A rigid counterinsurgency doctrine obscures Iraq’s realities

[Skybird]

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/11/3155836

This has started to be discussed at the Steal Beasts forum, and I found this article very worthy to be thought about. the author is a Ltn.Col. who actually has had first hand experience in Iraq and Baghdad. After the recent success, or what appears to be that, of operation "Surge", the author holds some critical scepticism of exactly this operation's theoretical background, and the importance of Gen. Patreus's "dogma".

So the influence of this narrative over the past four years has placed the Army in a box, defined by a simple syllogism: History, reduced into lessons learned, has shown the way to do counterinsurgencies right; the Army, up to and including 2006, has not followed the rule. However, it is now following the rule with the “troop surge” and victory will, therefore, come in time if there is support from the American people. Yet this perceived “right” way may be the wrong way, based on conditions on the ground that involve Iraqi politics and culture, American policy, troop strength, and tactical vulnerability.

Recommended reading.

Credit for finding it goes to Norfolk (SBP-forum).