BATTLE: M-1 Abrams Vs. T-90

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by frinik

I agree with Whukid!Whatever its flaws the US Army is a better trained and equipped army than the Russian one.

One only has to read numerous reports and articles about the situaiton of the Russian army; beatings of recruits, unbelievable amount of theft on a grand scale, corruption( officers keeping the recruits pay for themselves), the high suicide and desertion rate, the shortage of modern housing , prevailing alcoholism and drug use etc.I suspect any decent Western European army could defeat the Russian army in a matter of weeks.

Anyway, even the vaunted Soviet Army was never more than based on raw numbers of equipement and a huge pool of expendable cannon fodder to cush its opponents.the East front in 1941-1945 being one clear example.

technologically the Soviets/Russians were always oen steps behind their opponents in most areas and in every post WWII conflict in which Soviet/Russian equipement has been deployed by one side against the other equipped with Western one (US/European) on the battlefield the side equipped with the former has been defeated or driven back.

Russian equipemnt is cheap( with generous financing offered), very sturdy and simple to operate and ideal for Third World countries with low literacy and technical skills and thats why it's so popular.But the moment a more sophisticated side equipped with British, French or American hardware comes into play the Soviet/Russian equipped side takes a beating.

While the collapse of Communism has allowed Russia and the Ukraine to gain access to Western technology and narrow the technological gap in terms of computerised and high tech weaponry the sorry state of Russian society and economy have not allowed the Russians to effectively catch up with the west.their equipemnt ain't bad! But it's not on par and the rigid Soviet-inherited training doctrine still largely followed by Russian/Ukrainian armies combined with bullying and corruption has turned those armies into paper tigers.

Don't get me wrong; I believe the individual Russian soldier to be courageous, tough and a worthy soldier.it's just the perenially corrupt and brutal training and abusive system and leadership( be it under the Tsar, the Soviets of the Russian Fed).

Countries with money such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states never turn to Russian weapons unless like Iranm they have no other alternatives.They want American or French aircrafts or communication equipement, German tanks or submarines, British choppers or apcs.Poor countries with access to Western credits will buy Western equipement simply because battlefield experience has demonstrated that they are better.

In the cold war, the Russians nbo doubt were aware of their deficits in individual vehicle design, on the other hand tailroed others aspects of such vehicles to fall in line with the general doctrine and from time to time prodcue some unique or classy details in platforms. The Russian pohilosphy in vehicle design must eb seen in combination with the way they planned to fight a war against NATO forces. And these plans were in return the way they are due to their vehicles. High losses and short longevity of tanks in battle were taken into account, and compensated for by wave-doctrine, numbers, and other factors. As a general result, and ignoring that I assume that nuclear weapons would have been used by the Soviets from day one on, I think that a Soviet attack full scale attack would have been driven deep in to German territory and would have been anything but certain to be stopped by NATO before reaching or even crossing the Rhine. In context with this doctrine and planned way to fight, their vehicles were good enough.

After the cold war, the expected next wars and the way they would be fought, changed, to asymmetrical confölicts, or conflicts of limited, regional, local range. The focus shifts from huge ground formations of armour, to smaller units fighting more "indioviodually" against each other. Soviet armour, by its heritage from the cold war, is much less prepared for this kind of battles, than Western counterparts. Their developements needed and still need to close a much wider gap between "then" and "now". Wetsern armies tried from earlier a transition into the new era after the cold war. The Russians started late, and now lagg behind both in doctrine and technological design of heavy and light armour.

At least so it seems to that novice that I am.

The big Soviet archilles heel of their cold land war turning into a hot one, would have been logistics and maybe also comms, imo.

[frinik]

I personally think the Achilles heel of the Soviets was their doctrine based on massed attacks - putting their faith in the steamroller tactics - and rigid command structure refusing to give or yield any autonomy to their comanders on the ground.This has been standard Russian-Soviet doctrine since at least the XVIIIth century.The Germans - until they were harmstrung by Hitler's paranoia and ground down by fighting on 3 fronts - were able to defeat superior Soviet armoured and infantry attacks through a flexible approach giving their officers on the ground the autonomy to act based on actual battlefield conditions.That's how the Germans inflicted 14 million casualties( and 23 million wounded) on the Soviets while taking only 3.5 million killed and 5 million wounded.

[Skybird]

The "three wave doctrine" and the use of large, automatically rolling formations is the result of

- massive mistrust into subordinate ranks (loyalty in the face of lethal orders, competence) and the belief that micromanaging at the top level is the way to go;

- cheap equipement that lacked quality but could easily beproduced in huge quantity;

- WWII where the maximum concentration of firepower from arty and tanks proved to be the only way to defeat tactically superior German forces;

- lack of communciation capacity to coordinate more complex force setups that act individually in smaller subunits. If you cannot give all those orders needed for more agility due to lacking capacity to communicate, make more units (or larger formations) listen to the same set of order.

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

Don't forget the WWII experience, which suggests that casualty rate is a function of speed of advance.

The West computes fights tactically and lets them build up to operational. The Soviets COMPUTE from the operational and subordinates the tactical to the operational.

The straight assault lines versus Western "flexible" overwatch tactics is an example of what is desirable tactically from what is favorable operationally. If the command and control problems can be surmounted (when they practiced their style of attacks at the NTC, not a few American formations broke down), overwatch tactics tactically suffer fewer losses. However, they also take more time, so in an operational point of view, you are:
1) Killing your traffic control system
2) The enemy has more time to bomb your rear columns (a Soviet experience much more than a Western or even German one)
3) The enemy has more time to prepare Line 2, then Line 3 (this is a experience shared by the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans, but they came away from it with different conclusions)

So the Soviets hope to bleed heavily breaking Line 1 (let's say it is "Fully" prepared) at the fastest possible speed, then introducing a fresh formation to hit Line 2 when it is only Hastily Prepared, and a 2nd fresh formation to hit Line 3 in Meeting Engagement.

The West tries and finds the best way to break Line 1, and then bashes their head at Line 2 and Line 3.

Given the Soviet's visualized main scenario, their operational art and tactics make sense. The problem is what happens when their whole array cannot be deployed? Such as in guerilla warfare. That, along with a long lack of financing to train their troops in any tactics, is why the Soviets have greater trouble than the West adjusting in modern warfare.

[frinik]

One important factor too; most Western armies are professional armies; tehn French, the British, the Americans, the Canadians and even the Bundeswehr - after much debate - joined them after Germany decided to do away with conscription.The Russian army until recently was made up of recruits with little battle experience and training besides basic training and formation drilling.The Russians want to reform their army and turn it into a much smaller but professional type army.

Professional armies made up of volunteers who agree to join for 3 to 5 years are able to give their soldier better training and, one assumes, motivation to fight.The smaller size inherent to professional armies also allows the government to allocate funds to purchase the best and most modern equipement.