Stories and Patrol Logs + Screenshots and Videos (merged)

[paulhager]

U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL May 27, 1944

From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet

Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #3.

Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering third war patrol.

Bernard H. Schwartz

(A) Prologue

New 5” gun installed. MacDonald promoted to PO 3rd Class. Put him in charge of the gun crew. Abele promoted to Sr. PO. He and Ensign Townsend have been taking apart and generally fussing over the Mark 6 Exploders. Our magnetic pistol test at the beginning of patrol 2 was very successful - we hope to build on that success this patrol.

Torpedo loadout: 4 Mark 14, 4 Mark 18 – stern; 8 Mark 14, 8 Mark 18 – bow.

(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)

(B) Narrative

05 APR – 17 APR
Departed 5 April to recon 3 island bases: Yap, Ulithi, and Woleai.

In transit to Yap.

Flash message received: Intercept IJN forces en route to Saipan from Home Islands. ETA to port of Saipan: early hours of 20 April. At 12 knots, we’re a little over a day away from the Saipan area.

18 APR
By 1800, 40 nm West of Saipan. The orders offered no details on the course the convoy would follow though it should be expected to come from the NW. Practically speaking, close the island, the convoy could appear anywhere in the quadrant from North to West.

With a day and a half to go until the expected arrival of Japanese forces, decided to investigate the nearby port of Garapan.

19 APR
Approached Garapan from the NW at 0200. Radar showed several ships riding at anchor. Two ships were patrolling.

Initially proceeded South down the coast then turned to approach from due West. Meanwhile, one of the patrollers was heading North, along the coast – perhaps heading to the port on the other side of the island.

At 10000 yards, went to periscope depth. Closed to 3000 yards submerged. A quick survey revealed a Buzyun Maru, a Ryuun Maru, an Akita Maru, and an Auxiliary Gunboat all anchored. The remaining patroller was nowhere to be seen. As we prepared to retire from the area and report our findings, the OOD, who had just gone to the observation scope, informed us with remarkable composure that a gunboat was 300 yards dead astern and approaching. Somehow it had come from directly behind and not been picked up by our sound equipment.

Attack #1
The boat was too close for a torpedo shot. Of the two options remaining the worse was to go deeper. The gunboat would roll depth charges and we would be helpless. Therefore, we battle surfaced and went to flank speed, turning to bring the deck gun to bear. The 40 mm Bofors opened up immediately and took out the machine gunner in the bow. As the turn brought the deck gun to bear, it roared to life. The first shell took the gunboat amidships. The second took out the wheelhouse. The Bofors meanwhile stitched the boat at the waterline. The gunboat was finished.

There was a spout of water 100 yards to port. An Auxiliary Gunboat at anchor had gotten into the action. Now we crash dived.

Although the orders had not specified it, operational security was assumed to dictate that we not reveal our presence in the area. Under the circumstances, there was no longer any need for stealth. We leveled off at 200 and circled to make a complete sound check of the area. Nothing stirred within the range of our sensors. There were no sounds of ships getting up steam or weighing anchor. All was quiet. We couldn’t leave it at that – we aimed to liven things up a bit.

We withdrew another 1000 yards and went to periscope depth. The Ryuun Maru was the largest target available so we selected it and fired a Mark 14 from the stern tube. It struck amidships.




One torpedo proved insufficient so we hit it with a second Mark 14. The Maru still refused to sink so we withdrew to 6000 yards and surfaced to finish it with the 5”. Even with radar to assist, the gunners missed the first few shots but when they finally got a couple of hits we could see that the Maru was done for. And none too soon because the Auxiliary Gunboat was getting the range as well. We went to flank speed, turned away, and then crash dived.




At 10000 yards from the nearest ship we surfaced and made our way to the East side of the island and the Port of Saipan.

On our journey to the East side of the island, “gremlins” got into the SJ radar – we put our crack engineers on the problem.

We rediscovered that second patrol boat at sunset, just North of the port. The crash dive took 49 seconds – better than our best drill thus far. An approaching enemy sub killer tends to concentrate the mind.




We found a thermal at 180 and kept going, down to 400 feet. Some minutes later, our enemy roiled the Pacific with depth charges at least 1000 yards astern.




After 10 minutes, we secured from silent running and the repair work on our radar resumed. The repair team asserted that it would be functional in no more than an hour.

At 0930 we rose to radar depth. The unit came to life and at the end of the first complete sweep we saw a total of seven objects – one of these was undoubtedly our pursuer. A few more sweeps showed that the 6 blips in the harbor were stationary. The escort moved forward at slow speed and then stopped – it was listening for us.

Attack #2
We went to 28’ – decks awash – and made a slow approach at 5 knots. The target, a Sokuten Minelayer, remained stationary as we closed to 2700 yards. At that point, we loosed a Mark 14 set to high speed.




The minelayer exploded and sank almost immediately.

With the only patroller eliminated, none of the other ships posed a threat. From 1100 to 1245, we systematically destroyed all 5 ships in the harbor, starting with two Sokuten Minelayers. This was followed by an Akita Maru, a Heito Maru, and a Taihosan Maru. A total of 10 torpedoes were expended in the attack. Along with the 2 from the previous attack, half our torpedoes were gone.

The remaining object was not a ship – it was a float plane we dispatched with the 40 mm.

20 FEB – 24 FEB
Conducted reconnaissance of the three islands, starting with Yap. We continued on to Ulithi and Woleai. (Intelligence gathered on this mission is in a separate report filed with ComSubPac and marked SECRET.) After informing ComSubPac about the successful conclusion of our mission, we were ordered to conduct offensive operations along the Japan-Rabaul shipping lane.

25 APR – 18 MAY
A long, fruitless patrol. Ventured to the Bismarck Sea, dodged a couple of aircraft patrols. Then proceeded North, pursuing a zig-zag path to Saipan, thence to area around Truk. Made close approach to Truk and radar found a number of ships at anchor.

Made a second run to Bismarck Sea and again meandered around.

Made a second run to Truk – no contacts.

With fuel below 35% reported to ComSubPac. Was ordered back to new base at Majuro.

19 MAY – 25 MAY
Return to base. Dock 25 May.

(C) Fuel Consumed
76%

(D) Weather
Normal for area(s).

(E) Torpedoes Expended
12 – 8 ships sunk, estimated tonnage 18568.

(F) References
See Patrol 2
See Patrol 4

[paulhager]

U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL August 6, 1944

From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet

Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #4.

Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering fourth war patrol.

Bernard H. Schwartz

(A) Prologue

A few old comrades move on to new assignments. A new Chief named Fred Austerlitz joins the crew. He comes highly recommended as a torpedo expert. Austerlitz is assigned the billet in the aft torpedo room left by PO 1st Putnam.

Torpedo loadout: 8 Mark 18 – stern; 8 Mark 14, 8 Mark 18 – bow.

(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)

(B) Narrative

13 JUN – 17 JUN
Left Majuro – made high speed run to Manus Island to top off tanks and proceed to PZ.

Along the way received several reports which suggested major IJN Fleet operations were in progress:
0200 14 JUN, USS Redfin reported 4BB, 4CV, 8CA, many DDs; 5° 00’ N, 119° 38’ E, 10°T, 12KTS.
2030 15 JUN, USS Cavalla reported 15+ large combatants; 11° 50’ N, 131° 52’ E, 50°T, 12KTS.
2200 15 JUN, USS Seahorse reported BBs, CAs, DDs; 5° 25’ N, 128° 15’ E, 20°T, 15KTS.
0740 16 JUN, USS Flying Fish reported heavy units; 12° 45’ N, 124° 20’ E, 90°T, 12KTS.
1530 17 JUN, USS Cavalla reported an AO and 3DD; 11° 43’ N, 130° 25’ E, 10°T, 12KTS.

Connecting the dots suggested a battle might be in the offing to the NW. We were nowhere close.

18 JUN – 27 JUN
In transit to PZ. Arrive 2300, 27 June.

On 21 June, received reports of a carrier battle in the vicinity of the Marianas. Sounded like we gave the IJN a real pasting!

28 JUN
Attack #1
A single crossed our path: a Momoyama Maru. Hit the Maru with a perfect shot from the stern right under the stack. Broke her back.

We have nothing but praise for the designers of the Mark 18. It’s accurate and reliable – we’ve never had a dud. In contrast, we’ve had some duds with the Mark 14.

29 JUN
Attack #2
Just before sundown, another single sailed into range. We were able to get into position for a stern tube shot with our target silhouetted by the fading light of the Western sky.

The ship, a Kinposan Maru, went dead in the water but failed to sink so we moved to 2200 yards off the stern, which had no gun mount, and reduced the ship to a burning and sinking hulk with the 5”.

30 JUN
Attack #3
Moments after receiving orders to patrol in the East China Sea, another ship hove into view. Amazingly, it was the third unescorted merchant ship we’d encountered in as many days. We attacked from 2800 yards off the track. A Mark 14 set for 2’ under the keel was used – it detonated just behind the stack.

That should have finished the Heito Maru but it stubbornly remained afloat. We surfaced and began shelling it. The first several rounds were either wide of the target or overshot. The ship began firing toward us just as a 5” shell finally struck the ship in the vicinity of the stern cargo hold. There was a brilliant flash followed by a rising fireball.

Three torpedoes and a few 5” rounds had sunk 3 enemy ships – we were off to a very good start.

We secured from general quarters and set course for our new PZ.

31 JUN
Attack #4
Just before arriving at our patrol zone, a flotilla of sampans crossed our path. The gunners could always use some practice so we fired on them with both the 5” and the 40mm, sinking 2. Then we continued on.

An hour or so later radar picked up an approaching plane. We dived for an hour and then resumed our course.

01 JUL – 04 JUL
Patrolling.

Attack #5
We had been ordered to patrol in this area for 96 hours and we were close to time to report in to ComSubPac when an unescorted merchant approached from the East – speed was 10 knots, course was 273°T. Made a surface attack from 1600 yards using a Mark 14. Result: 1 shot, 1 kill.

Shortly after our victory, ComSubPac sent a flash message alerting of a convoy en route to the Home Islands traveling through the Formosa Strait. We were close to the track of this convoy and therefore plotted an intercept course. At the same time we reported in to ComSubPac which approved our stalk of the convoy, after which we were to patrol 100 nm West of Manila.

05 JUL
At 0525 radar picked up ships at 34000 yards bearing 135. This couldn’t be the same convoy, which had to still be some distance to the SW. We counted 15 ships in the convoy: position 26° 18’ N, 121° 40’ E; Course 90°T, Speed 10 knots. Twelve ships were in 3 columns, 3 abreast. There was an escort running patterns ahead of the center column, either an escort or a small freighter trailing the center column, and about 3000 yards back from it, an escort running patterns.

We initiated an end around maneuver at 16 knots and for the next hour closed the distance to 20000 yards while pulling ahead. At 0635, position was 26° 18’ N, 121° 51’ E; Course 90°T, Speed 10 knots.

A check of the ephemeris revealed that, if the convoy continued at its present course and speed, the Sun would set at 1046 – moonrise would be at 0955. The moon would be just short of full. We could attack in 4 hours and 25 minutes – 12 minutes before the end of civil twilight and 1 hour 5 minutes after moonrise. Too bright for a surface attack at anything closer that 3000 yards. With clear weather the moon would only get brighter as it rose in the sky, again precluding a close-in surface attack.

The alternative was to make a submerged daylight attack ASAP but that made it more likely the escorts would tie us up long enough for the convoy to escape. Fortunately, it would take at least another hour to get into position for the daylight attack – time we could use to consider our options.

Attack #6
The decision was taken out of our hands: the convoy changed course at 0810. New Course: 10°T; New Speed 8 KTS. Now we had to run a new end around.

We were in position a little before sunset. The lead ship in the center column was chosen as a reference target. We submerged when the lead escort was at 9000 yards – even in the fading twilight, the moon made it far too bright to remain on the surface.




The center column leader proved to be a Nagara Maru – perfect! There was another Nagara in the far column, number 2 position. All of the other ships were smaller. The center Nagara would remain the target – we’d just refine the solution. The only lingering issue was how many torpedoes to allocate. We settled on the 3 Mark 14’s in tubes 1-3 – a miss would have a decent chance of hitting a ship in the adjoining column. Torpedoes 1 and 3 were set for 15 feet and 12 feet respectively. Number 2 was set for 26 feet, magnetic trigger.

We fired the spread and dove the boat. Depth here was only 430’ which was barely enough room to maneuver.

The first torpedo struck right on schedule at 11:19:41.




Numbers 2 and 3 also hit. She was done for.

We found a thermal at 270, leveled off at 300, and went to silent running. We were unmolested by the escorts.

At 1155, we secured from silent running and began reloading torpedoes. Rose to radar depth at 1300. An escort was conducting a sprint-drift search, range 9000, bearing 200. We surfaced and set course for our new PZ.

06 JUL
In transit to PZ.

Attack #7
A singleton showed up on the radar screen at 1930: Course 358°T, Speed 11 KTS. It turned out to be a Nagara Maru. Got into position for a stern shot and fired a spread of 2, both of which hit.

Two hits should have sufficed but the Maru stubbornly sailed on. We surfaced and used the deck gun to convince her she was dead.

07 JUL
Attack #8
Yet another unescorted merchant strayed into our path. Initially it was traveling at 11 knots, 30°T, however, it changed course on us, necessitating some rapid adjustments on our part. The target, an Akita Maru, slowed to 9 knots, then sped up to 10 just before we hit it with a Mark 18 from tube 4. Her back was broken and we left her to her fate.


08 JUL
Reached PZ.

09 JUL – 10 JUL
Patrolling. Harassed by enemy aircraft from dawn ‘til dusk.


Attack #9
Patrolled within radar range of the entrance to Manila Bay. Late on the 10th, target appeared heading North: 11 KTS, 344°T. We were already in a good position to attack so we tracked its approach over the next hour-and-a-half.

11 JUL
The actual attack took place took place at 0012 on the 11th. A single Mark 18 was fired under the keel of the target, a Hakusika Maru. Wind was brisk and waves were a bit choppy, which makes such shots problematic, as was the case this time. The torpedo detonated but didn’t seem to significantly damage to the Maru, which commenced a series of S-turns. We turned the boat to pursue and readied the Mark 14’s in tubes 1 and 2, setting them for 15 feet and high speed. Had to guestimate the target speed and course. Fired both with a 1 degree spread. The first was dead on target, the second missed astern – our first miss of the entire patrol!




Viewed through the periscope it was not immediately apparent that the second hit had much of an effect. However, after a few minutes, the ship slowed and began to settle by the stern. The end came abruptly seven minutes later as the Maru slid, stern first, into the Pacific.


Attack #10
This PZ had been very good to us and our good fortune was to continue. Several hours later, a blip showed up on radar – a ship headed West: Speed 10 KTS, 273°T. We’d have to chase it but with all diesel generators pouring amps into the motors, we quickly overtook it. Then it altered course, coming to 257°T and it slowed to 9 KTS.

The attack was made from 1600 yards – a single Mark 18 from tube 2. It struck just behind the stack and split the ship – a Ryuun Maru – in two.

We had 10 torpedoes remaining and had sunk just over 49000 tons of enemy shipping.


12 JUL – 13 JUL
Our time in this PZ expired so we reported our status to ComSubPac. Our new PZ was closer to home: East of Okinawa.

We proceeded to our PZ at two-engine speed.

14 JUL
Attack #11
Early on the 14th, a ship crossed our path: Speed 9 KTS, Course 239°T. Setup for the attack was easy. Then the target threw us a curve and changed course and speed: 11 KTS, 261°T. Some fast footwork and we again had a good attack position, 1600 yards off the target’s track. Radar and sonar gave us a good solution on an Akita Maru. Then something strange happened.

As we were preparing to fire our last Mark 14, the Maru slowed, its searchlight pierced the night, and it commenced making S-turns. Since we had been submerged for the last several thousand yards of the target’s approach because of light conditions and our own phosphorescent wake, it was inconceivable that the target saw our periscope. The alternative was equally unlikely – that it had listening gear and was reacting to our final ranging sonar pulses.

Irrespective of the reason our target was taking evasive action, the attack continued. We had to rapidly recompute course and speed, which amounted to some educated guesses plus Kentucky windage. The Mark 14 lanced toward the target at 46 knots. From the periscope it was possible to see the ship’s searchlight fix on the torpedo’s wake and the ship begin to accelerate and turn away. It was too little, too late.






The ship completed its turn, stopped and settled by the stern.

We surfaced and continued on toward our PZ. So far we had sunk over 50000 tons of enemy shipping and had 9 torpedoes – all Mark 18’s – remaining.

15 JUL – 17 JUL
Detected approaching enemy aircraft. However, just before we dived the boat, our radar detector sounded – the aircraft had radar! Fortunately, we’ve got inverse squared versus inverse to the fourth power in our favor – that and good old American know-how. We surfaced after an hour.

There were no further incidents on the way to the PZ, which we reach early on the 17th.

18 JUL – 20 JUL
Patrolling.

21 JUL
Attack #12
Surface contact – 0105, Speed 11 KTS, Course 253°T. Tracked for the better part of an hour, then the target changed course/speed at 0155: 9 KTS, 228°T. It appears that, often as not, the enemy zigs around the top of the hour.

This time we didn’t use active sonar to refresh our solution – we strictly relied on popping up the scope.

The target was allocated 1 Mark 18, set for a foot-and-a-half below the keel. The hit was right under the stack, which should have broken the target – a Ryuun Maru – in half.




If there is a slight variation in a torpedo’s depth keeping, which might be expected in heavy seas, then that could explain the observed behavior: sometimes the torpedo strikes the hull; sometimes the torpedo goes a few feet too deep which attenuates the explosive bubble effect. Seas were moderate, not heavy, for this attack. Perhaps even that was enough to disrupt the depth keeping.

The Maru was sailing away, with a distinct starboard list. When it was stern on, we surfaced – the ship only had a bow deck gun and we should be in the shadow provided by the superstructure. We opened fire at just under 2000 yards – the first two shots were wide but then our gunner had the range and rocked the target with several hits. The ship began to turn, bringing the bow gun to bear. The first shot was very short. The second coincided with one of our hits and was much closer.




We directed the gunners to target the enemy’s main armament. They scored a hit – or so we thought until the Maru responded with a shot that showered the bridge watch with spray. We crash dived.




We leveled off at 100 and allowed the ship to open the distance, then returned to periscope depth. Once again the ship was presenting its stern so we surfaced again – this time the range was 2400. Several unanswered hits sufficed to finish her off.




When our operations in this patrol zone ended, ComSubPac ordered us back to the Philippines – this time to patrol in a 100 nm radius centered 40 nm North of Calyan Island. Fuel was hovering just above 50% so we couldn’t do too many more of these long distance jaunts.

22 JUL – 24 JUL
In transit to PZ.

Received message from ComSubPac on 22 July: new base at Saipan. Somewhat ironic given the devastation we’d visited upon the Japanese there during our last visit.

Reached PZ.

24 JUL – 27 JUL
Patrolling.

New patrol zone 150 nm West – the overlap happened to find us starting our patrol in the PZ.

28 JUL
Attack #13
Our last attack of this, our fourth patrol, began at 1201. While running the Eastern leg of our search pattern we found a small convoy of 7 ships heading north: Position 20° 33’ N, 119° 50’ E; Speed 11 KTS; Course 01°T. The convoy was assumed to consist of 3 merchants in a single column in the center and four escorts in a diamond centered on the last ship in the column. When we’ve encountered this formation in the past, the ships in positions 2 and 3 are high value – often Nagara Marus. We considered the possibility that this time they might be large tankers.

We had to do an end around – there was nothing for it but to go to flank speed, burning up more of our precious fuel. Mindful that formations often zig at the top of the hour, we chose an oblique course that should give us a good setup ASAP. Although the moon was up and fairly bright, seas were rough and there was a light mist. A surface attack was a possibility.

We got a rude awakening when we closed to within 20000 yards of the lead merchant – roughly 18000 yards from the near escort: the radar warning sounded. Although we had the advantage of better radar equipment and, of course, the radar equation, this development played hob with our plans. Clearly, a surface attack was now out of the question. A submerged attack made it more likely that the escort’s passive sonar would pick us up before we could get close – though this situation should be mitigated somewhat by the wave action’s effect on the hull-mounted sensors.

The quick attack was no longer feasible – we changed course to a parallel track at 20000 and began to pull away. The constant radar warning became annoying so we turned it off – it wasn’t telling us anything we didn’t already know.

Top of the hour came and went and the convoy doggedly continued at the same course and speed.

We finally reached a position about 6000 yards off the convoy track and turned 90 degrees to it. We submerged to decks awash and continued on at 5 knots, taking our final radar readings on the lead merchant. Once we had a good solution we dived the boat – distance was around 3000 yards from the track. The hope was to find a reasonably shallow thermal that we could exploit to get close, then come to periscope depth inside the screen.

We found the thermal at 220. We continued down to 250, silent running. We were roughly 2200 yards off the track.

When the lead escort passed our bow, we began to rise to periscope depth. If we’d timed things right we should have a good shot on the number 2 merchant, then we could submerge to the safety of the Pacific’s depths.

The timing was near perfect. When the periscope broke the surface it was pointed on the bearing (135) of the flank escort, which was oblivious to our presence. Swiveling quickly showed the lead merchant, an Akita Maru was just crossing our bow. In the number 2 position was a Nagara Maru. A quick check of number 3 brought a very welcome surprise: a Taiyo CVE! That would be our target. No time for fanciness – the 4 remaining Mark 18’s in the bow had been set for 12 feet, impact pistol. We got the solution and fired all 4 at the CVE. Then we dove for that thermal at 4 knots.

The first torpedo was a couple of seconds late on target. A couple of seconds later, number 2 hit.




Numbers 3 and 4 followed quickly. The men involuntarily cheered. Who could blame them? However, celebrations ended as we crossed the thermal and resumed silent running.

We leveled off at 420 and made a slow turn to course 180. Escorts dashed about upstairs but never dropped any depth charges nor gave any indication that they had the faintest idea where we were.

An hour after the attack most of the convoy had moved on but one escort was laying back, making sprint drift searches 2000-3000 yards away, bearing 115. We felt safe enough to secure from silent running and go to 3 knots.

After another couple of hours, the escort was no longer in evidence. We went to periscope depth and did a couple of 360 scans. Nothing. Then we went to radar depth and did two complete sweeps. Nothing. Surfaced the boat at 1752 – almost 3 hours to the minute after firing at the target. We were alone.

Reported to base and resumed patrol.

30 JUL
The time in the PZ had expired so we contacted ComSubPac and got the expected, “return to base” message.

31 JUL – 4 AUG
Returning to new base at Saipan. Arrived 4 August.

(C) Fuel Consumed
84%

(D) Weather
Normal for the area(s).

(E) Torpedoes Expended
20 (8 Mark 14, 12 Mark 18) – 10 merchant ships, 1 CVE + 2 Sampans sunk by gunfire; estimated tonnage, 77,743.

(F) References
See Patrol 3
See Patrol 5

[captgeo]

right on, good report m8

[paulhager]

U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL September 24, 1944

From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet

Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #5.

Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering fifth war patrol.

Bernard H. Schwartz

(A) Prologue

Promoted to Commander.

A decoy dispenser was installed that should spoof enemy sonar. A few changes on board as some veteran crew members transfered out to new subs and replacements came aboard.

Torpedo loadout: 8 Mark 18 – stern; 8 Mark 14, 8 Mark 18 – bow.

(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)

(B) Narrative

26 AUG – 31 AUG
In transit to Point Baker: the Bashi Channel in the Luzon Strait. Upon arrival, began conducting anti-shipping operations.

01 SEP
Patrolling.

02 SEP
Attack #1
Target detected at 1734, 10 KTS, 54°T. A full Moon made a close-in surface attack problematic so opted for submerged attack.

Submerged when target at 8000. Refreshed TDC range data with active sonar. Target, a Momoyama Maru, did not zig at top of the hour. One Mark 18 from the stern was fired, range 1400. We got a hit right under the stack and she went dead and dark but she stayed afloat.




Rather than waste another torpedo, we maneuvered to a position directly astern at 1800 yards and surfaced. The gun crew took over, missing the first two shots but scoring consistently thereafter. After the 10th hit, ceased firing to assess the damage. It was enough. As the ship sank, we notified ComSubPac.

We received orders to patrol 100 nm East of Cam Ranh Bay.

03 SEP
In transit to Cam Ranh Bay PZ.

Attack #2.
Our next target materialized at 1512, an Akita Maru headed South: 10 KTS, 173°T. Once again, chose to make a submerged attack using a Mark 18 from the stern tubes. This attack was a bit more successful – one hit under the stack proved sufficient.




Returned to course for Cam Ranh Bay PZ.

04 SEP
In transit to PZ.

05 SEP
Continued voyage to PZ throughout the daylight hours.

Attack #3
Another single detected. Time 1830, Speed 9 KTS, Course 38°T. As had been the case for over a week, wind speed close to 0, gentle swells, perfect visibility.

Another stern attack was chosen for this target, a Zinbu Maru, however, 2 Mark 18’s were selected. Range was closer to 2000 yards. Right after firing, the target slowed and began to sail in the familiar evasive S-curve maneuver. Of course the two torpedoes missed far ahead. We readied two more torpedoes and fired. Both of these hit.




We’ve noted this behavior at least once before on a clear night with limited wave action. Surely the lookouts could not have seen our periscope, which was never up for more than 30 seconds. For better or worse, we’ve expended 6 torpedoes for 3 kills.

Returned to course.

06 SEP
En route to PZ.

07 SEP
Arrive PZ and hit by heavy rain and fog – visibility 300 yards.

Attack #4
Radar picked up a ship approaching Cam Ranh Bay, moving very slowly – 1 to 2 knots.

We closed to 1000 yards and cut the motors. We drifted to inside 900 yards as the slow moving ship crossed our bow. Rather than fire a torpedo, we manned the deck gun and, with directions from the radar operator, commenced firing. With the first hit, the searchlights came on – now we had a target showing dimly through the gloom.



There was an explosion and flames, which made targeting even easier. A few more rounds and there was a final, satisfying explosion. She was finished.

As best as we could determine, our victim was a Hieto Maru.

We continued on to a position within radar range of the entrance to Cam Ranh Bay from which vantage we could pick off any ships entering or leaving the port.

08 SEP
Attack #5
The storm continued unabated. At 0223 a contact appeared to the SW: 9 KTS, 30°T. Range was 40000. We started only 2200 yards off its track – we reduced that to 1000. At 0300, another target appeared 40000 yard NNE, also headed in our direction: 8 KTS, 197°T. After we finished with target 1, we’d go after this one.

Visibility was nil so the first attack was conducted radar only. We fired 3 Mark 18’s – 2 hit. There was no huge secondary explosion to render our victim visible. A couple of the lookouts said they saw it break in half.

The second attack was conducted radar only as well – not surprising since the storm had been going without letup for the better part of a day. Our target changed course, necessitating an adjustment on our part. We fired 2 Mark 14’s at the high speed setting – range was a shade over 800. Only one of the two hit but this time we got a nice explosion, easily visible from the bridge.




The storm showed no signs of letting up so we investigated Cam Ranh Bay and found. . .nothing. We returned to patrolling outside.

09 SEP
Attack #6
The storm was entering its 3rd day when radar showed us another target. We initially tracked it at 9 KTS, 195°T. As it approached, it sped up and altered course slightly, eventually settling on 11 KTS, 196°T. We fired 2 Mark 14’s and got 1 hit.

It was insufficient to get a kill though the target was crippled – its speed was slowed to 3 knots. We commenced radar-directed fire from the deck gun and finished it off.

Shortly after this attack, the storm finally ended.

10 SEP
Patrolling.

11 SEP
Attack #7
The weather was now the antithesis of what it had been two days earlier – visibility was perfect, seas were calm. Late in the day, the lookouts detected smoke on the horizon minutes after the radar showed a single pip. Course was northerly: 344°T; speed was slow: 6 knots. We closed and fired 3 Mark 18’s – all hit.




After this attack we contacted ComSubPac and were given a new PZ – 150 nm off the Mekong Delta.

12 SEP
Attack #8
Received report of an enemy vessel just off the delta heading NE at medium speed. Reached the PZ shortly thereafter and plotted an intercept course. Radar picked up the ship an hour later: 10 KTS, 40°T.

Initial contact was made in the alluvial shallows off the mouth of the Mekong. Accordingly, we stayed 20000 yards ahead of the target in order to attack when we had reached deeper water.

The attack was made with the remaining 2 Mark 18’s in the stern from a range of 1400. Both hit.

There is no sight quite as satisfying as a ship whose back has been broken in an attack because there is no doubt that she is dead.

Attack #9
We moved a little farther East and resumed patrolling. Roughly 11 hours later, we detected another ship. We started out with a good angle on the ship which was traveling at 8 knots, 197°T. Just minutes after we had obtained these data, the ship turned to 253°T and accelerated to 14 knots. One would almost think that we had been spotted but at night with a light mist that would have been impossible at 40000 yards. We went to flank speed to get into position.

For some inexplicable reason, the ship slowed to 11 knots, which made our task much easier. Thanks to the radar and frequent updates to the TDC we had a good solution. We were at 3000 yards and still at an oblique angle but were confident enough to attack from that position. We fired the remaining Mark 14’s in a pattern designed to “walk” from the bow to the stern. All four torpedoes were running hot, straight, and normal.

The torpedoes hit as planned: the first struck the bow, the second just in front of the stack and broke her in half.

The other two Mark 14’s struck a corpse.

We radioed ComSubPac and were ordered back to base.

13 SEP – 21 SEP
Returned to base. Only incident in transit: had to dive to avoid aircraft at 2314 on 14 September.

Docked 21 September at 1712.

(C) Fuel Consumed
56% - Saipan is much closer to the action.

(D) Weather
See information on storm, above.

(E) Torpedoes Expended
22 (14 Mark 18, 8 Mark 14) – 10 merchant ships, estimated tonnage 52, 997.

(F) References
See Patrol 4
See Patrol 6

[paulhager]

U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL November 07, 1944

From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet

Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #6.

Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering sixth war patrol.

Bernard H. Schwartz

(A) Prologue

Several promotions and transfers among the crew. No new equipment/weapon systems installed. Gaskets on all outer torpedo doors replaced. Old motor on the SJ radar antenna was replaced. Offered the opportunity to test the Mark 27 “Cutie” torpedo. Seemed too small (too “cute”), both in terms of size and warhead charge, to be of any real utility. Chose not to accept the offer.

Received classified briefing and sealed orders to be locked in the Captain’s safe. We were to leave Saipan, head North of the island and then proceed at 12 knots on course 280. On D+1 we were to open the sealed orders.

Torpedo loadout: 8 Mark 18 – stern; 8 Mark 14, 8 Mark 18 – bow.

(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)

(B) Narrative

01 OCT
Left Saipan at 1400, 1 October.

02 OCT
The sealed orders were opened.

“SS-382 is to proceed at 12 knots to Op Area ‘Maru Morgue’ and patrol within a 50 nm radius of point ABLAZE (refer to chart). Duration of the patrol is to be no less than 120 hours. You are to report any contact with IJN Fleet units and engage at your discretion. If no contact, proceed to Sibuyan Sea at best speed to arrive no later than 22 October 0800 GMT. Under no circumstances are Japanese merchant ships to be attacked as they might betray your position. If no enemy contact has been made by 26 October 0100 GMT, report to ComSubPac for further orders.”

03 OCT – 06 OCT
In transit to PZ. Arrive late on 6 October.

07 OCT – 09 OCT
Patrolling

11 OCT
Weather: clear, brisk winds, some chop.

At 0550 detected large task force moving fast: Speed 16 KTS, Course 30°T – range 37500 yards. There appeared to be 5 columns with a circular array of escorts surrounding them. Position was favorable for an attack on the center column – with the sea state, hiding under a thermal until the screen passed and then rising to periscope depth for a quick attack seemed the best plan.

While racing to get into position the radar detector sounded. We gave it a few minutes and then dived the boat. We found a thermal at 200, continued to 210 and went silent.

We waited for the escorts to pass overhead but instead, passive sonar indicated that the task force was turning away. We’d have to surface and go after it. We went to periscope depth to ascertain the new course. Upon raising scope, the first ship to appear was an Atlanta Class CL at 3000 yards – it was Halsey and the carriers! What were they doing up here?

We surfaced and saw one of the new Iowa BB’s at 5000 yards.


The TF completed its turn and headed off to the SE.

It was frightening to contemplate what might have happened had there been heavy rain and fog. We would almost certainly have tried to attack by a combination of radar and sonar. As the Japanese Empire shrinks and the Pacific becomes an American lake, the likelihood of meeting friendlies increases. It means we can no longer assume that ships encountered in Japanese territory are hostile.

Completed the 120 hours and set course for the Sibuyan Sea by way of the Luzon Strait, speed 12 knots.

12 OCT
At 1905 detected TF, range 33000 yards: Position 22° 28’ N 122° 56’ E; Speed 16 KTS; Course 135°T. TF had three columns in the center of a circular arrangement of escorts. The TF was not spread out so an attack from outside the screen, if conducted with Mark 14’s, was feasible. Seas were moderate, with a light mist. A waning crescent Moon had just risen. Decent conditions for a surface attack.

At 1924, a second TF SW of the 1st appeared. Meanwhile, our target TF seemed to be in the midst of a major reshuffling. One ship didn’t seem to be participating, so we began tracking it.

At 1938 the radar warning sounded – we were being painted. We went to decks awash to reduce our cross section. Fortunately, we were very close to our attack position.

The closest escort would pass within 2000 yards. We planned on firing before then, which would give us time to dive for a thermal – escaping on the surface seemed decidedly problematic. The main target came into visual range – we had a good solution. We prepared to fire 3 Mark 14’s when we finally got a good look at the target silhouette.

It was an Iowa Class BB! Again! We were a half minute away from hitting her with three torpedoes.

We sent a blinker message to the near DD – must have given her captain a fright. After an exchange of recognition signals, we surfaced and returned to our course.

12 OCT – 16 OCT
In transit to Sibuyan Sea.

On the 13th clouds rolled in and the sky darkened but the storm passed us by.

Arrived entrance of Sibuyan Sea on the 16th.


17 OCT – 22 OCT
Patrolling.

23 OCT
Received Flash message that large enemy TF spotted and engaged in Palawan passage by Dace and Darter. Based upon this report, the TF could be headed in our direction. We terminated the patrol and raced at flank speed to an optimal ambush point: the Western entrance to the Tablas Strait.

At 2130, a large force was detected North of Semirara Island and SW of Liwagao Island: Position 12° 09’ N 121° 18’ E; Speed 22 KTS, Course 95°T. The TF was arranged in 2 columns and surrounded by escorts. As the TF passed Semirara, it began to turn for its run through the strait, coming to course 53°T.

We had good position so only a slight adjustment was needed. At the current speed of the TF, we should engage just after sunrise.

The TF zigged: Speed 22 KTS, Course 35°T. We adjusted again, setting up for a bow shot. As we did so the radar warning sounded. We went to decks awash.

Attack #1
As the TF passed through the narrow passage between the two islands, several escorts on the starboard side fell back. This was ideal because we were now set up 1400 yards to the starboard off the track of said column. All that was required was to avoid a couple of escorts and then we should be able to set up the attack unmolested. Accordingly, we dived the boat, hoping for a shallow thermal. We found it at 165 feet.

The hydrophone operator tracked the flank escort – the one that would pass close behind us. When he lost it, we began a slow rise – we crossed the thermal just as the escort reappeared from our baffles. At 80 feet we opened tube doors 1 through 6.

Weather was clear but there was heavy wave action – when we popped the scope only an intermittent view was possible. However, a quick scan of the near column showed several CAs, followed by a Kongo BB. Bringing up the rear was a big boy – a very big boy: a Yamato Class BB. In fact both Yamatos were present in the TF – the sister ship was bringing up the rear in the port column.

The Yamato (or Musashi – they look identical) would be our target. Tubes 4 through 6 were loaded with Mark 18’s. They were set for magnetic, depth 37. The three Mark 14’s in tubes 1 through 3 were set for 30 feet, impact, and high speed. The 3 Mark 18’s would be fired first, then the 14’s. Six torpedoes probably wouldn’t be enough for a big boy like this so we also readied the 4 stern tubes – depth 30 – and opened the outer doors. Thanks to our PK, we could fire the two salvos from the bow while executing a hard turn to port. This would bring our stern tubes to bear just in time – we hoped – to fire them at the target as well.

After our final update to the TDC, we commenced the hard turn. The 3 Mark 18’s were fired a few seconds later with a fairly wide pattern: midships, bow, then stern. The Mark 14’s are nearly 60% faster so we delayed firing them accordingly. All torpedoes away, we continued the turn. Then the Mark 18’s hit – one, two, three – with the 14’s right behind.

http://imageshack.us/a/img408/9849/194410232235z.jpg

http://imageshack.us/a/img109/1456/194410232236z0.jpg

Six hits! But we weren’t done. The OOD was on the observation scope – two DD’s were approaching. Meanwhile, our target was making a port turn and slowing, there were only a few seconds to set up the shot. Guesstimated the speed as 11 knots and the course as 40°T, then fired a very wide spread from the stern tubes. There was no time to watch the attack play out – we crash dived, releasing decoys at 100 feet.

Torpedo 1 missed. Torpedo 2 hit, as did number 3. Number 4 was a miss. We crossed the thermal and went to silent running, allowing momentum to carry us deeper. We leveled off at 420 feet. There were no depth charges. Even the decoy didn’t seem to generate any interest.

We continued the port turn in a leisurely fashion. The hydrophone operator reported on the fast screws of the escorts milling around above us. He proffered another report: a warship some distance off was emitting a strange rattling noise that sounded like a propeller shaft out of balance. Our target?

The escorts seemed to tire of the search and hightailed it off toward the TF. Normally, the enemy leaves one or two escorts to conduct sprint drift searches close to the suspected location of a sub but the hydrophone operator said that he could account for all of the escorts and they had all left. He also said the target emitting the rattling noise was still out there, moving slow.




We gave it a half hour and went to periscope depth – making several quick 360’s. Nothing. Next, radar depth. The nearest targets were bearing 300, long range. At 2312 we surfaced and began torpedo reload. The radar showed a large pip at 13400 and a smaller one at 14000. The large one was traveling at 9 knots, 35°T – the smaller one appeared to be accelerating away, leaving the slower one to itself. Curious.

We continued to track the near target. It had slowed to 6 knots by 2337. By 2345 it was moving at 4 knots, 0°T.

24 OCT
Attack #1 (continued)
At 0003, the “Big Boy” – as the crew called the battleship – was scanning us with his targeting radars. We hoped we were too small a target for the big guns.

We closed to visual range as we passed – the pagoda tower visible through the haze. The guns didn’t fire but BB juked away from us. We continued running due North.

Assuming that BB was trying to keep up with the TF, when we reached a position between it and the last known position of the TF – which had now disappeared from our screen – we submerged and doubled back.

By 0107 we were getting in position for a bow shot.




As BB closed, it suddenly made a starboard course change. It was easier to just target it with the stern tubes – all four. Final range was 600 yards when we fired. The first torpedo struck under number 2 turret.




Three more slammed into BB but it seemed to shake them off. Unbelievable! We began a starboard turn to bring the bow tubes to bear when a large fireball erupted from the number 3 turret, followed almost immediately by an audible boom. It had to be the magazine exploding.




More explosions rocked BB – in less than a minute, it was settling into the deep water of the Tablas Strait.

During the terminal phase of the attack, the SD had picked up an aircraft at long range but then it had disappeared. Since all was clear we surfaced. In a matter of seconds, bombs were bursting around us – we crash dived. The wave action must have interfered with the antenna – that’s the only explanation for how the aircraft was able to get so close. Once inside (CLASSIFIED) range, the SD can no longer detect aircraft above (CLASSIFIED) altitude. If the SD antenna was inoperative for a few sweeps that could explain what happened.

We remained submerged for a half hour and then returned to periscope depth. The SD was functioning properly because it detected the same, or another, aircraft patrolling. We followed it for another 15 minutes until it disappeared to the NW. We surfaced and headed North at 3 engine speed, while radioing ComSubPac with our report. We were given a new PZ in the Formosa Strait.

Attack #2
Just before sunset, we sailed North of Verde Island and into the Western passage. Radar began picking up two ships approaching. Presently, one of them began scanning us with radar so we submerged. As the Sun set, a ***a CL and escort hove into view.




It was a worthy target, to which we allocated 3 of our remaining 10 torpedoes: the Mark 14’s in tubes 1 through 3. All 3 hit.




Unlike the escorts for the TF, which left the BB to its fate, this escort hung around and listened. We had to crawl away on our electrics. Fortunately, the escort did not have radar so we were able to surface in due course and escape under cloak of darkness.

Attack #3
At 2000, a single appeared. After more than 3 weeks with no action the past 24 hours had seen a lot.

Our target proved to be a merchant – we targeted it with the two remaining Mark 14’s.




We resumed course for our PZ – now down to 5 torpedoes.

25 OCT
Traveling to PZ.

26 OCT
Reached patrol zone.

Attack #4
Just before sunrise, a single was detected. As the Sun rose, we attacked it with 2 torpedoes, both of which hit.




We had expended 21 torpedoes and sunk 2 cargo ships and two warships for an estimated 77,375 tons!

27 OCT
Attack #5
The night of the 27th, visibility was marginal when radar spotted a convoy headed South toward our position: Speed 8 KTS, Course 196°T. It was composed of 12 merchants in 3 columns with 3 escorts. With only 3 torpedoes left, we’d go for the biggest target.

We obtained a good radar solution on the lead ship in the center column. As we closed in, the radar detector sounded, so we made the final approach decks awash, getting into position 2400 yards off the center column. As the convoy approached we went to radar depth and continued tracking.

When the lead escort passed, we got a reasonably good visual on that lead center ship – it was a Ryuun Maru. We allocated all our remaining torpedoes. We fired and turned away. All torpedoes missed. Not sure how we could have missed at that range. Possibly the last stadimeter check was on an adjoining ship – it was dark enough for that to have happened.

Even though we were out of torpedoes, we still had three more days to patrol. Only then could we go home.

28 OCT
Patrolling.

29 OCT
Attack #6
Though bereft of torpedoes, when a solitary merchant came within radar range, we chose to engage it with the 5”. We submerged to allow it to come within range and then surfaced. From ordering surface until the first shot was fired took 2 minutes and it was a hit! Range was 5200 yards – it was an incredible shot. Many of the subsequent shots were misses but the gunners got a creditable number of hits when we were within 4000 yards. On the down side it took about half our ammo to get the kill. The up side – the merchant was never able to fire a single round in our direction.



Attack #7
This would prove to be our last attack of the patrol. Unlike the previous attack, this one took place at night so we were able to approach on the surface. We got closer before we opened fire – around 4000 yards. Even though it was night, with lower visibility, the hit percentage was higher, possibly because the early hits started a fire among containers stacked on the foredeck. As we closed in to 3200 yards, the target began returning fire from guns mounted fore and aft. We threw it into reverse – all back full – and continued firing. A shell splashed no more than 20’ in front of the boat! Eventually, the rate of fire from the target fell off. When the ship began launching life boats we ceased fire. A final explosion wracked the vessel. She broke in two and sank.



30 OCT – 5 NOV
We notified ComSubPac when we reached the end of our time on station and were ordered to return to a new base at Guam.

The trip home was uneventful – arrived at Guam 5 November.

(C) Fuel Consumed
77%.

(D) Weather
Normal for the area(s).

(E) Torpedoes Expended
24 (16 Mark 18, 8 Mark 14) – 6 ships (4 cargo, 2 warships), estimated tonnage 87,599.

(F) References
See Patrol 5
See Patrol 7

[paulhager]

U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL Month dd, 194_

From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet

Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #7.

Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering seventh war patrol.

Bernard H. Schwartz

(A) Prologue

The “Pike” was offered the opportunity to try out another experimental torpedo, the Mark 16. Unlike the diminutive “Cutie”, this one is standard size and has large warhead. In fact, at 943 pounds, it is the largest in the U.S. inventory. The Mark 16 doesn’t home like the “Cutie” but it runs at 46 knots for an amazing 13700 yards! In view of our sinking the Musashi (intelligence verified the identity of our target), we’ve been offered 12 of these super torpedoes. In return, all we have to do is provide a detailed report of each torpedo’s performance (see Attachment A). Naturally, we accepted the offer.

Torpedo loadout: 8 Mark 18 – stern; 4 Mark 18, 12 Mark 16 – bow.

(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)

(B) Narrative

23 NOV – 29 NOV
Left Guam at 1700, 23 November. Reached patrol zone 29 November. Everything routine in transit.

30 NOV
Received report of ship just outside the PZ, headed ENE at medium speed. We altered our search pattern to account for its possible movements. We were lucky to catch in our one of our sweeps because it had changed course: Speed 10 KTS, Course 01°T. Seas were moderate, light haze – we would make a submerged attack and try out one of the Mark 16’s.

Attack#1.
The ship was obvious bound for the Bungo so it was unlikely to make any major course change. We obtained a good radar solution. When the ship came into visual range we went to radar depth, now using the radar to supplement our periscope observations.

The ship was a Ryuun Maru – we set the Mark 16 for magnetic and depth for 1½ feet below the keel and opened the outer door.

We went to p-depth and let the PK run for awhile before raising the scope. We were on the money. We downed scope. When the PK indicated that the target was bearing 335, we popped the scope for the terminal reading. Everything looked good – we fired and downed scope. Five seconds before the torpedo was to hit, we raised the scope again. It detonated just behind the stack.




Not a perfect shot but it should have been good enough. However, the Maru wasn’t dead, it turned to port and began to withdraw. We allowed it to open the range to 2200 and then battle surfaced. We got off the first 3 shots from the 5” before the Maru could respond.




By the time the Maru was able to fire, it was uncoordinated and ineffective. A few more 5” hits and she was done.

The first test of the Mark 16 revealed nothing special. The large warhead should have been enough to deliver the quietus to the Maru but it didn’t. Perhaps the magnetic exploder didn’t detonate in the optimal position. Maybe a depth problem. With 11 remaining, there will be enough for several more tests.

01 DEC
Attack #2
Minutes after the clock reached 0000, our second target appeared. Initially its speed was 7 knots, course 249°T. However, about the time we got into position it changed course to 270°T and accelerated to 8 knots.

The ship turned out to be a Haruna Maru – a small tanker. It wasn’t work a Mark 16, so we readied the Mark 18 in tube one. The attack was nothing special and the one torpedo sufficed.




Sent a message notifying ComSubPac of our kill. About 45 minutes later, two aircraft were spotted at long range. Both appeared to converging directly on our position. The Japanese must have DF’ed our position somehow – perhaps patrolling subs. There was nothing for it but to dive. We remained submerged until nightfall, then we sent another message to ComSubPac requesting an update to our orders. We were given a new PZ in proximity to Iwo Jima.

02 DEC – 04 DEC
In transit to patrol zone.

05 DEC – 09 DEC
Patrolling, in the course of which, we moved farther West.

10 DEC
Attack #3
At 0021, began tracking ship: Speed 9 KTS, Course 69°T. At 0109, changed course to 76°T. Turned out to be another Haruna Maru. Once again, we chose not to waste a Mark 16 on it and went with a Mark 18. One hit, one kill.



11 DEC – 12 DEC
Patrolling.

13 DEC
Attack #4
Yet another small merchant came our way. Perhaps solid evidence that Japan is on the ropes: we’ve sunk the large ships in such numbers that only pitifully small ones remain. For this attack we used a Mark 18 from the stern.




We reported in to ComSubPac late in the day so that if we were DF’ed it would be dark by the time planes had been vectored to our location. We were given a new patrol zone in the NE end of the Tsushima Strait.

14 DEC
Attack #5
Convoy detected at 2225, 10 knots, 185°T. Seven ships, 2 escorts. It was only a few minutes before dawn. We decided to use the Mark 18’s in the stern and set up 2400 yards off the track.

As the convoy came into visual range, we selected the lead two ships in the near column: a Momoyama Maru and an Akita Maru. They would be attacked in reverse order the number 2 Akita first, followed by the Momoyama.

The attack couldn’t have gone better. Each target was hit twice.






Although we didn’t get visual confirmation, we could hear the ships breaking up as we dove for 400 feet.

Both escorts began to search for us – somehow, despite our wakeless torpedoes they began depth charging only 500 yards away. Then the hydrophone operator alerted us that one of the escorts was approaching fast. That bit of information we didn’t need because the whole crew could hear the pinging. Just when the escort passed overhead, we executed a hard port turn and released decoys. We dove the boat to 545 and resumed silent running. This seemed to confuse the escorts which blasted away at the decoy.






Unfortunately the decoy kept them occupied only a few minutes because one of the escorts made another pass. We repeated our previous maneuver except we turned hard astarboard. Again the the destroyers went after the decoy. This time, instead of trying to maneuver away, we settled on the bottom at 667 feet. It is unlikely that the Japanese sonar can pick us up.

. . .

Thirty minutes have elapsed since a near miss damaged our pumps, 2 electric motors, and caused flooding. If we don’t surface soon, we won’t be able to. One of the escorts is still up there – thankfully, the other returned to the convoy. I plan on trying to ambush him and hit him with a full spread of Mark 16’s. God be with us.




(C) Fuel Consumed
TBD%.

(D) Weather
Normal for the area(s).

(E) Torpedoes Expended
xx (xx Mark 18, xx Mark 16) – x ships, estimated tonnage xx,xxx.

(F) References
See Patrol 6
See Patrol 1


NOTE FROM USN HISTORICAL SOCIETY
We know from contemporaneous Japanese action reports that an American submarine was rammed on the surface and sunk and that all hands perished. Thanks to the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute Department of Marine Archeology and their dives in the Tsushima Strait we have been able to confirm that the sub was the Picuda, which was officially reported missing and presumed lost on 14 December 1945. The Picuda was found in 667 feet of water and this unfinished report was retrieved from the Captain’s safe.

Along with the reports filed by Commander Schwartz, this narrative reveals for the first time that Schwartz, whose exploits up to and including this attack had been nothing less than stellar, made a fatal error in judgment by ceasing evasive maneuvers and, instead, laying on the bottom. Forensic analysis validated Schwartz’s statement that a near miss caused damage and flooding that could not be controlled at that depth.

All 6 torpedoes were still in the bow tubes when the submarine was found. Schwartz never got off his last ditch attack.

[Armistead]

Well Paul, was God with you or not?

[JagdPanzer44]

Recently came back to SHIV after a long layoff. Love it. Using RFB+RSRD.

Leaving Manila with a new paint job... (If pix don't show, blame postimage )

[Armistead]

[JagdPanzer44]

Originally Posted by Armistead

That's just an awesome shot. Dig that dazzle pattern!

[Kptlt. Neuerburg]

[JagdPanzer44]

[in_vino_vomitus]

I've actually been playing Silent Hunter for quite a while. I started off with SH1 last century, stopped playing, discovered SH4 in the bargain bin of my local games store, liked that well enough, and then, I can't remember how, found the forums, and in them, TMO.......

Ducimus talks about wanting to make the game more immersive. I don't think he needs me to say that he succeeded. When my computer got virused and it's replacement got water damaged, and it's replacement, wouldn't run the modded game - Well, the stock game just didn't cut it any more, in much the same way that a double espresso won't really do it for a crack head.

So. I stopped playing for a couple of years. Then I searched the forums for a way to make the game work with windows 8 - I saw nothing, which made me think I was just installing it wrong. I tried harder, it worked and now I'm just as hooked as before, only I'm rustier than Jimmy Hoffa's pushbike. On the plus side, I'm getting lots of practice evading DD's and by elimination working out all the stupid mistakes that I didn't used to make so much.

Anyway, the forum says I should make a post, and I can see that's a good idea, so here I am. Without wishing to sound too much like a beauty queen I'd like to say a big thank you to everyone who's spent time writing mods, tutorials and utilities and increased the fun factor on this game exponentially.

Finally, since this is a screenshot thread - Here's a pic of the DD that managed to set off one of my torpedoes, causing it's target to successfully evade the rest, and went on to teach me a valuable lesson in humility with a couple of its friends.......

[Armistead]

Glad to have you onboard, start your own thread and introduce yourself..

[Fifi]