

M Cambon asks whether this proposed new text meets with the approval of the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the modified text still raises debatable questions and that he would have to present it for the approval of his Government. At the end of twenty-five years it still gave to Poland no voice on the final decision of its affairs.

Mr White remarks that he still fears that a Power hostile to Poland might change the status of Eastern Galicia.

M Berthelot says there is a very sharp difference between the two points of view. To effect conciliation he thinks that the Council might accept the principle of Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal by leaving it to the League of Nations to decide in twenty-five years the procedure which it will apply.

M Cambon says that, in other words, the Council might state at this time that the League of Nations will examine in twenty-five years’ time the question of Eastern Galicia, leaving it to the Council of the League of Nations to decide whether it will take its decision by a unanimous or a majority vote.

M Laroche states that if the procedure to be followed is not specified, it is certain that, taking into account the provisions of the Covenant, the Council will have to decide by a unanimous vote, and yet twenty-five years later the Covenant might have been changed and the procedure applied at that time might be different.

M Cambon asked Mr White whether, taking into account Sir Eyre Crowe’s firm stand on the question, he does not feel like accepting the point of view of the majority.

Mr White says he withdraws his objection provided his attitude is recorded in the minutes so that in twenty-five years Poland should not consider America responsible.

(It is decided:

(1) To accept the text of the Eastern Galicia Treaty as presented by the Committee on Polish Affairs;

(2) That paragraph 2 of Article II should read as follows:

“At the expiration of the period of Twenty-five years the Council of the League of Nations shall have full powers to maintain, revise, or modify the statute as defined by the present Treaty.”)


2. The Council has before it a note from the Committee on Greek Affairs.

M Cambon reads and comments upon the draft telegram. He proposes the Council should address it to the Inter-Allied High Commissioners at Constantion in Smyrna.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests the following modifications: The first paragraph from second line beginning “Greek claims” should read, “to examine the questions relative to the Greek Administration of Smyrna raised by your telegram referred to above.” In second paragraph, in place of “the suggestions to be presented to the Supreme Council” read “those questions and to present its recommendations to the Supreme Council”. For the phrase in lines 3 and 4, “which those conflicts have made clear” read, “which have brought about the situation indicated by your telegram.” In third paragraph, second line omit “if necessary”. At the end of last paragraph add, “your information and after hearing the Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople upon the whole question”.

Mr White in turn suggests that, at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 3 there be added: “and to submit therewith your observations and if necessary your recommendations”.

(It is decided to send to the Inter-Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople, the draft telegram after modifications suggested by Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr White, as follows:

“Reference your telegram 2045.2 The Supreme Council has entrusted the Commission on Greek Claims to examine those questions relative to the Greek Administration in Smyrna raised by your telegram referred to above.

In order to study those questions and present its recommendations to the Supreme Council, the Commission would like to know with certainty the concrete facts of every kind which could be considered to have brought about the situation indicated in your telegram, especially in the matters of criminal and civil jurisdiction, customs, postal and press censorship, administration of the port, etc.

You are consequently requested to collate without delay and in agreement with the Allied High Commissioners the information furnished by your representatives at Smyrna on the concrete facts specified above, and to submit therewith your observations and if necessary your recommendations. You will be good enough to communicate these to Paris as early as possible by means of a telegram drafted in agreement with your colleagues and indicating as far as possible the sources of your information, after having heard the Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople upon the whole question.”)


3. M Berthelot says M Dutasta and himself had seen on the previous day the two German Delegates Herr Von Simson and Baron Von Lersner. The interview bore on the note sent to the German Government as well as the protocol annexed thereto. Herr von Simson spoke practically all the time and Baron von Lersner did not take active part in the conversation. Mr Berthelot had emphasized to Herr von Simson that he spoke in a personal and not in an official capacity. Herr von Simson first raised the question of participation by America in the Commissions on the execution of the Treaty. He had replied that it had been decided that America would not be represented finally on any of these Commissions until the Senate had ratified the Treaty, and that this decision had been accepted by all the Allies who agreed that the American seats on these Commissions, though they remain vacant, will be reserved. Communication by M Berthelot of His and M Dutasta’s Interview With the German Delegates.

Herr von Simson then raised questions of detail; first, Memel: He wished to know what would be the situation of that city and under what conditions it would be occupied by the Allies. He had replied that this was a subject which only interested the Allies, and that in any case, the situation of Memel would be settled in such a way as not to impose too severe charges on the city, and also the Allies considered that Memel would be incorporated in a new State.

Herr von Simson did not insist and next raised the question of the Sarre. To his questions he had replied, without feeling obliged to give him a full statement. He had told him that President Wilson had agreed to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, although the Senate had not yet ratified the Treaty; he had thought it inadvisable to inform him that the Council would settle only the question of delimitation of the Sarre and that the question of sovereignty over that territory would remain in abeyance.

Herr von Simson had then referred to the occupation of Allenstein and Marienwerder. He had indicated that articles 95 and 97 of the Treaty did not consider the question in the same manner for the two Provinces; for Marienwerder the question of the possibility of occupation had been raised, which was not the case with Allenstein. That observation had embarrassed him somewhat and he had answered that his personal opinion was that it seemed possible to occupy both territories and that in any event, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers did not intend to impose too heavy a burden on those territories. When the German Delegates met the Allied Commissioners, observations could be made by the Germans and information would be given on those points. Incidentally he had informed him that a general meeting of the Allied and German Delegates would be held the following Monday, and that the Allies considered that only questions of principle should be raised and the discussion be as succinct as possible in the interest of Germany herself. Herr von Simson had agreed on the last point.

Herr von Simson had then raised the question of the Protocol: He said he did not understand the classification adopted by the Allies to distinguish between the Armistice Clauses partially fulfilled, unfulfilled, and violated. He had not understood why the Protocol referred only to the Clauses whose execution was not provided for in the Treaty of Peace. In spite of three successive explanations, Herr von Simson professed not to understand. M Berthelot had assured Herr von Simson that the Protocol specified only certain “violations, among others;” the Allies did not intend to raise the others.

The question of the Baltic Provinces preoccupied greatly the German Delegates: Herr von Simson had asked him whether, if the evacuation was not completed at the time the Treaty came into force, the Allies would continue the blockade. He had replied that the Allies did consider the question with a broad-minded spirit, and that if they had had recourse to a blockade, that was only because satisfaction had not been obtained. In proportion as the Allies recognized loyal and honest efforts on the part of Germany to expedite the evacuation, the blockade, he thought, would be relaxed.

M Berthelot asks whether in that statement he had properly interpreted the spirit of the Supreme Council.

(The Council agrees that he had.)

M Berthelot continues that Herr von Simson had discussed the Scapa Flow sinking. M Dutasta and himself had informed him that they were not qualified to discuss the question, but that a written answer should be made by the Germans. Thereupon Herr von Simson had stated that the attitude of the German Government had been quite correct and that the sinking of the German Fleet was due to a misinterpretation of facts, namely, that Admiral von Reuter had not been notified in due time of the renewal of the Armistice. He had given him to understand that whatever interpretation Admiral von Reuter put upon the incident, the Fleet at Scapa Flow had represented a German asset. That asset had disappeared and the responsibility of the German Government remained undiminished. As Herr von Simson considered that the responsibility of the Allies was involved, he had informed him that the Allies had examined from the technical and political points of view the question of interning the German Fleet in a neutral port; that the experts had explained that such a solution was impossible, as no neutral port had facilities to receive the German Fleet. On the other hand neutral Governments had been disinclined to have this responsibility placed upon them; no Allied Power had wanted to retain the German Fleet, least of all the British. He had asked whether it was Herr von Simson’s wish that he should say to the Supreme Council that the German Government denied responsibility for the Scapa Flow incident. Herr Von Simson refused to commit the German Government to that and said that a written explanation would be forthcoming.

After a brief reference to the submarines destroyed in the North Sea and on the Spanish coast, Herr von Simson had raised the vital question, from the German point of view, of the handing over of guilty individuals. He had stated that it was materially and morally impossible for the German Government to comply with that demand. To that statement M Berthelot had replied that he was not qualified to discuss the execution of the Peace Treaty, but that if his personal opinion were asked for, he would say that the whole question had been examined by the Allies with the greatest care and that they had made every effort to see it from the German point of view. He had asked Herr von Simson whether he admitted that crimes had been perpetrated and that the guilty individuals should be punished. Herr von Simson agreed as far as to say that the guilty parties should be brought to judgment, but only before German tribunals; to which he had replied that the situation in that case would be yet more difficult for the German Government. Herr von Simson claimed that America, while admitting the principle that the guilty individuals should be handed over, did not insist on their being actually delivered up. M Berthelot replied that he did not know the correctness of the statement, but that Herr von Simson certainly ought to realize that populations which had suffered directly from the war could not have the same feeling on that question as those that had not. There were crimes which families could not forget and, speaking to him as man to man, he had asked him whether if the German Government considered its duty in a loyal spirit, it would not find the difficulties less than it had at first believed. The Allies would not be implacable and if they recognized that a sincere effort was being made to hand over the guilty individuals, they might not insist on the extreme fulfillment of this clause; he had asked whether Herr von Simson did not think that there would be found German individuals, courageous and patriotic enough to surrender themselves voluntarily. Herr von Simson did not think so and M Berthelot had replied that such would not be the case in the Allied countries.

He had finally explained to Herr Von Simson that the Council had fixed the deposit of ratifications for December 1st but this would only be possible if Germany did not create any difficulty. Germany had had the protocol for the last three weeks and if Germany had observations to make she should do so immediately; the German Government should not forget that the execution of the Treaty would mean the repatriation of her prisoners.

The Council expresses thanks to M Berthelot for his very valuable summary.


4. Mr White states that the Labor Conference at Washington, which had been unofficial up to that time, wishes to know, as it intends to adjourn on November 29th, whether the deposit of ratifications was set for December 1st; in that case the Conference would hold over until the 2nd or 3rd of December to pass official resolutions to confirm the work previously covered unofficially.

M Cambon replies that December 1st had been set and that the fact could be officially communicated to the Labor Conference.


5. The Council has before it a report of the Special Economic Commission.

M Serruys reads and comments upon the report. He says the Economic Commission is unanimous but not in agreement with the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee wishes to insert in article 232 bis in the Hungarian Treaty the following paragraph, “The Greek Orthodox Communities established at Budapest and other cities of Hungary as well as religious or other foundations are particularly included in the companies and associations referred to in this article.” If this paragraph were inserted an ambiguity would be caused as the word “Orthodox” had a political meaning broader than the religious one, and he did not think that it came within the province of the Economic Commission to decide this point.

M Fromageot admits that the argument of the Economic Commission had some weight, but the Drafting Committee does not think an ambiguity existed as the article referred to Allied subjects. He thinks it will be sufficient, however in order to prevent any such ambiguity, to add to the paragraph read by M Serruys the following phrase: “when subjects of Allied or Associated Powers are interested in those Communities or foundations”.

(It is decided that the third paragraph of article 232 bis of the Hungarian Treaty be modified as follows:

“The Greek Orthodox Communities established at Budapest and other cities of Hungary as well as religious or other foundations are particularly included in the companies and associations referred to in this article, when subjects of Allied or Associated Powers are interested in those Communities or foundations.”)


6. The Council has before it Draft Answer to the Danish Request Regarding the Liquidation of Property of Schieswigers Residing Abroad.

M Serruys reads and comments upon these documents. He adds that in the question concerning liquidation of enemy property there had never been unanimity between the Allied and Associated Powers. Article 297 of the Versailles Treaty speaks explicitly of the power and not of the obligation to liquidate. As a matter of fact England has already liquidated German property, France on the contrary had confined itself to sequestration, and as there had never been a common policy it might well be dangerous to give the impression that a common theory and common arrangements are now obtaining. It was exactly to avoid that inconvenience that the Economic Commission had proposed a noncommittal text. The Drafting Committee, on the other hand, in the draft it proposed (Number 4) is less noncommittal, and the Economic Commission sees great disadvantage in leaving the impression that a unanimous policy had been agreed upon by the Allies. The first sentence of the second paragraph as drafted by the Drafting Committee is too vague; it will be necessary to specify that the Allies should not undertake new measures of liquidation since at that moment measures were actually being executed in England, which could not be stopped. On the contrary the second sentence of the second paragraph did not go far enough; it anticipates only restitution of the proceeds of liquidation whereas in certain cases it is the liquidated property that will be handed over.

M Fromageot says that the Drafting Committee has considered that matter from a purely practical point of view. As he had explained at a previous meeting of the Supreme Council, he had been mainly concerned with the difficult situation in which the Schleswigers were placed. Besides, the Drafting Committee’s reply was merely a draft letter to the Minister of Denmark, not a legal document.

M Cambon says that the Council is not prepared to enter into questions of technical details. It would be well for the experts to come to an agreement and submit the agreed text to the Council at a future meeting.

(It is decided that the special Economic Commission and the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft letter to be written to the Danish Minister, and that the draft agreed upon be presented to the Council at a future meeting.)


7. The Council has before it a note of the Drafting Committee relative to the Request of the Dutch Government for Permission To Export From Germany Certain War Material for Its colonies.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon the note. He says it was for the Council to decide whether it should maintain the terms of the Treaty and the legal position already adopted by the Council.

(It was decided that a letter be sent to the Dutch Minister at Paris advising him that the Supreme Council maintains that no departure can be made from its rule vetoing the export of war materiel from Germany.

8. The Council has before it the proposed Treaty, the report from the Spitzbergen Commission, and the addition to the draft reply to the Norwegian Minister. M Laroche reads and comments upon the report.

(After a short discussion.

It is decided:

(1) To approve the proposed Treaty presented by the Spitzbergen Commission;

(2) To approve the report of the Spitzbergen Commission, including the annexed letters;

(3) To accept the addition to the draft reply to the Norwegian Minister, proposed by the Drafting Committee.)

(The meeting then adjourns).
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22nd November 1919

Ship Losses:

Myron (United States) The lumber hooker foundered in Lake Superior off Whitefish Point with the loss of 17 of her 18 crew. Only the captain survived.
Ady (Belgium) The schooner, carrying a cargo of copra, caught fire off Jamaica and was abandoned.
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Saturday, November 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.
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Old 11-23-19, 09:13 AM   #4258
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23rd November 1919

French troops and tanks participate in a parade in Metz, marking the one-year anniversary of the city’s return to France.


A Caproni biplane flies under the Brooklyn Bridge.
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Old 11-23-19, 05:31 PM   #4259
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Sunday, November 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.
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Old 11-24-19, 07:53 AM   #4260
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24th November 1919

A German chimney sweep using skis to get around.


Fighting the White Plague - Several hundred modern young crusaders—Philadelphia school children—form a living tuberculosis double cross.
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