100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

15th August 1919

The “Restoration of Pre-War Practices Act 1919” receives royal assent, which gives back returning British veterans their former jobs. However, it forces out women who entered the workforce during the war.

A French Tank and soldiers patrolling Istanbul during the Entente occupation.


Romanian war orphans at a Red Cross camp.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, August 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

16th August 1919

The First Silesian Uprising begins in Germany as ethnic Poles launch a general strike to protest continued German control in the area.

Juho Vennola becomes the new Prime Minister of Finland.


The parade of the White Guard of Finland in Helsinki August 16, 1919.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, August 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Again the Supreme Council holds no meetings.

[Jimbuna]

17th August 1919

Major-General Herbert C. Holman, head of the British Military Mission to South Russia, with Cossack children. The region was recently captured by anti-Bolshevik forces.


Alexander Izvolsky, former Russian Foreign Minister who played an important role in Russia’s alliance with Britain before the outbreak of the Great War, has passed away.


Observation deck on airship R. 33

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, August 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Being a Sunday, the Supreme Council holds no meetings.

[Jimbuna]

18th August 1919

Aftermath of War

Russian Civil War: North Russia intervention – The Bolshevik fleet at Kronstadt, protecting Petrograd on the Baltic Sea, is substantially damaged by British Royal Navy Coastal Motor Boats (torpedo boats) and military aircraft in a combined operation.

British forces attack Bolshevik-controlled ships in Kronstadt Harbour, Russia and successfully sinks the cruiser Pamiat Azova.



U.S. Army truck catches fire during a cross-continental trip across the United States to test the country’s road system.


Ship Losses:

Andrei Pervozvanny (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War, British campaign in the Baltic: Battle of Kronstadt: The Andrei Pervozvanny-class battleship was torpedoed by HM CMB-31 ( Royal Navy) at Kronstadt and beached to prevent sinking. Never fully repaired and scrapped post civil war.
HM CMB-24 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War: British campaign in the Baltic: Battle of Kronstadt: The coastal motor boat was shelled and sunk by Gavril ( Soviet Navy).
HM CMB-62 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War: British campaign in the Baltic: Battle of Kronstadt: The coastal motor boat was shelled and sunk by Gavril ( Soviet Navy) after possibly being in a collision with HM CMB-62 ( Royal Navy).
HM CMB-67 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War: The coastal motor boat sank in a storm.
HM CMB-79 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War: British campaign in the Baltic: Battle of Kronstadt: The coastal motor boat was sunk during the battle, either by Russian shelling, being capsized by a wave/wake, or in a collision with HM CMB-62 ( Royal Navy).
Pamiat Azova (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War, British campaign in the Baltic: Battle of Kronstadt: The depot ship was torpedoed and sunk by HM CMB-79 ( Royal Navy) at Kro.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, August 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M. Pichon asks whether his colleagues have received any news of Hungary. He assumes that all had seen the telegram from General Bandholtz.

(This telegram is read.

M Pichon also mentions another telegram addressed to M Clemenceau by the Archduke Joseph.

Mr Balfour says that the latter telegram appears to be satisfactory. The Government undertakes to proceed to a general election in a short time, and to remit the negotiation of peace to the national assembly.

M Pichon said that the phrase used, namely, “on the basis of universal suffrage” is not very precise. It does not necessarily imply that the voting will be direct and secret.

S Tittoni says that failing this condition there will be no legitimate government.

M Pichon says that in addition the time limit “as soon as possible” is very indefinite, and the resignation of the government “when the National Assembly meets” might be considerably postponed. He thinks that instructions should be given to the representatives of the Allied Governments to arrange that the elections should take place very soon; that they should be based on direct and secret voting, and that the Constituent Assembly should be formed immediately.

Mr Polk asks whether the Allied Representatives have yet made any report on the present Government. He has himself received information from two sources: from Mr Hoover, and from certain persons who have just returned from Hungary. Both agreed that it was scarcely possible for the Council to recognize the Archduke Joseph. He only remained in power because he controls the police and the Hungarian army. No labor representative or socialist has joined his Government. The mere fact that he is a Hapsburg had greatly upset the neighboring small States. Mr Hoover’s conclusion is that this Government should not be recognised, as there could be no proper election while the Archduke Joseph remained in power. Should the Conference refuse to recognize him he would fall, and he could then be replaced by a Coalition Government.

M Pichon asks whether there was any proof that the Romanians had supported this Government.

Mr Polk says that they of course deny it. The information received is to the effect that they were present at its formation and could have prevented it. The Archduke Joseph had been put in power by the Hungarian military party.

S Tittoni said that retrospective considerations are not of much import. The Romanians denied any complicity in forming the present Government of Hungary, and their mere presence at its formation did not establish complicity. Their presence, however, inasmuch as it contributed to the maintenance of order, also contributed to maintaining any Government in power. The question for the Council was whether this Government should be recognised as a de facto government, or whether the Council should say that elections must be held by a government more representative of all parties in the country.

Mr Polk says that he understands no social democrat or labor representative would join a Coalition Government with the Archduke. Recognition of the Archduke’s Government would amount to excluding from recognition the real representation of the country. He thought, therefore, that it would be a fatal error to recognize the Archduke’s Government. He feels American opinion will be very strongly opposed to it.

S Tittoni thinks it would be better to consult the Allied Mission in Budapest before coming to a decision. The Mission might be asked whether, should the Archduke Joseph withdraw, power would be likely to pass without revolution to a Coalition Government. The Mission might also be asked whether, seeing that the Archduke Joseph did not furnish a rallying point for all parties in Hungary, it would not be well to recommend him to resign and yield his place to a Government which might be really representative.

M Pichon says that there are undoubtedly objections to any Government with a Hapsburg as chief. Such a Government is bound to be a reactionary government. The Conference, however, has said that it will not interfere in Hungarian internal affairs. Nevertheless the Allied Mission in Budapest had inevitably had relations with the Archduke, hence a very delicate situation. If the question suggested by S Tittoni were to be in the precise form he proposed, the Conference would be open to the charge of interfering in the internal affairs of Hungary. He thought that the representatives should be asked for information on Hungarian conditions. The previous instructions sent to them should be recalled. They should be told not to appear to interfere and above all to do nothing tending to convey any recognition of the present Government which, in the eyes of the Conference, has no legal existence, which did not represent the chief parties in Hungary and especially excluded all democratic elements.

Mr Polk says that he agreed that information is what the Council desires. He drew attention to the fact that the Archduke’s government had not been put in power by the Hungarian people, but by a coup d’état. It took the place of the Government in whose favour Bela Kun had resigned. If the Archduke knew that the Powers were unfavorable to him he would resign, and a Coalition Government might soon be possible. The representative of the French Government had had an interview with the Archduke, who had said that he would abdicate as soon as a Socialistic Government could be formed. If he had spoken the truth he might resign immediately.

M Pichon says that it would be necessary for the Council to make up its mind as to what it wanted. Is it prepared in the end to say to the Archduke that he must resign? If the Council was bound by its decisions not to interfere in Hungarian internal politics, it would not be easy to do this. If the Archduke were told that he could not be recognised officially, this would be of little avail, as even without official relations, the Governments were to some extent committed to the intercourse they must have with the administration in power. The Archduke had formed a program, and had communicated it to the Allied Generals in Budapest. The Generals had received him, and even their silence was construable as a sort of recognition. The question is therefore whether the Council should await the advice of the Allied representatives in Budapest or not before asking the Archduke to resign.

M Polk says that he thinks it will probably be better to wait. But he reminds the Council that M Clemenceau has made a strong point in the instructions to the Generals of not recognizing this Government because of the bad example this would set to the rest of Europe. If the Generals, therefore, had recognised the Archduke’s Government, they had exceeded their mission.

Mr Balfour says that he does not think that they had done so.

S Tittoni said that they had been visited by the Archduke. They had received his program, they had remained silent, they had made no protest. All this amounted almost to a recognition. The question therefore was should the Archduke be asked to retire.

M Polk observes that there are precedents for official relations with unrecognized Governments. For instance, the Government of Lenin and Trotsky had not been recognised, but agents of the Powers had been in contact with them.

M Pichon observed that the agents in question, at least as regards France, had not been officials. The telegram alluded to by S Tittoni had not, he thought, contained a program. It merely contained a communication by the Archduke to the members of his Cabinet.

S Tittoni said that it was necessary to take into consideration public opinion. Throughout the Allied world it was thought that the Council was in some manner favorable to the Archduke’s Government. The papers are engaged in speculations as to whether it was France, Italy or Romania that backed the Archduke. All Governments would be questioned in their Parliaments. It is therefore important that the Council should take sides openly and that all should appear to be following the same course.

M Pichon says that the Council had already declared that it would only recognize a Government representing the national will.

Mr Balfour then proposes a draft telegram for communication to the Allied Generals in Budapest He says that he thinks the advantages of this telegram were that it would recognize the need of the Allied representatives to work with the people in power. It makes it clear that the Conference does not trust these people; that the main reason for this distrust was that the head of the Hungarian Government is a Hapsburg; and that what the Conference desires is to obtain the opinion of the Hungarian people. A National Assembly based upon universal suffrage and direct and secret voting was necessary. It was only on these conditions that peace could be made with a Hungarian Government. He thinks this constitutes sufficient material for a very strong hint to the present Hungarian Government.

M Pichon says that it is undesirable to use any sentence which might suggest that the Allies were ready to agree to the restoration of the monarchy in Hungary.

Mr Balfour says that the Allies could not oppose a monarchical form of government in Hungary should the Hungarians desire it.

S Tittoni said that he agrees with M Pichon, not that he objects to a monarchical form of government, but because in Hungary it would be bound to have a Hapsburg at its head, and because the Hapsburgs were the authors of the war.

(The telegram drafted by Mr Balfour is then adopted.)


2. Mr Polk communicates to his colleagues a telegram from Mr Hoover regarding the situation in Upper Silesia.

S Tittoni says that the conclusion of the telegram is that a military occupation was necessary. The Council he understood had already decided that there should be a military occupation at Silesia.

M Pichon points out that the occupation could only be carried out after the ratification of the Treaty.

S Tittoni points out that a question affecting the very existence of Central Europe is at stake. If the coal mines of Silesia are destroyed, the life of Europe will be in jeopardy. Even if the Treaty does not give the Conference the right to intervene, he thinks that in a case of this kind it would be quite fair to exceed Treaty rights.

M Pichon says that the military occupation of Silesia before the ratification of the Treaty is a very serious matter. He suggests that General Weygand should be sent for.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks according to the armistice the Allies were entitled to occupy any strategic point they wished in Germany.

S Tittoni points out that it is not necessary to occupy the whole of Silesia. It is, however, of vital interest to save the mines.

Mr Polk reads another telegram from Mr Hoover recommending that representatives of the Coal Commission should proceed at once to Upper Silesia. He thought this might be decided upon without awaiting General Weygand’s arrival.

Mr Balfour suggests that M Loucheur, who, he understands, presides over the Coal Commission should be asked to send its representatives to Silesia.

S Tittoni says that he thinks a Commission will not be able, without military assistance, to save the mines.

(At this point General Weygand enters the room.)

General Weygand, after reading the telegrams, says that he has just received from General Henrys similar news to that sent by Mr Hoover. General Henrys also asks for troops to occupy Upper Silesia. A reply has already been sent to General Henrys to the effect that according to the Treaty the Allies had no right to enter Silesia, but that his request had been communicated to the Conference.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Allies have no rights under the Armistice.

General Weygand replies that Silesia is still German territory, and that no article in the Armistice with Germany entitles the Allied Armies to enter into German territory. All that could be done was to anticipate the terms of the Treaty.

M Pichon thinks that all that can be done for the time being is to send the representatives of the Coal Commission.

General Weygand says that the German Government, if questioned, would be bound to disavow the promoters of trouble in Upper Silesia. In this case the German Government will probably declare itself unable to control the situation. Should it do this, the Allies would have sufficient reason for offering to assist in controlling it.

M Pichon says that he understands General Weygand’s proposal to be that the German Government should be asked to remedy the condition of affairs in Upper Silesia. If it declares itself unable to do so, the Allies will tender their help.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Allies have not a right to send troops into Germany to occupy strategic points.

General Weygand says that a provision to this effect exists in the Armistice with Austria, but not in the Armistice with Germany.

Mr Balfour remarks that according to Mr Hoover the strikes in Upper Silesia have a political character, and are really fostered by the Germans themselves. If the Allies asked the German Government to suppress the strikes, the Polish party in Upper Silesia would consider itself aggrieved and this policy might amount to sacrificing the Poles to the Germans.

S Tittoni says that he understands that German troops have not yet evacuated Upper Silesia. In that case the responsibility for ensuring order was theirs.

Mr Balfour draws attention to the passage in Mr Hoover’s telegram stating that the Polish miners had been protecting the mines against the Spartacists who appeared to have combined with the German Volunteer Corps in shooting the Poles. Under such circumstances it is difficult to send German Soldiers into the district to restore order without incurring the reproaches of the Poles.

S Tittoni said that the destruction of the mines must be put a stop to by some means or other. There was really no question of sending German troops to quell the disorder, as German troops were already there.

M Pichon says that the Council is faced with a dilemma. The Germans will certainly fall upon the Poles. On the other hand, it is a big responsibility to occupy German territory before the Treaty.

S Tittoni thinks that the destruction of the coal supply in Central Europe is a worse evil.

M Pichon says that the Military Commission suggested in Mr Hoover’s telegram is not, in his opinion, very likely to have a very great effect.

General Weygand points out that such a Mission can only be sent with the consent of the German Government. Should it proceed to Silesia without the consent of the German Government, the latter might refuse to be responsible for its safety.

M Pichon says that the Allies have really no means of military intervention within the terms of the law.

Mr Balfour says that in one sense the Germans have as great an interest in putting a stop to the destruction of the mines as the Allies. German industries depend upon Silesian coal. They will therefore lose as much as Czechoslovakia, Vienna or Italy. He suggests that the Germans might be told that if they declined to help, the Allies would arrange that they should have no coal from Silesia, should the district go to Poland.

M Berthelot observes that Herr Erzberger in a recent speech had drawn attention to the diminishing production of coal in Silesia. He had added that there was reason to anticipate a still further diminution. For this reason he had urged that restrictions be imposed on the consumption of coal in Germany in order that sufficient coal should be left for the winter months. This indicated that the German Government was aware of the situation in Silesia, and had perhaps contributed to bring it about. It was not therefore quite safe to speculate on the good faith of the German Government.

General Weygand said that in negotiating on this matter with Germany, it was reasonable to assume that the German Government acted in good faith, seeing that it could not admit that it was inspiring the destruction of the mines.

M Berthelot said that the German Government would then resort to dilatory tactics. They would say that it was not a case of revolution but a case of strikes, which it was difficult to suppress.

General Weygand says that the coal from Silesia was a matter of European interest. Many arguments were at the disposal of the Conference. This coal concerned Austria, Czechoslovakia and other States. The Conference moreover was bound to hand over the territory to Poland in good condition should it ultimately be assigned to Poland.

M Pichon says that General Dupont might perhaps be asked to intervene with the German Government and ask it to take the necessary steps to remedy the situation. He suggests that General Weygand should prepare a text of a telegram to General Dupont, and submit it to the Council on the following day.

Mr Balfour says that he had been struck by one of the considerations brought forward by General Weygand. The situation should be looked at in its broader aspect. The Silesian coal question affected not merely the comfort, but the very existence of the new states created by the Conference. The question was not one of local strikes and local destruction of property, which, unfortunate though it might be, might well be considered no business of the Conference. It was the consequences elsewhere that mattered. These consequences might perhaps justify the Conference in exceeding the letter both of the Armistice and of the Treaty, and in anticipating the terms of the latter by a few weeks. He thought the policy to which the discussion pointed might be summarized under three heads. First, the representatives of the Coal Commission should be sent to Silesia; second, an appeal should be made to the German Government in the manner suggested by General Weygand, and third, Marshal Foch should be asked to devise plans for combining with the forces of order in the country, in order to protect what was not merely German or Polish property, but a world interest.

M Pichon said that he understands that the third proposal would only come into play if the two former were insufficient.

(It was then agreed that:

(a) M Loucheur be asked to send representatives of the Coal Commission to Upper Silesia without delay, to examine the situation and to report on the means of remedying it.

(b) That the attention of the German Government be called to the condition of affairs in Upper Silesia and to the danger of destruction of the coal mines, and that it be asked to take necessary steps to ensure order. General Weygand was asked to submit at the following meeting, draft instructions to General Dupont, embodying this policy.

(c) To ask Marshal Foch to prepare means of sending forces into Upper Silesia, should the need arise, in order to protect the mines from destruction.)


3. S Tittoni said he wished to draw attention to a memorandum he had received from the British Delegation, regarding the plan according to which the Conference should work. Program of work for the Conference

M Pichon suggests that this question be held over until Thursday, when M Clemenceau is expected to return.


4. S Tittoni says that he thinks the Council should not separate until the Austrian Treaty had been signed. He asks when this event could be expected.

Captain Portier said that the first meeting of the Editing Committee was to take place on the following day. The last reports from the various Commissions had only just been received. He thought that the labors of the Editing Committee could, at best, be completed in 48 hours, provided that the Committee confined itself to coordinating the answers prepared by the Commissions, and that it did not deal afresh with the various problems.

Mr Balfour says that even after the Committee has finished its work, time would be required for printing and correcting proofs.

Captain Portier said that, presumably, the Austrians would be given, as the Germans had been given, 5 days to consider whether they would sign or not.

Mr Balfour asks if a time table of the various necessary operations could be prepared by the Secretary-General. He agrees that the Council should not separate until the Austrian Treaty had been signed and the Bulgarian Treaty presented.

M Pichon says he thinks that all are agreed that the Editing Committee should confine its labors to coordinating reports of Commissions, except in case any two reports were inconsistent.

Mr Polk said that he would like to see the instructions to the Committee. He thought the Committee should not be too strictly limited, though its main task was certainly to co-ordinate the answers prepared by the Commissions. He understood that some of its members proposed to recast the Treaty.

Captain Portier pointed out that the Committee had received no instructions. There was merely a resolution to the effect that a similar organism should be set up to that set up to make the final reply to the Germans.

(It is agreed that the Editing Committee should be instructed to limit its labors to the co-ordination of the various replies prepared by Commissions, except when inconsistencies in these replies required examination of any question on its merits.)

M Tittoni observed that the Conference had dealt with many important matters. It might fairly be said that it had governed Europe, but it would be severely criticized by public opinion should it separate without having made peace.


5. Mr Polk says he had received a telegram from Sofia to the effect that General Franchet d’Esperey, acting under the authority of the Peace Conference, had ordered the Bulgarian Government to disarm its forces. He asked whether General Franchet d’Esperey had given an order to the Bulgarian Government, or had conveyed a request. The Council had agreed that no orders could be given. He would, therefore, like to know exactly in what manner the General had proceeded, as it appeared that he had obtained the removal to Constantinople of the firing mechanism of all the surplus small arms in Bulgaria. He was also informed that the General had gone to Bulgarian Thrace and told his officers to say that the country would be attributed to Greece, and that the Bulgarians must evacuate it.

General Weygand says that he had no information whatever regarding the second point, but he did not think that the information received by Mr Polk could be accurate. As to the first the measures taken by General Franchet d’Esperey were the result of the telegram sent him from the Conference. He had been told he could not exact anything from the Bulgarians which was not required of them in the armistice. The results he had obtained had been reached by negotiation.

Mr Polk asks whether he could be furnished with a copy of the request addressed by General Franchet d’Esperey to the Bulgarian Government.

General Weygand says that no other instructions had been given to General Franchet d’Esperey except those sent from the Conference. He believes that his negotiations with the Bulgarian Government had been conducted verbally.

Mr Polk says he would like to have a report from General Franchet d’Esperey regarding these negotiations, as well as a copy of any documents that might have passed between him and the Bulgarians.

M Berthelot said that there was a telegram sent by General Franchet d’Esperey to the French War Office, saying that he had gone to Sofia and had obtained his results by negotiation. It might have been pointed out that there are forty-five thousand Bulgarians under arms instead of the twenty-eight thousand to which they were entitled.

Mr Polk asked whether there was any objection to the furnishing of a report.

M Pichon says he thinks the General will have nothing to report.

Mr Polk says that the Bulgarians must be very easy people to manage if so much had been obtained from them even in excess of the terms of the armistice. Marshal Foch had told the Council that the Bulgarians had been very punctilious in executing the armistice. The honor of the Council was therefore engaged and General Franchet d’Esperey had acted as the agent of the Council. He does not question the way in which the General had acted, but he thinks there could be no possible objection to his furnishing a report to the Council.

M Pichon says that the General has only followed the instructions given him.

S Tittoni points out that the armistice only prescribes the number of divisions the Bulgarians were to keep, not the number of men in each division.

General Weygand agrees that this is so. The armistice had been deficient in this respect. Any request for reductions of the number of men under arms was in excess of the armistice, but this had been obtained by negotiation.

(It is decided: that General Franchet d’Esperey should be asked to furnish a report to the Council on his negotiations with the Bulgarian Government regarding disarmament and the alleged evacuation of Thrace.)


6. General Weygand said that according to a Nauen wireless message the German Government had recalled General von der Goltz.


7. M St Quentin says that according to the terms of Peace handed to the Austrian Delegation on the 20th July, some districts of Western Hungary had been attributed to Austria. In their note of the 1st August the Austrian Delegation complained that the Hungarian authorities, having obtained information of the intentions of the Conference, were exercising brutal reprisals on the populations of these districts. Cattle and agricultural implements were being removed. The inhabitants were being forcibly enlisted. The Austrian Delegation therefore requested that the Commission to superintend the plebiscite should be sent immediately to Western Hungary. No attention had yet been paid to this request as the Treaty did not provide for a plebiscite. Only the Austrian Delegation asked for one. The Conference had not taken a plebiscite into consideration.

S Tittoni asked why the Austrians are asking for a plebiscite in a country which the Conference had attributed to them without one.

M St Quentin says the Austrians ask for more territory than the Conference desire to give them. In addition to this the Austrians hope to create a precedent in order to ask for a plebiscite in Styria for instance, where the Conference had no intention of holding one. On the 9th August the Austrian Delegation had been authorize by the Austrian Government to ask the Conference for authority to send Austrian police into the affected districts to maintain order until the plebiscite should take place. On the 14th August a letter had been received from the Austrian Delegation saying that the Hungarians threatened to retake Western Hungary by force. The letter further expresses anxiety as to the movements of Romanian troops. It requests the Conference to forbid both the Hungarians and the Romanians to enter the area attributed to Austria, and renewed the request for permission to send police into the country. Finally on the 15th August the Delegation informed the Conference that the necessities of the case had forced the Austrian Government to act and to send police and customs officials into Western Hungary up to the frontier line laid down by the Conference. The Delegation hoped that this action would be approved by the Conference. There are therefore two questions for the Council to settle. Would it ratify the fait accompli either expressly or by maintaining silence and in that case would it notify the Romanian and Hungarian Governments?

In reply to a question M St Quentin says the Austrians had occupied the whole of the territory assigned to them.

(It is decided that no answer should be sent to the various communications of the Austrian Delegation regarding the occupation of Western Hungary.)

S Tittoni observed that this does not imply approval.


8. M St Quentin says that a similar instance arose in regard to Prekomurie. The Serb-Croats-Slovene Delegation has asked for occupation of permission to occupy the portion of this territory attributed to them. Troops had been got in readiness to occupy the area. The Delegation now asked that the Hungarian Government should be notified of the decision of the Conference, in order that opposition should not arise.

(It is agreed that as the Conference cannot deal with any recognised Government in Hungary, notification in the sense desired by the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes cannot be made.)


9. M St Quentin said that the frontier fixed in Baranya had not been notified to the Serb-Croats-Slovene Delegation. The Delegation persisted in asking for localities beyond the line adopted by the Conference. He suggested that the best means of stopping these requests would be to inform them of the frontier so fixed.

S Tittoni asks why the Delegation has not been informed.

M St Quentin replies that the general rule of the Council was that no frontiers should be communicated to any Delegation, without an express decision to that effect.

(It is decided that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation should be informed of the frontier laid down in the Baranya.)


10. The Committee has before it the following note:

It has been unanimously decided to submit the following resolution to the Council:

“The Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty, having been entrusted with the question of the expenditure of the Boundary Commission and having found no precise indications, in the Treaty with Germany, concerning the distribution of these expenses, except in the case of Schleswig, calls the attention of the Council to the advantage of adopting a general rule for the distribution of these expenditures, as regards the Treaties to be signed with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.”

The various solutions examined in the course of the discussion are the following:

A. To divide the costs between the Two States concerned (Schleswig case).

B. Expenditure divided between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

C. Expenditure charged to the League of Nations.

Mr Polk says that he thinks some difficulty will be experienced in collecting the money from the two contributing States. He thinks that it would perhaps be simpler that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should advance the funds and recoup afterwards from the two States concerned.

Captain Portier explains that what is desired was a principle for application in all cases in the future. The Treaty with Germany had only provided for the expenses of holding a Plebiscite, in the case of Schleswig. No such provision had been made for the districts in dispute between Germany and Poland. This omission caused considerable difficulties, and the Committee for the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty wished to avoid a repetition of this difficulty in future. The question was of some urgency seeing that the treaties with Austria and Bulgaria were approaching the final stage.

Mr Balfour suggests that the Commission should decide on the incidence of the cost, in accordance with the loss and gain of the two countries concerned. The country gaining territory should pay a contribution proportionate to its gain.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the cost of the Delimitation Commissions should be shared equally between the two States concerned, and that the cost of Commissions conducting Plebiscites should be allotted in proportion to the gain and loss incurred by the States concerned. The percentages should be fixed by the Commissions in each case.)


11. General Sackville-West explained the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles regarding the allowances to be granted to officers serving on Commissions of Control in Germany. The, main conclusions are that officers should continue to receive the ordinary rate of pay of the rank held by them at the time of their appointment. The pay will therefore vary according to the nationality of the officer, but it is considered that allowances for work on Commissions of Control in Germany should be equalized. In order to arrive at a uniform principle, seeing that naval and air officers were concerned as well as army officers, it is suggested that a Committee should be formed of one Military, one Naval and one Air Officer of each Nation, together with a Financial Expert. The Council was asked to ratify this proposal, and to appoint members to the suggested Committee. Allowances To Be Assigned to Officers on Commission of Control in Germany

(The Report of the Military Representative is accepted, and it is decided to appoint a Committee composed of one Military, one Naval, one Aeronautical member and one Financial Expert for each country represented on the Inter-Allied Commissions of control, to fix under the Chairmanship of General Nollet, the rate of allowances to be granted for service on Commissions of Control in Germany.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

19th August 1919

Afghanistan achieves its full independence from Britain following the Third Anglo-Afghan War (August 19 is Afghanistan’s Independence Day).

Two British soldiers enjoying a café in Boulogne, France.


Joseph E. Seagram, Canadian distiller and politician who owned Seagram’s, has passed away.


The United States readopts its pre-January 1918 official national insignia for U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft, a white star centered in a blue circle with a red disc centered within the star. The marking will remain in use until June 1, 1942.


Ship Losses:

Frip (Sweden) The wooden schooner, en route from Karlskrona to West Hartlepool, sank after striking a mine from the minefields at Herthas Flak in Kattegat. One crew member was killed.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, August 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


(During the discussion of this question the following were present: General Weygand, Mr J F Dulles, M Castoldi and Captain Le Vavasseur.

1. Mr Balfour said that he feels compelled to ask the Council to reconsider the decision that it has taken at its previous Meeting Some time before, the question had arisen, as to whether the Coordinating Committee should deal direct with all reports, which the various Technical Committees might prepare, on the subject of Austrian Notes; and whether, after dealing with them, they should send a unified report on the subject to the Council The decision arrived at had been, that the duties of the Coordinating Committee should be modified in that sense. But, in order to effect this, it will be necessary to give the Committee in question greater latitude. M Pichon and S Tittoni had, on the other hand, desired to restrict the functions of the Coordinating Committee, and to prevent it from dealing with any questions of principle The ill consequences of these limitations could now be foreseen. In the case of the German Treaty, all reports of Committees had gone, in the first instance, to the Council of Four, who had examined them almost word for word at a great expenditure of trouble; and had then sent them back to the Coordinating Committee, for the preparation of a unified report in which the decisions of the Council of Four were incorporated. He had hoped, by proposing that the Coordinating Committee should deal direct with the reports of the Committees, that the present Council might be spared a lot of work. In order to effect this, however, the Coordinating Committee must be given greater latitude than the decision arrived at on the previous day permitted. He would like to point out that a great number of replies from the Austrian Delegation had not been submitted to any Committee at all. He would like to know the reason for this; and further wished to be informed to what particular body the questions raised by the Austrian Delegation were being referred. The existing decision would have, as a result, that the Coordinating Committee would actually be prevented from considering the Austrian notes. In this case it would be necessary for him, as a representative of Great Britain, to work through all the controversial points raised by the Austrians, in collaboration with his experts, and, after bringing all relevant questions before the notice of the Council, to send back the result to the Coordinating Committee. Such a procedure would take a great deal of time, and would be a strain on the temper of the Council. He asked, therefore, whether it would not be better to relax the restrictions imposed by the decision of the previous day, and to allow the Coordinating Committee to survey the Austrian notes, and the Austrian Peace Treaty, as a whole, and to report to the Council. He did not think it would be proper to allow it to be said that the Austrian Delegation had never had its case properly heard, or to permit it to be thought, that the immense operation of liquidating the Austrian Empire had been effected without a due consideration of all the problems involved. He therefore hoped that the previous decision might be modified.

S Tittoni asked whether it was correct to say that the Austrian notes had not been fully examined, or that certain points in them had not been referred to any Committee.

M Pichon replies that he does not think the statement is correct, and that, in his opinion, every question raised by the Austrian Delegation had been referred to a competent Committee.

Mr Balfour replied that this was not the opinion of his experts.

M Berthelot, confirming M Pichon’s previous statement, said that only one question raised by the Austrian Delegation had not been considered. The question in point was, whether the Austrian State was to be considered as a New State, similar to Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia, or as an enemy State similar to Germany. The British Delegates had considered that Austria should be regarded as a New State; but the Council had already decided in an opposite sense, and their view had been strongly supported by President Wilson. It was most important that this decision should be upheld, since any withdrawal from the standpoint adopted would involve recasting the Peace Treaty with Austria.

S Tittoni says that if it were really thought that Austria was not an Enemy State, the Italians would not have fought for over three and a half years, with a loss of over half a million dead, against a mere phantom.

(At this point M Cambon and members of the Editing Committee entered the room; and M Pichon laid the question raised by Mr Balfour before them.)

M Cambon says that he did not know of any question raised by the Austrian notes having failed to receive consideration; since the whole duties of the Coordinating Committee consisted in dealing with the reports of the Technical Committees, to which the notes in question were referred. The procedure of his Committee had been as follows. He had read a draft covering note to the general reply to be given to the Austrians in which he summarized the remarks and criticisms raised by the Committee to whom the notes had been referred. In his note, he had insisted upon one point which was, that the Council should exercise to the full its rights against Austria, which had been the author of the war, by the fact that it had sent its ultimatum to Serbia; and had, moreover, before any declaration of war, performed belligerent acts against France and Belgium. When he had finished reading his draft covering letter, M Headlam-Morley had read an alternative covering note, conceived in a totally different sense; and had argued therein, that Austria should be considered as a New State, and not as an Enemy one. But the question so raised had been decided previously in the sense that Austria must be regarded as the direct legitimate heir of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. With regard to all other clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria, dealing with economic, military and political questions, they had been adequately discussed by the Technical Committees. The one point raised by Mr Headlam-Morley could not be dealt with in that way, since it was purely political and must be left to the Council to reconsider, if necessary.

Mr Headlam-Morley draws attention to the words in the preamble of the Peace Treaty with Austria stating that Austria was to be “recognized as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria”.

S Tittoni replied that this was only intended to imply that Austria was a New State, insofar as her old frontiers and status had been altered. The question now before the Council was whether it ought to regard the old State of Austria as no longer existing in any form; in which case all possibility of reparation, or of fixing responsibilities, would absolutely disappear.

M Pichon says that President Wilson had urged that Austria should be regarded as a new and an enemy state, and the Council of Four had adopted his point of view. If the Peace Treaty with Austria is to be discussed under this new point of view, each separate clause that it contains would have to be reconsidered.

Mr Balfour said that the discussion had departed from the lines which he had originally intended for it. S Tittoni and M Pichon had explained with much fervor and eloquence that Austria must be regarded as guilty for the outbreak of war, and for a great deal of the suffering inflicted upon France and Italy; they had further shown that she could not be regarded in the same light as Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. He has never wished to dispute this, for it had always been perfectly clear to him, that an absolute distinction existed between the Governments of Vienna and those of the other States formed on the ruins of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had wished to draw the attention of the Conference to a new problem, deserving special consideration; the problem in question being, how the present Austrian Government was to be treated with regard to the Peace Treaty presented to it, and to the observations that it was making thereon. If M Pichon and M Tittoni thinks that the Council should consider every problem raised by the Austrian Delegation, he has no objection to acceding to their wishes. He would, on the other hand, have preferred that the very highly qualified Committee presided over by M Jules Cambon, should have, in the first place, considered the Austrian replies. If the decision taken on the day before were upheld, he would be obliged to examine the Peace Treaty, and the Austrian notes upon it, word by word, in company with his experts. He thinks that it would be unfortunate to compel members of the Council to concentrate their attention on these points of detail, in view of the enormous responsibilities that they were called upon to bear.

S Tittoni thanks Mr. Balfour for his explanation, and says that the discussion had now been limited to a mere question of procedure. The Committees had examined the Austrian counter proposals, and the Council must now discuss their reports. Mr Balfour proposed to save time, by an alteration in procedure, which would turn the Coordinating Committee into a sort of delegation of the Council. If time would really be saved by this, he would be the first to agree to it, but he does not think that it would have that result. He thought, on the contrary, that it would introduce a new complication, because whatever the Co-ordination Committee might report, the Council would certainly have to reconsider it. When the questions raised came before the Council, he would certainly reserve to himself full liberty of discussion, in spite of anything the Coordinating Committee might have said.

By adopting Mr Balfour’s procedure, three separate discussions would become inevitable:

(1) The Austrian counter proposals would be discussed in the technical Committees;

(2) The Reports of the technical Committees would be discussed in the Coordinating Committee;

(3) The Coordinating Committee’s Report would be discussed in the Council.
But if the Council were first to consider the Committee’s reports, and then send back its decisions to the Coordinating Committee, the procedure would be shortened by one set of discussions.

M Cambon said that he agrees with S Tittoni when he said that a fresh complication would be introduced by the adoption of Mr Balfour’s proposal. At the same time S Tittoni had not shown all the steps through which the discussion of questions raised by the Austrian counter-proposals had to pass. The Coordinating Committee had been nominated in order to bring unity into the divergent questions brought before the Council by the counter-proposals of Enemy States. The Committee thinks it ought to carry its work through as rapidly as possible, and for this reason, it had asked for assistance from the Drafting Committee on that morning. If it is decided that the functions of the Committee were to be fundamentally altered, it would be necessary for the Committee in question to refer back all questions previously decided to experts and to the Drafting Committee. This would mean a delay of 15 days or more, which would be of no benefit to the Peace Conference. For this reason, it would be best to limit the functions of the Coordinating Committee in the manner laid down in the previous decision of the Council. Any member of the Committee, or the Committee as a whole, would always be in a position to draw the attention of the Council to special points worthy of its consideration. A short time previously, the report of the Aeronautic Committee had been under discussion, and it has been noted that the report in question contained certain expressions on the subject of the Austrian Government, not couched in a very diplomatic form. The Coordinating Committee, however, had no intention of submitting points of this nature to the Council. The duty of the Committee was obviously to coordinate all the questions raised, and submit them to the Council in the form of a single report.

Mr Polk remarks that points on which the Coordinating Committee had been unanimous need not further be discussed.

M Pichon said that when the Peace Treaty with Austria has been drawn up, all questions had been thoroughly examined by competent technical Committees, whose reports were to be placed before the Council of Five, who, after discussion, had sent the reports in question, together with their own decisions to the Drafting Committee. The clauses, as drawn up by the Drafting Committee, by virtue of this procedure had been resubmitted to the Council, who had transmitted them to the Austrian Delegation. The Austrian Delegates then made counter proposals, which were sent to experts, on whose reports decisions were made. The decisions and reports were sent to the Coordinating Committee, which resubmitted them to the Council. M Cambon had therefore accurately described the manner in which the Coordinating Committee was intended to work. The Coordinating Committee could not be regarded as a Court of Appeal for the Technical Committees, since the members of the Committee were Delegates and not Technical experts. If the Council should decide that the Coordinating Committee should make decisions on the reports of the Committees, it would be doing no more than making a nontechnical body decide over the Heads of Experts. Everybody wished to make the procedure of the Council as rapid as possible. This would be best effected by keeping the Coordinating Committee strictly to its coordinating functions. Mr Balfour’s wishes would be fully met by instructing the Coordinating Committee to draw special attention to points demanding consideration from the Council.

M Cambon said that he thought it important to adhere to the procedure outlined by M Pichon. If the Coordinating Committee were to be called upon to discuss questions of principle, it would of necessity, be obliged to call in experts to assist it. This would indefinitely lengthen both its own labors, and those of the Conference. The consequences of the alternative proposals of M Pichon and Mr Balfour had been very clearly exemplified by the questions arising out of Mr Headlam-Morley’s letter and his own. Mr Headlam-Morley had explained that, if his own letter were adopted, the Peace Treaty with Austria would have to be remodeled almost in its entirety, whilst, if M Cambon’s draft reply were agreed to, no important changes in the Treaty would be necessary. The Conference had drawn up a Peace Treaty largely on the basis of reports of technical Committees. Doubtless the Treaty in question was open to criticism, but it would be even more so, if it were known that a non-technical committee had been given a power of decision over the reports of experts.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that he believes that it had been stated that he wished to re-draft the whole Treaty with Austria. He wished to deny any such wish on his part most emphatically. It had been his privilege to be a member of several Committees whose duty it was to consider questions arising out of the Peace Treaty with Austria, and out of the Austrian counter-proposals. It had been his own opinion, and that of his colleagues on the Committees to which he referred, that the Peace Treaty with Austria could not stand in its present form. This was so far accepted that M Laroche’s Committee was largely re-modelling the provisions of the Austrian Treaty. To give one example, the original clauses on the subject of nationalities had been found to be inapplicable. The Austrian objection to the original articles had been supported by his Italian colleagues, and by the Czechoslovak delegates. The result was that they were now being re-drafted. This alteration in the original draft Treaty was not made in deference to the opinions of anybody so insignificant as himself, but merely because investigation had shown that the Treaty required recasting. In the case of the Peace Treaty with Germany, the Council of Four had closely studied all problems arising out of the German counter-proposals. The procedure had now been altered, and the replies were being sent, in the first place, to the Coordinating Committees, which had, in consequence, been compelled to recognize an alteration in its own functions. In the case in question, the work of considering counter-proposals was much more difficult. The German counter-proposals had raised problems referring to the cessation of a state of war. In the present instance, the Peace Conference was concerned with the liquidation of an entire Empire, and all observations on the problems raised involved a proportionately higher degree of complication. The Coordinating Committee is therefore called upon to examine answers to the Austrian Delegation, not only with a view to seeing that they were coherent, but also with the object of relieving the Council of some of its duties. The decision arrived at on the previous day prevented the Committee from duly fulfilling some of the duties that it was called upon to perform.

M Pichon said that the Coordinating Committee is left free to draw the Council’s attention to certain important points, but is not allowed to discuss questions of principle.

Mr Polk then submits a draft proposal.

S Tittoni then proposed a modification to the draft proposal in the sense that the Coordinating Committee should not, as a whole, draw attention to alterations in principle, but that its individual members should be allowed to do so.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that the Editing Committee should:

(1) Co-ordinate the various replies to the Austrians, making only verbal changes, and

(2) Submit to the Supreme Council Annexes pointing out all questions where one or more of the representatives of the Coordinating Committee thought that changes in substance should be made.)


(At this point the Experts of the Editing Committee leave the room, and the Naval Experts, with M Seydoux, enter.)

2. M Seydoux read and commented on the report contained in Appendix “A”. He further read a telegram, received from Sweden (see Appendix “B”).

Mr Dulles calls attention to two points of practical interest: first, as prompt action is necessary, because the Russian ports would be closed in about three months by ice, it was undesirable to undertake anything which would require prolonged negotiations with the neutral States; such as getting their consent to the stopping and searching of their ships by the Allied Navies. Moreover, this is not necessary since, if they agree not to give clearance papers to ships for Russian ports, any vessels found on their way to such ports would either be without clearance papers, or would have falsified them. Secondly, he notices that, among the measures suggested, was the establishment of censorship over postal and telegraphic communications. As the United States had no agency for carrying out such a censorship, and no such agency could be re-established without the action of Congress: in asking this of the neutral States, the Allied and Associated Powers would be requesting them to do something which one of them would not be prepared to do.

M Seydoux says that he proposes that in the Note which should be sent to the neutral Powers, they should be asked to refuse clearance papers to vessels proceeding to Bolshevik Russia, passports to individuals with the same destination, and banking facilities for operations of trade. They should further be invited to exercise censorship over mails and telegrams to Russia, as far as it was in their power to do so.

Mr Polk says that Admiral Knapp had drawn attention to the desirability of asking neutral countries to exercise censorship only over their own mails and telegrams.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks it important that all action proposed under the resolution should be taken in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M Seydoux then asked what measures should be taken with the Germans.

M Pichon says that, in his opinion, the German Government should be asked to take measures similar to those that neutral countries were to be invited to carry out.

S Tittoni said that it should be pointed out to the German Government that the measures proposed were in its own interests. It should be invited to carry them out for this reason, despite the fact that the provisions of the Peace Treaty gave the Allied and Associated Powers no right of dictating.

(It is decided to send a Note to the German Government and to neutral States in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, asking:

(a) That clearance papers should be refused to vessels intending to proceed to ports in Bolshevik Russia;

(b) That an equivalent embargo should be placed upon goods intended to be transmitted by land to Russian destination;

(c) That passports should be refused to individuals desirous of traveling to or from Bolshevik Russia;

(d) That banks should be prohibited from dealing with the affairs of, or transacting business with Bolshevik Russia;

(e) That as far as possible, acceptance of mails and telegraphic communications destined for, or coming from, Bolshevik Russia should be refused; and informing them:

(f) That the Allied and Associated Powers had the intention of putting into force, in their own countries, measures similar to those that Neutral Governments were now invited to adopt;

(g) That ships of the Allied Navies, enforcing the intended embargo on the ports of Bolshevik Russia, would act under the authority of the Allied and Associated Governments.)


3. The resolution submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation is adopted.


4. Mr Polk draws the attention of the Council to a further telegram received from the United States Minister at Warsaw.

General Weygand reads a telegram that he had drafted for communication to General Dupont and stated that he wished to make certain remarks upon it. In the first place, he desires to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the negotiations, which it is intended that General Dupont should open, would not compel the German Government in any way. General Dupont was only President of the Armistice Commission at Berlin, and could only deal with the German President of the Armistice Commission. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs had begun to bring the German Armistice Commission under his own orders. It was therefore evident, that the German Government would have opportunities for delay in considering General Dupont’s proposals, and would be able to gain time by its procrastinations; it might, therefore, carry out severe measures of repression against the Poles in the meantime. He asks whether a more speedy method of communication to the German Government could not be devised. The telegrams communicated to the Council showed that they were faced with an insurrection in Silesia. They are, therefore, called upon, not to maintain order in that country but to restore it. The Military Representative of the Supreme War Council at Versailles had decided, previously, that one division would be sufficient for maintaining order in Silesia; but this decision had been on the supposition that the country in question would be in a state of tranquillity. One division would certainly not suffice to maintain order in a populous district of 360,000 inhabitants, in a state of insurrection. The original figure must therefore be revised, and he reminded the Council that one inter-allied division had been raised with difficulty. Allied troops in Silesia must obviously be supported by some Government, and the only Government which would give them the support required, was the Government at Berlin. In order to avoid placing the troops under the orders of the German Government, he had proposed to send the Allied High Commission to Upper Silesia, in anticipation of the actual provisions of the Peace Treaty. The difficulties of maintaining troops in such a country were very great. He proposed, by way of lessening them, to ask the German Government to anticipate the provisions of the Treaty, only with regard to the disturbed parts of Upper Silesia. The Area in question is not great, and consisted only of one-third of the entire plebiscite district.

Mr Balfour says that whilst Great Britain has no diplomatic representative at Berlin, he does not know that this was the case of the other Allied Powers.

S Tittoni answered that the Italians were represented in Berlin by a Civil Commissioner who would not, however, have any diplomatic attributions until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

General Weygand said that he proposed that the Germans should be dealt with through their Delegation at Versailles. He has negotiated with the German representatives and had found them fairly reasonable, more particularly Von Lersner.

M Pichon says that it would be necessary to hand a written note to the German representatives.

M Berthelot said that it was, on the whole, better to negotiate by means of written communications in such cases. Notes were clearer and more concise than conversations. He points out, however, that Von Lersner could only be used as a medium of transmission.

M Pichon then says that he thinks it might, after all be better to deal with the Germans through General Dupont.

General Weygand said that General Dupont could exercise no coercion upon the German Government, and negotiations through him would be lengthy. He gave as an example, the length of time necessary to obtain Von der Goltz’ recall.

M Pichon remarks that if it were true that the German Government had promoted the strikes in Upper Silesia, they would obviously show no energy in re-establishing order there.

Mr Balfour said that General Weygand had not referred to a suggestion of the previous day, which was that Germany should be threatened with the loss of the coal from Silesian coal fields. If the Government at Berlin could be shown to have stirred up strife, the Allied Governments would be justified in exerting all their efforts to prevent the export of coal to Germany until the requirements of other Allies had been satisfied. Such a measure would be equitable, and possibly effective.

S Tittoni said that the information submits to the Council at its present meeting, and on the previous day, had differed in one point. The Council had first been informed that the German Government had incited revolution in Silesia. They were now told that it had provoked insurrections against itself. The Allies should be careful not to allow the German Government the right of conducting repressive measures in the name of the Council.

Mr Balfour agrees with S Tittoni.

General Weygand says that the Polish Delegation had drawn attention to the same point.

Mr Balfour proposes that the Reparation Commission which was now in direct touch with the German Delegation at Versailles, had opened negotiations with the Government at Berlin. He asked whether it would not be possible to employ Mr Hoover. He enjoyed a special position, which gave him the right to go anywhere in Central Europe. Mr Hoover, though not an accredited diplomatic officer of any of the Allied and Associated Governments or of the American Delegation, was certainly capable of acting in the name of the Council. Would it not be possible to ask him to go and interview the Government at Berlin and to advise the Council on the result of his conversation.

Mr Polk remarks that Mr Hoover is now on his way back from Warsaw, and cannot be stopped.

M Pichon suggests that M Loucheur should be asked to attend the meeting of the Council on the following day.

Mr Polk says that, in consequence of the strike in Upper Silesia, all train services in Austria were to be stopped. The train from Vienna had been held up on the night before.

M Berthelot remarks that information from Polish sources was often exaggerated, and suggested that a delay of 24 hours would not spoil the decision of the Council.

M Pichon suggested that Paragraph (c) of General Weygand’s draft telegram should be omitted. He further suggested that General Dupont should be asked to give the Council an accurate report of the situation of affairs in Germany, and that he should suggest what measures he thought the Council might suitably take.

S Tittoni suggests that General Dupont should give what information he could as to the action that the German Government proposed to take.

General Weygand said that General Dupont might be informed, purely for his own information, that the Allied and Associated Governments were considering the possibility of anticipating certain provisions in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

Mr Balfour asks whether it would be wise to inform General Dupont of all the measures that the Council has proposed to take, and to draw his attention to the dangers that it foresaw from allowing German intervention.

M Pichon said that he thinks it would be wise to do so; providing that information of this sort was purely for General Dupont’s personal guidance.

S Tittoni asked whether General Dupont could be asked to consult with the local strike leaders in the affected districts in Silesia, and whether he could get information from them as to the possibility of a resumption of regular work.

Mr Balfour asked Mr Polk to communicate with Mr Hoover.

(It is decided:

(a) That General Weygand should re-draft a telegram to General Dupont, incorporating the wishes of the Council, as expressed in the previous discussion;

(b) That M Loucheur and Mr Hoover should attend at the Council after their return.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

20th August 1919

U.S.S. America arriving in New York Harbor bringing U.S. troops home.


African American troops doing rifle practice at Camp Jackson, South Carolina.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, August 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. Mr Balfour says that he has received a telegram from the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, asking whether, in view of the appointment of a Greek Colonel as a consultative member of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna, an Ottoman Colonel might be admitted on the same footing. Mr Balfour asks whether he is authorized by the Council to reply in the affirmative.

(It is agreed that in view of the resolution taken on August 14th Mr Balfour should reply that similar facilities to those afforded to the Greek representative should be granted to the Turkish representative on the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna.)


2. Mr Balfour says that the position in the Baltic States is very surprising. He has prepared a summary of the reports received from Reval. He thinks it might be of interest to the Council to have this report read.

The following Report was then read:

“On August 14th after negotiations in which the French, British and American representatives appear to have taken a prominent part, a North-Western Government for the provinces of Pskoff, Novgorod, and Petrograd was formed. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs is Lianosov and General Yudenitch is Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief. General Rodzianko as acting Commander of the North-Western Army accepted this Government.

The Government proclaims its intention of convoking a Congress of Representatives of the people in order to base itself on democratic principles. It is decided to establish the Headquarters of the Government at Reval, the reason being that the majority of its members fear that if they go to Pskoff their lives will be in danger from Balahovich, the former Commander of the Russian North-Western Corps, who might attempt a coup d’état.

The Government, which proclaimed itself as ‘a group acting as an independent government in the North-Western provinces as part of a united Russia’ proceeded to make a declaration of which the following were the principal points

(a) That they assumed complete responsibility for deciding all provincial questions;

(b) That they requested financial assistance as well as stores and equipment from the Allied and Associated Governments;

(c) That they requested the immediate help of the Estonian Government with armed forces to liberate Petrograd as well as the rest of the Petrograd, Pskoff and Novgorod Governments from the Bolsheviks;

(d) That they requested the French, British and American representatives to obtain from their Governments the recognition of complete Estonian independence;

(e) That they proposed to open negotiations with the Estonian Government at once in order to obtain an outlet to the sea through Estonian ports and to regulate commercial relations between the two countries;

(f) That they were informing the Supreme Russian Government of Kolchak of the decisions taken by them and were confident that he would appreciate the necessities of the situation.
As soon as this declaration was issued, the French, British and American representatives at Reval together presented to the Estonian Government a note from General Gough urging co-operation with the Russian North-Western Government and stating that the Estonian claim to complete independence would be represented to the Allied and Associated Governments.

The Estonian Government have returned a formal reply, to the effect that they are unable to co-operate with the Russians as requested until the Allies recognize full Estonian independence.

General Gough reports that unless this is given at once the collapse of the Russian Army may be expected and it will be impossible to control the situation. He also considers that the new Government should receive immediate support.”

M Berthelot says that the French Government has received similar information. The Estonian Government does not merely require recognition as an independent Government, but also material assistance in arms and money - the financial aid amounting to 600 millions of francs.

S Tittoni says that he has read in a newspaper that General Balahovich together with the Bolshevik force which he commanded, had gone over to the Estonians and had proceeded to Pskoff. This appeared to corroborate the information received by Mr Balfour.

M Berthelot says that this General had always played an ambiguous part. He could not be seriously trusted by any side.

Mr Polk asks from what source Mr Balfour had received his news.

Mr Balfour says he has received his information on the previous day, after the meeting.

M Pichon says that he has also received similar news on the previous evening.

Mr Balfour says that the most noticeable feature of the news was that the French, British and American representatives seemed for the last week to have been engaged in fostering a coup d’état without consulting with their own Governments.

Mr Polk says that there is no American representative in the Baltic authorized to act on behalf of the American Government. There is an American General associated with General Gough, and also an officer employed on relief work. The General has lately been telegraphed to, that he must take no part in local politics. The Allied Missions in the Baltic were composed of representatives who acts independently. They were not subject to the orders of General Gough.

M Pichon says that he thinks the conference had placed General Gough in command of the Allied representatives.

Mr Polk observed that although General Gough was the senior officer, he is not in command.

S Tittoni says that the Allied representatives might have argued that as the Conference had recognised Admiral Kolchak in order that he might fight the Bolsheviks, they were justified in recognizing any other Russian organization with a similar purpose.

M Pichon suggests that Mr Balfour should ask General Gough to send supplementary information.

Mr Balfour observes that General Gough had discreetly gone on leave. The really practical difficulty was that the Estonians are, in a manner, putting a pistol at the Head of the Council. If they came to terms with the Bolshevists, there was no further hope of fighting Bolshevism in that area. They were threatening to do so. In other words, they are attempting methods of blackmail in order to be recognized and assisted with money and arms. General Gough informed the Council that failing recognition of the Estonian Government, disaster would inevitably overtake the North-Western Russian Armies.

M. Berthelot pointed out that the Estonians had been employing the same tactics for the last six months.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the Council could do very little. He will inquire, however, what the British Government proposed to do regarding General Gough.

S Tittoni said that Admiral Kolchak might be asked whether he would recognize the independence of Estonia. He had already been asked to recognize its autonomy. With this the Estonians were not satisfied.

M Berthelot says that Admiral Kolchak would never recognize the independence of Estonia. Admiral Kolchak had, hitherto, refused to recognize the independence of Finland. In any case, the Baltic provinces were necessary to Russia as an outlet to the sea.

Mr Balfour observes that the second item on the Agenda, namely, ‘Allied Policy in the Baltic States,’ is connected with the topic under discussion. He has prepared on this subject a proposal which he begged to submit to the Council:

“The Baltic Commission are requested to submit to the Council a declaration of Allied and Associated policy with regard to the international position of the Baltic States, in the place of the draft declaration considered, but not accepted, by the Council on July 26th.

This declaration should be framed in strict accordance with the relevant portion of the letter addressed by the Conference to Admiral Kolchak on May 27, which, unless and until other arrangements are made, must be regarded as the governing document in all their transactions. The declaration should therefore provide in the first place that, unless an agreement is speedily reached between these States and Russia, a settlement will be made by the Allied and Associated Powers, in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations; and, in the second place that pending such settlement these States shall be recognised as autonomous, and fully competent to enter into relations with the Allied and Associated Governments.”

M Berthelot observes that every time the autonomy of the Baltic States is mentioned, these States are exasperated, as they continually ask for independence. He thinks it is desirable to try and find a slightly different formula.

Mr Balfour says that the expressions used had been borrowed almost textually from the letter addressed by the Conference to Admiral Kolchak.

Mr Polk says he understands the draft to be an instruction to the Baltic Commission.

Mr Balfour says that this is so. The Baltic Commission is inclined to recognize the independence of the Baltic States. It does not keep in mind the larger policy of the Conference. He thinks this draft would remind them of the wider aspect of the question.

Mr Polk says that provided the Baltic Commission was being asked merely to submit a resolution for discussion by the Council, he would agree.

Mr Balfour says this is all that is proposed.

(The draft instruction above quoted is then adopted.)


3. General Weygand explains the Report on the evacuation of Latvia by the Germans, prepared by Marshal Foch. He observes that the note is prepared exclusively from a military point of view. As regards General von der Goltz, the German Government had replied that they could not admit the right of the Conference to demand the recall of the General. Nevertheless there was news that he was at Mittau, on his way to Berlin. It is not yet clear whether he had been recalled or whether he was on his way to consult the German Government. As to the evacuation of the German troops by sea, he thinks the German allegations are wrong. The operation is really possible and can only be settled locally by General Gough. As to evacuation by land, the German reasons were equally bad. The British, as far as he knows, had never promised to furnish engines. This question also could be settled locally. As to removal of material by the Germans, the Allied and Associated Powers had authority under the Armistice to forbid it. The conclusion was that of the five things asked for, only one, namely, the stoppage of reinforcements, had been agreed to by the German Government, although the Poles said that the agreement was not being fulfilled. As to the recall of General von der Goltz, the situation was not clear. As regards the remaining three, the Allies had a right to enforce their demands and General Gough was in a position to obtain satisfaction.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Allies have any right to make one particular German evacuate Latvia before any other.

General Weygand admitted that the Allies had no right to make a special case. However, General von der Goltz is undoubtedly the source of all the trouble, and he is every now and then disavowed by the German Government. In any case, the interpretation of his movements is not clear, and the matter remained in suspense.

M Pichon says that according to the French representative at Helsingfors, General von der Goltz had certainly gone to Berlin.

(The conclusions of Marshal Foch’s Note are adopted and it is decided that General Gough should be asked by Marshal Foch to obtain the execution of the demands contained therein, with the exception of the recall of General von der Goltz, pending further information regarding that officer.)


4. M Pichon says that he has obtained confirmation of the news communicated on the previous day regarding Silesia. He caused to be read a report of a speech by Chancellor Bauer before the German National Assembly. In addition to the German version, he had received from Mr Zamoiski the Polish version. Mr Zamoiski is of the opinion that unless the Allies intervene with troops, the situation will go from bad to worse. M Pichon had told him that intervention in German territory was a very serious step, and that the Council had asked for further information. He had also told him that the Germans were to be informed that unless they could control the situation it might be necessary to intervene.

Mr Balfour says that he had received a telegram from Sir Percy Wyndham, of which the following was the most significant passage:

“Polish Foreign Office informed me this morning position considered very serious, and Government is afraid German regular army will invade Poland, and time has come when it will be impossible to resist the popular demand for intervention by Polish troops. Immediate outbreaks expected in Warsaw if this is not done. Deputation from Upper Silesia has arrived at Warsaw to bring pressure on Polish Government to above effect. Matters appear to be serious, and situation would be eased if Polish Government could be informed that the Allied Powers are bringing pressure to bear on German authorities.”

He proposes, subject to the approval of the Council, to send the following reply:

“Evidently Germans have both the right and the duty of maintaining order in Upper Silesia until Treaty is ratified. In these circumstances the Poles would be breaking the Treaty if they send troops into the disturbed area except on German invitation.

We shall endeavor without delay to send Allied representatives to the disturbed area, who will report to the Council, and may be able to act as a moderating influence on the spot.

If we can by negotiation hasten the date at which the Inter-Allied Commission take charge of the plebiscite area, we will do so.

The interest both of Poland and of all Central Europe urgently requires that work should at once be resumed in the mines; that order should be maintained; and that the Polish population should be patient during the very few weeks which still separate them from the date of the German evacuation.

You should inform your Allied colleagues of this telegram, which has been sent after discussion at Supreme Council.”

This reply contains two practical proposals. The first to send representatives to Upper Silesia. Representatives of the Coal Commission were already being sent. It might be possible to attach a civilian mission not specifically concerned with coal. The second was that the Conference would attempt to negotiate with Germany, in order to hasten the date at which the Allied Commissioners should take charge of the plebiscite zone. In this connection it might be remembered that the German Government had forwarded a demand from the inhabitants of Danzig that the date of the separation of the town from the German State should be hastened. If the Germans favored this in Danzig, they might be willing to show a similar spirit in regard to Upper Silesia.

M Pichon said that he sympathized with the proposals suggested by Mr Balfour, but he must point out that it would be meeting the desires of the Poles. It would appear that the Polish workmen had brought about the strikes in Upper Silesia, with the purpose of rendering Allied intervention necessary.

Mr Polk says that he had learned from Mr Hoover that he is conducting negotiations with the German Government regarding the coal supply. It might be possible to take advantage of this to ask Mr. Hoover to bring the situation of the Silesian coalfields to the notice of the German Government.

(It is agreed that the Coal Commission might urge the German Government to agree to an early holding of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia as a means of improving the coal supply for the coming winter.

It is further agreed that Mr Balfour should send the telegram to Sir Percy Wyndham above quoted. The telegram drafted by General Weygand and sent to General Dupont in accordance with the decision of the previous day is approved.


5. General Belin explained the revised Naval, Military and Air Clauses prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles. He states that the only matter on which there was no definite conclusion is the number of men Hungary was to be allowed to keep under arms. The Military Representatives had attempted to act in accordance with the instructions of the Council, given on the 8th August, 1919. Various figures had been suggested, the two extreme figures being 45,000 and 18,000 men. The Military Representatives had suggested 35,000 as a compromise, and this was the only matter in which the clauses now proposed differed from the clauses inserted in the Treaty with Austria.

M Pichon said that on the matter of the number of men to be kept under arms in Hungary, he must reserve his decision pending the return of M Clemenceau. With this exception he was prepared to accept the clauses drafted by the Military Representatives.

(Subject to the French reservation regarding the number of men to be maintained under arms in Hungary, the Articles proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles are accepted.)


6. The Council has before them draft replies to the German Delegation, prepared by the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission, regarding:

(a) Calculation of damages in the territories devastated by the war. Replies to the German Delegation
(b) Restitution of topographical plans of the mines of Costeplatz.
(The proposed replies, are accepted.)


7. M Pichon says that on the previous day he and Mr Polk had had a conversation regarding the demand of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to be heard on the subject of the reparations due from Bulgaria.

S Tittoni said that he sympathizes with the request, but he thinks the objection was that it created a precedent. There was no doubt that interested parties should always be heard before a decision affecting them was taken. But in this case the matter had been fully discussed and all the Serbian arguments had been heard. It was needless to have these arguments repeated, and unless the Serbians had anything new to allege, it was an undesirable precedent, tending to call into question decisions of the Council already made.

Mr Polk says that the Serbian delegates think that they would be discredited at home if they failed to obtain a hearing from the so-called Supreme Council. He quite agreed that it was undesirable to hear a restatement of old arguments, but he does not wish the delegates to return to their country with a sense of humiliation. He thinks that they might be required, in accordance with S Tittoni’s proposal, to confine themselves in their arguments to any errors or omissions there might be in the Treaty.

M Pichon says that he supports Mr Polk’s views. Apart from the desire to show courtesy to the Serbians, he thinks it is advisable to avoid incidents similar to those which had taken place previously. Before the Treaty is communicated to the Bulgarians it will be necessary to communicate it to a plenary session of the Conference. On a previous occasion Mr Bratiano had caused a disagreeable incident at a Plenary Session. By pacifying the Serbian Delegation before hand, it might be possible to avoid a repetition of a similar incident.

Mr Balfour says that he finds himself in a difficulty. He understands Mr Polk’s views and sympathizes with them, but he does not know what had taken place in the previous stages of the discussion regarding reparation due to Serbia. He believed that the Serbians would demand the restitution of a larger number of cattle, cows, pigs, etc., than was allowed to them. But all nations had similar claims to make, and they could rarely be satisfied. If the Serbians were to be heard, the Romanians would demand a hearing. The Romanian case against Hungary at the present time, was based on a claim for restitution of what had been stolen from Romania. The Allies, however, are saying to the Romanians that they could not recoup their losses, and that they must take their share with the rest of the Allies. The Portuguese too had a sense of grievance and would, if they heard of this, repeat their demand for representation on the Reparations Commission. It would take up a good deal of the time of the Conference to hear a restatement of the claims of all the aggrieved nations. If the Serbians can be confined to a statement of the points on which in their opinion the Commissions had gone wrong he would be content, but he was afraid that it would be difficult to restrict them sufficiently.

S Tittoni says that a compromise appears possible. M Pichon on behalf of the Conference might be deputed to listen to all the Serbians might have to say.

M Pichon says that he thanks S Tittoni, but feels that the Serbians will not be satisfied. He has already heard them and knows what they have to say. He does not think that anything they could bring forward would alter the decision greatly in their favor. If they are refused a hearing, however, he thinks that a curt answer should not be sent them, but that a reply should be made giving in full the reasons for the point of view adopted by the Conference. In substance the Serbian complaint fell under two headings,

(a) Insufficient restitution of cattle;

(b) Exclusion from membership of the Reparations Commission in Bulgaria.

M Berthelot says that Serbia is an agricultural country and cannot revive without regaining her cattle. France and Italy have been partially invaded, and partially despoiled of cattle; Serbia has been entirely overrun and entirely despoiled.

(At this point Col Peel enters the room.)

Mr Balfour explains the above discussion to Col Peel.

Col Peel says that if the Serbians are allowed to present their case, the Greeks and Romanians would ask to do likewise. A similar situation would arise with regard to Hungary. He quite agrees that the Serbians have suffered extreme hardship, but it is not the Serbians who are presenting this claim, but the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State. Two-thirds of this new state had been our enemies in the war, and probably contained quantities of cattle, some of them looted from the Allied countries. What the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation wants is far more than could possibly be granted. They want the Treaty with Bulgaria to be on the lines of the Treaty with Germany. He can see no objection, however, to the hearing of the Delegation if they have anything new to say, which they had not previously urged.

(It is agreed that M Pichon should reply to the request of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to the effect that their request could not be accepted for the various reasons given in the above discussion. If, however, the Delegation has any new facts or arguments to bring forward, the Council will be pleased to receive them, and then to decide whether or not a hearing is desirable.)


8. Mr Polk says that he has received the following telegram:

“In the Sessions of August 18, the Commission heard Admiral Horthy, Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Forces. He gave information as to the resources on which he counts in organizing these forces. They seemed to consist chiefly of officers. He thinks that the Romanians are influenced by the Bolshevists. He thinks that the workmen have still many concealed arms. He calls attention to the considerable requisitions effected by the Romanians. The Commission summons for the 19th the General commanding the Romanian forces or his representative. He will indicate the measures that he has taken, with a view to respecting the indications of the verbal note of August 16. He will make it known whether these measures are being carried out, especially concerning requisitions.

Inter-Allied Military Commission.”

In this connection he has a proposal to make, which he would not ask the Council to accept at once, but which he would ask his colleagues to consider.


9. Mr Polk says that the American officer in touch with the Austrian Delegation informed him that the Delegation when it received the final answer of the Conference, proposed to take the terms back to Vienna to submit them to the Austrian Assembly. It is further said that in all probability should no alterations be made in the territorial frontiers laid down for Austria, and especially should a plebiscite in Syria be denied, Dr Renner will not be authorized by the Assembly to sign the peace. He would be forced to resign and a change of Government would result.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

21st August 1919

Friedrich Ebert is officially sworn in as the first President of Germany after serving as the Provisional President since February.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, August 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. Mr Polk asks that the letter he had addressed to M Clemenceau be referred for examination and report to the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission.

(This is agreed to.)


2. Mr Polk says that he now begs to withdraw the reservation he had made on August 7th, regarding the Anglo-Belgian Agreement on the Belgian sphere in the ex-German Colony of East Africa.


3. Mr Hoover says that he has just returned from a trip of investigation into various economic questions. The main discovery of his trip had been the critical situation as to coal in Central Europe. There are three coal-fields, from which the entire supply for this section of Europe was drawn: first, the one in Upper Silesia, now affected by the strikes: one in Teschen, under dispute between the Czechoslovaks and the Poles; and one in Poland. The total output from these three fields is 5 to 6 million tons a month, and they constitute the very heart of Central Europe. Unless their production is kept up, it will be impossible to maintain the transportation and municipal services in Central Europe. The Upper Silesian coal-mines have practically stopped production on account of the strikes. One mine has been entirely destroyed. It would be only a matter of days before the remainder would be disabled beyond repair for several months. There are many versions as to the cause for the situation. There appeared to be four parties to the quarrel: first, the Polish workmen; second, the German Grenzschutz troops, who were in a high state of emotional nationalism; third the Spartacists; fourth, the German coal-owners and perhaps the German Government itself. The causes appear to be not economic, but political. The Polish authorities had shown him documents which, if they could be authenticated, would prove that the Germans had tried to stir up the Spartacists to make trouble, and that the German troops had actually attempted to drive out the Polish workmen. The Germans said, on the contrary, that the Polish workmen and the Spartacists had conspired together to foment the trouble, and that they were forced to restore order. One of the strange results of this state of affairs was that in one case some Polish workmen were guarding their mines to save them from destruction. In his own opinion, the only possible remedy was an occupation by Allied troops. No Commission could bring about a reconciliation between the contending parties. Colonel Goodyear, who had been in charge of coal distribution, had been sent there, and was trying to get the parties to come to some agreement together, but he was convinced that it would be impossible to do so. Mr Hoover himself had had a discussion with Herr Markenson, a German who had been a member of the Armistice Commission on the Eastern Front. He is very disturbed, and from his statement he had gathered that the German Government are not fully in control of the Grenzschutz troops, whom they were trying to replace by regular troops. This same German had said that the German Government was most anxious, as it necessarily ought to be, to restore order, but, of course, one could never tell what power the Berlin Government exercised over the various military bodies in the East. Undoubtedly, the German owners are in desperate fear of the destruction of their property, and will welcome any method of reestablishing order.

There are contradictory currents even among the Germans themselves, and it is his opinion that the racial animosities had reached such a point that nothing could stop the strife but a military occupation. He realized, of course, that this is not legally possible until after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, but the intentions of the German Government might here be put to the test, and he thinks that the German Government will probably agree to anticipate the action proposed by the Treaty, and, of course, the Poles are asking that this be done. He believes that this would be the attitude of the German Government, because of the desire Herr Markenson and his colleagues had expressed to get Allied troops all along the Eastern front, between the Poles and the German volunteer troops, and because the difficulty of controlling the latter made them fear a general conflagration.

He had had a meeting with the Trades Union Leaders of the Teschen district, and there also found the Trades Unions divided along the lines of nationality. The Polish leaders confess that they cannot help to increase production until they know to whom the mines would fall, and they will not work for the Czechs. There is here also much political sentiment. He had asked whether strikes would be used to influence the plebiscite, and was answered that undoubtedly they would be. This information he considers as of interest, both as affecting the political situation in the Teschen district, and also by analogy furnishing a clue to the situation in Upper Silesia.

There is a political question - that of restoring order; and there is also the economic question of stimulating production and getting the output from the mines necessary for the maintenance of the ordinary life of central Europe. From the last point of view, the three districts were one and the selfish interests of any one nation must be entirely set aside for the general good of that section of the continent. At present the feeling of the Czechs towards the Austrians is such as to make it hopeless to ask them to keep coal shipments going to Austria, although the Austrian transportation, which was dependent on that coal supply, was absolutely essential to the Czechs themselves, and the same sort of feelings existed everywhere. He thinks it necessary that the Coal Commission should appoint a sub-Committee to control all three Districts with the authority of the Peace Conference. He suggests that this be done at once, and he would like to see the Coal Committee enter upon its duties with the prestige that would be given it by the assurance that it would constitute the Plebiscite Commission as soon as it became possible to appoint that body. He thinks it possible to select men competent for both, and he thinks that it will only be possible for the Coal Committee to perform its duties if invested with the double authority, only this double authority could solve either question.

M Pichon asks Mr Hoover at what time he had visited Upper Silesia.

Mr Hoover replies that he had not visited Upper Silesia, but had interviewed people coming from there at a place on the Railway outside the mining area.

M Pichon says that he had asked this question because he had just received news that the situation in Upper Silesia had improved.

Mr Hoover says that on his side he had telegrams from Warsaw, informing him that there was continuous fighting along the whole of the German-Polish frontiers.

S Tittoni says he thinks the improvement in any case must be precarious. He is disposed to agree to the proposals made by Mr Hoover.

M Pichon says that there is a telegram from General Dupont which confirms most of what Mr Hoover had said.

Mr Hoover says that he was in possession of a proclamation of the socialist party, calling upon the Poles to expel the Germans from the mines. There is, therefore, a mixture of Spartacist, and Nationalist feeling which was very confusing.

Mr Polk says that he has received a telegram from the American Minister in Warsaw, stating that the Polish Government had refrained from intervening in Silesia in spite of the excitement of the Country over the situation, because they are afraid that such action would prejudice their case in the eyes of the Conference.

Mr Balfour said that Mr Hoover’s proposals are very similar to those adopted by the Conference in its previous meetings. The Council had thinks it might be possible to ask Germany to allow an anticipated exercise of the Treaty. Mr Hoover added the hope and expectation that the German Government would consent. The means by which the Council had hoped to obtain the acquiescence of the German Government was the Coal Commission.

Mr Hoover said that he would suggest that the Coal Commission be strengthened by a German member and even by a Czech and a Polish member.

Mr Balfour asked whether Mr Hoover does not think that these members might obstruct business.

Mr Hoover says that they might perhaps be disposed to do so, but that they could be controlled by the Great Powers. There had previously been a Coal Commission with a Czech, Polish and German member, together with a British and American representative, which had worked quite successfully before the signature of the Treaty.

Mr Balfour said that he is very favorably inclined to Mr Hoover’s proposals, but with regard to the suggestion that the Coal Committee should also conduct the administration in the plebiscite zone, he would like to ask a few questions. The Plebiscite Commission could not be precisely the Committee suggested by Mr Hoover; it is hardly possible to have a plebiscite area in which Poland is interested, controlled by a Czech and a German Commissioner. The Coal Committee, moreover, not only has to carry out diplomatic negotiations with Germany, to superintend the production of coal in disturbed parts of Upper Silesia and Teschen, but it is also asked to control a plebiscite area, two-thirds of which was agricultural, and not coal producing at all. In order to carry out its various duties, not only would it have to move over large areas, possess an intimate knowledge of coal production, considerable acquaintance with other industrial conditions, but it must also be endowed with political experience, tact and knowledge of the conditions of all the neighboring countries. Such universal competence might perhaps be difficult to find concentrated in one set of individuals.

Mr Hoover says that what he meant to suggest was that the four Principal Allied representatives on the Coal Committee should ultimately become the administrators of the plebiscite area, in order that they should begin from the first with additional prestige.

Mr Balfour said that the Coal Committee would be composed of technical experts rather than of administrators and men of political experience.

Mr Hoover says that he is not entirely of this opinion. The technical side of the Committee’s work was comparatively simple; the distribution of the output of the mines was well established; the mine-owners are well acquainted with the quantities sent to the various consuming areas. The Committee would have chiefly to adjudicate among the rival claimants. Their functions would be, therefore, rather administrative than technical. He adheres to the belief that a merely technical committee would be of little use. There already is one, and its influence is not great.

Mr Balfour says that he will ask one more question. It had struck him previously that, should the German Government make difficulties, it might be threatened by being told that should the coalfields be attributed to Poland, the Allied Powers would exercise their influence to see that Germany was last served in the distribution of coal from these mines. He asks Mr Hoover whether he thinks this form of pressure could be employed.

Mr Hoover says that he thinks it is possible. The method he is suggesting was not a logical one. It would be more reasonable, first to establish the administrative Commission, and under it a Coal Committee. He was reversing the process, and suggesting that the Coal Committee should be endowed in anticipation with the prestige of the administrative body.

Mr Balfour says that this method appeared to him to be very ingenious.

M Pichon says that he agrees that the method was ingenious, but he thinks that there is some danger in confusing the two functions. It is possible that the Coal Committee might at a future date, assist the Plebiscite Commission. He thinks it inadvisable to state at the present time that coal experts would become the future administrators of the country. This could not be done legally at present. Moreover, he does not think that the Germans would agree. They did not accept the Treaty in a very willing spirit. A demand of this kind would raise difficulties. The Council might make up its own mind that the Coal Committee, if, as it was hoped, it gained authority in the country, should later on assist the Plebiscite Commission. He does not think that this could be openly declared.

Mr Hoover says that his feeling was that a Coal Committee, as such, would be helpless. It could only use arguments derived from the general coal situation in Europe. He pointed out that the Council was considering the prospect of military occupation. Should this take place, the only administrative organ possible would be the Plebiscite Commission.

S Tittoni said that the essential thing was to find out whether the German Government will acquiesce. Should it do so, there will be no difficulty, and the Coal Committee could, as Mr Hoover suggested, obtain political power. The principal thing was to approach the German Government without delay.

General Weygand says that if Allied troops are sent into Upper Silesia, it would be absolutely necessary to establish a high civil authority to ensure a modus vivendi. It appears to him that this authority could not be the Coal Committee, whose functions extended to other areas than Upper Silesia. It must undoubtedly be the Commission provided for in the Annex to Section 8 of the Treaty. This Commission is doubtless that which has been called the Plebiscite Commission in the discussion. It is really a Commission to govern the country under the authority of the Allied and Associated Powers, pending the completion of the plebiscite.

Mr Hoover then suggests that the Coal Committee be sent as a Coal Committee, but that, as many Governments as might find it possible to do so, should appoint to it members who would subsequently serve on the Administrative Commission. Further, if the German Government should agree, no delay would occur in selecting new representatives.

M Pichon said that the whole question is whether the German Government will agree to the exercise of the right which only accrued 15 days after the ratification of the Treaty.

S Tittoni urged that the question be put to the German Government immediately. A reply could perhaps be obtained within two days.

Mr Balfour says that the Conference had no regular diplomatic civil agent in touch with the German Government. He therefore suggests that Mr Hoover should go to Berlin on behalf of the Council to negotiate on this matter. Mr Hoover is so identified with the economic interests of Europe that no more suitable representative could be found for such a mission. His work has been outside the political arena so he had a better hope of success than anyone else.

M Pichon says that he agrees.

Mr Polk suggests that Mr Hoover be given an opportunity of consulting his French and British colleagues on the Coal Commission.

S Tittoni suggested that in any case it should be explained to the German Government that the Allies have no political object in these negotiations. They were only animated by anxiety for the economic revival of Europe.

M Pichon proposed certain draft instructions for Mr Hoover.

(These instructions are approved in principle and it is agreed that Mr Hoover, after consultation with his colleagues on the Coal Commission, should report on the following day whether he was able to undertake the mission and whether any alteration of the draft instructions appears desirable.)


4. Mr Polk asks that Mr Hoover be heard on the situation in Hungary.

Mr Hoover says that the staff of the Belief Organisation had been in Budapest and other parts of Hungary during the past ten days; that facts which had come to their personal attention might be of interest to the Council. Up to 10: 00 on the previous Monday the Romanians are still requisitioning food all over the country and in Budapest they were taking supplies even from the Children’s Hospital. Trains carrying the requisitioned supplies are passing out of the country as fast as possible, although in one place some had accumulated because the Romanians are awaiting the repair of a bridge before the trains could continue on their way. None of the members of the Relief Organisation believed for a moment that the Romanians intended to accede to the desires of the Council. He was not concerned with the morality of their actions but with the practical effects. Two of his officials, Captains in the American Army, had themselves seen the Romanians take sixteen wagon- loads of supplies from the Children’s Hospital and eleven deaths had resulted therefrom within twenty-four hours, for there is no way of replacing these supplies. He does not think that any action by the Romanians could be secured unless the Military Mission were instructed to send agents to frontier points to stop the Romanians from shipping out any more of the requisitioned material until its disposal could be decided by the Council. In his own opinion the supplies requisitioned should be turned back to Budapest to feed the population of that city. He would like to call attention to another point which threw a sidelight on the situation. While the coup d’état, by which the Archduke Joseph’s Government had been installed was not entirely a Romanian affair, nevertheless Romanian troops have surrounded the meeting place of the Ministry and had turned their machine guns on the building in which they were. This event has had an immediate repercussion throughout Poland and Eastern Europe and the Bolshevists were making much of it and claiming that the Alliance was trying to reestablish reactionary government in its worst form and this had done more to rehabilitate the Bolshevist cause than anything that had happened for a long time. The social democrats had refused to have anything to do with the new Government and Garami, the leader of this group, thinks that if things are allowed to continue as they were, the old reactionary party would be well established in ten days and the Allied and Associated Powers would have to be prepared to see the House of Hapsburg begin to re-establish itself throughout all its former dominions. He can only suggest that the Council should instruct its representatives in Budapest to call the Archduke before them and say that his Government could never be accepted or recognised. Such action might induce the Archduke to step aside and invite the social democrats to form a coalition government.

M Pichon says that the Council had already taken a decision of a similar character. The telegram sent on the 18th August embodied this policy. In it the Council had said all that it could possibly say consistently with its declared policy of non-interference in the internal politics of Hungary. The Council cannot take the responsibility of deliberately upsetting a Government in order to set up another.

Mr Balfour says that the only further step that could be taken would be to make the telegram more public, by asking the Generals in Budapest to make it widely known that Peace will never be signed with a Government not representing the people.

Mr Hoover says that if the Hungarian people go to the polls with only a choice between Bolshevism and a Hapsburg, the result of the elections might be in favour of the latter. This would be a paradoxical and disastrous result of a consultation of the people. Eastern Europe is past the blandishments of polite suggestion. Human life in those parts had declined in value to an extent not realized in Paris. Very energetic action was required. He thinks the Generals in Budapest should summon the Archduke and tell him clearly that he would never be recognised, and that he had better resign.

S Tittoni says that if he feels certain that on the fall of the Archduke a good Government would be set up, he would risk intervening. Before doing so, however, he would like to ask the Generals in Budapest what Government they thought would result from upsetting the Archduke.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks this matter so important that he would like to wait until the following day, when M Clemenceau would be present at the Council. As to the other proposal of Mr Hoover, namely, to have the frontier between Hungary and Romania watched, in order to stop the export of requisitioned material, he thinks some decision should be taken.

S Tittoni says that all instructions sent to the Generals in Budapest should be accompanied by a proviso that they should take action if they thought action suitable; as they are on the spot, they are better able to judge what could be done.

(It is then decided to send the following telegram:

“The Supreme Council learns that the Romanian troops of occupation continue to make requisitions of every kind in Hungary, and to send the goods so obtained to Romania.

The Council begs the Inter-Allied Commission to report on the practical possibility of sending officers to the frontier posts between Hungary and Romania to prevent the export of goods requisitioned to the detriment of the Allies, and in diminution of their common security.

Should the Commission regard this suggestion as feasible, Supreme Council authorizes it to act accordingly.”

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

22nd August 1919

With the support of the Polish Army, ethnic Poles around the town of Sejny launch an uprising against the Lithuanian authorities. Polish cavalry in Sejny.


American solider with a Chinese family in Vladivostok, Russia.


The Prince of Wales, future Edward VIII, is in Quebec City where he inaugurates the Quebec Bridge.