GER politics thread

[mapuc]

It's an article in RT I can't say how reliable it is

Natural gas reserves in Germany, which has one of the highest underground gas storage capacities in Europe, have fallen to historically low levels compared with previous years.

https://www.rt.com/business/546399-g...-gas-reserves/

Markus

[Skybird]

Its believable. Warnings have been published in German media already in early autumn. Mid-Decembre the reserves where lower than 60%, and the heating season already was started with the lowesr reserves since - well, since "always".

In Germany, oil reseves are politically regulated, minimums must be kept by providers. With gas, that is different, there are no regulations, and reseves are calculated by market mechanisms exclusively. Over 40 gas and electricity providers have gone bancrupt meanwhile, and cancelled supply contracts with households. In some regions, costs for such customers went up not by 100 but several 100%.

A first taste of things to come. Russia is the one reason.The other reason is the EU's fantastic green deal policies.

Well, the problems are home-made. Enjoy. There is a reason why I invested last year into an emergency solar panel generator, petroleum ovens and petroleum reserves. We are still on oil in our house, but if the brown stuff hits the fan I do not take it for granted that oil for filling up the house tank will not be rationed by the state.


The whole gas issue degenerates into a mess much, much faster than I expected to be possible just half a year ago. My mistakle was that I mistook today'S Russia for too long with the Sovjet Union of the past. The USSR stuck to its contracts for delievring stuff throzgout the cold war. I underesutmated that this was about to chnage quickly - becasue Putin is not Breschnev and Russia is not the USSR. The USSR also was more dependent on good will from Western economc importers to the USSR. Russia is that dependent far less.


Lesson learnt, bad mistake by me. This time the Americans were fully right with their scepticism over NS2 and Russian gas in general.

[Jimbuna]

Looks like the EU are in the stronger position

BREST, France — The Kremlin always likes to pretend that gas and politics can be kept apart. But the Europeans aren’t standing for that anymore.

EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager on Thursday gave the strongest indication to date that Moscow's gas-export monopoly Gazprom risked another round of antitrust action from Brussels. The normally tight-lipped Dane gave a rare insight into her thinking on what would be a highly politically charged case by implying that Moscow appeared to be manipulating the market as energy prices soar and Russia masses troops on the Ukrainian border.
https://www.politico.eu/article/russ...s-brussels-eu/

[Skybird]

Major energy provider RWE said today that German gas reserves are down to 40%. How long these last depends on how cold it gets in comign weeks, but they will last "a few weeks" (quote], not longer.

Gas is used in Germany for both heating and electric power production.

I am on oil heating in the house with six households where I live. But getting oil showed to be difficult last time. We ordered early Novembre - and got a date for short before Christmas, delayed to early January, delayed and finally delivered one week ago, and only 5000 instead of the ordered 10000 litres. That is mysterious, the company did not give an explanation. I have not read in the media that oil is critical in supply, too, so I am wondering. Irritating is that the company did not give the house administration any straight explanation.

My stockpiled personal supply of petroleum for my emergency heating oven would last for 280-320 hours, so with heating 10 hours per day, it would last for 4-5 weeks. I feel confirmed that I bought these things.

[Jimbuna]

^ Back to rationing eventually?

[Skybird]

The Neue Zürcher Zeitung writes on a yearly polling of Germans on their moods and priorities:

The "Security Report 2022" takes the pulse of Germany's citizens. Economic fears dominate, while health risks are losing their terror. The proportion of those who would like to see a more liberal approach to the Corona crisis has increased.

While German Health Minister Lauterbach is trusted very much, Foreign Minister Baerbock - here with her Russian counterpart Lavrov - has to make do with low scores.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is able to contain his passion. On several occasions, however, he has turned out to be a passionate speaker in his still rather short time in office - always when he countered the view that Germany is torn apart. "To that end," he said in the Bundestag, "I state: our society is not divided."

The "Security Report 2022" published this Tuesday could make Scholz ponder. After all, 56 percent of all Germans, and thus 4 percentage points more than last year, are "very worried" that society could become "more and more" divided. A high 70 percent would like to see more action by the state to counter these divisive tendencies. And that is not the only revealing finding the report has in store.

Since 2011, the Allensbach polling institute has been producing the annual Security Report on behalf of the Hamburg-based Center for Strategy and Higher Leadership. Its purpose is to gauge the fears and risks that concern German citizens. For the current edition, a total of 1090 people were interviewed in person and orally between January 6 and 20, "representative of the German population aged 16 and over".

In addition to the growing concern about a social divide, another figure turns out to be less than flattering for the "traffic lights." The number of those who fear that "our government" could prove too weak in the face of multiple problems shot up from 24 to 35 percent within a year. On the other hand, concern that overall political stability could decline fell from 44 to 33 percent. Does the third year of Corona indicate a decoupling of social sentiment and trust in executive performance? Is Germany depoliticizing itself for the good of politics?

At the very least, the capital of trust is earning different rates of interest. As of mid-January, 62 percent of respondents trust Health Minister Karl Lauterbach to do a "good job," but only 23 percent trust Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. At 15 and 13 percent, the approval ratings for the new Federal Interior Minister Nancy Faeser and the new Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht, both of whom belong to the SPD, are catastrophic.

Baerbock may grudge her poor ranking all the less because her Green cabinet colleague Robert Habeck receives a remarkable 43 percent. From this, one could draw the no less striking conclusion that Habeck is perceived far more as a climate protection minister than as a federal economics minister, which he also is. At the same time as he is held in relatively high esteem, the Germans surveyed also said that they were most concerned about inflation at the moment.

Against the development that "money is worth less and less," 84 percent would like to see greater commitment from the state, and 70 percent name inflation as their greatest concern. In his first government statement as economics minister, Habeck admitted that high inflation is "a particular burden for low-income households.

A year ago, Germans were primarily concerned about the economic impact of the Corona crisis. This fear slipped to second place, but at 66 percent instead of 70 percent, it is still a significant source of tension. A geopolitically unpredictable situation continues to worry 62 percent and climate change 54 percent - at an equally stable level.

In general, the Corona crisis is losing some of its terror in the general perception. Threats from new global pandemics are felt by 31 percent instead of 43 percent, and by 30 percent instead of 34 percent from an infection with the corona virus. This, too, expresses a paradox: Governments are trusted less, but the results of their actions are becoming less important.


Security also has a foreign policy component, and there the weights have shifted enormously. A year ago, North Korea was rated as the greatest threat to world peace, ahead of Iran, China and Turkey, and the Russian Confederation, which was far behind with 32 percent. Now Russia ranked first with 66 percent, China retained second, North Korea fell to third and Iran to fifth. Afghanistan slipped in between.

For all their realpolitik inclinations, Germans still seem to follow the principle of the bear who wants to have his fur washed without getting wet. 72 percent overall instead of 58 percent previously - but only 54 percent in the eastern part of the republic - consider NATO membership important "for the security of our country." At the same time, only 44 percent demand that Germany fulfill its membership obligations and participate militarily in the defense of a NATO state under attack.

Thus, at the beginning of this year, the Germans are still wrestling with themselves and their principles. Sometimes they are relaxed about problems that they hardly trust anyone to solve, sometimes they are very worried. The only thing that remains stable is the longing for stability - albeit with slight tectonic shifts.

In 2021, 77 percent agreed with the thesis that the greatest possible security is the most important thing in Corona times and that the freedom of the individual must take a back seat to protection against infection. And 25 percent instead of 17 percent agree with the rather un-German statement that freedom comes before security. One in four Germans says that everyone should decide for themselves which protective measures they will take and which they will not.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
https://www.nzz.ch/international/sic...and-ld.1667505

The priorities the german population has obviously differs significantly fromn the perception of things that politicians and ideologists want to command.

[Skybird]

Russian state propaganda station Russia Today (RT) operated in Germany by a foreign license, which is not allowed. Not mentioning that it is the voice of the Kreml like Prawda was the organ of the party. Germany has prohibited th eoperaiton of RT therefore. russia now retaliates by prohibiting Deutsche Welle in Russia, and releasing sanctions that are not further specified against German personnel of "media and public relevance".



The quarrel of lovers is the renewal of love.

[Skybird]

Germany is more or less unprepared for Russian cyberattacks aiming at putting Germany'scritical infrastructure into a Blackout. Politicians also actively prevent - at least do their best to delay - to change that. To knock out Germany, it would not take one single Russian tank and not one single bomb dropped.

https://www-focus-de.translate.goog/..._x_tr_pto=wapp

[Skybird]

The Süddeutsche Zeitung (!) writes:


"Voll erwischt"

Germany is stumbling unprepared through a world beset by a historic number of crises. Its previous foreign-policy beliefs are no longer suitable - and it hardly dares to adopt new ones. This weakness makes external aggression possible in the first place.

The past few years have been extremely irritating for the Germans' self-image in foreign policy. The country that found its balance in the world in good deals and good advice has found that one certainty after another is waning, influence is waning and the oh-so-comfortable stability is melting away. A sense of insecurity, sometimes even hopelessness, has taken hold.

In the last few months alone, the catalog of decline has encompassed the entire cosmos of foreign policy self-evident: The U.S. is ruled by an anti-democratic narcissist and narrowly escapes a democratic collapse, France's neighbor declares the common defense alliance brain-dead, nationalists and populists drive the EU apart, the most important economic partner - in the Far East - destroys the globalized trade world out of national interest and en passant builds a new world order. Ah yes, almost forgotten: After 20 years, a military mission in Afghanistan ends in flight and collapse. And now Russia is preparing to wage a war to its liking in order to underline its blackmailing will - simply because it can.

It's no surprise, then, that the ever-pandemic nation reacts intolerably to the overdose of crisis, that it demands guidance or, in the worst case, gives up its bearings because the compass has been out of adjustment for far too long. The never-ending series of dramatic world events, fits of weakness and defeats has triggered a great sense of helplessness and helplessness - and this testifies to naiveté and despondency in dealing with the world.

One of the ritualized demands of the Munich Security Conference, and not just since German President Joachim Gauck's appearance, has been the sentence that Germany must assume more responsibility in the world. This sentence, delivered with great determination, usually ended: nowhere. Because whenever this Germany strived for more responsibility, it happened according to the formula "more of the same". More money, more talks, more reminders, more demands. German foreign policy is the master of the middle, of balance, of timidity, of caution.

These qualities are usually also well invested, especially when foreign policy is conducted in the derivative of the Germans' most important interest: Europe, the EU, is Germany's guarantor of peace and prosperity, which is why the powerful country in the middle should be as careful and constructive as possible in cultivating the unity and cohesion of the community.

But there are just a few other assumptions that the country faithfully follows without having questioned their suitability for the year 2022. It was the German diplomat Thomas Bagger who named the two most important ones in a sensational essay three years ago. Is it true, then, that the road leads to ever more democracy, liberality and the rule of law, that these forms of government are superior and irresistible, and to that extent will sooner or later be accepted by all? And is it correct that military power no longer plays a role, precisely because one is surrounded by friends?

This basic trust in the good and the true, in the power of example, can already be considered arrogant. Today, in the crisis vortex of the time, it is dangerous to form foreign policy with the ideas of the post-reunification years and otherwise take refuge in moral superiority. Let the others buy weapons - for Germany, the likelihood of war is ruled out because common sense forbids it. The problem is that this is not the first time that Vladimir Putin has considered war to be an effective means of asserting his interests. The world that Germany prettifies for itself usually shimmers in harsh black or white.

So the moment had to come when this merciless world would also seize the timid Germany by its greatest weakness: morality. Is it reprehensible and even war-promoting to provide the threatened Ukraine with weapons for its own defense? Or is there not an obligation to help one of the biggest victims of Nazi atrocities to repel an invasion by its Russian neighbor?

It is indeed characteristic of the German debate that it is conducted almost exclusively in moral categories, but is not decided along the question of what helps to assert German interests? What do the classic military principles of deterrence and a credible defense capability still mean? And what does it say about the world's perception when this nation, filled with peacefulness, questions the logic of nuclear deterrence every four years at the Bundestag elections and pretends that none of this is any longer its business?

As the world becomes rougher and more unpredictable, Germany takes refuge in an ideal landscape, true to the principle that good will prevail. The extent to which this attitude is now seen as a weakness and a burden for the alliance was amply documented in the Ukraine crisis. The real bill, however, is due in Germany itself, where this historic crisis density comes up against a largely unprepared population that simply lacks the tools to deal with blackmail, coercion, military threats and attacks on the political system. Insecurity is created by an aggressor. But it becomes dangerous only through weakness.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

[Catfish]

With more than 30,000 foreign troops stationed you cannot call this a sovereign country anyway.

[Skybird]

Focus writes:


Putin's war has changed Germany. It took Germany a whole four days to shift its foreign policy axis. It is a historic course correction. If one were to give this Sunday a headline, it might be this one: February 27, 2022, is the day of Germany's self-liberation.

In any case, it is far more than what the chancellor in the Bundestag called a "turning point in time." It is nothing less than Germany's biggest course correction since the country's rearmament in the 1950s.

The "end of all illusions," Christian Lindner [German finance minister, FDP, Skybird] has called it. The end of this "special form of German restraint" in foreign and security policy. Which has now been "left behind." Germany's Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock [Greens] put it this way, as if a burden had really fallen off Germany.

Perhaps the clearest illustration of this sweeping change can be found in the two Green protagonists: Baerbock and Robert Habeck [minister for economy and climate]. But one thing is clear: It is a necessary change, but one at the very last minute. One that did not happen of its own free will. Germany's self-liberation was preceded by days of painful self-imprisonment to the limits of a German "Sonderweg" [special way].

Germany, before it corrected itself, disgraced itself to the bone. With its long refusal to even talk about the Putin-Schröder pipeline, it maneuvered itself into the sidelines among its alliance partners. Has made itself ridiculous with these 5000 helmets of shame.

And with its refusal to supply weapons to the victim of the attack, Ukraine, it has displayed an arrogant, self-centered, national-obsessed cold-heartedness that will continue to reverberate for a long time to come. This 180-degree turnaround had to be all the more dramatic now. This turnaround becomes clear at four strategic points: Security now becomes the first state objective.

Energy security becomes the yardstick of national sovereignty. A European defense community becomes conceivable. And the realization that Germany's security cannot be defended without nuclear weapons was openly expressed by the German chancellor. A Social Democrat.

Annalena Baerbock brings Ukraine into German living rooms. "That could be us in these subway shafts." And "our children." Putin has done more than, badly enough, invade a neighboring country with the aim of subjugating it.

He has broken the international order, of which Germany sees itself as the guarantor. This breach justifies this, as Baerbock puts it, "historic hour." The Green Party then justifies the delivery of German weapons to the Ukrainian war and crisis zone.

It is a triple historical break: no weapons to crisis areas, German weapons must never again be used to shoot at Russians, and: Pacifism can be a mistake. The latter is a break with the history of the Greens, which emerged from the peace movement at the end of the 1970s.

Robert Habeck recalls this analogy, outrageous at its core, that Putin made when, recalling a nursery rhyme, he threatened in the direction of Ukraine: "you will have to submit, my beauty." Habeck calls what Putin is doing in Ukraine a "military rape." Anyone who stands by and watches this, is guilty.

This is followed by a short, clear reckoning with pacifism, which once made the Greens possible in the first place. He respects pacifism, but considers it "wrong." For pacifism, too, is subject to an illusion. As if one could preserve one's innocence with the right attitude. Habeck: "We won't get out of this with clean hands." The ancient Greeks called it tragedy - no matter which path you take, you make yourself guilty.

Baerbock and Habeck, two Green ministers in wartime, thus place themselves in the continuity of Joschka Fischer. The first Green foreign minister had justified Germany's participation in the Kosovo war at the turn of the millennium with the Nazi atrocities in Auschwitz.
Self-liberation Day was also a day of corrections

The day of self-liberation was a day of corrections for the left-of-center parties. A farewell to illusions cherished for decades.

For the Social Democrats, who now no longer want to be Putin-understanders. For the Greens, who no longer want to be pacifists. For the Left [=SED], which still believes that "arms races do not create security. But which clearly states: "We have misjudged the intentions of the Russian government.

The Christian Democrats' correction turned out to be smaller - in the slipstream of the big turnaround by the Reds and Greens. But spending 100 billion on the Bundeswehr means a correction even for Christian Democrats, Christian Lindner drew attention to it.

Merkel is not only an architect of the Russia policy that is now in ruins, but she, together with today's German President Frank Walter Steinmeier, tinkered for years with the illusion that "dialogue" could exist without military deterrence.

Amira Mohamed Ali, head of the Left Party parliamentary group, told the Bundestag about a telephone conversation with her aunt Hilde, 95 years old. She was now "afraid of war again." Two hours after this very special Bundestag session, the report runs that Putin has put his nuclear forces on alert.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

[mapuc]

Throughout the day I have seen many Danish politician speaking warmly about your chancellor Scholz.

One of them wrote that he, Scholz, is Germanies new Helmut Kohl

Markus

[Skybird]

Please not, one Kohl was enough.

Also note that Scholz did nothing without being bitterly pressed to do it. Scholz never does, he never starts moving before he has absolutely no other choice anymore to stop his paralysis. Its fair to say he does not move himself, he gets moved by the events rolling over him. That respect is not justfied!

He absolutely hates to take a position that he then is identifiable with and that he can be held accountable for, poltically. He enver accepts that withotu beign mericelssly forced to do that by the veents.

That is not acting. That is reacting, and alway reacting late, and often not at the last minute but one minute later.

I will not applaud a man who hesitated and hesitated more and hesitated again and then, when reality rolled over him and left him no other choice, reacted to it. He does neither lead, nor act! He trails behind, and reacts! Because he can no longer afford not to do so! The others left him no other choice. If he had his way, we would still not deliver weapons, would still block others to send German made weapons, would still not excldude Russia form SWIFT, and the lite version of that that was agreed on was due to germany - who again has already watered it down a bit.

If you want to applaud German politicians, three names: Ludwig Erhard, for his lacking party bias and economic competence, Helmut Schmidt for his sense of realism and active pragmatism, Richard von Weizsäcker for his general modesty, educated mindset, and noble inner quality.

The most overestimated politicians in Germany since WW2: Adenauer, Brandt, Kohl, Merkel. And a legion of clowns in their wake.

Thank you Markus, now I am angry again.

[Catfish]

^ so true

Sorry Markus, i think what Scholz did was right, but it took a loong time. Of course he has to do what is best for his country, so hesitation and discussions with advisors are mandatory.
Anyway this has put Germany directly into Putin's fire line. We will see what happens next.

[mapuc]

I do not applaud any German politician or politician in general. I just posted a story about our Danish politician talking highly about your chancellor.

It was not my intention to make Skybird angry.

Markus