Who Started World War II?

[Betonov]

Originally Posted by Tchocky

What you type isn't my fault.

I'd hate for anyone to think what you post has anything to do with me.

Apology accepted I guess.

Under international law it's your fault

Originally Posted by Fahnenbohn

Yes, that's it. Under the International law, "This is not the one who attacks first whi is responsible for the war, but the one who made war inevitable."

[Tchocky]

[Jimbuna]

Originally Posted by Fahnenbohn

* And sorry Tchocky, I regret my word, but in a sense, you didn't let me the choice.

That apology and the fact the intended recipient accepted it saved you from an infraction.

@RR.....I do appreciate the subject matter can lead to anger and emotional language but you have adequately made your point.....no more please, you are more than capable of debating on a better level.

[Betonov]

Originally Posted by Jimbuna

@RR.....I do appreciate the subject matter can lead to anger and emotional language but you have adequately made your point.....no more please, you are more than capable of debating on a better level.

He was dragged down to their level.
Happens to the best of us.

[Oberon]

http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Making-S.../dp/0415907160

The quote is featured in this, it is also mentioned in wikipedia, and I believe was originally taken from the Schmundt notes, the full text of that meeting is below (in spoilers because it's quite a wall of text):

 

The Schmundt Notes
Report on a Meeting on 23 May 1939

Command Issue
Only through officer
Place: the Führer’s office, New Reich Chancellery
Assistant on Duty: Lieutenant-Colonel of General Staff Schmundt

Participants: The Führer, Field Marshall Göring, Grand Admiral Raeder, Colonel General v. Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, Colonel General Milch, General of Artillery Halder, General Bodenschatz, Commanding Admiral Schniewindt, Colonel at the General Staff Jeschonnek, Colonel of the General Staff
Warlimont, Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Schmundt, Captain Engel,
Corvette Captain Albrecht, Captain v. Below.

Subject: Information about the Situation and Political Goals.

The Führer states the purpose of the meeting to be the following:

1.) Presentation of the situation.
2.) Setting of the tasks resulting from the situation for the Wehrmacht.
3.) Clarification of the consequences resulting from the tasks.
4.) Securing the secrecy of all decisions and works resulting from the result of the consequences.

Secrecy is a pre-condition of success.

In the following the contents of the Führer’s statements are rendered:

Our present situation is to be viewed under two aspects:

1.) Actual development from 1933 to 1939.
2.) The constantly equal situation in which Germany finds itself.

In the time from 1933-39 advances were made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously. Our relationship with our environment has remained the same. Germany had left the circle of the power states. The balance of power was established without Germany’s participation.

Statement of Germany’s vital claims and re-entry into the circle of the power states disturbs this balance. All claims are taken to be an 'intrusion'.

The English fear an economic threat more than a common threat by power.

The mass of 80 millions has solved the ideological problem. The economic problems must also be solved. No German can avoid the creation of the economic pre-conditions for this. Solving the problems requires courage. There must be no avoiding the solution of the problems by adaptation. On the contrary, the circumstances must be matched to the demands. Without intrusion into foreign states or attacking foreign property this is not possible.

The living space, adequate to the greatness of the state, is the basis of all power. For a time one may do without, but then the solution of the problems comes around one way or the other. There is the choice between rising or falling. In 15 or 20 years the solution will be compulsorily necessary for us. Longer than that no German statesman can go around the issue.

At the time we are in a state of national enthusiasm, in the same mood as two other states: Italy and Japan.

The time lying behind us has been well used. All steps were consequently directed towards the goal.

After six years the situation today is the following:

The national-political unification of the Germans has occurred, save for small exceptions. Further success cannot be obtained without bloodshed.

The drawing of the borders is of military importance
The Pole is not an additional enemy. Poland will always be on the side of our enemies. Despite the friendship treaty there has always been the intention in Poland to use any chance against us.

Danzig is not the object that is at issue. The issue for us is the extension of living space in the east and securing of food supplies as well as solving the Baltic problem. Food supplies can only be obtained in areas sparsely populated. Beside the fertility the German thorough agriculture will immensely increase the surpluses.

In Europe there is no other possibility.

Colonies: Warning against giving away colonial possessions. That is no solution of the food problem. Blockade!

If fate forces us to a conflict with the West, it is good to have more land in the East. In the war we can count even less on record harvests than in peacetime.

The population of non-German territories does not do military service and is thus available for work.

The problem 'Poland' is not to be separated from the conflict with the west.

Poland’s inner steadfastness against Bolshevism is dubious. Thus Poland is also a dubious barrier against Russia.

A successful war in the west with a quick decision is questionable, as is the attitude of Poland.

Pressure from Russia the Polish regime will not withstand. Poland sees danger in Germany’s victory over the West and will try to take this victory away from us.

There can thus be no question of sparing Poland, and the decision that remains is to attack Poland at the first appropriate occasion.

A repetition of the Czech case we cannot believe in. There will be fighting. The task is to isolate Poland. The success of isolation is decisive.

Thus the Führer must reserve for himself the final order to strike. There must be no simultaneous confrontation with the West (France and England).

If it is not certain that in the sequence of a German-Polish confrontation a war with the West is to be excluded, the fight must be mainly directed against England and France.

Principle: Confrontation with Poland – beginning with attack against Poland – will only have success if the West stays out.

If this is not possible it will be better to attack the West and to liquidate Poland at the same time.

It is a matter of skillful politics to isolate Poland.

A difficult question is that of Japan. While at the time they are for various reasons cool in what concerns going together with us, it is in Japan’s own interest to move against Russia in time.

With Russia economic relations are only possible when political relations have improved. In press statements a cautious attitude is becoming apparent. It is not to be excluded that Russia is disinterested in a shattering of Poland. If Russia keeps driving against us, the relationship with Japan may become closer.

An alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany-Italy-Japan would lead me to attack England and France with some devastating strikes.

The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful confrontation with England. It is necessary to be prepared for the confrontation. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony that would weaken England. England is thus our enemy, and the confrontation will be one of life and death.

What will this confrontation look like?

England cannot liquidate Germany with a few powerful strikes and force us into submission. For England it is decisive to carry the war as close as possible to the Ruhr area. French blood will not be spared. (West Wall!!) Possession of the Ruhr area is decisive for the duration of our resistance.

The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied militarily. Declarations of neutrality cannot be relied upon. If France and England want to bring about a confrontation during the war between Germany and Poland, they will support the Netherlands and Belgium in their neutrality and let them build fortifications to them force them to come along.

Belgium and the Netherlands will, though under protest, give in to the pressure. If England intervenes during our Polish war, we must thus make a lightning strike against the Netherlands. It is desirable to gain a new line of defense of Dutch territory up to lake Zuider. The war with England and France will be a war of life and death.

The idea that we may be able to buy ourselves out cheaply is dangerous: this possibility does not exist. The bridges must then be broken down, and the issue will no longer be right or wrong, but existence or non-existence of 80 million people.

Question: Short or long war?

All armed forces and state leaders have to strive for a short war. The state leadership must, however, prepare as well for a war lasting 10 to 15 years.

Throughout history people have ever believed in short wars. In 1914 they were still of the opinion that long wars could not be financed. Even today this view is still in many heads. Any state will, however, hold out as long as possible if there is not a decisive weakening right away (for instance Ruhr area). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that an unfortunate outcome of the war will mean the end of its world power.

England is the motor that drives against Germany. It’s strength lies in the following:

1.) The Briton is proud, brave, tough, resistant and has an organizational talent. He knows how to take advantage of any new event. He has the adventure spirit and the courage of the Nordic Race. Quality sinks with broadening. The German average is better.

2.) It is a world power per see. Constantly increased by allies since 300 years ago. The power is to be seen not only as a real one but also as a psychological one encompassing the world. In addition there is the boundless wealth and the credit-worthiness related thereto.

3.) The geopolitical security and protection by strong sea power and a gallant air force.

England’s weakness:

If in the war we had had two more battleships and two more cruisers and begun the Skagerrak battle in the morning, the British fleet would have been beaten and England brought to its knees. It would have been the end of the World War. In the past it was not sufficient to beat the fleet, one also had to land to defeat England. England could feed itself. This is no longer possible today.

As soon as England is cut off from its supplies it is forced to capitulate. The supply of food and combustion material depends on protection by the fleet.

The attack of the air force against the English homeland does not force England to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation is the consequence.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick solution. It would be criminal, however, if the state leadership were to rely on surprise being achieved.

Experience tells us that surprise can be foiled by the following:

1.) Betrayal to persons outside the competent military circles;
2.) Ordinary coincidence leading the whole action to break down;
3.) Human failure;
4.) Weather conditions.

The date to strike must be established long in advance.
Beyond this one cannot, however, live in tension for long.
We must count on the weather conditions making a surprise intervention by the fleet and air force impossible.

This must be considered in the planning as a worst case. .

1.) It remains to be endeavored to deal the opponent a or the devastating blow at the very beginning. Right or wrong or agreements play no part in this.

This is only possible is one doesn’t ‘slip’ into a war with England due to Poland.

2.) Beside the surprise attack and the shattering of English possibilities on the continent, the long war is to be prepared.

The army has to take hold of the positions that are important for the fleet and the air force. If we succeed in occupying the Netherlands and Belgium and beating France, the basis for a successful war against England will have been created.

From western France the air force can take care of the narrower blockade of England, while the wider blockade is carried out by the fleet with the U-boats.

Consequences:

England cannot fight on the continent, the daily attacks by air force and navy cut apart all lifelines.

Time decides against England. Germany doesn’t bleed to death on land.

The necessity of this kind of warfare has been proven by the World War and the military confrontations since then.

From the World War the following compulsory conclusions for the waging of war must be drawn:

1.) Had the navy been stronger at the beginning of the war and the army turned on the Channel ports, the outcome of the war would have been another.

2.) A land cannot be brought to submission by the air force alone.
It is not possible to attack all objectives at the same time, and a few minutes in between bring the defense onto the stage.

3.) What is important is the reckless use of all means.

4.) Once the army in cooperation with the air force and navy taken the most important position, industrial production no longer flows into the Danaid barrel of army battles, but benefits the air force and the navy.

Thus the army must be in conditions to take these positions. The attack according to plan is to be prepared.

To study this is the most important task. The goal is always to bring England to its knees.

Every weapon has a decisive effect on the outcome of battle only as long as the enemy doesn’t possess it.

This applies to gas, U-boats and the air force. For the latter it applied as long as the English fleet had no defense, which in 1940 and 1941 will no longer be the case. Against Poland for instance the tank weapon will be effective, as the Polish army lacks the defense against it.

Where the effect can no longer be deemed decisive, its place is taken by surprise and genius of operation.

This is the program for attack.

The program obliges to the following

1.) Correct evaluation of the weapons and their effect:
for instance
a) Battleship or aircraft carrier, what is more dangerous in the individual case and on the whole. An aircraft carrier is better for protecting a convoy.
b) Is an air attack on a factory more important than one on a battleship? Where are the bottlenecks of factory production?

2.) Regarding the army’s quick preparedness. The neighboring states must be overrun from the barracks.

3.) Regarding the study of the opponent’s weak spots.
These studies must not be left to the general staff. Secrecy is then no longer guaranteed.
The Führer has thus decided to command a small study staff at the Wehrmacht High Command which contains representatives of the three Wehrmacht branches and will on a case by case basis take in the supreme commanders or heads of general staff. This staff must constantly inform the Führer and keep him updated.

The study staff takes care of the intellectual preparation of operations at the highest level and the technical and organizational preparations resulting therefrom. The purpose of certain instructions is nobody’s business outside the staff.

As much as the armament of our opponents may increase, they must at some time reach the end of their possibilities, and ours will be greater.

French recruit classes 120,000 men!

We will not be forced into a war, but there is no way for us around it.

Secrecy is the decisive pre-condition for success. Also towards Italy or Japan the goal must remain secret. For Italy there remains the breaking through the Maginot Line, which is to be studied. The Führer considers the breakthrough possible.

Putting together (bundling) the Wehrmacht branches for the study of the overall problem is important.

The purpose

1.) Study of the overall problem.
2.) " the procedure.
3.) " the required means.
4.) " the necessary training.

The staff must consist of men with much fantasy and best professional knowledge, as well as officers with a sober, skeptical mind.

Principle for the work:

1.) Nobody is to be involved who must not know.
2.) Nobody must learn more than he needs to know.
3.) When at the latest must the respective person know it? Nobody must know anything earlier than he needs to know it.

Upon question by Field Marshall Göring the Führer establishes that

a) the Wehrmacht branches determine what is to be built;
b) the ship building program is not to be changed;
c) the armament programs are to be targeted to 1943 or 44.

For the correctness of the rendering:
Schmundt, Lieutenant Colonel

Also available in the original German at:
http://www.ns-archiv.de/krieg/1939/s...9-schmundt.php

[Oberon]

In an aside, a youtube channel I like to frequent has had an interesting series over the past month or two, 'What if Nazi Germany had won in Europe?':

[Bilge_Rat]

Originally Posted by Raptor1

The Polish Corridor was part of Polish-Lithuanian territory before it was annexed by Prussia in the late 18th century, it had a majority Polish population which steadily grew in the interwar period and was important to the Polish economy. Certainly its incorporation into Poland was one of many harsh terms the Treaty of Versailles inflicted on Germany, but I don't think it lacked precedent or somehow justified the German invasion, which wasn't interested solely in securing it to begin with.

There were two reasons given for creating the "Polish corridor"

1. was that it had a majority Polish population that should be "reunited" with Poland proper.

However, given that the territory had been German for 150 years or over 6 generations, exactly what was a "German" or a "Pole"?. Is a 3rd generation U.S. citizen of latino descent an "american" or a "mexican"?

The second problem was that the ethnic groups were intermingled:




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pomerelia

In almost every county, the "German" population was close to or over 50%. That is why Poland went out of their way to chase the Germans away to make the corridor more "Polish" after it was annexed.

French historian Raymond Cartier states that millions of Germans in the Sudetenland and in Posen-West Prussia were placed under foreign rule in a hostile environment, where harassment and violation of rights by authorities are documented.[122] Cartier asserts that, out of 1,058,000 Germans in Posen-West Prussia in 1921, 758,867 fled their homelands within five years due to Polish harassment.[122] In 1926, the Polish Ministry of the Interior estimated the remaining number of Germans at fewer than 300,000.[citation needed] These sharpening ethnic conflicts would lead to public demands to reattach the annexed territory in 1938 and become a pretext for Hitler′s annexations of Czechoslovakia and parts of Poland.[122]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty...les#In_Germany

Trying to redraw borders based on supposed "ethnic" lines is always asking for trouble. Large groups of ethnic Russians are located in the Baltic states and Ukraine, should those territories be ceded back to Russia?

2. the second reason given was that Poland needed an access to the Sea for economic reasons. The problem was that the only seaport in the corridor is Danzig which was over 95% German. The Allies could not justify transferring Danzig to Poland which is why they came up with the idea of a "free city" which was not German or Polish. So Poland did not really have an access to the Sea since goods had to transit via Danzig.

No matter how to look at it, the real reason why the "corridor" was created was to punish and weaken Germany. It is hard to believe anyone thought it was a viable long term solution.

[MH]

Ok so it is well established fact that Germany after ww1 was punished and humiliated for too long which eventually led to WW2.
In some sense maybe it was well understood by western power which is one of the reason why Hitler was allowed to stretch the rope as far as he did till he invaded Poland.
Lets assume that some moves Germany made on international arena before WW2 could be justified yet there is a difference between this and white washing all the dirt and Nazi ideology.
It is nuts.

[Oberon]

I can sympathise with the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, and even the Anschluss of Austria, but beyond that it starts to get much more difficult to justify. Especially after Munich.

[Bilge_Rat]

Originally Posted by MH

Ok so it is well established fact that Germany after ww1 was punished and humiliated for too long which eventually led to WW2.
In some sense maybe it was well understood by western power which is one of the reason why Hitler was allowed to stretch the rope as far as he did till he invaded Poland.
Lets assume that some moves Germany made on international arena before WW2 could be justified yet there is a difference between this and white washing all the dirt and Nazi ideology.
It is nuts.

That is certainly not my goal MH. There is no possible justification for the Holocaust and once the war started, it had to be fought to the finish.

However, if discussing the causes of WW2, you cannot just look at august 1939.

Any politician, even Hitler, does not exist in a vacuum. He came to power by harnessing the nationalist/conservative forces who wanted to overturn the "humiliation" of the Versailles Treaty. If the Treaty had been more fair, the Nazis might never have come power and WW2 might have been avoided. Remember they only polled 2% of the votes in 1928.

[Fahnenbohn]

This is absolutely obvious for me that this :



... was a patent injustice and a constant affront. No country on the earth could have accepted that. And refusing to Germans to solve this problem without giving any reasons is a kind of war declaration : "I would not allow you to cure this injury. If you revolt yourself, I'll beat you."

Hitler renounced the Polish Corridor, this was not an expansionist politic, it was just a border rectification.

So, before going further, you have to explain me : if Hitler really wanted to invade and annexe Poland ...

- why did he make peaceful proposals to Poland since 1937 ? that was not necessary.
- if Poland has accepted these proposals, Germany would have no more pretextes to invade Poland.

Britain/USA were supporting Poland to have no negociations with Germany.
So in fact, this is Britain/USA who legitimated Hitler's offensive, and pushed Germany into the war....

*

[Raptor1]

Originally Posted by Bilge_Rat

1. was that it had a majority Polish population that should be "reunited" with Poland proper.

However, given that the territory had been German for 150 years or over 6 generations, exactly what was a "German" or a "Pole"?. Is a 3rd generation U.S. citizen of latino descent an "american" or a "mexican"?

I believe spoken language is usually used to measure the spread of ethnic groups. It's certainly a problem, but by the same token you could argue that Poland as a state shouldn't even exist because all of it has been part of Germany, Russia and Austria for more than a hundred years.

Originally Posted by Bilge_Rat

The second problem was that the ethnic groups were intermingled:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pomerelia

In almost every county, the "German" population was close to or over 50%. That is why Poland went out of their way to chase the Germans away to make the corridor more "Polish" after it was annexed.

Trying to redraw borders based on supposed "ethnic" lines is always asking for trouble. Large groups of ethnic Russians are located in the Baltic states and Ukraine, should those territories be ceded back to Russia?

That map is of all of West Prussia, not just the area the Polish corridor was located in. Apparently in 1921 the population in the corridor was 81.2% Polish. I don't know the exact numbers of Germans that have left the area in the interval between the establishment of Poland and that date, but from what I understand the area has had a majority Polish population even under the German Empire, despite the latter's attempts to Germanize the area since the late 19th century.

Originally Posted by Bilge_Rat

2. the second reason given was that Poland needed an access to the Sea for economic reasons. The problem was that the only seaport in the corridor is Danzig which was over 95% German. The Allies could not justify transferring Danzig to Poland which is why they came up with the idea of a "free city" which was not German or Polish. So Poland did not really have an access to the Sea since goods had to transit via Danzig.

No matter how to look at it, the real reason why the "corridor" was created was to punish and weaken Germany. It is hard to believe anyone thought it was a viable long term solution.

Poland built a new port in Gdynia after the war to reduce its reliance on Danzig, and it eventually overtook the latter in significance to the Polish economy. This would not have been possible without the Corridor. Given enough time, I think the Danzig could well have been peacefully incorporated back into Germany; I don't believe the Poles ever claimed ownership of it.

As for the real reasons for why it was given to Poland, then I can't argue that weakening Germany was not a factor. The harshness of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles most certainly contributed to the Nazis coming to power, but I really don't see how the Corridor could have justified the German invasion in any way.

[Fahnenbohn]

Originally Posted by Oberon

I can sympathise with the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, and even the Anschluss of Austria, but beyond that it starts to get much more difficult to justify. Especially after Munich.

About Hitler's proposals about the Danzig corridor problem, I see nothing unreasonable. Please tell what could happen if Hitler did "as in Czechoslovakia", as you say ? And would it be even possible ? Poland was not Czechoslovakia (a totally artificial state) ...

[Bilge_Rat]

Originally Posted by Raptor1

That map is of all of West Prussia, not just the area the Polish corridor was located in. Apparently in 1921 the population in the corridor was 81.2% Polish.

In 1910, the Germans represented 43% of the population:

According to Richard Blanke, an American historian of German descent[60][specify], 421,029 Germans were living in the area in 1910, making up 42.5% of the population.[61] Blanke has been criticised by Christian Raitz von Frentz, his book classified by him as part of a series on the subject that have an anti-Polish bias, additionally Blanke's views have been described by Polish professor A. Cienciala as sympathetic to Germany.[62] In addition to the military personnel included in the population census, a number of German civil servants and merchants were introduced to the area, which influenced the population mix, according to Andrzej Chwalba.[59] By 1921 the proportion of Germans had dropped to 18.8% (175,771). Over the next decade, the German population decreased by another 70,000 to a share of 9.6%.[63]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish...raphic_reasons

[Oberon]

Originally Posted by Fahnenbohn

About Hitler's proposals about the Danzig corridor problem, I see nothing unreasonable. Please tell what could happen if Hitler did "as in Czechoslovakia", as you say ? And would it be even possible ? Poland was not Czechoslovakia (a totally artificial state) ...

Hitler betrayed the ideals of the Munich Agreement, up until that point Britain was reluctantly willing to do business with Hitler, to stave off the war that no-one in Western Europe wanted. No-one who had any memory of the First World War and the horrors of the trenches on the western front could have possibly wanted another major war. The public had no stomach for war, and so Chamberlain did not challenge the taking of the Sudetenland, and even forced the Czechoslovakians to accept the terms.
After Czechoslovakia Britain and France came to the decision that trying to make deals with Hitler probably wasn't going to work, and that war was likely.