Quote:
Originally Posted by Onkel Neal
Why not? What's going to happen?
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The concern is that US seeks a capability to enact a first strike using conventional fast weapons (such as hypersonics from forward deployed subs) and then catch the rest using the strategic BMD. SM-3 blk IIa is important here, as it both provides a second layer of strategic BMD to CONUS and expands the number of launchers by an order of magnitude or two, depending on the scale of the interceptor production.
This concern not only drives the development of Russian technological hedges (Burevestnik, Poseidon/Status-6 in strategic mission) or the Russian LoW stance (with declaratory doctrine that we would launch on warning of such hypersonic attack in progress) but also the Chineese modernisation/build up (MIRVing their force).
Moreover the SM-3 test itself would reinforce the position of critics of the New Start Treaty in Russia, as back in the day we decided to negotiate our concerns in a separate treaty, which never happened.
Now for the NST follow up it would be even harder to negotiate a treaty that does not include BMD and the new conventional first strike weapons.
Thus, overall, it would appear to be detrimental to strategic stability in general and US security specifically.