100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

14th September 1919

Aftermath of War

G. D'Annunzio occupies Fiume.

Boston police strike ends as nearly all 1,500 strikers are replaced with returning veterans from the Great War, setting back efforts to form a police union. Massachusetts Governor Calvin Coolidge with State Guardsmen brought in to restore order.


General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, attends a High School track event in Washington D.C.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, September 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

15th September 1919

Russian Red Army soldiers captured by Anti-Bolshevik troops awaiting transport.


Sightseers surround the captured German submarine Deutschland at Yarmouth, England.


President Wilson attending a fleet review off the coast of Seattle onboard the battleship U.S.S. Oregon.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, September 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


...


Monday, September 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


...

[Jimbuna]

16th September 1919

Aftermath of War

Sir Edmund Allenby arrives in England.

A Bolshevik train destroyed in an Allied attack in northern Russia.


A car wreck that occurred as the U.S. Army First Division was making its way to Washington D.C. for a Victory Parade.


The North Russia intervention, 1918-1920: A wounded officer of the East Surrey Regiment.


Adolf Hitler: Around this time, Hitler made his earliest known recorded statement about the Jews in a letter (now known as the Gemlich letter) dated 16 September 1919 to Adolf Gemlich about the Jewish question.


Ship Losses:

Belvedere (United States) Trapped in ice since 15 September in the Chukchi Sea 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) northeast of "Cape Jinretlen" – presumably a reference to Cape Dzhenretlen (67°06′48″N 173°39′00″W) – on the coast of Siberia, the 523-gross register ton steam whaling bark sank four hours after her three passengers and crew of 30 abandoned her the following morning. All on board survived.
HMS M25 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War, North Russia Intervention: The M15-class monitor ran aground in the Dvina River in Russia after the river level fell and was scuttled.
HMS M27 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War, North Russia Intervention: The M15-class monitor ran aground in the Dvina River in Russia after the river level fell and was scuttled.
USS R-6 (United States Navy) The R-class submarine was driven aground at New London, Connecticut. She was later salvaged, repaired and returned to service.

[Jimbuna]

17th September 1919

The North Russia intervention, 1918-1920. Wounded British troops.


Oakland, CA - Secret service agents protect President Woodrow Wilson as he is driven along Broadway. Seated in front of him is Oakland Mayor John L. Davies.


By 60 against and 31 for, Alabama House of Representatives rejects the 19th Amendment that would give women the right to vote (Alabama would only ratify the amendment in 1953)

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, September 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, September 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Clemenceau says that he has requested Marshal Foch to be present at this meeting of the Council for the purpose of further studying the question of the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the German troops. He has received a letter from Mr. Polk regarding this matter. He would like to know what answer had been given by Mr Lloyd George in the course of his conversation with Mr Polk.

Mr Polk states that he does not like to quote the words of another person, but that he understands Mr Lloyd George to say that he prefers to let matters stand as they are. Mr Lloyd George had thought that the question should not be brought up again until the Germans had indicated a refusal to carry out the withdrawal, should they so refuse. He has answered Mr. Lloyd George that he believes the question should be brought up at once, and for this reason had written the letter to M Clemenceau, which had just been read.

M Clemenceau suggests that Marshal Foch might read the instructions which he proposes to send to General Henrys.

Marshal Foch said that he has sent the instructions to General Henrys in accordance with the decision reached by the Council. He had told him that the principle of an ultimatum to Germany had been decided upon, but that his opinion was asked before the same should be transmitted to Germany.

Mr Polk asks whether it is agreed that the Council should take no decision until the receipt of the answer from General Henrys.

Marshal Foch states that his instructions to General Henrys had been based on the fact that the principle of an ultimatum had been decided upon. If this ultimatum is now considered as conditional, it will be necessary for him to modify the instructions which he had sent.

Mr Polk points out that he is not opposed to an ultimatum, but wishes solely to formulate objections to the use of the Polish troops.

Marshal Foch says that the sending of an ultimatum without deciding upon the means to carry it into execution would be a useless procedure. He has made a study of this question and believes that the Polish troops constitute the only force which could be used. If the Council were of the opinion that no use could be made of these troops, it is unnecessary to send an ultimatum.

Mr Polk states that the feeling of the American Delegation on this question was that the use of Polish troops against Germany in the Baltic provinces would be to cause hostilities, which had been suppressed in Upper Silesia with great difficulty, to spring up again. A military operation of this character would certainly lead to war between Germany and Poland. It is extremely necessary to maintain the situation in Upper Silesia in a calm state, in order not to increase the actual difficulties of the coal shortage. After the Treaty had been ratified by three great Powers, Upper Silesia would be occupied by Inter-Allied troops. When this occupation becomes a fact, and when no further disorders in the coal districts are likely, the Council might then decide to use the Polish forces. He is not opposed to their eventual use, should the need arise.

M Clemenceau says that in view of Mr Polk’s statement he believes the best course at present is to adjourn the discussion and to take the question up again when Upper Silesia should be occupied by the Inter-Allied troops.

Mr Polk says that the matter seems to him particularly serious. The Council is obliged to decide whether it is preferable to allow the Germans to remain in Lithuania for the moment, or drive them therefrom even at the risk of shutting down the production of coal in Upper Silesia. He has talked with M Loucheur and with Mr Hoover, who had both stated that the cutting off of the coal supply would have very serious consequences. He had talked with S Tittoni on the previous evening regarding the matter and the latter had agreed with him that an unnecessary risk will be run through this operation.

Marshal Foch points out that the Conference alone is capable of choosing between these two political courses of action.

M Clemenceau says that he personally regrets that this operation, which he believes excellent, should not take place. In the face of the opposition of the American Delegation, however, the matter must be suspended, for it was exceedingly dangerous to commence it without being sure of carrying it to a successful completion.

Marshal Foch says that on three separate occasions threats had been sent which had not been followed up.

Mr Polk says that the gravity of the situation in Silesia appeared worthy of considerable thought and should compel the Council to hesitate.

M Clemenceau says that he would hesitate if he believed that the proposed action in the Baltic provinces would have an effect on the situation in Silesia, but he was not of this opinion.

Mr Polk answers that he has recently interviewed the different American representatives, who had arrived from Poland, Silesia and the Baltic provinces, namely, Mr Gibson, Colonel Goodyear and Colonel Greene. These gentlemen are all of the opinion that the coal situation will be seriously aggravated and threatened should the proposed action be taken. He had also seen Mr Paderewski and had asked him whether he is ready to bear the expenses of the operation in question. Mr Paderewski had replied that France was to bear the expense. He had then informed Mr Paderewski that the United States would not incur any obligations therein. He believes, however, that it would be well to ask General Henrys what his opinion in the matter might be.

Marshal Foch says that General Henrys can only report on one element of the problem, namely, the condition and state of the Polish Army. It should not be lost sight of, however, that the Council, in insisting upon the evacuation of the Baltic provinces, is simply carrying into effect one of the clauses of the Treaty. The Allied and Associated Powers should stand together on this matter. It should be understood that the Polish Army would be in charge of the operation, but it would be supported both by the Czechoslovak troops and the Allied detachments on the Rhine. General Henrys would answer that he can not defeat Germany with the Polish forces alone - more particularly should Germany be able to concentrate all her troops against Poland.

M Clemenceau says that the Poles have notified the Council that they possess an army of 450,000 men.

Marshal Foch pointed out that these figures are accurate but that this force will not be sufficient to defeat Germany and that the Allies will risk seeing Poland severely dealt with, which is obviously not a situation to be desired.

Mr Polk says that he has no objections to the sending of an ultimatum, but only to the use of Polish troops. He believes that another method of pressure to compel the execution of the ultimatum can be found, either from an economic standpoint through the Economic Council, or by the retention of prisoners of war. He does not think that the risk of starting a new war between Poland and Germany should be run, because no one of the Powers was at present disposed to render financial aid to Poland. On the other hand, economic pressure might be exceedingly effective. For example, the Germans at the present time are in the process of borrowing money from the United States through the agency of private banks. The Council might put a stop to this procedure. The recent example of Romania, who had acted as an agent of the Allied and Associated Powers, seemed to him extremely unsatisfactory and should not lead the Council to stir up a similar operation elsewhere. He suggests therefore that an ultimatum might be sent, making use of economic pressure.

M Tardieu says that the retention of the prisoners of war constitutes an excellent means of pressure as well, for their immediate repatriation is necessary to the internal political situation of Germany.

M Clemenceau proposes that Marshal Foch should read the text of an ultimatum which he had prepared, and that if such text is satisfactory to the Council, it might be modified in the way suggested by Mr Polk.

Marshal Foch then reads his proposed letter to the German Government.

Mr Polk stated that he finds this text satisfactory.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether the steps which have been discussed as a method of pressure would be sufficient to bring about the execution of the matters covered in the note.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Polk is favorable to an economic means of pressure, such as a blockade.

Mr Polk says that he is particularly anxious not to commit the Council at the present time to the use of the Polish Army. He does not wish to intimate that this Army might not be made use of at some future time, but he wishes to leave the decision of this question open.

Marshal Foch says that on three different occasions ultimatums couched in mild language had been sent to the German Government on the following dates: June 18, August 1 and August 24.

Mr Polk remarks that as the Council has already sent three ultimatums a fourth was scarcely necessary. The best method of procedure would be to notify Herr von Lersner that the Council insisted upon the carrying out of the Armistice in question, and that in case of refusal certain measures, such as blockade, other means of exerting economic pressure, retention of prisoners of war, and, as a last resort, the use of the Polish Army, had been decided upon.

M Clemenceau says that this notice should be in writing.

General Weygand says that he is prepared to draft the text of such a letter, as he was familiar with the question. An answer has been received from the Germans to the effect that they were willing to evacuate the territory in question but that they cannot enforce the execution of their orders.

(It is decided that General Weygand should submit to the Council at its next meeting, a draft letter to the German Delegation demanding the withdrawal of the German forces from the Baltic provinces. This letter should draw attention to the means of exercising pressure on the German Government proposed by Mr Polk, viz, blockade and other economic pressure, retention of prisoners of war, and possible use of the Polish forces.)

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand then withdraw.)


2. Upon the proposal of S Scialoja the resolution taken on September 11 regarding the languages used for the convention on Aerial Navigation is modified to read as follows:

“It was decided that the Convention on Aerial Navigation should be drafted in English, French and Italian, each text to be of equal authority.”


(At this point the members of the Central Territorial Commission enter the room.)

3. M Tardieu stated that the Greek Delegation had sent a letter to the Central Territorial Commission on September 13 relative to certain points with regard to the territorial clauses of the Bulgarian Treaty. The Central Territorial Commission had been of the opinion:

1) That the request put forward by the Greek Delegation is ethnographically just.

2) That the line proposed by the Greek Delegation should, from a geographical point of view, be modified in accordance with the red line on the map annexed to the commission’s report.

The Italian delegate, in view of the principle put forward by the Greek Delegation, suggests a change in the line of Western Thrace to the advantage of Bulgaria.

The American Delegate, while not denying the weight of the opinions of the other delegations, draws attention to the inconvenience which would result from changing a line already unanimously decided upon, and it further does not believe itself to be in a position to advance an opinion without a more careful study of the whole question.

Mr Polk says that he has certain objections to formulate. President Wilson, before his departure, had personally proposed a line of demarcation. He had already agreed to a considerable modification of this line and does not feel that he had authority to make a further change therein. He points out that he has already consented to the taking of certain territories in the region of Adrianople from Bulgaria, although there is a large population of Bulgarians in such territories. He can do nothing further along these lines and in addition feels that the proposed change, even though ethnographically just, is unsound from a geographic point of view.

(It is decided to reject the proposal of the Greek Delegation with regard to a further modification of the frontiers of Bulgaria in Western Thrace.)

M Tardieu says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the necessity of asking the Bulgarians to withdraw their troops from Western Thrace as they were still occupying that region as well as the Stroumitza salient. This occupation might last for a long time, as the Bulgarian delegation has requested a period of twenty to twenty-five days in which to prepare their answer to the Peace Conditions of the Allies. The Bulgarian occupation compels the Allies to maintain troops in the neighborhood which are not absolutely necessary. He suggests that the Bulgarians might be told that the Allies were likely to grant them the delay requested, on condition that they would evacuate the territories in question immediately.

Mr Polk asks what forces will relieve the Bulgarian troops.

M Tardieu answers that the military experts believe that three battalions only would be necessary to maintain order in Thrace. This force is already on the ground and there is in addition a division in Sofia which can profitably be recalled. He points out that there is no question of inserting a clause in the Bulgarian Treaty regarding this matter.

Mr Polk says that as the matter has no place in the Bulgarian Peace Treaty he proposes the consideration of the Treaty itself be terminated and the proposition of M Tardieu be adjourned to the following day.

(This proposal is accepted.)

(M Tardieu then withdraws and M Kammerer enters the room.)

M Kammerer says that the Greek Delegation had, on September 15 sent to the Secretary General some additional remarks relative to the political clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. The Committee on New States had prepared a report on the matter which had been submitted to the various delegations.

(It is decided to accept the following clause proposed by the Greek delegation for insertion in Article 56, with regard to the protection of minorities and voluntary emigration:

Article 56, paragraph 2: “Bulgaria undertakes to recognize the provisions which the Allied and Associated Powers shall deem opportune relative to reciprocal and voluntary emigration of ethnic minorities.”

M Kammerer continuing says that the Greek Delegation has also asked that a paragraph be added to Article 50 dealing with the protection of minorities. The Committee on New States believes that the Treaty should be limited to general provisions with regard to the different religious sects, and therefore that by accepting the addition proposed by the Greek delegation the risk would be incurred of entering into details and thereby creating a precedent. For this reason the Committee on New States had recommended that the Council reject the Greek proposal.

(It is decided to reject the paragraph proposed by the Greek delegation for insertion in Article 50 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty.)

Mr Laroche says that the Greek Delegation has proposed a change in Article 44 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty. By this proposal the Greek Delegation asks solely that it be treated in the same manner as the Slav [Serb]-Croat-Slovene State, and it had appeared difficult to refuse the addition requested. The Drafting Committee upon being consulted had approved of the text drawn by the Greeks.

(After a short discussion it is decided to insert the following paragraph in Article 44 of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, in accordance with the request of the Greek Delegation:

“Bulgarian nationals, however, who became resident in this territory after October 18, 1912, will not acquire Greek nationality without a permit from Greece.”)

M Kammerer says that the Greek Delegation has formulated certain objections with regard to Article 46 by which Article Greece agrees to execute a special treaty for the protection of minorities. The refusal to execute the article is based on the fact that no additional territory was given to Greece by the Bulgarian treaty. The committee on New States is of the opinion that this point is well taken and therefore proposed that Greece, while agreeing to sign the clause of the Bulgarian treaty obligating her to execute the minorities treaty, should not be compelled to sign the latter treaty until such time as she should be assured of the grant of new territories.

(It is decided that a letter should be sent by the President of the Peace Conference to the Greek Delegation requesting the latter to accept Article 46 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty and notifying them that the special treaty provided for in this article would not be submitted for signature until such time as the Conference should be able to make known to the Greeks the territory which might be attributed to them.)

M Kammerer says that the Greeks have in addition raised certain objections with regard to the signature of special clauses in the treaty with Greece. The Committee on New States had rejected all the Greek proposals with the exception of that dealing with the option of nationalities. Should the Council accept the proposal of the Committee a simple modification of Article 3 of the proposed treaty with Greece would give effect to the objection.

(It is decided that Article 3 of the proposed treaty between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece should be so modified as that the first paragraph should read as follows:

“Greece recognizes as Greek nationals with full rights and without any formalities Bulgarian, Turk (or Albanian) nationals domiciled at the date of the entry into force of the present treaty, on territory transferred to Greece since January 1, 1913.)

(At this point Mr Laroche and M Kammerer withdraw, and Mr Jouasset enters the room.)

Mr Jouasset says that the Greek Delegation has formulated certain objections relative to the reparations clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. The Commission on the Reparation of Damages had studied these criticisms and had submitted its report in the matter to the Secretary General.

(It is decided to accept the proposal of the Reparations Commission with regard to Article 121, the sixth paragraph of which should be amended to read as follows:

“These sums shall be remitted through the Inter-Allied Commission referred to in Article 130 of this part to the Reparation Commission created by the Treaty of Peace with Germany of June 28, 1919, such as it is constituted by the Treaty with Austria of September 10, 1919, (Part VIII, Annex II, Paragraph 2); This Commission is referred to hereinafter as the Reparations Commission. It will assure the effecting of payments in conformity with the arrangements already made.”)

After a short discussion it is decided to accept the proposal of the Delivery of Reparations Commission and to add the following additional paragraph to Article 127:

“In addition to the deliveries mentioned above, the Inter-Allied Commission shall have the authority, should they recognize it as possible, to attribute to Greece, Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State during the two years which shall follow the entry into force of the present Treaty, such quantities of livestock as may appear to them justified; the value of these deliveries shall be placed to the credit of Bulgaria.”

Mr Jouasset then reads that portion of the report of the Commission on Reparations dealing with this question. He says that the French Delegation has made a proposal which, after liquidation of the debts and credits of Bulgaria to Germany, gives the Reparations Commission the right to decide whether the remainder of the Bulgarian debt should be demanded or whether Bulgaria should be granted certain terms or intervals of payment, or a complete remission of the debt. Such a formula will be simple and will not commit anyone to a fixed course of action in the future. It will have the further advantage of giving satisfaction to the five small States and of nullifying any pretext which the latter might have to refuse advance payments accorded them by the Allies. On the other hand, if a part of the debt is remitted in the first instance to Bulgaria, an enemy Power, the small States might take advantage of this precedent and refuse to settle their debts to the Allies.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the debt of Bulgaria in relation to Germany and Austria should not be compared to the debt of the different small States with relation to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The British Delegation was of the opinion that changes in the text of the Treaty would constitute a sign of weakness and that the most simple course to pursue was to uphold the text in its present form.

Mr Polk says that it is certain that Bulgaria cannot pay more than it is actually called upon. To make a change in the article in question would be to raise false hopes in the minds of the small Powers, that they might obtain something which they are certain not to receive. He therefore believes that the text as drafted should be upheld.

S Scialoja says that the French proposal simply transfers the difficulty to the Reparations Commission. This will lead to a delay of three months, during which time Bulgaria will not be able to obtain the credit which she needs. It is to be feared that in addition she will dispute certain of her debts, and such a loss of time might even result in the enhancement of the payment of such sums as she indisputably owed for the purpose of reparations.

(After a short further discussion, it is decided to make no change in the text of Article 124 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.)

(At this point M Kammerer and M Jouasset withdraw, and M Serruys enters the room.)

M Serruys says that the Romanian Delegation has presented three proposals regarding Articles 171, 175 and 177 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. The Economic Commission has studied these proposals and has submitted a report thereon to the Secretary General indicating its opinion.

(After a short discussion, it is decided to accept the report submitted by the Economic Commission:

Article 171: The English text of Article 171 being the only one which is accurate, it is decided to revise the French and Italian texts to conform therewith.

Article 175: It was decided to maintain the text of this Article without change. The benefit of capitulations in Bulgaria in favor of Japan is upheld but is not to be extended to all the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article 177: The Romanian proposal was rejected and the Article maintained without change.)


4. On the proposal of M Clemenceau, it is decided that the text of the conditions of the Peace with Bulgaria should be presented to the Bulgarian Delegation at the meeting of the Supreme Council on Friday, September 19, 1919, at 11:00 o’clock, in the Salle de l’Horloge, Quai d’Orsay.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

[Jimbuna]

18th September 1919

American FT-17 tanks at a victory parade in Washington D.C.


The Netherlands grants women the right to vote after a women’s suffrage bill is approved by Queen Wilhelmina. Dutch suffragists.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, September 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


M. Pichon says that M Clemenceau would not be able to attend the meeting and that he had asked him to make his excuses for him.


1. M Pichon said that he thinks the question should be examined at once. He does not think it necessary to read the two letters which Mr. Barnes had sent to M Clemenceau on September 12 and September 17.

Mr Polk said that Mr Barnes had concluded his letter of September 12 by saying that, as M. Clemenceau had learned on the preceding day, Mr. Polk had refused to involve his Government, although on the previous day he had given both M Clemenceau and Mr Barnes to understand that this accomplishment was within the range of possibility. He does not believe that this statement is quite correct. He had talked that morning with M Clemenceau, who agrees with him. He does not think that it is the duty of the American Government to invite the German and Austrian delegates to attend the Conference at Washington. He thinks that if the Council maintains its resolution of September 11, and if the German and Austrian delegates were invited to take part in the work of the Congress, the American Government would be entirely prepared to facilitate their voyage and accord the necessary passport facilities, in order that these delegates can go to Washington in anticipation of being invited to attend the Conference. Mr Barnes has not exactly understood him when he said that the American Government are prepared to invite the delegates.

M Pichon says that the American Government is ready to facilitate the journey of the delegates and that the American Government will inform the two countries in question.

Mr Polk says that the American Government will do this if the Council entrusts them with this task and they will not do it on their own initiative. When the question had previously been discussed, the Italian delegate had raised the question of an invitation. M Clemenceau had energetically refused to agree that this invitation should be sent in the name of the Council and Mr Balfour and he had held the same view. What Mr Barnes asked was that the American Government take the responsibility for this invitation and communicate it to the German and Austrian delegates. He felt that this could only be done if the American Government were requested by the Council to do so.

M Pichon says that Mr Polk had stated what had occurred. The Conference had rejected the proposal of S Scialoja and had taken the resolution which was still in force. The question now is whether the American Government will consent to inform the German and Austrian delegates that they can go to Washington, that the necessary arrangements for the journey would be made and that they should await the decision of the Congress at Washington, which alone was able to decide as to whether or not they are to be admitted.

Mr Polk says that he does not wish to continue a discussion which concerns only a question of form. He is ready to inform the German and Austrian delegates unofficially in the name of the American Government, that they will receive every facility for their journey. He thinks the time might be saved if Mr Barnes, Mr Gompers and their French and Italian colleagues informed the German and Austrian delegates unofficially that they would undoubtedly be permitted to participate in the Conference.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he agrees with Mr Polk that it was simply a question of form. He desired to say, however, that Mr Barnes, in his letter of the 12th September, proposed simply that the decision taken by the Council on the preceding day be communicated to the German and Austrian Governments through the medium of the Secretariat General.

M Berthelot points out that it had been said that the notification in question should be communicated unofficially. Any communication from the Secretariat General will, of necessity, be official.

Mr Polk said that the American Delegation are prepared to make this communication, if they were directed by the Council to do so.

S Scialoja said that he thinks it would be desirable to add to the communication that the American Government were prepared to facilitate the journey of the delegates, who should go to Washington before the opening of the Congress, in order that if they are permitted to participate, the work of the Congress should not be delayed. He considers it important that the workmen of the Allied and Associated Countries should be able to say to their colleagues that the Council had not wished to make this invitation official, but that it has taken every precaution unofficially to ensure its decision being communicated to the German and Austrian delegates.

(It is agreed that the American Delegation should be requested in the name of the Conference to communicate to the German and Austrian Delegations the decision of September 11, 1919, regarding the admission of German and Austrian delegates to the International Labor Congress at Washington.)


2. M Pichon says that on the preceding day General Weygand had been asked to prepare a text of a note to be addressed to the German Delegation.

General Weygand then reads the draft of the note.

Mr Polk says that the note provides for the evacuation not only of German units, but also of individual Germans, who, after being demobilized, had joined Russian units. He thinks that the Allied and Associated Powers will be taking a risk in making a demand which the German Government might not be able to fulfill. He does not know what the United States Government will be able to do if a situation arises where American citizens had enlisted in Mexican and Cuban units. He feels considerable doubt as to the legal obligations of the Germans in this matter.

General Weygand says that he has received documentary proof to show that the German Government encouraged enrollment of Germans in Russian military units, and paid them by giving them land in Russia. This land did not belong to the German Government and the position of that Government was clearly illegal. General Gough was present and could give the Council much interesting information.

Mr Polk says that he has also received the same information as to the action of the German Government. He thinks that action, such as has been described, could be provided against in the future. But he does not know whether the Council could demand that the Germans now there could be given up. It is a complicated legal question and he would be very glad to hear the views of M Berthelot and M Fromageot.

M Berthelot said that entire companies had passed into the Russian Army. The draft could however be modified, so that note would be taken of Mr Polk’s remarks.

Mr Polk said that the question was one of international law, so far as facts were concerned. Mr Paderewski had shown him documents which prove that these acts were abetted by the War Office at Berlin. He is satisfied with General Weygand’s draft in many respects, but he thinks the text too broad.

M Pichon asks Mr Polk whether he will be prepared to accept the draft in principle. It will be given to M Fromageot, who will revise it from a legal point of view.

Mr Polk says he is prepared to do this, if M Fromageot collaborates with Mr James Brown Scott.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether the military authorities think that the threat in the last paragraph of the note was strong enough to have the desired effect.

Marshal Foch replied that he does not think so. It is the fourth communication on this subject which had been made to the German Government. He sees no reason why it should be treated differently from the others. He suggests that the Council hear the opinion of General Gough.

Mr Polk asks whether Marshal Foch thinks that the threat to use Polish troops would have the desired effect.

Marshal Foch says that it is not only the question of the use of Polish troops; that the Allied Governments should bring pressure to bear with all their power and all their troops. Thus, there would be a beginning of action and the Allied and Associated Powers would be quite ready to march forward if the necessity therefor should arise.

Mr Polk says that there is a threat of military measures in the last lines of the draft note. There are objections to sending this fourth note, and he thinks that the end desired can be accomplished by bringing economic pressure to bear. He is ready on his part to inform the German bankers that they will not be permitted to borrow money in the United States.

Marshal Foch says that he has nothing to say in regard to this suggestion.

(At this moment General Gough enters the room.)

M Pichon says that the Council would be grateful if General Gough expresses his views on the subject of the Baltic Provinces.

General Gough says that in his opinion the greatest danger in Northern Russia is the German danger. It was far more serious than the danger of Bolshevism. There is no doubt that there was a military plot in this region, and that General von der Goltz was at the head of it. The plan consists in colonizing the Baltic States and raising a strong Russo-German Army, which would be outside of the territory of the Allies, and, in a certain degree, independent of the German Government. The persons responsible for this movement aimed at joining certain Russian parties, who are represented by General Yudenitch, or if not by General Yudenitch himself, then by persons surrounding him. A great many people were ready to accept the German authority, as they considered it a means of regaining their rights and privileges at Petrograd, and in the surrounding regions. The German authorities do not hesitate to make promises to these people in this sense. If the Allies permit this force to become constituted, the first result will be destruction of the happiness and liberties of the people of the Baltic Provinces. Then the independence of Finland would be threatened. If the Allies permit this plot to succeed, a series of murders and fighting and a state of tyranny will result, in the Baltic Provinces and perhaps in Russia. These peoples, instead of being given peace, will be given a sword. There was also a great danger that this Russo-German force would some day be used against the Allies themselves. It is not impossible, in view of the demobilization of the Allies, that the Russo-German forces will outnumber the Allied forces in a few years, and a very grave menace for Europe would consequently result. He believes that the Allied and Associated Governments will insist upon the immediate withdrawal of the German Military Government and of the German forces. It will next be necessary to establish order and to lend assistance to the Governments of the Baltic Provinces, not only in giving them money, but in lending money, to let them pay for the goods which they would need from the Allied and Associated Powers. In other words, commerce should be restored. The Baltic peoples are rich enough to pay. He adds that the peoples of the Baltic Provinces are well disposed toward the Allies. They differ very radically from the German and Russian population as well as from their own aristocracy, the Baltic barons, who are the descendants of the former German conquerors. The great middle class population is well disposed toward the Entente and had a cordial hatred of Germany. If the Allies assisted them in organizing, there will be a barrier, not only against Germany, but against Bolshevism as well. These people were radicals and democrats, but have no liking for Bolshevism. They will not accept Bolshevism, unless they are overrun by Germany or deserted by the Allies. In the latter event, they would undoubtedly prefer Bolshevism to German rule. If the Allied and Associated Powers establish peace and restore the prosperity of the Baltic peoples, it will be possible to give these peoples a free hand as regards Central Russia, and even to authorize them, if they wish it, to make peace. The Bolshevik danger is nowhere more threatening than in the interior of Russia, and the populations of these districts are desirous of resuming trade relations with the Baltic populations. Such relations will have a desirable effect.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the question before the Conference is to consider the best means of compelling the German Government to withdraw its troops from the Baltic Provinces. It had been said that the German authorities favored the enrollment of their demobilized soldiers in Russian units. He wishes to know what power the German Government had over the army of General von der Goltz, and its commander. He questions whether Germany has really disarmed. He asks whether, if the demobilization should take place on the spot, it will
not facilitate enlistments into Russian units.

General Gough replies that the army of General von der Goltz will obey the orders of its commander. It is not a fact that the German Government has no authority over these troops, nor that they had favored demobilization on the spot and filled the country with military workmen. The Letts will murder these workmen, if they are left alone. The Germans in Latvia are soldiers. They are not demobilized, and obey the orders of General von der Goltz. They can impose themselves on this region only by force. It had been intended to found colonies of these men in the Baltic Provinces, but this had not as yet been done.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether the orders of General von der Goltz will also be obeyed by isolated soldiers in Russian units.

General Gough says that he believes that they will. He holds this opinion on account of a similar case, which had occurred previously. When the Germans had evacuated Riga, they had provoked numerous conflicts. There existed at that time a Landwehr battalion composed of 9000 men, of whom 5000 were Germans. The Commander, Fletcher, was a German, as were most of his officers. In spite of protest from certain persons in the Baltic Provinces, it had been possible to send Fletcher, his officers and men, to Mitau, to join their army, and Fletcher himself had returned to East Prussia. Today this Landwehr battalion is commanded by a British officer, Colonel Young, and there is not a single German in it. There is nothing to be feared on that side. It will be enough if the Germans left the country and the Lettish Government were thoroughly installed, so as to be able to ward against any dangers. There is no doubt of the fact that no German civilian can remain in these regions after the German army has left. They will be massacred by the population immediately.

Mr Polk asks whether the situation in Estonia and Lithuania is different.

General Gough says that Lithuania has received more assistance from the Allies and is in a position to restore herself more rapidly. Estonia, on the other hand, had been abandoned to the Germans for many months.

Mr Polk asks General Gough what he thinks would be the effect if the Allies used Polish troops to force the Germans to evacuate the Baltic Provinces.

General Gough replies that the use of Polish troops would lead to great confusion in the country and there would be ceaseless fighting. In his opinion, it would be advisable to search for other means, for the Allies ran the risk of seeing the Poles defeated and Poland reconquered by Germany. It is necessary to seek means of establishing peace and not of provoking new wars.

Mr Polk asks General Gough whether he thinks that economic pressure could be brought to bear.

General Gough replies that he thinks this could be done, but both economic and moral pressure should be used at Berlin. If the German Government acts in good faith and really desires to withdraw these troops, there is nothing to prevent the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. At the moment, the German Government is really waiting to see which is the stronger, the Peace Conference at Paris, or General von der Goltz. There is no doubt that a plot exists and that the German Government were the masters of its fate, for the German Government is in a position to recall General von der Goltz, if they wish to do so.

Mr Matsui asks how large the German forces in question are.

General Gough replies that it is difficult to give the exact numbers. The Germans had organized a sort of military cordon which prevented contact with the populations of the regions which the Germans occupied. He believes that the army was composed of from 40,000 to 100,000 men. He believes that the latter figure is too high, but he is not sure. He calls attention to the fact that the German forces in the Baltic Provinces are supplied by a railway crossing East Prussia and terminating at Mitau. It would be a simple matter to stop this traffic and thereby endanger the rationing of the German forces. On the other hand, the evacuation of the German troops could be effected by way of Riga, although the Germans alleged that this was impossible. In the Libau district there were five German ships, which could be used for this purpose.

Mr Polk says that there are also at New York a number of German ships, which would be available.

Mr Matsui asks whether there would be a danger of Bolshevism in these regions after the Germans have withdrawn.

General Gough says that this danger would not exist, because the population was anti-Bolshevist, and, furthermore, because the Bolsheviks were anxious to conclude peace with the Baltic Provinces, and were to recognize their independence up to a certain point. In any event, the Baltic Provinces are able to defend themselves by force of arms.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that if the German troops were dependent upon East Prussia for their supplies, the situation would improve after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, which provided for the occupation of Memel and the neighboring districts by Allied troops. The Treaty also provides for Inter-Allied occupation of Allenstein. The army of General von der Goltz would consequently find itself isolated and without liaison with East Prussia, for it can communicate only with a small part of East Prussia, which would itself be isolated. He expected that the treaty would be ratified in about three weeks’ time and suggested that it might be advisable to await the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

General Gough says that this is the case, but that General von der Goltz is not a person who would ignore these facts, and it is quite likely that he has availed himself of the delay by organizing stocks of provisions and munitions which would enable him to maintain himself for several months. It would be preferable to act immediately, for delay gave the Germans two advantages:

In the first place, it constantly diminishes the moral influence of the Allied and Associated Governments in the country, by showing that the decisions of the Conference were not obeyed; in the second place, it gives the Germans time to prepare an offensive, if they intended to make one, and to accumulate all that is necessary for this operation.

(M Pichon thanks General Gough for his statements and General Gough then withdraws.)

M Pichon says that he had received the amendments prepared by M Berthelot based upon the observations of Mr. Polk.

M Berthelot says that the article concerning the Germans isolated in the Russian forces could be changed so as to read as follows:

“mais encore à tous les militaires allemands en groupe ou même isolés, qui sur la suggestion ou avec l’appui des autorités allemandes, ont nominalement pris du service …”

(“but also to all German military, in groups or isolated, who upon the suggestion or with the approval of the German authorities, have nominally taken service …”)

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether it was proposed that this text be adopted. He found himself in a somewhat delicate situation, for the original proposal concerning the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces had come from his Prime Minister. It was Mr Lloyd George who had proposed that Polish troops be utilized. After these proposals had been made, it had been decided that a note should be prepared in this sense. The information, which had been given that day, showed that it would not be advisable to utilize Polish troops. The situation therefore was now quite different. If the Allied and Associated Governments do not add a threat and are not prepared to carry it out, the ultimatum will not be effective. Under these circumstances, he hesitates to agree to its being dispatched. He asks whether it will not be more advisable to write a note to the German Government, saying that the Allied and Associated Powers do not believe the arguments which the German Government had used, that these Governments know that the German Government are in a position to insist upon the evacuation being effected, and that they are convinced that the German Government can carry it out. The German Government should be further informed that as they have not effected the evacuation nor paid any attention to the previous notes of the Council, the Allied and Associated Governments propose to sever all commercial relations with them and to decide upon other measures of a similar nature. In his opinion, it is advisable to make no further demands, but to put the German Government face to face with a fait accompli. Before deciding upon this course, it will be necessary for all the Governments to agree as to the steps which they were prepared to take. So far as he is concerned, he will be glad to consult his Government, for it was probable that there would be complications, so far as interrupting certain steps, which were already being taken, such as the repatriation of prisoners of war, was concerned, and he was not certain that the British Government would agree to the imposition of the blockade. If a decision were taken after forty-eight hours, the members of the Council would have an opportunity to consult their Governments and they could then decide upon the action to be taken.

Mr Polk said that in awaiting this decision, he will confer with members of the American Delegation and have it made known to Baron von Lersner at Versailles that the American Government would suspend all financial agreements.

(It is decided to postpone the decision concerning the dispatch of a Note to the German Government, relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, for 48 hours, in order to permit the various Delegates to consult their Governments as to the various means of pressure which could be brought to bear.)

(At this point Marshal Foch and General Weygand withdraw.)

3
3. M Pichon said that the question had been raised on the preceding day and that Mr Polk had then asked that it be postponed until the following day.

M Tardieu reads the draft resolution which he had prepared, which is worded as follows:

“It is decided that the Bulgarian Government evacuate Western Thrace and the Strumitza Loop. General Franchet d’Esperey will give the necessary instructions for the evacuation and for the occupation of the evacuated territory by Greek troops, (in the region of Xanthi and Gumuldjina) and for the occupation of the remaining territory by Allied troops.”

Mr Polk says that he believes that the line goes too far. Xanthi and Gumuldjina are beyond the line. He cannot agree to have Greek troops occupy regions other than those which were to be attributed to them by the Peace Treaty.

M Tardieu says that he is of the same opinion.

Mr Polk said that General Bliss and the American Delegation believe that the proposal is a dangerous one and that it will lead to incidents similar to those which had occurred at Smyrna. He thinks that trouble in this region is bound to occur and that the Allied Governments do not have the troops at their disposal, which it will be necessary to send there. He objects to the entire proceeding and wishes to protest and he will take no responsibility for what might happen for there will be no American troops in that country. He proposes that in the first place the territory should be occupied by French troops and that the Greek occupation should take place after the French occupation.

M Tardieu says that General Franchet d’Esperey, whom he had consulted, does not believe that trouble would result. He thinks, however, that the text of the draft resolution should be altered so as to be satisfactory to Mr Polk.

Mr Polk says that General Chretien holds the same view that he does. So far as he is concerned he can only accept the proposal with the reserve already expressed and because of the fact that no American troops are to be sent. He asks whether it was proposed to maintain the local administration.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks it would be inadvisable for the Council to bind themselves, for the Bulgarians might refuse to take the responsibility.

Mr Polk suggests that the matter be referred to the Central Territorial Committee.

M Tardieu says that he proposes to suppress the last two lines of his proposition, from the words “by Greek troops”, and to add a second paragraph, which would be worded as follows:

“This occupation will be undertaken first by Allied troops, who will be replaced by Greek troops in the zone indicated on the map enclosed herewith. The local administration will be continued.”

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether the words “by Allied troops” means that Greek troops would participate equally in the occupation of the other zone.

M Tardieu says that this is not meant and that he refers to troops of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

S Scialoja says that it should be clearly understood that occupation by Greek troops is to be limited to the zone in question, and that these troops would not participate with the troops of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the occupation of the other zone.

Mr Polk says that it was important that the line should be definitely established before it is brought to the attention of the military authorities.

M Tardieu says that this matter could be left to the Committee.

(After a short discussion, in the course of which Mr Polk renews his reservation and declares that the proportion of Greek troops appears to him too great in proportion to that of the Allied troops, the following resolution is adopted:

1) It was decided that the Bulgarian Government should evacuate Western Thrace and the Strumitza Loop. General Franchet d’Esperey should give the necessary instructions for this evacuation and for the occupation of the evacuated territory.

2) The occupation should be effected by Allied troops.

3) These troops might be Greek in the zone indicated in the map, attached herewith, when the Commander in Chief should consider it possible; the rest of Western Thrace should be occupied by Allied troops, other than Greek troops.

4) The local administration will be continued.)


4. M Pichon says that the Conditions of Peace would be delivered to the Bulgarian Delegation on the following day at the Quai d’Orsay at 10:30.

Mr Polk says that representatives of the American Press had asked him whether they would be admitted to this ceremony.

M Pichon says that the meeting will be different from those which had taken place with the German and Austrian Delegates. It had not been anticipated that representatives of the Press would be present. It had been intended to transmit the conditions of peace to the Bulgarians through the medium of M Dutasta, the Secretary General of the Conference, without any ceremony of any kind. M. Stancioff, the Secretary of the Bulgarian Delegation, had said that he thought this procedure somewhat uncomplimentary to the Bulgarian Delegation. The Supreme Council had then decided that the delivery of the Conditions of Peace should take place at the Quai d’Orsay in the presence of the Council.

Mr Polk says that he is willing to accept the opinion of the majority, but he wishes to place himself upon record as saying that he believes that the Conference had throughout shown a tendency to ignore the presence of the other Delegations. He knows that the heads of some of these Delegations feel that they have been ignored. The Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and other Delegations particularly interested, feel that the matter is one which concerns them very closely and that they should be present at the ceremony.

M Pichon says that it will be possible to invite the Head of each of the Delegations.

(After a short discussion, it is decided to invite to the Ceremony of the Delivery of the Conditions of Peace to the Bulgarian Delegation:

Two Representatives of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and one Representative of each of the other Allied Powers who were signatories of the Treaty.

It is also decided that Representatives of the Press should be authorized to be present at the Meeting and that there should be five Representatives of each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and two of the other Powers.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

19th September 1919

General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, addressing U.S. Congress.


American aviator Roland Rohlfs breaks the flight altitude record by reaching 34,160 feet (10,411 meters)

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, September 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. Mr Polk asks whether any news has recently been received from the Military Mission in Hungary.

M Pichon says that he has received a telegram from sir George Clerk dated September 12–13. Several cipher telegrams had also arrived but had not yet been decoded. In view of this fact he proposed that the question be adjourned until the meeting of the Council on Monday.

Mr Polk says that he is in favor of M Pichon’s proposal because he had received word from General Bandholtz to the effect that the latter was in process of organizing a police force for Budapest and hoped to conclude the negotiations on that day. Undoubtedly information on this subject would be available by Monday.

(It is decided to adjourn the discussion on this question until Monday, September 22nd.)


(At this point M Tardieu enters the room.)

2. M Tardieu states that, in accordance with the resolution taken by the Council on the previous day,1 he had received from Messrs. Dulles and Nicolson a paper indicating a line of demarcation of the zones Western Thrace. This note, to which a map has been annexed, he is not able to accept, for he has understood that the region of Gumuldjina is to have been incorporated in the area in question.

Mr Polk says that he has no fundamental objection to the eventual attribution of this territory to Greece, but that he cannot consent to its occupation at the present time by Greek troops.

(After a short discussion it is decided to delay action on the resolution taken by the Council on September 18th and to further study the question of the occupation of Thrace by the Allied troops at a future meeting of the Council.)

(M Tardieu then withdraws.)


3. M Cambon reads from and comments upon Report No. 5, transmitted to the Council by the Commission on Polish Affairs, on the subject of the status of Eastern Galicia.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that in view of the fact that Poland, within its present boundaries, does not comprise all the territories which it possessed prior to its partition, he believed that it would be preferable to omit the second paragraph of the Preamble, which read as follows: (a) Preamble

“Seeing that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the partition of the latter.’

(It is decided to delete the following paragraph from the text of the Preamble to the Treaty:

“Seeing that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the partition of the latter.”)

M Cambon says that the Commission has been unanimous upon the draft of Articles 1 to 11 (inclusive) of the Treaty.

(It is decided to accept the first eleven articles as drafted by the Polish Commission for insertion in the proposed Treaty, regarding Eastern Galicia.)

M Cambon reads the text of Article 12 as proposed by the Polish Commission, together with the additional paragraph to this article proposed by the British delegation.

Mr Polk says that he wishes to ask M Cambon a question regarding this article. In the first phrase the following clause appears, “The Diet of Eastern Galicia shall legislate on the following matters.” He wants to know whether, in the opinion of the Commission, this gives the Galician Diet the exclusive power to legislate upon the subjects enumerated in the article in question.

M Cambon says that such is the intention of the Commission.

M Pichon adds that the Diet would have complete sovereignty for the questions involved.

M Cambon said that the Commission had been unanimous upon all the paragraphs in question. Nevertheless, the British delegation had asked that the following clause be added to the text: “Agrarian legislation passed by the Polish Diet shall only become applicable to Eastern Galicia if and when it is confirmed by the Eastern Galician Diet.”

He adds that agreement has not been reached upon this clause. The American, French, Italian and Japanese delegations had been opposed to inserting it and the British delegation had insisted upon its being put in. The Council is therefore obliged to decide the question.

On July 6th the Polish Diet had passed an agrarian reform law of extreme importance which marked the beginning of the social transformation in Poland. By the provisions of this law the State became the owner of all forests in Poland. The Agrarian organization of the Polish Republic was to be based primarily on the peasants’ farms, the creation of new farms by colonization and the enlarging of those actually in existence. The State was to decide upon the division of the land and in this process was to create large reserves by the following means:

(1) From lands of which it was the owner;

(2) Lands belonging to members of old reigning families or to branches of the latter;

(3) Domains of the Russian Peasants’ Bank and of the Prussian Colonization Commission;

(4) Domains of the Bishoprics, Congregations, Convents, Monasteries or other public institutions;

(5) Domains formerly belonging to congregations, but not yet partitioned;

(6) Lands acquired through speculation and belonging to persons who had been convicted of having participated therein.

The six categories of lands above mentioned are to furnish the basis upon which the distribution should first be made. Thereafter the distribution is to continue by withdrawing land from each large owner. Eight of ownership was to be limited, no one individual to be allowed to possess a farm larger than 180 hectares. In certain regions, however, where the interests of agriculture might make it necessary, this maximum area could be increased to 400 hectares.

He points out that these are the principles of reform which had been imposed upon the party of the Right, which represented the large landed proprietors. The latter do not appear to have accepted their defeat and were already preparing to contest viciously the passage of each of the organic laws necessary to effectuate this scheme. He adds, for the information of the Council, that the above law had only received a majority of two votes.

It appear that the above provisions, which are very broad and diametrically opposed to the ideas regarding private property which had been held up to the present time, were not considered liberal enough by the majority of the Galicians. However that may be, the question is to know whether these provisions can be applied “hic et nunc” to Galicia by the Polish administration or, whether, at the time a Diet shall be constituted in Galicia, the latter should give its opinion upon the application of this legislation or itself enact a special law. The British delegation believes that it is necessary for the Galician Diet to be called upon to give its opinion. The other delegations think that this Agrarian law gives sufficiently favorable terms and adequately upholds the rights of private property owners vis-a-vis the peasant class.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the question is in reality a larger one than the mere enforcement of a particular law, the merits of which he did not wish to pass upon at the present time.

The main idea which had guided the Council in all its discussions on the autonomy of Eastern Galicia had been that a people was being dealt with who had retained marked sympathy for certain of its neighbors, more particularly Russia. It had always been the desire of the Council to look to the future with the possibility that this people might wish to ally itself with a regenerated Russia or any Ukrainian state which might be formed. It had been desired to allow the separation to be made from Poland, if such state of affairs became possible, and consequently the autonomy of the country was preferable to a mandate over it entrusted to the Poles. He thinks that a line should be drawn between those matters on which uniformity of legislation could be obtained without difficulty and issues on which the people of Eastern Galicia should be permitted to legislate alone. Uniformity on agrarian questions is difficult to attain. No obstacle should be placed in the way of an ultimate union of Eastern Galicia with Russia, and it therefore should not be made impossible for this province to separate itself from Poland. He did not wish to argue in favor of such a separation, but believed that the door should be left open for a move in the direction of Russia. By so doing the Powers would give Galicia a free hand and would avoid creating difficulties, of which agrarian legislation might well be one.

He points out that the Council might be guided by England’s experience in relation to Ireland, in which country agrarian questions had always been the most difficult of solution. England had never imposed its agrarian legislation on Ireland and was thankful that the same had not been done, England could never be charged with having forced its own system of laws on the Irish. The United States furnished another example of a country for whose well being uniformity of laws was not necessary.

He does not wish to criticize the law in question, but points out that no guarantee exists against its repeal. The Poles might be tempted to enact legislative measures hostile to the interests of the Galician people, and it is for this reason that he believes all laws of an agrarian nature should be submitted to the approval of the Galician Diet. The most simple method to obtain this result would be to add agrarian questions to the list of matters within the jurisdiction of the Diet of Eastern Galicia, which are set out in Article 12. Great danger would be run through the imposition of legislation purely Polish in character because many of the large property holdings in Galicia were actually in the hands of Poles and the temptation to impose a system favorable to their interests would be very great.

M Cambon says that he would like to refer to Article 16 for discussion with Article 12, for the two stand together and a decision of the Council on one would have its effect on the other. He then reads the two texts proposed for Article 16 and points out that this Article in substance brought up the question as to whether or not Eastern Galicia is to be allowed representation in the Diet of Warsaw.

He is fundamentally opposed to the British proposal for the reason that, whether it is desirable or not, the fact that the government of the Galician state is entrusted to Poland placed in the hands of the Polish Government representation of Eastern Galicia abroad. All questions of general administration will be settled at Warsaw. It is therefore necessary that Eastern Galicia be permitted to take part in all questions of high policy in the Polish Diet. The Diet of Galicia could deal with the other matters as indicated in Article 12. It was therefore necessary not to state in the decision that representation of Galicia with Poland should be disregarded.

With reference to the agrarian legislation, he points out that this question is bound up with the decision which would be taken on Article 16, for if the Council granted Galicia representation in the Polish Diet her representatives in this body could make themselves heard to good effect.

S Scialoja says that, although the Italian representative on the Polish Commission has supported the majority opinion, he thinks it would be well to make a slight change. He does not favor the addition proposed by the British delegation however, but inclines to the second proposal made by Sir Eyre Crowe, namely, to insert agrarian legislation in the list of matters included in Article 12. If such a change is not made Eastern Galicia might be deprived of all rights of enactment of agrarian laws, should she refuse to accept the legislation of the Polish Diet. According to M Cambon’s statements, it is probable that the Galicians will go further in the matter than the Poles have already done. This means that they are not satisfied with matters as they stand and it would therefore do them an injury to crystallize the present situation and prevent them from improving it.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he agrees with M Cambon in believing that Articles 12 and 16 are closely allied. All the points raised by the British delegation are intimately connected one with another, and the same arguments as have been brought forward for agrarian questions prevail in regard to compulsory military service. He wishes, however, to further discuss the representation in the Polish Diet. Assuming that this representation exists, the danger might arise that certain Polish members of the Diet would wish to impose on the Galicians an agrarian scheme favorable to Polish interests. The Galician representatives, being in a minority, could not effectively block the measure. In cases where matters of general interest arise it was probable that Galicians and Poles might vote on the same side, but in cases of special legislation the Galician minority would be absolutely powerless. If this argument is true, the Commission is correct in saying that the question of representation had a direct bearing on Article 12. He further wishes to call attention to the meaning of Article 13, and the right of temporary veto accorded to the Governor therein. This article provided sufficient guarantees to prevent the legislation of the Galician Diet affecting Poland adversely.

M Pichon asks whether Mr Paderewski had not stated that Poland could not accept the Treaty under these conditions.

General Le Rond says that the Sub-Commission had heard the Polish delegation on the subject four times. In the first place, Mr Paderewski, later Mr Dmowski, and later Mr Dabsky, the author of the Polish agrarian law had appeared before it. Mr Daiko, representing the Ruthenians, had also appeared before the Commission. This body is therefore entirely alive to all the difficulties which Sir Eyre Crowe had brought up and to all the arguments in answer thereto.

The Agrarian reform is based on a general banking scheme which is to be uniform throughout the country. It appears difficult to organize a similar system within a country so limited as Galicia, and of such a small population. The reform was also based upon a system of local committees, giving guarantees to the people analogous to those existing in Posnania and other provinces. The points raised by the British delegation are irreconcilable with the solutions proposed by the majority. The representatives of the Polish Government had stated that they could not accept a Treaty in which their government would be deprived of the right to dictate agrarian reform.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that there is much to be said for the arguments presented by General Le Bond, but he does not believe that they go to the root of the matter. He is fully alive to the difficulties from a practical point of view which would result from allowing Galicia to legislate independently, in the event that she should exercise her rights in a manner which does not meet with the approval of the Polish Diet. He believes that the people themselves would be competent to avoid all complications of this nature and they might even declare themselves favorable to uniformity of legislation. It does not devolve upon the Council, however, to force them to such uniformity. Furthermore, Galicia was not such a small country as General Le Bond had given the impression, for it contained practically four and one-half million inhabitants. There will, consequently, be no insurmountable difficulties in establishing an agrarian system for this country even though certain complications might arise from the banking point of view. The argument put forward by General Le Bond did not therefore seem to him of sufficient weight to overthrow his proposal of granting the Galicians a voice in the legislation.

Mr Polk says that he is greatly influenced by the arguments put forward by Sir Eyre Crowe. He wishes to submit a proposal which had just been made by Mr Gibson, which might help the situation to a certain degree. This would consist in adding the following clause to the addition proposed by the British delegation: “In case of a rejection of the Polish law by the Galician Diet, the latter will have the right to legislate on this question.” This solution would have the advantage of permitting the Galician Diet to adopt the Polish legislation should this body so desire.

M Cambon points out that it is perhaps unwise to anticipate a refusal and base the Galician right of legislation upon this. He suggests that it would be sufficient to provide: “The Galician Diet shall give its opinion on the possibility of applying Polish law.” In this way the body would of necessity be consulted.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that M Cambon’s proposal appears rather vague and will open the way to misunderstandings, while clearness in the matter is greatly to be desired. The danger might be that the Poles could say that they had asked the opinion of the Galician Diet, that the latter had not agreed, and nevertheless it made no difference to them.

M Pichon suggests that the agrarian laws might be settled by agreement between the two Diets.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the fact remains that Article 13 gives the Polish Governor an absolute right of veto.

Mr Polk says that he approves the second British solution, namely, the insertion of agrarian questions in Article 12. The difficulty can be covered by adding that, if the Galician Diet had not legislated on the matter within a given period, the Polish law would apply.

S Scialoja says that it might be also added to the laws of Article 13, which are subject to an absolute veto of the Governor.

M Cambon draws the attention of the Council to the fact that the agrarian law might lead to disturbances within the country, and that the Polish Government might charge the Allies with turning over to them the administration of a country without granting them the means of handling disturbances which might arise through the application of agrarian laws. The majority of large estates in Galicia are in the hands of the Poles. These estates are to be partitioned in favor of Ruthenes. This is a fruitful source of conflicts between different interests and of dangers which might easily lead to a revolution. He thinks, therefore, that the Polish Government should be left the means of exercising its authority. Too much importance should not be given to these details, however, as the system which was being inaugurated was only temporary.

M Pichon says that he has a proposal which he believes will settle the matter. This was to adopt the proposition presented by Sir Eyre Crowe, and add the following paragraph thereto:

“In case of persistent dispute between the two Diets, the question will be brought before the Council of the League of Nations.”

Sir Eyre Crowe said that this proposal will, in effect, permit the League of Nations to enact the agrarian laws.

M Pichon said that the Covenant of the League contemplates arbitration as one of the essential roles of that body.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the League of Nations will therefore be called upon to decide between two bodies of law. To bring this about it is necessary that the Galician Diet should be given a legislative power by the Treaty.

(After a short discussion, it is decided:

(1) That legislation on agrarian questions should be included within the competence of the Galician Diet, and inserted in Article 12 of the proposed Treaty;

(2) That agrarian legislation should be included among the laws over which the Polish Governor has the right of veto (Article 13), but that if the Governor’s veto be maintained for more than one year the question should be automatically brought before the Council of the League of Nations for decision.

It is further decided that the above resolution should be referred to the Commission on Polish Affairs for insertion of its provisions in the Treaty.
These two articles (14 and 16) are accepted without change.)

M Cambon reads and comments upon Article 16. He says that the organization provided for therein, which was to protect the rights of Galicia, will lack a proper foundation if Galicia is not represented in the body of the Polish Diet. It should be understood that the Galician representative will take no part in the matters which were exclusively Polish.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he recognizes the weight of the arguments put forward by M Cambon, but that he does not wish to express an opinion as to the root of the matter. He wishes particularly to remark that the question had been the object of much academic discussion up to the present time, and that the idea involved had rarely been applied from a practical point of view. Under the former German Constitution Bavaria was granted special rights, but in practice it had been found impossible to prevent the Bavarian representatives from taking part in the body of the Reichstag, in the discussion of matters which were entirely foreign to the special interests of Bavaria. The question of knowing whether States with partial autonomy could obtain representation in a larger Parliament was one of the most contentious which could be found, and had given rise to much discussion and often contradictory conclusions on the part of men of high intelligence in all countries of the world. Mr Balfour, who has special experience of Government in Ireland, has more than once called attention to the grave difficulty of finding a satisfactory solution of this question. Several bills proposed on the Home Rule question had broken down precisely on the point of the Irish representation in the British Parliament. It is, therefore, very natural that his Government should feel a certain hesitancy in imposing a fixed and definite scheme on another people in a matter which is so much a matter of controversy. The British Delegation feels that a solution along the lines proposed by Mr Cambon might perhaps be reached. He does not wish to criticize it, nor to exclude the possibility of its eventual adoption, but he does not wish to force it at the outset on the people concerned. It is within the province of these people to decide the question in the last analysis.

Mr Polk says that the British proposal contemplates the intervention of the League of Nations if desired by “both parties”. He wishes to suggest for consideration of the Council, a substitution of the words “either party” for the words “both parties”. He wishes also to propose for the consideration of the Council that Galicia be granted two or more representatives in the Polish Diet, until such time as a definite decision in the matter might be arrived at. These representatives might have a consultative voice, with the right to take part in the discussion of matters concerning Eastern Galicia but would not be accorded a vote. Representation of this kind would be similar to that enjoyed by the Territories in the United States, as distinguished from the active and voting representation of the States. This proposal is a temporary measure solely and he thinks the Council might deliberate profitably thereon.

The discussion of Article 16 was then adjourned.


(At this point M Loucheur enters the room.)

4. M Pichon says that a letter has been received from the Austrian Delegation with regard to the shortage of coal in Austria.

M Loucheur says that he wished to inform the Council at once that he had not waited for the ratification of the Treaty before giving orders to increase the coal supply in Austria as soon as possible. He had personally given orders in this matter but he could not guarantee that he would be completely successful, for the shortage of coal in Central Europe was so great that the industries of Czechoslovakia were likewise threatened. He suggests that he might draft a letter to the Austrian Delegation informing them of the steps which have been taken.

(It is decided that M Loucheur should submit to the Council a draft letter to the Austrian Delegation, informing the latter of the steps which have been taken to offset as far as possible the coal shortage existing in Austria.)

(M Loucheur then leaves the room.)


5. Mr Polk says that he is not ready to discuss this matter because there were certain differences of opinion existing thereon among the military representatives.

(It is decided to adjourn the discussion of this question until Monday, September 22.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

20th September 1919

Italian nationalists in Fiume (Rijeka, Croatia) listen to a speech by Gabriele D’Annunzio, who seeks to have the city annexed by Italy. The city is disputed between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia).


President Wilson addressing 50,000 people in San Diego to promote public support for the ratification of the Versailles Treaty and joining the League of Nations.

[Jimbuna]

21st September 1919

Turkish officials, with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the center, at Sivas, discussing Turkish resistance against partition and Allied occupation.


Amputees race on crutches at a race organized by the Red Cross in New York City.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, September 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.