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09-28-19, 02:31 AM | #1 |
Loader
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Historical question- US sub commanders relieved during WWII
I have read in several different places about a lot of US sub commanders being relieved in the early days of WWII. Relieved for nonaggression, passivity, and so on. The commander of the Wahoo, prior to Morton, for example. And some sources say that about 1 in 3 commanders were relieved during this time.
I also read a post on these forums where someone said they were sent to empty target areas, could find nothing to shoot at, then were relieved because they didn't sink anything. Then, they were replaced by another guy who was sent to another empty target area, and was probably relieved when he came back. What is the real story here? I'm aware that the conventional US doctrine/thinking on submarine employment prior to WWII was not great (used as scouts/screening force for Big Gun task forces, attack only using sonar from 100' depth, etc.) But were there really so many bad US submarine commanders in those early days? |
09-28-19, 03:00 AM | #2 |
Engineer
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Being unsuccessful as a submarine commander doesn't necessarily reflect the skills of the commander, all though it might. Being sent to a patrol area with no targets makes it hard, even for the best, to ramp up impressive tonnage. Additionally the torpedo crisis made sure even good commanders in target rich patrol areas returned with poor results. For the first two years the US submarine force was fighting with its hands tied behind its back, thanks to laziness, arrogance and corruption ashore.
All successful military action relies on intelligence. Commanders failing in the field might also have had to do with a lack of intelligence on where to find the enemy early in the war. To assess whether a commander was simply too cautious I believe only reading the patrol logs can give us hints today, 70 years or more after the war. I'm no sub commander so for me it'd be difficult to assess. The patrol logs of virtually every US submarine from WW2 are freely accessible on the internet. They are extremely interesting. For example most S-Boat commanders were fighting their own equipment more than the enemy. Engines burning out, not starting, bearings running dry, radio, navigational equipment and targeting aids failing, etc, etc. Things started to get better when the real cowards and failures in the armament sector and weapons engineering/testing/production got relieved. |
09-28-19, 07:18 AM | #3 |
Sea Lord
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The Pacific Theater was vast and target-poor compared to the Atlantic. Hunting skills, as distinct from attack tactics, were relatively more important. The successful skippers were aggressive in finding targets in their assigned area. Dick O'Kane said it: " It's a big ocean. You don't have to find the enemy if you don't want to."
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09-28-19, 09:15 AM | #4 |
Chief
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An empty target area can be corroborated with other officers or other vessels.
I have never seen a report or read a story about a target area that was confirmed not empty and a skipper not attempting to sink something. I cant confirm it did or did not happen. I bought a bunch of wwii sub books, maybe one of them will mention this when I get to them. That said, I have seen reports and read stories about skippers being relieved by higher ups with the excuse that they felt they were not aggressive enough. The thought process was, the older naval experienced skippers that initially got the jobs were to act on the conservative side in a different role, more about scouting and cleanup than wolves, prior to Dec 7th. Problem was, Post Dec 7th, the submarine fleet was the only offensive weapon ready and waiting for orders to retaliate They were untouched during the two raids on Pearl while they were all birthed up against the fuel depots. Yeah go figure. Neat Factoid: the first confirmed kill for our side after Dec 7th, was on Dec 7th, and it was the AA guns of a US Sub at pearl returning fire that did it. Although I cant remember which one though, but I am sure you can find it online. In any case, COMSUBPAC felt that some of the captains were not aggressive enough and were replaced with considerably younger captains gung-ho to take the fight to the enemy. The stories about the dud torbedos, yep all true, and patrols that had significant duds that came back were "explained" away by command as having too passive a captain instead of the real problem, crap armament that risked the sub and crew. There are Japanese reports of their ships steaming into ports with whole torpedos sticking out of their hull. Then there was the initial training of our submarines crew which focused on attacking from underwater with no periscope, only sonar. While possible, the odds of a miss are significant, plus there is no confirmation even if you do hear a blast of the sinking. That rule was due to incompetence by command during the training drills stateside which stipulated, if the watching crew discovered your periscope, it was considered an immediately failed mission resulting in possibly replacement of the officers being trained. One of the first changes of an aggressive captain on a sub, was to throw away all the rules and do what was necessary to sink ships, which included developing new techniques of attack. While initially unappreciative, comsubpac had no choice but to submit to allowing the captains such control. The results could not be debated or argued against. It was in 1943 that one of the new captains (I think he was new) did research with full documentation and film on the Mark 14 to show the Bureau of Ordinance in DC their screwup. Things changed after that. Interesting, I cant find any stories of what happened to the the staff at the bureau after it was revealed that the first two years of the war our submarines had unfit torpedos and potentially all those removed captains may not have deserved to be removed all due to the incompetence and unwillingness of the bureaus staff to listen to and accept the reports of the captains of the first two years. No its not the fish, its guy fishing. What I have noticed and correlated is that several of the new model torpedos after the Mark 14 were developed either in tandem or exclusively by private U.S. firms. Read into that what you want. Last edited by skirich; 09-28-19 at 10:34 AM. |
09-28-19, 11:43 AM | #5 |
Sea Lord
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Do you have accounts of multiple US submarines being assigned to the same patrol area? I thought this was not done early in the war, because of the threat from Japanese subs. Any sub encountered in the patrol area could be presumed hostile. If you have accounts to the contrary, I'd be interested in reading them.
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09-28-19, 12:58 PM | #6 |
Chief
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October 1, 1943 was the first Coordinated Attack Group aka Wolfpack, out from Midway. Captain Momsen devised the strategy.
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09-28-19, 01:01 PM | #7 | ||||
Gefallen Engel U-666
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"Only two things are infinite; The Universe and human squirrelyness; and I'm not too sure about the Universe" Last edited by Aktungbby; 09-28-19 at 01:25 PM. |
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