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Old 11-10-19, 09:18 AM   #4231
Jimbuna
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10th November 1919

Aftermath of War

President and Madame Poincare arrive in England.

Latvian soldiers fighting against German-backed West Russian Volunteer Army in Riga.


Birth of Mikhail Kalashnikov, arms designer.
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Old 11-10-19, 10:47 PM   #4232
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Monday, November 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. S de Martino asks if he might deliver a message from S Tittoni, who wishes to express his great regret at not being able to be present at that meeting; he is obliged to leave on the following day and is still ill in bed. He had particularly hoped to be able to come to that meeting to bid farewell to his colleagues. At the same time he had asked S De Martino to submit to the Council a consideration which had occurred to him with respect to its work. The Supreme Council had organized a Committee for the execution of the Treaty and that Committee, called the Committee of Ambassadors, although other than Ambassadors might sit upon it, is to be entrusted with everything concerning the execution of the treaties; the Supreme Council, on the other hand, is entrusted with all work preparatory to the same treaties. In order to facilitate this division of labor and inasmuch as the large questions were at the moment not ready for settlement - such as the Treaty with Hungary, the question of the former Ottoman Empire and the Adriatic question - S Tittoni wishes to ask the Council to consider the possibility of adjourning, after the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty, until one of those questions should be ready for settlement. In the meanwhile all remaining unfinished work relative to the execution of the treaties can be entrusted to the Committee of Ambassadors.

M Clemenceau replies that this question cannot be raised without the consent of the Governments concerned. Of course three questions are raised by this suggestion: he thinks that the Hungarian question will be satisfactorily settled. The question of Turkey is a difficult one, but he is willing, and thinks it necessary to take it up, and he feels that the British and American Governments will agree with his views. The question of the Adriatic is a most delicate one but it must be admitted that the Council is not at fault. The responsibility lies entirely with Italy. The Italian Government has been incapable of executing the orders given by the Council. The Council had formally decided that only one Italian battalion should remain at Fiume, but this order had been flagrantly violated in such a manner that it seemed clear that the Italian Government had no control over its army and navy. The Command at Fiume had passed to D’Annunzio. He is not hostile to Italy but he is obliged to point out that the Italian Government has not been able to make its orders respected. He had supported the Italian point of view in a long telegram that he had sent to President Wilson, but he was very much embarrassed as to what he should further say, since he had received a courteous but emphatic reply from President Wilson to the effect that it was useless to make agreements with a Government which assumed obligations that it could not fulfill. French soldiers had been killed at Fiume and the French Government had taken no action; but such a situation could not be prolonged indefinitely.

S de Martino wishes to be allowed to remark that a Government exists in Italy as well as in any other country. As to the point of being obeyed or not by the army at Fiume, it is in agreement with the Allied Governments that Italy abstain from attacking Fiume. If Italy is confronted with difficulties, of which the Council is well aware, that does not mean that the Italian Government has not taken up the question of Fiume with the very best intentions of settling it properly. The Italian Government has shown a spirit of conciliation which he thought M Clemenceau would appreciate.

M Clemenceau points out that nevertheless the fact remained that the Italian Government was not obeyed by its Navy. The greatest spirit of good will had been shown. For this reason no action had been taken as a result of the incidents at Fiume, but that situation must be put an end to. The postponement of the work of the Council cannot be agreed to as long as that will result in the consolidation of the existing situation at Fiume.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees with M Clemenceau, but feels that the points at issue with Germany and the Bulgarian question must first be settled before there can be any thought of postponement. He thinks that these questions might be settled before the end of the month, by which time he hopes that all other questions, except the Turkish one, will also be out of the way. He therefore feels that there is no great difficulty in practice; the object aimed at by S De Martino can be met without necessarily adopting his plea for an adjournment of the Conference now.

Mr Polk also agrees with M Clemenceau and observes that there are two or three questions which have to be settled before an adjournment can be thought of. He is of the opinion that those questions can be settled before December 1st. He also feels that it would not be fair to turn such questions over to the Committee of Ambassadors, which is only supposed to coordinate questions relating to the interpretation and execution of the Treaties.

M Clemenceau appreciates the troubles the Italian Government has had to encounter. However, that Government must settle the question of Fiume and get its army and navy under control.

S de Martino repeats that the Italian Government has the army and navy under control and is obeyed by them. If it had not wished to take military action against Fiume, it was because the Allied and Associated Powers had likewise not wished it. They had not wished to attack Fiume and a fortiori Italy had not wished to either. The situation there did not prevent his declaring that there is a Government in Italy and that the army and navy are under control of the Italian Government.

M Clemenceau declares that he must formally state that S Tittoni had said, not once but many times, that the Italian Government could not take Fiume because the army and navy would not obey the Government. He thought S Tittoni could not contest this, and he wished this to be formally put on record. The fact that the Italian Government had to contend with a very delicate question was no reason for attempting to place the responsibility on the other Allied and Associated Powers, who clearly could not be burdened therewith.

S de Martino says that such is not his intention, and that the sole question raised was one of expediting the work of the Council. S Tittoni, who had to leave for Italy on account of the political situation, had hoped to return to take up the discussion of the important questions alluded to.

M Clemenceau observes that such a solution would greatly embarrass him in any reply to President Wilson.

S de Martino says that he has transmitted the suggestion, but that if it is going to occasion great inconveniences he does not wish to insist upon it.

(It is decided to take no action on the Italian suggestion relative to the prolongation or postponement of the work of the Supreme Council.)


2. The Council has before it a note from the President of the German Delegation dated November 7th, 1919 relative to municipal elections in Upper Silesia.

M Clemenceau points out that the proposed action of the German Government is in utter defiance of the decisions of the Supreme Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that strictly speaking the Council cannot prevent such action on the part of the German Government before the Treaty comes into force, but it can say that it has already warned that Government that such elections will not be recognized.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Polk also agrees. He presumes that the Council is sure of its legal ground when sending such an answer.

(It is decided that the Allied and Associated Powers should again inform the German Government that the municipal elections proposed to be held by it in Upper Silesia, prior to the coming into force of the Treaty, will not be recognized as valid.)


3. M Berthelot comments upon the note from the Swiss Legation.

M Clemenceau observes that as such clauses are already contained in the Treaties with Germany and Austria there seems no good reason for not inserting them in all the Treaties.

(It was decided to act favorably upon the request of the Swiss Legation relative to insertion in Treaties still to be drafted and signed of clauses relative to Swiss neutrality, analogous to Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and Article 375 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria.)


4. Mr Polk informs the Council that he has just received a telegram from Admiral Bristol to the effect that fighting between Greeks and Turks had taken place near Soma because the Greeks had not obeyed the orders of General Milne not to advance the line of occupation until the 15th of November and to wait until the Turkish army obeyed the orders given it to retire on November 12th, and that the Greeks had acted on the orders of their own Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquires if this point has not already been raised by Mr Venizelos at the preceding meeting of the Council.

M Clemenceau thinks it had not.

General Bunoust is sure that it had not. The point Sir Eyre Crowe had in mind was the incident at Nazilli.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that Mr Venizelos should be asked to explain the incident referred to in the telegram read by Mr Polk.

M Clemenceau suggests that the information contained in the telegram be sent to Mr Venizelos and that he be asked for explanations.

(This is agreed to.)

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Investigation at Smyrna dealt with two questions. The Commission had been appointed to investigate the complaints made by the Sheik-ul-Islam. The Council might unwittingly have given the Commission too large a mandate but it had never contemplated that the Commission should go so far as to advise it whether or not there should have been a Greek occupation. He proposes to separate the report into its two component parts. The question raised by the second part of the report has already been presented in an acute form as a result of Mr Venizelos ordering Greek troops beyond the zone of occupation laid down by the Council without consulting it. He thinks that there is a good deal to be said for Mr Venizelos in this connection inasmuch as he has sent many pressing communications to the Council which, owing to the great pressure of work, had not been promptly answered. The Council had ordered General Milne to determine the Greek zone of occupation; he had done so and on the other hand the Greek and Italian Governments, after satisfactory negotiations, had agreed to a line of demarcation between their zones. He feels that the other conclusions of the report might be accepted; but he is struck by the fact that a great deal of pertinent testimony had not been heard by the Commission, therefore it was difficult for the conclusions of the report to be accepted unreservedly, although he might have been inclined to do so if he had not heard Mr Venizelos’ explanations at the preceding meeting. For instance, with respect to the affair at Menemem, Mr Venizelos had pointed out that the Greek authorities had made an accurate count of the victims and found that only 20 had been killed, identifying them by name, whereas the number fixed by the Commission as a result of an investigation made by a French officer had placed the number at several hundred. He does not feel qualified to state that a different procedure could have been adopted, but he feels that if the Greek side of the case could have been heard the conclusions of the report might have been different. In his opinion this was the one reservation to be made when accepting the report.

General Bunoust observes that some question has been raised as to the Commission going beyond the mandate given it. He wishes to point out that the report submitted consists of three parts: a summary of the facts, the fixing of the responsibilities, and the conclusions. This conforms not only to the spirit but to the letter of the Council’s mandate contained in its telegram to the Commission of July 26, 1919. It had been suggested that the Commission was not justified in taking up the question of the expediency of the Greek occupation. He wishes to reply that the complaint of the Sheik-ul-Islam to the Supreme Council had formed the basis of the investigation, and this complaint had pretended that the Greek occupation was unjustified. The Commission had therefore necessarily examined that question. To take up a question of detail, in an affair such as that at Menemem it is impossible for anyone to make an accurate estimate. The Commission did not insist upon the exactness of its figures but it was convinced that figures submitted by the Greeks could not be any more accurate. With respect to contradictory testimony he wishes again to cite the affair at Menemem, where all the Turks had testified in one way and all the Greeks in another. The Commission had therefore tried to take the testimony of the witnesses who seemed to be the most reliable and it had taken a great deal of testimony from French, English and Italian witnesses. The testimony of M. Laplanche, a French employee of the railroad, had established that the day before the massacre in question the Turks had claimed that they feared a massacre and the Greeks had been informed of this but had taken no precautionary measures. The Greek battalion retreating from Pergamum had indeed been subjected to outrages, but when it once reached Menemem not a single shot had been fired at it. Many Greek witnesses claimed to have heard and seen shots but not one of them had been able to substantiate his evidently false statements. The Commission does not insist that the Greeks had prepared this massacre, but it is convinced that they had done absolutely nothing to prevent it and that the Greek authorities were obviously incompetent.

Sir Eyre Crowe has never doubted that the Commission had proceeded in the most sincere and honorable way, but, as Mr Venizelos had pointed out, the principal accused parties had not been heard. He had felt that although it had possibly been well not to acquaint the Greek representative with the names of the witnesses, it might have been possible to give him the depositions without giving him the names of the witnesses. But even this had not been done. He could not say that the conclusions of the report would have been different had such procedure been adopted, but it is evident that they might have been; therefore these conclusions were not entirely satisfactory. When the procedure adopted by the Commission had been brought to the attention of the Council it had not approved thereof; but it had then been too late to make an effective change. However, he does not wish to insist unduly upon this point for on the whole Mr Venizelos had accepted the substance of the report, inasmuch as he recognized that abuses had been committed and had meted out punishment therefor. Furthermore, calm now reigned in and around Smyrna, and in fact everywhere except those points where Greeks were in armed contact with Turks. He felt that the Greeks had done their best and that on the whole they had succeeded rather well.

M Clemenceau wishes to ask General Bunoust if he feels that calm did in fact reign in the occupied territories.

General Bunoust says that it does in the town of Smyrna, but that elsewhere the calm was only apparent and might well cease to exist at any moment. Furthermore, the town of Smyrna is nothing in comparison with the entirety of the occupied territories. There certainly is no calm at Aidin.

M Clemenceau inquires if the Greeks have withdrawn again within the Sandjak of Smyrna.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that General Milne has established a line beyond which the Greeks are to retire, and they have done so. There is, however, a small triangle in the region of Aidin where General Milne had proposed the following alternative: either the Greeks should be permitted to advance beyond the line of occupation previously laid down, or they should withdraw to a line behind the one at present held by them. In the latter event, General Milne had recommended an Inter-Allied occupation - i. e. Greek, French and English - of the triangle comprised between the present line of Greek occupation and that to which they would be forced to withdraw. This solution, including the exclusion of Italian troops from the proposed Inter-Allied force of occupation, had been discussed and approved by the Supreme Council, although he himself has found it difficult to agree with that conclusion. He feels that an Inter-Allied occupation would be the best solution possible, but it has not proven feasible. He is convinced of the impossibility of telling the Greeks to evacuate and of letting the Turks in.

Mr Polk inquires if the town of Soma is in the vicinity of Aidin.

S de Martino explains that it was to the north of Smyrna. He wishes to point out the following facts with respect to the region of Aidin. When the question was submitted to the Council as a result of General Milne’s report three solutions became possible: to leave the Greeks where they were, to let the Turks occupy this territory, or else to effect an Inter-Allied occupation, necessarily including the Greeks in such a force since they were already there. Turkish occupation had not been considered. But when the point of Inter-Allied occupation was raised there was no longer a question of a line of demarcation between Greek and Italian zones of occupation; it was a question, on the one hand, of Italian occupation, and on the other hand, of Inter-Allied occupation. He felt that when the word “Inter-Allied” was used Italy could not be excluded. What had been decided upon is, he thinks, contrary to the view of the French Government, because M Pichon had told him before the meeting that M Clemenceau’s point of view favored Inter-Allied occupation with Italian troops. He does not intend to resuscitate that question, which has already been decided, but he does wish to say that according to information he has received from Constantinople the solution which had been adopted had produced a very bad impression, inasmuch as it had been interpreted as a proof of discord between the Great Powers. He feels that if the Allies, all of whom had interests in Moslem countries, do not give evidence of solidarity towards the Moslem world they will expose themselves to the greatest danger in the future. He has spent eleven years in Moslem countries and could affirm that within ten or fifteen years the Allies would have the greatest difficulty in maintaining their Moslem colonies. The exclusion of Italian troops had made the Turks think that something queer was happening. When he had read the minutes of the meeting, at which he had not been present, he had seen that the reason given for exclusion of Italian troops from Aidin was the fear of disagreement and conflict with the Greeks. He wishes to insist that these fears had no foundation. The Italian Government had come to two agreements with Greece. One of lesser importance, relative to the provisional line of demarcation between Greek and Italian troops, the other a more general agreement. He knows that the Allies are pleased that this latter agreement has been reached. In view of the terms of this latter agreement, which laid down a common line of action with a view to avoiding any cause of disagreement or conflict, he feels sure that if the Italian troops had encountered the Greek troops at Aidin no conflict would have taken place between them. He would like to have Mr Venizelos himself questioned on this point. He wishes to bring all this to the attention of the Council as a matter of record, although he does not intend at that time to reopen the question of Aidin.

Mr Polk inquires if the agreements referred to have been put on record.

S de Martino replies that the agreement respecting the line of demarcation has been put on record and that the other had not.

Mr Polk presumes that there is no objection to it being put on record.

S de Martino thinks not, and says that he would speak to S Tittoni on the matter.

M Clemenceau remarks that General Milne had proposed three solutions: as two of them are impossible, he suggests the other be adopted.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that he has asked Mr Venizelos if the Greeks are certainly able to hold the territory in question and had been told that they could.

M Clemenceau thinks that the Greeks should then be allowed to remain at Aidin.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees.

M Clemenceau points out that it should not be forgotten that all those questions of occupation are purely provisional.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees.

S de Martino agrees.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that General Milne had asked that the Greeks, if they alone are to supply the occupying forces, be allowed to advance beyond the present line of occupation, as that is a necessary condition of their being able to hold the Aidin region.

Mr Polk asks if General Milne has not made it clear that this proposed advance would necessarily mean further fighting between the Greeks and Turks.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies in the affirmative.

Mr Polk states that he will have to make a reservation on this point. His Government has no troops to send, therefore although he cannot unconditionally object to this solution, his Government does not wish to assent thereto, and feels that it must decline all responsibility.

Sir Eyre Crowe says it has been found impossible to find French or British troops to occupy this territory, but he hoped the point might again be raised and that M Clemenceau might once more examine the possibility of sending French troops.

M Clemenceau says that he will again raise the question and will let Sir Eyre Crowe know on the following day, but he feels that he will not be successful inasmuch as France has no troops to spare. He thinks it is no use for the Council to shut its eyes to the fact that the Turks will continue to harass the Greeks. If troops were sent to this region it will result in protecting the Greeks from attacks which they had brought upon themselves.

Mr Polk says that he hesitates to express an opinion inasmuch as his Government can do nothing to help the situation by sending troops. But he wishes to put himself on record as insisting that any further difficulties or fighting in Asia Minor would certainly make the ultimate settlement of the Turkish question more difficult. The Turks and Greeks will always fight each other; therefore, he feels that any decision which will necessarily bring them into closer and further armed contact was bad in principle.

M Clemenceau observes that even if it is found possible to send an Inter-Allied force, that would not solve the question of conflicts between the Greeks and Turks. The fact of having the troops at Aidin would not have prevented fighting in Soma. Mr Venizelos had rather taken the Council to task and it cannot leave unanswered some of the points raised by him. It is perhaps true that the procedure adopted had not always been the best. He suggests that an answer be sent to Mr Venizelos stating in substance that, although Mr Venizelos’ complaints as to the procedure adopted might have been justified in certain particulars, nevertheless he himself (Mr Venizelos) had recognized that abuses have been committed, and further recommending to Mr Venizelos the use of extreme caution in the future. In the same letter Mr Venizelos should be informed of the decision taken with respect to maintaining Greek troops in Aidin and he should be forcibly reminded that all occupation is purely provisional.

General Bunoust wishes to point out that the Council proposes to tell Mr Venizelos in effect that the Commission has not proceeded in the way it should have. He wishes to warn the Council that any such action would be an impeachment of its own decisions. The Council in its instructions of July 26th had marked out the exact lines of action which had since been followed by the Commission, and subsequently had decided that Colonel Mazarakis should not be present at the meetings of the Commission. He wishes to add that the Commission, in recommending an Inter-Allied occupation, had desired to test the sincerity of the Turks who had repeatedly proclaimed that they only objected to an occupation by the Greeks.

M Clemenceau replies that the Council has no wish to blame the Commission in any way. The question is whether the instructions had been well worded. He suggests that M Berthelot prepare an answer to Mr Venizelos, to be submitted to the Council, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting.

(It is decided:

(1) To ask Mr Venizelos for explanations relative to the conflict between Greeks and Turks near Soma, reported in a despatch from Constantinople dated November 8, 1919;

(2) That M Berthelot should prepare, for submission to the Council, a reply to Mr Venizelos, taking into account the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.)


5. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation regarding the exportation to Russia of German munitions and war material.

Sir Eyre Crowe summarizes the note from the British Delegation. He thinks there is a good deal to be said in favor of helping General Denikin but he wishes to point out that his Government is already heavily committed in supplying the northern Russian forces.

M Clemenceau thinks that the manufacture and exportation in question could be stopped as soon as the Treaty has been put into force.

Mr Polk asks if it is proposed to do anything at that moment.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the manufacture and exportation could be stopped at once.

Mr Polk wonders if this is wise. He inquires if any right exists to stop this manufacture and exportation at the present time.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that this right existed even under the Armistice. This was clear from the fact that the Germans themselves, in asking permission for this manufacture and exportation, recognized that the right to prohibit it existed under the Armistice.

Mr Polk wishes to know what the reason is for prohibiting this manufacture and exportation; is the idea that ammunition factories should not be put into operation or was it in order not to help General Denikin?

M Clemenceau suggests that the Germans be told that they cannot manufacture and export the munitions and material in question.

Mr Polk says that he objects to these supplies being furnished by Germans but he does approve sending such supplies to General Denikin. If anyone else could supply him with the material in question he would be in favor of it. He wishes to know who is going to pay for this material and how the payment would be made?

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that he is not sure. He thinks that perhaps Bolshevist money will be used in payment.

M Berthelot observes that the trouble is that there is no way of controlling the destination of this material.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the same group of manufacturers and exporters also supplied Colonel Bermondt.

M Clemenceau suggests that a reply be sent that inasmuch as the Council has no control over the use and destination of the munitions and war material in question, and cannot even be sure that part thereof would not find its way into the hands of elements hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers, the Council cannot sanction the manufacture and dispatch of the munitions and war material in question. He asks who would convey this information and to whom the communication would be sent.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he will send this answer to the British Military Representative in Berlin, in the name of the Council, for transmission by him to the proper parties.

(It is decided that Sir Eyre Crowe, in the name of the Council, should inform the British Military Representative at Berlin, for transmission by him to the proper parties, that inasmuch as the Council has no control over the use and destination of the munitions and war material in question, and cannot even be sure that part thereof would not find its way into the hands of elements hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers, the Council cannot sanction the manufacture and dispatch of the munitions and war material in question.


6. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee relative to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon the note of the Drafting Committee and explains that what is proposed therein is not a formal convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations prior to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty with Germany but only informal warning information.

Mr Polk asks whether, assuming that the only thing the Council will do at its first meeting will be to nominate the Commission of Delimitation for the Sarre District, it will not be sufficient to call the meeting for the day after the deposit of ratifications.

M Fromageot replies that if it is sure that nothing further has to be done it will be sufficient. It is possible, however, that many and serious questions will have to be taken up especially in the event of the United States ratifying the Treaty prior to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. It is therefore better to take all preliminary precautions even if they should eventually prove useless.

Mr Polk thinks that he will have to ask for an adjournment. He does not see the necessity for all these various notices. The question had once been very simple but it is now becoming very complicated. The only question he wishes to raise is: Does the President of the United States have the power to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations before the deposit of ratifications. If not, he thinks the President could issue such a call on the day of the deposit of ratifications and that the meeting could be held the following day.

M Fromageot says that the solution proposed by the Drafting Committee involved no convocation which might be deemed premature.

Sir Eyre Crowe adds that a further point had been raised: The United States might or might not ratify the Treaty prior to the date of the deposit of ratifications. Mr Polk’s point is only based on the United States not having ratified. The proposal of the Drafting Committee covers both contingencies.

Mr Polk says that he would refer the matter to his Government although he feels confident that there will be no objection.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he would have to make a small reservation with respect to the place of the first meeting. There have been some previous discussion on this point of whether the meeting should be in Paris, or in London where the machinery of the League of Nations already exists. When the point had come up before the Council the British Delegation had not agreed that the meeting should be held in Paris. Since that time he has obtained his Government’s consent to holding the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in Paris if no other business was to come before the Council than the nomination of the members of the Commission of Delimitation for the Sarre District. That is all that he can agree to at the present time but he will try to obtain further consent for the first meeting of the Council to be held in Paris irrespective of the business to be transacted at that meeting.

M Clemenceau observed that he of course cannot make any statement as to what will be on the agenda at the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

Mr Polk thinks that there is a great deal of unnecessary trouble in connection with this question. It is proposed to be entirely prepared for an important meeting of the Council on the day of the deposit of ratifications. Apparently that day will be somewhere in the neighborhood of November 25th. If that is so his Government’s Delegate could not reach Paris in time, even if the United States had already ratified the Treaty.

M Berthelot thinks that the deposit of ratifications can be effected on or about November 27th, as far as the Allied and Associated Powers are concerned. It has become evident from various sources that the Germans will not sign the protocol without raising various difficulties. If the deposit of ratifications is delayed it will be on account of the German attitude.

(It was decided to approve the recommendations of the Drafting Committee relative to the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations with the following reservations:

(1) That Mr. Polk will refer the matter to his Government.

(2) That Sir Eyre Crowe will refer to his Government the question of holding the first meeting of the Council in Paris irrespective of the business to be transacted at said first meeting.


7. The Council had before it a draft answer, prepared by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, to the note of the German Delegation of October 3rd, relative to the organization of the plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy.

(It was decided to approve the draft answer, prepared by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, to the note of the German Delegation of October 3rd, relative to the organization of the Plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy.

(The meeting then adjourns.)
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Old 11-11-19, 09:20 AM   #4233
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11th November 1919

The first two-minute silence of Remembrance Day is held in the British Empire to commemorate the first anniversary of the end of the Great War.


Overhead view of Paddington station platforms with passengers and staff observing two minutes' silence on the first anniversary of the Armistice.


Prince of Wales at White House.
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Old 11-11-19, 08:09 PM   #4234
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https://www.horseandhound.co.uk/news...ZJFoZ5ICQm2q-s

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One hundred years after the First World War, charity Brooke has launched a campaign called Every Horse Remembered to commemorate the eight million equines killed in the conflict.
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In Britain, one million equines were conscripted — including donkeys and mules — and only 62,000 returned after the armistice.
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Old 11-11-19, 10:37 PM   #4235
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Tuesday, November 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Berthelot says that the members of the Council have received the draft reply to Mr Venizelos which he had been asked to prepare. He calls the attention of the Council to the fact that two questions on the subject of Smyrna had not been discussed the day before: Mr Venizelos, on one hand, complained of the conditions which had governed the censorship, and expressed his intention of establishing a Greek censorship at Smyrna; on the other hand, the Inter-Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople had sent them on November 3rd a note in which they criticized the attitude of the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna; the latter tended more and more to substitute his action as well to that of the High Commissioners as to that of the Turkish officials. In the draft reply which he had prepared he had taken those two points into consideration.

Sir Eyre Crowe is of opinion that the question should be examined at the next meeting, but he wishes to state immediately that he does not entirely agree with M Berthelot: Is it possible for the Allies to supervise the Greek authorities at Smyrna from Constantinople? Besides, perhaps the draft letter points out too clearly to Venizelos that he is wrong.

M Clemenceau agrees to adjourn the examination of the draft prepared by M Berthelot.

(The examination of the draft reply to Mr Venizelos is adjourned.)


2. Mr Polk wishes to read a telegram addressed to the Supreme Council by the Secretary of Labor of the United States in his capacity as President of the International Labor Conference. He explains that the American Delegation will not assume the responsibility for the terms of this communication. On the other hand, from the information he had received from Baron von Lersner, most of the German delegates have reserved berths which were leaving between November 15th and 20th. He would know the next day whether all the delegates had been able to secure berths.

M Clemenceau does not see what they can do for the time being.


3. The Council has before it a letter from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation and a report from the New States Commission, dated November 8th, 1919.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the report of the Commission, and upon the draft letter to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation appended to said report. He wishes to call the attention of the Council to the fact that the Commission had been unanimous in thinking that it was satisfactory to send to the Serb Delegation a reply which would interpret the Treaty. The only disagreement was on one point. The drafting of Article II in the Serbian Treaty was different from the corresponding article in the other Minorities Treaty. Following S Tittoni’s suggestion, the Supreme Council had indeed decided on September 1st to replace in the article in question, for the Serbian Treaty, the words “proceder de telle manière” by the words “prendre telles mesures.” On the other hand, the corresponding English text was the same in all the Treaties, viz: “take such action.” The majority was of the opinion that this difference in the drafting of the French text did not alter the sense and that nothing opposed itself to their informing the Serbs thereof. On the contrary, the Italian Delegation was of the opinion that it would be wiser to abide, without further explanation, with the decision of the Supreme Council. On the whole, they believed that their reply was of such a nature as to satisfy the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, except with regard to the Macedonian question. However, one difficulty still remained: it is likely that the Serbian Delegation might feel it hard to accept the decision of the Council which asks that it should recognize the right of option under the conditions provided in Article 4, for persons of Turkish nationality. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation will perhaps put forward objections on this point.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether there are any reasons to believe that the Serbs would make difficulties on this point.

M Kammerer says that in a private conversation, at a time when the question of a special clause on the subject had come up in the Minorities Treaty, Mr Trumbic had expressed some doubt. He thought that the Belgrade government would find it easier to make a simple declaration.

Mr Polk says he approves the report of the Commission; but asks whether it would not be easier to obtain the assent of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation if they were to give Mr Trumbic the satisfaction of being heard by the Council? This would facilitate his task in his own country, for it could not then be said that the Conference had refused to hear the Serb Delegation.

M Kammerer says that from the very beginning the New States Commission had decided to hear no one.

Mr Polk remarks that one of the grievances of the Romanians, which was unjustified, was that they had not been heard by the Council. He did not wish to insist, but they might give them such satisfaction if they were heard; this might be the best way of obtaining their signature.

M Clemenceau asks whether this might not be the source of further delays.

Mr Polk asks whether the Commission felt sure that the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation would be content purely and simply with the letter which was going to be sent.

M Kammerer answers that except with regard to Article 4, they have every reason to think the Serbs will sign. It might perhaps be wise to send them immediately the letter which the Commission had prepared: If they have any objections to make, the Council might hear them.

M Clemenceau asks whether the Italian Delegation maintains its reservations regarding Article 11.

S de Martino states that they did not insist for the sake of conciliation, but it was understood that the two expressions were of the same value; one could not conceive an intervention of the League of Nations if the League could not take such measures as might be opportune.

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the report presented by the New States Commission with regard to the observations of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the Minorities Treaty;

(2) That the President of the Conference should send to that Delegation the draft reply as prepared by the New States Commission.


4. M Clemenceau says that the question should be adjourned as the Reparations Commission is not ready to discuss it.

Mr Polk asks whether they could not inform the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation that the Separations Commission had instructions to hear its representatives. The Reparations Commission might be further informed that the Supreme Council desired that the request of the Yugoslavs be considered with the utmost care with a view of meeting the situation as far as compatible with the Treaty and the declarations of May last in the Council of Four.

Sir Eyre Crowe has no objections to make.

M Clemenceau does not have any either. He asks whether the Italian Delegation has any to offer.

S de Martino answers that he has none, if it is understood that the hearing of the Yugoslav Delegates by the Reparations Commission does not affect in any way or prejudice the decisions of this Commission.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Reparations Commission should be requested to hear a representative of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation regarding the distribution of shipping which belongs to the erstwhile Austro-Hungarian Empire, between Italy and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State;

(2) That the Separations Commission be informed that it is the desire of the Supreme Council that the Yugoslav request be considered with the utmost care with a view to meeting the situation as far as compatible with the clauses of the Treaty and the declarations of May last in the Council of Four, it being understood that the Reparations Commission be given power of appreciation and decision;

(3) That the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation be informed that the Reparations Commission has been instructed to hear its representatives.


5. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 7th, 1919.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon the note of the Drafting Committee.

M Clemenceau wishes to ask who would make the distinction between German Government property and private property.

M Fromageot answers that this distinction should not be very difficult to make.

Mr Polk inquires whether they could not await the arrival of the German Delegates to solve this question?

M Clemenceau asks whether they will have the necessary powers.

Mr Polk says it is a violation of the Treaty: He thinks that it would be saving time to follow his suggestion rather than send a new note.

Sir Eyre Crowe says they are confronted by a difficulty of form. They have before them a question which had been brought up only by an American report which stated, besides, that the Germans had ceased to remove, at least partly, the materiel in question. They did not know whether the materiel which was being removed did or did not belong to the state. Perhaps it would be sufficient to warn the German Government that they would not permit the removal of government-owned materiel.

M Fromageot says that the first thing to do is to verify on the spot to whom belonged the materiel which had been removed.

Mr Polk says that there were at Danzig representatives of the Inter-Allied Railway Mission in Poland.

M Clemenceau said it is for them to give the necessary information.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Inter-Allied Railway Mission in Poland be requested to advise immediately whether materiel removed by the Germans from Danzig is State or private property;

(2) That the Drafting Committee prepare a draft note warning the German Government that the Allied and Associated Powers will not allow removal or sale by German authorities of naval materiel at Danzig, which belonged to the Reich, to the German States, or had been requisitioned by them.


6. The Council has before it a note from the Secretary-General of the Conference dated November 8, 1919.

(After a short discussion,

It is decided that the Allied and Associated Powers, having drawn up a list of individuals charged with crimes to be delivered by the German Government, should have a representative on the Commission whose appointment had been decided on November 7th, and who is charged with the organization of mixed tribunals set up under Article 229 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.


7. The Council has before it a note from the Commission on Polish Affairs dated November 10th, 1919 and a letter from the Secretary General of the Polish Delegation status of Eastern dated November 9th, 1919.

M Cambon said that before commenting upon the report of the Commission he wishes to call the attention of the Council to the letter from the Secretary-General of the Polish Delegation. The American, Italian and Japanese Delegations are of the opinion that the request addressed to the Council should be granted. The British and French Delegations, on the other hand, think that it is time to solve this irritating question.

M Berthelot says that Mr Paderewski had already explained to the Council the Polish point of view. They do not see the use of hearing another Polish representative.

S de Martino says if it only means a few days delay it might be courteous to grant it.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether Mr Patek would be informed of the new conclusions arrived at by the Commission. In that case he will discuss them before the Council. Or will the conclusions be kept secret?

M Cambon said that they are not to be transmitted, but as usual there will be some leakage.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that if at each step they were to hear the Poles, they would never finish. They had come with great difficulty to an agreement. It would be imprudent to reopen the compromise which had been arrived at. However, he himself does not wish to oppose the granting of a short delay of three days for instance. In that case it should be taken into account that Mr Patek would make objections and that he would ask for time to receive instructions from Warsaw.

(The American, Italian and Japanese Delegates stated that they did not insist.)

Mr Polk thinks they might discuss the report and take a decision, with the reservation that they would give Mr Patek a further hearing.

M Clemenceau agreed.

M Cambon reads and commented upon the report of the Commission. He says that no disagreement exists between the members of the Commission except in regard to Article 16 which concerns the representation of Eastern Galicia in the Polish Diet. While the text of the majority provided for a representation of Eastern Galicia in the Diet and defined the attributions of its representatives, the minority on the other hand (the British Delegation), wishes to have the question of Eastern Galicia’s representation in the Polish Diet discussed between Galicians and Poles. The majority is afraid that such a procedure will result in endless and violent conflict between Poland and Galicia.

Sir Eyre Crowe states with satisfaction that the majority has made an effort to meet the minority half way. On his side the minority feels obliged to make some concessions. Three points would have to be discussed:

(1) With regard to the duration of the Mandate which the League of Nations would give to Poland in Eastern Galicia, he has received instructions from Mr Lloyd George to see that the duration of this Mandate should be limited to 10 years. He himself (Sir Eyre Crowe) proposed 15 years, the Commission had proposed 30 years, and finally 25 years had been agreed upon. He would be prepared to take the responsibility to accept this figure. If they did not agree on this point the American Delegation would come back to its former proposition and the question would be reopened.

(2) With regard to the Military service, he had already had occasion to express the reluctance of his Government to accept the principle of conscription in the territories placed under the control of the League of Nations. He accepts, however, in a spirit of conciliation, the proposed arrangement.

(3) Lastly, with regard to article 16, he wishes to say that the British Government is in no way opposed to a representation of Galicia at Warsaw. He only thinks that the problem is of so complex a nature that it would be better to let the interested parties solve it themselves. He undoubtedly could accept the text proposed by the majority, but they should take into account the case where Poles and Galicians would agree upon another system; would they be bound by article 16, as proposed by the majority? The British Delegation cannot accept the majority’s text except with the following addition, “this arrangement shall be subject to revision by common agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia.”

S de Martino accepts the British Amendment.

M Clemenceau states that all the Delegations accept the same.

M Cambon says that the changes which the Council has approved might necessitate some alteration of the articles originally adopted. He asks that the Council give the Commission on Polish Affairs the mandate to effect in accord with the Drafting Committee such changes of texts which would appear necessary.

Mr Polk says they are agreed not to publish anything concerning the decisions that had just been taken until the text of the Treaty had been definitely agreed upon.

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the report prepared by the Commission on Polish Affairs or its majority, with regard to the text of the preamble and Articles 2 and 38;

(2) That Article 16, as proposed by the majority, be adopted with the following addition, “This arrangement shall be considered as subject to revision by common agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia.

(3) That the Commission on Polish Affairs in agreement with the Drafting Committee should modify the articles concerning the status of Eastern Galicia, which had already been adopted, so as to conform with the two preceding decisions;

(4) That said decisions should not be final until a representative of the Polish Delegation had been heard by the Council;

(5) That the decisions of the Council with regard to the status of Eastern Galicia should remain secret until further order.)


8. The Council has before it a list prepared by the French Delegation of the questions still to be decided by the Supreme Council.

Mr Polk thinks that the Russian and Baltic questions cannot be settled by the Council. Would it not be better to agree now that they should be dealt with by the respective Foreign Offices?

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the question of Bessarabia should, however, come before the Council.

Mr Polk says the American Delegation is of the opinion that the Bessarabian question could not be settled at that time.

Sir Eyre Crowe states they are clearly of the opinion that Bessarabia should go to Romania.

Mr Polk says he is willing to discuss the question, but that this is not the time to make this cession.

M Berthelot says that the question of the Aaland Islands had already been put before the Council and that it had been decided to adjourn the settlement of same until it knew what attitude Sweden would take in regard to the blockade of Russia. In the same way, the problem of repatriation of Allied contingents and of enemy prisoners from Siberia, belonged to the Council.

M Clemenceau says that the Committee of Ambassadors might deal with the settlement of these three questions: They are questions of execution of the Treaty. It is understood that the Delegations will send in to the Secretariat-General the additional lists which they had been asked to prepare.

Mr Polk asks whether the Dutch-Belgian Treaty will be ready in time for examination by the Council.

M Berthelot thinks so. An agreement seems imminent.

Mr Polk asks whether the distribution of merchant ships is to be settled by the Supreme Council or the Reparation Commission.

M Clemenceau states that the Council will discuss it and refer it back to the Reparation Commission if it is deemed necessary.


9. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation.

Sir Eyre Crowe says the question had been put by the British Treasury, who wished to know from what date the allowances of members of the Boundary Commissions would be drawn.

M Berthelot thinks that the proposals made by the British Delegation offered certain difficulties. It does not seem just to begin the payment of allowances on the day when the nomination was notified to the Secretary-General of the Conference, for these notifications do not all take place at the same date. On the other hand, the date when the Treaty would be put into force is perhaps too late. It would be better to say that the allowances will become due from the constitution of the Commissions, leaving it to the Subcommittee of the Commission on the Execution of the Treaty to determine the application of that decision.

(It is decided:

(1) That the allowances laid down in the “Instructions regarding Boundary Commissions,” should begin to be payable to members of such Commissions, and be recoverable from the interested States, from the date of constitution of each Boundary Commission;

(2) That the Subcommittee of the Commission on the Execution of the Treaty settle all details with regard to the application of this decision.)

(The meeting then adjourns)
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12th November 1919

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Wednesday, November 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a draft note to Mr Venizelos relative to the report of the Commission of Inquiry, prepared by the British Delegation, a telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated November 3, and a letter from the Greek Delegation, dated November 4.

M Berthelot reads the draft note prepared by the British Delegation.

M Clemenceau raises the following point of form: On page 2 he thinks the word “observed” should be changed to read “felt” in the sentence reading: “It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself felt along the limits of the Greek occupation.”

Sir Eyre Crowe explains that in drawing up this note the British Delegation had wished to avoid mixing up two questions; he realizes, however, that other questions, referred to on the previous day by M Berthelot but not touched upon in this draft note, still remained to be settled. The question of the administration of Smyrna is a rather complex one and it might be well to turn it over to a Commission. A Commission on Greek Territorial Claims is already in existence. He understands that Mr Venizelos has a good deal to say on this question and it would perhaps be better for him to be heard by that Commission.

S de Martino agrees, particularly as he thinks it is time that a decision should be reached relative to the relations between the Greek army of occupation and the local authorities on the one hand, and the central Government of Constantinople on the other. It would be well to be guided by the principles of The Hague Convention. On the other hand, it would be well to show consideration to Mr Venizelos, who throughout the war had shown qualities of the highest value and whose difficulties were well known.

M Clemenceau suggests that the question be referred to the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims which, if necessary, can solicit the advice of the military experts.

M Berthelot points out that as General Bunoust, who is entirely familiar with the situation, is present he might give the Commission valuable advice.

Mr Polk calls the attention of the Council to a paragraph of the draft note authorizing the Greeks to advance from Aidin up to the river Kochak Chai. That clause is a very important one. It should be remembered that any further advance meant fighting between the Greeks and Turks. General Milne himself has recognized that fact. He therefore wishes to ask if the Council deemed it advisable to assume the responsibility for such further conflict.

M Clemenceau again points out that he can send no troops; he feels that possibly the best solution would be to have Mr Venizelos withdraw his troops from the region of Aidin where they had gone without the consent of the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that this means letting the Turks occupy this region.

M Clemenceau inquires if the Italians are far distant from the Greeks in this region.

S de Martino explains that they are not; that the Italian forces are within six hundred meters of the line of the River Meander and the parallel railroad. The Greek line was along the north bank of the river.

Sir Eyre Crowe explains that if the Greeks retire a triangle will be left between the river, the railroad and the Greek line, which includes Aidin. To the south the line had been fixed by agreement between Mr Venizelos and the Italian Government. He thinks that it would not be advisable to withdraw the Greeks from the triangle in question and turn it over to Italian occupation.

S de Martino points out that he has not made any such suggestion.

M Clemenceau then suggests that the Greeks could be left at Aidin, but that they should not be allowed to advance.

Mr Polk asked if General Milne himself had not said that a further advance by the Greeks would inevitably result in serious trouble.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that General Milne had rather said that he would be willing to authorize a further advance if the Council was prepared for the fact that such an advance would mean encountering armed opposition. General Milne had favored that advance on strategic grounds.

M Clemenceau observes that as Mr Venizelos feels capable of conquering Asia, the Greek troops certainly should be able to maintain their ground at Aidin. He agrees with Mr Polk that if the Council orders a further advance it will be in a position of creating further trouble.

Mr Polk says that he cannot agree to a letter authorizing the Greeks to advance in view of the fact that the authorities on the spot had said that trouble would certainly ensue. He thinks that this would be tantamount to authorizing the Greeks to advance and conquer additional territory.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the only alternative is to let in the Turks who will then unquestionably start to massacre the Greeks.

Mr Polk asks if Sir Eyre Crowe feels convinced of this?

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he does.

Mr Polk says that his personal view is that if this line of action is followed all Asia Minor will eventually have to be occupied.

M Clemenceau suggested that the Greeks be left at Aidin but that they not be authorized to advance further.

(This was agreed to.)

S de Martino wishes to ask Sir Eyre Crowe if he could give him some information on the intentions of the British Government relative to the occupation of Aidin. According to a telegram which he had received from Italian Authorities on the spot, English troops were reported to be ready to advance on Aidin. General Montague Bates, commanding the 83rd Infantry Brigade, was said to be in command of those forces. On November 4th more than 70 cars were reported to have left for Afium Karahissar in order to transport the British Troops.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that the British arrangement had been made in contemplation of Inter-Allied occupation. As no French troops could be sent he thought that the British troops would likewise not approach Aidin.

(It is decided to approve the draft note to Mr Venizelos relative to the report of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna prepared by the British Delegation after making the following modifications therein:

(1) On the second page of this draft note the sentence: “It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself observed along the limits of the Greek zone of occupation”, should be changed to read, “It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself felt along the limits of the Greek zone of occupation”;

(2) The clause: “In the meanwhile allowing the Greek troops to advance from Aidin up to the river Kochak Chai, according to General Milne’s recommendation” should be eliminated.

It is further decided to refer to the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims the questions pertaining to the administration of Smyrna, and that the Commission should be at liberty to take the advice of Military Experts, in particular that of General Bunoust.)


2. The Council has before it a reply from the Romanian Government transmitted by the Chargé d’Affaires of France, dated November 2nd, to the note of the Allied and Associated Powers dated October 12th.

M Clemenceau observes that the answer is very unsatisfactory and is even of a nature to cause anxiety.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees. He feels that the answer is practically a refusal of all the demands presented by the Supreme Council. The only point upon which the Romanians had even partially agreed was the evacuation of Hungary, and even on that point the Romanian Government had made a most formidable reservation with respect to the extent of the Hungarian territory to be evacuated. The Romanian answer gave no satisfaction to the Council’s demand relative to the evacuation in so far as concerned the withdrawal beyond the river Theiss. On all other points the answer is evasive and defiant. The Council should carefully examine the present situation in Romania. Its authority must be respected. Mr Bratiano is merely dilly-dallying and playing for time, and the measures adopted by him had resulted in deluding the majority of his countrymen into thinking him a great patriot. He (Sir Eyre Crowe) feels that if the King and the majority of the Romanians are made clearly to see that a persistence in their present attitude will necessarily mean a breach with the Allied and Associated Powers and Romania’s exclusion from the Alliance, then Romania would adopt a more compliant attitude. He thinks that in such an event the present Government would be forced to retire and that a Ministry would be constituted which would see the wisdom of meeting the Council’s just demands and would act accordingly. He thinks the above considerations should be put very plainly to Romania and that it should be told that if its reply to the communication proposed to be sent by the Council is not satisfactory it will mean the breaking off of relations between Romania and the Allied and Associated Powers. The Romanians cannot be driven out of Hungary by force as the Council has no force to dispose of, and it seems to him that the only alternative is the line of action he had proposed.

Mr Polk says he welcomes any strong action.

M Clemenceau thinks that the action proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe is strong enough to meet the requirements of the situation.

S de Martino inquires if it would be wise to adopt in its entirety Sir Eyre Crowe’s suggestion, which involves threatening Romania. The resulting situation if the Romanians should refuse to agree to the action proposed should be examined. If the Romanians refuse the situation would be worse than it was before.

M Clemenceau thinks that the terms of the communication to be sent to Romania were reasonably clear. They could be plainly told that they will be no longer in the Alliance.

M Berthelot reminds the Council that at the time of signing the Austrian Treaty it had considered telling Romania that Bukovina would not be attributed to it, but that in the Austrian Treaty it would be given to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This had not been done as it had seemed too severe a measure to be judicious at that time. However, as it is now proposed to exert pressure on Romania, it is well to examine the means of bringing this pressure to bear and a similar plan might now be considered. Romania might be told that her claims to Transylvania will not be recognized and that the question of Bessarabia will not be discussed until it can be taken up with a reconstituted Russia. He points out that the Romanian reply is satisfactory in so far as it announces the imminent withdrawal of the Romanian forces to the Theiss; the result had been to facilitate negotiations with the Hungarians. What he was now suggesting was primarily theoretical. The question of the advisability of taking such measures must still be decided, for when considering the question of punishing a Government it would be well not to lose sight of the fact that the population should not be wholly antagonized.

Sir Eyre Crowe reminds the Council that Sir George Clerk had referred in a former telegram to Romanian atrocities in Transylvania and the Council had inquired what part of Transylvania was meant. This question had not yet been answered but he had that day received a mass of documents relative to outrages in Transylvania, an examination of which might lead to the conclusion that the inhabitants of Transylvania were not as favorable to Romania as might have been thought.

M Clemenceau observed that two distinct questions are raised. First, is there a basis of right for taking away from Romania the Hungarian territories in question? The second question relates to the outrages committed by the Romanians in Transylvania.

Mr Polk says that he has always felt that if Romania refused to accede to the very reasonable demands of the Council she should not have Transylvania given to her. He thinks that such action is entirely too generous.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that the difficulty is that if Transylvania is withheld from Romania that would involve an occupation by Allied troops, which is obviously impossible.

Mr Polk observes that if these territories are withheld from Romania she would at least be in a position of never having been given them. Although occupation by the Allies is out of the question, he thinks that such action would at least have a great moral effect.

S de Martino thinks that the point of prime importance is to rehabilitate the prestige of the Council. The action proposed by M Berthelot was certainly rather severe. He would have to consult his Government on that point. In the meantime he thinks that the Ministers at Bucharest might be instructed to take further action.

M Clemenceau does not think this advisable in as much as the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Bucharest had already done all they could do.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that in his personal opinion a communication should be sent to Romania in the nature of a real ultimatum. He will, however, have to consult his government before agreeing to send such a communication.

Mr Polk inquires if it is necessary to send a communication of that nature. Could not an answer be sent to Romania pointing out that her latest communication to the Council is no answer at all, and demanding a satisfactory answer from her.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that the time for such action has gone by and that the present is the time to act firmly and decisively.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Polk also agrees.

M Clemenceau suggests that Romania should be informed that the Allied and Associated Powers will withdraw their representatives from Romania and that the Romanian representatives in the various capitals, as well as her representatives at the Peace Conference, must also be withdrawn. He further suggests that M Berthelot should draft a note, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting, this note to be submitted to the Council as soon as the Heads of Delegations have been able to consult their respective Governments.

M Berthelot points out that a diplomatic rupture is a serious matter and inquires if it is to be resorted to at once.

M Clemenceau says that his patience is utterly exhausted. He has been long suffering with the Romanian Government and has even been reproached for that attitude. The Romanians always try to prolong pourparlers indefinitely, and this must be put an end to.

Mr Matsui agrees to the action proposed. He, of course, will have to consult his Government, which he thinks will not raise any objections. He wishes to point out that his Government has no diplomatic representation in Romania. In the meantime, in as much as he might not be able to receive an answer from his Government until some time after the other members of the Council have heard from their respective Governments, he is willing to agree with the view which would be adopted.

M Berthelot summarized the contents of the communication to be prepared by him. He will recall to Romania all that has been done for her and in her behalf by the Allied and Associated Powers and will point out the refractory attitude consistently maintained by Romania with respect to the just demands of the Supreme Council.

S de Martino calls attention to one paragraph of the Romanian note which seemed to him to have some merit. That is the paragraph dealing with the granting of authority to the Sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission to receive complaints relative to unauthorized requisitions. Romania had pointed out that in this respect she had been treated worse than the Yugoslav State had been in the matter of its requisitions in the Banat.

M Berthelot explains that the situations are not at all analogous. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had never been in opposition to the Council on this question.

General Weygand states that he has lately received a visit from Colonel Dimitrescu. He did not know the Colonel and was unaware how much importance should be attached to his statements. By way of information, however, he wished to tell the Council that Colonel Dimitrescu had complained of the Council’s attitude towards Romania and had pointed out that the present Government in Romania, mainly composed of Generals, was only able to attend to internal affairs; he therefore hoped that the Council would have patience with Romania until elections had been held and a government constituted which was qualified to deal adequately with foreign affairs as well as internal matters.

M Clemenceau thinks that no importance should be attached to these remarks of Colonel Dimitrescu; Mr Bratiano was behind the whole matter.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that the Ministry of Generals had been put in power so that precisely that argument could be advanced.

(It is decided that M Berthelot should draft a note to the Romanian Government, for submission to the Council, taking into account the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.)


3. The Council has before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 9th and a telegram from the Inter-Allied Military Mission dated November 10th.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that the situation in Hungary seems to have greatly improved. He calls attention to Sir George Clerk’s request that about 20 officers be sent to Hungary to be attached to various army and police units.

S de Martino says that he is in favor of sending these officers if the other members of the Council are also.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the question of their payment would surely be raised. It seemed to him that they might well be paid by the Hungarian army.

M Clemenceau agrees and says that he also favors sending these officers.

Mr Polk says that at present Colonel Yates, he believes, is in charge of the reorganization of the Hungarian Gendarmerie. He thinks that his Government would have no objection to sending a few officers to Hungary temporarily but he will of course have to consult his Government.

M Clemenceau suggests that it might be well in replying to Sir George Clerk to warn him to be on his guard against a restoration of the Hapsburgs under any guise.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that this might be unnecessary in as much as Sir George Clerk had indicated that Friedrich’s departure is imminent.

M Clemenceau points out that his retirement in many ways resembles that of Mr Bratiano. Although nominally retiring he will still remain in power. He thinks it would be well to include a general phrase of the tenor above suggested by him.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees.

(It is decided:

(1) That Sir Eyre Crowe should prepare, for submission to the Council at its next meeting, a telegram to Sir George Clerk in answer to the telegram, dated November 9th, received from him, and taking into account the telegram received from the Inter-Allied Military Mission dated November 10th;

(2) That the Heads of Delegation should examine the question of sending a total of about 20 Allied officers to Hungary.)


4. The Council has before it a note relative to the expenses of transportation of the Inter-Allied troops of occupation for Plebiscite Areas.

General Weygand reads and comments upon this note and points out that the German Government will certainly raise the question of the payment of expenses of transportation.

M Clemenceau observes that the work to be done by these troops would be for the account of various interested countries. He thinks that those countries might well bear the expenses.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that is the proper solution, but wishes to point out that in the case of Danzig and Memel the Council had decided that those expenses should be borne by the local authorities.

Mr Polk suggests that the matter be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(This was agreed to.)

S de Martino wishes to bring up a question closely related to the foregoing one. In the plebiscite areas the expenses of maintenance of the Inter-Allied troops and Commissions would entail expenses which had not yet been estimated with exactness. These expenses, however, will be considerable. According to the terms of the Treaty these expenses are to be met by the local revenues of each plebiscite area. In the case of Allenstein, Eastern Prussia might be called upon for partial payment in case the local revenues were not sufficient. In the remaining areas the local revenues should suffice. Under these conditions it seems necessary that a more or less accurate estimate of the expenses of maintenance of those troops and Commissions should at once be made by a Committee of Financial and Economic experts who would be charged with determining whether or not the whole of those expenses should be apportioned to the local revenues of the plebiscite zones.

General Weygand observes that he only raised the question of the expenses of transportation. The question of the expenses of maintenance was a far larger one. There has as yet been no means of arriving at a very accurate estimate of the transportation expenses but from some figures at hand it seemed that they would amount to two or three million francs. The amount of the expenses of maintenance he thought could easily be calculated.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that this latter amount cannot be estimated with great accuracy because it is impossible at this time to know how long the various areas will be occupied.

M Berthelot points out that the occupation will not be effected by a large number of troops and would not last for a long time, except possibly in the case of Upper Silesia where the local revenues would be amply sufficient.

S de Martino suggested that the Drafting Committee also examine this question at the same time as the question of the expenses of transportation.

General Weygand states that he will be able, with the aid of the Allied Military Representatives, to estimate the expenses of maintenance, and he will communicate that estimate to the Drafting Committee.

(It was decided:

(1) That the note relative to the expenses of transportation of the Inter-Allied troops of occupation for plebiscite areas should be referred to the Drafting Committee for examination and report;

(2) That at the same time the Drafting Committee, after receiving from Marshal Foch an estimate of the expenses of maintenance of the Inter-Allied troops and Commissions in the plebiscite areas, should determine by whom such expenses should be borne in case the local revenues were not in all cases sufficient.)


5. M Berthelot informs the Council that a telegram has been received from Sofia saying that the Bulgarians are prepared to sign the Treaty without any conditions whatever. Mr Stambouliski is anxious to be present at the signature of the Treaty, but as he is just leaving Sofia he will not reach Paris for several days. He (M Berthelot) thinks there would be no harm in awaiting M. Stambouliski’s arrival before proceeding to the signature of the Treaty, all the more so as there were several details still to be settled. For instance the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government which had to sign the Austrian treaty before signing the Bulgarian treaty, is prepared to sign the former when the question of the distribution of tonnage had been adjusted. The Council had also decided that certain clauses were to be inserted in the Bulgarian Treaty relative to the neutrality of Switzerland.

(It is agreed that there is no objection to awaiting the arrival of Mr Stambouliski before proceeding to the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty.)


6. M Berthelot informs the Council that according to a telegram from Prague the Czechoslovak troops have already been ordered to evacuate the mining district of Salgo Tarjan without awaiting a prior reimbursement of the Czechoslovak Government for expenses incurred by it on behalf of Hungary. Dr Benes had desired to remain in occupation of two points in the neutral zone by way of guarantee, but if the Council does not agree with him he is not prepared to insist.


7. General Weygand reminds the Council that at its meeting of November 4th it had approved the communication sent by Marshal Foch to the German Government relative to the interruption of railroad traffic in the occupied regions of Germany. The German Government had complied with the terms of this communication. Therefore, the day before Marshal Foch had consented to allow certain reductions in railroad traffic in the occupied territories. The matter was at that time settled satisfactorily to both sides.


8. M Berthelot informs the Council that a telegram from Belgrade has announced that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government is ready to sign the Austrian Treaty as soon as the distribution of Austrian commercial tonnage had been adjusted.

S de Martino states that he has been informed the previous day that his Government and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had reached a complete agreement on this point.

(The meeting then adjourns.)
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Old 11-13-19, 07:49 AM   #4238
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13th November 1919

Speeches given by Adolf Hitler: Munich, Eberlbrau - Hitler's second public speech - hecklers were violently ejected. 130 attended.

Vickers Vimy Heavy bomber about to embark on the first aerial trip from Britain to Australia (the journey takes 28 days): © IWM (Q 73244)


Prince of Wales at George Washington's tomb.
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Old 11-13-19, 11:03 PM   #4239
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Thursday, November 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


M Pichon states that M Clemenceau had asked him to apologize for being unable to be present at the opening of the meeting. He proposes to start with the second item on the agenda, viz; the draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.


1. The Council ha before it a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk prepared by Sir Eyre Crowe.

Sir Eyre Crowe calls the attention of the Council to the last paragraph of the draft telegram. He had thought it necessary to call the attention of the Hungarian Government very specially to the necessity of its troops evacuating the Comitadjes of Western Hungary, which had been given to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

(It is decided to approve the draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.


2. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 3rd and a note from the British Delegation dated November 11th.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that the Supreme Council at its meeting of November 1st had decided to obtain the advice of the Drafting Committee on the draft note prepared by the Aeronautical Representatives in answer to a communication of the German Government dated October 12th. The Drafting Committee, having alluded to the fact that the question was already covered by a paragraph of the protocol to be signed by the German Plenipotentiaries, had concluded that it was useless to send that note. Since then, the question had again been discussed by the Aeronautical experts and the Drafting Committee. They had come to the conclusion that the protocol did not cover all the violations which the Germans had committed under that heading. Under these conditions it appeared advisable to reply to the German note of October 12th, and he thinks that it will be necessary to put the question once more before the Drafting Committee.

S de Martino agrees that Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal is very opportune. It is a most important point which they should not leave in the air, and he insists that the proposal of the British representative be taken into consideration.

Captain Roper says it is indeed extremely advisable that the views of the Supreme Council on that point should be made clear. There are, however, two ways of proceeding: they can either reply directly to the German Armistice Commission, or confine themselves to sending instructions to General Masterman. The draft instructions can be sent immediately, but the Drafting Committee is of the opinion that it would be advisable to await the coming into force of the Treaty before answering the Germans.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the Drafting Committee might prepare at the same time draft instructions for General Masterman and a reply to the German Armistice Commission, which will be sent at a later date.

Mr Polk wishes to ask to what extent the Germans can dispose of their aeronautical materiel, balloons, Zeppelins, etc.

General Groves states that the Germans cannot dispose of anything which might be considered military or naval aeronautical materiel.

Mr Polk inquires who is the court of appeal on the military or naval character of that materiel?

General Groves answers that it is the Aeronautical Commission of Control.

(It is decided to entrust the Drafting Committee to prepare in agreement with the technical experts.

(1) Draft instructions for General Masterman;

(2) A reply to the German note of October 12th, concerning German aeronautical materiel.)


3. The Council has before it a draft letter to the German Delegation regarding elections in Upper Silesia.

Mr Polk says that the elections which have just taken place in Upper Silesia are partly favorable to the Poles. Would it not be inadvisable under these circumstances, to oblige the Plebiscite Commission to hold these elections in all cases null and void?

M Laroche says he has asked himself the same question. The Polish Press considers those elections a great success for the Polish cause. The German papers, however, bring out the fact that the Poles had not obtained half the votes recorded. From a legal point of view it seems difficult to annul the elections only in part; he thinks it better to stick to the principle of declaring all elections void. The Plebiscite Commission might take on the spot all necessary administrative measures to maintain, in extraordinary cases the election in certain municipalities.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that Mr Polk’s observation might be satisfied by changing the last paragraph. They might use instead of saying, “That the Powers will consider as null and void”, the words, “That they will hold themselves entitled to consider null and void, etc.” On the other hand, the Powers wished this note to put an end to the exchange of correspondence with the Germans on that question. He therefore thinks it more advisable to omit the paragraph beginning with the words, “in this connection the observations, etc.”; as a matter of fact that paragraph contains allegations of fact which the Germans will be tempted to answer. If this omission is approved, the fifth paragraph beginning with the words, “It is, however, a matter of surprise, etc.” might well be placed at the end of paragraph 2 which begins with the words, “if the Versailles Treaty, etc.”

(It was decided to approve the draft letter to the German Delegation concerning municipal elections in Upper Silesia, with the following changes:

(1) Omission of paragraph 4, beginning with the words, “In this connection, etc.”

(2) Paragraph 5, beginning with the words, “It is, however, a matter of surprise, etc.” should be placed at the end of paragraph 2, which begins with the words, “If the Versailles Treaty, etc.”

(3) In the last paragraph replace the words, “that they will consider as null and void” by the words, “That they will hold themselves entitled to consider null and void, etc.”


4. The Council has before it a letter from General Nollet to the President of the Conference, dated November 1st.

Colonel Rote reads and comments upon the letter from General Nollet.

Sir Eyre Crowe says this is an important question, and he wishes to know if the proposal made by General Nollet had the approval of the French Government.

M Pichon said that the French Government had confined itself to communicating the letter of General Nollet to the Council without taking any position in the matter.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the questions with reference to the organization of these Commissions had been discussed very thoroughly and the draft which had been finally arrived at was the result of a compromise. It had been decided that the allowances would only be given in virtue of the function exercised by the officers, without taking into account their rank or situation. This question was an important one because its solution affected the problem of Reparations. If they now decided to give special allowances to officers on the ground that they were General Officers or because they were the senior representatives of their country, they would be departing entirely from the principles followed up to this time. He would very much like to have the opinion of the French Government on that point, on the one hand because the French element was very strongly represented on the Commissions of Control operating in Germany, and because, on the other hand, it had seemed to him that the French Government is opposed in principle to any measure calculated to diminish the Separations fund. Should the Council be of the opinion that the request of General Nollet should be answered, he personally would not oppose it, but he wishes to point out that they would be committing themselves to a new principle on a question which affected the problem of Reparations.

(At this point M Clemenceau enters the room.)

M Clemenceau agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe that it is advisable to adhere to the ruling which they had previously fixed. The arguments given by General Nollet do not seem very convincing. They had decided to remunerate, not the rank or situation, but the function, and he does not believe that there is any reason to change their attitude on that point.

Colonel Roye said that it was to be feared that, on account of the existing high cost of living in Germany, the allowances to officers mentioned in the letter of General Nollet might not be sufficient.

S de Martino says it is understood that no negative conclusion will be arrived at on this day, and that the question should be referred back to General Nollet for further information.

M Clemenceau said General Nollet’s proposal does not seem to him to have sufficient grounds; but if he gave the Council some better arguments in a further note, he personally would not object to examining the question anew.

(It is decided to adjourn the question raised by the letter of General Nollet dated November 1st, pending further information to be furnished by him.


5. The Council has before it a draft note to the Romanian Government prepared by M. Berthelot.

M Berthelot reads the draft note.

M Clemenceau wishes to inform the Council that he has been asked to receive General Coanda and Mr Antonescu; he will receive them that afternoon, and he intends to confine himself to advising them to accept without further delay all the demands which were formulated by the Conference.

Mr Polk asks whether, in making reference in the second last paragraph of the letter to: “arrangements to be concluded with Hungary, Bulgaria and Russia” they did not seem to commit themselves to giving Bessarabia to Romania, in the event of the latter country complying with the Council’s demands.

M Berthelot does not think so; the question certainly had been discussed by a Commission which had come to the unanimous decision to give the whole of Bessarabia to Romania, but the Council had not taken any decision to that effect, and its liberty of action remained unimpaired.

M Clemenceau states they will wait before taking a final resolution until all the delegates have received their instructions.

Sir Eyre Crowe states he has already received his.

Mr. Polk thought that the instructions he already had gave him sufficient authority to accept the draft under discussion. He would, however, let the Council know his decision at the next meeting.

S de Martino says that, as far as he is concerned, he expects to receive his instructions that very evening. He feels the greatest confidence in the outcome of the interview which M Clemenceau would have that afternoon with General Coanda and Mr Antonescu. He expresses the hope that M Clemenceau will speak to them with the firmness which he so well knows how to employ, and feels certain that he will obtain the results the Council desires. General Coanda is very intimate with Mr Bratiano and capable of having a good influence upon him. He wonders whether it is wise to discuss, as they are doing in the draft before them, the behavior of Romania during the war. They are running the risk of starting a polemic, for Romania will certainly be sure to answer that she had herself been abandoned by Russia.

M Clemenceau remarks that they also had been abandoned by Russia, which had not prevented their carrying on the war to an end. Three months before the Bucharest Peace he had warned Mr Bratiano that he was committing his country to a disastrous policy. Mr Bratiano had protested that he would never conclude a separate peace, a protest which had not prevented his doing so.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether a period of six days is not a little short.

M Clemenceau replies he thinks there was a point in giving the Romanians a rather short period; they will thus bring them to ask for a prolongation which the Council would grant. But the very fact of their having asked for a prolongation would, as a matter of fact, commit the Romanians to an answer.

S de Martino thinks it will be necessary to impose upon the Romanians a definite time for the evacuation of the Hungarian territory to the east of the Theiss.

M Clemenceau wishes to know whether the Council would give him authority to acquaint unofficially the Romanian delegates he is to see that afternoon with the draft under discussion.

Mr Polk says he will very willingly give this authority, especially as this document seems to him remarkably well drafted.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks what their attitude will be should the Romanian delegates, after having been unofficially acquainted with the draft note, ask for a postponement of the official communication of the note.

M Clemenceau thinks that they should in any case send the note as soon as it has been definitely approved.

(It is decided to authorize M Clemenceau to communicate unofficially to the Romanian delegates the substance of the draft note to the Romanian Government.)


6. Mr Polk wishes to ask, as a matter of information, whether the situation has been modified since the Luxemburg question had been discussed in the Council. He had been informed that the British Government had recognized the Government of the Grand Duchess.

M. Clemenceau has not heard that there had been any such recognition on the part of the British Government. Great Britain had only sent a representative to the wedding of the Grand Duchess. He would, however, be glad if Sir Eyre Crowe would acquaint himself with the exact situation. The situation as between France and Luxemburg was as follows: The majority of the Luxemburgers was favorable to a “rapproachement” with France, but the French did not wish to commit themselves to a policy which might involve them in difficulties with Belgium. As for the present Government of Luxemburg, the Grand Duchess is German by birth, and he believes, by sympathy. She is, however, obliged at this time to appear very Francophile. There are no present difficulties between France and Belgium on the general question. The only question in dispute is a certain railroad administered by the Alsace-Lorraine Railroads, which Bismarck had taken away from France in 1871. The Belgians are claiming this railroad, which the French cannot give them. This is a very small difficulty, which furthermore, is on the point of being settled. It is essential that the Principal Powers should act in accord concerning the recognition of the present Luxemburg Government.

M Berthelot says the Belgians have asked the French whether they intend to recognize the Grand Ducal Government. They had answered it is for the Belgians first to take a decision on that point. The Belgians then said they preferred to abstain provisionally from recognizing the Government of the Grand Duchess, and the French have based their attitude upon the Belgian. The sending of a representative by the British Government to the wedding of the Grand Duchess had been a mere act of courtesy. Nevertheless from information they had received, it would appear that there had been at the same time recognition of the Luxemburg Government by Great Britain.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he will get information on the subject and communicate it to the Council.

(The question is then adjourned.)


7. Mr Polk wishes to say a few words to the Council on the question of German oil tank ships. On September 27th, the Supreme Council by a vote to which he was a party, had decided to ask the Germans to deliver the 14 German oil tank ships which were lying at Hamburg. Since that date he had several times discussed the question with Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr Henry Berenger. There was a good deal of feeling in America on the question: for that reason he earnestly wishes that, pending the outcome of negotiations, the ships under discussion should stay where they are. He thinks his proposal will not raise any difficulties, as he hopes to arrive at a solution within three or four days.

M Clemenceau asks what are his objections to these ships being taken to an Allied port?

Mr Polk says that certain declarations Mr Hoover had made had given the impression in America that the fate of these ships was already settled. Out of that arose the question which was the object of the negotiations then in progress.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that in the protocol submitted for the German signature the Council had confirmed the decision of September 27th by asking the delivery of all these ships, without specifying them by name. It does not seem possible to ask the Germans now to keep these ships; that would be to publish a difference of views between the Allies. It is to be hoped, however, that the Germans have not yet delivered the ships in question. If by chance they had already done so it would be sufficient to instruct the Naval Armistice Commission to retain these ships without doing anything with them for the moment. He hoped Mr Polk would not see any objection to this procedure.

Mr Polk says that the record of the meeting of September 27th shows that those ships were to be delivered to the Allies, but did not specify under what conditions the temporary operation of these ships should be regulated. He fears that if these ships are to be delivered by the Germans in the Firth of Forth a wrong interpretation of this measure would spread in America.

M Clemenceau asks that the discussion be adjourned to the following day.

(The meeting then adjourns.)
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Old 11-14-19, 10:15 AM   #4240
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14th November 1919

Aftermath of War

Romanian troops evacuate Budapest.

Admiral Kolchak’s Siberian Army begins to retreat form Omsk to Chita in the face of advancing Bolshevik troops, starting the Great Siberian Ice March. Thousands die during the march due to attacks and the cold.


The Prince of Wales, Secty Daniels, Asst. Secty. of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Rear Adml. Scales Commandant [i.e., Commandant] of the Naval Academy reviewing Naval Cadets at Annapolis.


Ship Losses:

No. 4 (Soviet Navy Red Movement) Russian Civil War: The armed pontoon had to be beached to prevent sinking in the Volga Estuary after a torpedo launched from a White Navy coastal motor boat exploded on the river bottom beneath it.
No. 7 (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War: Medvezhyegorsk Operation: The gunboat was shelled and damaged by White artillery in Lake Onega and beached, scuttled by retiring Soviet troops to prevent capture.
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Old 11-14-19, 12:27 PM   #4241
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Friday, November 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Clemenceau reports his conversation of the previous day with General Coanda and Mr Antonescu. They had asked that the period for a reply be extended from six to eight days inasmuch as they declared that they were able to assure him that within that time the Supreme Council would receive a favorable answer without qualifications, from the Romanian Government. They had also asked that the sentence dealing with the conclusion of peace, while a Romanian army of 400,000 men was still in the field, be expunged. His impression is that the Romanians are really ready at last to give satisfaction on all points. He thinks that when so doing they might try to discuss the question of the Minorities Treaty, but he does not think that they will offer serious resistance on this point and that any such discussion will really amount to nothing.

S de Martino reminds M Clemenceau that at the previous meeting he had expressed the greatest confidence in the outcome of the interview between M Clemenceau and General Coanda and Mr Antonescu, and he is glad to see that his confidence has in every way been justified.

M Clemenceau replies that it was as a result of his association with his Italian colleagues that he had acquired diplomatic skill. He suggests that a decision as to sending the draft note to the Romanian Government be postponed until all the delegates had received the instructions of their Governments.

(This suggestion is agreed to.)


2. Mr Polk desires briefly to summarize the present status of the question of oil tank ships. On September 27th, after the matter had been discussed at several prior meetings, the Supreme Council had decided to allocate the tankers in accord with the plan of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive. At that time he had accepted and joined in the decision without being fully aware of the purport of the prior discussions and of the attitude of his Government. The position taken by the United States is that behind this question the ultimate and beneficial ownership of the tankers was a question for the Reparation Commission. The remaining question, which is the troublesome one, is as to the temporary allocation of these tankers. Messrs Davis and Hoover had thought that this latter question had already been decided in a sense contrary to that of the decision of September 27th, which had temporarily allocated these vessels between Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. When that decision had been communicated to his Government it had protested against it because it felt that this was contrary to a decision already taken. He now wishes to suggest that pending a final decision, which he hoped would very shortly be arrived at, nine of the fourteen tankers in question be allowed to remain where they were so that there would be no change in the situation. He wishes to explain the reasons for this suggestion. There is a great deal of feeling in the United States, and if the temporary allocation decided upon by the AMTE were to be put into effect it would cause his Government great embarrassment. If the decision of September 27th could be rescinded, and the tankers could be held where they then were pending a final decision, the shipping question he thinks will become very simple.

M Clemenceau asks why only nine of the tankers are spoken of. How many are there?

M Berenger replies that there are fourteen.

M Clemenceau inquires why Mr Polk had raised the point with respect to only nine of them.

Mr Polk explains that nine of these tankers are claimed by a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company.

M Clemenceau says that he understands that no question was raised as to the temporary allocation of the other five tankers.

Mr Polk says that that is the case.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that a formal demand had been made upon the Germans to deliver these tankers. Furthermore, in the protocol drawn up for their signature, the point of the undelivered tankers had been specifically brought up. With respect to the attitude to be taken towards the German Government it seems to him quite impossible to modify this demand which had already been formally made. The Germans had been playing for time and counting on dissension between the Allied and Associated Powers. If the Germans have not yet delivered these tankers, and do not do so within a week or two, Mr Polk’s views will be partially met and the situation will be facilitated. If the ships have been delivered he is willing in deference to Mr Polk’s urgent representations to agree that the decision of September 27th be modified, but only to the following extent: if the tankers have been delivered to the Armistice Commission they should remain in the hands of the Armistice Commission instead of being temporarily allocated in the manner theretofore decided upon by the AMTE.

M Berenger reads the decision of September 27th. This decision had been arrived at unanimously after a long and careful study of the question.

Mr Polk says that is not so as far as he was concerned.

M Berenger mentions several instances showing that the United States Representatives on various Committees had been thoroughly familiar with the question in all its phases. Mr Polk himself had had the questions put on the agenda on September 23rd. Previously there had been a full discussion at a meeting at which Mr Dulles and others had been present. Telegrams had been exchanged and certainly the question was one of such importance that the United States Government must have been fully aware of it. As soon as the decision had been made known great pressure had been brought to bear both in New York and Berlin. The first effect of that pressure was that the Shipping Board had committed an act of violence in holding up the steamer Imperator and other passenger ships in contravention of the decision of the Supreme Council. Furthermore pressure had been exerted in Berlin to keep the tankers in Hamburg and not have them go to the Firth of Forth. This pressure had been brought by the Standard Oil Company which claimed the ownership of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. In October 1914 the tanker Leda had been taken by the British as a prize of war and condemned by a Prize Court, but thereafter, as a result of American representations, this ship had been given up by England to the American Government for the Standard Oil Company. The Leda had been given up by the British Government as a result of the Standard Oil Company’s claim of ownership of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. Twenty-seven other ships of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft in United States ports had been recognized as belonging to the Standard Oil Company, and judgments of competent courts had affirmed the Standard Oil Company’s ownership of the stock in question prior to the time the United States entered the war; but the contention of the United States that the tankers now at Hamburg were in the same situation could not be sustained. He had heard rumors from well informed sources, that before the United States entered the war, i.e. in 1916, the Standard Oil Company had alienated its stock-holdings to a German concern. He agrees with Mr Polk that the question of final ownership of the tankers can only properly be settled by the Reparation Commission. He wishes to emphasize the fact that the solution of this question was most pressing; in fact it was vital inasmuch as some 50 thousand tons are involved and the scarcity of petroleum is world wide. On the other hand he agrees entirely with Sir Eyre Crowe with respect to the present disposition of these tankers. It will obviously not do to let the Germans see that there is still dissension on this point between the Allied and Associated Powers, dissension resulting from a question of private ownership and interests. The German need for petroleum had been recognized and that difficulty had been settled. The Germans had only begun to emphasize their lack of petroleum in July and they had requested the use of ships to remedy the existing scarcity. The Supreme Council had decided that these tankers could circulate under the Inter-Allied flag for one voyage; it had been thought that this would supply the German needs. He takes note of what Mr Polk had said regarding the feeling of the United States but he wishes to point out that before any concession can be made to the views of the United States Government the Shipping Board will certainly have to release the Imperator and the other passenger steamers which are being illegally retained in United States ports. The questions are closely connected. If the Shipping Board releases the ships referred to the nine tankers in question might go to the Firth of Forth and be held there until a final decision on this question is reached. In the meanwhile, the other five tankers should be disposed of pursuant to the decision of the AMTE relative to their temporary allocation.

Mr Polk does not wish to take up the Council’s time by replying separately to all the points raised by M Berenger, but he feels obliged to make a few remarks. Of course he also feels that it is advisable not to show that there is any lack of solidarity between the Allied and Associated Powers but he feels that as far as this question was concerned the Germans are well aware that there is a division of opinion. The question of the ultimate ownership of the tankers is a technical and an involved one, which should be decided by competent courts and the Reparation Commission. With regard to the rumored sale by the Standard Oil Company of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft that was far more than a rumor; in fact it had been referred to by the United States representatives in reports submitted by them to their colleagues on Commissions. The question to be settled is what the legal effect of that sale is.

M Berenger says that that is the first time he has known definitely about that sale.

Mr Polk says that he means the sale of the shares of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, and he wishes to point out that said sale had not been recognized by the Alien Property Custodian who had seized the German securities. This had been set forth in a note presented by the United States representatives. It is not within his province to discuss the propriety of the action of the Shipping Board; what he wishes to point out is that his Government feels, rightly or wrongly, that the question of title had been discussed long ago and that because such a question existed, the ownership of these tankers had not been settled, nor had the allocation thereof been settled at Brussels. The matter had been brought up at London where the United States was only informally represented; then it had been referred to the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels, where the United States is not represented at all. At that time it had been unknown to him that an agreement existed covering the division of passenger ships and tankers between Great Britain and France, and that the allocation made depended thereon.

M Berenger says that he had not heard of any such arrangement between Great Britain and France.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he would have something to say on that point.

Mr Polk says that this agreement contemplated the delivery of passenger ships to Great Britain and tankers to France; he understands that a French company had been formed to enter the oil carrying trade. He is not stating these facts with any desire to engage in a controversy. He merely wishes to show the feeling which exists in the United States. He had not been fully informed of all the points of discussion in this controversy, although as to that he is not seeking to present any excuses, but he could not help feeling that the other countries concerned had been fully aware of the delicate nature of the questions under discussion. The question had arisen in the French Chamber and a modification of the temporary allocation decided upon had been discussed. Public opinion in America had looked upon this as a permanent change in the allocation, contrary to the understanding which Mr Hoover thought had been reached. He repeated that the Germans knew that there was a division of opinion on this question. He himself had done his utmost to see that the Protocol to be signed by Germany should not specifically mention these tankers. He only asks that the tankers should remain where they re. He wishes to inquire if M Berenger means to say that if the Imperator and other passenger ships are not released by the Shipping Board the tankers should be allocated according to the decision of September 27th.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that it is a notorious fact that whenever the question of oil is touched upon, great difficulties result. With reference to the German knowledge of the division of opinion between the Allies, he thinks he cannot agree with Mr Polk’s point of view. A first decision had been taken and formally notified to the Germans. They had then received information from Standard Oil Company sources that no attention need be paid to this decision.

Mr Polk says that this is something that he did not know.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that from the information in his possession, he feels sure that it is so. There had then been further discussion in the Supreme Council and the Germans had been a second time instructed to deliver the tank ships. The Germans had been aware that there had been disagreement prior to that final decision, but they did not know that such disagreement had continued thereafter. The situation is not now as Mr Polk thinks, and the question has become one of the honor and prestige of the Allied and Associated Powers in the eyes of the Germans. Mr Polk had made two statements which it seems to him might be interpreted as raising a question of the good faith of the British Government and to these, of course, he must object. The first statement is Mr Polk’s reference to a decision taken at a meeting of the AMTE in London where the United States was only informally represented, and the subsequent reference of the question to the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels where it is known the United States is not represented. He wishes to point out that the decision to hand over the ships was taken at a meeting at which a representative of the United States was present. The matter was then referred to the Supreme Economic Council. The suggestion therefore was that the decision had been arrived at over the heads of the Americans. He would emphasize that the proposal to refer the matter to the Supreme Economic Council was made by the United States representative himself with the implication that the United States would accept. He does not wish any possible impression to remain that the decision at Brussels was the result of taking advantage of the United States not being represented there.

Mr Polk says that of course he had meant to imply nothing of the kind.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the second point referred to by him is the alleged secret agreement between the French and British Governments.

(He then reads from a letter received from the Ministry of Shipping on the subject).

There is no such agreement in existence. There is an agreement between Mr Kemball Cooke and M Loucheur in regard to allocation of passenger steamers which is perfectly plain and above-board. In fact, Mr Cooke had announced it himself to the AMTE and had it circulated to all the Delegates with the Minutes. The following wording occurred in that agreement: “in consideration of the allocation to France of the tank steamers as decided by the AMTE.” Sir Eyre Crowe presumes that Mr Polk is referring to that clause. If so it is a mare’s nest, as that simply refers to the withdrawal of Great Britain’s claim to certain tank steamers which was disclosed by the first examination of the percentage due to her on a rigid ton for ton basis in comparison to losses. As a matter of fact no bargain is possible with the French as neither are they in a position to make one nor are the British in a position to guarantee the delivery of the tank steamers. All the British had said was that they would not claim what they considered their just proportion of the tank steamers. The French Oil Shipping Companies were, of course, preparing for the management of these tankers. As it is now five weeks since the Supreme Council had allocated a considerable proportion of the steamers to France it does not seem unreasonable that the French should have been making preparations to take them over.

M Berenger points out that the agreement is dated November 10th and can therefore have had no effect on the decision taken by the Supreme Council on September 27th.

Mr Polk says that he had not claimed that the agreement was a secret one but had merely said that he had not known of it.

Sir Eyre Crowe says the whole trouble is that the United States claimants would not admit that the allocation is purely temporary; they wish to mix it up with the question of permanent ownership. He now finds himself in a difficult position. The question had been raised of the 10 passenger steamers illegally held by the Shipping Board in the United States. He wishes to remark that though there might be considerable feeling in the United States the indignation in England was even greater. He has just received peremptory instructions from his Government to submit the following decision to the Supreme Council: that the Supreme Council should now address a formal demand to the United States Government that the 10 passenger steamers illegally retained by the Shipping Board in United States ports should be immediately released. He had not wished to present this question at that session, but as the matter of the retention by the Shipping Board of 10 passenger steamers had been raised, he feels obliged to inform the Council of the instructions he has received.

M Clemenceau points out that public opinion in France is also greatly aroused over this question.

Mr Polk says that Sir Eyre Crowe had felt that he had laid great stress on his statements with respect to the fact that the decision reached by the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels was taken in the absence of American representation, and with respect to the formation of French Oil Shipping Companies. He wishes to remind the Council that he was only stating the case as it was seen in the United States, whether rightly or wrongly. It was, of course, not his intention to make imputations of any kind; he merely wished to show that public opinion in America felt that a decision had been taken at Brussels when the United States had not been represented there.

M Clemenceau asks why the United States had not been represented on the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels?

Mr Polk explains that since Mr Hoover had left American representation on the Supreme Economic Council had ceased. With respect to the formation of French Oil Shipping Companies the impression existed in the United States that these Companies were being formed to use ships to which United States interests had a valid claim.

M Berenger says that as far as he knows no French oil shipping companies had been formed.

Mr Polk says that their formation had been reported in the French press.

M Berenger replies that that was no more accurate than a great deal of other information appearing in the press.

S de Martino says that he does not wish to go into detail, but he desires to make a general observation. A good deal has been said about the impression that the Germans would have as to dissension among the Allied and Associated Powers on this question. He feels that on this occasion not only will the Germans receive such an impression but they will, for the first time, profit by it, and the prestige of the Council will be very badly affected. There is no country which does not have a very great interest in this question. Oil is badly needed everywhere and it is most injudicious to keep these tank steamers in idleness. He thinks that public indignation will surely be aroused if the impression is created that these ships are not being used as a result of a theoretical discussion. He fully agrees with M Berenger with respect to the nine tankers; that is to say, that they should go to the Firth of Forth and remain there until a final decision can be reached; while the other five tankers should be allocated according to the decision of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

Mr Polk says he will cable his Government with respect to this point.

M Clemenceau points out that the only point of agreement is that the ownership of the tankers in question should eventually be determined by the Reparation Commission. He agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe that the question raised by the action of the Shipping Board in the United States should not be taken up at this meeting. He thinks it would be better to have the nine tankers go to the Firth of Forth until a final decision is had on the question. He appreciates the difficulties of the United States Government and wishes to be of assistance to it as far as possible, because he thinks it was not ultimately responsible for what had happened. He wishes to point out, however, that with respect to the United States, the question is fundamentally one of private interests, whereas in France and England the question was one of general interest which affected everybody. Under these conditions he feels that private interests should give way. He trusts that when Mr Polk, as he had said he would, sends a telegram to his Government relative to the suggestion that the nine tankers should go to the Firth of Forth and stay there until a final decision had been reached on the matter, he would at the same time take into consideration the view he (M Clemenceau) had just expressed, and that feeling in France and England was as fully aroused as it was in the United States.

Mr Polk wishes to make it clear that his Government’s solicitude is not for the Standard Oil Company; his Government feels that a matter of principle is involved. He thinks that the Standard Oil Company did not consider that the present administration was in its favor.


3. The Council has before it three joint notes from the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in Teschen.

M Laroche reads and comments upon the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions consisting of these three joint notes.

(It was decided to accept the recommendations of the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in Teschen, contained in the three joint notes.


4. Mr Polk explains that Colonel Haskell, Inter-Allied High Commissioner for Armenia, is leaving Paris that night and that prior to his departure he thought it would be well for him to give the Council a brief summary of the conditions in Armenia. Situation in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan

Colonel Haskell informs the Council that the three republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are at daggers drawn with each other on almost all points. Georgia and Azerbaijan have perhaps some slight degree of good feeling towards each other, evidenced by a loose defensive alliance concluded between them as a protection against a possible advance southward of General Denikin’s army. Armenia refused to join this alliance. Political and economic conditions in each of the three countries are in as bad a condition as can be imagined. He wishes to point out that these three countries have been arbitrarily carved out and delimited. The only railway system from the Black Sea through to Persia traverses all three of these republics and any one of them has it in its power, under present conditions, to paralyze traffic. Aside from the animosity existing between these states, further material difficulties have resulted from their arbitrary delimitation: for instance, all the railway repair shops are in Georgia and all the fuel for the operation of the railway system comes from Baku in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, between these three republics there are various contested districts, and neutral zones which have been marked out by the British, which it had not been possible to change because they gave rise to such burning questions that no change can be adopted until all three republics are consolidated under one administration. He has been entrusted by the Supreme Council with representing it in Armenia, but he cannot efficiently carry out the necessary work as long as Georgia and Azerbaijan remain without his jurisdiction. Moreover, owing to the fact that these two latter republics do remain without his jurisdiction, an anomalous situation is presented. Thousands of inhabitants of Azerbaijan are receiving relief in Baku and other localities, and the same is true of many Georgians at Tiflis and other points; though those destitute people are entirely dependent on the relief they receive, the Relief Administration has no control whatever over the local administration. If all three republics were put under one administration the neutral zones referred to could be eliminated, and a definite frontier temporarily fixed. Such a solution would preclude the existence of a situation such as now exists, where a large number of Armenians find themselves within the political limits of Georgia. The Georgians will not feed them because they were of Armenian nationality, and on the other hand, the Armenians refuse to give them any assistance inasmuch as they were living within the territorial limits of Georgia. There are no foodstuffs available anywhere, and all three of the republics are virtually living on the salvage of the Russian collapse. Economic life was at a standstill. Practically nothing can be imported inasmuch as the money of all three of the republics have no purchasing value. The Caucasian ruble, which should be worth 51 cents was now only worth about 1 cent, and it had actually been found impracticable to issue paper money in smaller denominations than 10 rubles because the value of the paper was greater than the money. Foreign merchandise shipped on the railroad through to Persia is liable to be requisitioned by any one of the three Republics, as their need for everything is so great. The most essential need perhaps, is to control the system of through railway transportation. In Armenia alone some 800,000 destitute are being relieved and about 15,000,000 francs per month is being spent on this relief work. Armenians in foreign countries do indeed attempt to send some relief to their starving countrymen. Although those supplies get through the ports of Batum and its surrounding territory, where the British have an efficient administration, they are held up at various points in the interior by the Georgian authorities, and the same situation applies to all railway traffic.

Mr Polk explains that the Council has sent Colonel Haskell as its representative for relief work in Armenia and Colonel Haskell feels that it is necessary for him to have the same functions in Georgia and Azerbaijan in order to efficiently accomplish his mission. That matter can be settled later when the experts have been heard. As Colonel Haskell is leaving Paris this night, he (Mr Polk) thinks that it might be of interest to the Council to hear his views.

M Clemenceau thanks Colonel Haskell for his presentation of the question.

(At this point Colonel Haskell leaves the room.)


5. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation relative to measures to be taken to remedy the dearth of rolling stock in Austria.

M Pichon suggests that the British note be referred to the Committee on Organization of the Separation Commission.

(It was decided to refer to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission the British note relative to measures to be taken to remedy the dearth of rolling stock in Austria.)


6. The Council has before it a proposal from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian Coal.

Major Aron reads and comments upon this proposal.

General Le Rond suggests that paragraph 2 of the proposal of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal be modified so as to provide that the requirements of Upper Silesia should first be satisfied.

(It is decided to adopt the draft decision submitted by the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal, after modifying it so that the end of paragraph 2 should read as follows:

“A - To Upper Silesia: The tonnage which the Commission shall judge suitable to attribute to it.
- to Austria: 200,000 tons per month.
- to Poland: 250,000 tons per month.

B - To Germany: The surplus.”)

(The meeting then adjourns.)
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15th November 1919

Rail transport: The golden spike is driven and construction of the San Diego and Arizona Railway is completed at a cost of $18 million. (J.D. Spreckels drives the "golden spike" on the San Diego & Arizona Railway)
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Saturday, November 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. Sir Eyre Crowe states that the drafting of the resolution of November 11th concerning the status of Eastern Galicia does not seem to him to agree entirely with the decision which had been actually taken by the Council. He had understood that their decision was an absolutely final one and the Polish Delegates would be heard, not by the Council, but by the Commission.

M Clemenceau does not agree with Sir Eyre Crowe on that point; if his recollection is correct, the text of the resolution quite agreed with what they had decided. It was understood, however, that the hearing of the Polish Delegates would only be an act of courtesy on the part of the Council. Their declarations would have no influence on the Council’s decisions, and should not take more than one-half to three-quarters of an hour.

M de Saint Quentin stated that in accordance with the resolution of November 11th, the Secretary General had informed the Polish Delegation that Mr Patek would be heard by the Council as soon as he arrived in Paris, and had insisted on the extreme urgency presented by the question of Eastern Galicia.


2. The Council had before it the draft note to the Romanian Government, inserted in the minutes of November 13th.

M Berthelot reads the draft note.

Mr Polk asks whether it would not be advisable to refer, at the end of the third paragraph, to Sir George Clerk’s Mission at Bucharest.

M Berthelot says that, so as to take into account Mr Polk’s remark, which appears to him quite justified, one might insert at the end of the third paragraph the following phrase: “in order to show the importance which the Conference attached to obtaining the reply of Romania, it had even entrusted a special delegate, Sir George Clerk, to go to Bucharest.”

M Clemenceau states that in recognition of the good-will shown by General Coanda and Mr Antonescu in the interview he had with them two days previous, he proposed to omit in paragraph seven the words: “the time when Romania still had under arms an army of over four hundred thousand men.” He also suggested granting to Romania a period of eight days to make its answer known instead of six days which they had proposed to give them in their original draft.

Mr Polk suggests adding in Section 3 (on top of page 4) the following words: “under the conditions shown by the note from the Supreme Council, dated October 12th.”

Sir Eyre Crowe proposes a change of form in the second last paragraph of the draft which he thinks would read better as follows: “As far as the fixing of frontiers yet to be effected is concerned, Romania will thus, by its own conduct, forfeit all title to the support of the Powers, as well as the recognition of its rights by the Conference.”

S de Martino says that he finds himself in a rather embarrassing situation. He had received his instructions, but these were not quite clear. He was told on one hand, not to oppose the Allies in the question of sending the note to Romania, and on the other, not to subscribe to expressions which were too strong, and which would lend it a character of violence or of threat. As a matter of fact this draft threatened the Romanians with a diplomatic rupture. Under these circumstances he had asked Rome for new instructions which he hoped to receive that day. He would like to know if Mr. Polk had already received his instructions.

Mr Polk says he is ready to accept the draft which was then before them.

M Clemenceau says it is extremely important that they should vote that very day. The immediate dispatch of the note is necessary all the more because they are sure, according to the declarations made to him by the Romanian Delegates that their demands would be accepted.

S de Martino states he had also received the Romanian Delegates. The latter had come away with the very best impression of their interview with M Clemenceau and of the manner in which he had explained the situation to them. They had also told him that a misunderstanding had arisen between Sir George Clerk and Mr Diamandi on the question of the evacuation. The Romanians consider their retreat to the Theiss only as a first step towards the evacuation of Hungarian territory, and do not intend in any way to stop short on that river for a protracted period. They had also expressed themselves as ready to sign the Austrian Treaty. As for the rectifications of frontiers which were asked for by the Romanians, they were of very secondary importance, and concerned chiefly the Commissions of Delimitation on the spot. He wondered whether, taking into account the good-will which the Romanians seemed to show, they might not subdue some of the expressions which were used in the draft note under discussion.

M Clemenceau feels obliged to remark that he had read the draft note to General Coanda and Mr Antonescu. It therefore seems to him, under the circumstances, extremely unfortunate to change in the draft anything at all except the phrases concerning first, the Romanian forces still under arms at the time of the Armistice, and second, concerning the period within which they demanded an answer - a period which they had agreed to extend from six to eight days. He had himself let the Romanian Delegates hope for the granting of these two concessions. He does not think that they ought to make any further concessions, especially as General Coanda had already left for Bucharest to report on the situation with reference to the communication which he (M Clemenceau) had read to him.

S de Martino hopes his instructions would arrive in the course of that afternoon and that he could make known his final answer between 16:00 and 17:00. He feels certain, moreover, that he will receive authority to accept the note which was before them.

Mr Polk feels that a new delay in the dispatch of the note would be extremely unfortunate.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the note should be sent as it had been read to the Romanian Delegates. S de Martino might let his Government know that there is, properly speaking, no threat towards Romania as they were virtually certain that the Romanians will accept their demands. Should the note not be sent immediately, the Council will be giving the Romanians the impression that the Allies are hesitating.

Mr Polk maintains that the Council has already used towards the Romanians language quite as severe.

S de Martino points out that the acceptance of the note by General Coanda and Mr Antonescu commit only themselves. The Council does not know for certain what will be the attitude at Bucharest.

M Berthelot remarks that the same thing had taken place concerning the Council’s note of November 7th. The Italian Minister at Bucharest, alleging that he had not received direct instructions from S Tittoni, had refused to join in the step taken in concert by his colleagues.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the British Delegation had received similar information from its representative at Bucharest.

S de Martino says that the Italian Delegation had, as a matter of fact, telegraphed to its representative at Bucharest to associate himself with his colleagues.

M Clemenceau proposes to dispatch the note to Romania immediately. If the Italian Delegate cannot accept that note, it would suffice to send a telegram to the Italian Representative at Bucharest advising him to abstain from joining his colleagues.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks what decision would be taken with regard to publishing the note.

M Clemenceau says he had promised in the course of his interview of November 13 with the Romanian Delegates to support in the Council the non-publication of the note. The Romanians had made a formal promise. He thought that they should take their good-will into account and not crush them under the blow of a publication, the effect of which in Romania would certainly be very serious.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks they are not sure that Mr Bratiano will appear as conciliatory as General Coanda.

M Clemenceau states that if Bucharest offers any difficulties the Council will then be free to publish the letter, and that, even without the toning down upon which they had decided that day. It should not be forgotten that General Coanda had answered for the King of Romania.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he is quite ready to associate himself with the views the President had just expressed. They ought, however, to take care that the Romanian Government should not take advantage of their silence to present the facts to Romanian public opinion in a false light.

S de Martino remarked that the telegram to which he had referred previously and which directed the Italian Minister at Bucharest to join in the step taken by his colleagues was dated November 10th, 00:47.

M. Berthelot says that as the note of the Allies was dated November 7th, the slight misunderstanding which had taken place was easily explained by the interval of three days which occurred between the note and the telegram.

(It is decided to adopt the draft note to the Roumanian Government.)

S de Martino makes the reservation that his final approval of the note will be made known in the course of the afternoon. If the instructions received by the Italian representative should not allow him to adopt the note, the Italian Minister at Bucharest will receive telegraphic instructions to abstain from associating himself with the step taken by his colleagues.

(It is further decided not to publish, for the present, the note addressed to the Romanian Government.)


3. Mr Polk reads the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on July 5th on the subject of Colonel Haskell’s mission. He proposes to add after the word “Armenia” the words, “Georgia and Azerbaijan”. The Council had heard at the preceding meeting Colonel Colonel Haskell’s declarations. He simply wished to submit this proposal to the Council without insisting that it should be accepted.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he has submitted this question to his Government. He thinks he can already say that they would not object to the extension of Colonel Haskell’s mission for the organization of relief in Georgia and Azerbaijan. He would, however, call to the attention of the Council the fact that in the resolution which had just been read Colonel Haskell is entitled High Commissioner. He wishes to make his reservations on that title all the more so as he did not think that it corresponds with the functions with which Colonel Haskell has been entrusted.

Mr Polk says as the British are already represented in those regions, he proposes that Sir Eyre Crowe be good enough to submit a draft resolution at a later meeting.

S de Martino says that the Italians also have officers in the Caucasus. He will therefore consult his military experts, but he can already say that he is in favor of the American proposition.

(It was decided that Sir Eyre Crowe, after consultation with the competent experts, will put before the Council a draft resolution extending the powers already conferred upon Colonel Haskell for Armenia to include Georgia and Azerbaijan in matters concerning relief work.)


4. M Clemenceau says that it is advisable to take up as soon as possible the important questions which still remain to be decided by the Council. He wishes to ask whether they should not examine the list of questions on the agenda of the Council which had been drawn up by M Berthelot.


5. Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to call attention to the urgency of taking a decision concerning the provisioning of Vienna. Their information depicts the situation of the Austrian capital in a terrible light. To enable the Austrians to buy food, it seems necessary to grant them a loan. But he thinks the guarantee for this loan should be a charge upon the Reparations Fund. That is an important question which the Reparation Commission ought to deal with immediately.

M Clemenceau asks whether it does not rather concern a financial commission.

Mr Polk says the Reparation Commission is already acquainted with the question. Mr Rathbone had cabled Washington to explain the situation and to ask how far the American Government would consent to be committed.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that if immediate measures are not taken, it is to be feared that there will be from 300,000 to 400,000 dead that winter in the streets of Vienna. The Austrians realize the situation and are resorting to every possible means to get money. They are at the moment engaged in selling their art collections, pictures, jewels, etc, a procedure which is, as a matter of fact, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.

M Berthelot says it is correct that the Austrians have tried to sell their “objets d’art”, but in fact they have not managed to sell anything with the exception perhaps of a few isolated objects. He had, moreover, seen Dr Benes, who had also depicted the situation at Vienna as tragic. He had stated that if the Powers were willing to help him, he would be in a position to send coal and food to Vienna.

M Clemenceau says that Dr Benes might be asked to discuss the question in agreement with the Reparation Commission.

(It is decided:

(1) To refer to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission for examination and report the problem of means to be adopted to ensure the provisioning of Vienna;

(2) That Dr Benes be asked to make known to the Committee his views on the subject.)


6. M Berthelot summarizes Sir George Clerk’s telegram, dated November 13th. He says that the information conveyed in this telegram is not very reassuring, and it seems that the formation of a coalition cabinet is making the situation more uncertain than ever.

M Clemenceau wishes, in that connection, to say a few words concerning the attitude of Admiral Troubridge. No one contests the fact that the Admiral is a distinguished and capable man, but he is a partisan of Archduke Joseph. He has a right to be, but he wonders whether the Admiral is not going a little far in following his preferences, which apparently are not those of his Government. The information he is giving on Admiral Troubridge’s attitude comes from an excellent source and he wonders if it is not advisable for the British Government to take this situation into account, all the more so because the Admiral’s influence throughout Hungary is considerable.

Sir Eyre Crowe says the Admiral has received instructions to comply with the policy of Sir George Clerk. He will not fail, however, to take up the question raised by M Clemenceau.


7. Mr Polk says he would have an important statement to add to the declarations he had made at the preceding meeting on the oil tank ships, but as the French and British experts are not present, he proposes to adjourn this question to the next meeting.


8. M Berthelot says that in the question of distribution of enemy ships, the naval experts have not yet succeeded in arriving at a complete agreement. He thinks that an understanding will be made easier if the Council hears the question, inasmuch as the differences of views which existed seemed to him of slight importance.

M Clemenceau says that they can put the question on Monday’s agenda.


9. M Berthelot says that they have informed the Serbs that they will not be authorized to sign the Bulgarian Treaty until they had signed the Austrian Treaty. The Serbs have answered they cannot sign the Austrian Treaty before the question of the distribution of Austro-Hungarian tonnage has been solved. That question can be discussed on Tuesday, for the British expert will then have received his instructions.

M Clemenceau thinks that if that question is settled on Tuesday, the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty can be set for Wednesday or Thursday.

(The meeting then adjourns.)
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Old 11-16-19, 09:27 AM   #4244
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16th November 1919

Elections are held for the first Belgian Parliament since the Great War. The Socialist and Catholic Parties each hold 70 seats in the Chamber of Representatives but the Catholic Party holds the edge in the Senate.

Hungarian Republic (1919–20): Admiral Miklós Horthy entering Budapest as the head of the National Army on 16 November 1919. He is being greeted by city officials in front of the Hotel Gellért.


Alfred Werner, Swiss Chemist who won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1913, has passed away.
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Old 11-16-19, 10:34 AM   #4245
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Sunday, November 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.
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