The T-34 in WWII: the Legend vs. the Performance

[Feuer Frei!]

I stumbled upon a really interesting read on the T-34. Interesting in my eyes since i've always been fascinated with Tanks. Moreso in WW2, where these armored beasts took the stage with ferocious and deadly intent, other times with merely a whimper, no sooner rolling onto the battlefield than being reduced to scrap metal with one swoop of a well-organised Bomber group.
Anyway, what follows is a very-well written story of the Russian T-34, and later the T34/85, it's inception, from design to battlefield performance, production numbers and perhaps dispelling some common myths of this infamous Tank.
If you're into tanks like me, then this is worth a read:

http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-...hBusters2.html

[Jimbuna]

A good interesting read and an excellent assessment IMHO.

The T-34 was the Russian equivelant to the US Sherman and sheer weight of numbers made up for the deficiencies faced when facing superior/more capable German AFV's.

For example....the Sherman only became a true threat when armed with the Brit 17pdr but still lacked in armour protection.

[Skybird]

I always considered the T34 to be what I would call a "pack-tank", in the meaning of that it is the tank pack of many tanks that spell disaster for the enemy, with the fame and ability of the tank as an individual vehicle being overestimated. Jim probably has it right when comparing it'S role to that of the Sherman. Above all, both tanks symbolize what really decided the war, more than any other singular factor, probably: industrial power and the ability to produce high numbers in short time.

Without the industrial overkill capacity of the US, the war in Europe maybe, probably, likely would have ended slightly different. And the war in Russia maybe as well - who knows. The Russians acted like they acted because by quantities of material they could afford it, and in the early and medium phase of the war, they desperately needed lend-and-lease material and planes from Britain. Without these two, the war maybe would have come to a decision against them before their industrial capacity could start to play a role. And a huge group of soldiers without material tools to fight, is not so much a group of soldiers, but rather cannon fodder.

Nice to finally read an assessment on the T34 that agrees with me. Usually I got kicked when on some rare occasions questioned its value. It is a holy icon for many, it seems. In Berlin, it still has its own monument. If you stand close to it, you realize how small these things are, and how ugly they look.

[Stealhead]

Originally Posted by Skybird

I always considered the T34 to be what I would call a "pack-tank", in the meaning of that it is the tank pack of many tanks that spell disaster for the enemy, with the fame and ability of the tank as an individual vehicle being overestimated. Jim probably has it right when comparing it'S role to that of the Sherman. Above all, both tanks symbolize what really decided the war, more than any other singular factor, probably: industrial power and the ability to produce high numbers in short time.

Without the industrial overkill capacity of the US, the war in Europe maybe, probably, likely would have ended slightly different. And the war in Russia maybe as well - who knows. The Russians acted like they acted because by quantities of material they could afford it, and in the early and medium phase of the war, they desperately needed lend-and-lease material and planes from Britain. Without these two, the war maybe would have come to a decision against them before their industrial capacity could start to play a role. And a huge group of soldiers without material tools to fight, is not so much a group of soldiers, but rather cannon fodder.

Nice to finally read an assessment on the T34 that agrees with me. Usually I got kicked when on some rare occasions questioned its value. It is a holy icon for many, it seems. In Berlin, it still has its own monument. If you stand close to it, you realize how small these things are, and how ugly they look.

Indeed the T-34 is not much of a threat in ones and twos but in large numbers you wont be able to destroy them fast enough.

I would honestly say that another factor hindered German tank design; over complexity their designs where very complex and required a lot of intensive work that other tanks like the T-34 and M4 did not have war machines usually only last several months in combat conditions if they are not destroyed the lack of intensive maintenance will bring them down.In war like WWII logistics is the true key to victory as you said.If you cant construct enough tanks,planes,bullets and bombs you are in all likely hood going to loose.

Tanks like the Tiger and Panther where very impressive but a large enough number of them where never produced to make a difference.On top of this by 1944 the quality of German tanks was very low on average and most captured German tank crewman during interrogation had low confidence in their tank quality sure they knew the potential and they understood the fear factor.Another little know fact is due to war shortages alloys normally added to steel to make the armor strong but not brittle where not available in large quantities in Germany in the last year of the war they had to come up with alternate methods of producing the steel armor it was not successful though and it was not uncommon for armor to shatter due to its brittleness.

I often wonder if the Germans had designed somewhat less complex tanks they could have been able to produce larger numbers of them and this most certainly would have had some effect.Of course it would have helpful if the Germans had the ability to seriously damage its enemies industrial capacity.The Germans needed a very rapid war they got in over their heads and the rest is history.

[Skybird]

The German had reasons why they built their tanks the way they did. Improved fire control systems. Better situational awareness and visibility for the commander. Leads to better teamwork, faster reaction, better coordination of tanks in teams. The article that Feuer Frei! posted, tells a grim story on what it costed it the Russian that their tanks lacked in these regards, and how badly groups of T34 apparently were interacting, and could not react to threats that they even were not able to identify.

Granted, from a certain point on, the relation between "few but good platforms" versus "many but inferior platforms" decides it in favour of the latter. Technological advantage can compensate numerical inferiority to a certain degree, and not beyond.

In the late cold war, manby NATO fighter pilots seemed to have doubts that the technologically superior NATO air forces would be able to stop the Russian airforce, due to the numbers of fighters that were expected to be flying for both sides at a given time. Better technology, shorter maintenance times, all nice and well - still, there were doubts. Mike Spick, author of several books on airplanes from that era, also somewhere expressed such an opinion . It again is true today I think when considering the high tech toys the US is fielding: F-22 - are they still grounded? - and F-35 in so small numbers that even if technologically superior they represent a force prohibiting them to be everywhere. In principle, the US has a force that is designed to take on inferior, smaller enemies, not the real big players like China or Russia. If you loose a bomber costing 150 million, that is one thing. If you loose a bomber costing 2.5 billion and you only have 40 or so, the loss is significantly more costly to your finances, your economy, and your military doctrine. Same is true for the shrinking sizes of submarine fleets (US) and surface vessels (Britain). Yes, I know financially our nations cannot afford these military budgets at all anymore. But we should realise that this means not that we "assume the next war will be like the previous one", but that we just massively lose in military potency, and every loss we suffer in numbers in peace or war as well weighs much heavier than ten and 20 and 30 years ago.

I do not believe in this doctrine of "the maximum best even in minimal quantities", I think the total end number of a force also needs to go into the formula, to some degree. That's why a F-22 or F-35 would never have been built, if I would have had a word. I would have build slightly cheaper and slightly less sophisticated planes - but these in a significantly greater number. At least as long as Russia and especially China also do not not sacrifice numbers for maximum hightech standards, like the US today.

A balance between expensive, slow-producing quality and numerical quantity is of the essence.

[sublynx]

A T-34 as a boxer, 1941:

Mobility: fast
Hitting: heavy, but misses all the time, because of tunnel vision and lousy hand - eye coordination
Protection: excellent
Intelligence: no brains

A t-34 with a radio, good gun and optics and a German trained crew would have been a really tough tank in 1941.

Originally Posted by sublynx

A t-34 with a radio, good gun and optics and a German trained crew would have been a really tough tank in 1941.

So basically the Skoda T-25 & VK3002 Projects?





So I guess only one question remains.... anybody want to do a T-34 platoon in World of Tanks?

[Stealhead]

Originally Posted by Skybird

The German had reasons why they built their tanks the way they did. Improved fire control systems. Better situational awareness and visibility for the commander. Leads to better teamwork, faster reaction, better coordination of tanks in teams. The article that Feuer Frei! posted, tells a grim story on what it costed it the Russian that their tanks lacked in these regards, and how badly groups of T34 apparently were interacting, and could not react to threats that they even were not able to identify.

Granted, from a certain point on, the relation between "few but good platforms" versus "many but inferior platforms" decides it in favour of the latter. Technological advantage can compensate numerical inferiority to a certain degree, and not beyond.

In the late cold war, manby NATO fighter pilots seemed to have doubts that the technologically superior NATO air forces would be able to stop the Russian airforce, due to the numbers of fighters that were expected to be flying for both sides at a given time. Better technology, shorter maintenance times, all nice and well - still, there were doubts. Mike Spick, author of several books on airplanes from that era, also somewhere expressed such an opinion . It again is true today I think when considering the high tech toys the US is fielding: F-22 - are they still grounded? - and F-35 in so small numbers that even if technologically superior they represent a force prohibiting them to be everywhere. In principle, the US has a force that is designed to take on inferior, smaller enemies, not the real big players like China or Russia. If you loose a bomber costing 150 million, that is one thing. If you loose a bomber costing 2.5 billion and you only have 40 or so, the loss is significantly more costly to your finances, your economy, and your military doctrine. Same is true for the shrinking sizes of submarine fleets (US) and surface vessels (Britain). Yes, I know financially our nations cannot afford these military budgets at all anymore. But we should realise that this means not that we "assume the next war will be like the previous one", but that we just massively lose in military potency, and every loss we suffer in numbers in peace or war as well weighs much heavier than ten and 20 and 30 years ago.

I do not believe in this doctrine of "the maximum best even in minimal quantities", I think the total end number of a force also needs to go into the formula, to some degree. That's why a F-22 or F-35 would never have been built, if I would have had a word. I would have build slightly cheaper and slightly less sophisticated planes - but these in a significantly greater number. At least as long as Russia and especially China also do not not sacrifice numbers for maximum hightech standards, like the US today.

A balance between expensive, slow-producing quality and numerical quantity is of the essence.

The US only has 29 B-2s there where 30 but one had a flight control computer failure right after lift off at Anderson AFB in Guam the crew of course did not have time to regain control and had to eject they made it out just fine the B-2 did not.This was in 2008 I believe.

I agree with the your concept it does not hurt to have something more advanced so long as it gives you an advantage but there is a limit cost and complexity of manufacture and of equal importance maintenance wise.Better to have something a little less advanced but easier to produce.

[Penguin]

A very good read, make sure to check out the other myth-busting stuff on this site, they're also worth reading. The aircraft vs armor article is really eye-opening. I also had a wrong assumption about this detail of WW2.

And glad to see you're back and alive, Feuer Frei!
Willkommen zurück!

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

Originally Posted by Feuer Frei!

I stumbled upon a really interesting read on the T-34. Interesting in my eyes since i've always been fascinated with Tanks. Moreso in WW2, where these armored beasts took the stage with ferocious and deadly intent, other times with merely a whimper, no sooner rolling onto the battlefield than being reduced to scrap metal with one swoop of a well-organised Bomber group.
Anyway, what follows is a very-well written story of the Russian T-34, and later the T34/85, it's inception, from design to battlefield performance, production numbers and perhaps dispelling some common myths of this infamous Tank.
If you're into tanks like me, then this is worth a read:

http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-...hBusters2.html

A very interesting analysis with many good points, but a bit incomplete b/c it seems to without explanation ignore one factor - the simple fact the Germans were mostly on the defensive in the last phase of the war. Even with excellent observation devices, a well camouflaged gun or tank in the defense still has a huge visibility advantage over a moving tank, and that alone would easily account for a couple of tanks being plucked before a battle even starts.

[mako88sb]

Originally Posted by Kazuaki Shimazaki II

A very interesting analysis with many good points, but a bit incomplete b/c it seems to without explanation ignore one factor - the simple fact the Germans were mostly on the defensive in the last phase of the war. Even with excellent observation devices, a well camouflaged gun or tank in the defense still has a huge visibility advantage over a moving tank, and that alone would easily account for a couple of tanks being plucked before a battle even starts.

Yes, for some reason this point often gets ignored when comparisons are made with German and allied tanks. Studies done after the Korean war indicate that the main factor in tank vs tank battles is whomever spots the other first can increase their effectiveness in combat by as much as 6 times.

I'm not so familiar with the T-34 but the 76mm version with the 2 man turret was a ridiculous design that really hampered the commander/gunners ability to engage first. I read a book awhile ago by Dmitriy Loza that goes into great detail about his days commanding Sherman's provided by the lend lease program. Seeing as he also fought in the T-34, it's great to read about the pros & cons of the M4A2 & M4A2E8. He even has this interview that's quite interesting. He certainly seems to have a higher opinion of the Sherman then what's the norm lately:

http://english.battlefield.ru/dmitriy-loza.html

[mako88sb]

Originally Posted by Stealhead

Indeed the T-34 is not much of a threat in ones and twos but in large numbers you wont be able to destroy them fast enough.

I would honestly say that another factor hindered German tank design; over complexity their designs where very complex and required a lot of intensive work that other tanks like the T-34 and M4 did not have war machines usually only last several months in combat conditions if they are not destroyed the lack of intensive maintenance will bring them down.In war like WWII logistics is the true key to victory as you said.If you cant construct enough tanks,planes,bullets and bombs you are in all likely hood going to loose.

Tanks like the Tiger and Panther where very impressive but a large enough number of them where never produced to make a difference.On top of this by 1944 the quality of German tanks was very low on average and most captured German tank crewman during interrogation had low confidence in their tank quality sure they knew the potential and they understood the fear factor.Another little know fact is due to war shortages alloys normally added to steel to make the armor strong but not brittle where not available in large quantities in Germany in the last year of the war they had to come up with alternate methods of producing the steel armor it was not successful though and it was not uncommon for armor to shatter due to its brittleness.

I often wonder if the Germans had designed somewhat less complex tanks they could have been able to produce larger numbers of them and this most certainly would have had some effect.Of course it would have helpful if the Germans had the ability to seriously damage its enemies industrial capacity.The Germans needed a very rapid war they got in over their heads and the rest is history.

Another problem that really plagued the Panther in regards to alloy shortages was the fact that the final drive used a singe-teeth spur gear design as opposed to the double herringbone used in the Sherman s. This design was simply not adequate for a tank whose weight eventually doubled. Once key alloys started to become scarce, these single-teeth gears became more brittle and quite a number of Panther breakdowns was attributed to this. The increasing amount of inexperienced drivers only made the situation worse.