100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, July 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers with Mr Maklakof, Delegate from Russia.


1. M Tardieu explains that M Pichon is unavoidably prevented from attending the meeting. He asks Mr Lansing to take the chair.

Mr Lansing asks M Tardieu to take the chair himself.

M Tardieu does so. He says that he had been asked to open the discussion on Bessarabia by explaining the views of the Committee which had studied the question. He reads the Report made by the Committee:

“The Committee, after taking into consideration the general aspirations of the population of Bessarabia and the Moldavian character of that region from the geographical and ethnical points of view, as well as the historical and economic arguments, pronounces itself in favour of joining Bessarabia to Romania.

It considers that this measure should be effected in a form which will safeguard the general interests of Bessarabia, more especially as concerns its relations with the neighboring countries, and which will guarantee the rights of minorities in conformity with the provisions of the League of Nations.”

Since the Committee had reported, a protest had been received from Mr Tchaikowsky on behalf of the Russian Committees in Paris, protesting against any annexation by Romania, and stating that Russia could not recognize any such act, and further alleging that the Romanian troops had behaved in a very arbitrary manner in the country. Mr Tchaikowsky ended by demanding a free plebiscite.

Mr Lansing says that the practical question was to know whether a decision regarding Bessarabia could find a place in any of the Treaties of Peace.

Mr Balfour points out that he had made the same remark on the previous day. He had thought it was important to do all that was necessary to complete the Treaties first. M Clemenceau, however, had thought the Bessarabian question pressing and had therefore urged that it be taken up. Mr Lansing, however, points out that no resolution can be adopted on the subject, and this statement has not been met by any dissent.

Mr Lansing observes that the powers accorded to him as plenipotentiary were limited to the negotiation of Peace. They do not enable him to deal with a conflict between two friendly Powers. President Wilson, no doubt, might have been able to deal with such a question. He himself is not in that position.

M Tardieu says that it had been decided on the previous day to hear a Russian and a Romanian representative. They had been asked to come, and each would doubtless say what he thought should be the frontier line in Bessarabia. Should the two agree, which he admitted was not likely, Mr Lansing would not be placed in the difficulty to which he alluded. Should they not agree, the Council would then be forced to see what further action could be taken. He would point out, however, that it is difficult to make a Treaty with Romania if one of her frontiers were left gaping. He suggests that Mr Maklakof should be heard.

Mr Lansing agrees to this, but points out, however, that if any resolution is asked for, he could not take any share in it. He has given this warning in order that no false impression should be produced.

(At this stage, Mr Maklakof enters the room, and is asked by M Tardieu to express his views on Bessarabia.)

Mr Maklakof says that two memoranda had already been sent to the Peace Conference on the subject of Bessarabia; he would endeavor to give a gist of the argument. In the first place, he must point out that no portion of the domains of the Russian State could be disposed of by third parties without the consent of that State. Not even the Peace Conference could assume that power. He and his friends have no authority to speak for any constituted Government of Russia. He wishes to make this point quite clear at the outset.

As to the merits of the question, he would observe that there has never been any agreement between Romania and Russia authorizing the former to demand Bessarabia. Romania had entered the war on certain terms. These terms had not touched the question of Bessarabia. Romania could therefore base no claim on any clause in any Treaty. Neither could Romania claim the right of conquest. These two arguments being set aside, it is alleged that Bessarabia should go to Romania by reason of the principle that peoples had a right to dispose of themselves. He would not discuss this principle, subject to limitations, though it might be. He would admit it, and he would further admit that if there were any Russian subjects of Romanian nationality who wished to unite under one flag with the rest of their countrymen, Russia would be well-advised to permit it. Russia is big enough to make a sacrifice of this kind, but it was the very statement that Bessarabia desired to join Romania that he challenged. Bessarabia was not a Romanian country as a whole. Such demonstrations of a desire to join Romania as had occurred among a portion of the population were mere camouflage. It was on the question of fact that he joined issue and refused to allow the legitimacy of the Romanian claim.

He would point out that the word Bessarabia was often wrongly used. He would not go back to remote antiquity. In the eighteenth century, Bessarabia had been part of Moldavia, which was then a Turkish province. The Christians in those parts had always been under the moral protection of Russia. In 1812, a few months before the Napoleonic invasion, Bessarabia became a Russian province, captured from Turkey. There were at that time some 300,000 inhabitants. At the present time there were some three millions. Over forty years later, the Crimean war had taken place and in the Peace of Paris the territory captured from Russia had been restored to her, in exchange for small areas, and Ismail and Akkerman had been added to Moldavia. The rest of the country, i.e. the major part, had remained Russian since 1812. Then, in 1878, at the Treaty of Berlin, the Dobruja had been added to Romania, giving her access to the Black Sea, and territory twice as large as the portion of Bessarabia she had held. This small portion was given back to Russia to secure Russia’s access to the Danube. Ethnographically, the last census had not established a Moldavian majority in the country. There was no reason to allege that the statistics had been falsified in any manner. Parts of the country were completely Russian.

There are, however, four districts in the center which are mainly Moldavian. It is only in these districts that the question of a referendum arises. These districts might be united to Romania should the population really wish it. He would not, in principle, raise any objection. The Romanians, however, declare that Bessarabia had already expressed its will. This he denies. Immediately after the Russian revolution, municipalities elected by universal suffrage had been set up. They were the best organs for the expression of the popular will. They had not asked to be annexed to Romania. These municipalities had since been dissolved by the Romanians, and their representatives had protested against the Romanian desire to annex the country. The vote, however, had since been secured from the Sfatul Tseri, which was an emanation of the Councils of Workmen and Soldiers, the latter largely composed of Moldavian deserters. This body had resolved to make Bessarabia part of a Russian Federated Republic. This was in December, 1917. In the following March, when Romania had been forced to accept Peace, and Mr Marghiloman was in power, this statesman had got into touch with the Sfatul Tseri and obtained from it a vote in favour of joining Romania, with guarantees of local autonomy. When Romanian troops had entered Bessarabia, invited to do so, he admitted, even by Russians, in order to re-establish order, the same body, at an interval of six months, had voted for annexation to Romania, but out of 160 Members, only 46 had voted. It was a matter for surprise that a revolutionary assembly should have voted in favour of its inclusion in a Monarchy. The whole vote, he submits, was open to suspicion. It had been given during a military occupation of the country, and it was a minority vote of an arbitrarily self-appointed body. If he believed that the people backed this vote, he might be disposed to acquiesce in it, but he feels quite sure that a free plebiscite would yield a completely different result. Therefore, he asks that there should be a proper consultation of the people. He reminds the Council that there had been a time when the catastrophe in Russia imperiled the success of the Allied cause in the War. If the War had ended disastrously, and Romania had sought compensation from Russia for the losses brought upon her by Russia’s failure to continue the War, he would have understood the Romanian claim. But Romania had now come out on the side of the victors, among whom Russia was not. Romania had got all she had fought for and all she had asked for before the War.

Therefore, he protests with the greatest force against the claim now made by Romania, especially as it was not founded, as alleged, on the desire of the majority of the population. Finally, he would say that if there are districts showing a small Moldavian majority, wishing to join Romania, he would be disposed to let them go. As it is, he constantly receives complaints even from Moldavians in Bessarabia, of the treatment they received at the hands of the Romanians. The vote of the Sfatul Tseri is being used quite fallaciously to justify what a reasonably conducted plebiscite would undoubtedly upset. He points out that similar votes had been obtained in Lithuania and in Latvia, in favour of annexation by Germany. Any decision annexing Bessarabia to Romania would be a source of permanent grievance, and would do harm to Romania, which would not be in a position to absorb an unwilling population. The most he can admit iss a plebiscite in the district in which the Moldavian population is predominant.

(Mr Maklakof explains his views with the help of a map, and then withdraws.)

M Tardieu suggests that Mr Bratiano should only be questioned regarding the vote alluded to by Mr Maklakof.

S Tittoni says that the Council is in full possession of ethnical statistics and that it is unnecessary to hear Mr Bratiano on that subject.

(At this stage Mr Bratiano, Mr Misu, Mr Diamandy and M. Pellivan* enter the room.)

M Tardieu, addressing Mr Bratiano, said that the members of the Council have studied the ethnological question thoroughly. They would like to know what degree of sincerity and authority Mr Bratiano attributes to the vote obtained in the Sfatul Tseri.

Mr Lansing interposes that it matters little how that vote had been obtained. It is more important to know how the consultation of the people could be carried out in the future.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the question put by M Tardieu arises from the statement made by Mr Maklakof.

M Tardieu says that there is a connection between the two. He therefore asks Mr Bratiano to reply.

Mr Bratiano says that he believes the vote alluded to did express the will of the people and had been given in full freedom. He admits the assembly was a revolutionary assembly but similar assemblies had expressed the will of the people in Poland, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. The Romanian occupation had found that assembly in power and in control of the country. Its authority had resulted from the various successive developments which had taken place in Russia since the downfall of Czarism. Mr Lansing suggests a plebiscite. Bessarabia, he would point out, was a Romanian country attached by force to the Russian throne for over 100 years. When Russian autocracy fell, Bessarabia had come back to Romania. The Romanians had been called in by the people and even by the only recognised Russian authority at the time, namely, the Ukrainian Government. Difficulties did not arise on the question of nationality. It was the social question that caused all the trouble. The Bolsheviks were dissatisfied with the Romanian Government merely because it established Governmental order. The agrarian reforms introduced made the peasant pay for the land obtained by the expropriation of the land owners. The land owners on their side grumbled because they were expropriated.

Mr Lansing says that he wishes to put a plain question to Mr Bratiano. Would he object to a plebiscite?

Mr Bratiano replied that he does. He does so because the choice offered the people would be that between Bolshevism and order. It is dangerous to offer such a choice to a country on the border of disturbed Russia. Should the Romanians withdraw their troops there would be endless tumult in the country.

Mr Lansing asks whether Mr Bratiano, if given possession of the country, would agree to a plebiscite in two years.

Mr Bratiano says that he would not as only revolutionary agitation would result from the knowledge that a plebiscite would take place in that period.

Mr Lansing asks whether Mr Bratiano would object to a plebiscite at any other specified time in the future.

Mr Bratiano says that he would object still more strongly, as it would only prolong the agitation. He further begs to be allowed to state that the possession of Bessarabia by Russia is now an anachronism. It had been for the Russian Empire a march on the road to Constantinople. It can no longer serve that purpose. Russia owed Romania a great debt as being largely responsible for her misfortune. Circumstances point very clearly to the best way in which Russia could discharge that debt. It would be by the cession of Bessarabia.

(At this point the Romanian delegates withdraw.)


2. The following nominations are made for the Appointment of a Commission To Supervise the Execution of the Treaty of Peace With Germany:

United States of America: Mr J F Dulles.
Great Britain: Sir Eyre Crowe.
France: M Tardieu.
Italy: S Scialoja.
Japan: Mr Otchiai.


3. The following: nominations are made for the Appointment of a Committee To Organize the Reparation Commission Provided for in the Treaty of Peace With Germany:

United States of America: Mr J F Dulles.
Great Britain: Col S Peel.
France: M Loucheur.
Italy: S Crespi.
Japan. Mr Mori.


4. Mr Balfour says that he has an explanation to make regarding the form in which the question had been put on the Agenda. He understands that the Committee on Greek Affairs had been unable to deal with the frontier between Greece and Bulgaria without knowledge of the ultimate border line between Greece and Turkey. It was for this reason that he had suggested that the Enos-Midia line be assumed provisionally as a frontier between Greece and the future territory of Constantinople. This could be used as a working hypothesis. Committee To Delimit the Frontiers of Bulgaria

M Tardieu suggests that the Coordinating Committee on Territorial Affairs should be asked to deal with this subject and to hear the various experts dealing with the different frontiers of Bulgaria.

(It is finally agreed that the Coordinating Committee on Territorial Affairs should be asked to delimit the frontiers of Bulgaria and to make a report to the Council.)

S Tittoni gives notice that Colonel Castoldi will take the place of S Salvago Raggi on the Committee.


5. The following resolution is proposed by Mr Lansing and adopted:

“That the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference shall notify the Austrian Delegation that it will be allowed a period of not more than ten days, counting from the date upon which it will receive the last section of the Conditions of Peace, in which to make such counter-proposals or observations as it may see fit.”


6. Mr. Lansing proposes the following resolution:

“That the modifications which were made in the Conditions of Peace with Germany as a result of the German counter-proposals or for any other reasons, shall, insofar as they may be applicable, be made ipso facto in the Conditions of Peace with Austria.”

S Tittoni says that he has a reservation to make. Germany had been given an option of furnishing labor as a means of reparation. Italy has a superfluity of labor and does not desire that labor be offered as a form of reparation.

Mr Lansing suggests that, if this i the only reservation, the text proposed, together with S Tittoni’s reservation, be sent to the Drafting Committee for suitable modification and incorporation in the Treaty.

(This is agreed to.)


7. Mr. Balfour observes that he had pointed out on the previous day that the frontier between Austria and Hungary required speedy attention.

(It is agreed that the Committee newly set up to answer the Austrian notes regarding frontiers should endeavor to report on the following day.)


8. M Tardieu points out that there is a clause in the draft Treaty with Austria requiring Austria to recognize “the following frontiers of neighboring countries.” As it is not likely that these frontiers will be completely settled before the signature of Peace with Austria, it is desirable to alter the wording and to require the assent of Austria to frontiers to be fixed later by the Allied and Associated Powers.

(This is agreed to, and the question is referred to the Drafting Committee.)

S Tittoni remarks that he assumed it was established that the ultimate decision regarding frontiers was a matter not for the League of Nations but for the present Conference of Allied and Associated Powers. He wishes to make the same reservation as had been made by the Italian Delegation regarding the Treaty with Germany.


9. Mr Lansing expresses the view that there should be a communiqué.

Mr Balfour says that he understands the Council to be the lawful heirs of the Council of Four which had issued no communiqués. He suggests that this example be followed.

S Tittoni says that he is indifferent.

Baron Makino says that he agrees with Mr Balfour.

M Tardieu asks Mr Lansing if he insists on his view.

Mr Lansing says that he thinks it preferable to issue a communiqué, which could be made brief. His experience is that information always leaks out, through one Delegation or another. The Delegation most faithful to secrecy suffered.

Mr Balfour says that if the communiqué is so judiciously framed as to contain no information, he is indifferent.

(After some discussion, it is decided that for the present no communiqué should be issued.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Jean J. C. Bratiano, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.
Nicolas Misu, Romanian Minister at London, plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.
Constantin Diamandy, Romanian Minister at Petrograd; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.
Jean Pellivan, Director of Justice in Bessarabia.

[Jimbuna]

3rd July 1919

Total French WWI losses on land and sea 1,366,235.

2085 Soldiers of the American Expeditionary Force on board the USS Alaskan for their return voyage to the United States, 3 July 1919. Photographed while Alaskan was departing St. Nazaire, France.


Anti-Bolshevik forces in southern Russia, led by General Anton Denikin (pictured), begin an offensive to capture the Soviet capital of Moscow.


Ship Losses:

HMS Fandango (Royal Navy) The Dance-class minesweeper struck a mine and sank in the Dvina River in Russia. Eight crewmen were killed.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, July 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Clemenceau’s Office, Ministry of War, Paris, 14:30

Meeting called by M Clemenceau at the request of S Tittoni.

Present:
M Clemenceau
Mr Lansing
Mr Balfour
S Tittoni

Prof Mantoux (Translator)


1. S Tittoni brings up a question in regard to the troops in Asia Minor. He proposes that the railway line running east and west should be controlled by the British, French and American authorities, and that it should constitute the boundary line between the Italian and Greek forces, but that both the Italians and Greeks should have the right to use it.

M Clemenceau observes that the Italians had gone into Asia Minor without authority from the Conference. He also suggested that S Tittoni should draft some formula regarding the proposition of the use of the railroad and the suggestion that it be made the boundary between the Italian and Greek forces. He also points out that no matter what action is taken in this regard, the settlement of the question of Asia Minor should not be made a separate question, but that it would be considered in connection with the settlement of the whole Turkish question.

S Tittoni explains that Italy does not desire to obtain sovereignty over that portion of Asia Minor now controlled by her troops. Italy does, however, desire to secure certain concession to the coal mines at Heraklia and to the oil wells at Van.

Mr Lansing states that he is sympathetic to the Italian desire to secure coal mines at Heraklia. On the other hand he thinks that Armenia is too poor to be deprived of all her resources and that the oil wells at Van should not be taken from her.

M Clemenceau points out that the French have certain concessions at Heraklia, and that the Italians were now proposing to surround the French concessions.

Mr Lansing asks S Tittoni whether Italy has any coal mines.

S Tittoni replies that Italy has none.

Mr Lansing then asks M Clemenceau what coal mines France has.

M Clemenceau replies that of course Mr Lansing knows what coal resources France possesses.

Mr Lansing then states that under these circumstances Italy should also have coal mines.

Thereupon, M Clemenceau becomes somewhat excited and states very emphatically that he cannot bargain away the rights of his people.


2. Mr Balfour inquires if S Tittoni has anything to say regarding the Adriatic.

S Tittoni states that the Italian Delegation has based their position on the proposition that there is a Treaty of London. He also explains that the Italian Government has to consider Italian public opinion as regards this question.

Mr Lansing asks S Tittoni whether he would abide by the strict terms of the Treaty of London if the others consented to do likewise.

S Tittoni avoids a direct answer by himself asking questions.

Mr Balfour observes that S Tittoni is not answering Mr Lansing’s question.

Mr Lansing states that he has no objection to S Tittoni using what might be called “Yankee Methods”.

S Tittoni then asks Mr Lansing whether the United States would accept the Treaty of London if his question were answered in the affirmative.

Mr Lansing expresses his entire willingness to do so insofar as the terms of the Treaty of London are just. Mr Lansing repeats his question to S Tittoni.

S Tittoni states that he is forced to consider Italian public opinion.

Mr Lansing replies that if public opinion varied the faith of treaties, then there would be endless trouble. For his part he would not venture to say what public opinion in Great Britain and France would do in varying the Treaty of London.

M Clemenceau remarks that he knows well what French public opinion would do.

After some discussion it is proposed to abandon entirely the Treaty of London as a basis of negotiation, and it is agreed that S Tittoni should approach the question as if no treaty existed and prepare a plan which would then be discussed in a very confidential way between those present.

Mr Balfour remarks to Mr Lansing that President Wilson had expressed his willingness to leave the determination of sovereignty over any point on the Adriatic to a plebiscite.

In reply Mr Lansing stated that if this rule were to be applied at all it would have to be made applicable to all the Italian line which might cause trouble in the Tyrol.

It is agreed that S Tittoni will submit to those present his views in writing as stated above.


3. S Tittoni calls attention to the fact that the Yugoslavs are holding certain Italians as prisoners in the Klagenfurt Region. He suggests that his colleagues should agree to take certain steps to secure the release of these Italians.

Mr Lansing asks S Tittoni what Italians are doing in the Klagenfurt Basin.

M Clemenceau supports this question.

S Tittoni explains that the railroad had been torn up by the Yugoslavs for some 30 miles and that the Italian troops had been sent in to repair it.

Mr Lansing observes that the Yugoslavs would not have torn up the railroad if the Italian troops had not advanced.

No decision is taken but it is tacitly understood that M Clemenceau, Mr Lansing and Mr Balfour would ascertain whether they had received any information in the matter.

[Jimbuna]

4th July 1919

Italy. Food riots and strikes in Romagna and Bologna spread to other cities like Milan, Genoa, Livorno, Pisa, Florence, Palermo and others, with several people dead. Shopkeepers reduce food prices; sometimes to as much as 50 to 70 per cent.

France: Demobilisation law comes into force.

Victory Arch Erected in Tokyo, Japan.


Augusto B. Leguía (pictured) launches a successful military coup against Peruvian President José Pardo.


Men representing different Allied nations compete in a 100m dash at the Inter-Allied Games in Paris.

[Jimbuna]

5th July 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: 104,743 officers and 2,725,403 other ranks demobilised to date.

Eugen Leviné, communist revolutionary and brief leader of the Bavarian Soviet Republic, is executed by the German government.


People gather around the Washington Monument to celebrate July 4th.;


Ship Losses:

MP-1 (Merivoimat) The minesweeper was sunk by mines.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, July 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers


1. (At M Clemenceau’s request, it is agreed that experts should not be present at the Meetings of the Council but should only enter the room if specifically requested to do so by the Chairman.)

(During the following discussion, Mr Herbert Hoover, Sir William Goode and S Luigi Crespi are invited to remain.)


2. M Clemenceau asks Mr Hoover to explain the economic position in Hungary.

Mr Hoover says that the problem is that of the economic rehabilitation of Central Europe. As matters stand there is no hope of removing and distributing the Hungarian harvest unless the Danube and the railways across Hungary are reopened for traffic. The question, therefore, is not merely an internal Hungarian question, it is one of external economic relations. The action of the Hungarians has tied up the Danube and with it a large proportion of the river craft used on it. Further, the withdrawal of the German Armies from South-Eastern Europe left behind it in Hungary a large quantity of rolling stock and river craft. In order to set the economic life of Central Europe going again, it was necessary to have control of these essential means of transport. The third aspect of the question is largely political. Bolshevik ideas are impregnating the working classes throughout the area. Unless some means can be devised of abating the infection, the economic regeneration of Central and South-Eastern Europe will be difficult. Bela Kun’s government is spending a great deal of money on sending Bolshevik missionaries to industrial centers outside Hungary. This reacts on production. Moreover, the military power of the Hungarian Government is growing. A kind of nationalist passion is thereby put at the service of the revolutionary theories advocated by the Government. It is not likely that Bela Kun will abstain from spreading his theories outside the borders of Hungary by the help of this military force. The next probable victim after Czechoslovakia is Austria. The social and political aspects of the question, Mr Hoover says, are not his province, but he would like to observe that Bela Kun’s party until the last three weeks has not represented methods of violence. Latterly, however, executions have increased, which indicates that opposition is growing in the country and that the methods of red terror are being resorted to. Previously, it might have been possible to treat the Hungarian revolutionary party with indulgence. Now that it is showing a tendency to overflow its frontiers, it must be considered as an economic danger to the rest of Europe.

M Clemenceau ask Mr Hoover what he thinks of the Szegidin group.

Mr Hoover replies that this group appears to him to be composed of extreme reactionaries without any notable intellectual capacity. For instance, their deliberations of late have been devoted to the question of the resumption of the right of dueling. He does not expect much help from that party. It appears, however, that discontent with the Bela Kun Government is growing among the working classes. Information from British sources has been received to the effect that the Trade Unions would gladly see the Government upset. Communism would not appear to have penetrated very deeply into the population and the Government is becoming, like that in Russia, a tyranny of a minority. Another difficulty applying to any solution that might be suggested is the obvious duplicity of Bela Kun. In support of this Mr Hoover quotes the following messages interchanged between Lenin and Bela Kun:

1) Message sent by Lenin from Moscow to Bela Kim at Budapest of 19th June, 1919, (includes following):

“It is necessary to make the fullest possible use of every opportunity to obtain a temporary armistice or peace, in order to give the people a breathing space. But do not trust the Entente Powers for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting to gain time in order to be able to crush you and us. Try and organize postal communications with us by aeroplane.”

2) Message sent on June 21st by Bela Kun (Budapest) to Lenin (Moscow) in reply to his telegram of June 19th:

“I thank you very much for your telegram in which you approve of my foreign policy. I am very proud of being one of your best pupils but I think in one point I am superior to you, namely, in the question of ‘mala fides.’ I think I know the Entente very well. I know that they will fight us to the end. In this war, only a state of armistice can occur but never peace. This is an out and out fight. Once more I thank you for your note.”

The authenticity of these messages is supported by the fact that they had been revealed first by British sources and subsequently intercepted by Austrian wireless. Of the various solutions proposed in the memorandum he had submitted, no doubt the military occupation of Budapest would be the best. He believes it would be welcomed by the population, but it is no doubt beset with difficulties. The alternatives to this policy are a more or less mitigated recognition of the Bela Kun Government. The plan he had suggested was that the various Inter-Allied Commissions working in the neighborhood should establish economic relations with the Hungarians. There need be no direct recognition by the Governments, but by this side entrance it might be possible to obtain the opening of the river and the setting in motion of the means of transport and thereby the distribution of necessary supplies. He admits that this might possibly strengthen Bela Kun’s Government, but, on the other hand, Bela Kun is supporting himself in favour with the working class on the back of the blockade. All the hardships of the situation are attributed to the Blockade. By removing it, the Powers would deprive him of this argument and he might find it more difficult to plead his case. Whether this would neutralize the advantage of semi-recognition, he does not know.

M Clemenceau asks what is being done to re-victual Hungary?

Mr Hoover replies that nothing at all is being done. At the time when Bela Kun came to power, the Economic Council was about to re-victual Budapest, as the situation there was thought urgent. The Communist Government, however, had, on coming into power, made a stringent search for all supplies and had, by careful re-distribution, managed to feed the population tolerably well. It appeared clear that they would reach the next harvest without starvation. Communism, therefore, had saved the Allied and Associated Powers considerable expenditure on food and supplies, as, since the establishment of the Communist Government nothing whatever had been sent to Hungary.

S Tittoni says that the question of Hungary is one of the most difficult the Conference has to deal with. The Bela Kun Government is a serious threat to the neighboring countries, including Italy. There have been two periods in this movement. In the first a peaceful revolution had been brought about. The effect of this stage had been the most dangerous. The Russian Revolution had been represented to the people of Europe as being accompanied by carnage and general destruction. The Hungarian revolution had been quiet. It was, therefore, more attractive and more dangerous. It appears to many in other countries that the sequestration of private fortunes for re-distribution and the re-allotment of house room were excellent measures which might be imitated to advantage in their own countries. The second period, however, appeared to reproduce the methods of the Russians. Not only were there executions but methodical and systematic massacres had been instituted. It is very necessary therefore, to suppress the volcano. The means of doing it, however, are not clear. He admits he has no suggestions to make. The blockade obviously is not a solution. If rigidly enforced, all non-Bolsheviks will starve and Bolsheviks would eat. If, on the other hand, food is imported into the country the Government will only grow stronger. He would welcome any feasible solution that might be proposed, but he has none to make himself. There is one point, however, to which he wishes to draw special attention, and that is the reported seizure of all securities in Budapest by the Bela Kun Government. Should these securities amounting to 6 milliards of francs be exported and sold abroad, it will be useless to demand reparation from Hungary. There will be nothing left to take possession of. He thinks it is imperative to put a stop to this.

Mr Balfour says that in his extremely lucid statement Mr Hoover had approached a question of which he recognizes the great complexity from the economic side alone. The economic problem is how to make transit by all means of communication through Hungary serve the purpose of equitable distribution of means of subsistence in South-Eastern Europe. This cannot be brought about unless the situation in Hungary is radically changed. Neither Mr Hoover nor S Tittoni offered any plan for a complete alteration of that situation. He believes, therefore, that the case must be approached from the military side. A short time ago the Council of Four had sent orders to the Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Romanian Governments with the object of promoting Peace among them. These orders had only been half carried out. Many things had happened since. Mr Bratiano, in a private conversation, had told him that the Romanians cannot and will not retire from the Theiss until the Hungarians had been disarmed. The Hungarians are withdrawing from Czechoslovakia and massing their troops in Hungary. Universal armament has been ordered. If the Romanians, therefore, retire from the Theiss, which they can defend, they do not know what lines they can hold, seeing their commitments on other frontiers. He thinks there is force in the argument put forward by Mr Bratiano. He has caused further inquiries to be made and had discovered that the Hungarians have not carried out their Armistice engagements. They have not reduced their troops to six divisions; in fact, they appeared to have doubled their forces.

He therefore suggests that the Military Authorities be requested, through their agents on the spot, to order the Hungarians to disarm in accordance with the stipulations of the armistice. This is not only the right of the Allied Powers but their duty. It should be made known in Hungary itself that until this has been done there can be no kind of negotiations with the Hungarian Government. Should it persist in breaking the terms of the armistice, military action should follow. We had some hope that the threat alone would overthrow Bela Kun’s Government. Should it not, the Powers are bound to do to Hungary what they would have done to Germany had she broken the armistice. To carry this out it will be necessary to organize the Romanian, Czechoslovak, Serbian and French troops at hand. When the Hungarians have been disarmed there will then be no excuse for the Romanians not to retire after this, when Hungary has been put into her right place, negotiations could be undertaken either with Bela Kun or his successors. By this means the evil of giving credit to Bela Kun, which Mr Hoover has shown is to be feared, will be avoided. At the present time Vienna is in danger and perhaps Romania. This could be stopped by prompt military action, which would be justified by Hungary’s flagrant breach of the armistice.

M Clemenceau says that he would like to state his opinion, though he fears it will not be a very clear one. He has agreed thus far with all the speakers. The situation reminds him of the La Fontaine fable in which a gathering of rats decided to hang a bell round a cat’s neck. All agreed this was desirable but no one knew how to do it. He thinks that the situation has been accurately described by Mr Hoover. He acquiesces in all S Tittoni had said, and he thinks Mr Balfour has said excellent things. But how were the Powers to do what he proposed? France is demobilizing and cannot stop the process. At the end of October there will be but three classes with the Colors; that is to say the Army will be on a peace footing. The French Chamber is resolutely opposed to intervention in Russia. He thinks the Chamber is right, seeing the results hitherto obtained; a milliard or so is being thrown away on the expedition in Siberia. This is an absurd expense and cannot continue. If Parliament, therefore, declines to fight Bolshevism in Russia, it will equally refuse to fight it in Hungary. Mr Balfour’s argument that the Hungarians had accepted the armistice and had then broken it and therefore deserved coercion is a strong one, if indeed they had accepted it. But what troops does Mr Balfour mean to use to coerce the Hungarians? He had mentioned Czechs, Romanians and French.

Mr Balfour adds and Serbs.

M Clemenceau says that they will require money. He for one cannot supply any. Moreover, Germany for the time being seems ready to fulfill her engagements and to behave well. Should the Germans, however, see the Entente thoroughly embarrassed in Hungary this attitude might change. The march on Budapest had been thought of before. In particular the Italians seem disposed to go there, and he heard that General Segro has gone to Rome to advocate the policy.

S Tittoni says that the Italian Parliament is of the same mind as the French.

M Clemenceau says that no strong economic argument can be brought to bear on the Hungarians. Whether the blockade is raised or not, little effect can be produced on internal policy. The population can hold out. He has some doubts about the capacity of the Czechs to fight the Hungarians. The Romanians might or might not be willing. At the present time they seem considerably dissatisfied with the Peace Conference. There are no British or American troops available. French and Italian troops therefore seem called upon to do the work. He must state clearly that for his part he cannot undertake it. He has consulted Marshal Foch and General Franchet d’Esperey, who had often wished to march on Budapest. He has asked for plans, and has been supplied with a plan more ambitious than that of Napoleon’s march on Moscow. French, British and Italian contingents are required. The fact is that both the peoples and the Parliaments of the Entente countries are anxious to settle the crisis more quickly than is really possible. After the vast upheaval of the war and the pulverization of military forces, and, on top of it, the universal inclination towards social revolution, it is hardly possible to produce order in a short time. The Conference had tried to establish justice in the world. This was not the first time that such an attempt had been made. All know what had resulted before. It is now clear to all who had taken part in the Conference how difficult it is to draw even frontiers equitably. His Italian colleague would doubtless agree with him. People like the Russians, who had been slaves under a terrible despotism, had thought that liberty could be exercised without self-control. They had betrayed their Allies and caused them immense losses. The evil had spread. Italy, though an old and wise community, had been shaken up. Great Britain and France had had their troubles. There had been disaffection in the French Navy and even in the Army. The world was sick of fighting. The Conference had therefore to deal with revolutions in military power, alterations of frontiers, and social revolutions inspired by no ideas. It had been thought that the Russian people would recover. That was a mistake; owing to the vastness of the Russian territory somehow the Russian people had survived its own disasters, but all intervention to assist them to establish a reasonable Government had been in vain. Now the evil has attacked Hungary, which had not been anticipated, as it was a country of peasants and relatively rich. The policy he had to offer was not one of which he was proud. It was simply this - to hold the issues and to wait. He says this after taking into consideration the feelings of the Entente Peoples, and of their Parliaments. All are in a hurry to cease fighting, and to resume normal life. They are probably wrong, but that feeling cannot be gainsaid. This is not a noble policy, and might be said to look like impotence. He will not deny it. But, after losing hundreds of thousands of lives and spending the national treasure, he thinks no other policy is possible. As to Hungary, he knows the country a little. Before the war the people had been the slaves of Germany, merely because they thought that Germany was the strongest power, but there was more common-sense there than in Russia. He had been struck in Mr Hoover’s statement by the fact that the trades unions were sick of the Communist Government. He would therefore follow Mr Balfour’s policy so far as to threaten Hungary with intervention should they not observe the armistice. Then he would consult the military experts. If military action has to be undertaken, all will have to help, and much money will have to be spent. In the meantime, however, he hopes that Providence might furnish some means of escape. It is not his nature to temporize, but in this case he will. Hungary could be surrounded by a “cordon sanitaire”; Communism would not last long in that country. If the Generals recommend a plan similar to that shown him some months ago by Marshal Foch he feels sure that no Government will undertake the task of coercing Hungary. It is not a showy policy that he recommends, but it was the best he can offer.

Mr Lansing observes that there is one question of urgent necessity, namely, that of making peace with Hungary. To do this it is necessary to have someone there to make peace with. Does the Council propose to make peace with Bela Kun? If not, with whom? If it cannot be made with Bela Kun, pressure must be brought to bear on him to go. The only means of doing this appear to be military means.

(At this point General Bliss, General Sackville-West, General Thwaites, General Belin and General Cavallero enter the room.)

M Clemenceau asks General Bliss to show what forces and what methods he thinks would be necessary to compel Bela Kun’s Government to respect the armistice if other means failed, and what hope of success he entertains.

General Bliss says that some six weeks ago, at the request of the Council of Four, the Military Representatives at Versailles had made a report on the means that might be taken to prevent a Hungarian attack on Czechoslovakia. The report had been to the effect that if military measures had to be resorted to, the troops used must be those on the spot, namely, Romanian, Serbian and French troops. It was then believed that the troops available locally would be sufficient. This was the opinion of the French General Staff. Since then, however, Bela Kun’s troops had increased from 150,000 to 220,000 armed men. The situation had also changed in other respects, and he is unable to say whether the troops then considered sufficient would be sufficient now. There had been an inconclusive discussion in the Council of Four on the report. Since that date he knows nothing of what had been decided. If the plan then recommended had been thought workable, it should have been submitted to General Franchet d’Esperey. This, as far as he knows, had not been done. Moreover, he cannot say whether the Romanians and Serbians would act. As far as he is concerned, he thinks the question requires study at Versailles, in order that he might exchange views with his colleagues on the new situation.

General Cavallero agrees with General Bliss that a new study of the subject is necessary. The action now required is not quite the same as that contemplated previously, and in the meantime the Hungarian army has increased.

General Belin said that all the Military Representatives had agreed that a demonstration of force would have been sufficient when they were previously consulted. He still believes that a demonstration by the forces locally available would be enough to overthrow the Bela Kun Government.

M Clemenceau says that he does not wish the Military Advisers to restrict their recommendations to the employment of forces at present on the spot. If more are required, he expects them to say so.

General Sackville-West says that he is in accord with his Military colleagues. He would like to re-consider the question.

M Clemenceau asks how soon a report can be obtained.

General Buss says that if all the information required were available, the report could be made within 48 hours.

Mr Balfour asks whether, in view of the flagrant breach of the armistice by Bela Kun’s Government, it would not be well to warn him at once that he must observe the armistice. He would be ready, however, if his colleagues preferred it, to wait 48 hours until the report of the Military Representatives had been received.

(It is agreed that the report be awaited.)

General Bliss points out that it will be necessary to consult the Commander-in-Chief on the spot.

M Clemenceau says that it will be sufficient to consult Marshal Foch, who has all the necessary information from General Franchet d’Esperey.

Mr Lansing asks that the Military Representatives add to their report a brief account of the armament at the disposal of the Hungarian Army, and of their means of replenishing this armament. In particular, he would like to know whether it was made within the country or imported from without.

(The following resolution is then adopted:

“It was decided that the Military Representatives at Versailles in consultation with Marshal Foch, should examine the military possibilities of enforcing on Hungary respect for the Armistice conditions accepted, and make a report to the Council in 48 hours. The Military Representatives were also asked to report on the means of munitionment at the disposal of the Hungarian Government.”)

(The Military Experts then withdraw.)

S Tittoni then suggests that the Allies take steps to forbid the exportation of all the securities seized by the Bela Kun Government, as the disposal of these securities abroad would render nugatory any claim for reparation on Hungary.

(The following resolution is then adopted:

“That the Financial Commission be asked to submit at a very early date to the Council, a proposal for preventing the sale abroad of securities seized by order of the Bela Kun Government in Hungary.”)


3. At Mr. Lansing’s proposal, the following resolution is adopted:

“Colonel W. N. Haskell, U. S. A., is appointed by this Council to act as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the United States, British, French and Italian Governments, it being understood that Colonel Haskell will be coincidentally appointed to take full charge of all relief measures in Armenia by the various relief organisations operating there. All representatives of the United States, British, French, and Italian Governments in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Constantinople are to be at once instructed to co-operate with and give support to Colonel Haskell.”

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

6th July 1919

British troops march in London to celebrate the victory in the war after the signing of the Versailles Treaty.


British airship R34 completes its flight from Scotland to New York, completing the first transatlantic voyage by dirigible.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, July 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE


There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

7th July 1919

Aftermath of War

Peace Treaty ratified by the German Government.

British Army of the Rhine, July 7, 1919.


German physician Magnus Hirschfeld founds the Institut für Sexualwissenschaft (Institute for the Science of Sexuality), one of the first of its kind in the world. (The Nazis later shut down the institute and destroys its archives).


Airship R-34 compared to the Woolworth Building in Manhattan, New York City.


Actor Jon Pertwee, later associated with Dr. Who, born.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, July 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers


1. M Clemenceau says that before beginning the subjects on the Agenda he has a statement to make on what was going on in Italy. He does not wish to make difficulties worse, but the situation is such that it is to be feared massacres might occur. He has received dispatches, which he can show his colleagues, regarding the position at Fiume. Disturbances have taken place there, caused, it is alleged, by the misconduct of a French soldier. This is the Italian account and he will not dispute it. It might be true, and in any case similar things have happened elsewhere without leading to any serious consequences. There had followed in the Italian press a virulent attack on France and on Great Britain, but especially on France, and it can readily be believed that it was inspired by German influence. The French Ambassador had made a protest to S Nitti. S Nitti has declared that he cannot control the press. It is surprising that S Nitti cannot control the Italian press, seeing the power he has over the press outside his own country. At Fiume things have gone from bad to worse, and there is a movement tending to the expulsion of French and British troops. When the Allied Council had addressed a memorandum to S Tittoni, President Wilson had wanted to ask the Italian Government to evacuate Fiume. He had begged President Wilson not to insist on this, as it appeared to him that all the Allies had an equal right to maintain troops there. As there are French and British troops in Fiume, it is only fair that Italian troops should be there, provided they remained as representatives of the Alliance. He recalls he said this in order to show that he is not anti-Italian. The latest news from Fiume is that the condition there is going from bad to worse. French fatigue parties passing through the streets had been attacked with grenades and revolvers. Attacks had been made on British troops, but not so openly. Isolated men had been maltreated. The Italian general said he could not put a stop to these disturbances as long as French and British troops remained in the town. This is not all. At Genoa French soldiers had been knifed, and similar things had happened in other Italian towns. French consuls at Milan and elsewhere have sent him newspaper cuttings threatening a renewal of the Sicilian Vespers. In addition to this there is evidence of Government action. Supply trains for Poland and Czechoslovakia are being detained at Modane on some futile pretext of paying customs dues. These supplies are urgently required and it is obvious that they are stopped by Government action. Further, the French Consul at Rhodes reports that, at the very time when the Peace Conference was asking S Tittoni to withdraw Italian troops from Southern Asia Minor, 3,300 men had been sent two days ago to occupy a further point in Asia Minor. The French Ambassador in Rome, who has been most violently attacked, had been told by General Albricci that these attacks would cease if better news came from Paris. This is an attempt to bring pressure on the Peace Conference. Against this attempt he now makes the strongest protest. He will not deliberate under threats and he would not tolerate pressure of this kind. From an official person specially qualified, whose name he does not wish to give, but will if necessary, he learned that Admiral Thaon di Revel had put a stop to mine-sweeping, and had ordered that new mines be kept in readiness in case of war with France. He is prepared to show this information, if they wish it, to Mr Balfour and to Mr Lansing. It is further hinted that this news should not be taken too seriously, but that it might be allowed to leak out in order to influence the Conference. He has hitherto resisted two things. First, abominable attacks by the Italian Press, and secondly, the temptation to make a reply to attacks in the French Press which was being maneuvered on behalf of Italy against the French Government. He could, by making a public statement put a stop to all this but he has restrained himself in order not to make things worse. If these things do not cease, however, he will be forced to answer. This would produce a disastrous diplomatic situation which he wishes to avoid. It is for this reason that he addresses S Tittoni in the Council. He wishes to know what is at the bottom of all this. Why, when the Council is deliberating about Asia Minor, are fresh Italian troops sent there? Why is there no official protest by the Italian Government against the virulent Press campaign conducted against Fiume? He does not suggest the Italian Government should apply the censorship; but it could make a statement in refutation of what was alleged. In any case he will not be influenced by pressure. If he has to make a choice, he will not allow French soldiers to be murdered in Fiume. He has ordered back French troops from Italy where they had once been welcome in times of stress, but are now no longer well received. Nothing, however, will stop him from keeping French troops in Fiume where they have a right to be.

S Tittoni said that he thinks the Fiume incidents most deplorable. He is deeply concerned at the outbreak of dissensions among troops which had bled in the same cause. He also has received dispatches which he will not quote as they might give explanations of the origin of the outbreak not altogether in accord with those mentioned by M Clemenceau. He thinks there should be an inquiry into the incidents and suitable punishment for those responsible. At all costs friendship must be restored between the Allies. He suggests that an Inter-Allied Commission be appointed to inquire into the events at Fiume and that its findings should be awaited before any decision is taken.

M Clemenceau asks whether the Commission would also inquire into what had taken place at Genoa.

S Tittoni says that his proposal is confined to Fiume. The Italian Government has shown its anxiety to put matters right by sending General Caneva immediately to make an inquiry. General Caneva is an army commander, a senator and a man of judicial temper. He will certainly do his very best.

M Clemenceau interposes that no complaint was made against General Grazioli in person.

S Tittoni continuing says that as regards the events in Genoa an inquiry is taking place. He will inform the French Government of the result as soon as possible. Irresponsible acts should not be allowed to compromise the good relations of the Governments. It is essential that the Governments should remain closely united.

M Clemenceau says that the French Consul at Milan reports danger of massacres.

S Tittoni said that he is going there on the following day. This shows the importance he attaches to the subject. During his absence S Crespi will take his place. He would beg the Council to await his return before dealing with questions specially concerning Italy. M Clemenceau had spoken of threats aimed at the Conference. He feels bound to deny formally that there is any ground for such a belief. It would be puerile on the part of the Italian Government to attempt to coerce the Conference. Italy is represented by himself at the Conference and he trusts that the spirit of friendship and conciliation shown by him will be recognised. As to the statements attributed to General Albricci and to Admiral Thaon di Revel, he feels certain that whatever they might have said has been greatly distorted. He can, if necessary, ask these officers for explanations, but he is bound to say that he cannot believe what is attributed to them. As to the Italian Press, it is certainly true that S Nitti cannot muzzle it. The same papers that attacked France are also conducting a most violent attack on him. Party feeling in Italy is very strong and the violence of expression in the Italian Press at the present time has never been equaled. As to the alleged influencing of the French Press, he feels bound to deny that anything of the sort is going on. Since joining the Delegation he has seen all that took place and can find no evidence to that effect. He is ready, however, to do anything that might satisfy M Clemenceau. He will also point out that censorship had just been abolished in Italy. As regards Asia Minor he is not aware of the events alleged. To make sure that no misunderstanding took place he had summoned General Bongiovanni to Paris in order to give him his instructions personally. These instructions will be entirely in accordance with the confidential interview he had had with his colleagues a few days ago. As to the transit of supply trains to Serbia he is informed that certain customs dues are legitimately required. These dues Serbia promised to pay but her present attitude makes it reasonable to doubt whether she will pay. Not only food is being shipped, but arms and munitions as well. There is a report that the Serbians have asked the Czechoslovaks to join them in an attack upon Italy. He will at a later date give fuller information in writing on this subject to his colleagues.

M Clemenceau says that he has no wish to continue the debate and that S Tittoni’s proposal for an Inter-Allied Inquiry at Fiume gives him satisfaction for the moment, provided it be made at once.

Mr Lansing says that he agrees. He thinks it will be necessary to select a military man and he would like to consult General Bliss. He thinks it would be better to select an officer from Headquarters rather than one serving on the spot.

Mr Balfour says that he also is in favour of a Commission to inquire into the events at Fiume. It is the first duty of the Council to prevent the development of these unfortunate incidents into matters of international concern. He thinks the method suggested by S Tittoni a good one. He cannot immediately nominate an officer and he is inclined to agree with Mr Lansing that the best selection would be an officer not serving in Italy nor in the Adriatic. He will have to consult his military advisors. He feels it is scarcely necessary to say that he entirely agrees with his colleagues regarding the folly and wickedness of attempting to influence the decisions of the Conference by pressure from without. The effect will be exactly the reverse of that desired by anyone employing such methods.

Mr Lansing says that he has a suggestion to make regarding the work of the Commission. It should not only make an inquiry in order to determine the immediate responsibilities for what had occurred, but should also make recommendations regarding what should be done in the future. He can see no reason himself why the forces maintained by the Allies in Fiume should not be reduced to equal contingents of police.

M Clemenceau suggests that each of the Delegations should designate their officers on the following day and give them their instructions.

Mr Balfour says that he is not sure he can arrange to have the officer present on the following day.

Mr Lansing expresses the same opinion.

S Tittoni says that he agrees to the extension of the duties of the Commission suggested by Mr Lansing, but he will stipulate that no suggestions be made to the Commissioners and that they be left to propose their own solutions.

M Clemenceau says that, to speak plainly, it cannot be tolerated that Fiume should continue to be governed in the name of the King of Italy.

S Tittoni says that this was not done by the Italian Authorities but by the local municipality.

(It is decided that an Inter-Allied Commission of military officers should be appointed to make an inquiry into the incidents at Fiume and to recommend means of improving the situation for the future

It is agreed that the American, British, French and Italian Delegations should nominate their respective commissioners on the following day and that these should receive collective instructions from the Council.)


(The Members of the Drafting Committee enter the room.)

2. M Clemenceau asked M. Fromageot to tell the Council in what state the Austrian Treaty was.

M Fromageot says that the Treaty is ready, its articles and its pages numbered. It only requires a last revision which can be completed by the following evening.

Mr Balfour asks whether the question of frontiers was solved.

M Fromageot says that all that has been sent to the Drafting Committee has been put into shape.

M Clemenceau observes that the Council wishes to know what is missing.

M Fromageot replies that he is unable to answer this as he is not aware of the intentions of the Council.

M Clemenceau says that he had hoped M Fromageot would be able to tell him what the Council had omitted.

M Fromageot says that Article 27 of the Treaty provides a frontier entirely surrounding Austria. On some points it is stipulated that the exact line should be fixed at a later time. The Drafting Committee at one time had been told that they would have to insert the frontiers of the neighboring States. Later the Committee had been told to insert a clause requiring Austria to recognize such frontiers as might be laid down thereafter.

Mr Lansing says he wishes to know whether the Treaty in its present form is final.

M Fromageot says he is unable to answer this question.

Mr Balfour says that after examining Article 27 he observes that the old frontier between Austria and Hungary is maintained. He understands that the question of altering this frontier had been referred to a Commission. This Commission has not yet reported, and its conclusions therefore have not been accepted by the Council.

Mr Lansing says that certain portions of the Treaty have been handed to the Austrians. There remain other portions - Financial, Economic and the Reparation Clauses which have not been handed to them. He wishes to know whether these were completed. If so, he suggests that these portions be sent to the Austrian Delegation.

M Fromageot argues that for ease of reference it would be better to present the whole Treaty to the Austrians at one time with all the articles in due series.

(After some further discussion it is decided that the Commissions considering the boundaries of Austria should report to the Council on the 9th July, 1919.)


3. M Fromageot points out that in all other cases of new frontiers a stipulation has been introduced appointing Boundary Commissions to establish the exact line on the ground. Only in the case of the frontier between Austria and Italy is there no such provision.

S Tittoni says that if the Article is left in its present state the inference would be that the line must be settled between the Italians and the Austrians. He further asked how many members were appointed to the other Boundary Commissions mentioned. He would prefer a small Commission. For instance, one of three, with one Italian, one Austrian and one other member.

M Fromageot says that the numbers vary. They are either 7, 5, or 3. There are 3 for Danzig and 5 for the Saar Valley.

(After some further discussion it is decided to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Austria a provision to establish a Boundary Commission of 5 members to draw the frontier between Austria and Italy.)


4. The Council has before it the following document:

“The French Delegation have informed the Commission on Baltic Affairs of a telegram from the French High Commissioner in Siberia, from which it appears that Admiral Kolchak’s Government have asked the Allied Governments to support at Helsingfors the request which they have addressed to General Mannerheim to commence operations against Petrograd as soon as possible.

The Commission do not consider that they can recommend the Allied Governments to take the responsibility of involving the Finns in warlike operations whose chances of success it is difficult for them to judge at a distance. They feel, however, that the Finnish Government have been stopped several times in their desire to take action against the Bolsheviks of Petrograd by the fact that they do not know how any initiative of this kind would be viewed by the Allied Governments.

The Commission therefore think they can recommend the following suggestion to the Council of Ten:

A joint telegram should be addressed to the British, United States, Italian and French Chargés d’Affaires at Helsingfors requesting them to inform General Mannerheim’s Government that in case they felt able to grant the request to act made to them by Admiral Kolchak, the Allied Governments, without bringing any pressure on the Finnish Government, would have no objection to that operation.”

(It is agreed that a joint telegram to the above effect be drafted in the name of the Council by M Pichon).


5. M Clemenceau says that as President of the Peace Conference he had received from the Minister in Paris a request for a hearing regarding certain Norwegian claims relating:

Norwegian claims:

(a) to Spitzbergen

(b) to the Northern frontier between Norway and Finland.

(c) to reparation for Norwegian shipping sunk by the Germans during the war.

Mr Lansing says that he would prefer to entrust the Spitzbergen question to a Sub-Commission rather than to refer it to the Baltic Commission. He recalls that in 1914 there had been a Commission in Christiania on this subject, whose labors had been interrupted by the outbreak of war. The matter was a complicated one, both from the political and from the economic aspect. The American representative at the Christiania Conference is happily now in Paris.

M Clemenceau says that he accepts Mr Lansing’s proposal.

S Tittoni said that he is informed that there are extensive coal deposits in Spitzbergen. He asks that the coal situation in Italy be taken into consideration in any decision taken regarding these coal deposits. The future of Italy in respect to coal was very unpromising. Since the acquisition of the Saar Valley coal-field by France, France can obtain coal at 50 francs or 60 francs a ton. Coal in Italy cost 250 francs a ton. The prospect for Italian industries dependent on coal fuel is therefore hopeless unless this situation can be remedied.

(It is agreed to appoint a Sub-Commission consisting of one representative each of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy to consider the claims of various Powers in Spitzbergen, and to make a report to the Council.

M Pichon is asked to invite all the neutral Powers interested to present their views to the Commission.)

(b) Frontier Between Norway & Finland (It is agreed that it would be difficult for the Peace Conference to intervene in a frontier question between two neutral States, and no decision for the time being is taken on this subject.)

(c) Norwegian Claim for Reparation Against Germany (It is decided to refer the Norwegian claims against Germany for damage to Norwegian shipping at sea to the Reparation Commission.)


6. M Mantoux reads the proposed reply.

M Balfour thinks that a somewhat over-eager invitation was extended to Austria to come into the League.

M Clemenceau says that he will consent to any alteration in wording Mr Balfour would care to make.

Mr Lansing expresses the view that it is perhaps desirable to encourage the Austrians, both by reason of the threat of Bolshevik Hungary at their very doors, and also in order to dispel their tendency to join Germany.

Mr Balfour says that if soft words are likely to give the Austrians encouragement, which might be true, he will withdraw his criticism.

(The draft reply proposed by the Sub-Committee of the Commission on the League of Nations is approved.)


7. S Tittoni expresses the view that commercial censorship is part and parcel of the blockade. It must, therefore, logically cease at the same time. It might be maintained by an arbitrary act, but cannot be maintained legally.

(It is agreed that the commercial censorship as being part of the measures constituting a blockade on Germany should be abolished at the same time as the blockade.)


8. (It is agreed that the Yugoslav Delegation should receive copies of the Austrian Notes and counter proposals concerning Yugoslavia.)


9. Mr Lansing says that he has a proposal to make regarding the repatriation of certain Armenians, in order that they should be able to sow the next crop.

Mr Balfour says that so far as he remembers, on previous day a Commissioner had been appointed for Armenia.

Mr Lansing observes that what was now proposed was different. It is necessary to bring exiled Armenian agriculturalists back to the country, and to dispossess the Turkish usurpers of their land. His proposal is that General Milne be consulted as to the possibility of doing this.

Mr Balfour says that he will certainly agree to consulting General Milne as to the possibility of repatriating a certain number of Armenian refugees. He does not think, however, that he can accept the responsibility laid down in the second sentence of the proposal, namely, that their protection should devolve upon the British forces.

Mr Lansing says that all he wishes is that General Milne should report as to this also.

Mr Balfour says he will agree if a slight modification of the text were made.

(It is then agreed that the British Government should consult General Milne as to the possibility of repatriating immediately a certain number of Armenian refugees, and as to the possibility of ensuring their protection by British forces until Armenia received a mandatory. In the meantime their food will be supplied as at present by the American Relief Organisation.)


10. Mr Balfour says that he would like to draw attention to a matter which had not been put on the Agenda. General Gough represents the Allies in the Baltic Provinces. Orders have been given for the Germans to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces; this order they are carrying out but imperfectly. For instance they have been ordered to withdraw from Riga. They have removed five miles outside Riga and there halted. General Gough complains that he can only get into touch with the Germans by circuitous methods. He cannot hasten the process of German evacuation very much. He asks whether he can be given authority to treat direct with the German Command on this matter.

Mr Lansing says that he agrees in principle, but would like before giving an answer to consult his military advisers.

(It is agreed that this question be put on the Agenda for the next meeting.)


11. (It is decided that the proceedings of the Council be recorded by the Joint Secretariat, and that the procès-verbaux be distributed on the same scale as those of the Council of Heads of States.)

(The Meeting adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

8th July 1919

Aftermath of War

President Wilson returns to the United States.

British tanks parked outside of occupied Cologne, Germany.


The U.S. Army sends an automobile convoy of 81 vehicles across the continental U.S. to test the road system. The voyage took 56 days, demonstrating the need for better infrastructure. Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower is part of the convoy.


28 year old Dwight D. Eisenhower(far right) poses for a photo in Ohio while on the Army’s first transcontinental motor convoy. This trip would influence his role in pushing through the Interstate Highway Act of 1956.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, July 8, 1919

A small French steamer carries President Woodrow Wilson (on the after deck, marked by an arrow) from the Brest dockyard to USS George Washington for passage home to the United States.



PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers


1. M. Clemenceau says that he has bad news to give to the Council. He has a report of a still graver incident in Fiume. Nine French soldiers have been killed. The day before, General Grazioli had requested the French General to withdraw from the city with his troops. The same request was apparently made to the Serbians. What the Serbians replied, he does not know. The French General refused. It was on the morrow of this that the mob, encouraged by an Italian officer, had attacked a small French post. Sailors from the Fleet had come ashore to join in the assault and warships in the Harbor had fired on the post. This had led to the death of nine men.

Mr Lansing says that he has had a report on the previous afternoon, which he had communicated to S Tittoni, to the effect that a French post of Annamite troops had been attacked by the mob. Then forces had been landed from Italian ships and the Barracks of the Annamites had been surrounded. It was at this stage that some of the latter had been killed. The report quotes a British observer who had seen three Annamites stabbed to death while holding up their hands in token of surrender. In addition to this, a French packet boat had been fired on by Italian volunteers.

M Clemenceau says that this is more than could be endured. No one in France would submit to treatment of this sort. Therefore, his first act is to ask his colleagues what should be done. He assumes that they are ready to defend the rights of France as he is ready to defend theirs. The Italian Government has installed in Fiume a gang of men, known as volunteers, who control the city in the name of the King of Italy. It was to help these volunteers that the Italian General asked his Allied colleagues to withdraw from the city. He therefore proposes to retire with his British and American colleagues and to make his decision after consultation with them.

S Crespi says that he wishes to express on behalf of his Government the sincerest regret for what had taken place. He is deeply impressed by the reports received by his colleagues. He, himself, has no news later than that which had been on the previous day in S Tittoni’s hands. He was therefore taken by surprise. He hopes and believes that the reports referred to the same incident as has been mentioned on the previous day, namely, to the incident of Sunday. The information in the hands of the Italian Delegation is to the effect that after provocation caused by a French soldier, rioting began. It is alleged that a French soldier had fired first. He had been supported by other men who came from a small post and fired on the crowd. Italian soldiers had then intervened to restore order, then French sailors had fired from ships. The information, therefore, is not quite the same as that in the hands of M Clemenceau.

Mr Lansing says that he has no other information than that of which he had given an account. It is therefore possible that it is a new version of the Sunday incident mentioned on the previous day.

Mr Balfour says that by every account it was a deplorable affair. He, himself, has no information. He has no means, therefore, of judging whether there had been one incident or two. He asks M Clemenceau whether his dispatches related to events of Sunday or to subsequent events.

M Clemenceau said that the event described had taken place on the 6th.

Mr Balfour says it might then perhaps be assumed that everything had taken place on one day.

M Clemenceau says that this might be true. On the previous day he had not known how serious the matter was. He had then been content with a Commission of Inquiry. Now he thinks this is not enough. He cannot allow French soldiers to be murdered. It must also be borne in mind that on the day before the incident or incidents, the Italian General had desired the French troops to be removed ten kilometers west of the Town in order to avoid trouble. The Italian General had no right to demand anything of the sort and the French General had rightly refused. The dispatch he had received concluded by asking that Allied warships should be sent to Fiume.

S Crespi points out that according to M Clemenceau’s news, the Italian General had not given any orders to his French colleague but had only made a proposal. Moreover, General Grazioli, the day before the incident, had driven through Fiume in the same car with General Savy, in order to show the good understanding existing between the two Commanders. He had done everything he could to avoid disturbances. Incidents of this kind where troops of various nations were gathered were liable to occur everywhere.

M Clemenceau says that incidents of this kind have not occurred elsewhere. There is no instance of British or American ships firing on French troops nor of French ships firing on British troops. On the previous day, he had not known that the Italian warships had acted in this manner. He must therefore insist on consulting his British and American colleagues separately as to the action to be taken. He proposes that they should withdraw together.

S Crespi says that he would, himself, withdraw. (At this point the Italian members of the Meeting withdraw.)


2. M Clemenceau nominates General Naulin as French representative.

Mr Lansing nominates Major-General C. P. Summerall.

Mr Balfour says that he is unable to nominate an officer at that moment.

S Crespi says he would make his nomination on the following day.


3. The following instructions are accepted:

Instructions to Commission of Inquiry:

That the inter-allied Commission of Inquiry for Fiume shall investigate and report the facts as to the incident or incidents of violence, which have recently taken place in that town, and record their opinion on the responsibility therefor. They should further submit to the Supreme Council as soon as possible their recommendations as to the best means of preserving peace and safety hereafter.


4. M Clemenceau hands S Crespi a Note regarding the stoppage of trains at Modane.

S Crespi says that it is a technical matter and that he will reply on the following day.


5. Mr Balfour says that he has prepared the following draft resolution:

"In order to expedite the evacuation of the Baltic States by Germany in accordance with the decision taken by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on June 13th and communicated to the German Government by Marshal Foch, vide his telegram No. 3029 dated June 18th President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission at Spa, it is Resolved:

(a) that General Gough shall be authorized to deal directly with local enemy commanders in the Baltic States on matters arising from the above decision;

(b) that General Gough shall have similar powers with regard to the execution of any subsequent decisions of the Allied and Associated Governments in connection with the German troops now in the Baltic States, all such decisions being in the first instance communicated to the German Government through the usual channels;

(c) that Marshal Foch will be informed of this resolution and will be requested to communicate its substance to the German Government, with a request that the German Commanders in the Baltic States may be given the necessary instructions."

There is also a resolution of the Commission on Baltic Affairs:

"The Baltic Commission having been informed of the contents of the telegrams from General Gough and Colonel Tallents of 25th, 26th and 27th June respecting the necessity of an immediate credit of £500,000 in order to pay Russian and Lettish troops in Libau required for maintenance of order, consider that it is urgently necessary that this sum should at once be placed at the disposal of General Gough on grounds of military necessity as otherwise the position of the Inter-Allied Mission and of General Gough will become shortly untenable in Latvia, and it will be impossible to enforce the evacuation of the German troops.

The Commission, however, desire to draw attention to the fact that this £500,000 is only sufficient to meet immediate military necessities and they therefore recommend that inquiries should be made as to what securities in the way of timber, flax or other raw materials the three Baltic States can give for a loan.

In case such a loan can be raised either from one or more of the Allied and Associated Governments or from private banking institutions on the basis of such security it is recommended that the above advance of £500,000 should ultimately be merged in this loan."

The first is intended to place General Gough in direct relation with the Germans in order to ensure their retirement from the Baltic Provinces.

The second relates to a different point though it is also connected with the retirement of the Germans. It appears that the Germans have been paying the Russian Forces in those parts. Those forces must be maintained, therefore paid. General Gough requires £500,000 to do this. He supposes that there is no choice but to agree. He confesses that it was news to him that the Germans had hitherto paid those troops. If, however, the Allies have to become the Paymasters of those forces, he thinks it best to entrust the money to General Gough, the Allied Representative, on the spot for proper disbursement.

Mr Lansing observes that this is a new proposal. The United States are in a difficult position in matters of this kind. He knows of no fund out of which such a cost could be defrayed. American laws are very stringent on the subject of spending money. Until July 1st, while the President was in Paris, there had been funds which he could spend at his discretion. At present there are no funds available. The only means of raising money for such a purpose that he can think of is a loan. Seeing that there is no recognised Government in the Countries in question, it does not appear possible to raise a loan.

M Clemenceau says that it is not clear to him how the French contribution could be raised.

(It is decided to accept the first resolution and to refer the second for report to the Financial Commission.)


6. (The proposed reply of the Committee (Report of the Prisoners of War Commission on the Observations Submitted by the Austrian Delegation Regarding the Conditions of Peace) is accepted.)


7. (After some discussion the French text (Reply to the Notes of the Austrian Delegation Relating to Economic Conditions) is accepted with slight alterations. The adjective “German” was suppressed in connection with the expression of “Austria” or “Austrian” and the sentence regarding the boycotting of Serbian cattle was struck out.)

8. (It is decided that the answers accepted by the Council regarding economic questions, the League of Nations and Consular and Diplomatic Agents in South America should be handed to the Austrian Delegation on the 9th July, and that the replies should be given to the Press on the evening of the 9th July, so as to be published on the morning of the 10th.)

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, July 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 17:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations from America, Britain and France


M Clemenceau says that what he proposes to do is to send a French warship to Fiume. He wishes to know whether his colleagues will agree. There is a French warship at Constantinople which can reach Fiume in four days. He would prefer to act in complete agreement with his colleagues.

Mr Lansing says that there are no American troops in Fiume. There are, however, some Naval officers. He thinks perhaps it would be wise to obtain a report on the incidents from the British Admiral.

M Clemenceau says that France has been insulted and that the French flag must be shown.

Mr Lansing says that the Italian troops are, unfortunately, very much in the majority at Fiume. It is for this reason that the crowd had been encouraged to attack the French. He had this in his mind on the previous day when he suggested that the Allied troops should be reduced to equal contingents of police.

Mr Balfour says that he sees no objection to the sending of a French man-of-war. In the meantime, he will do all he can to obtain the evidence of the British Admiral.

Mr Lansing agrees. He thinks, himself, that the Italians are to blame. American troops have also been insulted, but it might appear, on further investigation, that there were extenuating circumstances. Should this prove to be the case, M Clemenceau would, no doubt, stop his warships by wireless.

M Clemenceau says that the ship must appear at Fiume. It could be withdrawn, if necessary, after 48 hours stay there, but the French flag must be shown.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks both the British and American Governments would act in a similar manner in similar circumstances.

Mr Lansing says that he thinks perhaps they would have done so without consulting their colleagues.

Mr Balfour says that he understands that this action will not put a stop to the inquiry which had been proposed on the previous day.

M Clemenceau says that he does not mean in any way to interfere with that decision. All he wishes to maintain is that an inquiry alone will not be sufficient after what has occurred.

(After obtaining the agreement of his colleagues, M Clemenceau gives orders for the dispatch of a French Warship to Fiume.)

[Jimbuna]

9th July 1919

The German National Assembly ratifies the Versailles Treaty by a vote of 209 to 116.


President Wilson and the U.S. delegation at the Paris Peace Conference returns on the S.S. George Washington to New York harbour. Wilson will now attempt to get Congress to pass the Versailles Treaty and join the League of Nations.


World needs a League of Nations to stop a future generation of German people fed nothing but revenge.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, July 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. (Nominations continue for the Commission of Inquiry into the Incidents at Fiume.)

For Great Britain, General Watts is appointed.

S Crespi says that he cannot at present nominate an Italian officer. He thinks that there will be an officer on the spot and it is agreed that he should join his colleagues at Fiume and be sent the same instructions as are given to them.

(It is agreed that the officers nominated should attend the Council the following day at 15:30 to receive their instructions. As it is not possible for General Watts to be present, it is agreed that General Thwaites should attend to receive instructions in his stead. It is also agreed that General Cavallero should attend to receive instructions in place of the Italian officer to be nominated.)


2. M Clemenceau asks if any of his colleagues has any news from Italy.

Mr Balfour says he has nothing save what he had shown the Chairman on the previous day. Though there is a British Admiral and a British colonel commanding a battalion in Fiume, he has received no news from them. He had telephoned to London, asking for more news to be sent him.

S Crespi says that he has received a dispatch from S Nitti and one from Fiume. It appears from these dispatches that no incidents have occurred since Sunday. In any case, the Italian Government is determined to maintain order.

M Clemenceau says that the French Military Attaché in Rome again reports the words of General Albricci, to which he had previously alluded. The French Ambassador is also of the opinion that an attempt is being made to influence the Conference.

S Crespi says that he is quite sure this is a complete misunderstanding.


3. S Crespi says that he is not able to reply at once to the document handed to him by M Clemenceau on the previous day. He will, however, furnish a reply at the next meeting.


4. Mr Lansing says that, before taking up the subjects on the Agenda, he wishes to draw attention to a despatch he had received two days previously from Warsaw. It is to the affect that the retiring German troops are removing horses, cattle, agricultural implements and everything necessary for the cultivation of the next harvest. This might be the act of irresponsible soldiery, but it is necessary to put a stop to it.

M Clemenceau proposes that M Dutasta should proceed at once to the Germans at Versailles and make a formal complaint to them on behalf of the Council.

(This is agreed to.)


5. (On Mr Balfour’s proposal, it is agreed to summon the Bulgarian Government to send a Delegation to Paris to receive the Peace Terms. The Secretary-General is asked to take the necessary steps.)


6. Mr Lansing proposes that this question should be taken up before the first question on the Agenda. He thinks the two questions are connected and that the means of action should be determined before addressing any communication to Bela Kun.

(At this stage, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites enter the room.)

General Bliss is asked to make a statement and says that all that is necessary was mentioned in the report.

The report is then read by M Mantoux.

Mr Balfour says that he does not doubt that the appreciation of the Military Representatives is accurate. If the Allied Powers, France, Great Britain, Italy, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Serbia, are too weak to deal with one recalcitrant power, the position was one of great humiliation. That, perhaps, does not matter much, but Bela Kun is turning Hungary into a military stronghold of revolution. Budapest has become an armed camp and all the factories are making munitions. Propaganda is being carried on in the most dangerous fashion in the neighboring countries. If the Allies must sit still and see the Armistice broken before their eyes, they are bound to lose prestige. Central Europe is likely to lose more than prestige. The Bulgarians have just been summoned to Paris to hear the Peace Terms. Is it likely that they will obey if they see that the Allies cannot even coerce a fragment of the late Austro-Hungarian monarchy? The Bulgarians are only half disarmed and would feel that they can defy the Conference. The situation in Central Europe is both difficult and critical. The wave of disturbance might go west as well as east. The situation would, he thinks, grow more critical if it is manifest that the Conference cannot control a small and defeated nation, which is not only breaking the terms of the Armistice, but, in alliance with the Russian Soviet Government, attempting to cause general revolution. He does not favour wild military adventures, but he does not like a confession of impotence.

Mr Lansing says that he has nothing to add to what Mr Balfour had said. He thinks Allied prestige should be maintained. Bolshevism will spread to Austria if it appears to be successful in Hungary. He wonders whether the contribution suggested for Serbia in the report of the Military Representatives was not underestimated. He is not aware that Serbia is fighting or anticipated fighting on any other front. He therefore suggests that the Military Representatives should get into touch with the authorities of Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Romania, in order to find out what these States can do to help.

M Clemenceau says that he must remind Mr Balfour and Mr Lansing that there were neither British nor American troops at hand. The French have two divisions, but other help will be required. He suggests that the Military Representatives, after conferring as suggested by Mr Lansing, should return, together with Marshal Foch, and tell the Council what results they had obtained. He feels sure that Marshal Foch would ask for British and American troops.

Mr Balfour says it will be necessary for him to summon Sir Henry Wilson. Only the British Cabinet can decide whether any British troops are to be employed. He will ask Sir Henry Wilson to consult the Cabinet before fining over to Paris, in order that he might be in a position to state what could be done.

General Bliss observes that it will not be of much use for the Military Representatives to consult the Czech, Serbian and Romanian military authorities as to the number of troops at their disposal, unless there are means of knowing whether their Governments would consent to give troops for this purpose or not.

Mr Lansing says that perhaps the best course would be to confer with the heads of the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Romanian Delegations in Paris.

(It is then agreed that the Heads of the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Romanian Delegations be invited to attend the Council on Friday, 11th July, and that Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson be also asked to be present, in order to discuss the possibility of military action against Hungary.)

(At this stage the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites withdraw.)


7. The Council has before them the following documents:

1) A Report of the Financial Commission. Sale of Securities by Government of Bela Kun

2) A draft Joint Note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the Allied, Associated and Neutral Powers and to the Government of the German Empire and of Austria.

3) A draft Joint Note of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to Bela Kun.

4) A draft communication to the Press.

Mr. Lansing thinks that the result of the previous discussion shows that no action can usefully be taken at present.

Mr Balfour thinks that there can be no harm in telling Bela Kun, on behalf of the Conference, that he is considered to be a thief. He might take no notice of it and put the communication in the waste paper basket, but it could do him no harm. He thinks Bela Kun should be warned that his right to steal funds for his own political purposes is not recognised. He does not think that the letters drafted are very suitably worded, but, in substance, he thinks they might be adopted.

Mr Lansing says that his objection refers specially to the note addressed to Bela Kun. He does not like threats which cannot be followed by action. He thinks the less the Conference has to do with him the better, and the less he is regarded as a power the better. The letter addressed to other Governments and that addressed to the Press, he does not object to. He thinks they will produce the desired effect without a direct threat to Bela Kun. He also points out that the expressions “Bolshevik” and “Communist” should be expunged from these letters.

Mr Balfour says that he would not object to the omission of the document addressed to Bela Kun, which he admits is not likely to have much effect on him.

S Crespi says that the question has been closely examined in the Commission. It has been recognized that the letter addressed to Bela Kun will not produce much effect, but it is necessary, before taking action in Allied countries regarding the sales of securities, to furnish such action with a legal ground. The only legal ground in this instance can be an official protest against the anticipated action of the Hungarians. The letter is therefore proposed for its legal rather than for its political effect.

Mr Lansing says that he cannot agree with this point of view. A lawless government, unrecognized by any other government, has no legal standing at all. He thinks the Allies will have as strong a legal position whether they inform an outlaw that he is doing wrong or whether they address no remonstrances to him at all.

S Crespi then suggests that the three letters should be sent back to the Commission to be re-drafted in such a manner as to contain a clear declaration that the Allied Powers define Bela Kun’s proceedings as thefts. The drafting will be done in accordance with the views expressed by Mr Balfour and Mr Lansing.

(This is agreed to, and S Crespi undertakes to obtain a re-draft by the Financial Commission.)


(At this point, M Tardieu, Mr Nicolson, Mr Leeper and S Vannutelli-Rey entered the room.)

8. The Council has before them the recommendations of the Yugoslav Committee. These and Hungary recommendations are adopted.

(The Experts then withdraw.)


9. Mr Lansing says that he is unable to act on this subject. He must take the Convention to Washington. The Economic side of the question has not been discussed in America. He suggests that as the matter does not really concern the Peace Conference it might be carried through by ordinary diplomatic methods.

After some further discussion Mr Lansing agrees that the Convention might be discussed inasmuch as it concerns European Powers - American adhesion being reserved.

(It is decided that the subject be put on the Agenda for the following day on this understanding.)


(At this point the Military Representatives enter the room.)

10. General Bliss says that a short time ago the Council of Four had sent to the Military Representatives at Versailles a of project of Mr Winston Churchill’s for repatriating the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. These troops numbered some 60,000 men. The proposal combined the repatriation of these troops with a movement regarded as useful to the Allied cause. One group of 30,000 men at present in the neighborhood of Omsk was to operate on Kolchak’s right flank and to gain contact with the North Russian forces, and thus to reach Archangel. The other portion was to be repatriated by sea in American ships from Vladivostok. The Military Representatives are asked to examine this proposal together with Czechoslovak authorities. He himself has an interview with Mr Benes - as a consequence of which Mr Benes had attended a meeting at Versailles. Before agreeing to the movement of Czechoslovak troops to Archangel, Mr Benes wishes to know whether Allied troops will remain in Northern Russia or whether they will be removed before winter, irrespective of the arrival of the Czechs in time for shipment from Archangel before the port is icebound. Thus the matter cannot be proceeded with until it is known whether or not the Allied forces in North Russia will await the arrival of the Czechoslovaks. He had written a letter to that effect which hitherto had remained unanswered.

Mr Balfour says that at the time of Mr Winston Churchill’s proposal there had been, he understood, a fair prospect of a junction of the Czechoslovak forces with the Inter-Allied troops in North Russia. Since Kolchak’s reverses this junction appeared less probable; in fact there now seems to be little chance for the Czechoslovaks of reaching the White Sea before the ice set in. The question for them, therefore, is whether the Allied troops will wait for them. He is informed that the British Government means to withdraw its troops before the winter. If the Czechs therefore are unable to reach Archangel before November, he could not promise that they would find British troops awaiting them. He believes that the same applies to the other Allied contingents in North Russia. If this is so it appears to follow that all the Czech troops must be repatriated from Vladivostok. The result of this will be that part of the Siberian Railway will be deprived of the troops guarding it and Kolchak would have to fill the gap. Therefore, the only point to be dealt with immediately is the question whether Allied troops will stay in North Russia through the winter. As far as Great Britain is concerned, the answer is “No”.

M Pichon said that the French Government also means to recall the French troops from Archangel. He points out that the withdrawal of the Czechoslovaks had a very serious result on the whole situation in Siberia.

General Beun states that these troops are guarding 1300 kilometres of railway. If withdrawn they must be replaced. It appears that Japan and the United States must be called upon to fill the gap. The Czechs are at present along the central portion of the line. The Japanese and American troops lay to the east of them. As the Czechs are moved towards Vladivostok the American and Japanese might move westward into their place. There were at the present time 5,000 Czechs in Vladivostok. Their immediate shipment will give some satisfaction to opinion in Czechoslovakia.

S Crespi says that Italian action will be in conformity with French and British action.

Mr Matsui says that Mr Churchill had inquired some time ago whether Japanese troops could replace the Czechoslovaks on the Siberian Railway. He is now informed that it is the question of finding troops to guard 1300 kilometres. The Japanese General had not felt authorized to reply without consulting his Government. He doubts whether there are enough Japanese troops in Siberia to undertake so large a task. If more are required he is not at present able to say what view the Japanese Government will take. He has already telegraphed to his Government on the subject and will do so again.

Mr Lansing says that the problem now before the Council appears to be a military one with which he could not deal. The political question is whether the Czechoslovaks should be evacuated from Siberia. The answer to this is in the affirmative, provided it is militarily possible.

M Pichon says it will be possible if the Americans will send a few troops to reinforce the Japanese.

General Bliss says he thinks this cannot be done. American troops have been sent to Siberia to help the Czechoslovaks to leave it. Once the Czechoslovaks have left there will be no pretext to justify the retention of American troops in the country.

M Pichon says that if the United States will not take on the task it remained for the Japanese to do so; otherwise the whole country would become a prey to Bolshevism.

Mr Matsui says that he is not in a position to state whether the Japanese Government would undertake so much. He will consult them and say that the Conference desires that Japan should be responsible for the guarding of the Siberian Railway.

Mr Balfour says that the question now being discussed is not the one on the Agenda. Without knowing how much the American and Japanese Governments are prepared to do it is difficult to see any solution to the military difficulty which has been raised.

Mr Lansing says that the question on the Agenda is whether the Czechs cab be shipped from Archangel. The answer to this is in the negative. They must, therefore, be shipped from Vladivostok.

M Clemenceau says that as Mr Lansing expresses no hope of American assistance it is desirable to know whether the Conference wishes to invite Japan to undertake the defense of the Siberian Railway.

Mr Lansing says that before giving a final answer he would like to consult Washington. He suggests that the Government at Washington should be consulted by the President of the Conference.

(It is then agreed that the Military Representatives at Versailles should prepare a draft dispatch to be sent by M Clemenceau to the American and Japanese Governments regarding the necessity of providing for the defense of the Siberian Railway after the evacuation of the Czechoslovak troops.)


11. (The Report of the Representatives is accepted.)


12. Mr Lansing observes that this question was one between France, Great Britain and Italy, and that America is not concerned.

M Clemenceau, alluding to documents appended, asks S Crespi how many troops Italy is prepared to send.

S Crespi says that Italy will send two battalions if Great Britain sends two.

Mr Balfour says he was not prepared to say how many British troops will be sent.

M Clemenceau says that he does not support the proposals made by General Franchet d’Esperey that there should be three British battalions and two Italian, while there are two French divisions in the country. France has no special interest in Bulgaria. He personally does not care who possesses Cavalla. He does not agree to maintain two French Divisions in Bulgaria while Great Britain has only one platoon, and Italy two battalions. The French Army is being demobilized, and a number of the troops in Bulgaria will be automatically recalled. In his opinion, there should be an Inter-Allied occupation in equal shares, or none.

General Bliss says that on the 9th June the Military Representatives had made recommendations, which had been approved on the 16th June by the Council of Four. It had been agreed that two French Divisions should be maintained, and that Great Britain and Italy should both be represented. On consultation, Great Britain had offered one platoon, and Italy one battalion. Now General Franchet d’Esperey calls attention to the insufficiency of the British and Italian contribution.

M Clemenceau says that the situation has changed, as he is now forced to demobilize, and remove his troops from Bulgaria, unless his Allies take their share. The only Great Power which has not been demobilized is Italy. Why they have not done so is their business. The only people with interests at stake in Bulgaria are the Greeks, and they sent their troops to Smyrna.

S Crespi says that M Clemenceau has more than once declared that Italy had not demobilized. He wishes to make a formal and official statement that Italy has demobilized as much as France, and had even demobilized one class more than France.

M Clemenceau says that if that is so, Italy could take her share of the watch on Bulgaria. Meanwhile, she is sending 40,000 troops across the Black Sea to Baku.

MS Crespi says that the British Government has requested that the British troops in the Caucasus be relieved by the Italians. He is not aware that Italy has as yet decided to send even one man.

M Clemenceau says that he has nevertheless received official telegrams in support of what he said.

General Cavallero said that he has just given General Thwaites a statement in complete contradiction of the information mentioned by M Clemenceau.

(It is then decided to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles the question of devising means for an equal Inter-Allied occupation of Bulgaria.)


13. M Clemenceau announces that, according to the Havas Agency, the Weimar Assembly has ratified the Treaty, the Rhine Convention, and the Protocols of the Treaty, by 208 votes against 115.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)